{"kind":"task","effective_mode":"full","benchmark":{"kind":"benchmark","effective_mode":"full","slug":"longbench-v2","formal_name":"LongBench v2","introduction":"LongBench v2 evaluates deep understanding and reasoning over long contexts through multiple-choice questions. Its official description lists 503 questions spanning tasks such as single-document and multi-document QA and code-repository understanding.","introduction_ja":"","introduction_en":"","category":"Category not supplied","task_count":null,"acquisition_status":"Acquisition status not supplied","official_url":"https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2","indexing_mode":"noindex","profile":{"resources":[],"task_format":"","scoring":"","metric":"","size":"","answer_access":"","license":"","citation":"","maintainer":"","released":"","why_hard":"","related":[]}},"task_id":"0d64d287-5193-53db-9b47-6647ab7fc2d1","task_key":"train--66ed910a821e116aacb2033b","task_revision_id":"1","upstream_id":"66ed910a821e116aacb2033b","short_description":"Which following option is wrong, according to the topic \"disaster \" in the text?","config":"","split":"train","body":"{\"choice_A\":\"ILC Draft of the protection of Persons in the Event of Disaster (2016) is based on a common sense of the definition \\\"disaster\\\".\",\"choice_B\":\"International Disaster response/relief law (IDRL) established rights and obligations in the aftermath of disasters\",\"choice_C\":\"Disasters are considered not \\\"natural\\\", but still can and should be regulated. Affected state, UN, governments, NGOs, and the global community have to work together, even if we'll take years to complete the draft.\",\"choice_D\":\"This could happen: In the aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake, local and international aid organizations swiftly mobilize to provide emergency relief to the devastated region. During this critical response period, it is imperative that all efforts are directed not only towards saving lives and delivering essential supplies but also towards upholding the human rights of the affected population.ensuring access to clean water, food, shelter, and medical care, as well as safeguarding their rights to security and dignity.\",\"context\":\"Introduction \\n \\nAs the purpose of this volume is to address the legal challenges posed to the protection of human \\nrights by events loosely qualified as ‘disasters’, a preliminary question to be explored is the iden-\\ntification of the term’s legal contours under international law. However, as emphasised by the \\nInternational Law Commission (ILC) Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, within the \\nframework of activities related to the Draft Articles on the protection of persons in the event \\nof disasters (ILC Draft Articles): \\n1 ‘[t]here is no generally accepted legal definition of the term in \\ninternational law’. \\n2 Indeed, it would be challenging to pinpoint a single instrument of interna-\\ntional law capable of providing the authoritative and guiding legal parameter for this term. In \\nthis regard we are experiencing similar challenges to other areas of law in which standardised \\ndefinitions are lacking and significant interpretative efforts are consequently required to navigate \\namong different instruments towards the identification of common criteria. \\n3 The relevance of \\nthis interpretative exercise should not be underestimated, as  \\n \\n[s]uch a definition will help identify the situations in which protection may or shall be \\ninvoked, as well as the circumstances under which protection will no longer be neces-\\nsary. Describing the contours of ‘disaster’ will also help identify the persons in need of \\nprotection and thus ascertain who is entitled to protection. \\n4 \\n \\nHence, with the aim of providing a pertinent terminological framework for this volume, in the \\nsubsequent paragraphs, we will explore the taxonomy \\n5 of disasters and seek to better identify the \\nlegal contours and implications of this notion. \\n \\nA first brief reference will be made to the terminology issues addressed by disaster studies, in \\nwhich specific emphasis is placed on the social and sociological dimensions of events that might \\nrepresent a disaster, our aim being to verify to what extent such references could be translated \\ninto legal paradigms or capable of influencing them. Subsequently we will focus our attention \\non the international legal dimension of this term, conducting a critical assessment of the main \\napproaches in this area as identifiable in relevant practice. In particular, the law-making tech-\\nniques adopted in treaties and soft-law documents could be grouped according to two diverging \\nperspectives: (a) international instruments avoiding the terminology challenge, hence addressing \\n \\n2 \\n \\nA TAXONOMY OF DISASTERS \\nIN INTERNATIONAL LAW \\n \\nGiulio Bartolini \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n11\\nrelevant legal issues arising in the event of disaster without trying to define this term or, con-\\nversely, (b) documents illustrating the distinctive features events should possess in order to be \\nqualified as a disaster. This second approach can be traced back to one of the earliest definitions \\nof disaster in international law, namely that provided in the Convention establishing the Inter-\\nnational Relief Union in 1927 (IRU Convention). In this latter context attention will be paid \\nto current and recurring key issues in the terminology dilemma, thus permitting us to identify \\ntrends and converging elements. This analysis will also take advantage of the definitions of disas-\\nter included in the most recent and relevant documents in this area, namely the abovementioned \\nILC Draft Articles and the Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group \\non indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction, elaborated to measure global \\nprogress in the implementation of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai \\nFramework), as endorsed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in February 2017 \\n(Report on DRR terminology). \\n6 Finally, some concluding remarks will build upon this analysis \\nin order to highlight the potential relevance of these terminology issues to the protection of \\nindividuals under human rights law. \\n \\nA brief foray into the terminological challenges \\npertaining to disaster studies \\n \\nAlthough our focus will be on the international law dimension of the term ‘disaster’, we should \\nemphasise that the ‘definitional minefield’ \\n7 related to the notion of disaster is a contentious \\nissue in disaster studies too. As recently recognised, indeed, ‘the existing taxonomies of disaster \\nmatter . . . [as they] . . . might have far-reaching consequences for disaster policy’. \\n8 Over the \\nlast few decades \\n9 (and in advance compared to the terminology debate among international law \\nscholars) \\n10 a vast array of writings have been produced with the primary aim of revising the tra-\\nditional narrative according to which such events were ‘an exteriority where God or Nature was \\nto blame for the destruction caused by disasters’. \\n11 The position that ‘there is no such thing as a \\nnatural disaster’ \\n12 is a current leitmotiv of disaster studies scholars and might now be considered \\nas the starting point for our terminological analysis in this area. \\n \\nThis emphasis permits us to underline that it is ‘hard to identify catastrophic events which \\nresult purely from “natural” causes’, \\n13 as \\n‘the human contribution to disasters must be understood \\nand recognized’. \\n14 Based on such assumptions, disaster studies tend to emphasise that ‘[a] disaster \\nevent is the intersection of the physical and social environments’, \\n15 and may conclude that ‘[i]t is \\nalso now well established that disaster risk and eventual disaster are social constructs based on the \\npresence of potentially damaging physical events but seriously and dominantly conditioned by \\nsociety’s perceptions, needs, demands, decisions and practices’. \\n16 From this viewpoint, therefore, \\ndisasters appear to be the consequences of hazards or hazardous events \\n17 whose final adverse \\neffects on the inventory of elements present in the affected area are primarily determined by the \\ncombination of the abovementioned event(s) with human, environmental, social and structural \\nvulnerabilities, as well as the capacity of affected communities to be resilient and cope with them. \\nIn brief, the consequences of a hazard ‘are at least as much a function of where and how we live \\nas a function’ \\n18 of the hazard itself. Such positions have also been expressed through various \\nhypotheses of equations seeking to capture the distinguishing elements of disaster risk and hence \\npredict the possibility of adverse effects caused by a hazard. For instance, according to some, \\nDisaster Risk R\\nCapacity C\\n( ) =\\n( ) ×\\n( )\\nVulnerability V\\nHazard H\\n( )\\n \\n19\\n \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n12\\n \\nor \\nDisaster Risk R\\n( ) =\\n( )×\\n( ) ×\\nHazard H\\nExposure E\\nVulnerability V\\n( )\\n( )\\nCopingCapacity C\\n \\n20\\n \\n \\nSuch nuanced elements focus in particular on the social and sociological implications of such \\nevents, as emphasised by scholars who have emblematically and succinctly qualified disasters as \\n‘social events in social time’. \\n21 However, the translation of such elements into legal terminology \\nremains complex. First, it should be recognised that even within disaster studies the possibility of \\nidentifying a common terminology is far from being accepted, as recognised by leading treaties \\nin this area. \\n22 The never-ending nature of the process of refining this term has been captured \\nby Kroll-Smith and Gunter, according to whom ‘the more we know about specific disasters, the \\nmore definitions of disaster are registered in the literature’. \\n23 Second, even if it were accepted \\nthat the abovementioned ‘shift in focus has obvious implications for law in general and human \\nrights in particular’, \\n24 it must also be recognised that international law practice dealing with the \\nterminology issue appears to have evolved primarily according to its own trend and regardless \\nof the concomitant debate in disaster studies, as can be revealed through an assessment of such \\npractice. \\n \\nAs a result, even if current international legal terminology could be criticised as not being fully \\ncapable of fully reflecting the social implications of disasters and the need to address the causes \\nunderlying such events, it still represents the primary point of reference for the identification of \\na workable definition of disaster in this branch of law. For this same reason we will engage in the \\nfollowing paragraph in an empirical assessment of current definitions of disaster as provided by \\ninternational law instruments, so as to grasp their main elements of reference. However, a plea \\ncould be made for a more osmotic approach among areas of research regarding disaster scenarios, \\nas some elements of the current terminological reflections pertaining to disaster studies might also \\nhelp to provide a broad theoretical picture and better address the same issue under a legal lens, \\nfor example regarding the thorny issue of separating natural or man-made disasters in relevant \\nlegal definitions. \\n \\nThe defi\\n nition of ‘disaster’ in international law practice \\n \\nAs mentioned above, the terminology issue can also be addressed from the perspective of inter-\\nnational law, according to solutions endorsed in treaties or soft-law documents. In this context \\nthe primary references for terminological analysis are provided by instruments pertaining to the \\nemerging body of law qualified as international disaster law. \\n25 Although its legal contours are \\nstill under debate, this term can be said to include rules and policies aiming to comprehensively \\naddress the legal and operational issues pertaining to the cycles of a disaster – commonly dis-\\ntinguished into the phases of mitigation, preparedness, relief and recovery – \\n26 hence adopting a \\nholistic approach towards the main legal, institutional and policy challenges raised by disasters in \\nits temporal phases. \\n27 \\n \\nOf particular relevance to our analysis are instruments in which, thanks to their specific focus, \\nthe large majority of general legal definitions of disaster can be found, as we shall explore later. \\nFor the purpose of our analysis, within the ‘rather scattered and heterogeneous collection of \\ninstruments’ \\n28 pertaining to this area of law, other instruments not addressing the terminology \\nissue or having a limited scope of application and thus not contributing to the identification of \\ncommon trends in this context are of little relevance. \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n13\\n \\nIn this latter regard, in fact, it could be underlined that the triggering mechanisms of several \\ntreaties and other documents have been tailored to their specific scope of application  \\nratione \\nmateriae \\n, and consequently a general definition of disaster is lacking in such instruments. These \\ntexts do not dwell on an abstract definition of the term but interpret it as a specific kind of \\nevent that warrants assistance activities in and of itself. Reference could be made, for instance, to \\nthe term ‘disease’ \\n29 included in the WHO International Health Regulations, ‘oil pollution inci-\\ndent’ \\n30 provided by the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response \\nand Co-Operation, or ‘nuclear accident or radiological emergency’ in the 1986 Convention \\non Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. \\n31 Even if related \\nevents might eventually lead to a situation of disaster according to the potential general definition \\nemerging in international law, the limited scope of application of these instruments has an impact \\non the possible use of their constitutive elements to identify criteria for the more comprehensive \\nterm of art. Similarly, reference could be made to treaties pertaining to different subject matters \\nbut including specific provisions whose application is triggered by the occurrence of a ‘disaster’. \\nHowever, such documents do not provide autonomous definitions of the term, probably under \\nthe assumption that it is self-evident, or not wishing to embark on a lengthy law-making process \\nin relation to definitions of less relevance for their purpose. An example of this latter trend may \\nbe provided by universal treaties regulating customs, such as Article 1(B) of Annex B.9 to the \\n1990 Istanbul Convention, intended to facilitate the temporary admission of relief consignments \\n‘to those affected by natural disasters and similar catastrophes’, or other treaty clauses making \\nreference to ‘natural disasters’ \\n32 or ‘disasters or natural calamities’ \\n33 for their application, without \\nhowever detailing such terms. \\n \\nConsequently, for the purposes of this contribution, specific attention will be paid to inter-\\nnational instruments that expressly include a general definition of disasters, so as to verify recent \\nevaluations according to which ‘[a] closer examination of the content of several conventions \\nmakes it possible to argue that the definitions of the term “disaster”, where provided in the \\ntreaties, are almost identical or at least do not differ in any significant manner’. \\n34 In this regard, \\nlooking at the genealogy of the legal definition of disaster, the first example may be provided by \\none of the earliest instruments in this area, namely Article 2(1) IRU Convention. According to \\nthis provision, the purpose of the organisation was \\n \\n[i]n the event of any disaster due to  \\nforce majeure \\n, the exceptional gravity of which \\nexceeds the limits of the powers and resources of the stricken people, to furnish to \\nthe suffering population first aid and to assemble for this purpose funds, resources and \\nassistance of all kinds. \\n35 \\n \\nHence this first general definition of disaster in international law does appear to focus on certain \\nkey elements in the debate. \\n \\nFirst, the ‘[ \\nf \\n] \\norce majeure \\n’s more restrictive “Acts of God” emphasis’ \\n36 provided by the IRU \\nConvention apparently points to the unavoidable and unexpected character of disasters, a trend \\nbeing reversed by the current mainstream in disaster studies. Second, for an event to be quali-\\nfied as a disaster for the IRU’s purposes it should be able to overwhelm the capacity of affected \\ncommunities and States. This element is easily associated with the very  \\nraison d’être \\n of the IRU, \\nintended ‘to co-ordinate as occasion offers the efforts made by relief organisations . . . and to \\ninduce all peoples to render mutual international assistance’. \\n37 This emphasis on the involvement \\nof international assistance in tackling a calamitous event may be particularly significant for the \\napplication of treaties devoted to this area of cooperation, although it can hardly be prescribed as a \\nrequirement for the definition of a disaster, as emphasised by subsequent practice. Finally, it could \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n14\\nalso be argued that the IRU substantially considered the notion to be self-explanatory, taking into \\naccount that the treaty provides only basic indications on the characteristics events should have in \\norder to be qualified as a disaster. While this early definition suffers somewhat the lapse of time \\nsince its original drafting, it is nonetheless significant as already able to highlight the difficulties \\nand certain trends in the elaboration of a legal qualification of disaster. \\n \\nSubsequent attempts at dealing with this definition in relevant international instruments have \\nfollowed two diverging methodologies, namely: (a) avoidance of the terminology issue, thus \\naddressing relevant problems without providing a definition of the term, or (b) a descriptive \\napproach, aiming to illustrate the distinctive features events should present in order to be qualified \\nas a disaster. \\n \\nThe first trend can be considered a minority one. Only in a few instances do treaties specifi-\\ncally addressing the disaster cycle provide no legal qualification of this term in the text. In this \\nregard mention could be made of the 1991 Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster \\nAssistance \\n38 and certain bilateral treaties developed in the 1970s and 1980s. \\n39 It is not unusual \\nin law-making processes to omit a detailed definition of key terms, with the implicit aim of \\nmaintaining some flexibility and preventing States from relying on a literal interpretation of the \\nproposed criteria to escape from the application of relevant treaties. Examples are provided by the \\nnotions of ‘armed conflict’ in international humanitarian law or ‘outstanding universal value’ \\n40 \\nin the 1972 World Heritage Convention. However, in the area of disaster law such a trend may \\nbe due to an opposing rationale. In particular, the fact that the application of such treaties of \\nassistance depends primarily on the concrete willingness of States involved to act in a spirit of \\ncooperation and solidarity has reduced the need to set stringent requirements regarding the \\nexact definition of the treaty’s  \\nratione materiae \\n scope of application. This element is particularly \\nemphasised by the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance where, although \\na reference to disaster situations is made in the Preamble, its Article 1 devoted to ‘[a]pplicability’ \\nsimply states that ‘[t]his Convention shall apply whenever a state party furnishes assistance in \\nresponse to a request from another state party, except as they otherwise agree’. \\n \\nWhile this radical approach has not been replicated in many contexts, significant room for \\nflexibility has also been provided in treaties that do provide a definition of disaster. In some cases, \\nfor instance, even if the relevant document includes criteria to qualify certain events as a disaster, \\nthe definition includes clauses intended to potentially enlarge its scope of application according \\nto the interests of parties involved. Reference could be made, for instance, to the 1997 Agreement \\nbetween Argentina and Chile on cooperation in case of disasters, whose Article 1, apart from \\ndescribing the characteristics events should have to be qualified as a disaster, also provides that \\n‘“[d]isaster” shall mean any event so described by the Party requiring assistance’. \\n41 \\n \\nHowever, as mentioned above, the large majority of international instruments addressing dis-\\nasters usually include a definition of this term through certain descriptive elements and general \\ncriteria. As a result, ‘even if “disaster” is not a term of art and, as such, lacks one single accepted \\ndefinition’, \\n42 especially since the 1970s and 1980s an increasing body of practice has built up \\nin this regard. Such practice comprises certain common elements and qualifiers, permitting the \\ndelineation of current converging trends in this area in light of recurring  \\ntopos and cross-fertilisations. \\nHence, before looking at the recurring issues in practice over the last decades, it may be helpful to \\ndraw attention to the definitions of disaster included in the most recent and relevant documents \\nin this area, namely the ILC Draft Articles and the Report on DRR terminology, which already \\nemphasise current elements in the debate and highlight the shift that practice in this area has \\nundergone since the early definition was provided in the 1927 IRU Convention. \\n \\nAccording to Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles, ‘“disaster” means a calamitous event \\nor series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n15\\ndisplacement, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the \\nfunctioning of society’. \\n43 Similarly, for the Report on DRR terminology, which has led the UN \\nOffice for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to update its definition, \\n44 a disaster is \\n \\n[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due \\nto hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, \\nleading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental \\nlosses and impacts.  \\n \\nThese texts capture current trends and key converging elements in relation to terminology but \\nnonetheless present some differences, for instance the emphasis in the Report on DRR terminol-\\nogy on elements such as pre-existing vulnerabilities and exposures, thus addressing aspects present \\nin disaster studies but not international law practice. Such definitions obviously do not come out \\nof the blue but are expressions of the significant practice developed over the last decades, permit-\\nting identification of the main and recurring complexities related to the terminology issue, as will \\nbe explored subsequently. In particular, the current definitions of disaster pivot on two main axes, \\nupon which we can place the most frequently recurring features emphasised by practice, namely: \\nthe origin of disasters and the effects of such calamitous events. A series of sub-questions could \\nalso be formulated in relation to these features. \\n \\nOrigin of disasters \\n \\nFirst, practice tends to categorise disasters according to their origins and causal elements, thus \\nreplicating in the normative arena the basic dilemma faced by disaster studies. As underlined \\nabove, disaster studies consider it almost impossible to make clear distinctions regarding the nature \\nof disasters, namely to focus only on natural disasters as compared to those of man-made origin. \\nIn fact, disasters often result from a complex web of factors in which no single sufficient cause \\ncan be identified, especially once natural phenomena merge with human agency in the birth and \\nexpansion of calamitous events. \\n \\nDespite this basic assumption, in some limited cases treaties have expressly restricted their \\nscope of application to natural disasters, as mainly exemplified by Article 1.3 of the 2011 \\nSouth Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural \\nDisasters (SAARC Agreement). \\n45 Conversely, the very large majority of relevant instruments \\ndoes not include a qualifier in this regard \\n46 (probably on the assumption that an explicit ref-\\nerence to causation may be unnecessary) or clearly affirm, through similar expressions, \\n47 that \\na disaster might be caused by exposure to ‘the operation of the forces of nature or to human \\nintervention’. \\n48 This approach is also confirmed by the Commentary to Draft Article 3(A) \\nof the 2016 ILC Draft Articles, which emphasises that ‘[n]o limitation is included concerning \\nthe origin of the event, that is whether it is natural or human-made, in recognition of the \\nfact that disasters often arise from complex sets of causes that may include both wholly nat-\\nural elements and contributions from human activities’, \\n49 according to the position already \\nendorsed by the Special Rapporteur. \\n50 In a similar manner this approach can be inferred from \\nthe reference to ‘hazardous events’ included in the definition of disaster of the Report on DRR \\nTerminology, as it makes explicit reference to this additional term of art. In fact, according \\nto the Report, ‘[h]azards may be natural, anthropogenic or socio-natural in origin. Natural \\nhazards are predominantly associated with natural processes and phenomena. Anthropogenic \\nhazards, or human-induced hazards, are induced entirely or predominantly by human activities \\nand choices’. \\n51 \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n16\\n \\nThe first element of this qualification also calls for the analysis of certain related issues. In \\nparticular, ‘disasters of human-made origin’ may apply to several scenarios, as exemplified by \\nscholars seeking to include within this term ‘financial,’ ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ events (including \\narmed conflicts). \\n52 However, from our perspective, such a very broad interpretation risks com-\\npletely undermining a potentially autonomous notion of disaster in international law and does \\nnot appear to be supported by international practice. \\n \\nIn particular, several instruments specify that armed conflict does not fit within the legal defi-\\nnition of disaster. \\n53 This approach has been expressly endorsed by treaties \\n54 and other relevant \\ndocuments in this area. An early example is already included in the UN 1984 Draft Conven-\\ntion on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance \\n55 and subsequently reiterated by the \\nInternational Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in their Guidelines for \\nthe Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery \\nAssistance (IDRL Guidelines). \\n56 Even the ILC has confirmed that ‘[a] situation of armed conflict \\ncannot be qualified  \\nper se \\n as a disaster’. \\n57 Said approach is also shared by the Report on DRR \\nterminology, which maintains, in relation to anthropogenic hazards, that ‘[t]his term does not \\ninclude the occurrence or risk of armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or ten-\\nsion which are subject to international humanitarian law and national legislation’. \\n58 Such express \\nlimitations are especially relevant in identifying the contours of an autonomous definition of \\ndisaster, as armed conflicts could otherwise easily fulfill any proposed criteria due to their signif-\\nicant impact and negative consequences. The reasons behind this latter approach can clearly be \\njustified by the desire to make a clear distinction from a branch of international law, namely the \\nlaw of armed conflicts, that is already extensively regulated at the universal level according to its \\nown rationale. Moreover, it reflects the recognition of ‘important differences between the context \\nof conflict and peacetime disaster’, \\n59 according to a solution also endorsed by disaster studies. \\n60 \\n \\nIn a similar vein, with the aim of avoiding definitions which are too broad, the Commentary \\nto Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles maintains that the term ‘disaster’ does not include \\n‘other serious events, such as political and economic crises, which may also undermine the func-\\ntioning of society, but which are outside the scope of the draft articles’. \\n61 Nonetheless, it could \\nalso be pointed out that, in certain circumstances, the relatively flexible approach adopted in some \\ndefinitions has ultimately implied that mechanisms originally envisaged to deal with common \\nscenarios related to disaster situations have effectively been used to address other public emer-\\ngencies. In this regard the primary example is provided by the activation of the European Union \\n(EU) Civil Protection Mechanism to deal with the recent migrant crisis and the phenomenon of \\ninternally displaced persons present in non-EU States in relation to scenarios of armed conflict. \\nSuch extensive use of the Mechanism has however met with criticism in the doctrine focusing \\non the ad hoc nature of this solution, which has responded mainly to internal EU policies rather \\nthan to the scope of the Civil Protection Mechanism itself. \\n62 \\n \\nEffects of disasters \\n \\nSecond, definitions of disasters usually include references to the effects calamitous events should \\nhave in order to be qualified as such. In particular, reference is made to events capable of affecting \\nthree broad categories usually expressly specified in current practice, namely: people, \\n63 property \\n64 \\nand the environment. \\n65 In a very limited number of instruments express reference is also made to \\n‘cultural heritage’ \\n66 as a distinctive element potentially suffering from the effects of disasters, with \\nthe clear intention of emphasising the relevance of cultural assets, their intangible relationship to \\nhuman beings and the need to preserve them for future generations from the effects of disasters. \\n67 \\nHence events may well trigger a series of consequences, recently included through several broad \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n17\\nexamples in the ILC definition, such as loss of life, human suffering and distress, mass displace-\\nment, or material or environmental damage. This text has systematised similar terminology used \\nin international practice, where reference is made, for instance, to prejudices to the ‘health’ \\n68 of \\nhumans and ‘animals’, \\n69 ‘material damage’, \\n70 ‘economic losses’, \\n71 ‘human . . . losses’, \\n72 ‘environ-\\nmental losses’, \\n73 ‘social . . . damage’, \\n74 etc. \\n \\nSuch emphasis on different kinds of effects seeks to comprehensively underline the many \\nsignificant impacts disasters might have on affected communities, not being limited to direct prej-\\nudices against human life but covering the entire ‘disaster impact’. \\n75 For instance, the emphasis \\non environmental damage – an element that has more recently been routinely included in the \\ndefinitions of disaster – should be welcomed as a recognition, also in this area, that ‘the environ-\\nment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health \\nof human beings, including generations unborn’ according to the position maintained by the \\nInternational Court of Justice. \\n76 \\n \\nIn order to avoid over-restrictive definitions, it should be emphasised that relevant provisions \\nconsider such criteria as being alternative ones. Therefore it is not necessary to ascertain the \\noccurrence of all the abovementioned effects together, as the existence of one of them is suffi-\\ncient to fulfill the criterion. Similarly, it can also be emphasised that a transboundary nature of \\ndisasters is not considered necessary in this practice. Therefore even if the events in question are \\nof a solely domestic nature they can still be relevant for the definition of a disaster, as reiterated \\nby the Commentary to Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles. \\n77 \\n \\nAs emphasised above, for a hazard to result in a disaster implies its capacity to impact people, \\nproperty or the environment. However, in order to avoid classifying any sort of event as a disaster, \\ninternational practice routinely employs certain qualifications so that only significant matters \\nare contemplated: for instance, effects of hazards must be ‘severe’, \\n78 ‘widespread’, \\n79 ‘significant’ \\n80 \\nor ‘serious’. \\n81 Such elements clearly aim to differentiate between the common difficulties that \\ncommunities may experience and a proper international legal definition of disaster. In fact, \\neven if this term should be vested with some flexibility due to its mutable nature, the risk of its \\nover-application or indefinite character is quite evident, as emphasised by some very outdated \\nand isolated practice in this area seeking to deal with not only technological and natural disasters \\nbut also ‘les accidents de la vie quotidienne et de la circulation routière’. \\n82 \\n \\nHowever, it remains complex to effectively establish a threshold for such qualifications and \\neffects of disasters. The difficulties are illustrated, for instance, by Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC \\nDraft Articles, whose reference to events capable of ‘seriously disrupting the functioning of \\nsociety’ has expressly been used to cover ‘only extreme events’ \\n83 and to fix ‘a high threshold’, \\n84 \\nin order to ensure that the occurrence of severe detrimental effects alone, as exemplified in the \\nfirst part of this same definition, \\n85 could not be considered sufficient to fulfill this term. This \\nlatter reasoning is expressly included in the Commentary, where it is specified that ‘the nature of \\nthe event is further qualified by the requirement that any, or all, of the four possible outcomes, \\nas applicable, result in the serious disruption of the functioning of society. In other words, an \\nevent that resulted in, for example, large-scale material damage, but did not seriously disrupt the \\nfunctioning of society, would not, accordingly, satisfy the threshold requirement’. \\n86 However, the \\nCommentary fails to spell out which criteria should be used to ascertain the disruption of a soci-\\nety. Accordingly, some scholars have suggested that this additional element should be deleted in \\norder to avoid establishing too high a threshold, \\n87 or have underlined that the societal disruption \\nelement would not be fit for some types of disasters, such as environmental ones. \\n88 \\n \\nFurthermore, it could be pointed out that the sole reference to ‘society’ in this definition \\ncould potentially be misleading. Even if this term is also present in other instruments, such as the \\nTampere Convention on the Provision of T\\nelecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n18\\nand Relief Operations (Tampere Convention) or the IDRL Guidelines, \\n89 other trends are also \\nidentifiable. In particular, other treaties include an additional reference to the term ‘community’ \\nalong with ‘society’, \\n90 or make reference to more geographically defined notions such as disasters \\nimpacting local communities \\n91 or having a ‘spatially limited’ character, \\n92 for example occurring in \\n‘a definite area’. \\n93 Similarly, several treaties use the terms \\n‘disaster’ or \\n‘accidents’ \\n94 in an interchange-\\nable manner, with the implicit consequence of also addressing events with a more limited impact. \\n \\nPresumably, this latter practice seeks to avoid the potential interpretative difficulties related to \\nthe term ‘society’, a notion not qualified in international instruments and one that might imply \\nthe assessment of the detrimental effects of hazards on a very large scale. The Report on DRR \\nterminology, however, adopts a different solution: here the definition of disaster specifies \\n‘[a] serious \\ndisruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale’ and the related  \\nAnnotations \\nemphasise that this criteria is satisfied when the events ‘test or exceed the capacity of a commu-\\nnity or society to cope using its own resources, and therefore may require assistance from external \\nsources, which could include neighbouring jurisdictions, or those at the national or international \\nlevels’. \\n95 In this latter case, therefore, the disruption of a community or society is primarily linked \\nto the presence of events of any scale that overwhelm the response capacity of the entities affected. \\nThis concept appears in several treaties, presumably with the aim of underlining the shortcomings \\namong the descriptive criteria otherwise used for the identification of a disaster. \\n96 \\n \\nIt is clear that increased harmonisation should be favored in future international practice in \\norder to clarify this element, which is largely motivated by different perspectives behind the \\ntwo instruments: the definition provided by Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles has \\nbeen accompanied by the usual caveat, according to which Draft Article 3 on the ‘use of terms’ \\nhas been provided ‘[f]or the purposes of the present draft articles’. As the purpose of the Draft \\nArticles is primarily to regulate cooperation at the international level between the affected State \\nand external assisting actors, usually driven by large-scale disasters, it does not appear unusual \\nthat the ILC moved toward a definition intended to identify international provisions with a high \\nthreshold in relation to events. Conversely, the Sendai Framework appears to adopt a very com-\\nprehensive approach, being intended to ‘apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent \\nand infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards’. \\n97 From \\nour perspective, and in the light of relevant practice, a broader definition should be favored in \\nthe identification of ‘disaster’ as a legal term of art, at least making reference to community along \\nwith society, in order to ensure that the interpretative challenges related to the societal disruption \\nelement do not result in an excessively limitative notion. \\n \\nThe abovementioned detrimental effects can be recorded and evaluated according to different \\ntime scales, and in this regard reference is usually made to notions such as sudden-onset (such as \\nvolcanic eruptions) or slow-onset emergencies (such as drought). Recognition of the different \\ntemporal context of disasters has progressively been encapsulated in legal definitions addressing \\nthis term. For instance, a very limited number of international treaties expressly limit their field \\nof application to sudden-onset disasters, as was the case in the original version of the 1991 Treaty \\nestablishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, which specified situations \\ninvolving ‘[a] sudden event’. \\n98 However, this limitation has been deleted from the new 1998 \\ntreaty regulating this entity \\n99 and the majority of international instruments do not include this \\nqualification. Conversely, certain relevant instruments now expressly include slow-onset disasters \\nin their scope of application, such as the Tampere Convention \\n100 and the IDRL Guidelines. \\n101 \\n \\nThis position has recently been shared by the ILC in its Commentary to Draft Article 3(a), \\naccording to which \\n‘the draft articles apply equally to sudden-onset events (such as an earthquake \\nor tsunami) and to slow-onset events (such as drought or sea-level rise), as well as frequent small-\\nscale events (floods or landslides)’, \\n102 hence expanding the definition to a series of events ‘that, \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n19\\non their own, might not meet the necessary threshold, but that, taken together would constitute \\na calamitous event for the purposes of the draft articles’. \\n103 In a similar vein the  \\nAnnotations \\n to \\nthe definition of disaster in the Report on DRR terminology make reference to both categories \\nof disasters. While a slow-onset disaster is ‘one that emerges gradually over time. Slow-onset \\ndisasters could be associated with, e.g. drought, desertification, sea-level rise, epidemic disease’, a \\nsudden-onset disaster is ‘one triggered by a hazardous event that emerges quickly or unexpect-\\nedly. Sudden-onset disasters could be associated with, e.g. earthquake, volcanic eruption, flash \\nflood, chemical explosion, critical infrastructure failure, transport accident’. \\n104 \\n \\nFinally, it should also be emphasised that various definitions do not limit this notion to the \\neffective occurrence of negative consequences. Indeed, several international instruments empha-\\nsise that this definition could be satisfied, in legal terms, even before the occurrence of the disaster \\nscenarios hypothesised, mainly in order to permit the timely activation of relevant assistance trea-\\nties and reduce the negative consequences foreseen. In several treaties \\n105 a disaster is considered \\nas such in the presence of an event which ‘threatens’ \\n106 or ‘may cause’ \\n107 the abovementioned \\ndetrimental effects, a position shared by Article 1(C) of the 2000 Framework Convention on \\nCivil Protection Assistance, which requires only the threat of loss in order to identify a dis-\\naster, \\n108 by Decision 1313/2013/EU, \\n109 and by other treaties. \\n110 It appears clear, especially in \\nrelation to treaties on assistance, that the prompt activation of cooperation among States and \\nother assisting actors may help to reduce potential detrimental effects. Similarly, the relevance of \\nprotection issues linked with human rights standards can hardly be limited to actual victims of \\ndisasters without paying attention to potential ones. However, this element has not been expressly \\nincluded in the definition or the Commentary to Draft Article 3(a), \\n111 in line with the original \\nproposal of the ILC Special Rapporteur. \\n112 \\n \\nConclusions \\n \\nThis taxonomy of the definitions of disaster provided by international law instruments allows us \\nto identify several elements that converge toward the identification of this term of art, relating in \\nparticular to the origins of disasters, the effects such events might have and relevant limitations. As \\na result, even if certain criteria have yet to be properly addressed by practice, the legal boundaries \\nof this notion are increasingly well defined. \\n \\nAs mentioned above, the protection of human rights in disaster scenarios obviously represents \\none of the key legal paradigms to be taken into account. Indeed, the same terminology issue may \\nbe of some relevance in this context, as will be explored in the following chapters. \\n \\nFirst, the definition of the term ‘disaster’, according to international law practice, helps to \\nclarify which events and related legal issues fall outside the parameters of this notion. A particular \\nmention could be made of armed conflicts, which  \\nper se \\n do not represent a disaster, according to \\nrelevant documents such as the ILC Draft Articles and the Report on DRR T\\nerminology, as well \\nas other practice. Also for the purpose of the present volume, armed conflicts have been excluded \\nfrom any specific analysis, unless relevant international humanitarian law provisions might pro-\\nvide insights to help solve certain challenges, for example in the case of disasters occurring in \\ncomplex emergencies, namely within a State already affected by an armed conflict. \\n113 \\n \\nSecond, defining the term ‘disaster’ can permit the identification of specific exigencies related \\nto the protection and respect of human rights which arise in such particular scenarios. As \\nrightly underlined by Kälin, ‘[h]uman rights are never more important for people than in times \\nof particular need and vulnerability, and they therefore have an important role to play in times \\nof disasters’. \\n114 The provision of this latter definition with clear contents could therefore help \\nStates, international organisations and non-state actors to better clarify the specific content of \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n20\\nobligations inherent in general human rights guarantees as applied in disaster contexts. This \\nperspective is endorsed by the ILC Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina, according to whom \\n‘[s]uch a definition will help identify the situations in which protection may or shall be invoked’ \\n115 \\nand clarify who needs protection in such specific circumstances. In particular, the context-based \\ncharacter of some challenges to the application of human rights obligations in the case of dis-\\nasters implies that clarification of this definition might contribute to the better identification \\nof situations where additional or specifically tailored measures could be requested as compared \\nto common scenarios, as explored by the authors of this volume. \\n116 Even the integration of \\nthe rights-based approach into the disaster management perspective, as championed by some \\nactors, \\n117 can obviously benefit from the identification of situations in which suggested actions \\nand legal and operative paradigms should be considered relevant. \\n \\nFurthermore, this link between the terminology issue and substantive human rights provi-\\nsions could also be explored in relation to certain specific elements. For instance, while we have \\nseen that the origin of a disaster, i.e. human-made or natural, is no longer appropriate for ter-\\nminology purposes, as both typologies are commonly covered by relevant instruments, it could \\neasily be shown that this distinction still has an impact in terms of the substantive human rights \\nobligations States are expected to fulfill. Examples could be provided, for instance, in relation \\nto different standards that States are requested to comply with, under a due diligence paradigm, \\nin relation to the prevention of natural or anthropic disasters. \\n118 Conversely, on the basis of the \\nabovementioned terminological analysis, criticisms could be made regarding the restricted scope \\nof application of instruments specifically intended to address challenges to the protection of \\nhuman rights solely in case of natural disasters, such as the Operational Guidelines on Human \\nRights and Natural Disasters drawn up by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. \\n119 As discussed \\nabove, especially on the basis of analysis carried out within the framework of disaster studies and \\nconfirmed by relevant practice, such a distinction is hardly tenable, as similar challenges to human \\nrights protection might also be expected to occur in the event of human-made disasters. Finally, \\nterminology issues might also impact limitations and derogations to human rights treaties. In fact, \\nespecially in relation to events capable of fulfilling the high threshold criteria provided by Draft \\nArticle 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles, States may be able to consider such disasters as situations \\nrepresenting public emergencies and hence demand extraordinary measures, as shall be explored \\nsubsequently. \\n120 \\n \\nAs a result, the possibility of qualifying an event as a disaster might have the added value of \\nunderlining the specific and multifaceted peculiarities that such situations can imply and there-\\nfore properly guarantee positive and negative human rights obligations. Even if human rights \\nlaw is naturally not dependent, from the point of view of its relevance, upon the existence of a \\ndisaster, identifying the proper content of the latter term could nonetheless help to better frame \\nthe guarantees protecting fundamental values within this specific context. \\n \\nSelected bibliography \\n \\nG. Bartolini, ‘Il progetto di articoli della Commissione del diritto internazionale sulla “Protection of Persons \\nin the Event of Disasters”’,  \\n100 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2017) 677 ff. \\n \\nA. de Guttry, ‘Surveying the Law’ in de Guttry, Gestri and Venturini (eds),  \\nInternational Disaster Response Law \\n(Springer, 2012), 3 ff. \\n \\nIFRC,  \\nLaw and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study (IFRC, 2007). \\n \\nR.W\\n. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds),  \\nWhat Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions \\n (International \\nResearch Committee on Disasters, 2005). \\n \\nJ.-M. Thouvenin, ‘La définition de la catastrophe par la CDI: vers une catastrophe juridique?’ in P\\n. Sanjuán \\nand J.-M. Thouvenin (eds),  \\nInternational Law and Disasters (Ibanez, 2011) 41 ff. \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n21\\n \\nNotes \\n 1 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/71/10 (2016) \\n(ILC Report 2016) (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016) 12. \\n  \\n2 ILC, Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Mr. Eduardo Valencia-\\nOspina, UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 (5 May 2008) 152, para 46. \\n 3 For similar problems see for instance: M. Di Filippo, ‘The Definition(s) of T\\nerrorism in International \\nLaw’ in B. Saul (ed),  \\nResearch Handbook on International Law and Terrorism \\n (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) \\n105; A. Gilles,  \\nLa definition de l’investissement international \\n (Larcier, 2012); C. Dugard, ‘The Problem of the \\nDefinition of T\\nerrorism in International Law’ in P\\n. Eden and T. O’Donnel (eds),  \\nSeptember 11, 2001: A \\nTurning Point in International and Domestic Law? \\n (Transnational Publishers, 2005) 187; V\\n. Grammatikas, \\n‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law: A Problem Still Looking for a Solution’ 52  \\nRevue \\nHellénique de droit International (1999) 321. \\n 4 ILC, Second Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Mr. Eduardo Valencia- \\nOspina, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009) 193 (ILC Second Report) para 31. \\n 5 Regarding this term and its use in classification exercises in international law see, of course, M. Milanovic \\nand V\\n. Hadzi-Vidanovic, ‘A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict’ in N.D. White and C. Henderson (eds), \\n \\nResearch Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum \\n(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 256. \\n 6 UNGA, Report of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Indicators and T\\nermi-\\nnology Relating to Disaster Risk Reduction, UN Doc. A/71/644 (1 December 2016) (Report on DRR \\nterminology); for the relevant UNGA Resolution see UNGA, Res 71/276, UN Doc. A/RES/71/276 \\n(13 February 2017) where, at its para 2, this body ‘[ \\ne \\n] \\nndorses \\n the recommendations contained in sections \\nIV and V of the report’, namely the recommendations on global indicators and terminology proposed \\nby the working group. \\n 7 D. Alexander, ‘An Interpretation of Disaster in T\\nerms of Changes in Culture, Society and International \\nRelations’ in R.W\\n. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds),  \\nWhat Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions \\n(International Research Committee on Disasters, 2005) 25, 27. \\n 8 L.G. Sun, ‘Climate Change and the Narrative of Disaster’ in J. Peel and D. Fisher (eds),  \\nThe Role of \\nInternational Environmental Law in Disaster Risk Reduction (Brill, 2016) 27, 47–48. \\n 9 See, for instance, A. Wijkman and L. Timberlake,  \\nNatural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man? \\n (Earthscan, \\n1984). \\n \\n10 See, however, the early evaluation made by P\\n. Macalister-Smith,  \\nInternational Guidelines on Humanitarian \\nAssistance \\n (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1991) 21 who \\nmaintains that previous attempts to define this term in international law resulted in short-lived and \\ninadequate results. \\n \\n11 K.C. Lauta, ‘Human Rights and “Natural” Disasters’ in S.C. Breau and K. Samuel (eds),  \\nResearch Hand-\\nbook on Disasters and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 93. \\n \\n12 C. Hartman and G.D. Squires (eds),  \\nThere Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane \\nKatrina (Routledge, 2006). \\n \\n13 D. Cubie,  \\nThe International Legal Protection of Persons in Humanitarian Crises Exploring the Acquis Humani-\\ntaire (Hart, 2017) 245. \\n \\n14 Sun (n. 8) 30. \\n \\n15 B.L. Brown, ‘Disasters Myth or Reality: Developing a Criminology of Disasters’ in M. Deflem (ed), \\n \\nDisasters, Hazards and Law (Emerald, 2012) 3, 5. \\n \\n16 A. Oliver-Smith, I. Alcántara-Ayala, I. Burton and A. Lavell, ‘The Social Construction of Disaster Risk: \\nSeeking Root Causes’ 22  \\nInternational Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2017) 469. \\n \\n17 According to the Report on DRR terminology, 18, a hazard is ‘[a] process, phenomenon or human \\nactivity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic \\ndisruption or environmental degradation’. As for hazardous events, see ibid 20. \\n \\n18 Sun (n. 8) 31. \\n \\n19 USAID, ‘Introduction to Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2011) 15, available at www.preventionweb.net/\\nfiles/26081_kp1concepdisasterrisk1.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. \\n \\n20 B. Field et al. (eds),  \\nManaging the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: \\nSpecial Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change \\n (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 69. \\n \\n21 \\n R.W\\n. Perry, \\n‘Disasters, Definitions and Theory Construction’ in Perry and Quarantelli (eds) (n. 7) 311, 313. \\n \\n22 E.L. Quarantelli (ed),  \\nWhat Is a Disaster? (Routledge, 1998); Perry and Quarantelli (eds) (n. 7). \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n22\\n \\n23 S. Kroll-Smith and V\\n.J. Gunter, ‘Legislators, Interpreters and Disasters: The Importance of How as Well \\nas What Is a Disaster’ in Quarantelli (ed) (n. 22) 160–176. \\n \\n24 Lauta (n. 11) 94. More extensively K.C. Lauta,  \\nDisaster Law (Routledge, 2014) 76 ff. \\n \\n25 There is a growing body of literature on this topic, for instance: A. de Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturini \\n(eds),  \\nInternational Disaster Response Law \\n (Springer, 2012); D. Caron, M.J. Kelly and A. T\\nelesetsky (eds), \\n \\nThe International Law of Disaster Relief \\n (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Breau and Samuel (eds) (n. 11). \\n \\n26 Such terms are usually used by practitioners and researchers to identify the cyclical processes and patterns \\nthat disaster events follow. However, there is no agreement on the exact content of the different components. \\nAccording to M. Nthakomwa, ‘Cycles of a Disaster’ in K.B. Penuel and M. Statler,  \\nEncyclopedia of Disaster \\nRelief \\n (Sage, 2011) 96–98: the mitigation phase pertains to activities intended to minimise or prevent the \\noccurrence of non-imminent disaster; preparedness concerns actions carried out to minimise the impact of \\nimpeding disasters, usually on the basis of procedures developed during the mitigation phase; response deals \\nwith the actions immediately following a disaster; and recovery starts once the emergency is under control. \\nConversely, according to D.A. Farber, J. Chen, R. Verchick and L. Sun,  \\nDisaster Law and Policy \\n (2nd edn, \\nAspen, 2009) 3, the disaster cycle consists of mitigation, emergency response, compensation and rebuilding, \\nwith the latter completing the circle by including (or failing to include) mitigation measures. \\n \\n27 The need to comprehensively address legal issues pertaining to the disaster cycle has also been underlined \\nby the ILC, according to which  \\n \\nthe scope of the draft articles  \\nratione temporis \\n is primarily focused on the immediate post- \\ndisaster \\nresponse and early recovery phase, including the post-disaster reconstruction phase. Nonetheless \\n. . . the pre-disaster phase falls within the scope of the draft articles, and is the subject of draft \\narticle 9, which deals with disaster risk reduction and disaster prevention and mitigation activities. \\n \\n \\nSee ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 19, para 4. \\n \\n28 D. Fisher, ‘Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and Armed Conflict: \\nA Comparative Analysis’ 866  \\nIRRC (2007) 347, 353. \\n \\n29 According to art 1 of the WHO Health Regulations ‘“disease” means an illness or medical condition, \\nirrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans’. \\n \\n30 \\n International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (adopted 30 Novem-\\nber 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 UNTS 78, art 2.2,  \\n \\n‘Oil pollution incident’ means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, \\nwhich results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine \\nenvironment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more States, and which requires \\nemergency action or other immediate response. \\n \\n31 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (adopted 26 Sep-\\ntember 1986, entered into force 26 February 1987) 1457 UNTS 134. \\n \\n32 See, along similar lines, the Annex to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic \\n(adopted 9 April 1965, entered into force 5 March 1967) 591 UNTS 265, arts 5.11 and 5.12 according \\nto which public authorities must facilitate the arrival and departure of vessels engaged in natural disaster \\nrelief work and to the greatest extent possible facilitate the entry and clearance of persons and cargo \\narriving in such vessels. \\n \\n33 See Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 November \\n1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 152, art 21, according to which the World \\nHeritage Committee is requested to provide priority consideration for international assistance to be \\narranged for the benefit of cultural heritage in such cases. \\n \\n34 A. de Guttry, ‘Surveying the Law’ in de Guttry, Gestri and Venturini (eds) (n. 25) 6. \\n \\n35 Convention Establishing an International Relief Union (IRU) (adopted 12 July 1927, entered into force \\n27 December 1932) 135 League of Nations Treaty Series 247 ff. As for the IRU see P\\n. Macalister-Smith, \\n‘The International Relief Union: Reflections on Establishing an International Relief Union of July 12, \\n1927’ 54  \\nLegal History Review \\n (1986) 368–372; J. Hutchinson, \\n‘Disasters and the International Order – II: \\nThe International Relief Union’ 23  \\nInternational History Review (2001) 253. \\n \\n36 K.N. Bookmiller, ‘Closing “the Yawning Gap”? International Disaster Response Law at Fifteen’ in Breau \\nand Samuel (eds) (n. 11) 50. \\n \\n37 See art 2.2. \\n \\n38 Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance (adopted 7 June 1991, entered into force \\n16 October 1996) A-54 OAS. \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n23\\n \\n39 See, in this regard: Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents \\n(Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, adopted 2 March 1978, entered into force 1 December \\n1981) 1320 UNTS 123; Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Acci-\\ndents (Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, adopted 28 November 1984, entered into force \\n1 December 1988) 1554 UNTS 155; Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the \\nKingdom of Belgium on Mutual Assistance in Combating Disasters and Accidents (adopted 14 Novem-\\nber 1984, entered into force 1 November 1988) 1526 UNTS 42; Agreement on Cooperation on Disaster \\nPreparedness and Prevention, and Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters (Argentina and Spain, \\nadopted 3 June 1988, entered into force 1 September 1992) 1689 UNTS 23. \\n \\n40 C. Forrest,  \\nInternational Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge, 2010) 232–233. \\n \\n41 Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile on Cooperation in Case of \\nDisasters (adopted 8 August 1997) art 1. \\n \\n42 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 193 para 31. \\n \\n43 ILC Report 21, where the relevant Commentary is also present. \\n \\n44 For the past version of the notion of disaster see UNISDR,  \\nTerminology on Disaster Risk Reduction \\n (Geneva, \\n2009) 9: ‘[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread \\nhuman, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected \\ncommunity or society to cope using its own resources’, available at www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDR\\nTerminologyEnglish.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. \\n \\n45 SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters (adopted 11 November 2011) art 1.3, \\nmakes reference to ‘a natural hazard event’. \\n \\n46 See, for instance, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (adopted \\n26 July 2005, entered into force 24 December 2009) art 1.3 (ASEAN Agreement). \\n \\n47 Regarding this approach see, for instance: Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic \\nof Albania on Mutual Assistance in the Case of Disasters or Serious Accidents (adopted 27 January \\n2010, entered into force 1 July 2011) 2771 UNTS 307 art 2; Agreement establishing the Caribbean \\nDisaster Emergency Management Agency (adopted 1 July 2008, provisional application 4 July 2008) \\nart 1 (CDEMA Agreement); IFRC, Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of Interna-\\ntional Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (IFRC, 2007) art 2.1 (IDRL Guidelines); Agreement \\nbetween the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus \\non Cooperation in the Field of Prevention and Elimination of Consequences of Catastrophes, Natural \\nDisasters and Serious Accidents (adopted 16 December 2003, entered into force 27 July 2004) 2339 \\nUNTS 203, art 1.3; Institute of International Law, Sixteenth Commission: Humanitarian Assistance. \\nResolution (Bruges session, 2 September 2003) art I (Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance); Agree-\\nment on the Establishment of the Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe \\n(adopted 3 April 2001) art II; Tampere Convention on the Provision of T\\nelecommunication Resources \\nfor Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (adopted 18 June 1998, entered into force 8 January 2005) \\n2296 UNTS 5, art 1.6 (Tampere Convention). \\n \\n48 See CDEMA Agreement, art 1, according to which “‘disaster’ means the exposure of the human habitat \\nto the operation of the forces of nature or to human intervention resulting in widespread destruction of \\nlives or property, but excludes events occasioned by war or military confrontation’. \\n \\n49 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 4. \\n \\n50 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 194, para 37. \\n \\n51 Report on DRR T\\nerminology 18. \\n \\n52 S.C. Breau and K.L.H. Samuel, ‘Introduction’ in S.C. Breau and K.L.H. Samuel (eds), Research Hand-\\nbook on Disasters and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 3. \\n \\n53 However, see the Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance art I, intended to extend the scope of applica-\\ntion of this document to calamitous events whether of natural origin, man-made disasters or caused by \\narmed conflicts or violence. \\n \\n54 See: CDEMA Agreement, art 1 according to which a disaster ‘excludes events occasioned by war or \\nmilitary confrontation’; Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement \\nde la Malaisie sur la coopération dans le domaine de la prévention et de la gestion des catastrophes, et de \\nla sécurité civile (adopted 25 May 1998) art 1.a, which qualifies as a disaster ‘un événement autre que la \\nguerre’, available at www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I392FR.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. \\n \\n55 UNGA, Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance, UN Doc. A/39/267/\\nAdd.2-E/1984/96/Add.2 (1984) art 1.b, where the definition excluded ‘an ongoing situation of armed \\nconflict’. \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n24\\n \\n56 IDRL Guidelines art 2.1, according to which the definition is aimed at ‘excluding armed conflict’. \\n \\n57 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 24, para 10. \\n \\n58 Report on DRR T\\nerminology 18. \\n \\n59 IFRC,  \\nLaw and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study (IFRC, 2007) 24. \\n \\n60 This approach has also been criticised in the area of disaster studies. For instance Sun (n. 8) 47, maintains \\n \\n \\n[b]lurring the traditional lines between natural and technological disasters by recognizing that they \\nexist along a continuum of human contribution might also open the door to grouping natural dis-\\nasters, not just with technological disasters like toxic releases and industrial accidents, but with the \\nintentional man-made crises such as terrorism and war. This blurring of the boundaries between \\ndisasters, terrorism, and war might prove problematic for a number of reasons. \\n \\n61 \\n ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 22, para 2. \\n \\n62 F\\n. Casolari, ‘La dimensione esterna dell’azione dell’Unione europea nella risposta a disastri naturali ed \\nantropici: quale coerenza?’ in M. Gestri (ed),  \\nDisastri, protezione civile e diritto (Giuffrè, 2016) 98–99. \\n \\n63 With similar references made to situations affecting ‘people’, ‘life’, etc. see for example: Decision No. \\n1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mech-\\nanism (Decision No. 1313/2013/EU) art 4.1; CDEMA Agreement, art. 1; Agreement between the \\nGovernment of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; \\nFramework Convention on Civil Defence Assistance (Framework Convention) (adopted 22 May 2000, \\nentered into force 23 September 2001) 2172 UNTS 213, art 1.c.; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. \\n \\n64 See for instance: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and \\nthe Republic of Albania, art 2; CDEMA Agreement, art 1; IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1; Agreement between \\nthe Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; \\nTampere Convention, art 1.6. \\n \\n65 Ibid. \\n \\n66 See in particular: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; Council Decision of 24 June 2014 2014/415/\\nUE on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, OJ L 192/53 \\n(2014) art 3; Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic \\nCooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural \\nand Man-Made Disasters (adopted 15 April 1998, entered into force 11 March 2003) art 2 (BSEC \\nAgreement). \\n \\n67 \\n Concerning the relevance of these elements in the definition of cultural heritage see A.A. Yusuf, ‘Article 1. \\nDefinition of Cultural Heritage’ in F\\n. Francioni (ed),  \\nThe 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary \\n(Oxford University Press, 2008) 23, 27. See, similarly, Forrest (n. 40) 25–26. \\n \\n68 See for instance: IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of \\nLithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. \\n \\n69 Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. \\n \\n70 See, for similar expressions making reference to economic or material losses: ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3. \\n \\n71 See: SAARC Agreement, art 1.3; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of \\nAlbania, art 2; ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3. \\n \\n72 See, for instance, SAARC Agreement, art 1.3. \\n \\n73 Regarding losses to the environment see, for instance: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; SAARC \\nAgreement, art 3; IDRL Guidelines, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic \\nof Albania, art 2; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government \\nof the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; Framework Convention, art 1.c; Tampere Convention, art 1.6; BSEC \\nAgreement, art 2. \\n \\n74 BSEC Agreement, art 2. \\n \\n75 Regarding this term see the Report on DRR terminology, 13, where ‘[t]he term includes economic, \\nhuman and environmental impacts, and may include death, injuries, disease and other negative effects \\non human physical, mental and social well-being’. \\n \\n76  \\nLegality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. (I) 257, 241, para 29. \\n \\n77 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 19, para 5. \\n \\n78 Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1. \\n \\n79 See: SAARC Agreement, art 1.3; CDEMA Agreement, art 1; ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3; IDRL Guide-\\nlines, art 2.1; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. \\n \\n80 \\n BSEC Agreement, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. \\n \\n81 Agreement between Argentina and Chile, art 1. \\n\\n\\nA taxonomy of disasters\\n25\\n  \\n82 See Accord de coopération entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement du \\nRoyaume de Maroc en matière de protection et de sécurité civiles (adopted 21 April 1981, entered into \\nforce 21 April 1981) 1264 UNTS 453, art 1. \\n 83 \\n ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 22, para 4. \\n 84 \\n Ibid 24, para 10. \\n  \\n85 Such effects are ‘widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-\\nscale material or environmental damage’. \\n 86 \\n ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 5. \\n 87 \\n J.-M. Thouvenin, ‘La définition de la catastrophe par la CDI: vers une catastrophe juridique?’ in P\\n. \\nSanjuán and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds),  \\nInternational Law and Disasters (Ibanez, 2011) 41, 46–49. \\n 88 \\n T. Stephens, ‘Disasters, International Environmental Law and the Antrophocene’ in Breau and Samuel \\n(eds) (n. 11) 155, who criticises the ILC definition as, under international environmental law, calami-\\nties can involve damage to the environment per se and need not involve societal disruption (i.e. ‘pure \\nenvironmental harm’). \\n 89 \\n IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1. \\n 90 \\n See: ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3, making reference to ‘[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a \\ncommunity or a society’; SAARC Agreement, art 1.3. \\n 91 \\n See art 1(a) of the 1998 Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de \\nla Malaisie making reference to events which have a negative impact on the activities of \\n‘collectivités locales’. \\n 92 \\n Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. \\n 93 \\n See BSEC Agreement, art 2. \\n 94 \\n As for this term see, for instance: Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of \\nAlbania, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia on Mutual \\nAssistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents (adopted 17 September 2004, entered into \\nforce 1 August 2006) 2486 UNTS 277, art 2; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of \\nLithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3. \\n 95 \\n Report on DRR T\\nerminology 13. \\n 96 \\n See, for instance, SAARC Agreement, art 1.3, which makes reference to a situation ‘which exceeds \\nthe ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. For similar criteria: \\nAgreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. \\n 97 \\n Sendai Framework, para 15. \\n 98 \\n CDEMA Agreement, art 1.d. \\n 99 \\n Ibid art 1. \\n \\n100 \\n Tampere Convention, art 1.6 makes reference to events ‘developing suddenly or as the result of com-\\nplex, long-term processes’. \\n \\n101 See IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1. \\n \\n102 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 4. \\n \\n103 \\n Ibid. \\n \\n104 Report on DRR T\\nerminology 13. \\n \\n105 \\n Regarding this approach see, for instance, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of \\nLithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3. \\n \\n106 \\n Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and the Cabinet of Ministers of \\nUkraine on the Co-Operation in the Field of Prevention of Disasters and Elimination of Their Con-\\nsequences (adopted 27 April 2006, entered into force 8 August 2008) 2619 UNTS 95. \\n \\n107 \\n Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Russian \\nFederation on Co-Operation in the Field of Prevention and Response to Natural and Man-Made \\nDisasters (adopted 21 February 2000, entered into force 19 June 2002) art 1. \\n \\n108 \\n Framework Convention, art 1(c), according to which a disaster is ‘an exceptional situation in which \\nlife, property or the environment may be at risk’. \\n \\n109 Decision 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1. \\n \\n110 \\n See: Tampere Convention, art 1.6; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of \\nAlbania, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia, art 2; BSEC \\nAgreement, art 2; Agreement between Argentina and Chile, art 1.1. \\n \\n111 For a criticism see Thouvenin (n. 87) 49–50. \\n \\n112 \\n ILC Second Report (n. 4) 195, para 47, where ‘the Special Rapporteur underscores that some actual loss \\nis required, as opposed to the mere threat of harm’. \\n \\n113 See Williams and Simm’s chapter in this volume. \\n\\n\\nGiulio Bartolini\\n26\\n \\n114 W\\n. Kälin, \\n‘The Human Rights Dimension of Natural or Human-Made Disasters’ 55  \\nGYIL (2012) 119, 147. \\n \\n115 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 193, para 31. \\n \\n116 See the chapters by Hesselman, McDermott, Rolnik, Casolari, Adinolfi, Riccardi, Giacca, Polymenop-\\noulou, Nifosi, Guadagno and Sironi in this volume. \\n \\n117 See Creta’s chapter in this volume. \\n \\n118 See Sossai’s chapter in this volume. \\n \\n119 IASC,  \\nHuman Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights \\nProtection in Situations of Natural Disasters (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2008). \\n \\n120 See Sommario’s chapter in this volume.\",\"difficulty\":\"hard\",\"domain\":\"Single-Document QA\",\"length\":\"short\",\"question\":\"Which following option is wrong, according to the topic \\\"disaster \\\" in the text?\",\"sub_domain\":\"Legal\"}","display_format":"text","language":"","answer_status":"published","assets":[],"source_url":"https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2","history":"initial import","indexing_mode":"noindex","subproblems":[],"grids":[]}