{"kind":"task","effective_mode":"full","benchmark":{"kind":"benchmark","effective_mode":"full","slug":"longbench-v2","formal_name":"LongBench v2","introduction":"長い資料の深い理解と推論を、多肢選択問題で評価するベンチマークです。公式紹介では503問を収録し、単一・複数文書の質問応答やコードリポジトリ理解などを扱います。\n\nLongBench v2 evaluates deep understanding and reasoning over long contexts through multiple-choice questions. Its official description lists 503 questions spanning tasks such as single-document and multi-document QA and code-repository understanding.","introduction_ja":"","introduction_en":"","category":"Category not supplied","task_count":null,"acquisition_status":"Acquisition status not supplied","official_url":"https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2","indexing_mode":"noindex"},"task_id":"2234cbfb-4573-5db4-8355-a8deb1e9987e","task_key":"train--66f958b3bb02136c067c5219","task_revision_id":"1","upstream_id":"66f958b3bb02136c067c5219","short_description":"In light of the empirical data reflecting a decline in urban renewal projects…","config":"","split":"train","body":"{\"choice_A\":\"The decrease in urban renewal projects suggests that the judiciary’s protective role over property rights has diminished in the face of evolving urban development strategies, prompting legislative bodies to craft more restrictive measures around eminent domain that align with public sentiment.\",\"choice_B\":\"The decline illustrates that legislative bodies may react to judicial rulings by limiting their own powers in eminent domain, leading to an unexpected retreat of executive agencies from previously aggressive urban renewal initiatives that relied on condemnation.\",\"choice_C\":\"The observed trends indicate a realignment of power that favors local executive discretion in urban planning decisions, with judicial precedents serving as a backdrop that, while significant, do not dictate the parameters of property rights as strongly as previously thought.\",\"choice_D\":\"The findings reveal that the interplay between judicial decisions and legislative actions has resulted in a hybrid model of governance in which property rights are increasingly safeguarded by local stakeholders, reflecting a broader societal shift towards participatory governance in urban development.\",\"context\":\"Is the government exhausting its powers? An empirical\\nexamination of eminent domain exercises in New York\\nCity pre- and post-Kelo\\nAbstract\\nA controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) which did not limit the use of state’s emi-\\nnent domain powers, led to an unprecedented legislative reaction by almost all 50 states. Of all, New York State stands out as\\none of the single states not to respond with a legislative amendment. In this study, I ask whether the state’s predation was\\ngreater in the years following these legal and political developments, in light of the freedom which was granted to local politi-\\ncians by both the Supreme Court and the state’s legislators. The article hypothesizes that contrary to common perceptions,\\njudicial decisions impact local government actions even when no limits on the use of powers are being posed. I use rigorous\\nstatistics and scrupulously defined data to expand scholarly understanding of the aftermath of the judicial decision in Kelo.\\nThe main finding is that the decision has in fact affected political behavior, but in the opposite direction than commonly\\nexpected: politicians in New York City acted consistently with public opinion, which was hostile too Kelo, not by changing the\\nlaw, but by changing their practice. Studying all known taking exercises in New York City between 1991 and 2019, the paper\\nfinds no increase in the number of development projects involving condemnations after 2005. In fact, the probability of a tak-\\ning for economic development or urban renewal dropped by 90%. The use of eminent domain for such projects declined even\\nwhen both state and federal courts refrain from interposing any actual limit on its use. The paper lends qualified support to\\nan alternative assertion that takings decisions by government officials are largely shaped by planning and political needs and\\nthat officials are sensitive to revealed public preferences even when there is no constitutional or legal impediment on their\\nexercise of power.\\nKeywords: eminent domain, private property, state predation, takings for economic development projects.\\n1. Introduction\\nIn June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court delivered one of its most influential decisions in terms of the ensuing legis-\\nlative backlash. In Kelo v. City of New London,1 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Public Use Clause of the\\nU.S. Constitution Fifth Amendment does not deny states the power to take private property for “public purpose”\\nthat is not a collective good. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the states’ power applies to takings for “private\\nbenefit,” even in cases where the property taken was not blighted.2 The decision therefore permitted transferring\\nprivate property to private parties simply for the purpose of economic development, even if the property taken\\ncould not be said to inflict harm on society.\\nThere is an ongoing debate as to whether the Kelo decision reaffirmed a preexisting doctrine,3 or significantly\\nextended it. Be it as it may, the decision was met with strong public opposition, which was reflected in several\\nstate and national polls (Hoehn & Adanu, 2014; Somin, 2015, pp. 140–141; Strother, 2016), and encouraged by\\nintensified media coverage (L\\u0001\\nopez et al., 2007; Nadler et al., 2008; Strother, 2017, pp. 87; Zilis, 2015). Notwith-\\nstanding, as the Kelo majority of justices emphasized in their decision, nothing in it precluded “any State from\\nplacing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power” (Kelo, at 489). Indeed, all but five states enacted\\npost-Kelo reforms to their eminent domain state laws or constitutions.4 Most of these legislative reforms took\\n*Correspondence: Ronit Levine-Schnur, Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University\\n(Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya), 8 University Ave., Herzliya, Israel. Email: ronit.levineschnur@idc.ac.il\\nConflict of interest: The author declares no conflicts of interest.\\nAccepted for publication 17 March 2022.\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\nThis is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which permits use and distribution in any\\nmedium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.\\nRegulation & Governance (2023) 17, 449–468\\ndoi:10.1111/rego.12464\\n\\n\\nplace soon after the decision (Somin, 2015, pp. 179). Kelo has therefore resulted in more new state legislation\\nthan any other Supreme Court decision in American history (Morriss, 2009; Nadler et al., 2008; Somin, 2015,\\npp. 135–136).\\nThe Kelo case and its aftermath provide an opportunity to test the interplay between courts, legislators, and\\npublic opinion following a state-empowering decision (Sharp & Haider-Markel, 2008). Kelo offers an empirical\\nexample or “social experiment” in Posner’s words (2008, p. 319) to explore state- and city-specific policies that\\ndevelop under flexible limitations set by federal constitutional law. The comprehensive legislative response to the\\nKelo case has therefore been used by some as evidence to support the functionality of the political process\\n(Posner, 2008, p. 319; Stevens, 2005, p. 4). Ostensibly, just as traditional political theory predicts, rights supported\\nby the majority are well protected through the political process and are not dependent on judicial intervention\\nfor their recognition (Ely, 1980, pp. 87–88), that is, if the majority’s rights are infringed it would exploit its politi-\\ncal power to direct the government to what it perceives as the right direction. Furthermore, if no reform is\\napproved in a particular state, this is arguably because in that state, the public’s opinion does not sufficiently dis-\\napprove of the Court’s decision, and not because of any systemic failure.\\nHowever, the picture seems to be much more complex than that. Many of the legislative reforms have been\\nlittle more than symbolic. They have not abolished or strictly limited economic development takings, allegedly\\nfailing to meet popular demand. For example, many states have banned takings for economic development pur-\\nposes but exempted blight condemnation, allowing significant loopholes in their reforms (Somin, 2015, p. 150).\\nThis is in line with the public choice theory prediction that in response to public outcry, legislators have a strong\\nincentive to do something to appeal to their constituents’ demands. Rational legislators may be inclined to settle\\nfor symbolic reassurances to an outraged populace (Edelman, 1985; L\\u0001\\nopez et al., 2009, p. 107). Indeed, Somin\\nargues that the weakness of much of post-Kelo legislation can be attributed to the public’s ignorance.\\nWhile the public did show interest in the issue of economic development takings soon after the Kelo decision\\nwas granted, and while this interest was firmly expressed so that legislators responded in a way that resonated\\nwith deliberative democracy, this popular interest was not transformed into an ability to scrutinize the details of\\na proposed reform legislation (Somin, 2015, p. 166). This argument can be extended to explain why, in the\\nminority states, no legislative reforms were enacted despite that even in them the revealed popular opinion was\\nagainst the Court’s decision (cf. Gutmann & Thompson, 2009).\\nSomin views the Kelo legislative backlash as a strong indication for the limitation of traditional political the-\\nory (Somin, 2015, p. 178). He further argues that as the public’s attention to eminent domain tails off over time,\\nthe weakness of the legislative response will be abused by interest groups aiming to promote economic develop-\\nment and blight condemnations without fear of public scrutiny. Therefore, the need for judicial intervention may\\nwell increase over time rather than diminish (Somin, 2015, pp. 179–180). Consequentially, according to this\\napplication of public choice theory, the Court’s reluctance to intervene, coupled with the popular voter’s political\\nignorance, would result in a gradual distancing from what the majority wants.\\nNotwithstanding the strong scholarly rhetoric, the predictions of the public ignorance theory have never been\\nempirically tested. No study has sought to test empirically the question of whether, in the absence of legal duty to\\navoid takings for economic development and blight condemnation, the government would indeed exercise its\\neminent-domain power excessively to the detriment of its citizens’ preferences. In fact, there is a paucity of quan-\\ntitative literature on the factors that influence the decision to use eminent domain. One recent attempt to fill this\\ngap was a survey of country managers in North Carolina examining how they used eminent domain and their\\nattitudes toward it for the period between 2002 and 2007 (Hoyman & McCall, 2010). While the survey showed\\nthat the county governments were extremely cautious in their use of eminent domain authority, allowing only\\n7 out of 99 instances for economic development, the authors concluded that it would be premature to character-\\nize their analysis as a true impact study because not enough time has passed between the Court’s decision and\\nthe survey (Hoyman & McCall, 2010, p. 891).\\nThis paper seeks to fill the void by providing an empirical examination of a single case study to show how\\nthe public debate following the Court’s decision relates to actual eminent-domain practice. It presents an alterna-\\ntive hypothesis to the prevailing theories: public officials in the taking context are attuned to the public’s prefer-\\nences and to actual planning needs and therefore avoid exercising the full capacity of their powers even though\\nthey are legally permitted to do so.\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n450\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nEmpirically testing the validity of the competing hypotheses is a difficult task. The approach of this paper is\\nto focus on New York City, which thanks to data availability, provides an empirical opportunity to analyze the\\neffect of Kelo on a specific case study. New York State is one of the few states that have not reformed their emi-\\nnent domain law after the decision. Moreover, the State’s highest court reapproved the pro-taking practices even\\nafter Kelo (Mihaly & Smith, 2011),5 making an exception to the general post-Kelo pattern of stronger state judi-\\ncial scrutiny of public use issues (Somin, 2015, pp. 190–191). Noticeably, in two of the five states that did not\\nreform their takings laws following Kelo, the high courts increased protections against takings for private use.\\nBased on the case law, New York seems to be a case of resistance to the “Kelo storm.”6\\nThis study uses a quasi-experimental approach, taking advantage of availability of accurate micro-data on\\neminent-domain practices for New York City’s condemnations over a substantial period before and after the legal\\nchange. Digging into the City Record and reviewing cases, data were collected and coded on all exercises of emi-\\nnent domain by New York City from 2002 to 2019. In addition, Yun-chien Chang’s novel studies on compensa-\\ntion practices in the city (Chang, 2010, 2011), which he generously made available for this study, enabled the\\ncompilation of full data on the condemnation practices of New York City from 1991 to 2003.\\nThe study reveals that over a period of 29 years, the City executed its condemnation powers over 197 projects\\nthat included 3359 lots across the five boroughs, comprising the sample group. Following the logic of the public\\nchoice hypothesis, one could expect to see, for the post-2005 group, no apparent change in condemnations for\\nnon-public use purposes—economic development or urban renewal—if not a gradual increase with such takings.\\nHowever, I find that while the City was not legally bound to do so, in the years following the Kelo decision, it sig-\\nnificantly dropped condemnation for economic development and economic renewal by 90%. The findings appear\\nto call into question the prominence of traditional political theory and the public choice hypothesis as the single\\nexplanation for government behavior in the taking context. This holds true even if considering the effect of the\\neconomic recession of 2008.\\nThe remainder of the paper unfolds in four sections. Section 2 explains the relevant New York eminent\\ndomain law and presents current perceptions about its condemnation practices before and after Kelo. Section 3\\nconstructs the research design, providing the specifics of the study settings and data sources. Next, Section 4\\ndetails the findings. Finally, Section 5 discusses possible interpretations of the findings and points out the limita-\\ntions of the study. A short conclusion ensues.\\n2. Current perceptions about New York’s condemnation practices pre- and post-Kelo\\nA common perception about New York after Kelo is that the Court’s decision bolstered the state and particularly\\nNew York City’s abuse of eminent domain for economic development purposes (Somin, 2015, p. 85). Advocates\\nworking with the Institute for Justice opined that following Kelo, state and local officials in New York “responded\\nwith a binge of takings for private development to rival any other state in the nation,” and that “city officials appear\\nto be acting as if no one will be looking over their shoulder,” where the legislature “has left New Yorkers at the\\nmercy of unholy alliances between land-hungry developers and their bureaucratic allies” (McNamara, 2011,\\npp. 296–297, 300). Another advocate who led the Kelo case before the Supreme Court commented that since Kelo,\\n“the use of eminent domain in New York has been by far the worst. It sounds like a parody of takings horror\\nstories.” (Berliner, 2015, pp. 89; see also Carpenter & Ross, 2010).\\nThis pessimistic opinion regarding New York’s response to Kelo is based on a number of reasons that are\\nreviewed below. First, the fact that there was no legislative reform in the state. Second, that two high-profile pro-\\njects met the approval of state courts. And lastly, the Institute for Justice’s reports displaying critical growth in\\nthe number of takings for economic development projects in New York post-Kelo.\\nThe fact that no legislative reform took place cannot be disputed. However, it does not necessarily imply\\nworsening taking practices in the post-Kelo period, if prior to the decision there was already a long and\\nestablished tradition of taking for economic development. Indeed, this was the case in New York.\\nNew York’s Constitution Eminent Domain Clause7 mirrors the wording of the U.S. Constitution Fifth\\nAmendment. Accordingly, the jurisprudence dealing with the New York constitutional provision has generally\\nfallen in line with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Public Use Clause, if not foreshadowing it\\n(Salkin, 2007, p. 4). From early on, New York State and New York City in particular have been among the most\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n451\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nprominent supporters of takings for private-to-private blight condemnations (Caro, 1974; Jacobs, 1961, pp. 7–8;\\nPritchett, 2003, p. 37; see also Goldberger, 2007; Somin, 2015, p. 86), with strong backing by state courts (Nichols\\nJr, 1940, p. 630, n. 80; Salkin, 2007). This has been expanded over the years to encompass a very broad justifica-\\ntion for economic development takings (Hills, 2012).\\nNew York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL), which dates back to 1977, is considered as employing\\n“loose statutory restrictions” on eminent domain power. While it enumerates these powers and specifies bureau-\\ncratic procedures, it does not otherwise place restrictions on condemning authorities’ powers (L\\u0001\\nopez et al., 2009,\\np. 104). In particular, EDPL Section 103(G) states: “‘Public project’ means any program or project for which\\nacquisition of property may be required for a public use, benefit or purpose.” In addition, the Urban Renewal\\nArticle of the General Municipal Law,8 enacted in 1961, which is the primary legislative provision concerning tak-\\nings for the purpose of economic development, mandates that eminent domain may be exercised in “substandard\\nor insanitary areas.” In fact, this was interpreted so that blight is not necessary in order to use eminent domain;\\nand property may be taken even if it is not substandard if this proves necessary in order to rehabilitate a larger\\narea (Salkin, 2007, p. 6).\\nConsequently, New York’s courts have created a presumption that economic development is a public purpose\\n(Salkin, 2007, p. 5; Hills, 2012). As one court puts it, “in New York, the term ‘public use’ broadly encompasses\\nany use, including urban renewal, which contributes to the health, safety and general welfare of the public.”9\\nAbsent a clear showing of unreasonableness, the courts’ review is limited only to ascertain whether the project is\\nrationally related to a conceivable public purpose.\\nFollowing the Kelo decision there have been at least 17 post-Kelo bills to reform the EDPL or the State’s Con-\\nstitution.10 The New York State Bar Association convened a Special Task Force on Eminent Domain, which fol-\\nlowing a statewide summit in 2006, published an interim report including eight recommendations for amending\\neminent domain practices. The proposal was adopted by the Bar’s House of Delegates. Furthermore, a number of\\nmunicipalities have adopted local eminent domain resolutions or laws. However, none of the bills has been\\nenacted, nor have the EDPL or the State’s constitution been reformed. There is no clear explanation for that. For\\nthe purposes of this study, I did not explore records of the New York City government and the governments of\\nthe five boroughs to determine whether anyone was talking about Kelo. Nor can I answer the question whether\\nmayoral or local campaigns turn on condemnation policy or at least discuss policy.\\nTwo studies on states’ responses to Kelo have aimed to explain differences in legislative behavior. Overall, they\\nprovide a variety of potentially relevant factors. Sharp and Haider-Markel studied state legislative responses for\\nthe two years following the decision. Their analysis suggests the need to discount the effect of political factors as\\npredictors for states’ behavior, in line with prior studies on states’ responses to the Supreme Court’s abortion pol-\\nicy “invitation” to the states (Cohen & Barrilleaux, 1993; Medoff, 2002; Sharp & Haider-Markel, 2008). However,\\nthey stressed the role of interest groups at the state level, particularly that of populist or grassroots activist\\ninvolvement in legislation, which is more successful in states where legislatures’ professionalism is weaker\\n(Sharp & Haider-Markel, 2008). In another study, L\\u0001\\nopez et al. (2009) identified that the decision to enact a mean-\\ningful restriction on the eminent domain power was a function of political economy measures: states with more\\neconomic freedom, greater value of new housing construction, and less racial and income inequality were more\\nlikely to have enacted stronger restrictions. This study, conducted three years after the Kelo decision, rightly\\npredicted that New York would be among the few states unlikely to reform their laws at all.11 Nevertheless, this\\nfact alone cannot support the perception of New York’s growing appetite for takings following Kelo.\\nThe second reason that underlies the common perception about New York’s response has to do with two\\nhigh-profile decisions delivered by the New York Court of Appeals in 2009 and 2010.12 These decisions contin-\\nued to give wide scope for for-profit condemnation projects (Somin, 2010). In Goldstein, also known as the Atlan-\\ntic Yards project, the Empire State Development Cooperation (ESDC), a state agency, took private property in\\norder to transfer it to a private developer, Bruce Ratner. The initial plan was to build high-income housing and a\\nnew stadium for the New Jersey (Brooklyn) Nets basketball team. The project was first announced in 2003 and\\nthe land was formally taken at the end of 2006. The ESDC was also involved in Kaur, also known as the Colum-\\nbia University project. Private property was taken in order to expand the University and build new educational\\nand research facilities on its campus. The project was first announced in 2001 and the land was formally taken in\\nAugust 2008.\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n452\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nIn both cases, the state’s courts approved the takings while relying on a broad definition of “blight,”13\\nalthough not necessarily broader than in prior cases (Hills, 2012). Indeed, as one justice put it, these rulings “have\\nmade plain that there is no longer any judicial oversight of eminent domain proceedings,”14 but the only\\nadvancement compared to earlier jurisprudence is that the Court ruled that pre-Kelo practices would persist. The\\nquestion is therefore whether beyond their high profile, these cases are representative of New York City’s practical\\nresponse to Kelo. Recall that in both cases, the projects began long before the Kelo decision. Moreover, they were\\ncontrolled by a state agency whose involvement allowed the City to avoid public criticism (Fischel, 2004). In\\nother words, while it cannot be disputed that in these projects the ESDC has advanced massive taking of private\\nproperty for economic development or non-public use ends, it is not clear to what extent they reflect the city’s\\ntaking practices following Kelo. The claim that the rulings place “property owners across the state, particularly\\nthose in New York City, at risk and makes legislative reform an even more pressing priority” (Carpenter &\\nRoss, 2010) needs to be tested if the implication is that the risk has actually grown.\\nLastly, we turn to the reported numbers of takings. Prior to Kelo, the Institute for Justice published a compar-\\native review of states’ takings practices and in particular takings for economic development purposes\\n(Berliner, 2003). The empirical findings\\nof this study\\nwere relied\\non by many\\nsubsequent\\nstudies\\n(e.g., Kerekes, 2011; Lanza et al., 2013; L\\u0001\\nopez et al., 2009; Sharp & Haider-Markel, 2008). For New York State, the\\nInstitute was able to locate only 14 private use projects from 1998 to 2002, covering as little as 57 businesses (and\\nthreatening another 89). In addition, for the three-year period 1998–2000, a survey of the New York Unified\\nCourt System revealed 490 condemnations filed for all taking purposes, including traditional public uses. These\\nnumbers appeared to the reporter suspiciously low in comparison with other states, a finding that did not stop\\nher from portraying New York City as “the site of some of the most egregious condemnations for private use”\\n(Berliner, 2003, p. 2) and New York State as “perhaps the worst state in the country for eminent domain abuse.”\\n(Berliner, 2003, p. 144). However, when calculating the number of economic development takings (including\\nthreatened properties) per total housing units or total population, the State is ranked 23 out of 50 (Kerekes, 2011,\\npp. 206–207).\\nThe Institute for Justice’s updated review from 2009, which was also based on news reports, observed that\\nbetween 1998 and 2008, 2226 properties across the state were condemned or threatened with condemnation for\\nprivate development involving 74 development projects (Walsh & McNamara, 2009). Compared to the Institute’s\\nearlier study reported above, the average number of properties involved grew fourfold (from 48.6 to 202.3 per\\nannum), while the average number of projects grew by a factor of 1.44 (from 4.66 to 6.72). However, in the year\\nfollowing the Kelo decision (June 2005 to June 2006), Berliner estimated that across the country the number of\\nproperties condemned or threatened with the use of eminent domain to benefit other private parties\\n(Berliner, 2006) was nearly three times higher per year than in 1998–2002. Based on these estimations, the\\ngrowth patterns observed for New York were not dramatically different than were those across the country\\n(Kerekes & Stansel, 2016).\\nThe attempts to properly identify the patterns of takings in New York following the decision were therefore\\npartial and incomplete. Thus, as the New York State Bar Association Task Force on Eminent Domain reported,\\nempirical data on actual eminent domain practices were lacking: “little State-specific research and data exist to\\naccurately assess both the need for, and impact of, many of the proposed reforms” (New York State Bar\\nAssociation, 2007). The purpose of this paper is therefore to test whether indeed following Kelo, New York City\\nunleashed its powers as predicted by public choice theory and practitioners.\\n3. Methodology\\nIn Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court empowered states to toughen their eminent domain laws so\\nthat takings of private property for purposes such as economic development and urban renewal would be banned.\\nWhile almost all the states accepted this “invitation” due to the overwhelming public response, New York did not\\nrespond with a legislative reform. This provides us with a natural opportunity to examine how public officials\\nreact to a change with revealed public preferences that are not transformed into a change in the legally binding\\nlimitations on the use of power. The intensity of the public debate was an exogenous event whose occurrence was\\nnot anticipated, especially since the Court did not in fact change the preexisting doctrine (Bell &\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n453\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nParchomovsky, 2006). Where the treatment is applied randomly, not as a policy response to trends in levels of\\nactivity and without relation to the prior state of affairs of the dependent variable, “the correlation between pre-\\ntest scores and exposure to treatment is zero” (Campbell & Ross, 1968, p. 40). Even though in such cases, it is\\nreasonable to interpret trends prior to, and after, the political response as evidence of its causal impact\\n(Gerring & McDermott, 2007, p. 6). Nonetheless, caution should be exercised when inferring causality because of\\nthe inability to produce sufficient controls or a proper control group. This study aims therefore to describe the\\nresults, test whether the legal development is associated with changes in the taking practices and suggest this case\\nstudy only as a prediction (Privitera, 2018, pp. 240–241). I have no data on the actual needs (the demand side).\\nNor can such data be obtained. “Natural experiment” design of this type has its limitations.\\nThe logic of the public choice/political ignorance argument suggests that public officials in New York, left to\\ntheir own devices by Kelo and no further state-level legislative or judicial interventions, would respond to Kelo by\\ndisproportional engagement with takings, particularly for economic development or urban renewal after 2005. To\\ntest empirically the effect of the decision on taking practices in New York City, this study uses a pre-post\\nsection quasi-experiment. To that end, a substantially long period before and after the legal change needs to be\\nstudied and compared. The data include all condemnation exercises by the City or ESDC15 during a decade and\\na half before and after the decision (1991–2019), their specific taking purposes, and their exact dates and\\nlocations.\\nIn order to estimate the effect of the legal decision on condemnation practices, the following multiple logistic\\nregression was estimated:\\nProb TakingType ¼ urban renewal\\nð\\nÞ ¼ boroughþlegal changeþproject sizeþelection yearþerror:\\nThe dependent variable is taking projects for any purpose other than “pure” or “traditional” public good. I\\ncluster all such purposes as “urban renewal,” including both what could be labeled as slum remediation, blight\\nremoval, and economic development projects where the property taken cannot be said to inflict harm on society.\\nI also did not distinguish between cases where the property is transferred from private owners to the public or to\\nother private parties, a distinction that fueled much of the debate around Kelo. If the purpose of taking was not\\nsolely for general “traditional” public use, that is, collective goods (Epstein, 1985; Hoyman & McCall, 2010,\\np. 886), it was categorized as “urban renewal.”\\nThis clustering is justified both on practical and theoretical grounds. Practically, the data do not allow to\\nproperly distinguish between the blight and economic renewal projects without injecting high degree of discre-\\ntion. The data available on each project are not detailed enough to properly attest to whether prior to condemna-\\ntion the property inflicted harm on its surroundings.\\nTheoretically, what may be identified as blight areas in need of a fix might rest on biased considerations,\\ninsensitive to local communities’ needs and customs. Furthermore, it is possible that conditions of “blight” were\\ncreated as a result of intended actions by developer. So was argued, for instance, with respect to Columbia\\nUniversity’s Manhattanville expansion and the Atlantic Yards. Critics of the project accused Columbia of using\\nthe property that it owned to create the blight that would ease its use of eminent domain (Levin, 2016). Thus,\\nalthough these distinctions were prominent in scholarship post-Kelo, the data cannot properly capture it.\\nTesting the decision whether to execute an urban renewal project requires centering the analysis around pro-\\njects and not their sizes or the numbers of lots or blocks associated with them. As full data on project sizes in\\nterms of land taken were not available and cannot be computed, the regression uses as controls project size in\\nterms of the number of blocks (or lots) associated with it. Other independent variables include the legal change,\\nboroughs, and mayoral election years. For robustness an alternative estimation is offered where the number of\\nlots per taking is used as a multiplier to the observations. In addition to the multiple regression model, separate\\nmodels were estimated for each period in order to directly assess whether the yearly trend for the share of urban\\nrenewal projects relative to other types of takings projects changed between the pre-2005 period and after it.\\n3.1. Data\\nPrior research indicated the difficulties of obtaining data on condemnation practices in the city (Chang, 2011;\\n2010). Therefore, three data strategies were employed. For additional information about the data collection\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n454\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nmethods and the databases see the Supplementary Appendix. The first data source is based on Yun-chien Chang’s\\ntwo original studies on eminent domain in New York City, focusing on compensation paid from 1990 to 2003\\n(Chang, 2010, 2011, p. 201). In the first paper published in the Journal of Legal Studies, he collected data on con-\\ndemnation compensation from 1990 to 2002 from title certification sheets stored in the N.Y.C. Comptroller’s\\nOffice and from the records stored in the five county courts (Chang, 2010). Chang identified 430 fee condemna-\\ntion settlements during this 13-year period. For the second paper, published by the Journal of Empirical Legal\\nStudies, Chang collected 27 court-adjudicated compensation cases, which he believed to be the entire population\\nof court compensation cases in the city for 1990–2003 (Chang, 2011). The cases were secured from a variety of\\nresources, most importantly the record rooms of the five county courts.\\nThe second data source was condemnation notices by the City or ESDC published in the City Record—Official\\nJournal of the City of New York.16 The City Record is an established institution dating back to 1873\\n(Kilgannon, 2019). However, to the best of my knowledge, no prior study has examined its records systematically\\nto observe municipal practices over a long term. Every year, an average of 250 daily issues is published. Complete\\nPDF files of daily issues are available from 5 March 2008 to date.17 Unfortunately, earlier volumes were not elec-\\ntronically available at the time of study. For issues published since 2013, the City Record is also available through\\nan online searchable database, CROL, made public in 2017.18\\nThe third data source was case reviews for the entire period under examination. Lexis Advance was searched\\nfor New York cases in both state and federal courts, using the search term “eminent domain procedure law.” This\\nresulted in 329 hits for state courts, of which 261 cases were decided after 1 January 1990. A similar search was\\nalso conducted for federal cases, limiting to “New York” in addition to “eminent domain procedure law,”\\nresulting in 99 hits, 82 of which were in the period under study.\\nTwo additional previous studies on condemnation in New York were consulted. First, Carpenter and\\nRoss (2010) analyzed development projects in New York City and Long Island to determine the demographic\\nprofile of residents of communities surrounding project areas. They were able to find information on six projects\\nwhere eminent domain had been used or threatened. This included three projects represented in this study—\\nWest Harlem-Manhattanville, Atlantic Yards, and the Harlem-East Harlem Urban Renewal Area—as well as two\\nother projects in Long Island, which is not included in this study, and another in Jamaica. Second, another report\\nby the Institute for Justice (Walsh & McNamara, 2009) added to the three abovementioned projects the Brooklyn\\nCenter Urban Renewal, and the Willets Point Urban Renewal Plan, also represented in this study.\\nLastly, I referred to the New York City Automated Register Information System (ACRIS).19 ACRIS includes\\nall documentation about property sales and records in the city. The system, which is under the responsibility of\\nthe City Register, includes documentation of deeds, mortgages, and satisfactions of mortgages, Uniform Commer-\\ncial Code (UCC) financing statements, and Notices of Federal Tax Liens. The system allows to search property\\nrecords and to view documents for each borough except Staten Island from 1966 to the present. The entire set\\ncontains (as of 12 February 2020) 14,985,920 records of transactions of all kinds. For each registration, the docu-\\nment type is identified. There are 124 possible document types distributed among four categories: deeds and\\nother conveyances, other documents, mortgages and instruments, and UCC and Federal Liens. Only two docu-\\nment types are directly related to condemnation: “Condemnation Proceedings” and “Notice of Appropriation.”\\nOnly 139 documents of these types were found in the examined period, clearly suggesting that this search proce-\\ndure is unproductive, for reasons that are beyond the current scope.\\n4. Findings\\nThis section provides a general description of the levels of activity over the entire study period and for each of\\nthe tested periods (before and after Kelo). This is followed by explanations of the relevant variables of project size\\nand project purpose. Finally, the regression results are described.\\n4.1. Description of the data\\nAs can be seen in Table 1, the Case Review provided information on a total of 22 projects. These projects range\\nfrom 2000 to 2008, with one project in 1991. The Case Review also provided additional information on one\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n455\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nproject already covered by Chang’s database. This distribution indicates that Chang’s database is thorough and\\nreliable for both compensation analysis and for the condemnation practice at large, with a caveat that toward the\\nend of his examined period compensation settlements were not yet secured for projects only just announced. In\\naddition, the Case Review does not add cases to the period covered thoroughly by the City Record database\\n(March 2008 onwards).\\nFor the years covered exclusively by the Case Review (2004–2007), there were 12 projects, with an annual rate\\nof 3, whereas the average annual rate of projects for the years covered by Chang and City Record databases was\\n6.53, and 7.41, respectively. This gap indicates that either the case review is not comprehensive enough to identify\\nall relevant projects, or that these years were different because of the legal change or unrelated reasons. The data\\ndo not allow determining which, posing an empirical limitation that cannot be eliminated. In other words, due to\\ndata limitations, the immediate short-term response to the legal change cannot be properly verified. The data can\\nprovide much better knowledge on the long-term effect. However, it should be emphasized that the Case Review\\nas a limited data source is the only source available for the years adjacent to the legal change, both before and\\nafter. Hence, there is no intentional manipulation.\\n4.2. Taking activity levels\\nAs can also be seen in Table 1, the integrated dataset, which is based on the three data sources, includes 3359\\nlots20 (compromising 0.4% of the city’s lots, Ellen et al., 2016, p. 13), over 640 blocks condemned in the examined\\nperiod, representing 197 development projects.21\\nTable 1\\nSummary of projects, blocks, and lots by source and by legal change\\n2005\\nSource\\nProjects\\nBlocks\\nLots\\nPre\\nChang\\n85\\n265\\n687\\nChang + Case Review\\n1\\n7\\n10\\nCase Review\\n12\\n14\\n48\\nAll sources\\n98\\n286\\n745\\nPost\\nCity Record\\n89\\n322\\n2490\\nCase Review\\n10\\n32\\n124\\nAll sources\\n99\\n354\\n2614\\nTotal\\n197\\n640\\n3359\\n1991\\nand\\n1993 1995\\n1997\\n1999\\n2001 2003\\n2005\\n2007\\n2009\\n2011 2013\\n2015\\n2017\\n2019\\nFigure 1\\nTakings in New York City (1991–2019) by projects (n = 197), blocks (n = 640), and lots (n = 3359).\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n456\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nFigure 1 overlays the number of projects, blocks, and lots taken per year across the city. As can be observed,\\nthe number of projects is quite stationary over the period (1–13 per year), while that of blocks and lots varies. A\\npairwise correlation per year, displayed in Table 2 shows that while there is a strong correlation between projects\\nand blocks as well as between blocks and lots, there is a weak correlation (at the 5% level) between projects and\\nlots over the years.\\nAs shown in Table 1, comparing the observations before and after 2005 reveals virtually no change in the\\nnumber of projects, a slight increase in the number of blocks affected, and an inconsistent fluctuation in the\\nnumber of lots. In order to examine the change in project sizes between the periods, a Wilcoxon test was esti-\\nmated. No statistically significant difference in project sizes between the periods was found by lots (χ2\\n197,1 = 3.72,\\np = 0.05) or by blocks (χ2\\n197,1 = 1.13, p = 0.29). The jump in the number of lots in the post-period is totally\\nattributed to five infrastructure projects that together include 1529 lots (58% of the lots taken in the post-period).\\nIf these projects are excluded, the proportion between blocks and lots per project in both periods is roughly\\nthe same.\\n4.3. Project size\\nThe distributions of the number of blocks and lots per project have long tails to the right with rare extreme cases\\n(see Table 3).\\nIt is therefore better to incorporate blocks and lots as measurements of project size using three aggregated\\nordinal categories. By blocks, projects were classified as small (one block), medium (two to four), or large (five or\\nmore). By lots, projects were classified as small (less than 5 lots), medium (5–25), or large (over 25). The two\\nclassifications are not identical but rather close with a Gamma measurement of 0.93 (95% confidence interval\\n[CI] 0.89–0.97). Using these scales enables the analysis to take into account the different magnitudes of projects\\nwhile the comparison between them provides robustness confirmation.\\nMoving to the categorical variable allows to observe that the differences between the pre- and post-periods\\nare still insignificant for project size, by either lots (χ2\\n197,2 = 3.72, p = 0.16) or blocks (χ2\\n197,2 = 5.471, p = 0.06).\\nTable 2\\nPairwise correlations—per year, for projects, blocks, and lots\\nVariable\\nBy variable\\nCorrelation\\n95%\\nCI\\np value\\nCount\\nBlocks\\nLots\\n0.79\\n0.59\\n0.89\\n<0.0001\\n29\\nBlocks\\nProjects\\n0.71\\n0.47\\n0.86\\n<0.0001\\n29\\nLots\\nProjects\\n0.37\\n0.01\\n0.65\\n0.0470\\n29\\nAbbreviation: CI, confidence interval.\\nTable 3\\nSummary statistics for lots and blocks per project by pre/post-2005\\n2005\\nPre\\nPost\\nAll\\nN lots\\nN blocks\\nN lots\\nN blocks\\nN lots\\nN blocks\\nMean\\n7.60\\n2.92\\n26.40\\n3.58\\n17.05\\n3.25\\nSD\\n9.93\\n3.35\\n85.78\\n5.45\\n61.78\\n4.53\\nMin\\n1\\n0\\n1\\n0\\n1\\n0\\nQuantile 25\\n1.0\\n1\\n1.0\\n1\\n1.0\\n1\\nMedian\\n2.5\\n1\\n4.0\\n2\\n3.0\\n1\\nQuantile 75\\n11.0\\n3.25\\n15.0\\n4\\n13.0\\n3.5\\nMax\\n42\\n15\\n756\\n37\\n756\\n37\\nSum\\n745\\n286\\n2614\\n354\\n3359\\n640\\nN projects\\n98\\n98\\n99\\n99\\n197\\n197\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n457\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\n4.4. Project purpose\\nThe main variable, project purpose, can now be examined. For the 197 projects in this study, I determined the\\nproject purpose based on the information provided in the condemnation notices (for City Record) or court cases\\n(for Case Review), or based on Chang’s comments. For a few borderline cases, the purpose was verified using\\nGoogle Earth and other available sources such as relevant committee minutes. All projects that were purposed for\\nblight or economic development were marked as “Urban Renewal.” As a reminder, if the purpose of taking was\\nnot solely for general “traditional” public use, that is, collective goods, it was categorized as “Urban Renewal.”\\nSeven different purposes emerged, as summarized in Table 4.\\nIn light of the research question, project purpose is better characterized as a binary variable: urban renewal\\n(22%) or other (78%). Assessing the difference between urban renewal and other projects in terms of their sizes,\\nno\\ndifference\\nwas\\ndetected\\nfor\\nproject\\nsize\\nby\\neither\\nlots\\n(χ2\\n197,2\\n=\\n4.52,\\np\\n=\\n0.1)\\nor\\nblocks\\n(χ2\\n197,2 = 2.3, p = 0.32).\\nFigure 2 shows the share of urban renewal projects per year, displaying an overall decrease over time. Looking\\nmore closely at the activity per mayoral election year, no clear pattern can be observed. In three of the election\\nyears, the share was zero, while in the other three the share was higher than that of the surrounding years.\\nTable 4\\nFull scope of project purposes (n = 197)\\nPurpose\\nCount\\nProb (%)\\nInfrastructure\\n62\\n31\\nUrban renewal\\n43\\n22\\nCommunity facilities\\n28\\n14\\nBlue belt†\\n23\\n12\\nSchool\\n18\\n9\\nPark\\n16\\n8\\nInfrastructure, park\\n4\\n2\\nUnknown\\n3\\n2\\nTotal\\n197\\n100\\n†This term is used in the condemnation proceedings and stands for waterfront development. Much of the post-Kelo water-\\nfront development in NYC has been parkland and transit, so this category does not actually differ from “Infrastructure” and\\n“Park” in the same table, and it is presented in terms of accuracy.\\n1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019\\nFigure 2\\nShare of urban renewal projects, per year, 1991–2019 (election years marked with *).\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n458\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nTable 5 identifies for each borough the number of projects, their purpose, and size. It becomes clear that\\nStaten Island, which has a relatively high share of projects, has not experienced any taking for the purpose of\\nurban renewal throughout the examined period.\\nFrom Table 5, it can be seen that while the total number of projects and blocks taken for urban renewal\\ndecreased after 2005, it slightly increased for lots. This can be explained by the relatively large number of lots per\\nproject for the two urban renewal projects in Queens post-2005. These projects are the two phases of the Willets\\nPoint urban renewal project.22\\n4.5. Results\\nTo examine whether the probability of a taking project for urban renewal changed after the Court’s decision in\\nKelo, a multiple logistic regression was estimated. The dependent variable is 1 for urban renewal project and\\n0 otherwise. The independent variables are Borough, Project Size (by Blocks),23 the dummy Legal Change, and\\nthe dummy Election Year for mayoral elections in New York City.24 Table 6 shows the model’s parameter esti-\\nmates and odds ratios (OR). After controlling for all other independent variables, the probability of an urban\\nrenewal project is estimated at 10% of that from before the 2005 legal change (OR = 0.10, p < 0.001, 95% CI\\n0.03–0.29).\\nSignificant differences were found between the following pairs of boroughs: Queens–Brooklyn (OR = 0.06,\\np < 0.01, 95% CI 0.01–0.30); Queens–Manhattan (0.09, p < 0.01, 95% CI 0.02–0.43). This means that the proba-\\nbility of urban renewal takings in Queens is 6% of that in Brooklyn and 9% of that in Manhattan. Other paired\\ncomparisons were not significant.\\nAll pairs of project sizes categories were found to be significant: two to four blocks—one block (OR = 4.64,\\np = 0.02, 95% CI 1.27–16.90); five or more—one (OR = 33.00, p < 0.0001, 95% CI 5.90–184.61); and five or\\nmore—two to four blocks (OR = 7.11, p = 0.03, 95% CI 1.27–39.74). Therefore, the probability for the largest\\nproject size category to be for urban renewal is on average 7.1 times higher than when the taking involves 2–4\\nblocks. When compared to the one-block category, the probability is estimated at 33 times on average. The prob-\\nability of urban renewal taking for a 2- to 4-block project size is 4.64 times higher than for the one-block cate-\\ngory. Lastly, the coefficient for Election Year was insignificant, indicating no difference in the probability of\\nurban renewal takings in such years.\\nTable 5\\nDistribution of projects, lots, and blocks by boroughs and project purpose\\nBorough\\n2005\\nUrban renewal\\nOther\\nProjects\\nBlocks\\nLots\\nProjects\\nBlocks\\nLots\\nBrooklyn\\nPre\\n17\\n76\\n201\\n11\\n12\\n18\\nPost\\n5\\n13\\n124\\n20\\n24\\n44\\nAll\\n22\\n89\\n325\\n31\\n36\\n62\\nManhattan\\nPre\\n9\\n8\\n20\\n9\\n9\\n12\\nPost\\n2\\n8\\n65\\n9\\n25\\n47\\nAll\\n11\\n16\\n85\\n18\\n34\\n59\\nBronx\\nPre\\n4\\n19\\n47\\n4\\n4\\n5\\nPost\\n0\\n—\\n—\\n6\\n8\\n24\\nAll\\n4\\n19\\n47\\n10\\n12\\n29\\nQueens\\nPre\\n4\\n16\\n47\\n17\\n38\\n93\\nPost\\n2\\n19\\n158\\n18\\n77\\n828\\nAll\\n6\\n35\\n205\\n35\\n115\\n921\\nStaten Island\\nPre\\n0\\n—\\n—\\n23\\n104\\n302\\nPost\\n0\\n—\\n—\\n37\\n180\\n1324\\nAll\\n0\\n—\\n—\\n60\\n284\\n1626\\nAll\\nPre\\n34\\n119\\n315\\n64\\n167\\n430\\nPost\\n9\\n40\\n347\\n90\\n314\\n2267\\nAll\\n43\\n159\\n662\\n154\\n481\\n2697\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n459\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nFor robustness testing of the model parameterization, an alternative estimation is offered in the Supplemen-\\ntary Appendix (Table S1). Here, the number of lots per taking is used as a multiplier to the observations (fre-\\nquency). This could be justified based on the notion that takings are enacted upon lots as a derivative of the\\nproject. In this case, the prediction for the difference in probability of a taking to be designated for urban renewal\\npost-2005 is still 90% lower than before the legal change (OR = 0.1, p < 0.0001, 95% CI 0.06–0.15). As expected,\\ngoodness-of-fit has improved in terms of McFadden’s R2 to 0.44. Otherwise, the inflation of the observations has\\nincreased the significance of the parameters. Differences between boroughs have become clearly significant. Now\\nonly the difference between Queens and Brooklyn is insignificant while all others are significant. Significant dif-\\nferences also occur between all three categories of project size (blocks) and between an election year and other\\nyears.\\nIn order to assess whether the trend for the share of urban renewal projects was in decline prior to the legal\\nchange in 2005, a separate regression was estimated. For the first period of 1991–2005, a simple logistic regression\\nwas estimated, with only the year as an independent predictor. Here, the coefficient (and the model as a whole)\\nwas not significant (B = \\u00020.04, p = 0.45), indicating a steady pace at the period average of 45% urban renewal\\nprojects across the overall takings (Fig. 3). In comparison, for the post-period, the overall average share of urban\\nrenewal projects was 14.5%. Here, the coefficient was significant (B = \\u00020.22, p = 0.03*), indicating a decline over\\nthe years in the share of urban renewal projects (Fig. 4). Note that while the number of urban renewal projects\\ndeclined between the periods (from 34 to 9), the number of other projects increased (from 41 to 53). Had the\\nnumber of other projects been kept steady, the share of urban renewal projects for the post-period was 18%, rela-\\ntive to 45% in the pre-period.\\nTable 6\\nMultiple logistic regression for an urban renewal project (n = 137)\\nTerm\\nEstimate\\nSE\\nχ2\\nPv χ2\\nIntercept\\n\\u00021.03\\n0.37\\n7.65\\n0.006\\nBorough (Brooklyn)\\n1.02\\n0.39\\n6.75\\n0.009\\nBorough (Manhattan)\\n0.69\\n0.41\\n2.81\\n0.094\\nBorough (Bronx)\\n0.02\\n0.60\\n0.00\\n0.975\\nProject size (blocks) (2–4—one)\\n1.53\\n0.66\\n5.41\\n0.020\\nProject size (blocks) (5 or more—2–4)\\n1.96\\n0.88\\n5.00\\n0.025\\n2005 (post–pre)\\n\\u00022.35\\n0.57\\n16.94\\n<0.0001\\nElection year (election–no election)\\n0.22\\n0.52\\n0.17\\n0.681\\nOdds ratios—urban renewal project versus other purposes\\nBorough\\nOR\\nPv χ 2\\n95% CI\\nManhattan–Brooklyn\\n0.72\\n0.55\\n0.24\\n2.11\\nBronx–Brooklyn\\n0.37\\n0.23\\n0.07\\n1.89\\nBronx–Manhattan\\n0.51\\n0.43\\n0.10\\n2.73\\nQueens–Brooklyn\\n0.06\\n0.00\\n0.01\\n0.30\\nQueens–Manhattan\\n0.09\\n0.00\\n0.02\\n0.43\\nQueens–Bronx\\n0.17\\n0.08\\n0.02\\n1.23\\nProject size (blocks)\\n2–4—one\\n4.64\\n0.02\\n1.27\\n16.90\\n5 or more—one\\n33.00\\n<0.0001\\n5.90\\n184.61\\n5 or more—2–4\\n7.11\\n0.03\\n1.27\\n39.74\\n2005 legal change\\nPost–pre\\n0.10\\n<0.0001\\n0.03\\n0.29\\nElection year\\nElection–no election\\n1.24\\n0.68\\n0.44\\n3.46\\nNote: McFadden’s R2 = 0.26, n = 137. Parameter estimates for boroughs are all referenced to an average category, parameters\\nfor project size, legal change, and elections are all estimated relative to the adjacent category. Abbreviation: CI, confidence\\ninterval; OR, odds ratio; Pv, P value.\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n460\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\n5. Discussion\\nStudying condemnations in New York City for a period of 29 years allows a quasi-experimental test of the com-\\nmon assertion that left to their own devices by the Supreme Court decision, city officials under no constitutional\\nimpediment to their power would become more aggressive in their eminent domain practices. The findings refute\\nthis hypothesis, showing that the Court’s decision that approved taking for economic development projects,\\nwhich was followed by extensive public debate but no legislative reform in New York, had no long-term observ-\\nable positive effect on the government’s engagement in such takings. On the contrary: the probability of taking\\nfor an urban renewal project dropped by 90%. At the same time, no increase in the average size of projects\\nemerged, nor an increase in the overall level of taking activity, keeping a modest average of 6–7 development pro-\\njects per year throughout the City’s five boroughs. Therefore, the City did not show a bigger appetite for urban\\nrenewal including economic development takings after the decision, despite that the Court’s invitation to the\\nstates to amend their laws was not officially accepted by New York State.\\nFigure 3\\nLogistic fit of urban renewal project share by year, pre-2005 (n = 75).\\nFigure 4\\nLogistic fit of urban renewal project share by year, post-2005 (n = 62).\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n461\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nIn the three-player game portrayed by traditional political theory, featuring courts, legislators and public opin-\\nion, the popular majority’s dissatisfaction with a court’s decision triggers the legislator’s reaction. The multiple\\nreforms that followed the Kelo decision were used to support the effectiveness of the political system in the face\\nof contemporary views that we live in an era of disenchantment with the legislative process (Scheppele, 2009).\\nThus, if no reform was approved in a particular state, this was arguably because in that state, public opinion did\\nnot sufficiently disapprove of the Court’s decision. Public ignorance theory predicted that the Court’s reluctance\\nto intervene coupled by the popular voter’s political ignorance would result in a gradual distancing from what the\\nmajority wanted. These predictions are not supported.\\nI thus contend that neither traditional political theory nor the public ignorance theory pays proper respect to\\nthe factors that affect a fourth player: public officials. The assumption that the public’s ignorance leaves property\\nowners in the hands of eager land developers ignores the political effect the Court’s decision has on public offi-\\ncials; in particular, in the case of takings in urban environments, local public officials. In this more realistic four-\\nplayer game, the motivating forces at work on local officials’ expected behavior should also be considered.\\nThe public’s revealed opinion about economic development projects not only affects legislators but also has a\\nlingering effect on elected and non-elected members of the executive. While the public may be ignorant about the\\ndetails of a legislative reform, or might lose interest over time, these professional players possess high degrees of\\nknowledge and institutional memory. Their actions are therefore prone to be affected by popular views, even if\\nthat is not strictly formalized in legislation or constantly at the focus of the political debate. This is supported by\\nthe insignificant effect of election years on taking practices. Therefore, observing differences in legislation or in\\nlegislative responses is insufficient to fully capture the consequences of a public debate on constitutional matters\\nor its legislative consequences (Byrne, 2017; Turnbull et al., 2017; Turnbull & Salvino, 2009, p. 795). The need to\\nfocus on the executive’s response is in line with current political theory works that identify the growing trend of\\nexecutive aggrandizement (Graber et al., 2018; Khaitan, 2019; Uitz, 2018).\\nThe findings of the current study are consistent with recent empirical studies that call into question the pre-\\ndominant perception that government officials, when exercising their eminent domain power, act as narrow max-\\nimizers of self-interest who are exclusively motivated by budgetary constraints, specifically those created by\\ncompensation rules (Chang, 2009; Levine-Schnur & Parchomovsky, 2016). These studies lend qualified support\\nto the alternative hypothesis that when taking private property, government officials are largely motivated by a\\nvariety of budgetary and non-budgetary considerations, such as actual needs, fairness, and political effects.\\nAccordingly, it is not surprising to find a shift in taking practices reflecting revealed public disapproval of takings\\nfor economic development and urban renewal, even where the legislative response is lacking; and we may expect\\nthis shift to last long after the issue has lost popular attention. Thus, left to their own devices, government offi-\\ncials would not necessarily exhaust their power. They would still be sensitive to both planning needs and political\\nresponses.\\nA wise referee of this paper advised to consider the theories discussed above as not necessarily mutually\\nexclusive. Thus, according to the public choice theory, as time passes and attention wanes, politicians will return\\nto their prior habits. However, despite their inclination to attend to pressures by interest groups that might come\\nwith personal gain, politicians are also careful enough not to go against the popular sentiment. The question is\\nreally how much time has to pass before we are able to test if the second set of incentives has a lasting impact.\\nThe empirics of this paper allows to support the contention that there are more considerations at play than exis-\\nting theories predict, but they may not provide a sufficient mechanism to predict what would happen in the\\nfuture.\\nIt should also be pointed that there is a bit of a paradox in a possible argument that the reaction to Kelo\\nshows that judicial protection is not necessary, because political processes can take care of the situation (either by\\npassing legislation or just by changing the incentives of executive officials). After all, the reaction to Kelo occurred\\nbecause a high-profile case got to a major state or federal appellate court. In a regime where it is basically settled\\nthat “public use” means almost anything the government says it does, there will not be such cases (or at least they\\nwill not get to high-level courts), and thus few or no opportunities to generate such negative public reactions,\\nwhich in turn might deter future abuses. This suggests that even if public use standards are not as tight as some\\ncritics advocate, they do need to be restrictive enough to generate at least some high-profile litigation. Again, the\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n462\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nperiod studied is long, but not long enough to determine whether the effect of Kelo is strong enough to deter\\nabuses indefinitely.\\nSoon after the Kelo decision was delivered, Patricia Salkin predicted that it would not expand or limit eminent\\ndomain practices in New York. Referring also to New Jersey and Pennsylvania, she commented that since these\\nstates had already been practicing condemnations for economic development projects for many years (and with-\\nout strong public opposition, as documented by Becher (2014) for Pennsylvania), “the real impact of Kelo in the\\ntri-state area has been the increased media attention to urban redevelopment projects, a more informed constitu-\\nency due to the media attention, and perhaps more cautious government officials who are likely more inclined to\\nreview potential projects with greater scrutiny” (Salkin, 2007, pp. 25–26). Similarly, Clayton Gillette asserted that\\nKelo would not result in excessive abuse of powers, but rather would have minimal impact on the allocation of\\nsubstantive property rights due to the political process itself (Gillette, 2005). According to the present findings,\\nthis is indeed what happened.\\nAs mentioned, in addition to the uproar generated by Kelo, during the period under study New York City\\nalso had two local eminent domain controversies that too generated a great deal of publicity—the Kaur (Colum-\\nbia) case and the Goldstein (Atlantic Yards) case. Both cases reached the New York Court of Appeals and were\\nthe subject of protests, extensive media coverage, and so on. Perhaps some of the evidence is explicable by these\\nhigh-profile controversies, not just effects of the reaction to Kelo. Even if this is true, the opposite link between\\nthe court decision and the following practices remains.\\nThe data I cite focuses on actual condemnations. But one might expect the mere threat of eminent domain to\\nbe enough to get people to sell “voluntarily.” So, one possible alternative explanation for the data is that, post-\\nKelo, people threatened with condemnation were even more likely to give in without a fight (or at least without\\ngetting to the point where eminent domain was formally used) than before. My answer to that is that the data\\nbased on City Records includes all instances where at least the first stage of condemnation procedures was under-\\ntaken (that being a notice about a public hearing), regardless of what was later withdrawn. Chang’s database as\\nwell as the Case Review refer to cases where the procedure was completed. Given that for New York the doctrine\\nwasn’t expanded by the Kelo decision, I doubt that there is a reason to believe that the mere threat of condemna-\\ntion in the post-period would result in relatively greater numbers of surrenders than before. Therefore, including\\nall condemnations procedures for most of the post-period allows a proper treatment of this concern. Note, how-\\never, that due to practical reasons presented above, actual transactions based on condemnation threat that did\\nnot take any formal form resulting in “voluntary” sales are impossible to catch.\\nIn conclusion, I should emphasize that we ought to be very careful regarding casual inferences here. As previ-\\nously noted, urban renewal projects are often multi-year endeavors. Had Kelo made redevelopment projects eas-\\nier, those projects would appear in the data a few years after 23 June 2005, the date on which the Supreme Court\\nhanded down Kelo. This period where it becomes theoretically possible to see Kelo-enabled development coin-\\ncides with the 2008 Great Recession and ensuing credit crunch that hindered large-scale private development. It\\nwould seem less likely that developers would undertake large projects during a recession. However, the Recession\\nwas an exogenous shock that reversed over the years. As displayed in Figure S1, although the level of building\\npermits issued each year suffered slight drop in 2008–2010 (reaching to a maximum of 10% loss), the trend was\\nsoon overturned, with growing numbers of permits over the years. Such is the case with construction spending\\n(although here the drop was evidenced a bit later, between 2011 and 2013). Given that the study covers the\\nperiod until the end of 2019, this short downturn is not significant and cannot explain the shift in identified con-\\ndemnation practices. As the analysis presented above shows, the trend over the years in the post-period was a\\ncontinuous decline in the share of urban renewal projects which does not fit the Recession-effect hypothesis.\\nThe findings cannot provide clear answer to the reason why the probability for urban renewal projects\\ndropped over time. It might be simply because most of the feasible urban renewal projects have been done, so the\\nneed for such projects naturally dies out, or the practical availably given external limitation such as extended des-\\nignation of historic districts (Ellen et al., 2016) actually prohibits further projects, with or without Kelo.\\nIn summary, the conclusions offered above are confined to the specific case study tested. They are not\\nexpected to hold for different settings not tested. Based on the novel data-collection methods introduced here,\\nthis study may pave the way for future studies to focus on other jurisdictions and their response to Kelo. The\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n463\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\naccumulation of such studies would provide a broader perspective and allow further comparisons that would\\nstrengthen our understanding of the wider implications of the effect of the legal change on taking practices.\\n6. Conclusion\\nThe American nation is currently broadly interrogating the tools that have historically produced geographic seg-\\nregation and destroyed Black and other minorities’ wealth. Eminent domain is prominent in this debate. This\\nstudy offers essential hand-collected data about how New York City is using eminent domain. The study provides\\na useful estimation of the effect of a state-empowering Supreme Court decision that was followed by strong public\\nopposition but no state legislative reform. It shows that in New York City, there was a sharp decline in the proba-\\nbility of urban renewal taking projects following Kelo, despite the fact that New York was one of the few states\\nthat did not amend their eminent domain laws after the decision. The findings indicate that government officials\\ndo not exercise the full range of their eminent domain capacity even if they know that their decisions would not\\nbe in fact judicially scrutinized. Furthermore, city officials are either not required to or not interested in advanc-\\ning publicly sensitive development projects that pose a threat both to their diverse constituency and to the inter-\\nests of real-estate investors.\\nThis study supports the assertion that the influence of this decision would not be as dramatic as some suspect,\\nbecause as the New York City case shows, actual practices of land condemnations, even where no meaningful\\nrestrictions apply, are rather balanced and limited—far from that which is legally permissible.\\nThe present findings suggest that despite the absence of strict limitations on the government’s power, govern-\\nments can function well based on market forces and planning needs. Nonetheless, revealed public preferences do\\naffect the government’s behavior. On the basis of the current findings, future studies should proceed in two direc-\\ntions: one that attempts to better understand the current findings, another that attempts to explore their potential\\nextrapolation. First, future studies should try to better distinguish between condemnations to remove blight and\\nthose that aim to improve the use of property that was not inflicting harm; and between takings from private to\\npublic and from private to private. They should also try to assess the specific interest Kelo generated among NYC\\ngovernment, by examining the records of New York City government and the governments of the five boroughs\\nor the campaigns for mayoral or local offices.\\nSecond, future research should attempt to test whether the main finding regarding the responsiveness of gov-\\nernment decisionmaking to the revealed information on the public’s opinion is valid in other contexts as well. It\\nseems a fundamental political question. Moreover, the methods used to test it in this specific context, such as the\\nreview of the City Record used in this paper for the first time, may be further employed for other related contexts\\nin which intuition supports the overall conclusion, but evidence is lacking.\\nAcknowledgments\\nThe study would not have been possible without the generous access Yun-chien Chang allowed me to the data-\\nbase he created for his studies on NYC. Nimrod Karin and Alina Aharonovitz provided superb research assis-\\ntance, while Ron Horne delivered excellent support with the statistics. I thank the four anonymous referees,\\nRonen Avraham, Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Amnon Lehavi, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Adi Libson, Moran Ofir, Gid-\\neon Parchomovsky, Yuval Procaccia, Yaniv Roznai, David Schleicher, Ilya Somin, Eyal Zamir, and participants\\nand organizers at the State and Local Government Law Works-in-Progress Conference; Association for Law,\\nProperty, and Society Annual Meeting; Israeli Law and Economics Association Conference; Private and Commer-\\ncial Law Workshop at the Hebrew University Law Faculty; Law and Economics Workshop at Tel Aviv University\\nLaw Faculty, and Reichman University Law School Faculty Seminar, for valuable insights, comments, and\\nsuggestions.\\nEndnotes\\n1\\nKelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n464\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\n2\\nTaking for urban renewal that includes the destruction of deteriorated housing is also known as “blight condemnation.”\\nHowever, the exact definition for blight is subject to interpretation and is not standardized.\\n3\\nBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).\\n4\\nBerliner (2015) counts only 44 states making statutory or constitutional improvements, although she acknowledges that\\nthe 45th state, New Jersey, did pass a statute purporting to increase eminent domain protections. For an up-to-date listing\\nof post-Kelo state legislative initiatives, see, “The Castle Coalition: 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain\\nReform Legislation since Kelo,” http://castlecoalition.org/50-state-report-card.\\n5\\nGoldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009); Kaur v. New York State Urban Devel-\\nopment Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).\\n6\\nThe other states are Arkansas and Massachusetts. Additionally, no amends took place in the District of Columbia, and\\nthe US territories.\\n7\\nN.Y. CONST. ART. I § 7 (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation”).\\n8\\nN.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 500 et seq; § 502. See also N.Y. CONST. ART. XVIII § 1.\\n9\\nMatter of C/S 12th Ave. LLC v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 1, 10–11, 815 N.Y.S.2d 516, 525, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS\\n6897, 17–18, 2006 NY Slip Op 4172, 8 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t May 25, 2006).\\n10\\nFor example, S. 5936, 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S. 5961, 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005); S. 7358, 229th Sess. (N.Y. 2006). For more\\ndetails see New York State Bar Association Special Task Force on Eminent Domain, Report 3, 2006.\\n11\\nIt should be noted that NYC, Boston, and DC, where no legislative change occurred, form the Northeast Corridor, which\\nis among the most densely settled and wealthiest regions in the nation. These cities are more intensely developed than all\\nbut\\na\\nhandful\\nof\\nother\\nplaces\\nin\\nthe\\nnation\\n(Northeast\\nCorridor\\nInfrastructure\\nand\\nOperations\\nAdvisory\\nCommission, 2014).\\n12\\nGoldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009); Kaur v. New York State Urban Devel-\\nopment Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).\\n13\\nIn Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit rejected a pretextual taking claim.\\n14\\nMatter of Uptown Holdings, LLC v. City of New York, 77 A.D.3d 434, 908 N.Y.S.2d 657, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7343,\\n2010 NY Slip Op 7227 (Justice Catterson). See also Nat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler, No. 29 (N.Y. 23 June 2020)\\n(Justice Rivera).\\n15\\nCondemnations by the New York State Dormitory Authority were not included.\\n16\\nThe journal is published Monday through Friday, except legal holidays, by the Department of Citywide Administrative\\nServices of the City of New York under Authority of Section 1066 of the New York City Charter.\\n17\\nhttps://www1.nyc.gov/site/dcas/about/city-record.page.\\n18\\nNYC Citywide Administrative Services—The City Record Online, https://a856-cityrecord.nyc.gov/Search/Advanced.\\n19\\nhttps://data.cityofnewyork.us/browse?q=acris&tags=acris+land+records.\\n20\\nA lot, which in fact refers to a Tax Lot, is a subdivision of a Tax Block and represents the property unique location. A\\nTax Block is a sub-division of the borough on which real properties are located. See New York City, Glossary of Terms for\\nProperty Sales Files, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/finance/downloads/pdf/07pdf/glossary_rsf071607.pdf.\\n21\\nThe date of the Court’s decision (23 June 2005) was the cut-off point. In 2005, there were two taking projects prior to that\\ndate, which were attributed to the pre-legal-change group, and two taking projects after that date, which were attributed\\nto the post-legal-change group.\\n22\\nSee: https://edc.nyc/project/willets-point.\\n23\\nWhen estimating project size by lots similar results were obtained.\\n24\\nThe model cannot account for the interaction between legal change and project size as well as legal change and borough\\ndue to the limited number of observations.\\nDATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT\\nThe data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable\\nrequest.\\n© 2022 The Author. 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Using eminent domain for economic development: Does it increase private sec-\\ntor employment? Review of Law & Economics, 14(3), 20160020. https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0020\\nUitz, R. (2018). Courts and the expansion of executive power: Making the constitution matter. In D. Bilchitz & D. Landau\\n(Eds.), The evolution of the separation of powers (p. 85). Edward Elgar Publishing.\\nWalsh, C., & McNamara, R. (2009). Building empires, destroying homes: Eminent domain abuse in New York. https://ij.org/\\nreport/building-empires-destroying-homes/\\nZilis, M. (2015). The limits of legitimacy: Dissenting opinions, media coverage, and public responses to supreme court decisions.\\nUniversity of Michigan Press.\\nCASES CITED\\nBerman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).\\nC/S 12th Ave. LLC v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 1, 815 N.Y.S.2d 516, 2006 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6897, 2006\\nNY Slip Op 4172 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t May 25, 2006).\\nGoldstein v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164 (N.Y. 2009).\\nGoldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir. 2008).\\nKaur v. New York State Urban Development Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010).\\nKelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).\\nNat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Schueckler, No. 29 (N.Y. 23 June 2020) (Justice Rivera).\\nUptown Holdings, LLC v. City of New York, 77 A.D.3d 434, 908 N.Y.S.2d 657, 2010 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7343,\\n2010 NY Slip Op 7227.\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n467\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and post-Kelo R. Levine-\\nSchnur\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\\n\\n\\nSupporting information\\nAdditional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher’s web-site:\\nAppendix S1. Supporting Information.\\nFigure S1 Building permits issued and construction spending, in NYC, by year (2000–2019) (Source: Office of\\nthe New York State Comptroller, 2021).\\n© 2022 The Author. Regulation & Governance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd.\\n468\\nR. Levine-Schnur\\nIs the government exhausting its powers? An empirical examination of eminent domain exercises in New York City pre- and\\npost-Kelo\\n 17485991, 2023, 2, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/rego.12464, Wiley Online Library on [29/09/2024]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License\",\"difficulty\":\"hard\",\"domain\":\"Single-Document QA\",\"length\":\"short\",\"question\":\"In light of the empirical data reflecting a decline in urban renewal projects involving condemnations in New York City after the Kelo decision, what can be inferred about the shifting dynamics of power among the judicial, legislative, and executive branches in shaping property rights and urban development policies? How might these trends inform a reevaluation of the principles of constitutional governance regarding eminent domain? Which of the following interpretations best captures these nuanced interrelations?\",\"sub_domain\":\"Governmental\"}","display_format":"text","language":"","answer_status":"published","assets":[],"source_url":"https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2","history":"initial import","indexing_mode":"noindex","subproblems":[],"grids":[]}