# LongBench v2 / 66f6b623bb02136c067c2646

task_id: 39439830-c01e-538d-abcb-dcfa9ba98ebf
task_key: train--66f6b623bb02136c067c2646
task_revision_id: 1

{"choice_A":"Accidental fall from a building","choice_B":"Homicide by unknown assailants","choice_C":"Suicide due to stress from interrogation","choice_D":"Natural causes unrelated to interrogation","context":"Teoh Beng Hock\nTraditional Chinese\n趙明福\nSimplified Chinese\n赵明福\n[show]\nTranscriptions\nBar Council of Malaysia\n(headquarters in Kuala Lumpur)\nshowing a banner 'Teoh Beng\nHock dalam kenangan' (Teoh\nBeng Hock in memoriam).\n[show]\nv · \nt · \ne\nFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia\nIn this Chinese name, the family name is Teoh (赵).\nTeoh Beng Hock (20 April 1979 – 16 July 2009) was a Chinese Malaysian journalist\nand political aide to Ean Yong Hian Wah, a member of the Selangor state legislative\nassembly and state executive council. On 15 July 2009, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption\nCommission (MACC) took Teoh into custody for questioning about allegations of\ncorruption. Teoh was found dead the next morning on the rooftop of a building adjacent\nto the MACC offices. Pakatan Rakyat leaders and a number of federal government\nofficials called for a Royal Commission of inquiry into Teoh's death.[1]\nFamily\n​\n[ edit ]\nTeoh was the third child of Teoh Leong Hwee (born 1953). He had an elder brother; Teoh Beng\nKee (Chinese: 赵铭基) (born 1976), elder sister; Teoh Lee Jun (Chinese: 赵丽君) and a younger\nsister; Teoh Lee Lan (1980,Chinese: 赵丽兰). His father was a taxi driver, and his mother, Teng\nShuw Hor (1953) is a housewife.\nTeoh was engaged to 28-year-old teacher Soh Cher Wei after a two-year courtship, and had been\nplanning to register his marriage with her the day following his death. A photo shoot on the same\nday, followed by a honeymoon and wedding reception in October had also been planned. At the\ntime of Teoh's death, Soh was two months pregnant; she told the press she intended to keep the child.[2] National Registration\nDepartment regulations only allow a father's name to be included on the birth certificate if he is physically present at the time of birth;\nafter this was publicised through the press, Women, Family and Community Development Minister Shahrizat Abdul Jalil said she\nwould ask the NRD to look into the matter. Shahrizat also stated her ministry would assist in transferring Soh from her current school\nto one closer to her hometown, and look into assisting Teoh's family since he was their sole breadwinner.[3]\nPrime Minister Najib Razak later met with Teoh's family to express his condolences. Najib told them he would direct the Attorney-\nGeneral and relevant government departments to look into Teoh's family's wish that his child bear the Teoh surname.[4] On 15 August\n2009, Soh completed the traditional Chinese marriage ceremonies, together with Teoh Lee Lan, Beng Hock's younger sister, acting as\na proxy. Kerk Kim Hock, a distant uncle of Teoh and the family's acting spokesperson, told the press that completion of the marriage\nrites now entitled Soh to have her name engraved on Teoh's gravestone as his wife.[5]\nSequence of events\n​\n[ edit ]\nMACC officials claimed that the interrogation had lasted for about 9 hours. According to the MACC also, Teoh was freed at 3.45 am—\nhowever without proper explanation, his possessions, including his mobile phone, remained in MACC custody. MACC officials also\nclaimed that Teoh asked to stay the night at the MACC office, and was claimed to be last seen alive around 6 am. Teoh was found\ndead at 1.30 pm later in the day. The investigation had been into allegations that Ean Yong had paid RM2,400 for flags to be used in\nMerdeka Day celebrations, but not taken delivery of the flags. Teoh's colleagues who had also been questioned claimed that they\nwere put under pressure from MACC officers, including being denied access to legal counsel and food or drink.[6] Teoh's mobile\nphone was still in the possession of MACC officials when he was found dead at 1.30 pm despite the MACC's claims that Teoh was\nreleased at 3.45 am. The mobile phone was later handed to the police for investigation.[7]\nOne of Teoh's colleagues, Tan Boon Wah, later filed suit against the MACC for false imprisonment. In the case, Tan Boon Wah v.\nDatuk Seri Ahmad Said Hamdan, Ketua Suruhanjaya, Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia and Others, the High Court ruled\nthat because Tan was interrogated after normal working hours, he had been subject to false imprisonment, and ordered the MACC to\npay him damages. Tan's lawyer, Karpal Singh, said that Teoh's family could also sue the MACC for damages, citing this ruling.\nDemocratic Action Party Parliamentary leader and former Opposition Leader Lim Kit Siang lamented that \"Teoh Beng Hock would not\nhave died if MACC had followed the law\" and interrogated him during the day.[8]\nTeoh's family and others have called the MACC's version of events into question. When the investigating officer involved briefed the\nMACC's advisory board, several members of the board \"asked why he chose to stay back. Any detainee would have run for his life!\nThe investigating officer replied that since Teoh wanted to stay back, he allowed it.\" During this briefing it also emerged that no official\nrecords of Teoh's detention or his release existed.[9] In August, a video of men in uniform assaulting a man in their custody began\ncirculating as a supposed video of Teoh's interrogation. The Bukit Aman federal police headquarters denied the men were police\npersonnel. The video had previously been circulated in June as a supposed example of police interrogation techniques, ruling out the\npossibility of it involving Teoh. A political observer attributed the video's popularity to the government's failing to provide adequate\nclarification about the circumstances of Teoh's interrogation: \"The authorities are shedding little light about what happened to Teoh.\nThis allows rumour mongers to spread ridiculous things.\"[10]\nResponse to death\n​\n[ edit ]\nSome lawyers have argued that the law does not authorise the MACC to hold witnesses in custody, and that since Teoh was not a\nsuspect, he should not have been held in custody. The Malaysian Human Rights Commission (SUHAKAM) called the duration of\nTeoh's questioning \"inhumane and cruel.\"[1] The president of the Bar Council, K. Ragunath, said the MACC had contravened the\nFederal Constitution by denying Teoh legal counsel during questioning, as well as the Lockup Rules 1953, which require all detainees\nto be locked up between 6.30 pm and 6.30 am to rest. Ragunath called Teoh's interrogation tantamount to torture.[11] Ean Yong's\nlawyer insisted that as \"Teoh's movement was restricted, this amounts to an arrest,\" despite the MACC's insistence that Teoh was\nonly a voluntary witness.[12] Mohamad Ramli Manan, a senior official who retired from the Anti-Corruption Agency (before it became\nthe MACC), agreed:\nIt is against established law and practice to interrogate them (suspects) in the night. The lock-up rules demand that they be\nsent to a lock-up by at least 8 pm... Witnesses are sent back to their offices or homes and asked to be present at another\nappointed date. I don't know why they had to call Teoh at 5 pm. This may be due to poor planning or some evil intention or\nevil purpose on their part. ... The rights of a witness are protected more than that of a suspect, who is under detention...the\nperson can demand that the interview be adjourned to the next morning. ... The examining officer has to oblige, failing which\nthis becomes an (unlawful) detention or arrest. ... This shows that Teoh was definitely in the custody of the MACC. Under\nSection 15 of the Criminal Procedure Code, an arrest occurs when you confine the person (physically). Thus, there was\nunlawful detention or arrest of Teoh.[13]\nAnother former ACA official, Abdul Razak Idris, disputed Ramli's view of the interrogation process, saying: \"The Act provides that we\ncan interview anytime. Investigators are supposed to work 24 hours.\"[14]\nIn response to calls from civil society and political leaders for a Royal Commission, Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin stated\nthe Cabinet would consider setting up a Royal Commission of inquiry.[15] Initial police findings suggested foul play was not involved in\nTeoh's death, but his friends and relatives insisted Teoh had not committed suicide, pointing to the fact that he was to be married, and\nthat his fiance was pregnant.[16] Teoh's family lawyers claimed that during questioning by the police, his family had been asked\nquestions suggesting that they were primarily interested in \"[absolving] MACC officers from liability\" by pursuing the possibility of a\nsuicide. A week after Teoh's death, his family vigorously insisted there was no possibility he had killed himself: \"Teoh was joyful and\nhad no problems at work. Teoh had no financial issues, got along well with everyone and was preparing for his wedding.\" One detail\nwhich seemed to strike the police was Teoh's shoes; when his body was discovered, his shoes were apparently significantly damaged\nand worn. Teoh's fiancee \"said that Teoh had several pairs and seldom changed them unless they were damaged, but on that fateful\nday, he wore a new pair.\"[17]\nThe United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)-owned newspaper Berita Harian published an op-ed by New Straits Times Press\nmanaging editor Zainul Ariffin Isa criticising the response to Teoh's death, stating that criticisms of the MACC were an attempt to\nundermine Malay institutions. Zainul was particularly critical of Selangor Menteri Besar Khalid Ibrahim for his criticism of the MACC\nofficers' handling of the case, saying it was not right for Khalid to question \"those of the same race as him.\"[18]\nAt the weekly Malaysian Cabinet meeting on 22 July following Teoh's death, the Cabinet transferred all MACC officers involved in the\nprobe of graft allegations against the Selangor government to other assignments, pending the official police inquiry.[18] The Cabinet\nalso decided to establish a Royal Commission of inquiry into the MACC's interrogation procedures, but not Teoh's death, allowing the\nstandard inquest to pursue the matter.[19]\nRoyal Commission of inquiry\n​\n[ edit ]\nIn a joint statement, Pakatan Rakyat leaders called the Royal Commission's terms of reference insufficient, saying that the \"question\n[of how Teoh died] cannot be separated from the more general issue of how the MACC conducts investigations.\"[20] The Pakatan\nRakyat statement insisted that the Commission probe the following questions:\n*why was Teoh's case allegedly involving an amount less than RM2,500 is [sic] pursued with such aggression and urgency?\nwhy was Teoh and another so-called \"witness\" kept overnight and interrogated with such oppression?\nwhy was Teoh's hand phone in the custody of the MACC when the MACC insisted that he was only a witness; why did\nthe MACC initially deny they took his handphone?\nwhy would Teoh spend the night at the MACC's office if he was free to go especially since he was scheduled to be\nmarried the next morning?\nwhy would Teoh commit suicide (as alleged by MACC and others) in these circumstances, when he is about to get\nmarried, with his fiancé expecting their child, and with no sign or history of depression or mental illness?[21]\nRobert Phang, a member of the MACC advisory board, suggested that \"Though the royal commission's scope is wide, it can be\nopened up further to dig deeper into issues not cleared by the inquest,\" such as establishing a reason for Teoh's death.[9] Also being\ninvestigated is a mystery letter written on the letterhead of MACC, alleging MACC, Hishamuddin bin Hashim was involved with the\ntorture of Teoh Beng Hock and former Menteri Besar Khir Toyo had prior knowledge of it.[22][23]\nThe Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded that Teoh was not murdered but had committed suicide due to the aggressive\ninterrogation tactics by three MACC officers.[24] Teoh's family have rejected the RCI's findings and insisted that Teoh was\nmurdered.[25] The Bar Council of Malaysia have also questioned the RCI's findings.[26] A coalition of 126 NGOs have called the\nCommission's findings a whitewash as it did not address the concerns regarding the interrogation methods by the MACC.[27] Prime\nMinister Najib Tun Razak has defended the RCI's findings and called on all quarters not to question the findings.[28] The Malay daily\nUtusan Malaysia, which is owned by UMNO, defended the MACC and blamed DAP for Teoh's death.[29]\nThe three MACC officers involved in interrogating Teoh have been suspended pending an investigation by the police.[30]\nFurther developments\n​\n[ edit ]\nOn 10 February 2012, Teoh Meng Kee, Beng Hock’s elder brother filed an application at the Court of Appeal to review the open\nverdict stating that Teoh Beng Hock committed suicide delivered by the Coroner’s Court in 2011, after his application was rejected by\nthe High Court on 1 December 2011.[31] The Court of Appeal on 5 September 2014 set aside the open verdict stating that \"a person\nor persons were responsible\" for Teoh's death.[32][33]\nSee also\n​\n[ edit ]\nKugan Ananthan\nTan Boon Wah v Seri Ahmad Said Hamdan\nGunasegaran Rajasundram\nAhmad Sarbani Mohamed\nRoyal Commission Watch\nReferences\n​\n[ edit ]\n1. ^ a b Musa Kamal, Ayu; Muzliza Mustafa; Pearl Lee; Teoh El Sen;\nAizat Sharif (17 July 2009). \"DEATH OF TEOH BENG HOCK: A\nmystery waiting to be solved\"\n. The Malay Mail. Archived from\nthe original\n on 20 July 2009. Retrieved 20 July 2009.\n2. ^ Mahmood, Mazlinda (18 July 2009). \"Teoh's fiancee to keep\nbaby\"\n. The New Straits Times. Archived from the original\n on\n22 July 2009. Retrieved 22 July 2009.\n3. ^ \"Ministry to look into welfare of Teoh's family\"\n. The Star. 22\nJuly 2009. Archived from the original\n on 23 July 2009.\nRetrieved 22 July 2009.\n4. ^ \"Najib meets the Teohs\"\n. The Malaysian Insider. 28 July\n2009. Archived from the original\n on 31 July 2009. Retrieved\n28 July 2009.\n5. ^ Chong, Debra (15 August 2009). \"The bride wore black\"\n. The\nMalaysian Insider. Archived from the original\n on 16 August\n2009. Retrieved 15 August 2009.\n6. ^ Yeoh, Tricia (17 July 2009). \" 'Who will fall prey next?' \"\n.\nMalaysiakini. Retrieved 20 July 2009.\n7. ^ \"Cops step up probe into Teoh's death\"\n. Malaysian Insider. 21\nJuly 2009. Archived from the original\n on 22 July 2009.\n8. ^ Chong, Debra (19 November 2009). \"MACC can't quiz\nwitnesses beyond office hours, High Court rules\"\n. The\nMalaysian Insider. Archived from the original\n on 20 November\n2009. Retrieved 19 November 2009.\n9. ^ a b Ong, Andrew (1 August 2009). \" 'No in-out record', MACC\nadvisor raises eyebrows\"\n. Malaysiakini. Retrieved 3 August\n2009.\n10. ^ Ong, Andrew (4 August 2009). \"Assault video linked to Teoh\nsparks frenzy\"\n. Malaysiakini. Retrieved 4 August 2009.\n11. ^ \"Teoh 'the first political death' under Najib\"\n. Malaysiakini. 18\nJuly 2009. Retrieved 20 July 2009.\n12. ^ Spykerman, Neville (22 July 2009). \"Ean Yong: Teoh was\narrested\"\n. The Malaysian Insider. Archived from the original\non 23 July 2009. Retrieved 22 July 2009.\n13. ^ Kuek Ser, Kuang Keng (28 July 2009). \"Former ACA official:\nTeoh held unlawfully\"\n. Malaysiakini. Retrieved 28 July 2009.\n14. ^ Yip, Ai Tsin (31 July 2009). \"Ex-ACA top gun: Stop showering\ncriticism on MACC\"\n. Malaysiakini. Retrieved 31 July 2009.\n15. ^ \"Muhyiddin: Cabinet to consider setting up royal panel\"\n.\nMalaysiakini. 18 July 2009. Retrieved 20 July 2009.\n16. ^ \"Cops rule out foul play, friends rule out suicide\"\n.\nMalaysiakini. 17 July 2009. Retrieved 20 July 2009.\n17. ^ Ghazali, Rahmah (22 July 2009). \" 'Police tried absolve MACC\nofficers from liability' \"\n. Malaysiakini. Retrieved 22 July 2009.\n18. ^ a b \"Cabinet orders suspension of MACC officers\"\n. The\nMalaysian Insider. 22 July 2009. Archived from the original\n on\n23 July 2009. Retrieved 22 July 2009.\n19. ^ \"Cabinet approves royal commission\"\n. Malaysiakini. 22 July\n2009. Retrieved 22 July 2009.\n20. ^ \"Pakatan wants more from royal commission\"\n. Malaysiakini.\n23 July 2009. Retrieved 23 July 2009.\n21. ^ name=\"pr_statement\"\n22. ^ \"THE SHIT HAS HIT THE FAN\"\n. 20 August 2009. Archived\nfrom the original\n on 21 August 2009.\n23. ^ \"Senior MACC man denies forcing Teoh onto ledge |\nMalaysians for Beng Hock\"\n. Teohbenghock.org. 2 April 2011.\nArchived from the original\n on 30 August 2011.\n24. ^ \"RCI: 'Weak-willed' Teoh committed suicide\"\n. Archived from\nthe original\n on 23 July 2011. Retrieved 24 July 2011.\n25. ^ [1]\n Archived\n 23 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine\n26. ^ \"freemalaysiatoday.com\"\n. Archived from the original\n on 8\nMarch 2012. Retrieved 24 July 2011.\n27. ^ [2]\n Archived\n 23 July 2011 at the Wayback Machine\n28. ^ \"Najib: Don't dispute RCI report on Teoh\"\n. Archived from the\noriginal\n on 5 February 2012. Retrieved 24 July 2011.\n29. ^ Chooi, Clara (24 July 2011). \"Utusan defends MACC, holds\nDAP responsible for Teoh's death\"\n. The Malaysian Insider.\nArchived from the original\n on 15 October 2012.\n30. ^ Teoh El Sen (23 July 2011). \"Teoh's suicide: MACC suspends\nthree officers\"\n. Free Malaysia Today.\n31. ^ Ida Lim (5 September 2014). \"Beng Hock's death not suicide,\ncaused by 'unknown' persons and MACC, court rules\"\n. The\nMalay Mail.\n32. ^ V. Anbalagan (5 September 2014). \"Court of Appeal reverses\nopen verdict ruling in Teoh Beng Hock's death\"\n. The Malaysian\nInsider. Archived from the original\n on 6 September 2014.\n33. ^ Lim, Ida (5 September 2014). \"Beng Hock's death not suicide,\ncaused by 'unknown' persons and MACC, court rules\"\n. Malay\nMail. Retrieved 8 July 2018.\nAnti-Chinese sentiment (Sinophobia)\nCategories: 1979 births\n2009 deaths\nMalaysian people of Chinese descent\nDemocratic Action Party (Malaysia) politicians\nHuman rights abuses in Malaysia\nDeaths in police custody in Malaysia\nMalaysian prisoners and detainees\nMalaysian journalists\nMalaysian women journalists\nDeaths from falls\nDeaths by defenestration\nPolitical scandals in Malaysia\n20th-century journalists\nSearch\nSearch Wikipedia\nDonate Create account Log in\n\n\n  \nREPORT OF THE ~ \n- \nROYAL COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY \nINTO THE DEATH OF TEOH BENG HOCK \nPRESENTED TO SERI PADUKA BAGINDA \nYANG DI-PERTUAN AGONG ON \nTHE 22\"° JUNE 2011 \nBY \nCOMMISSIONERS \nTAN SRI DATUK SERI JAMES FOONG CHENG YUEN \n[CHAIRMAN] \nDATO’ HAJI ABDUL KADIR SULAIMAN \nDATO’ SELVENTHIRANATHAN THIAGARAJAH \nDATO’ DR BHUPINDER SINGH JESWANT SINGH \nPROFESSOR DR MOHAMED HATTA SHAHAROM\n\n\n\n\nTHE COMMISSIONERS \n  \n   \nFrom left \n: YBhg Dato’ Dr Bhupinder Singh, YABhg Dato’ Haji Abdul Kadir Sulaiman, \nYBhg Dato’ Selventhiranathan Thiagarajah, YBrs Professor Dr Mohamed Hatta Shaharom \nSitting: YA Tan Sri Datuk Seri James Foong Cheng Yuen \n \n\n\n\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n  \n    \nPage \nIntroduction \n1 \nRoyal Commission of Inquiry \n2 \n_ Representation \n2-3 \nProcedure adopted \n4-5 \nThe standard of proof \n5 \nSecond term of reference \n5 \nFacts \n5-8 \nEvents in the SUK building \n8-10 \nTBH at the Selangor MACC \n10-11 \n“Calming therapy” \n11-13 \nInterview by Arman and Ashraf \n13-14 \nMeeting with Lee Wye Wing \n14-15 \nRecording of statement \n16-17 \nEvents after 3.30am on the 16\" \n17-18 \nDiscovery of body \n18-20 \nPolice investigation - “the note” \n20-23 \nTan Boon Wah \n24-29 \nLee Wve Wing [\"Lee’] \n29-35 \nLee Kee Hiong [“Ms Lee’] \n35-36 \nMohd Harun Abdullah [\"Harun’] \n36-37\n\n\nPage \n  \n  \nDecision on the second term of reference \nForensic pathological aspects \nChronology \nTime of death \nPosition of the body when found \nPattern of injuries \nClothing and personal belongings \nConclusion on forensic pathologists’ evidence \nInterrogation \nFirst interrogation \nsecond interrogation \nThird interrogation \nTBH was not released after his statement was \nrecorded \nKIH’s active participation and involvement \nAnonymous fetter \nFourth interrogation \nRaymond \nForensic psychiatric aspects \nThe psychiatrists \nCharacter of TBH \nPsychological changes \nContributing factors \nConclusion on forensic psychiatric aspects \nvi \n37 \n38 \n38-39 \n39-40 \n40-44 \n41-44 \n44-45 \n45 \n45 \n45-46 \n46-49 \n49-52 \n52-54 \n54-57 \n58-60 \n60-62 \n62-64 \n64-65 \n65-67 \n67-68 \n68-71 \n71-72 \n72\n\n\nPage \n  \n  \nFirst term of reference \nSearch warrant \nRecommendations on powers of search \nApplicable standing orders \nBreaches of applicable standing orders \nTreatment of witnesses and suspects \nProposed improvements \nQualification and training \nInfrastructure \nCalling up witnesses \nWitnesses to be accompanied \ninterviewing and statement-recording \nLimitation on seizure \nSeparation of prosecutorial and \ninvestigative functions \nMaintenance of records \nPrevention of abuse of powers \nComplaints \nTraining by MACA \nvil \n72-73 \n13-77 \n77-80 \n80-83 \n83-85 \n85-86 \n86-87 \n87 \n87-89 \n89-90 \n90 \n90-93 \n94-95 \n95-96 \n96-97 \n97-99 \n99-103 \n104-105\n\n\nPage \n  \n  \n  \nInterview standards \nThe PEACE model \nFacilities for interviewing \nRecommendations \nStatus of Invited persons \nCooperation with other authorities \nInvestigations relating to accomplices \nAlternative methods of gaining evidence \nDocument examination \nRecruitment of professionals \nReview of abused processes \nIntegrated approach \nRecommendations for change of attitudes \nof MACC officers \nConclusion \nAcknowledgement \nviii \n105 \n105-107 \n107-108 \n108 \n109-112 \n112-113 \n113-114 \n114 \n114-115 \n115 \n115 \n115-116 \n- \n416-118 \n118-120 \n123-124\n\n\n  \n  \nREPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO \nTHE DEATH OF TEOH BENG HOCK \nIntroduction \n(1] \nOn the \n16\" July 2009 \n[“the \n16\"”], \nat about 1.30pm \na security \nguard attached to a commercial company occupying premises in a multi- \nstorey building known \nas Plaza Masalam [“Plaza Masalam”] \nin Shah \nAlam, Selangor, discovered the body of a male person lying face down \non the 5\" floor exterior landing of the building. He was later identified \nas Mr Teoh Beng Hock [“TBH”], \na Malaysian Chinese who was \nthe \npolitical secretary to an executive councillor of the State government \nof Selangor. \n[2] \nA day earlier, on the 15'July 2009 [“the 15\"”], TBH was taken \nin \nby officers \nof the Selangor Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission \n[“the Selangor MACC”] for questioning \nat \nits headquariers located on \nthe 14\" floor of Plaza Masalam. \n[3] \nPolice who arrived at the scene on the 16\" confirmed that TBH \nwas dead. \nThe police investigating officer for this case was one ASP \nAhmad \nNazri \nZainal [ASP \nNazri”]. \nSince \nhe classified \nthis case \nas \none of sudden death, a coroner’s inquest proceeded under section 337 \nof the Criminal Procedure Code. After interrupted hearings stretching \nover seventeen months, the coroner on the 5\"January 2011 \nreturned \nan open verdict. He was unable to rule out either suicide or homicide \nas the cause of death. \n[4] \nThere was \na public outcry over this decision, particularly from \nthe family members of TBH who demanded that a Royal Commission \nof Inquiry be set up to investigate \ninto the death of TBH while \nin the \ncustody of \na law-enforcement agency, namely, the Selangor MACC.\n\n\n  \n  \nRoyal Commission of Inquiry \n[5] \nAcceding \nto \nthis request, \nthe Yang di-Pertuan Agong, \nacting \npursuant to section \n2 (1) (d) and section \n3 (1) of the Commissions of \nEnquiry Act 1950 [“COE Act”], on the 26\" January 2011 appointed \nus \n_ \nas Commissioners for this Royal Commission of Inquiry [“the RCI”] with \n| \nthe following terms of reference: \n1. \n“to enquire whether or not there was any impropriety \nin the \nconduct of the examination of Teoh Beng Hock in the course \nof an investigation into a Shah Alam report number 0052/2009 \nby the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission \nin \nrelation \nto \nits standing \norders \nand \npractices \nand \nto recommend \nany \nappropriate action, where necessary; and \n2. \nto enquire \ninto \nthe \ndeath \nof Teoh \nBeng \nHock \nand \nthe \ncircumstances surrounding and contributing to his death.” \n[6] \nThe timeframe mentioned in our letter of appointment to complete \nthis inquiry and to render a report to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was \nthree months from the date of the issuance of our commission. This \nwas \nthe 25\" April \n2011. \nBut pursuant \nto \nour request \nto \nthe Yang \ndi-Pertuan Agong, this period was extended to the 25\" June 2011. \nRepresentation \n[7] \nWe commenced taking evidence in this inquiry on the 14\" February \n2011, after settling preliminaries and procedures \nin meetings from the \n29\" January 2011 onwards. Aside from the conducting officers assisting \nthe RCI, four parties sought representation by advocates under section \n18 of the COE Act. They were: \n1, \nthe Bar Council of Malaysia; \n2. \nthe MACC;:\n\n\n  \n  \n3. the State government of Selangor; \n4. the family of TBH. \n| \n[8]. \nSoon after their application was allowed, counsel for the family \nof TBH, Mr Karpal Singh and Mr Gobind Singh Deo, requested for an \nadjournment of the inquiry due to their engagement as counsel \nin the \ntrial of the former deputy prime minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim on a \ncriminal charge for sodomy in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur. Further, \nboth were \nof the view that the conducting \nofficers assisting \nthe RCI \nwould \nbe biased since they were officers from the Attorney-General’s \nChambers. \n[9] \nMr Malik Imtiaz Sarwar [“Mr Malik Imtiaz’], counsel representing \nthe State government of Selangor, appeared to share this view. When \nwe decided against granting the adjournment and the discharge of the \nconducting officers as we found \nno basis of their being biased \nor to \nhave a tendency towards bias at that stage, Mr Karpal Singh and Mr \nGobind Singh Deo informed \nus that they had instructions to subject \nour decision to judicial review by the High Court. \n[10] \nSubsequently, when this did not materialise, further arguments \nwere submitted \nto \nus \nby these counsel \nthat there was \na pending \napplication by the Attorney-General of Malaysia to have the decision of \nthe coroner reviewed. \nAccording to them, this should be disposed of \nbefore the RCI continued with its task. \nIn addition, there was a demand \nby them that the Chairman of the RCI should recuse himself since he \nis \na sitting judge of the Federal Court of Malaysia. We believed that \nthe primary objective for raising these grounds was to compel the RCI \nto adjourn its proceedings. When this was turned down, both Mr Karpal \nSingh and Mr Gobind Singh Deo on the 16\" February 2011 declared that \nthey would not be participating \nin this inquiry since they did not wish \n“to lend legitimacy” to \nit. The next day, Mr Malik Imtiaz followed \nsuit, \nciting as an additional reason that the RCI should not hear evidence \nafresh but adopt that disclosed \nat the coroner’s inquest, an approach \nwith which we disagreed.\n\n\n  \n  \nProcedure adopted \n[11] \nThe procedure adopted by the RCI during this inquiry was similar \nto that \nof previous \nRoyal Commissions \nof Enquiry. The conducting \n' \nOfficers \nafter consulting \nus \nand \nthe remaining \nrepresented \nparties, \nprovided \na \nlist of witnesses \nto be called. \nAll these witnesses turned \nup \nto \ntestify. They were questioned extensively and intensely \nby \nus \nand counsel for the represented parties. Some of them were examined \nagainst statements made by them \nto the police, investigation diaries, \ndeclassified investigation papers and other documents requested by us \nand provided \nfor by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission \n[“the \nMACC”] and police as well as exhibits tendered during the coroner's \ninquest. We must state that to a large extent the MACC was cooperative \nin supplying the materials we requested. \n[12] \nThough counsel representing the remaining parties were supposed \nto be impartial \nin assisting us to arrive at the truth of what happened \nto TBH on that fateful night of the 15 and early morning of the 16\", \nexcept for the conducting officers, each side took a diagonally opposite \napproach \nin their questioning of the witnesses and submissions made. \nDato’ Sri Muhammad Shafee Abdullah, counsel for the MACC, defended \nthe MACC officers called to testify, while the team of lawyers from the \nMalaysian Bar [“the Bar’] questioned them extensively, protractedly and \nrelentlessly to ensure that “no stone was left unturned” to arrive at the \ntruth. This mode of questioning was beneficial \nto us since \nit enabled \nus to view the evidence from different perspectives. \n[13] \nTo assist us in our own investigation was Mr Michael Leslie Squires \n[\"the \ninvestigator’] whose services were secured through \nthe public \nprosecutor under section \n16 (2) of the COE Act. He was an ex-police \nofficer from Liverpool, England and was the former chief investigator of \nthe Independent Commission Against Corruption [the ICAC”] of Hong \nKong. Mr Squires was able to conduct some investigations which were \nof assistance to us but of greater importance to us was \nhis input on \nthe investigation and interrogation procedures and practices adopted\n\n\n  \nin other jurisdictions. This enabled us to understand how questioning \nshould \nbe conducted \nto \nget maximum \nresults \nproperly and \nlawfully \nrather than to employ unscrupulous techniques to obtain the same. \nThe standard of proof \n[14] \nTo come \nto \na finding \nof fact by \nus, there must be \na particular \nlevel of proof to satisfy us. For the standard of proof required, we have \nbased our finding on a balance of probabilities sliding to proof beyond \nreasonable doubt [see Briginshaw v Briginshaw and another (1938) \n60 CLR 336, 362]. \n[15] \nWe adopted this approach for the reason that our finding may \ncause serious damage \nto the reputation \nof some individuals but this \nmust be measured against the death of a person while \nin the custody \nof a law-enforcement agency, where the only witnesses are persons \nwhose conduct is being investigated. Further, there are the inherent and \nharsh realities of meeting “a blue wall of silence” based on brotherhood \nties among officers of the organisations involved. \nSecond term of reference \n[16] \nOf the two terms of reference referred \nto us, the first \nis much \ndependent on our investigation and findings on the second. And since \nthere will be \na substantial degree of overlapping between the two, we \napproach our report by dealing first with the second term of reference \nbefore returning to the first. \n[17] \nTo fully appreciate our finding, we propose to illustrate the facts \nbefore proceeding to give our decision with reasons therefor. \nFacts \n[18] \nThe State government of Selangor at the time of TBH’s death was \ncontrolled by the Pakatan Rakyat, \na coalition \nof parties \nin opposition\n\n\n  \nat the Federal government level. Each state assemblyman \nin the State \nof Selangor was granted \nan allocation \nof RM500,000.00 \nper annum \nfrom the state coffers for projects and programmes carried out \nin \nhis \nconstituency. \nBut not all state assemblymen were allowed \nto decide \non how this should \nbe applied. \nSuch privilege was only reserved \nto \nthose from the party \nin power of the day. \nA Selangor state executive \ncouncillor had an additional allocation of RM100,000.00 per annum on \ntop of his standard allocation. \n[19] \nThere was no uniform approach on how to spend this allocation. \nMuch depended on the preference of the entitled state assemblymen \nto decide on how this was to be used. But \nit must be borne \nin mind \nthat any expenditure incurred on \na single project was not to exceed \na \nsum of RM20,000.00. \n[20] \nThe expenses for the projects undertaken were paid out by the \nrespective \nDistrict Office \nor Land \nOffice where the constituency was \nlocated. \n[21] \nIn the constituency of Seri Kembangan, the state assemblyman \nat the material time was Yang Berhormat [“the Honourable”] Ean Yong \nHian Wah [“YB Ean’]. He was and is also an executive council member \nof the \nState government \nof Selangor. \nDuring \nour \ninquiry, \nwe were \ninformed \nthat he elected \nto spend \nhis allocation \non “small \nprojects” \nand “programmes” for the years 2008 and 2009. \n[22] \nSmall projects involved civil construction works such as repairing \ndamaged drains, fences, retaining walls and the like. Programmes involved \nthe staging of events to foster better understanding and rapport among \npersons residing \nin the area. An example was the “Pesta Tanglung” \n[Lantern Festival] and another was the promotion of the release of a \ncertain member \nof the Pakatan Rakyat who was \nin detention under \nthe Internai Security Act [“the ISA”] at the material time as well as for \nthe abolition of that Act [though we find \nit strange that such a struggle \nshould fall within the ambit of “mesra rakyat” (citizens’ gathering)).\n\n\n  \n  \n  \n[23] \nFrom June 2009 right up to the \n1% March 2010 [when he was \ntransferred out], the deputy director of the Selangor MACC was one \nHishamuddin Hashim [“HH”]. As deputy director, \nhe was \nin charge of \ninvestigations and intelligence-gathering by the Selangor MACC \nin the \nState \nof Selangor. \nIt \nis \nof interest \nto note that he appeared \nto have \nabsolute authority \nto \ninvestigate anyone whom \nhe suspected \nto \nbe \ninvolved \nin any corrupt practice \nin \nthe \nstate without even \ninforming \nor obtaining the consent of his superiors \nin the MACC headquarters \nin Putrajaya [“HQ”] or his superior on the ground, the director of the \nSelangor MACC. Fortunately, we were informed by the current deputy \nchief commissioner of the MACC that this shortcoming has been rectified \nand that certain categories \nof cases dealt with \nby the MACC \nin any \nstate now require approval and consent from HQ before investigations \ncan commence. \n[24] \nAround the 21* June 2009, HH said that he received information \nfrom a source which alleged that Selangor state assemblymen entitled \nto the use \nof the allocation were engaged \nin submitting false claims \nand that certain Pakatan Rakyat state assemblymen were using the \nallocation \nin \nthe \ninterest \nof their \npolitical \nparties \ninstead \nof for \nthe \nbenefit of the public. The source suggested that claims submitted by \nthese \nstate assemblymen \nbe \ninvestigated. \nThis information \nreceived \nby HH was reduced into writing and tendered as an exhibit marked \n| \n207. \n[25] \nActing on this information, HH ordered his subordinate, Mohamad \nAnuar Ismail [“Anuar”’] on the 24\" June 2009, \nto file a formal written \ncomplaint to say that the state assemblymen of Selangor had filed false \nclaims to the District Office for programmes which did not take place \nand suggested action be taken to ascertain whether any offences set \nout in the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 [“MACC Act’] \nhad been committed. Anuar filed this complaint on the 13\" July 2009 \n[exhibit \n| 61].\n\n\n  \n  \n[26] \nFollowing \nfrom this, numerous documents from various District \nOffices and Land Offices in Selangor where such claims were managed \nwere seized. This attracted much publicity and was extensively reported \nin the local media. \ni27] \n_ Then on the 14 July 2009, HH gave \na briefing to his officers \noutlining \nthe \nplan for an operation. \nHe focused \non \ntwo areas: \nSeri \nKembangan which \nis the constituency of YB Ean and another known as \nKampung Tunku which is under a different state assemblyman. He then \ndirected that there should be nine teams, each engaging \nin different \nactivities, \nfor example, one to check with the registry of businesses to \nascertain who the proprietors of the firms were which had made claims \nfor projects or programmes while another was to search various targeted \npremises for incriminating evidence. \n[28] \nFacing insufficient manpower, HH requested for officers from other \nMACC branches \nin Selangor as well as from HQ to assist. Anuar was \nappointed by HH as the investigating officer [“the [O”] for this operation \ndespite there being available another more senior officer, Hairul Ilham \nHamzah \n[“Hairul \nllham”], who was the head \nof investigations \nin the \nSelangor MACC. \nAll \nin \nall, thirty-three officers were involved and on \nthe morning \nof the \n15\", HH commanded them \nto proceed. \nFurther, \nHH decided that Anuar was to take on Seri Kembangan whilst Hairul \nIlham was to concentrate on Kampung Tunku. \nEvents in the SUK building \n[29] \n_ \nAnuar and his team of four officers first went to the service centre \nof YB Ean \nin Seri Kembangan. On being informed that the claims \nin \nquestion were dealt with \nby YB \nEan’s \noffice \nat the \nstate secretariat \nbuilding [“the SUK building’] \nin Shah Alam, Selangor, he together with \nhis men proceeded there on the same afternoon of the 15\". \nAt about \n3.00pm at the 15\" floor office of YB Ean they met TBH. According to \nAnuar, \nafter identifying \nhimself he requested TBH \nto \ndeliver \nto him\n\n\n  \n  \nand his team documents concerning claims under the allocations for \nthe years 2008 and 2009. He and \nhis team intended \nto check these \nagainst four suspicious documents which they had extracted from the \nfiles taken from the District Office and Land Office. TBH complied and \nprovided \nthe documents required. \nHowever, \ninstead \nof limiting \ntheir \ninvestigation \nto this, one accompanying officer by the name of Mohd \nNajeib Anmad Walat \n[“Najeib”] probed into the laptop of TBH. He found \nfour suspicious documents [D94, D95, D96 and D97 \nin exhibit \n| \n197, \nie exhibits D94 \nto D97]. These were said \nto be drafts and involved \nquotations for projects paid out under the allocation. \n[30] \nSoon thereafter, YB Ean, upon being \nnotified \nby TBH through \nthe mobilephone \nof the presence \nof MACC \nofficers, \nrushed \nto \nhis \noffice from a sitting of the Selangor state assembly to meet with Anuar \nand \nhis team. \nHe was accompanied \nby \na large number of reporters. \nA heated exchange \nof words took place between YB Ean and Anuar \ncentred mainly on the MACC’s right of entry without a search warrant. \nIntimidated \nby the presence \nof the reporters \nin YB Ean’s office who \nwere roaming around \nfreely, Anuar and \nhis team \nleft and withdrew \nto the \ncar park \nof the SUK building. \nHe then \nmet Hairul Ilham who \nhappened \nto \nbe \nalso there on \nhis assigned \nmission. After receiving \nfurther instructions from HH \nas \nto what \nto \ndo, Anuar and \nhis team, \naccompanied by \nHairul \nIlham, returned \nto YB Ean’s office. There he \nmet TBH again. \nNot long thereafter YB Ean came back \nto the office, \nand this time he requested \nhis lawyer to be present. \nMr Manoharan \ns/o Malayalam [“Manoharan’], his lawyer, arrived shortly thereafter and \nfurther verbal arguments ensued, centring on the demand by Anuar to \nbring \nin TBH \nfor questioning \nat the Selangor MACC office. A picture \ndepicting this scene was captured by a newspaper reporter from “The \nStar’ and was published the next day. \n[31] \nEventually \na compromise was \nreached whereby TBH was \nencouraged to go with Anuar and \nhis team. According to Manoharan, \nAnuar had promised him that he, Manoharan, could accompany TBH to\n\n\n  \n  \nbe interviewed but was later “played out” or deceived by Anuar when \nhe was not even allowed to see TBH \nin the Selangor MACC office. \n[32] \nAccording to Anuar, when he met TBH \nin YB Ean’s office, TBH \nwas restless and walking \nup and down. This view was supported by \nthe testimony of Najeib who was examining TBH’s computers. \nin the \nopinion of Manoharan, \nTBH \nat that material time was shocked to see \nall the compuiers seized. But after speaking with and requesting TBH \nto cooperate with the MACC officers, Manoharan observed that TBH \nwas more cheerful and ready to go with Anuar and his team. \n[33] \nTBH left with Anuar’s team shortly before 6.00pm on the 15\" in \nhis own car. He was in fact escorted by two MACC officers. One Mohd \nHafiz Izhar Idris [“Hafiz’] carried the central processing unit [“CPU”] of \nthe computer seized from YB Ean’s office and sat at the rear of TBH’s \ncar. The other was Mohamad Azhar Abang Mentaril [“Azhar’] who carried \nTBH’s laptop and sat next to TBH who drove the car. \nThough Anuar \nand Hafiz insisted that TBH had kept his laptop with him throughout \nthe journey, \nthis was contradicted \nby video pictures captured on the \nclosed-circuit television camera [“cctv’] at the entrance to Plaza Masalam \non the fourth floor. They explicitly showed Azhar carrying \na bag with \nTBH’s laptop \ninside, \nwhile TBH \nhad \nnothing \nin \nhis hands except \na \nmobilephone which he was speaking into. \n‘TBH at Selangor MACC \n[34] \nAt about 6.15pm \nat the reception area \nof the Selangor MACC \noffice, Anuar met TBH. \nObviously TBH was brought there \nto await \nAnuar’s direction. Here, Anuar again observed that TBH was walking \nup and down as \nif he was looking for something. This prompted Anuar \nto inquire of TBH whether he [Anuar] could be of help. We found this \nrather strange when \nit was Anuar who had insisted that TBH be brought \nin for questioning. Then, according to Anuar, TBH inquired whether he \ncould contact \nhis lawyer through \nhis mobilephone. This request was \n10\n\n\n  \n  \nacceded \nto and TBH made \na \ncall. When \nthis was completed, Anuar \n‘demanded that TBH switch off his mobilephone. To ascertain whether \nthis was complied with, Anuar took TBH’s mobilephone \nto examine \nit \nbut returned the same to him with instructions to keep \nit \nin \nhis bag. \nHafiz, who was also at the reception area at that time, observed the \nfirst part of what took place but was uncertain whether or not Anuar \nreturned the mobilephone to TBH. \n[35] \nThis aspect of the evidence was crucial when \nit became apparent \nthat TBH was one \nof those who are addicted \nto this modern means \nof communication and who, when deprived of his mobilephone, would \nbecome completely disorientated and helpless in the situation he was in. \nHis obsession with this gadget is confirmed by his very close colleague \nMiss Ooi How Oon [“Mandy”] and his fiancée Ms Soh Cher Wei [\"Ms \nSoh’] \nas well \nas \nby \nhis family members. Mandy described TBH \nas \na person who could \nnot \nlive without \nhis mobilephone. \nAnd Ms Soh \nadded that TBH spent a lot of time on \nhis mobilephone talking to \nhis \nfamily and friends. An illustration of his need to communicate through \nthis means was when he called YB Ean \nto inquire where Manoharan \nwas. Soon after, he contacted Manoharan to find out where he was. \n“Calming therapy” \n[36] \nPerceiving \nit as an excellent idea \nto “calm” TBH down, Anuar \nplaced TBH \nin a section of the Selangor MACC office called Bahagian \nPendidikan Masyarakat, commonly known as “Pen Mas”. There were \nsome \nsofas: \ntwo single-seaters and \na three-seater. \nBut instead \nof \nallowing TBH to be alone to collect himself, Anuar ordered some officers \nto be his “companions”. \nThere were six to seven of them at one time, \nbeginning with Hafiz, followed by Azhar and others. Occasionally, Anuar \nwould come around to watch over the situation. The instruction by Anuar \nto one of these officers, Azhar, was to collect information from TBH of \nhis background: whether he was married, his educational qualifications, \nhis previous employment and the like. This was completed \nin just ten \n11\n\n\n  \n  \nminutes. Surprisingly, Hafiz also asked the same questions but confessed \nthat this was done with the intention of getting to know TBH. In addition, \nanother officer Sachianandan \na/l Krishnasekar [“Sachi”] also repeated \nthis line of questioning. \n[37] \nTBH was kept \nin \nthis situation from approximately 6.30pm \nto \n-10.40pm. But most of the officers who were there to “accompany” him \nrecalled that TBH kept very much to himself, he was quiet, tired and \nonly answered questions when asked. \nIn fact, at one stage, TBH asked \n-- Sachi as to when he would be able to go home. Sachi informed him that \nthis would presumably be after his statement had been recorded. \n[38] \nAlso during this time at the Pen Mas area, TBH was approached \nby Najeib who had discovered the four allegedly incriminating documents \nin TBH’s laptop while \nin the SUK building. Intending \nto access TBH’s \nemail account \nto again \nhave access \nto these \nfour documents, \nhe \nrequired TBH \nto type his password into the laptop. TBH complied and \nthese four documents were subsequently downloaded and printed \nby \nNajeib and given to Anuar. \n[39] \nIn the meantime, at another part of the office, Hairul Ilham, having \ntaken over the IO’s job temporarily from Anuar [since Anuar had \nleft \nafter 8.00pm \nto attend to his personal domestic affairs, \nie to fetch his \nmaid from the airport and take her to his house], ordered one officer \nby the name of Arman Alies [“Arman’] to examine four files containing \ndocuments obtained from \nthe \nDistrict Office and \nLand \nOffice. They \nrelated to claims made under YB Ean’s allocations for the years 2008 \nand 2009. Arman was from HQ and was brought \nin specially for the \npurpose of this operation. The relevance of Arman to this inquiry is that \nhe subsequently “interviewed” TBH \nin relation \nto these documents. \n[40] \nAccording to Arman, he looked through some of the documents and \nsingled out those that appeared suspicious. Not long after, Hairul Ilham \ngave him another four documents [exhibits D94 to D97] and requested \n12\n\n\n  \n  \nhim to check on how the prices of the items \nin those documents were \ndetermined and whether the firms which made the claims from the \nallocation actually did exist. Instead of carrying out this task by himself, \nArman asked TBH to assist. Further, he also made a request for another \nofficer to help out. Hairul Ilham agreed and assigned him one Selangor \nMACC officer by the name of Ashraf Mohd Yunus [“Ashraf\"]. \n“Interview” by Arman and Ashraf \n[41] \nTBH was called \nin for this “interview” before these two officers \nat about 10.45pm on the \n15\". \nIt took place \nin \na large meeting room \nclose to HH’s office. Instead of going through the documents and asking \nquestions, Arman reversed \nthe method \nand adopted \nan \ninquisitorial \napproach. He gave the documents he had to TBH and demanded that \nTBH \nsearch \nthe \nfour \nfiles \nto \nlocate documents which corresponded \nwith \nthe exhibits D94 \nto D97. According \nto \nboth Arman \nand Ashraf, \nTBH was unable to locate them. Then, exceeding their specific scope \nof duty, they grilled TBH on \nall those documents \nin the four files, \nnit- \npicking \nas \nto why TBH had signed \non some approval. forms \nfor the \nclaims against YB Ean’s rubber stamp. This was done despite TBH’s \nname \nbeing \nlegibly written \non \nthe documents \nto show \nthat \nhe was \nsigning for and on behalf of YB Ean. Questions were directed to TBH \non the alleged non-compliance with certain Treasury directives on the \naward of contracts, namely, that there should be at least three separate \nquotations before \na contract could be awarded and that the amount \nfor the contract should \nnot exceed RM10,000.00 [as both Arman and \nAshraf feigned \nignorance \nof this amount having \nbeen \nincreased \nto \nRM20,000.00 by a Selangor government circular which also permitted \ndirect awards of such contracts]. \n[42] \nAnother important aspect of this “interview” \nis that both these \nofficers extracted from TBH the password to his private email account, \na matter which vexed TBH very much, causing him great concern and \ndistress. We will discuss this later \nin this report. \n13\n\n\n  \n  \n[43] \nBoth Arman and Ashraf agreed that TBH was unable to answer \nmany of the questions asked. Most of the time, according to these two \nofficers, TBH was silent and just flipped through the documents \nin the \nfour files given. \n[44] \nThis so-called interview did not terminate until 12.45am on the \n16\". So the entire time taken by Arman and Ashraf to question TBH was \nabout two hours. Notes made of this “interview” were handed over to \nHairul Ilham but mysteriously they could not be located for production \nin this inquiry for us to examine. \n[45] \nAshraf maintained that throughout this “interview” he played no \npart in questioning TBH. During the entire two hours, aside from going \nout to collect \na copy of the Treasury directives [which were no more \napplicable] and fetching TBH a glass of water to drink, he was tagging \ndocuments referred to him by Arman. \n[46] \nWhile TBH was being “interviewed” \nby Arman and Ashraf, YB \nEan turned \nup \nat the \n14\" floor of Plaza Masalam \nat about 11.45om \nwith \na lady lawyer. They demanded to see TBH. \nHairul Ilham refused \nthe request but assured them \nthat TBH would \nbe released \nat about \n5.00am the following morning. Feeling frustrated YB Ean left. \nMeeting with Lee Wye Wing \n[47] \nAfter the “interview”, Ashraf ied TBH back to the Pen Mas area. \nThere TBH was surprised \nto meet \na person \ncalled \nLee Wye Wing \n[“Lee\"], whom he knew. Lee had also been brought in for questioning. \nHis episode in the encounter with the Selangor MACC will be elaborated \nupon \nlater. However, \nat this stage, we shall focus on what transpired \nbetween the two of them \nin the early hours of the 16\" at the Pen Mas \narea. According to Lee, the meeting between them lasted approximately \nten to fifteen minutes. Strangely, they were allowed to be alone together \nand \nduring \nthis time they exchanged experiences \non how they had \nbeen taken \nin. They had to speak softly for fear that officers passing \nthrough the area could listen \nin. \n14\n\n\n  \n[48] \nTBH, according to Lee, complained that the MACC officers had \ntaken away \nhis mobilephone and \nlaptop. \nHe \nalso lamented \nthat \nhe \nshould \nnot have disclosed \nto \nthe officers \nhis password \nto \nhis email \naccount. Then he inquired from Lee whether there was any necessity \nto have three quotations before a contract could be awarded. Further, \nhe complained that he had requested for his lawyer to be present but \ndid not manage to meet him. Generally, Lee observed that TBH had \nmany things on \nhis mind. From Lee’s perception, \nthis could also \nbe \ndue to the uncertainty of what was going to happen to them next and \nconcern over the claim by the MACC officers on the requirement for \nthree quotations before a contract could be awarded. Lee disclosed that \nTBH would not have known of such \na requirement since his work did \nnot involve such things. \nIn fact Lee said that he [Lee] would \nbe \nin \na \n- \nbetter position to explain this since \nit was within the scope and ambit \nof his work [a matter upon which we shall elaborate later]. The meeting \nended when TBH was taken away for his statement to be recorded. \n[49] \nAnuar returned \nafter completing \nhis domestic chores \nat about \nmid-night on the 15\", \nie going \ninto the morning \nof the \n16\". He was \nthen \ntold \nby \nHairul \nIlham \nto hand \nover the \nfour \nfiles, \nthe exhibits \n- \n-D94 to D97, the notes taken by Arman during his “interview” of TBH, \nand another set \nof documents marked as exhibits \n| 206A, \n| 206B, \n| \n206C and \n| 206D [which we \nshall \nclarify \nlater as \nto how they were \nsecured] to one officer by the name of Nadzri Ibrahim [\"Nadzri\"], who \nwas directed \nby Hairul Ilham \nto record TBH’s statement. \nNadzri had \ncomplied accordingly but instead \nof following \nHairul \nlIlham’s direction \nimmediately after receiving \nit at 12.30am on the 16\", Nadzri took his \ntime and only commenced recording TBH’s statement one hour later at \n1.30am. This process was only completed at 3.30am. TBH purportedly \nsigned the statement. This statement, which is only a photocopy of the \npurported original, \nis marked as exhibit \n| 69. We did not have sight of \nthe original. According to Nadzri, there was a toilet break \nin the midst \nof recording this statement. The toilet break took five to ten minutes. \n15\n\n\n  \nRecording of statement \n[50] \nWe were enlightened \nby Nadzri \nthat the recording \nof TBH’s \nstatement took the form \nof questions and answers. A question would \nbe posed \nby Nadzri with documents shown \nto TBH \nand TBH would \nanswer \nit. The answers given by TBH would then be keyed into the \ncomputer by Nadzri \nin the form \nof a narrative and shown \nto TBH \nto \napprove before the next question was asked. \n[51] \nNadzri observed that during this exercise TBH was serious and \nwas constantly looking down. \nHis hands were \nin between \nhis thighs. \nHe was quiet and yawned frequently. He also sighed repeatedly and \nhardly moved. \n[52] \nAccording \nto \nNadzri, Anuar \ndid \nenter the room while TBH’s \nstatement was being recorded. Anuar did not say anything of significance \nexcept to inquire casually whether things were “OK”. \n[53] _-The other thing \nthat happened during \nthe recording \nof TBH’s \nstatement was the admission \nby Nadzri that he had raised \nhis voice \nat TBH and remarked: “Kalau you penat, saya pun penat juga sebab \nsaya \ntaip statement” \n[“/f you are \ntired, \n| am also tired since \n| have \nto type the statement”]. We find this outburst rather unnecessary and \nuncalled for. First, \nit is from an officer carrying out his duty. He should \nhave been more professional \nin \nhis approach. And \nif he was indeed \ntired, \nhe should have asked to have been relieved and to have been \nreplaced by another officer. Second, TBH was not \na suspect. He was \na witness called \nin \nto assist the Selangor MACC \nin \nits investigation. \nCourtesy should have been accorded to him. Thus, such treatment \nof \nhim by Nadzri was certainly unwarranted. Further, \nif this process was \ntedious, \nit could easily have been adjourned to another day unless, \nof \ncourse, there was an agenda to put pressure on TBH by continuing to \nrecord his statement in these circumstances. \n16\n\n\n  \n. [54] \nAfter the recording of TBH’s statement, Nadzri had gone searching \nfor Anuar, Hairul Ilham having gone home at about 3.00am on the 16\". \nNadzri found Anuar sleeping \nin the prayer room [surau] which was \nsituated next to the meeting room. He was instructed by Anuar to leave \nthe documents and TBH’s statement on his [Anuar’s] table, and to inform \nTBH to go home. According to this witness, when he told TBH of this, \nTBH requested to be allowed to remain in the office to rest. Nadzri then \nagreed to this but warned TBH not to wander around. Nadzri claimed \nto have told Anuar of this and that the latter had agreed. \nEvents after 3.30am on the 16 \n[55] \nAshraf said \nthat, \nat about 4.40am \non \nthe \n16\", \nwhile \nhe was \nwalking past the waiting area outside Nadzri’s room, he noticed TBH \nlying on a sofa. TBH had requested for a drink and Ashraf had fetched \nit for him from the pantry. After this, Ashraf claimed to have departed \nfor home leaving TBH where he was, lying on the sofa \nin this area. \n[56] \nThen there was another officer called Raymond Nion anak John \nTimban [‘Raymond”] who affirmed that he saw TBH lying on the sofa \nin this location when he was about to leave for home at about 6.00am \non the 16\". \n[57] \nAnuar, though being the \nIO for the operation, elected \nto sleep \nuntil the next morning \nin an area supposedly most accessible to the \npublic: \nat the reception partitioned \nby \na screen. \nHe did \nnot wake up \nuntil 8.30am on the 16 when many of the staff had reported for work. \nAnuar explained that he had chosen this area because \nit was easily \naccessible \nto \nhis officers \nto consult him. \nStrangely, \nhowever, many \nofficers who passed this area did not even see him there. \n[58] \nAt about 8.30am on the 16\", after waking up from his slumber, \nAnuar declared that he was informed \nby a lady officer called Norsiah \nof a bag she noticed at the sofa \nin front of Nadzri’s room. When Anuar \n17\n\n\n  \nsubsequently returned to his room, he saw this bag which he believed \nhad been brought \nin by TBH the day before. \nIt was on the floor by \nthe side of the sofa \nin the area as described by Norsiah. Beside this \nbag was a mobilephone. He took possession of these and placed the \nmobilephone on his table and the bag on a chair in his room. He did not \ncheck the contents of the bag. We are puzzled by this rather careless \nand indifferent attitude adopted by Anuar in relation to the bag and the \nmobilephone. \n[59] \nWe would have thought that Anuar as the IO should have been \nmore vigilant and concerned with what was \nin the bag. For ail intents \nand purposes \nit might have been packed with explosives to blow the \nSelangor MACC office up as the office would no doubt be stored with \nincriminating evidence against suspects. Further, \nit defied logic not to be \ncurious particularly when the purported owner of this bag was nowhere \nto be seen. A look \nat \nits contents may have given some clues as to \nwho he was and where he could possibly be. \n[60] \nBut believing \nthat TBH may \nstill \nbe \nin \nthe \noffice, Anuar went \naround looking for him. He was later joined by Hairul Ilham who had by \nthen turned up for work. They could not find- TBH but took no further \nsteps \nto determine where \nhe was. We would have thought that \nthe \nfollowing elementary steps would have been adopted \nto locate TBH: \nfirst, of course, was to look inside his bag; second, was to contact the \nnight security guard, one Mohd Khairudin Denan [“guard Khairudin’] and \ninquire whether he had seen TBH leaving; third, was to contact Nadzri \n[the officer who recorded TBH’s statement] to ascertain whether TBH \nactually stayed the night. \nDiscovery of body \n[61]. \nAt about 1.30pm on the 16\", an officer by the name of Azeem \nHafeez Jamaluddin [“Azeem”] heard someone shouting from below the \nMACC office that \na person \nhad fallen from \nthe building. \nHe rushed \n18\n\n\n  \ndown accompanied by some other officers. The body was lying on the \nlanding at the 5\" floor of Plaza Masalam. \n[62] \nSoon thereafter Anuar and Hairul Ilham were informed and Anuar, \n‘upon seeing the body, ascertained that \nit was that of TBH. When. they \ncontacted HH, who was at HQ at that time, they were told by HH to go \nimmediately to HQ for a briefing on the incident. When they arrived at \n‘the car park of HQ, they were told by HH on the mobilephone to turn \nback and proceed straight to the Shah Alam police station to make a \nreport of the incident. \nBut when they reached the police station, HH \ncommanded them to return to the Selangor MACC office. So until this \nday no police report has been made \nby any Selangor MACC officer \nconcerning the death of TBH. \n[63} \nBoth Anuar and Hairul Ilham, instead of going straight back to \nthe office from the police station as ordered, called for an escort from \nthe Selangor MACC. According \nto them, they feared for their safety. \nApparently, a large crowd had gathered at the Selangor MACC premises \ndemanding an explanation as to how this could have happened to TBH \nwho was supposed \nto have been \nonly interviewed \nby \nthe Selangor \nMACC as a witness but instead had been found dead. \n[64] \nAnuar was even more paranoid \nin \nhis reaction. On his way to \nHQ with Hairul Ilham as instructed by HH, he instead deviated home to \ninform \nhis wife of the incident and for her to take safety precautions. \nHe said he felt vulnerable since “The Star’ newspaper had his picture \npublished \nthat morning arguing \nwith Manoharan \nin \nthe presence \nof \nTBH. Counsel for the Bar however interpreted the deviation to his home \nas an act of repentance for Anuar to confess to his wife for whatever \nunlawful actions he had taken against TBH. \n[65] \nThe police commenced their investigation not long after TBH’s \nbody was discovered. This included forensic work on the premises as \nwell as on the deceased. The latter was done by forensic pathologists. A \ndetailed account of their work will be disclosed and discussed later. \n19\n\n\n  \n[66] \nThat evening, ie on the 16\", all relevant personnel of the Selangor \nMACC involved \nin the operation remained \nin the premises. But before \nthat, the top brass of the MACC in the person of Dato’ Seri Abu Kassim \nMohamed, the then deputy chief commissioner, and Datuk Mohd Shukri \nAbdul \n[“Datuk Shukri’], \nthe then \nnational \ndirector \nof investigations, \nwere present at the Selangor MACC office. They were briefed on the \nsituation. \nDato’ Seri Abu Kassim Mohamed \nin \nfact instructed \nall the \nMACC personnel involved to speak the truth and to cooperate with the \npolice in their investigation. The police recorded cautioned statements \non the evening \nof the 16\" and the days that followed from \nall those \ninvolved. \nPolice investigation \n- “the note” \n[67] \n— \nIn the course of police investigation into the death of TBH, ASP \nNazri took. possession \nof TBH’s bag. The contents \nof this bag were \nemptied. Among \nthe things found were sheets \nof paper which ASP \nNazri considered to be not significant at that time. He did not carry out \nfurther investigation into these sheets of paper until prompted to do so \nby Dr Badi’ah Yahya [“Dr Badi’ah”], \na forensic psychiatrist appointed \nto assist the MACC \nto ascertain the state \nof mind \nof TBH from \nthe \npsychological aspect. \nDr Badi’ah had \ninquired \nof ASP Nazri whether \nthere had been anything \nleft behind \nby TBH which may amount to \na \nsuicide note, having regard to her experience in similar cases involving \nsudden. death suspected to be suicidal. \nBut only much later did ASP \nNazri take a look again \nat the documents found \nin the bag. When \nhe \nfound \na note written primarily \nin Chinese characters, he requested \na \ncolleague to translate \nit to him. When \nhe realised that the note may \nbe of significance, he brought \nit to the attention \nof his superior who \nthen ordered him to send \nit to the chemistry department for analysis of \n- the handwriting. The note was only produced at the inquest before the \ncoroner on the 9 August 2010, after the inquest had commenced. We \nmarked this note [“the note”] as exhibit \n| 168 (a) \nin the inquiry before \nus. \n20\n\n\n  \n  \n[68] _ The note was on of an A4-sized sheet of paper and on \nit were \nwritings \nin Chinese characters and \na few Bahasa Malaysia words. \nA particular part had been scratched out \nin the note. At the inquest \nbefore the coroner, \na Chinese interpreter had translated this note as \nfollows: \n| \n“Ou Yang \nDalam keadaan tidak menyalin fail dalam computer saya, mereka \ntelah mengambil semua computer itu. Mereka asyik menyalahkan \nkamu. \nMinta maaf. \nTidak mengerti \ntapi pura-pura mengerti, akhirnya menyusahkan \nkamu. \nSaya kata, ‘mendapat kelulusan YB’ \nMereka berdegil menaip jadi ‘mengikut arahan YB’ \nSaya tidak dapat membantu kamu, maaf. \nMinta maaf, saya sangat penat, selamat tinggal.” \n[Translated freely from Bahasa Malaysia into English by us \nit \nreads: \n“Ou Yang \nIn \na situation without having copied the files into my computer, \nthey took all the computers. They keep on blaming you. \nSorry. \nDo not understand but pretend to understand, ending up in making \nit difficult for you. \n| said, ‘Obtained YB’s approval’ \nThey were stubborn and typed \nit to become ‘according \nto YB’s \ndirection’ \n| am unable to assist you, sorry. \nSorry, \n| am very tired, goodbye.”] \n21\n\n\n  \n  \n[69] \nThe request made by ASP Nazri to the chemistry department was \nto determine whether the note could have been written \nby TBH. \nFor \nthe purpose of analysis, aside from the note, ASP Nazri also handed \nthe following documents \nto \nthe chemistry department \nto be used \nas \nsamples of TBH’s handwriting: \n1. \na photocopy \nof \na statement recorded \nby Nadzri from TBH \n_with \nthe bottom \npart \nof each page containing \na purported \nsignature of TBH: \n2. \na photocopy of TBH’s national registration identity card [“NRIC”] \nwhere he had purportedly initialled on the side; \n3. \nan original visa credit card with TBH’s name printed thereon \nand bearing on the reverse side a signature purported to be \nthat of TBH; \n4. \na notebook containing the purported handwritings of TBH. \n[All of these are collectively referred to as “samples”]. \n[70] \nOn the 14\" October 2009, a chemist from the chemistry department \nby the name \nof Wong \nKong Yong \n[“Mr Wong’, \nafter examining \nthe \nwriting on the note and comparing \nit with the samples, proffered the \nfollowing opinion: \n_ “The Chinese handwriting \nin documents BH \n1 \n[ the note \n] and \nBH 4 \n[ the notebook of TBH \nj were probably written by the same \nperson and the examination of [the] Bahasa Malaysia handwriting \non documents BH \n1 and the notebook BH 4 were written by the \nsame person. The \ninitials on document BH \n1 \nand BH \n2 [TBH’s \nstatement] were most probably written by the same person.” \n[71] \nSuspecting \nMr Wong may have erred \nin \nhis opinion, \nthe \nBar \nquestioned Mr Wong protractedly until Mr Wong had to admit that his \nexamination of the note was handicapped by the following. \n22\n\n\n  \n[72] \nFirst, the standard used for comparison had not been proved \nto be the handwriting of TBH. \nIn short, the handwriting \nin the samples \nused \nfor comparison \nhad \nnot been proved \nto \nbe \nthat \nof TBH. \nFor \nthis reason, \nhis opinion \nat best was that the writing on the note was \npurportedly that of TBH and not that \nit was that of TBH. \n[73] \nSecond, the first and second samples [TBH’s statement and his \nNRIC respectively] were photocopies. They were not originals. According \nto Mr Wong, \na photocopy of any document may leave marks such as \ndark smudges, dots and even \nlines on \nthe document, depending \non \nthe generation of the photocopy. And \nin respect of the signature ofa \nperson, one could not tell from a photocopy the strength, \nshading, and \npressure applied \nby the author which was necessary for comparison \n‘work. \n[74] \nThough we accept that there are natural variations in the writing \nand signature of a person, the shortcomings highlighted by Mr Wong, \nwhich handicapped him, cast grave doubts on the value of his opinion. \nThese shortcomings touched \non \nthe fundamental requirements \nto \ndetermine the authenticity of TBH’s writing on the note. And without the \noriginal of TBH’s writing, we were unable to accept Mr Wong’s opinion \nthat \nit was indeed TBH who wrote the note. \n[75] \nIn addition to this, the undue delay in tendering the note at the \nfirst available opportunity created suspicion of its authenticity. The note \nwas first brought to the attention of the coroner more than a year after \nit was purportedly found by ASP Nazri. His indifferent attitude, despite \nbeing prompted by Dr Badi’ah earlier [who had given him a checklist to \ninvestigate whether there was a possible suicide note as a person who \ncommits suicide may most likely leave behind such \na note] cannot be \ntranslated as mere carelessness or neglect. In faci, this created mistrust \nin us on the authenticity of this document, \nie the note. \nIn the light of \nthese circumstances and the shortcomings \nin Mr Wong’s opinion, we \nattached no weight to the note \nin our deliberations. \n23\n\n\n  \n  \nTan Boon Wah \n[76] \nTan Boon Wah was the de facto proprietor of a firm known as \nMerit Link Enterprise [“Merit Link”]. The proprietor was his wife. Merit \nLink. supplied one thousand \nfive hundred \npieces \nof Malaysian \nflags \nintended \nfor \na programme staged \nby YB \nEan \nin 2008. The cost \nof \nthese flags was RM2,400.00. Payment \nfor this was made from \nthe \nallocation entitlement \nof YB Ean. Suspecting \nthat the flags had \nnot \nbeen supplied, the Selangor MACC officers searched Tan Boon Wah’s \nhouse \nin Cheras, Kuala Lumpur, \nat about 4.00pm on the \n15\". When \nTan Boon Wah informed them that he had to fetch his wife from work \nas well as \nhis child, they \nleft but returned an hour later at 6.45pm \nto \ncontinue with their search. There was no search warrant for this exercise. \nFinally at 7.45pm, they took Tan Boon Wah to their office on the 14! \nfloor of Plaza Masalam. They also seized his mobilephone, passports, \nbank books and Merit Link’s rubber stamp. \n[77] \n. When they arrived at the office at 8.45pm, Tan Boon Wah was \nplaced \nin \na small room measuring \n10’ x 10’. The light in the room was \nnot switched on. There was a single chair with one of the roller wheels \nmissing. The only other piece of furniture was a drawer cabinet. As the \nlight was not turned on, the only light coming into the room was from \nthe outside where a pingpong table was placed. He was kept here for \nan hour. Then, suddenly, \nhe heard \nhis name being called \nout aloud \nand the light in the room was turned on. Two officers came in. One of \nthem was identified as Bulkini Paharuddin [“Bulkini’]. \n[78] \n. \nAt forty-eight years \nof age, \nBulkini was much \nolder than \nthe \nother officers involved \nin this operation. He was not from the Selangor \nMACC \nbut was one \nof those who had been brought \nin from HQ \nfor \nthe operation. We believe that he considered himself an \nold hand \nin \ninterrogation techniques, or “interviews” as the Selangor MACC officers \ninvolved \nin this operation constantly called \nit. \nAccording to Tan Boon \nWah, Bulkini and his team employed various methods to intimidate him \n24\n\n\n  \nand \nto try and make him admit that he did not supply the goods but \nhad received and pocketed the money instead. Methods employed were \nmostly psychological, ranging from keeping the room dark, belittling him \nfor producing one child only after five years of marriage, threatening to \n-bring his child into the office so she would cry upon seeing the pathetic \nstate \nher father was \nin, accusing \nhim \nof being unkind \nto \nhis family \nby not wanting to return home early by cooperating with the MACC, \nthreatening \nto strike him with \na pouch, forcing him \nto stand \nstraight \nwithout moving and made to look afar [and while this was happening \nhe was ridiculed by other officers playing pingpong outside the room], \ncalling him “Cina bodoh” [“stupid Chinese’], pointing \na finger cirectly \n‘at him and close to the bridge of his nose, deriding \nhis position as a \nmunicipal councillor, and threatening to hit him if he refused to cooperate. \nAt one time, \nBulkini even \nsat on the floor to question him while Tan \nBoon Wah was directed \nto \nsit on the damaged chair. Another method \nemployed was to try and pressure him to work with the Selangor MACC \nso as not to make Bulkini angry. Of course, \nall these assertions were \ndenied by Bulkini and the officers involved. \n[79] \nAnother aspect of the evidence was that Bulkini said that at about \n2.30am \non the 16\" after he had finished questioning Tan Boon Wah \nand briefed HH of Tan Boon Wah’'s recalcitrant attitude, he had told Tan \nBoon Wah to go home and \nto bring the relevant documents required \nthe following day, \nie on the 16. Tan Boon Wah instead had chosen \nto stay \nin the office to wait for his wife to produce these documents. \nThis was after Bulkini had allowed Tan Boon Wah to communicate with \nhis wife. \nThis assertion of Bulkini that Tan Boon Wah was free to go \nwas contradicted by the following evidence. \n[80] \nFirst, \nBulkini \nhad \nnot consulted anyone \nin \nauthority \nto \npermit \nTan Boon Wah \nto leave. Second, though \nBulkini had briefed HH \non \nTan Boon Wah’s refusal to admit the accusation levelled at him, there \nwas no evidence that HH had permitted \nBulkini \nto release Tan Boon \nWah. Third, \nif Tan Boon Wah had been released \nbut had chosen \nto \n25\n\n\n  \n  \nstay instead, then there was no reason why Tan Boon Wah should \nhave remained \nto have \nhis statement recorded on the 16\" \nup \nto as \nlate as 11.30am. His statement could have been recorded much earlier. \nFourth, why had Tan Boon Wah not been issued \na demand notice to \nproduce documents when he had supposedly been released by Bulkini \nwhereas in fact he was furnished with such demand notice in the late \n. morning of that day after his statement had been recorded? \nIf this was \nthe requirement, Bulkini did not comply with \nit when he had offered to \nrelease Tan Boon Wah. \nFifth, Tan Boon Wah only had \nhis belongings \nreturned \nto him \non \nthe \n16\" \nafter \nhis statement had \nbeen \nrecorded. \nAnd Tan Boon Wah had \nto acknowledge receipt for them. \nIf he could \nhave been released \nearlier, there would have been \nno necessity \nfor \nthese subsequent actions. \nSixth, \nif Tan Boon Wah’s wife was to have \nbrought those documents, should Bulkini then not have been interested \nto examine them to ascertain whether Tan Boon Wah had been telling \nthe \ntruth \nafter he \nhad \nbeen accused \nof lying \nover so many hours? \nInstead, \nBulkini chose \nto leave \nat 3.30am and Tan Boon Wah's wife \nnever appeared with the documents, which could only mean that Bulkini \nfabricated this piece of evidence. \n[81] \nApart from this, there were two important aspects of Tan Boon \nWah’s and \nBulkini’s confrontation pertinent to our inquiry. \nFirst \nis the \nclaim \nby Bulkini that \nat about 2.15am on the \n16\", \nafter questioning \nTan Boon Wah, and allowing him \nto remain \nin the small room which \nBulkini claimed that Tan Boon Wah preferred \nto be \nin [something we \nfind hard to comprehend], Tan Boon Wah went searching for Bulkini at \nthe pantry of the office. He requested for a drink and to be allowed to \nease himself in the toilet. Since the toilet was right next to the pantry, \nBulkini accompanied him there despite the fact that he was in the midst \nof his meal. \nBulkini asserted that at the entrance of the toilet, he saw \na male Chinese about the same height as Tan Boon Wah who was also \nabout to enter the toilet. After Tan Boon Wah had gone \nin but before \nthe toilet entrance door was shut, he heard Tan Boon Wah shouting \nin \nMandarin “Ni loh!”, translated by Bulkini to mean “You fah!”. Deciding \nthat his meal took priority over what these two might be talking about, \n26\n\n\n    \nBulkini returned to the pantry to finish his meal. Tan Boon Wah went \nback to where he had come from. \nBulkini never saw the other male \nChinese again. \n[82] \nSome three weeks after the death \nof TBH, \nBulkini decided \nto \nmake \na further police statement \non \nthe 20\" August 2009, \nthe \nfirst \nhaving been recorded on the 31% July 2009. \nIn this further statement \nhe claimed that the person whom Tan Boon Wah had shouted at on the \nmorning of the 16\" was in fact TBH. Though admitting that he had not \nat the material time known TBH, he said that he had recognised him \nfrom \na picture shown on the television news broadcast at 8.00pm on \nthe 16\", lying dead \nin Plaza Masalam. \nWhat prompted his recollection \nthat \nit was the same man he met at the toilet were the clothes worn \nby TBH on that day: white pants and a dark jacket. He explained that \nhe had not mentioned this earlier for the reason that he needed to be \ncertain. \nBut as time went by \nit became apparent to him that \nit must \nhave been TBH who Tan Boon Wah saw at the toilet and had shouted \nat. \n[83] \nTan Boon Wah, though admitting that he did see Bulkini \nat the \npantry that evening at about the time stated, denied that he either saw \nTBH or spoke to him. \nInstead, Tan Boon Wah affirmed that he met TBH \non his second visit to the toilet. However, he could not recall the exact \nhour but claimed that no officers were there then. On this occasion, he \nuttered to TBH: “Beng Hock, you are still here?” \nIn response Tan Boon \nWah recalled that TBH could have replied by uttering, “Em”. However \nhe was not certain of this. Since he was in a hurry to ease himself he \ndid \nnot engage \nin further conversation with TBH. \nBut when he came \nout of the toilet, TBH was gone. He then went back to the small room \nto sleep until 10.00am on the16\". \n[84] \nThough we are still narrating the facts of this case here, we think \nit appropriate at this stage to express our view on the issue of whether \nthere was such an encounter between TBH and Tan Boon Wah and \nthat Tan Boon Wah had indeed uttered the words “Ni /oh!” at TBH. \n27\n\n\n  \n  \n[85] \nThe purpose of Bulkini introducing this alleged piece of evidence \nwas basically to support the theory that some parties involved \nin the \nclaims under YB Ean’s allocation were blaming TBH for disclosing the \nscheme of.arrangement between suppliers of goods and YB Ean which \nthe Selangor MACC was investigating. \n[86] \nHaving considered the evidence, \nit is our view that this assertion \nof Bulkini was fabricated. The reasons now follow. \n[87] \nFirst, Bulkini never mentioned this meeting of TBH and Tan Boon \nWah in the toilet as witnessed by him in his first police statement made \nsoon \nafter the event. \nBy that time \nhe would have seen \nthe picture \nof TBH \nlying dead \non the \n5\" floor \nof Plaza Masalam. \nInstead, \nthis \ndisclosure was left to be made almost three weeks later. The lapse of \ntime renders this contention dubious. \n[88]. \n| \nSecond, \nin order for Bulkini to recognise TBH by the clothes he \nwore there should have been \na full-length picture of TBH \nlying dead. \nWe are doubtful whether such \na picture disrespectful of the deceased \nwould have been telecast \nin any \nof our national television networks, \n_ \nbearing \nin mind the sensitivities involved. \n[89] \nThird, \nBulkini’s description \nof TBH \nas \nbeing almost the same \nheight as Tan Boon Wah was contradicted \nby \na photograph tendered \nas exhibit \n| 219. \nit showed TBH and Tan Boon Wah together with TBH \nstanding \na head taller over Tan Boon Wah. \n' \n[90] \nFourth, we are unable to accept Bulkini’s claim that his recollection \nof the incident and recognition \nof TBH could improve with time. This \nis contrary to normal human recollection of events past. \n[91] \nFifth, \nthe \ntoilet was \nlocated just outside \nthe \npantry. Some \nsimple direction from Bulkini would have sufficed. Tan Boon Wah has \nno physical infirmities and as such there was no need for Bulkini to \n28\n\n\n  \nhave interrupted \nhis meal \nto accompany Tan Boon Wah \nto the toilet. \nAdditionally, \nBulkini occupied \na superior position \nin the investigation \nvis-a-vis Tan Boon Wah. \n[92] \nSixth, given that Bulkini was an experienced officer as proved by \n“his long service with the MACC, we were surprised that Bulkini made \nno attempt \nto \npick \nup any continuation \nof the alleged conversation \nbetween TBH and Tan Boon Wah \nin the toilet. This was compounded \nby four factors: one, Bulkini speaks and understands Chinese, having \nbeen educated \nin \na Chinese school up to primary six level where the \nmedium of instruction in Chinese schools in this country is in Mandarin. \nAnd both TBH and Tan Boon Wah were conversing \nin Mandarin. Two, \nas an experienced officer and given the circumstances of an ongoing \noperation, he should have been more interested in gathering intelligence, \nmore so when such a golden opportunity presented itself in the form of \nthese two witnesses who were perhaps sharing vital information which \ncould have assisted the investigation. Three, the alleged exclamation \nof “Ni \nloh!? \nby Tan \nBoon Wah \nto TBH \nshould have piqued \nBulkini’s \ncuriosity to follow up with what was \nto continue between the two \nof \nthem. \nBut, instead, \nhis preference to finish \nhis meal took precedence \nover the likelihood \nof \na scoop. \nFour, \nhe was already \nin front \nof the \nentrance \nof the toilet and \nit would \nnot have been \ndifficult for him \nto \nhave remained there \na \nlittle longer to \nlisten \nin. Any reasonable man \nwould have done so given the circumstances at that time. \n193] \nHaving \nregard \nto these numerous contradictions \nand \nthose \npreviously highlighted, we hold that this piece of evidence from Bulkini \nis unworthy of credit and should be rejected. \nLee Wye Wing [“Lee’] \n[94] \nLee was a project and programme agent. He arranged and put \ntogether different parties to carry out projects and programmes funded \nunder YB Ean’s allocation. \nIn the course of doing so, he also prepared \n29\n\n\n  \nthe documentation to secure the approval and payment of the completed \nworks. He worked closely with YB Ean and inevitably with TBH, as the \npolitical secretary to YB Ean. \n[95] \nOn the 15\", he received instructions to be present at the Selangor \nMACC office. He arrived at 4.30pm the same day and met Sachi, who \nwas presumably \nin charge \nof questioning him. When \nhe saw Sachi, \nthe first thing Sachi did was to demand that he place his mobilephone \non Sachi’s table. And then Sachi directed him to sit at an area where \nthere was \na \nsofa. \nSachi \nproceeded \nto \ninterrogate \nhim \nby informing \nhim that the Selangor MACC had enough evidence to charge him with \nan offence. He was then shown \na number of documents. He recalled \ntwo programmes associated \nwith these documents: \nPesta Tanglung \n[Lantern Festival] and the campaign \nto abolish the ISA. According \nto \nSachi, the things ordered for these programmes had not been supplied \nbut money had been claimed and collected in respect of them. Further, \nSachi accused Lee of using the allocation for political purposes. Sachi \nthen demanded that he produce documents such as receipts for the \npurchases he had made for the programmes. Though Sachi did not use \nviolence on him, \nhe had raised \nhis voice and acted \nin an aggressive \nmanner when questioning him. \n[96] \n. Between 6.00pm and 8.00pm on the 15\", Lee was kept \nin the \npantry. There he met his partner Wong Hong Chae, the proprietor of \nSyarikat Hong Chae, \na firm which had undertaken some projects and \n‘programmes for YB Ean. He was not permitted to speak to him. And \nthen \nat or about 8.00pm, \nhe was driven \nby \na team \nof the Selangor \n.MACC officers to his home in Seremban to collect documents. He was \nsupposed \nto hand over \nto them \nreceipts which supported \nhis claim \nthat the work under the programmes and projects had been carried \nout. These officers did \nnot search \nhis house. He provided them with \nreceipts, bank books and statements. His computer CPU was however \nseized. \n30\n\n\n[97] \nA-set of documents given by Lee to these officers that evening \nwere the first pages \nof exhibits \n| 206A, \n| 206B, \n| 206C and \n| 206D. \nThese were four sheets of handwritten notes depicting the distribution \nof funds received from \nthe four programmes completed and claimed \nfor under YB Ean’s allocation. Accompanying each of these four pages \nwere supporting documents such as approval letters, confirmation of the \njobs completed, invoices, approvals by the District Office for payments \nand photographs taken of the events. \n[98] \nAfter this exercise was completed, Lee was taken back to the \n14 floor of Plaza Masalam. They arrived around midnight. He was then \nplaced at the Pen Mas area where he met TBH who was already there. \nThere \nis no necessity for us to repeat what transpired between them \nas this has been discussed earlier. Lee was kept there \nuntil 2.00am \non the 16\" when his statement was recorded. \n[99] \nThe recording \nof Lee’s statement took three hours. \nIt \ndid \nnot \nfinish until 5.00am on the 16\". Then at about 6.00am he had breakfast \nat the pantry and there he met Tan Boon Wah for the first time. Though \nhe had heard \nof Tan Boon Wah and knew that he had provided the \nsound system for some of the programmes, Lee had not met him before. \nThey spoke but were reprimanded by officers accompanying them and \ntold to use only Bahasa Malaysia to converse. Lee stayed there until \n40.30am when one of the officers received a phone call to say that he \nwas to be released. He then \nleft Plaza Masalam immediately. \n[100] \nExcept for the ten to fifteen minutes spent with TBH at the Pen \nMas area around 12.00am \non the \n16\", \nLee \ndid \nnot see TBH again. \nHe learned from his niece Lee Kee Hiong at about 5.00pm on the 16\" \nthat TBH was dead. \n[101] \nSubsequently, after the investigation \ninto the use \nof YB Ean’s \nallocation was taken over by HQ from the Selangor MACC, Lee provided \nfurther documents to the new investigating officer, Anmad Shafik Abdul \n31\n\n\n  \n  \nRahman [“IO Shafik”), to justify that the claims and payments for the \nprogrammes and projects were aboveboard. \n[102] \nWhat \nis significant \nin Lee’s testimony was the insight into the \narrangement for the expenditure of YB Ean’s allocation for projects and \nprogrammes. Lee first explained the difference between a project [which \nhe termed \na “small project”) and \na programme, \nas described earlier. \nThen he elaborated that for small projects, because of the requirement \nto use Class F contractors who could be bumiputras only, he arranged \nwith a Malay friend of his, one Mohd Harun Abdullah [“Harun”], to set \nup \na number of bumiputra firms. When YB Ean required certain \ncivil \nworks to be done \nin \nhis constituency or for the constituency that he \nhad adopted [since opposition state assemblymen were not provided \nwith the allocation, assemblymen from the ruling party in the State of \nSelangor would adopt their constituencies \nso that residents \nin these \nconstituencies would also benefit from the allocation], he would prepare \nfor submission \na form known \nas “Borang \nA”. YB \nEan was required \nto sign on this. \nIt was \na request for the required works to be carried \nout. \n[103]. According to Lee, TBH did assist him in preparing some of these \nforms \nby filling \nin the particulars \ninto \na template \nhe had provided \nto \nTBH. This was to save time since TBH could complete this and give \nit \nto YB Ean \nto sign immediately. This form would then be forwarded to \nthe respective District Office or Land Office for processing. Work would \nnot start until the approval from one of these offices was obtained. And \nwhen the works were completed, Lee would prepare the invoice for the \ncontractor concerned to request for payment. YB Ean would then have \nto sign a form known as “Borang B” to confirm that the works requested \nhad been completed. Payment would \nnot be made \nuntil the technical \nsiaff of the respective District Office or Land Office had inspected the \nworks and confirmed that the costs for the items specified \nin the claim \nwere in accordance with the standard amount set down by regulations. \nOnly when the respective officer was satisfied as to this would payment \nbe made from these offices to the contractor. \n32\n\n\n| \n[104] \n. As for programmes, though the procedure was somewhat similar \nto small projects, the amount to be spent depended on YB Ean’s budget. \n. When YB Ean decided to stage, for example, the Pesta Tanglung at a \n~ \ncost of RM10,000.00, Lee had to work within this budget. Documentation \nleading to this claim was found in exhibit \n| 206C. For programmes there \nwas no necessity to use a bumiputra firm since \nit did not involve civil \nWorks. \n[105] \nWe noticed some shortcomings in this procedure. There was no \nquotation tendered prior to the approval for a programme. Though Lee \n[and \nLee Kee Hiong whose role we shall discuss shortly] confirmed \nthat he had to work within the budget, there was no one to verify as \nto whether the goods and services supplied for the programme were of \nthe value claimed. At least for a small project, there were the standard \ncharges \nlaid down \nby regulations \nto gauge the cost \nof works carried \nout. But none of this applied to programmes. \n[106] \nAccording to Lee, TBH had signed on behalf of YB Ean on some \nof the Borang \nB. He had typed his name on these forms and put his \nsignature on them except that he had affixed YB Ean’s rubber stamp \non the place where he had signed. Since there had been no express \ndeclaration that he had signed this document for and on behalf of his \nprincipal YB Ean, we were of the view that the MACC officers seized \nupon \nthis \nto capitalise \non \ntheir threat that TBH \nhad committed \nan \noffence. \n[107] \nThe next area \nof contention was the first page \nof each \nof the \nexhibits \n| 206A, \n| 206B, \n| 206C and \n| \n206D. \nAll these concerned \nprogrammes. \nIn fact one \nof them \n[exhibit \n| 206D] had nothing \nto do \nwith YB \nEan. \nIt was \nfor \na \ndifferent constituency, \nnamely, Kampung \nTunku. The state assemblyman there had also engaged the services \nof Lee and he had used \na firm known as WSK Services fo carry out \nthe programme. The proprietor of WSK Services \nai the material time \nwas Lee’s wife. \n33\n\n\n  \n  \n[108] \nThe distribution \nof the proceeds \nlisted \nout on these four first \npages \nof the \nsaid documents attracted some \ninterest \nin \nthe MACC \nOfficers, particularly the consistent payments \nto DAP Serdang Aman \nin three of these [exhibits \n| 206A, \n| 206B and \n! 206C] and another to \n“DAP Malaysia” [exhibit \n| 206D]. Lee and Lee Kee Hiong subsequently \n. \nexplained \nthat these were \nfor repayment \nof advances made \nby this \npolitical organisation \nfor the respective programmes. \nIn \nthe case \nof \nrepayment to the DAP Serdang Aman, we were told that YB Ean had \na service centre there. He had used the DAP set-up for this purpose. \nApparently, contractors and suppliers for the small projects or programmes \nwould go there \nto request \nfor payment \nfirst since the \nDistrict Office \nor Land Office would take one to two months to process their claims. \nThus, when payment was finally received from \nthe \nDistrict Office \nor \nLand Office, reimbursement had to be made \nto the political \nparty, \nie \n‘the DAP. \n[109] \nWe find this rather odd when the parties involved in this process \nwere unable to exclude political parties from involvement in government \nprojects. The allocation was from the budget of the state government. \nlt was supposed \nto \nbe spent \nfor the \nresidents \nliving \nin \na \nparticular \narea \nin the state. A political party should not be involved \nin assisting \nfinancially \nin such activities. Otherwise \nit would attract accusations, as \nit did \nin this case, \nthat such fund \nor part of \nit was channelled back \nto the political party. We are unable to comprehend here as to why a \ncontractor or an agent undertaking to stage \na programme or to carry \n‘out a small project required the financial assistance of a political party \nto tide him over for the period while awaiting payment from the District \nOffice or Land Office. Surely anyone doing business should have capital \nof his own \nor should \nmake arrangements for the same. \n[110] \nFurther, Lee had subsequently provided to \n1O Shafik a number \nof receipts issued \nby the DAP \nfor the reimbursement \nof the monies \nadvanced after HQ had taken over the investigation of the case. \nBut \nnone of the receipts was an exact match to the amount reimbursed to \nthe DAP as listed out \nin the first page of each of the exhibits \n| 206A, \n34\n\n\n| 206B, \n| 206C and \n| 206D. \nNevertheless, despite this and based on \n‘the explanation provided \nby \nLee, and the non-availability \nof TBH \nas \nan important witness, \nthe MACC decided \nthat the \ninvestigation \ninto \nthe suspected impropriety as \nto the use \nof YB Ean’s allocation \nbe \nstopped. \nLee Kee Hiong [“Ms Lee”] \n[111] \nMs Lee \nis the niece of Lee. She \nis a Klang municipal councillor \nand an active member of the DAP. She was the general manager of \nDAP Malaysia from 2003 to 2008. \n[112] \nMs Lee described herself as a programme co-ordinator and had \nworked as part-time staff in her uncle’s set-up WSK Services and Hong \nChae Enterprise [in the latter of which Lee and Wong Hong Chae were \n~ \nin some sort of partnership]. She focused only on programmes where \npayments were made from \nthe allocation. We believe that while Lee \ntook care of the paperwork, \nMs Lee did the groundwork, \nlike getting \nthe suppliers, arranging for services, ensuring attendance of participants \nand arranging \nthe \npublicity \nfor the programmes. When YB Ean \nhad \nan idea for a programme with \na budget, she would be contacted and \nwould \ntry to work within the amount allotted \nfor \nit. She claimed that \nshe also prepared \nthe accounts for the programme that was carried \nout. She was also the author of the first page of each of the four sets \nof documents [exhibits \n| 206A, \n| 206B, \n| 206C and \n| 206D). \n[113] \nAlthough \nMs \nLee \ninsisted \nthat \nshe \ndid \nnot \nsolicit \nfor these \nprogrammes, records showed that most of them were given \nto either \nHong Chae Enterprise or WSK Services. \n[114] \nMs Lee said that she had known TBH when he was \na reporter \nand was instrumental \nin getting \nhim \nto join the DAP \nas \na member. \nThough Ms Lee maintained that she did \nnot discuss the price of the \nprogrammes with TBH, she contradicted \nherself when she said \nthat \nTBH \nhad given \nhis \nopinion \nat times \nthat some items charged were \nexcessive. \n35\n\n\n  \n  \n[115] \nCounsel for the MACC suggested that there were improprieties in \nthe staging of the programmes where there could have been kickbacks \nto the DAP from the expenditure incurred. He applied to us to demand \nfrom Lee receipts \nto match each advance made by the DAP and the \nSubsequent reimbursement \nfor \nit. We refused \nhis application \non \nthe \nground that this was not within our terms of reference. Further, \nif the \nMACC had desired to pursue \nits investigation into this, \nit could have \nexercised \nits discretion to do so rather than to make use of the RCI. \nMohd Harun Abdullah [“Harun” \n{116] \nHarun was candid enough \nto admit that he had arranged with \nLee for the use of a number of bumiputra firms to carry out projects \nunder the allocation. To this end he had set up firms where his wife and \nrelatives were proprietors. He could not be a proprietor because he was \nblacklisted by the banks from operating a bank account. The operators \nof the bank accounts for these firms were the actual proprietors but \nin \n- practice Lee controlled the bank accounts. The proprietors would sign \nblank cheques which Harun would then hand over to Lee. None of the \nproprietors or Harun himself had carried out any of the works awarded. \nAs consideration for this arrangement, Harun would receive 5% to 10% \nof the amount paid for each project as commission. Examples of this \nwere reflected \nin exhibits | 206A, \n| 206B, \n| 206C and \n| 206D, though \ninvolving different firms. \n[117] \nAt the request of the Selangor MACC, Harun arrived at the 14\" \nfloor of Plaza Masalam \nat about 3.00pm on the 15\". He was made to \nwait in the waiting room while the officer in charge seemed to “keluar \nmasuk, keluar masuk” [“moving \nin and out”] except to engage with him. \nHe could not understand this when \nit was the Selangor MACC which \nhad wanted him to be present for questioning. \nHe felt very anxious. \nIt \nwas not until after some four hours later at 7.00pm that he was called \nin for questioning. This only took an hour. \nIt was finished by 8.00pm. \nThe officer who recorded his statement did not tell him to leave. Instead, \n36\n\n\n  \nhe was informed to wait for Lee to come back from Seremban before \nhe could go. This was a clear and obvious indication of cross-checking \none witness's statement with that of another which was being carried \nout by those involved \nin the operation on the evening of the 15\" and \ninto the 16\". \n[118] \nAfter Harun’s statement was recorded, he was asked to wait \nin \nan area outside Nadzri’s room where there was a sofa. At about 2.00am \non the 16\" when there was still no indication that he would be released, \nhe used his mobilephone [which surprisingly was not confiscated] to call \na friend who worked \nin HQ. He related his predicament to her, \na lady \nby the name of Saemah. Saemah asked to speak directly to any of the \nofficers \nin the premises. Harun then opened the door to a room nearby \nand found TBH having \nhis statement recorded. The officer recording \nTBH's statement asked him to look for another officer to attend to him. \n-He then found another officer who happened to pass by and handed \nhim \nhis mobilephone \nfor the \nofficer \nto speak \nto Saemah. After \nthis \nconversation between the officer and Saemah, \nHarun was released. \nThis was further confirmation \nthat \na witness was \nnot allowed \nto \ngo \nhome after his statement had been recorded. \nIn Harun’s case, \nif not \nfor the intervention of Saemah, Harun would have been forced to wait \ninto the morning \nof the 16\", as happened with the other witnesses. \nDecision on the second term of reference \n[119] \nHaving considered \nall \nthe evidence \nin \nits \nentirety, we found \nthat TBH was driven \nto commit suicide by the aggressive, relentless, \noppressive and unscrupulous interrogation to which he was subjected \nby certain \nofficers \nof the MACC who were involved \nin \nthe ongoing \noperation by the Selangor MACC on the night of the 15\" and into the \nmorning of the 16\". \n[120] \nOur reasons to support this finding are as follows. \n37\n\n\n  \n  \nForensic pathological aspects \nChronology \n[121] \nSoon after the body of TBH was discovered, forensic pathologists \nDr Khairul Azman Ibrahim [“Dr Khairul’] from Hospital Tengku Ampuan \n~ Rahimah, Klang [“the Kiang hospital’] and Dr Prashant Naresh Samberker \n[“Dr Prashant’] from the University \nof Malaya Medical Centre were \ncalled \nin to assist in the investigations. \n[122] \nDr Khairul \nand \nDr Prashant examined the body \nat the scene \nat 7.30pm on the 16. Rigor mortis was established \nin \nall the limbs. \nThe body was then transferred \nto the Klang hospital \nfor postmortem \nexamination at 9.10pm on the 16\". They jointly conducted the autopsy \non TBH at 12.00pm on the 17\" and a joint report was produced by them \non the 24'July 2009. That report was produced before us as exhibit \n| \n42. \n[123] \nDuring the inquest the coroner, prompted \nby an opinion given \non \nthe \nfirst postmortem \nexamination \nby one \nDr Khunying \nPorntip \nRojanansunan \n[“Dr \nPorntip”], \na forensic \npathologist from Thailand, \nwho was engaged \nby the State government of Selangor, ordered \nDr \n_Shahidan Mohd Noor [“Dr Shahidan’] to conduct a second postmortem \nexamination on TBH. Dr Porntip had opined that TBH had been beaten \nwith a piece of wood over the back of the thighs, an object had been \nthrust up his anus and that he had been manually strangled. \n[124] However, \nit must be emphasised that Dr Porntip was not present \nat the first postmortem examination conducted at the Klang hospital and \nshe based her opinion on photographs and the first postmortem report \nwhich had been sent to her. These photographs had been taken by the \npolice and were somewhat lacking in clarity. Dr Prashant had taken his \nown photographs at the first postmortem examination but these were \n~ \nnot tendered at the inquest. We came to know of their existence when \n38\n\n\n  \n  \nDr Prashant informed \nus during this inquiry that he had, on \nhis own, \ntaken photographs as well. By consent of all parties, the photographs \ntaken by Dr Prashant were tendered in evidence before us and marked \nas exhibit \n| 190. The importance of these photographs became evident \nduring \nthe testimony \nof the forensic pathologists before \nus and \nwill \nbe elaborated upon later \nin this report. The photographs taken \nby Dr \nPrashant were admittedly clearer and of better quality than those taken \nby the police and sent to Dr Porntip. \n[125] \nDr Shahidan conducted the second postmortem \nat the Sungai \nBuloh Hospital on the 22\" November 2009. He produced an undated \nreport which we marked as exhibit \n| 82. \n[126] \nPresent at the second postmortem examination was Professor Dr \nPeter Vanezis [“Professor Vanezis”] from the United Kingdom [“the UK*] \nwho attended the examination as an observer on behalf of the MACC. \nHe later produced \na report dated the 16\" December 2009 which was \nmarked \nas exhibit \n| \n90. \nDr Porntip was also present as an observer \non behalf of the State government of Selangor. She later produced \na \nreport dated the 25\" January 2010. \nThis was marked as exhibit \n| 89 \nin the inquiry before us. \n[127] \nAt the coroner’s inquest, \na barrage \nof questions was directed \nat the forensic pathologists we have mentioned above, \nexploring \nin \nminutiae the various possibilities of how the death of TBH could have \ncome about. They verged on the realm of speculation which we should \navoid. We had instead focused on probabilities based on the evidence \nbefore us and not on possibilities. For this we shall deal with the various \naspects of the case. \nTime of death \n[128] \nExcept \nfor \nDr Porntip, \nall \nthe other forensic pathologists who \ntestified \nbefore \nus agreed \nthat the estimated \ntime \nof death \nof TBH \n39\n\n\n  \nwas between 7.15am and 11.15am \non the \n16\". \nDr Porntip said \nthat \nshe was unable to give her views on this because she had not been \nphysically present \nat the \nmaterial time \nto see the body \nof TBH. As \nboth \nDr Prashant and \nDr Khairul were at the scene not long after \nits \ndiscovery we considered that the time of death of TBH was as stated \n~ \nby them. \nPosition of the body when found \n[129] \nThe position of TBH’s body when found on the 5* floor of Plaza \nMasalam \non the \n16\" was eight feet \nsix inches from \nthe wall \nof the \nbuilding and three feet six inches from the outer boundary wall. \n[130] \nAccording to the evidence of all the forensic pathologists taken \ntogether with the pattern of injuries sustained by TBH, which we shall \ndiscuss \nshortly, \nthe injuries sustained \nby TBH were consistent with \nthose \nof a person falling from \na height. \nFurther, one \nDr Sallehuddin \nMuhamad [“Dr Sallehuddin”], an associate professor at the University \nof Technology Malaysia, who had carried out simulation tests at Plaza \nMasalam on falling objects, also confirmed that based on the position \n- \nwhere TBH’s body was found, TBH would have fallen from \na height \nand from \na window above, which was believed to be the one marked \nas.| 63j on the sketch plan [exhibit \n| 63] of the Selangor MACC office \non the 14\" floor of Plaza Masalam. The height of the window on the \n14\" floor from the level at which TBH’s body was found on the 5\" floor \nmeasured one hundred and eight feet. \n[131] The window on the 14\" floor was directly above the place where \nTBH’s body was found. The window had a width of two feet ten inches \nand opened out swivelling upwards from the bottom. \nIt opened out to \na maximum extent of three feet eight inches when fully extended to an \nangle of forty-five degrees. According \nto Professor Vanezis, \na person \nwould have been able to climb out of this window when \nit had been \nopened and extended. \nSince \nthis window was \ndirectly above where \n40 \nTO \na \n  \n \n\n\n  \nTBH’s body was found, we believe that TBH must have exited from \nthis \nsite. \nFurther, various MACC \nofficers who were familiar with \nthe \narea had testified that this window was never locked. \nIt was frequently \nopened by officers for ventilation when smoking \nin the area. \nPattern of injuries \n[132] \nTBH suffered fractures of the bones of the legs and feet. Some \nof these fractures were seen on x-rays \nto be overlapping each other \nin that the bones were out of their natural alignment as a result of the \nfall from \na height which TBH sustained, as agreed by all the forensic \npathologists who testified before us. When TBH fell, he landed feet first \non the ground, leading to severe fragmented fractures of the bones of \nthe feet with overlapping fractures of both lower limb bones. \nIt was also \nagreed \nby them that TBH was conscious when \nhe fell. According \nto \nProfessor Vanezis, TBH was consciously trying to absorb the pressure \nof the \nfall as an instinctive reaction. We are \nin complete agreement \nwith this view and conclude that TBH fell from the window on the 14\" \nfloor and was conscious when he fell. \n[133] \nTBH also suffered fractures in the pelvic region. They were mainly \nof the sacrum \nand \nthe coccyx. \nIn respect \nof these, \nall \nthe forensic \npathologists agreed that they were due to the initial impact of the fall \nwhen TBH landed on his feet and buttocks almost simultaneously. \n[134] \nFurther injuries suffered by TBH were fractures of the ribs and \nmanubrium \nsterni [chest bone]. However, \nthe x-rays \nof the chest by \nthemselves did not reveal \na fracture of the manubrium sterni. But Dr \nPrashant maintained that such fracture was due to the bending outwards \nat the junction of the manubrium and sterni and would not have shown \nup on the x-rays. We agree with him since the junction of the manubrium \nand \nsterni \nis \na cartilage and \nit would have caused \na sublaxation \nin \nthis region, resulting \nin \na fracture. Such a fracture together with those \nof the \nribs \nin our opinion was consistent with TBH having falien from \n41\n\n\n  \na height owing \nto the force transmitted upwards from the legs to the \nchest when the body hit the ground. \n[135] \nTBH also had linear fractures \nof the skull and haemorrhaging \non the surface of the brain. According to Dr Prashant and Dr Khairul, \nthese fractures were due to the transmitted forces from the legs upwards \nthrough the mandible [jaw bone] and into the skull as a result of the \nfall. Professor Vanezis was more general \nin his opinion and explained \nthat these fractures were due to secondary impact as a consequence \nof the fall. Dr Porntip, however, attributed this to a pre-fall injury, \nie of \nTBH having been \nhit by a blunt object before he fell. \n[136] \nWe disagree with \nDr Porntip. \nIf TBH \nhad been \nhit \nby \na blunt \nobject and had suffered such severe injury of the head, he could \nnot \nhave consciously walked \nto the window to exit therefrom. And \nif, \non \nthe other hand, TBH \nhad \nbeen unconscious and thrown \nout \nof the \nwindow, \nhe would \nnot have landed \nfirst on \nhis feet and then on \nhis \nbuttocks almost simultaneously, and finally on his hands. According to \nProfessor Vanezis, the duration TBH to impact the ground in a \nfall from \na height of one hundred and eight feet would have been \nat a rate of \napproximately thirty-two feet per second. This would \nnot have given \nhim sufficient \ntime \nto \nrecover consciousness \nto take \nthe \ninstinctive \ndefensive action that he took \nin attempting to break his fall. \n[137] \nOn the other hand, \nif TBH had been conscious and forced out \nof the window, there would most probably have been \na struggle with \nhis aggressors. \nInevitably, \nthis would \nhave resulted \nin TBH having \ndefensive \ninjuries on \nhis body, \nindicating \na struggle. There were \nno \nsuch injuries found by the forensic pathologists. Then there would also \npossibly have been foreign sources \nof deoxyribonucleic acid [\"DNA’] \ntransmitted onto his body and clothing by the aggressors. But Dr Seah \nLay Hong [“Dr Seah’], a forensic scientist from the chemistry department \nwho conducted the DNA analysis on TBH and his clothing, detected no \nforeign sources \nof DNA in the fingernail clippings \nof TBH and on the \n42 \n \n\n\n  \nback outer side of his jacket except for one which later turned out to \nbe that of a person known as Gopala. This person had died as a result \nof a road accident and \na postmortem examination was carried out on \nhim just prior to that on TBH. Hence, there had been contamination of \nthat portion of TBH’s jacket as a result of the transmission thereon of \nGopala’s DNA, owing to the postmortem table not having been scrubbed \nclean completely. \n{138] \nWhen Dr Prashant and Dr Khairul conducted the first postmortem \n-examination on TBH, they found a fracture of the mandible [jaw bone] with \nbruising \nin the region. From the photographs taken at this postmortem \nby \nDr Prashant, \nthey noticed \na very \nlight pink stain over the neck \nregion. Dr Prashant, Dr Khairul and Professor Vanezis attributed this to \nhypostasis, \nie postmortem staining. Dr Porntip, however, held the view \nthat this was due to manual strangulation. Based on the evidence \nof \nthe other forensic pathologists, we were unable to accept her view as \nthe clear photographs taken by Dr Prashant were proof that the blood \nin this area had seeped into the muscles as a result of the fracture of \nthe mandible, leading to postmortem staining. \n[139] \nWe found \nDr Porntip’s view \nto \nbe extremely speculative \nand \ntherefore unacceptable. \nIn our opinion, this light pink stain on the neck \nwas most certainly due to postmortem staining. \nIt could not have been \nthe result of a bruise as claimed by Dr Porntip since \nit was not seen \nby \nDr Prashant and \nDr Khairul \nat the \nfirst postmortem examination. \nThis stain was due to the blood from the fracture of the mandible [jaw \nbone] seeping \ninto the region \nof the neck, simulating \na bruise \nafter \nTBH had died. \n{140] \nOur view \nis further reinforced \nby Professor Vanezis who said \nthat \nif TBH \nhad \nbeen strangled \nbefore \nhis death, \nthere would \nhave \nbeen \npetechial haemorrhages \nin the eyes [pinpoint bleeding \nspots]. \nSuch spots were completely absent in TBH’s eyes, a fact that even Dr \nPorntip admitted. \n43\n\n\n  \n[141] \nAnother factor that ruled out manual strangulation was the absence \nof a fracture of the hyoid bone and laryngeal cartilages [structures in the \nneck]. These would have been damaged had strangulation occurred. \n[142] \nFrom the photographs taken at the first postmortem examination, \nthere were tramline abrasions measuring \ntwo centimetres \nby \na_ \nhalf \ncentimetre found over the chest region \nof TBH. The Bar voiced \nits \nsuspicion that this could have been caused by physical abuse inflicted \non TBH \nbefore he died. But this suspicion was demolished when both \nProfessor Vanezis and Dr Porntip said that these tramline abrasions \nwere caused \nby the folding and creasing of the clothes worn by TBH \nat the time when he fell. \nClothing and personal belongings \n[143] \nPhotographs taken at the scene where TBH fell and during the first \npostmortem examination showed a number of tears on TBH’s trousers. \nThe first was right across the buttock region. Another was at the knee \narea. The third was beside the zipper of the trousers. According to all \nthe forensic pathologists, \nsuch damage \nto \nthe clothing \nis commonly \nseen \nin cases of a \nfall from \na height. This would have included the \nbelt which TBH was wearing which was severed near the buckle. \n[144] \nThe \nBar further voiced \nits suspicion \nthat this tear on the \nbelt \ncould have been caused by TBH being held dangling by the belt out \nof the window on the 14\" floor and that the \nbelt snapped under \nhis \nweight. We do not believe this was the case as there was no evidence \nin support of this, and further both Professor Vanezis and Dr Porntip \nacknowledged that such tear in the belt would be common \nin cases of \n_ \nfalls from heights resulting from forces exerted during the fall. \n[145] \nStill on the belt, Dr Seah found three contributors of male DNA \ntypes on it. Two of the contributors were identified. One was TBH himself \nand another was Gopala. Then there was the third which Dr Seah said \nshe could not identify against all those whose DNA samples she had \n44 \n \n\n\n  \ntaken. This included all the MACC officers who had been involved in the \ncase as well as the police officers and hospital personnel who had come \ninto contact with TBH after his death. \nBy this process of elimination, \nwe exclude the possibility of any of the MACC officers involved in this \ncase from having resorted to such techniques as holding TBH by the \nbelt and dangling him from a height. \nConclusion on forensic pathologists’ evidence \n[146] \nHaving considered \nthe evidence as \na whole on \nthis aspect of \nthe case, we hold the view that TBH fell out of the window on the 14! \nfloor of Plaza Masalam on the morning \nof the 16\" directly above the \nplace where his body was found later. \nInterrogation \n[147] \nTBH was taken to the Selangor MACC office for questioning just \nbefore 6.00pm \non the \n15\". \nHis attendance, though purportedly upon \ninvitation, was secured through \ninsistent pressure \nunlike \nLee’s \nand \nHarun’s attendance where they turned up voluntarily as requested. \nIn \n_TBH’s case, he was accompanied by the MACC officers to the Selangor \nMACC office after a commotion and some unpleasant exchanges and> \narguments \nat the SUK building. \nIn \nfact, \nhe was escorted there. We \nwere not surprised that given the harassed condition he was in, he was \nunsettled when he met Anuar in the reception area on the 14 floor of \nPlaza Masalam. He was forced to go immediately and his mobilephone \nwas confiscated by Anuar. To add to this, Manoharan who did turn up \nat the Selangor MACC was not allowed to see TBH as promised. TBH \nwas kept in the dark of this fact by the MACC officers. \nFirst Interrogation \n[148] \nThen TBH was taken to the Pen Mas area. There he underwent \na so-called “calming therapy” designed \nby Anuar. \nInstead \nof leaving \nTBH alone to ease his nerves as \na reasonable man would \nleft him \nto \n45\n\n\n  \ndo, TBH was verbally assaulted by a pack of officers numbering six to \nseven at one time or other during this period who were told to “chat” \nwith \nhim “to calm \nhim down”. \nRepeated questions from them \nof his \nbackground were asked. This could have been easily secured by Azhar \nwho was officially told by Anuar to carry out this task. \n[149] Though Anuar, the creator of this method of interrogation, pleaded \nignorance \nof this inhume treatment, we \nare \nof the view \nthat \nit was \ndone with a particular objective: \nto break down TBH’s resistance and \nto force him to say what they wanted. \nAn indication of this was what \nhappened \nat the time when TBH \nfirst arrived \nat the Selangor MACC \noffice. Anuar who met him \nat the reception area immediately asked \nTBH what he could do to help. This \nis something unusual to do when \nyou invite someone to your premises. \n[150] \nTo our mind, \nthis was \na tacit invitation \nby Anuar hinting \nthat \nTBH should “rat” on his boss, YB Ean, so that TBH would be able to \nextricate himself from the oppressive atmosphere that he found himself \nin, having regard to the fact that TBH had already had had a run-in with \nAnuar at the SUK building when the intention of the Selangor MACC \nto target YB Ean had become apparent. \n[151] \nThe therapeutic treatment designed by Anuar to calm TBH down \nthrough a “chat” at the Pen Mas area must have had a profound effect \non him. He had to endure this torture for four hours. As observed by \nhis “companions” of this “chat”, TBH was reserved, quiet most of the \ntime, kept to himself, and only answered questions when asked. Such \na description \nof TBH’s mocd \nfits the characteristics \nof a person who \nwas being intimidated. \nSecond Interrogation \n[152] \nThe second stage \nof the \ninterrogation came from Arman \nand \nAshraf. Though these MACC officers attempted to describe this process \n46 \n \n\n\n  \nas an interview we find \nit to be more \nlike an inquisition. \nArman and \nAshraf assumedc the role of inquisitors. They turned the four files over \nto: TBH and demanded that he find for them matching documents \nto \nthose obtained from TBH’s laptop. They then went further by picking out \nsuspicious documents from the four files and demanded an explanation \nfrom TBH without first investigating into the matter themselves. \nIn fact, \nthey exceeded the instructions given to them by Hairul Ilham to only \nfind documents in the four files which corresponded to those from TBH’s \nlaptop. \n[153] \nFurther, \nduring \nthis process, Arman and Ashraf would \nhave \ninstilled doubts and fear into TBH by declaring that Treasury directives \nrequire \nfor the \ncalling \nof three tenders before \na contract could \nbe \nawarded. There was also \na claim by them that some of the contracts \nhad exceeded the permitted limit of RM10,000.00. Of course this was \nnot true. Under \na Selangor government circular dated the 13' August \n2008, namely, Surat Pekeliling Perbendaharaan \nBil \n6 Tahun 2008 \n[in \nEnglish, Treasury Circular Letter No \n6 of 2008], YB Ean could award \na contract directly \nto \nany contractor without \nthe need \nfor \na tender \nexercise, and further the permitted maximum \nprice for each \nof these \ncontracts had been increased to RM20,000.00. \n[154] \nPerhaps, to give them the benefit of the doubt, both Arman and \nAshraf may not have known of this. But, as responsible MACC officers \nthey should have ascertained what the real position was before making \nsuch accusations. On the other hand, \nif both Arman and Ashraf had \nknown about \nthis, then they were intentionally exploiting TBH’s \nlack \nof knowledge \nor ignorance with false information deliberately aimed \nat confusing him. This was deplorable and must have caused severe \nanxiety to TBH as reflected in his conversation with Lee soon after this \ninterrogation session. According to Lee, TBH would not have been in a \nposition to know the detailed requirements for projects and programmes \nand \nthat \nhe, \nLee, would \nhave been \nthe \nbest person \nto have been \nquestioned about this. \n47\n\n\n  \n[155] Another aspect of this interrogation \nof concern was the \nability \nof Arman and Ashraf to extract from TBH \nhis password \nto his private \nemail account. To many of us, this may be equivalent to disclosing our \npin number of our ATM card. At least in the case of an ATM card, the \nextractor may be allowed to withdraw a limited amount of our money at \nany one time before such unauthorised access \nis reported. But \nin the \ncase of an email account, \nall our personal information and data would \nbe exposed immediately and permanently. This \nis \na gross violation of \na person’s rights. TBH would have been very disturbed over this and \nhis disappointment and regret \nin divulging his password to Arman and \nAshraf was further mirrored \nin his conversation with Lee. \n[156] \nWe are \nof the view that this regret and concern \nof TBH over \nthese matters remained festering within him. An indication of this could \nbe seen from his behaviour when his statement was being recorded by \nNadzri. This was further reflected in his being silent and being \ndeep in \nthought when he met Tan Boon Wah near the toilet. Instead of being \nexcited and surprised to see a fellow individual \nin a similar distressful \nsituation, \nhe maintained \na distance and was virtually silent. \n[157] From \nthe evidence adduced, we \nare \nof the opinion \nthat both \nArman and Ashraf were specially selected \nby HH \n[though disguised \nas instructions coming from Hairul Ilham] to carry out this interrogation \nof TBH. They did not ostensibly happen \nto be there and available as \neveryone else was busy. \nIn fact there was an excess of officers that \nevening, so much so that many were told \nto go home after a certain \ntime. But Arman and Ashraf were instructed to remain for this special \ntask despite both having \nprior engagements \nto attend court hearings \nthe next day. \n[158] \nHH must have realised that this was an important and delicate \ntask to \nbe performed \nsince TBH was most \nlikely the “go-between” \nperson \nof YB Ean \nin relation \nto the contractors or suppliers. And \nfor \nHH to find evidence to prove his suspicion, he had to focus on TBH to \n- disclose any irregularities or perceived irregularities that may have been \n48 \n  \n \n\n\n  \ncommitted by YB Ean regarding the allocation. Arman was certainly a \nbully and Ashraf, going by past records, was known to be successful in \nsecuring evidence, according to his superior Hairul Ilham. Furthermore, \n. \n_Arman and Ashraf knew each other well and had worked very well \ntogether previously as stated by Arman. From police records tendered \nin this inquiry by one DSP Kamaruddin Awang from the Selangor police \ncriminal investigation section, out of the twenty cases reported against \nthe Selangor MACC officers for assault, Ashraf was involved in fourteen \nof them and was positively identified by \na majority \nof those who had \nmade the reports against him. \n[159] \nFrom \nthis, we doubt Ashraf’s \nrole that evening was limited \nto \nthat of an office boy, just tagging documents shown to him by Arman, \nand that he took no part in questioning TBH. Such perfunctory work, \nin \nour opinion, did not require one person specifically to perform. Arman \ncould have done this himself since he had handed over the four files \nto TBH \nto do the work for him. There was no need for Ashraf to be \npresent unless he had a more active role to play. From the way Ashraf \nanswered questions by giving selective answers due to feigned memory \nloss at appropriate times, we found his evidence most unreliable. Having \ntaken into account all the relevant facts, we conclude that though no \nforce involving physical violence may have been applied \nto TBH that \nevening, threats of physical harm were most probably used by Arman \nand Ashraf when interrogating him. \nThird Interrogation \n[160] \nThe \nthird \nstage \nof the \ninterrogation \nkicked \nin when \nNadzri \nrecorded TBH’s statement. \nInitially, we thought \nthis process would \nhave \ninvolved TBH \nrepeating \nthe answers that \nhe had \ngiven \nto \nthe \nquestions which \nArman and Ashraf had asked of him. And, therefore, \nNadzri would have just repeated \nthe same questions and typed \nout \nthose answers as previously given. But this turned out to be another \nforum of interrogation. Nadzri started afresh and questioned TBH \nall \n49\n\n\n  \nover again. This covered even \nhis background which TBH had spent \n- \nfour hours earlier repeatedly relating \nto the \nsix to seven \nofficers \nat \n- the Pen Mas area where he was first taken. Proof of this can be seen \nfrom TBH’s statement [exhibit \n| 69] recorded by Nadzri. Though Nadzri \nmay have been assisted by Arman’s notes taken during Arman’s and \nAshraf’s interrogation of TBH, yet Nadzri took two hours to accomplish \nhis mission which often times as disclosed previously was very tiring for \nboth parties. In fact we were puzzled over this inordinate length of time \ntaken. \nIf Arman and Ashraf had asked \nall the pertinent questions and \nTBH had provided the answers \n[if we are to believe Hairul IIham who \nStated that he was satisfied that TBH was ready to have his statement \nrecorded], then this process should have been over in next to no time \nunless of course: (a) Arman and Ashraf had not been asking questions \ndirectly related to the documents, thus requiring Nadzri to start afresh, \nor (b) Nadzri deliberately prolonged this process to torture TBH mentally \nand disorientate him to agree to turn against his boss out of despair. \n[161] \nIn the course \nof examining \nthis \naspect \nof the evidence, we \nfailed \nto understand why the Selangor MACC adopted this approach \nof assigning \na first \nset \nof officers \nto do the preliminary interview \nor \ninterrogation \nof TBH \nat the \nPen Mas area, followed \nby another set \nof officers, \nie Arman and Ashraf, \nto interview or interrogate him \nin \na \nseparate room, and yet have another officer, \nie Nadzri, \nto repeat the \nsame process but this time also \nto record \nhis statement. This \nis \nnot \nonly duplicitous of work but contravenes sections 30 (1) (a) and 30 (8) \nof the MACC Act. \n[162]. Section 30 (1) (a) \nof the MACC Act provides: \n“An officer of the commission investigating an offence under this \n~ Act may order any person to attend before him for the purpose \nof being examined orally \nin relation to any matter which may, \nin \nhis opinion, assist in the investigation into the offence.” \n50\n\n\n  \n[163] \nSection 30 (8) of the MACC Act says: \n“An officer of the commission examining a person under paragraph \n(1) (a) shall record \nin writing any statement made by the person \nand the statement so recorded shall be read \nto and signed by \n_ \nthe person, and where such person refuses to sign the record, \nthe officer shall endorse thereon under his hand the fact of such \nrefusal and \nthe reasons therefor, \nif any, \nstated \nby the person \nexamined.” \n[164] \nFrom a perusal of these sections, we are of the opinion that the \nlaw requires an \nofficer who calls \nin \na person \nfor examination before \n_ \nhim \nto also complete the task \nof recording \nhis statement. Based \non \nthis interpretation of the above provisions, we are of the view that what \nAnuar did by sending in a group of interrogators under the pretence of \ncalming TBH, followed by Arman’s and Ashraf’s interrogation or inquisition \nof TBH, was against the law. Such unlawful intimidatory tactics would \nhave had grave consequences upon his mind and would have been \na \nculminating factor that drove him to suicide. \n[165] \nReturning to Nadzri’s recording of TBH’s statement, we find that \nthis process added further strain and duress on TBH. This, as we have \nsaid, was the third occasion that TBH was questioned. This time \nit was \nworse. His answers were vetted by Nadzri who then restructured them \nbefore typing them into his computer for TBH to approve. As we have \nobserved, this exercise was demanding with documents having \nto be \nreferred \nto and checked. \nAnd for TBH, we find that he would have \nhad to be careful with his answers since they were reduced to writing \nand could be used to incriminate him as well as others. Taken \nat this \ntime of the night and soon after the tormenting repeated interrogating \nexperiences, TBH had reacted aggressively to cause Nadzri to remark, \n“Kalau you penat, saya pun penat juga sebab saya taip statement” [\"/f \nyou are tired, \n| am tired also because \n| am typing the statement’). This \nmust have been the reaction of Nadzri \nin response to some words or \n51\n\n\n  \nacts by TBH. From this we can gather that TBH was utterly frustrated, \ndisappointed and angry. Further with such an utterance from Nadzri \nin \nthe form \nof a rebuke, TBH could have been driven further to want to \n“escape” from \nit all. \n_ {166] \nWhat we have described up to this stage are without doubt, \nin \nour opinion, factors contributing immensely to TBH’s decision \nto take \nhis. life. However, we believe that there must have been something that \n_ \nhappened between 3.30am [after the recording of TBH’s statement was \ncompleted] and 7.00am \n[the earliest estimated time \nof his death] on \nthe 16' that broke the camel's back, so to speak, that propelled TBH \nto commit suicide. \nTBH was not released after his statement was recorded \n[167]. \nContrary to what various officers, particularly Anuar and Nadzri, \nportrayed to the effect that TBH chose to remain in the Selangor MACC \noffice after \nhis statement had \nbeen \nrecorded, we \nhold \na completely \ndifferent view. We believe that he was not released. He was still under \ndetention by the Selangor MACC. \n[168] \nOur reasons are these. First, TBH’s attendance at the Selangor \nMACC office was practically effected by force. He had no choice as to \nthe time of the “interview” and if it was convenient for him. Evidence has \nshown that he had no choice but to follow Anuar and his men immediately. \nOn top of that, he was also escorted. Under such circumstances we \ncannot for a moment perceive that TBH would have desired to remain \na single minute longer \nif he was indeed free to go. \nIn fact this desire \nof his was made known to Sachi when he asked Sachi at the Pen Mas \narea as to when he could go back after having waited for a long time \nthere. \n. \n[169] \nSecond, \nsince cross-checking \nof witnesses’ statements was \npractised \nat the material time, TBH would have had \nto remain \nin the \n52\n\n\n  \npremises \nto wait \nfor \nLee’s \nand Tan \nBoon Wah’s statements \nto \nbe \nrecorded. Lee only had the recording \nof his statement completed \nat \n5.00am on the 16\" and Tan Boon Wah at 11.30am also on the 16\". \n[170] \nThird, none of the material witnesses such as Lee, Tan Boon \n-Wah and even Harun was allowed \nto go home after their statements \nhad been recorded. As for Harun, he had to use his “connection” to the \nofficer at HQ to secure his release. So this effectively demolishes the \nso-called common practice \nin the Selangor MACC that once a witness’ \nstatement has been recorded, the witness \nis free to go. \n[171] \nFourth, \nif TBH \nhad \nactually been \nallowed \nto leave \nby Nadzri \non the purported instruction \nof Anuar, there was no reason why TBH \nshould not have been issued with an official notice to bring \nin further \nsupporting documents demanded by Nadzri as was done with Tan Boon \nWah. This would have completed the formality for the exercise of his \nrelease. \n[172] \nFifth, there was a written memo issued by HH to all his officers in \nJune 2009 that an officer should always accompany a guest or witness \nwhile he remains on Selangor MACC premises. This came about after \na previous incident where a visitor at the 14\" floor of Plaza Masalam \nhad wandered unauthorised into Anuar’s room. Nadzri would not have \ngone against this memo unless he had secured a replacement to keep \na watch over TBH \nuntil he left. \n[173] \nCertain Selangor MACC officers who testified before us were at \npains to create an impression that their office was much sought after as \na place of refuge, for example, \nin the case of Lee to wait for his wife \nto bring documents while lying down uncomfortably on the sofa where \nhe just could not sleep due \nto stress; Tan Boon Wah \nnot wanting \nto \ngo home because he had had an argument with his wife and preferred \nto remain \nin \nhis small room and sleep on the floor; TBH not wanting \nto leave because he was too tired or too embarrassed to face YB Ean \nand preferred again the comfort of the sofa outside Nadzri’s room. \n53\n\n\n  \n[174] \nThis \ndid \nnot make sense \nto \nus. Photographs tendered \nof the \npremises revealed that \nit was \na working \noffice. \nIt was government \npremises where security and safety should have been paramount. \nit did \nnot have the trimmings of a hotel or even \na resthouse. And given the \nmental condition of these witnesses who were accused of wrongdoing \ninstead \nof being asked \nto assist \nin clarifying matters, we believe that \nnone of them would have preferred to stay a single minute longer if they \nhave been released. The impression given \nby these Selangor MACC \nofficers was certainly not acceptable \nto us and \nis an extremely poor \nexcuse to support their contention that TBH, Lee and Tan Boon Wah \nwere \nat liberty to leave but were so enamoured \nof the MACC office \nand the treatment they received that they chose not to leave despite \nbeing free to do so. \nHH’s active participation and involvement \n[175] \nHH had, from his own testimony and that of many of his officers, \nbeen conspicuously absent from \nall \nthe ongoing \nactivities that went \non \nin \nhis office throughout the evening \nof the 15 and early morning \nof the 16\". The impression given was that he stayed cloistered \nin his \noffice appearing only on one occasion to go to the toilet and common \nprayer room [surau] and then leaving for home at about 6.26am on the \n16\" to take his children \nto school and returning to the office at about \n8.30am that day. According \nto him, he did \nnot take an active part \nin \nthis operation except to act as a mentor to his subordinates. He did not \ngive directions on the mode and form of the interviews or interrogations \nnor did he have knowledge of whe conducted them and \nin respect of \n- whom. He asserted definitely that he did not cross-check on the results \nfrom the interviews or interrogations at that material time. \n{176] \nWe found him to be arrogant, given to falsehoods, untruthful and \nuncompromising \nin \nhis stand. \nHis falsehoods, particularly \nof his non- \nactive involvement \nin \nthe entire operation \nat the material time, were \nexposed from the contradictory statements he made before us. But more \n54\n\n\n  \ncompelling was the confirmation from two of his own officers, namely, \nAzeem and Azian who were brave enough to reveal towards the later \npart of our proceedings the actual role of HH \nin this operation despite \nthe fact that HH was their superior and \nstiil holds \na senior position \nin \nthe MACC as director of the MACC Negeri Sembilan. \n[177]. According \nto \nthem, \nHH \nwas \nactively \ninvolved \nin \nthe \nentire \noperation from \nthe very \nstart. \nHe was the \none who gave \nall \nthe \ninstructions and directions on how the witnesses were to be interviewed \nand interrogated and by whom. HH had attempted to exclude himself \nfrom this responsibility and instead shift \nit all to Anuar. He had called \nfor \na meeting on the evening \nof the 16\" [after the death \nof TBH was \ndiscovered] of officers from the Selangor MACC who were involved \nin \nthe operation to brief them on this. We find no reason to doubt these \ntwo witnesses. \nIn fact, there \nis contemporaneous evidence to support \nthis where Azian, worried about this deceit, had texted \na message to \nAnuar on his mobilephone to urge Anuar to expose the truth of HH’s \nactual involvement. \n[178] \nWe will now point out some discrepancies \nin HH’s evidence of \nhis \npurported \nnon-active involvement. \nFirst, Anuar \nas \nthe \n10 \nof the \noperation did not even know that Tan Boon Wah had been brought \nin \nfor questioning. This \nis unusual since Anuar was supposed \nto be the \ncoordinator. \n[179] \nSecond, Bulkini reported to HH directly of the negative result of \nhis interrogation of Tan Boon Wah. According to the chain of command \nand for the purpose of co-ordinating the entire operation, Bulkini should \nhave told Anuar, and not HH, \nof this. \n[180] \nThird, Anuar was purportedly sleeping \nthe entire early part \nof \nthe morning of the 16 away despite being \nin charge of synchronising \nthe results of the interrogation of the witnesses [TBH, Lee, Tan Boon \nWah and Harun] who were stil! being detained on the 14\" floor of Plaza \nMasalam. \n55\n\n\n  \n[181] \nFourth, HH had claimed that he did \nnot know that the person \n_ whom he saw at the pantry at 5.45am on the 16\" was Tan Boon Wah \nand did not question him about his presence there at such an unearthly \n| \nhour. This was most unusual when, just a month earlier in June 2009, \nHH had himself issued a written circular to all his officers that witnesses \nand visitors \nin the Selangor MACC office should \nbe accompanied \nat \nall times. \nThis purported \nindifferent attitude \nof HH \nin \nrelation \nto the \npresence \nof Tan Boon Wah at the pantry implies that he must have \n_ \nknown that Tan Boon Wah was \nstill around because \nof the ongoing \noperation and he would have \nin fact given direct instructions that Tan \nBoon Wah should not be released. \n[182] \nSixth, HH admitted that cross-checking of information extracted \nfrom various witnesses \nin \nthe Selangor MACC \noffice was \na norm. \nIf \n‘ Hairul I|ham had gone home at around 3.00am and Anuar was sleeping \nthroughout the early part of the morning of the 16\" and information from \nTBH and Lee and perhaps Tan Boon Wah \n[if he decided to change his \nmind to bend to the wishes of the Selangor MACC officers] was coming \nin, who was then doing the cross-checking? With HH remaining \nin his \nroom and being \npassionately involved \nin this operation, \nit would have \nbeen he who was doing this job. While doing this, he would have also \ngiven instructions to various officers involved to do what he considered \nappropriate. \n[183] \nWe \ndid describe \nHH \nas \nbeing \npassionately involved \nin \nthis \nentire operation. From the start we observed that he was convinced \nof the truth of the information he had received. However, he was fully \naware of the fact that the information was grounded on the belief of \nthe informant that Selangor state assemblymen were receiving monies \nfrom the allocation without the programmes being held or the projects \nbeing carried out. \n| \n[184] \n| As the information was grounded on \na mere belief and without \nsupporting \nfacts, \nHH \nshould \nhave exercised \nevery caution \nas \nthe \n56\n\n\ncomplaint was serious in nature and involved the State government of \nSelangor because, as practised, the allocation was not available to the \nstate assemblymen in the opposition. Instead of carrying out some basic \ngroundwork to satisfy himself as to the veracity of that information, he \nlaunched a \nfull-scale operation involving \na large number of witnesses \nand mobilised the whole Selangor MACC and sought manpower support \nfrom other MACC offices as well for this purpose. Though documents \nrelated to claims on the allocation were previously secured from various \nDistrict Offices and Land Offices, these were not thoroughly checked \nas could be seen from the instructions given by Hairul Ilham to Arman \nto check the four files \nfor incriminating evidence when \nthis should \nhave been carried out much earlier. Other examples of an absence of \ngroundwork were the instances where Bulkini and Sachi accused Tan \nBoon Wah and Lee respectively of not carrying out certain programmes \nor projects when this ought to have been first verified. \n[185] \nAn elementary approach would have been to have interviewed \nvarious independent persons who had attended the organised functions \nfor the programmes \nto check \nif the programmes were \nheld \nor \nto \nhave visited the project sites to check whether the projects had been \ncompleted. Such an approach could have also involved the questioning \nof the officers of the District Office or the Land Office who had certified \nthat the programmes were held and the projects were carried out. \n[186] \nNext, questions were directed at witnesses pulled in that evening \nof the 15\" on the suspected inflated price of items supplied. We are at \na loss to understand why the Selangor MACC did not check this out \nearlier with various suppliers for such items to find out their market price. \nAnd even on the suspicion that there were kickbacks to the DAP from \nthese programmes and projects, common sense would have dictated \nthat \nit would have been prudent to demand from the DAP \na \nreply \nto \nthese allegations and \nto require the production of relevant receipts \nif \nthe monies paid \nout to the DAP were indeed the reimbursements \nof \nadvances made earlier. \n5/\n\n\n  \nAnonymous letter \n[187] \nIn \nthe course \nof the \ninquiry, \nan anonymous \nletter dated \nthe \n5\" August 2009 \non the letterhead \nof HQ came \nto \nlight. Purportedly \nwritten \nby \nthe MACC \nofficers \nof Malaysia \nit was addressed \nto \nthe \nchief commissioner \nof the MACC. \nIt alleged \nthe corrupt practices, \nmisconduct and abuse \nof power committed \nby HH \nin connection with \nthe cases involving TBH and Dato’ Seri \nDr Mohamad Khir Toyo, the \nformer menteri besar [chief minister] of the State of Selangor. HH was \nsaid to be directly involved \nin the investigation \nin connection with the \nalleged misuse of funds allocated \nto YB Ean. The letter was marked \nas exhibit} 256 in this inquiry. \n[188] \nHH, \nin the course of the inquiry, testified that he was shown the \nletter and \nit was clear that \nit had received the attention of his superior, \nthe chief commissioner. However, there was no evidence to suggest that \na formal investigation on the matter had been carried out, given that \nthe MACC has very wide powers to set \nits investigation machinery \nin \nmotion. By section 29 of the MACC Act, a report may be made orally or \nin writing, and in the present matter before this RCI, the information that \nset the investigation machinery of the MACC in motion had purportedly \nbeen conveyed to HH merely over the telephone. \n[189] \nHH \nhad been with the MACC \nfor about nineteen years \nat the \nmaterial \ntime and, \nas \nstated \nearlier, was the deputy director \nof the \nSelangor MACC at the time of the incident, holding the rank of senior \nassistant commissioner 1. \nBased on the evidence gathered during this \n_ inquiry, \nit was clear indeed that HH was in full control of the investigation \nin \nthis case, and \nhe was \nnot merely giving formal directions \nin \nthe \ncapacity of a superior over his subordinates in the organisation. During \n_the period \nof the operation, twice \nin \na day, once \nin the morning and \nagain \nin the late evening or at night, officers involved \nin the operation \nwould brief him of the progress made and he on his part would give \nspecific directions \nas \nto \nthe further conduct \nof the operation. \nEven \n58\n\n\n  \nwhen the officers were on the ground, \nthey would \ncall him \non their \nmobilephones for directions should they encounter any problem \nin the \noperation, or he would call them to give directions. \n[190] \nIn amplification \nof these \nfacts, \nit must be noted that HH \nhad \nreceived the information of the alleged corruption involving the Selangor \nstate assemblymen \nat \nleast \nby \nthe 21* June \n2009, \nafter which \nhe \n_ \ndirected Anuar to formally lodge \na report to initiate investigations into \nthe matter and appointed \nhim \nas the \nIO. \nOn \n13\" July 2009, Anuar \nlodged the report adverted to earlier, which sparked off the operation in \nquestion. \nIt was HH who directed Anuar and Hairul to obtain documents \nfrom the District and Land Offices. According to the evidence, on the \n15\" he was in his room throughout the day ostensibly doing his normal \nwork while at the same time directing the operation from 5.00pm that \nevening. He never left his room except to go out to the toilet and the \nprayer room [surau] for prayers. \n[191] \nAround 5.45am on the 16\", he left his room and then for home \nand returned to the office at 7.15am. He attended the daily briefing by \nthe officers involved \nin the operation \nat 8.30am. Around 11.30am, \nhe \nleft the office for HQ for a discussion on purported unrelated matters \nwith \nofficers there, \nand \nafter that \nhe \nleft \nfor the Attorney-General’s \noffice \nin relation \nto other matters. \nEn \nroute, around 2.00pm, \nhe said \nhe received a call from Anuar informing him of the death of TBH. He \ndirected Anuar and Hairul \nto join him immediately \nat HQ. But before \nthey arrived, he and the deputy chief commissioner ieft for the Selangor \nMACC office. \n[192] \nWe were unable to accept the testimony of HH as related above \nas the truth, taking into account the activities that were going on during \nthe evening of the 15\" right up to the morning of the 16\" on the 14\" \nfloor of Plaza Masalam just outside HH’s room. No reasonable man \nwould \nbe able to accept as true the story \nof HH \nthat he was not \nat \nall concerned with what was actually happening \non \nthe premises \nof \n59\n\n\n  \n  \nthe Selangor MACC right under his nose and which involved several \nwitnesses, including TBH, who had been summoned or brought \nin by \nhis officers under his direction and were in their care and custody. No \nperson in his right mind would believe that HH would have been content \nto just remain \nin \nhis room on the same floor where \nall the activities \nreferred \nto in this report were going on and was merely waiting to give \ndirections \nto the officers involved \nin the operation as and when they \nneeded his advice. Such a stance was contrary to his action \nin leaving \nfor home \nin the early morning hours of the 16\" to take his children to \nschool and then rushing to be back in the office for the morning briefing \non the operation by his officers. This certainly was not the action of \na man who had no personal interest \nin the ongoing operation, having \nregard to the further fact that he had virtually gone without sleep the \n_ whole of the 15\" and the morning of the 16\". \n[193] \nOn \nthe testimony adduced before \nus, however, \nthere was \nno \ndirect evidence to prove that HH had a hand \nin the death of TBH. But \nas the seniormost officer involved \nin the operation and being physically \npresent \nin the office when the officers involved \nin the operation were \ninterrogating TBH virtually without \nlet, \nhe should \nbe held responsible \nfor the actions taken by him and \nhis officers which propelled TBH \nto \ncommit suicide. We shall elaborate further on this aspect of the evidence \nunder the heading “Fourth interrogation” which now follows, apart from \nwhat has been stated above. \nFourth Interrogation \n[194] \nWe agree with the submissions of the Bar that HH was just too \nstubborn [such trait was also displayed when he gave evidence before \nus] to retreat from his mistake \nin mounting such \na massive operation, \nparticularly when \nit had received wide and extensive press coverage. \nTo overcome his disappointment at the negative results obtained from \nthese witnesses up to that stage, he must have resorted to a personal \nand more aggressive interrogation \nof TBH \nsince TBH, \nas we have \n60\n\n\n  \nexplained, \nheld \nthe \nvital \nlink between YB \nEan and \nthe suppliers \nor \ncontractors, and \nif anything were to be made to “stick” on YB Ean, \nit \nwould have to be through TBH. \n[195] \nWe believe that he must have been assisted upon this foray by \n- Anuar and Ashraf. We name Anuar because his alibi had been proved \nto be false. As disclosed, hardly anyone saw him sleeping at the place \nhe claimed to be at between the hours after 3.30am and 7.00am on the \n16\". Even guard Khairudin who said that he saw Anuar sleeping \nin the \nvisitor's area [ruang fefamu] pointed out an area which was different \nfrom the area where Anuar claimed to have slept at. The evidence of \nguard Khairudin \nitself was not credible as he was found \nto have with \nhim \na prepared script while testifying \nin the witness box which proved \nbeyond peradventure that he had been coached. \nFurther, Anuar \nlied \nabout the role he had played in order to cover up for HH. And on top of \nthese factors, he was a trusted senior officer of HH who was prepared \nto sacrifice himself for HH, the other such officer Hairul Ilham having \ngone home by that time. \n[196] \nAs for Ashraf, we found \nit most unusual for him \nto fetch TBH \na glass \nof water at about 4.40am on the 16\". This established three \nthings. \nFirst, Ashraf was around during this time. Second, though TBH \nknew where the pantry was and could have gone there himself to get \na drink of water, yet he demanded Ashraf’s services. This was most \nextraordinary \nin view of Ashraf’s poor track record on physical abuse \nof suspects, which made \nit unlikely that he would entertain \na demand \nfrom a person who was inferiorly situated in relation to him at that point \nin time. \nThough TBH was termed \na “witness”, \nhe was treated more \nlike a suspect. Third, was the rather impolite and demanding nature of \n- \nthe request: “Hoi! Saya mahu minum air” [“Hoi! \n/ want to drink water’). \nThis could be said \nto be downright rude, yet Ashraf complied. From \nthis we drew the inference that Ashraf was not thoughtful and generous \nin performing \nthis service \nbut had done so out of remorse for some \nof the improper things that he and those involved had done \nto TBH \nduring the hours of 3.30am fo 7.00am on the 16\". \n61\n\n\n  \n  \n[197] \nThe acts committed by these three persons, namely HH, Anuar \nand Ashraf, were most probably in the form of another round of intensive \ninterrogation \nof TBH \nto coerce him \ninto making \na statement \nthat \nit \nwas YB Ean who directed \nhim \nto commit unlawful \nacts \nin handling \nthe allocation. This session must have been very taxing on TBH both \nphysically and mentally. He had been deprived of sleep throughout that \nnight and into the morning and had had to endure persistent, aggressive \nand unscrupulous questioning. His physical condition as described by \nAshraf when fetching him the glass of water was that TBH had moved \nto sit in an upright position very slowly. This fourth interrogation session, \nto our minds, must have been the final straw that broke the camel’s \nback. \nRaymond \n[198] \nBefore we came \nto this finding, we did take into consideration \nthe evidence of Raymond who had testified that he saw TBH at 6.00am \non the 16\" lying on the sofa outside Nadzri's room. \nIf this was true, \nthen TBH must have committed suicide after 6.00am on the 16. This \nwould \nfit into the estimated time of death of TBH which was between \n7.15am. and \n11.15am \non \nthe \n16\", \nas determined \nby \nthe forensic \npathologists. \nHowever, despite this, we entertained grave reservations \nover Raymond’s evidence. \nIn our opinion, he was not a reliable witness \nand was used by those responsible for TBH’s death to distance them \nfrom \ntheir wrongdoings \nby creating \nan impression that TBH was \nnot \nonly alive at 6.00am on the 16\" but was also resting comfortably and \npeacefully on the sofa outside Nadzri’s room. \n[199] \nRaymond \nhad \nsaid \nthat \nhe \nrecognised TBH \nat 6.00am \nthat \nmorning because \nhe had \nfirst seen him \nprior to this \nin the Pen Mas \narea around 12.00am on the 16\" talking to one other Chinese person. \nAt that time he had happened to pass by that area on his way to the \nadministrative section \nto get some writing paper. \nNext, \nhe had said \nthat he recognised TBH from “The Star’ news printout shown to him by \n62\n\n\n  \nAnuar earlier, of the latter arguing with Manoharan with TBH standing \nin the. middle. This had been taken at the SUK building. We found this \nclaim of Raymond difficult to accept for the following reasons. \nFirst, \nwhen Raymond purportedly saw TBH at the Pen Mas area, he did not \nknow who TBH was. \nHe only had had \na glance \nat the two Chinese \npersons sitting \nin this area. He had not looked directly at their faces. \nHe had only seen their backs and their heads. Second, even though \nTBH’s face appeared \nin the internet news which was downloaded and \nshown \nto him \nby Anuar \nprior \nto \nhis coming \nto know that TBH \nhad \ndied, we doubt that he would have taken particular notice of TBH. The \nfocus then was on Anuar who took pains to show off to his colleagues \nthat he was being featured \nin the media. Third, the particular location \nwhere Raymond \nsaid \nhe had seen TBH \nat 6.00am was dark. And \nif \nhe had \nnot got close to TBH, \nhe could not have been certain that \nit \n- \nwas indeed TBH. Fourth, what had brought Raymond to the area was \nthe coincidence that he was on his way out of the 14 floor of Plaza \nMasalam from his room. This was not his usual route. He said that he \nhad \nto come this way because he had forgotten \nto bring his access \ncard that was required to open some doors along his normal route. We \nfound this strange when other MACC officers informed us that almost \nall the internal doors of the office that evening were disarmed for the \npurpose of the operation \nin order to facilitate the movement of officers, \nincluding those not from the Selangor MACC office, to enable them to \nmove about freely. So this excuse of Raymond to use a different route \nto leave his room was highly suspicious. \n[200] \nRaymond \nin our opinion was used as \na time-marker by those \nconcerned with TBH’s death. Aside from all the contradictions exposed \nto \nsupport \nour view, \nthere was another factor: \nhis punch \ncard \nto \nindicate the time of his entry into and exit from the office. \nHis punch \ncard indicates that he had punched out at 6.04am on the 16\" and then \nvirtually immediately at 6.05am on the same day, \nit shows that he had \npunched \nin again. When questioned on this rather curious act of his, \nhe explained that he did so with the intention of not returning \nto the \n63\n\n\n  \noffice that day. We found this most illogical. \nFirst, \nif he was going \nto \nattend court that day during office hours, there was no necessity for \nhim to have punched in since \nit would have been physically impossible \nfor him to come back to the office while he was in court. Second, \nif he \nhad punched \nin to indicate that he was in the office at 6.05am on the \n16\", when would he then punch out since he did not intend to return \nto the office that day? We were \nin agreement with the Bar that this \npunching \nin and punching out almost simultaneously was to create the \nfirm impression that he was \nin the office at the material time. \n[201] \nAs \nit became obvious \nto \nus \nthat Raymond’s evidence was \ntailored \nto \nfit certain objectives, which \nin \nthis case dovetailed those \nof the MACC officers responsible \nfor TBH’s death, we rejected \nhis \nevidence as being unworthy of any weight or consideration \nin respect \nof the time he claimed to have seen TBH \nat 6.00am on the 16\". \nForensic psychiatric aspects \n[202] \nTo understand the probability that TBH took \nhis own \nlife, \nthe \ntraits of his character and the changing states of his mind as a result of \nwhat he underwent on the 15\" and the 16\" must be first understood. \n[203] \nCharacter comprises the aggregate features and traits that form \nthe individual nature of a person or thing. \nIt is also defined as a moral \nand ethical quality of a person. \nIt \nis sometimes used interchangeably \nwith the term personality which is the sum total of the physical, mental, \nemotional, and social characteristics of the individual: see \nDictionary. \ncom. \n[204] \nState of mind \nis defined as: \n- \n(a) \na temporary psychological state; and \n(b) \nthe state of the person’s cognitive processes: \nsee Dictionary.com. \n64\n\n\n  \n[205] \nAn \nindividual's \nstate \nof mind \nis \nrelated \nto \nhis character and \npersonality. Despite the term “mind” which denotes mental status, the \nfunction and influence of the emotion [which would influence the mind \nin many conditions] must not be ignored. This state of mind \nis most of \nthe time predictable, especially in normal and in expected situations. But \nin trying times and when severely-negative life events are experienced, \nsuch \nas when \nstress \n[physical, emotional \nor mental, \nor \nall \nof them \ntogether] is overwhelming, the state of mind of the individual could not \nonly undergo profound changes but would become unpredictable: see \nSocial and Emotional Influences \non Decision Making and the Brain, \nby Maurico R Delgado & James G Dilmore, 9(2) Minnesota Journal \nof \nLaw, Science & Technology, 899-912 (2008); Study: Emotion rules the \nbrain’s decisions [http:/Awww.usatoday.com/tech/science/discoveries/2006- \n08-06-brain-study_x.htm]. \n[206] \nlt must \nbe mentioned \nat \nthis juncture \nthat the \nstate \nof mind \nof an \nindividual \nheld \nin custody should \nbe \nof utmost concern \nto \nhis \ncustodians. Their sensitivity towards \nthe psychological \nstate \nof their \ndetainee reflects a humanely commendable attitude. This should prevent \nabuse of those held in custody by detainers: see Liability and Wrongful \nIn-Custody Deaths by Darrell \nL. Ross, \nin Sudden Deaths in Custody \nby Darell \nL Ross & Theodore C Chan, ed 2006, Totowa, New Jersey, \nHumana Press: 173-202. \nThe psychiatrists \n[207] \nTo enlighten \nus \non \nthe psychological aspects \nof TBH’s \nmind, \nwere three psychiatrists. They were supplied with relevant documents \ntendered \nduring \nthis \ninquiry \nand \nhad \ninterviewed \nfamily members, \nfriends and colleagues of TBH. Each of the psychiatrists gave us his/ \nher expert opinion on the matter and these were tendered to us. \nThe \nthree psychiatrists who submitted their reports to us were: \n(a) \nDr Badi’ah, \na forensic psychiatrist and \nDr Nor Hayati \nAli \n[‘Dr Hayati\"], \na community psychiatrist from \nthe Ministry \nof Health \nof Malaysia, who prepared \na joint report at the \nrequest of the MACC; and \n65\n\n\n  \n  \n(b) \nProfessor Paul Edward Mullen [“Professor Mullen”], Emeritus \nProfessor of Forensic Psychiatry, Monash University, Australia, \nwho was brought \nin by the Bar and prepared \na report at \ntheir request. \n[208] \nIn. his report, Professor Mullen furnished the following opinion \nand, made the following observations, which we summarise and also \n- \nquote below. \n[209] \nTBH, according to Professor Muilen, “...was firmly \nin the lowest \nrisk group for suicide when he was taken \ninto MACC custody.” And \nif TBH \n“...did \nkill \nhimself, \nthings were \nlikely \nto have occurred \nboth \nto undermine \nhis psychological \nstability and \nto frighten \nhim \nliterally \nto death. Also, \nhis concern for his family, and for his future wife and \nmother of his child, could have been turned into a weapon against him \nby a totally unscrupulous interrogator, as could \nhis loyalty and sense \nof responsibility to his colleagues.” \n[210] \nProfessor Muilen then stressed that certain interrogation techniques \nwould turn “...a law-abiding citizen with no prior experience of being \nin \nthe power of apparently unconstrained authority, particularly if they were \ncut \noff from \nall contact with sources \nof help and support...” suicidal \nas “[p]Jeople do \nnot \nkill themselves because they have \na method \nto \nhand, \nthey use \nthe methods \nat hand \nif they have become \nsuicidal. \nThe window from which TBH \nfell would have presented an obvious \nand easily accessible method. That there \nis such \na jarge window so \neasily opened on the 14\" floor of any offices, let alone an interrogation \ncentre, \nis to me extraordinary.” \n[211] \nProfessor Mullen was of the further opinion that “...it would be \nremarkable for anyone to voluntarily remain \nin \na place where he had \nbeen interrogated for eight hours in preference to returning home. TBH \ncould \nnot \nbut have been aware \nof the anxiety \nof friends and family \nabout his state. Given his enthusiasm for texting and phoning \nit is very \n66\n\n\n  \ndifficult to understand that he would \nnot have immediately reassured \nthem, whatever the time.” \n[212] \nAccording \nto \nDr Badi’ah \nand \nDr \nHayati, TBH came \nfrom \nan \nintact family and had a stable job. Having no history of mental illness, \nimpulsivity or substance abuse, TBH would be in the low-risk category for \nsuicide. \nIn fact, he was looking forward to his wedding and his fiancée \nwas then pregnant. However, both Dr Badi’ah and Dr Hayati were quick \nwith their reservation that nevertheless, “literature review for suicide \nin \ncustody showed \nthat the protective factors \nin the general population \nmay not have the same effect compared to people \nin custody.” \n[213] \nDr Badi’ah and Dr Hayati further pointed out that during the few \nweeks \nprior to TBH \nbeing questioned \nby the MACC, \nhe had \nhad \nto \nface and deal with two life-impacting events which could have added \nstress to his life. These would have changed his habits and demeanour \nsubsequently. They were: \n(a) \nthe bringing forward \nof the date \nof his wedding from the \noriginal \nset date \nin 2010 \nto \nthe \n13\" October 2009 upon \ndiscovering that his fiancée was pregnant; and \n(b) \nthe gathering of the documents by the Selangor MACC from \nthe District and Land Offices insinuating a misappropriation \nof the allocation by his boss YB Ean. \nAccording to these two doctors, these could be regarded by TBH as a \npotentially threatening situation. \nCharacter of TBH \n[214] \nFrom his family members and friends, we were able to have \na \nclear description of TBH’s character traits. He was hardworking, diligent, \nresponsible, devoted \nto \nhis family, loved children, and was faithful \nto \nhis boss YB Ean. \nHe appeared \nto \nbe cruising along fine \nin \nlife, and \n67\n\n\n  \n  \nthere was good reason to believe that the future appeared promising. \nAs \na member of the DAP and the political secretary of YB Ean, TBH \nmust have been devoted to its cause. His friends and family members \nfound him trustworthy and pleasant. He was seen \nto become angry \nif \nand when the situation warranted \nit. Not known to demonstrate extreme \nemotions, \nhe was never seen to succumb to rage. \nPsychological changes \n[215] \nPsychologically, although \na wedding and the preparation for \nit \ncould have been a positive life event for TBH, it could also have brought \nstress to him: see Holmes-Rahe Social Readjustment Rating Scale \nin \nJournal of Psychosomatic Research, (1967) Vol. 11, pp 213-218. Adding \nthis to the negative \nlife events, \nit could have been worse. \n[216] \n. However, despite the Selangor MACC commencing inquiries and \n| investigation \nin June 2009, \nof which TBH must have become aware, \nhe was \nstill able \nto take things \nin \nhis stride and manage the usual \nstresses and challenges of tife. \n[217] \nBut when \nhe was taken \nin \nby Anuar on the \n15\", TBH shifted \npsychologically from the low-risk group to the high-risk group for suicide. \nWe shall now proceed \nto deal with the events which, \nin our opinion, \npushed him into that stage. \n[218] \nWhen the MACC officers raided YB Ean’s office and started \na \nsearch there, the first person he wanted to contact after communicating \nwith his boss, YB Ean, was his lawyer, Manoharan. TBH appeared to \nhave been propelled into a fear-inducing situation as shown by the pattern \nof calis that he made when the MACC officers were conducting their \ninvestigation in the office. He needed reassurance from his colleagues, \nhence the calls he made. He was pacified when given the chance by \nAnuar to discuss his concerns privately for a few minutes with both YB \nEan and Manoharan \nin the SUK building before he was taken away to \n68\n\n\nthe Selangor MACC office. But when he was not allowed \nto see both \nof them after that when he was \nin the Selangor MACC office, \nhe was \ncut off from the outside world. The sense of isolation was intense as \nwas demonstrated by his behaviour as described by all those who came \ninto contact with him on the 15\" and the 16\". Added to this was the \ndeprivation of the use of his mobilephone. \n[219] \nIt was an accepted fact that TBH found companionship \nin \nhis \nmobilephone. It was also an instrument most often used by him to relieve \nhis stress. The analysis made on TBH’s mobilephone-call pattern showed \nthat he would call his friends and family at regular daily intervals. Taking \nhis mobilephone away would have meant robbing him of his means to \nreality and sanity. And the MACC officers did just that. Thus, for the \nfirst time \nin his life, TBH found himself totally and completely isolated \nfrom the outside world and thrust into desolation. \n[220] \nAnother factor which had serious implications \non TBH was the \nsurrendering of his laptop to the officers of the MACC, and worse than \nthis was being forced to divuige to the MACC officers the password to \nhis email account. As this held the key to many things private, TBH must \nhave felt that his privacy was violated under duress, and the secrets of \nhis life were in the open. This was a gross violation of TBH’s personal \nright, which would have compounded \nhis anxiety and worry. \n[221] \nTBH must have arrived at the Selangor MACC a harassed and \nunsettled man. This turn \nof events \nin \nhis \nlife was very sudden. \nBut \nbefore he was able to recover, other devastating situations were foisted \nupon him that precipitated him beyond the threshold of his tolerance. \n[222] \nTBH underwent four stages of interrogation as related earlier. His \ninterrogators later claimed that these were interviews to extract information \nfrom witnesses like TBH. But other witnesses testified that techniques \nemployed would range from mild interviews to harsh interrogation. All \nthese interrogators were known to have applied intimidating approaches \nduring the interrogation they carried out. \n69\n\n\n  \n  \n  \n[223] Even at the outset, the first stage of interrogation was proven to \nbe already a psychological burden on TBH. This “therapy” created by \nAnuar lasted for four hours, during which TBH was found to be reserved \nand quiet. Keeping to himself, he was only answering questions when \nasked. \n[224] \nArman and Ashraf behaved like inquisitors in an inquisition at the \nsecond stage of the interrogation. They instilled doubts and fear into \nTBH as regards the Treasury directives that required for the calling of \nat least three tenders before a contract could be awarded. But \nif both \nof them intentionally exploited TBH’s ignorance or iack \nof knowledge \nof the new set \nof rulings and directives \nof the State government \nof \nSelangor on this matter, \ntheir effort to confuse and cause anxiety to \nTBH was most deplorable indeed. \n[225] \nDuring \nhis interrogation, TBH \nhad \nto face MACC interrogation \nheavyweights like Arman the bully [who would manipulate his witness \nto obtain evidence], Ashraf the abuser [who was Machiavellian \nin \nhis \nmethod \nto secure evidence] and HH the arrogant leader [who would \nhave no qualms in lying as long as his ends were achieved, regardless \nof the means employed]. \n[226] \nHH was described by MACC officer Azian as a workaholic. As a \nboss, he also instilled fear in his officers. Opportunities for promotion \n. \nrested mainly \nin his hands. The whole range of interview-interrogation \ntechniques would have been employed by his officers and himself to \nsatisfy his desire to obtain results \nin the shortest possible time. Thus, \nit was not \nat \nall surprising that most of his officers, save two strong \nsouls [Azeem and Azian] who pointed out the truth, had the inevitable \nhabit of lying. \n[227] \nThe third stage of interrogation by Nadzri only worsened TBH’s \nplight. This stage only served \nto demonstrate how unscrupulous the \ninterrogator could be. Nadzri repeated the whole process of the previous \n70\n\n\n  \nstages \nof questioning \nand \ninterrogating TBH. \nHe took two hours \nto \ncomplete an excruciatingly laborious session which proved to be trying \nfor both parties. TBH had \nto bear the weight of abusive and intense \ninterrogation because he was the vital and sole link between YB Ean \nand \nthe contractors and suppliers \nfor the projects and programmes. \nBreaking TBH would mean the attainment of a much sought after result \nto get at YB Ean. \n[228] \nDespite the habitual denials by the MACC officers-cum-interrogators, \nit could be safely concluded that their interrogation methods ranged from \nearnest and intensive questioning to outright psychological intimidation \nand physical threats. Since this had been their approach, there was no \nreason to believe that TBH had received different and less aggressive \ntreatment as compared with the rest. \n[229] \nBy the time the fourth \nor final stage \nof the interrogation was \nover, TBH would have been almost a mental and physical wreck. When \nAshraf fetched him \na glass \nof water [demanded \nimpolitely by TBH], \nTBH was \nsaid to have sat up very slowly. \n[230] \nThese intense stages of interrogation must have created serious \ndoubts \nin TBH’s mind as regards \nhis actions \nin relation \nto his duties \nas YB Ean’s political secretary. Signing his name but affixing YB Ean’s \nseal, the absence of at least three quotations before the awarding of \na project or programme, the alleged kickbacks to the DAP, the direct \nawards of projects, and fixing prices to goods required for projects also \nweighed heavily on his mind. \nContributing factors \n[231] \nWe note that TBH’s relationship with \nhis boss, YB Ean, was \na \nmutually cordial and respectful one. TBH had never been found by his \nfamily members and close friends to have complained about the latter. \nThus, attempts \nto plant ideas \nof betrayal \nof his superior would have \nbeen very stressful to TBH. \n71\n\n\n  \n  \n[232] \nThere were also other contributing factors such as: \n(a) \nsleep deprivation; \n_(b) \nan uncomfortable and unfamiliar environment; and \n(c) \nbeing held \nin custody for a long time. \nConclusion on forensic psychiatric aspects \n[233] \nTormented \nby this predicament, TBH experienced \na change \nin \nhis state of mind. And \nin \na matter of hours, this change transformed \nhim from being in the low-risk group for suicide into the high-risk group. \nThe doubts, extreme emotional \nconflict and \nthe immense feeling \nof \nguilt were ail intolerable. Finally, precipitating the irreversible crisis that \nhappened \nto him between 3.30am and 7.00am \non the 16, was \nthe \nlast straw that broke the camel’s back. Finding no viable strategies to \nsurmount the hurdle of accusations levelled, he found himself unable to \nescape from the suffocating quagmire in which he was trapped. Losing \nall hope, TBH would have felt trapped and have succumbed to despair. \nSince the window on the 14\" floor was either open or could be easily \nopened and \nit was conspicuous and easily accessible near where he \nwas on \nthe sofa outside Nadzri’s room, TBH would have found that \nthe only way for escape from the torment he was undergoing was by \njumping out of the window, even though \nit meant taking \nhis own \nlife. \nFirst term of reference \n[234] \nIn relation to our terms of reference, as stated earlier, we have \napproached the issues by dealing with the second term \nof reference \nfirst and then with the first. \nTo recapitulate, the first term of reference \nreads as follows: \n— \n“1. \nto enquire whether or not there was any impropriety \nin \nthe \nconduct of the examination of Teoh Beng Hock in the course \nof an investigation into a Shah Alam report number 0052/2009 \n72\n\n\n  \nby the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission \nin relation \nto \nits standing \norders and \npractices and \nto recommend \nany \nappropriate action, where necessary.” \n[235] The facts relating \nto the taking \nof TBH from \nhis office on the \n15\" floor of the SUK building to the Selangor MACC office on the 15' \nhas. been dealt with earlier in this report and we shall not repeat those \nfacts here except to allude to them where necessary. \n{236] \nDuring the course of the inquiry the MACC made available \nto \nthis Commission \nits applicable standing orders at the material time of \nthe investigation. \n[t also answered certain questions posed and explained \ncertain aspects of its operations. \nSearch warrant \n[237] \nIt was the stand \nof the Selangor MACC that \nall the persons \nwho were questioned or interviewed in the investigation then underway \nwere called \nin for questioning or interviewing as witnesses and not as \nsuspects. However, we note with concern that officers \nof the MACC \ninvolved in the investigation acted under a misapprehension of the law \nwhen they purportedly exercised their powers under the MACC Act. \n[238] \nIn \ncarrying \nout \ntheir \nraids \non \nthe various places referred \nto \nearlier in this report for the purposes of their investigation, the officers \npurported \nto invoke sections 30 and \n31 \nof the MACC Act as well as \nother provisions \nin the Act. \nIt was not denied that the officers raided \nthe various places without any form of authorisation as required under \nsection 31(1) of the MACC Act. For convenience, we reproduce hereunder \nthe whole of section 31 which reads as follows: \n“31. \nPower of search and seizure \n(1) \nWhenever \nit appears \nto \nthe public prosecutor \nor \nan officer of the commission \nof the rank \nof chief senior \n73\n\n\n  \n_ assistant commissioner or above as authorized by the public \nprosecutor upon information, and after such inguiry as he \n_thinks necessary, that there is reasonable cause to suspect \nthat in any place there \nis any evidence of the commission \nof an offence under this Act, he may by written order direct \nan officer of the commission to \n—- \n(a) \n(b) \n(c) \n(d) \n(e) \nenter any premises and there search for, seize and \ntake possession \nof, any book, document, record, \naccount or data, or other article; \ninspect, make copies of, or take extracts from, any \nbook, document, record, account or data; \nsearch any person who is in or on such premises, \nand for the purpose of such search detain such \nperson and remove him to such place as may be \nnecessary to facilitate such search, and seize and \ndetain any article found on such person; \nbreak open, examine, and search any article, container \nor receptacle; or \nstop, search and seize any conveyance. \n(2) \nWhenever \nit \nis necessary so \nto \ndo, \nan \nofficer of the \ncommission exercising any power under subsection \n(1) \nmay- \n(a) \n(b) \nbreak open any outer or inner door or window of any \npremises and enter therein to, or otherwise forcibly \nenter the premises and every part thereinto; \nremove by force any obstruction \nto such entry, \nsearch, seizure or removal as he is empowered to \neffect; or \n74\n\n\n  \n(c) \ndetain any person found in \nor on any premises, \nor in any conveyance, searched under subsection \n(1), \nuntil such premises or conveyance has been \nsearched. \n(3) \nWhenever it appears to an officer of the commission that \nthere is reasonable cause to suspect that there is concealed \nor deposited in any place any evidence of the commission of \nany offence under this Act and such officer has reasonable \ngrounds for believing that, by reason of delay in obtaining \na written order of the public prosecutor or an officer of the \ncommission of the rank of chief senior assistant commissioner \nor above under subsection \n(1), \nthe object of the search \nis \nlikely to be frustrated, he may exercise in and in respect of \nsuch place, all the powers mentioned in subsections (1) and \n(2) as if he were directed to do so by an order issued under \nsubsection (1). \n(4) \nNo person shalf be searched under this section except \nby a person who is of the same gender as the person to be \nsearched.” \n[239] \nSection 31(1) enables the public prosecutor [which would include \na deputy public prosecutor], \nor an officer of the MACC of the rank of \nchief senior assistant commissioner or above who has been authorised \nto that effect by the public prosecutor, \nto empower an \nofficer of the \nMACC \nto act under section 31. \nIt \nis to be noted that the officer who \npurports to act under section 31 \nmust \nin the first place be authorised \nby the public prosecutor to do so only upon information which \nis to be \nconveyed to the public prosecutor and after such inquiry as the public \nprosecutor thinks necessary to satisfy him that there is reasonable cause \nto suspect that \nin any place there \nis any evidence of the commission \nof an offence under the MACC Act. Then the public prosecutor may \nby written order direct that officer to do any of the things specified \nin \nthe various paragraphs of section 31(1) enumerated above. \n75\n\n\n  \n  \n  \n[240] \nIt therefore becomes crystal clear that an officer of the MACC \ncannot exercise the powers \nof search and seizure under section \n31 \nwithout a written order from the public prosecutor, or an officer of the \nMACC of the rank of chief senior assistant commissioner or above who \nwas been authorised so to do by the public prosecutor. \n[241] \nIn the course of the inquiry before this Commission, Hairul IIham \nas well as HH were questioned as to where they derived their powers \nof search and seizure. They glibly answered \nthat \nit was pursuant \nto \nsection 31.:-We note with concern \nthat there was \na purported claim \nthat oral authorisation by a deputy public prosecutor in the misty past \nhad been given and that this \nin turn had devolved upon the Selangor \nMACC officers. \nBut on further questioning, we were unable \nto \nelicit \nfrom any officer the name of the deputy public prosecutor concerned. \nFurthermore, on his own testimony, HH held the rank of senior assistant \ncommissioner oniy \nat the material time and \nnot that \nof chief senior \n_ \nassistant commissioner so as to bring him within the ambit of section \n31(1) for any authorisation from any deputy public prosecutor to have \nlegal effect. \n[242] \nIn the \nlight of the foregoing, the purported exercise of powers \nunder section 31 \nby the MACC officers was fatally flawed \nin that they \nhad \nnot been authorised \nby \na deputy public prosecutor or \na lawfully \nauthorised chief senior assistant commissioner to exercise the powers \nconferred by section 31 \nas such authorisation must of necessity be \nin \nwriting to circumvent any challenge that may be raised \nin relation \nto \nthe authenticity of the authorisation. Furthermore, even \nif HH [despite \nthe \nlack of rank and \nthe absence \nof any written authorisation] \nhad \nbeen \nso authorised \nby \na deputy public prosecutor, \nhe \nstill needed \nto \ngive \na written order to his officers to act under section 31. This was \nnot done. \n[243] \nOn \nthe other hand, \nthe officers \nof the MACC contended \nthat \nwhen they act under section 31(3), the authorisation and the written \n76\n\n\n  \norder under section 31(1) do not come into play. Therefore, by invoking \nsection 31(3), they said that they could proceed to act off their own bat \nas \nit were without any referral back to a deputy public prosecutor or an \nofficer of the MACC of the rank of chief senior assistant commissioner \nor above who had been accordingly authorised \nby \na deputy public \nprosecutor pursuant to section 31(1). \n[244] \nWe are unable to accept such \na distorted interpretation \nof the \nprovisions of section 31. Section 31(3) can only come into play where \nofficers \nof the MACC enter premises \nas properly authorised under \nsection 31(1) and then a situation arises where, \nin the premises under \nsearch, there \nis reasonable cause to suspect that there \nis concealed \nor deposited \nin those premises any evidence of the commission of an \noffence under the MACC Act. Again, the officer having such reasonable \ncause \nto suspect must base his suspicion on reasonable grounds for \nbelieving that, by reason of the delay in obtaining a written order under \nsubsection (1), the object of the search \nis likely to be frustrated. Then \nonly, \nand \nonly then, \nmay \nhe exercise \nall \nthe powers mentioned \nin \nsubsections (1) and \n(2) of section 31 \nas \nif he had been appropriately \ndirected pursuant to an order issued under subsection \n(1). \nRecommendations on powers of search \n[245] \nIn this context, we wish to stress our concern over the cavalier \nattitude exhibited by the MACC officers in disregarding the intention of \nparliament embodied \nin section 31(1) of the MACC Act and arrogating \nto themselves a power that the law did not, and does not, confer. As \nthe \nofficers \nof the MACC \nare involved \nin \ninvestigating offences \nnot \nonly under the MACC Act but also under various other laws which may \nhave somewhat similar provisions as section 31, we recommend that \nall officers of the MACC should have a sound grounding in the various \nfacets \nof the applicable laws and \nin the interpretation \nof those laws \nbefore they are allowed to venture into the field of active operations. \n17\n\n\n  \n[246] \nOfficers of the MACC conduct searches under the provisions of \nsection 31 \nof the MACC Act which are similar to the search provisions \nfound \nin many other jurisdictions throughout \nthe world \nin \nthat they \nrequire the prior authorisation of a judicial authority of that of a senior \nofficer to-conduct searches. \nIn certain exigencies, this requirement \nis \nwaived and a search may be conducted on the officer's own authority \nin order to preserve evidence which might otherwise be destroyed and \nthe search frustrated by the delay \nin applying for a search warrant or \nsuch authorisation. \n[247] \nIn fact the MACC \nis \nin \na better position than most other law- \nenforcement agencies [*LEA’] around the world in that \nit is maintaining \nthe authority of a senior officer to issue warrants in the form of written \norders \nto search. This \nis not usually the practice and the issuing \nof \nsuch warrants \nis largely reserved to the judiciary. \n[248] \nIn the investigation \nin question, \nit was admitted by a number of \nthe MACC officers that there were no written orders in existence under \nsection 31(1) of the MACC Act for any of the searches conducted. This \nwas despite the fact that such authorisation could have been obtained \nfrom \na deputy public prosecutor attached \nto \nthe MACC \nor \na senior \nofficer of the MACC who was of or above the rank stipulated \nin section \n31(1). Rather the officers relied on their perceived powers under section \n31{3) to conduct the searches. The searches conducted were clearly an \nabuse of those powers as there was no reason to believe that \nthere \nwas any likelihood of the searches being frustrated on account of any \ndelay \nin obtaining the required authorisation. \n[249] \nIn addition, two senior officers, \nnamely, HH and \nHairul \nIlham, \nrelied \non the existence \nof a chief secretary’s circular of 1984 which, \nthey alleged, allows the search of government offices without warrant \nor authorisation. \nEven \nif this were \ntrue, \nthe \ncircular requires \nthe \n_issuance of an official letter from the chief commissioner of the MACC \nauthorising the search \n[a more onerous requirement than obtaining \na \n78\n\n\n  \n~ \nsearch authorisation by way of a written order under section 31(1)] and, \nin any event, such an administrative circular was clearly superseded \n_ by the MACC Act and the provisions of section 31. \n[250] \nMore disturbingly, the MACC officers indicated \nin evidence that \nthis was the usual \npractice, \nand \nit would appear that \nthis \nis \nnot an \nunusual practice in the MACC as a whole. Parliament clearly intended \nthat the provisions \nof section 31(3) were only for emergency use \nin \nexigent circumstances. However, \nit would appear that the MACC officers \nhave adopted them \nas common \npractice, \nfostering \na view \nthat the \nMACC can search without warrant or authorisation. Other LEA which \nalso have such provisions include the Malaysian \npolice, \nthe ICAC \nof \nHong Kong, the UK police, and other LEA around the world. However, \nin \nall circumstances the \nuse \nof these powers generates \na \nreport \nto \njustify that use. \n[251] \nWe therefore recommend the following in relation to the standard \noperating procedures [“SOP”] of the MACC regarding search: \n(a) \nthat \nthe commonplace \nuse \nof \nsection \n31(3) \ncease \nforthwith; \n(bo) \nthat the use of the alleged authority under the chief secretary’s \ncircular of 1984 cease forthwith; \n(c) \nthat, in general, properly issued warrants or written authorisations \nbe used as the basis for all searches by MACC officers; \n(d) \nthat, \nthe issue of those warrants or written authorisations \nbe properly justified \nin writing; \n(e) \nthat \nthe \nuse \nof section \n31(3) \nbe \nrestricted \nto ongoing \noperational circumstances where there is a real and present \nbelief that failure to act will result in the destruction or loss \nof evidence. The use \nof section 31(3) should be confined \nto exceptional circumstances \nto emphasise \nthe \nrule \nthat \n79\n\n\n  \n(f) \n(g) \n(h) \na written order should always be obtained, save \nin clear \ninstances where evidence may be \nin the process of being \ntampered with, removed and/or destroyed; \nthat, \nif possible, time should be taken to advise the relevant \nsenior officer [or deputy public prosecutor] of the requirement \nby telephone in order that he may issue a verbal authority and \na written authority may be quickly brought into existence; \nthat, in either case, immediately after the search, and, in any \nevent within twenty-four hours, a full written justification for \nthe search and use of section 31(3) powers [or telephone \njustification] be made to the relevant senior officer [or deputy \npublic prosecutor] who \nwill then \nindicate \na \nretrospective \nagreement \nin writing; \nthat a record be kept of such occurrences which are to be \nreviewed regularly by a deputy public prosecutor at senior \nlevel \nin the Attorney-General’s Chambers. \n[252] \n. These suggested amendments to procedures can be accomplished \nby the issue of new SOP regarding searches and incorporated into the \ntraining programme \nfor officers. \nIf this \nis \nnot considered appropriate, \nthen consideration might be given \nto additional legislation through an \namendment to the MACC Act. \nApplicable standing orders \n[253] \nThe applicable standing orders at the relevant time when TBH \nand the other witnesses were required \nto assist \nin the investigation \nwere the following: \n(a) \nPerintah \nTetap \nKetua Pengarah BPR Malaysia Bab \nB \n(Siasatan) Bil 2/1998 \n- Prosedur Memerintah Kehadiran dan \nMerekod Pernyataan Saksi Di Bawah Subseksyen 22(1){a) \ndan Subseksyen 22(8) Akta Pencegahan Rasuah 1997 [“SO \nNo 2/98”] \n80\n\n\n    \n(b) \n(Cc) \n[Standing Order of Director General of ACA Malaysia Chapter \nB (Investigation) No 2/1998 — Procedure on Order to Attend \nand \nRecording \nof Statement \nof Witness under Subsection \n22(1)(a) and Subsection 22(8) of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 \n(“SO No 2/98”)] \nPerintah Tetap Ketua Pengarah BPR Malaysia Bab B (Siasatan) \nBil 7/1998 — Prosedur Penggeladahan Di Bawah Seksyen 23 \nAkta Pencegahan Rasuah 1997 [“SO No 7/98”) \n[Standing Order of Director General of ACA Malaysia Chapter \nB (Investigation) No.7/1998 \n— Procedure \non Search \nunder \nSection 23 of the Anti-Corruption Act 1997 (“SO No 7/98”)] \nPerintah \nTetap \nKetua Pengarah BPR Malaysia \nBab \nB \n(Siasatan) \nBil 12/1998 Prosedur Penyitaan Harta Alih [*SO \nNo 12/98”] \n[Standing Order of Director General of ACA Malaysia Chapter B \n(Investigation) No12/1998 — Procedure on Seizure of Movable \nProperty (“SO No 12/98”)] \n[254] \nSubsequent to TBH’s death, the MACC made improvements to \nits standing orders pertaining to the treatment of witnesses through the \nintroduction of the following: \n(a) \nPerintah Tetap Ketua Pesuruhjaya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan \nRasuah Malaysia (SPRM) Bab B (Siasatan) Bil 2 Tahun 2010 \nProsedur Memerintahkan Kehadiran dan Merekodkan Pernyataan \nOrang Yang Diperiksa (Saksi) \nDi Bawah Subseksyen 30(1) \n(a) \ndan Subseksyen 30(8) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan \nRasuah Malaysia 2009. \n[Standing Order of Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti- \nCorruption Commission (MACC) Chapter B (Investigation) No \n2 of 2010 — Procedure on Order to Attend and Recording of \nStatement of Person Examined (Witness) under Subsection \n30(1)(a) and Subsection 30(8) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption \nCommission Act 2009]. \n81\n\n\n  \nThis standing order repealed SO No 2/98. \n(ob) \nPerintah Tetap Ketua Pesuruhjaya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan \nRasuah Malaysia (SPRM) Bab B (Siasatan) Bil 7 Tahun 2010 \n— Prosedur Pengggeledahan \nDi Bawah Seksyen \n31 Akta \nSuruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Tahun 2009. \n[Standing Order of Chief Commissioner of the Malaysian Anti- \nCorruption Commission (MACC) Chapter B (Investigation) No \n7 of 2010 — Procedure on Search under Section \n31 \nof the \nMalaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009}. \nThis standing order repealed SO No. 7/98. \n(c) \nPerintah Tetap Ketua Pesuruhjaya Suruhanjaya Pencegahan \nRasuah Malaysia (SPRM) \nBab \nB (Siasatan) \nBil \n17 Tahun \n2010 \n- Prosedur Penyitaan Harta Alih Di Bawah Seksyen 33 \nAkta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009. \n[Standing \nOrder \nof Chief Commissioner \nof the Malaysian \nAnti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Chapter B (Investigation) \nNo 17 of 2010 — Procedure on Seizure of Movable Property \nunder Section 33 of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission \nAct 2009]. \nThis standing order repealed SO No 12/98. \nHowever SO No 2/98, SO No 7/98 and SO No 12/98 were \nin force at \nthe time of TBH’s death. \n[255] \nWhen the MACC officers raided YB Ean’s office on the 15\", they \nseized \na laptop and \na CPU under section 33 of the MACC Act. \n[256] \nWhen TBH was brought to the Selangor MACC office at about \n6.15pm \nthat day, \nwe observe \nthat \nhe was subjected \nto what was \n82\n\n\n  \n. euphemistically called an “interview” by various MACC officers \nin four \ndifferent stages which culminated \nin \nthe \nrecording \nof \nhis \npurported \nstatement under section 30(8) of the MACC Act between 1.30am and \n3.30am on the 16\". We note with concern the manner \nin which TBH \nwas “interviewed” \nin stages by the MACC officers. The various stages \nof interrogation have been extensively dealt with \nin the earlier part of \nthis report and we need not repeat them here. \nBreaches of applicable standing orders \n[257] \nAmong the submissions made by the parties was the submission \nthat “suspects under investigation by the MACC are granted more legal \nrights than witnesses and that despite the limited scope of protection \nafforded to witnesses, there were nevertheless several infractions of the \nMACC’s standing orders.” We agree and \nlist the following infractions: \n(a) \nThe search of YB Ean’s office and seizure of TBH’s laptop and \nCPU without authorisation and a written order under section \n31(1) of the MACC Act was in breach of orders 3.4, 4, \n5 and \n6 of SO No 7/98 and of order 4.2 of SO No 12/98. \n(b) \nAs the operation had commenced sometime \nin June 2009, \nthe failure of the MACC officers to obtain authorisation and \na written order under section 31(1) to seize the laptop and \nthe CPU was totally unjustifiable as there was no basis for \nsuspicion \nthat evidence would \nbe tampered with, removed \nand/or destroyed. \nIn addition thereto, the failure of the MACC \nofficers to take photographs of and label the laptop and the \nCPU, and the places from where these items were seized as \nwell as prepare a sketch plan of the same, was in breach of \norder 4.4.2 of SO No 12/98. \n(c) \nFour documents \nthat were \nprinted \nout from TBH’s \nlaptop \n[exhibits \nD94 \nto \nD97] comprised \ntwo quotations and \ntwo \ninvoices which apparently formed the plank upon which the \nsuspicion of the MACC was launched that there was something \n83\n\n\n  \n  \n@) \n{e) \nff \nimproper in the claims made. However, these four documents \nwere not printed out \nin TBH’s presence for his verification. \nNeither was he asked to sign any seizure list regarding the \nfour documents. This \nis \nin breach of orders 4.4.1 and 4.4.4 \nof SO No 12/98. \nIn these circumstances, the authenticity of \nthese four documents \nis moot. \n| \nIt was the contention of the MACC that TBH cooperated with \nits officers voluntarily and therefore there was no requirement \nfor its officers to comply with the various standing orders as \nwell as the written \nlaw applicable, \nincluding section \n31. \nIn \nour view such \na contention should never be countenanced \nfor the simple reason \nthat authorities such \nas \nthe MACC \nwhen challenged as to their failure to comply with standing \norders and the law may then well say that as the witnesses \nhad cooperated \nvoluntarily, \nthere was \nno requirement for \ncompliance with the standing orders and laws. \nIf witnesses \nchallenge this and say that they did not act voluntarily, the \nMACC will be \nin no position to defend \nits stand. \nThe failure of the MACC to issue a written order to TBH to \nbe examined orally to assist in investigations was \nin breach \nof order 4.1 \nof SO No 2/98. \nThe MACC contended \nthat \nlegal counsel \nfor YB \nEan \nand \nTBH had advised them \nto cooperate with the MACC as \nits \nofficers were empowered under the law to do what they did. \nNotwithstanding that advice, \nit \nis our view that the relevant \nprovisions of the law should have been observed and correctly \napplied so that the public would be protected. Further, Arman \nand Ashraf who had earlier “interviewed” [in fact interrogated] \nTBH \npursuant \nto \nsection \n30(1) \nof the MACC Act \ndid \nnot \nsubsequently record TBH’s statement under section 30(8). \nIt was Nadzri who did this and this was \nin breach of order \n4.2.1 \nof SO No 2/98. \n84\n\n\n  \n(g) \nThe \nuse \nof Nadzri’s own words when \nrecording TBH’s \nstatement without recording \nthe \nlatter’s own words gives \nrise to uncertainty as to which parts of the statement were \nthe actual answers of TBH and which were not. This was \nin \nbreach of order 4.2.5 of SO No 2/98. \n(h) \nThe omission \nof the words “Tandatangan \nPegawai Yang \nMemeriksa” “Signature of Examining Officer’ on the last page \nof TBH’s statement at the portion where Nadzri purportedly \nsigned \noff as the recording \nofficer was \nin breach \nof order \n4.2.9 of SO No 2/98. \nTreatment of witnesses and suspects \n[258] \nWe observe that TBH was originally “invited” to be a witness \nin \nthe ongoing investigation \nby the MACC. However, the circumstances \nsurrounding his decampment from the SUK \nbuilding, his being escorted \nto the MACC \noffice, \nhis being interviewed/interrogated \nby the MACC \nofficers, the recording of his statement immediately after such interview/ \ninterrogation and his remaining \nin the care, custody and control of the \nMACC officers after the statement was recorded, all point to TBH being \ntransformed from being \na prospective witness to being \na prospective \nsuspect. The MACC officers contend that TBH was free to leave after \nhis statement had been recorded but that he elected to remain \nin the \nMACC office. \n[259] \nWe find \nit impossible \nto believe that he would want to remain \nin the MACC office after having being detained there for almost twelve \nhours. We find the failure of the MACC officers to release TBH after his \nstatement had been recorded amounted to cruel conduct and punishment \ninflicted on purpose. We would therefore recommend that all proceedings \nin any MACC \noffice be recorded on closed-circuit television [cctv] \nso \nthat there can \nbe no dispute whether witnesses are detained \nor kept \nin the offices of the MACC against their own free will or whether \nit can \nbe said that they are “'voluntarily there as guests of the MACC’”. \n85\n\n\n  \n[260] \nWe are of the view that the legal rights of both witnesses and \nsuspects should be enacted as part of the MACC Act because the same \nwill become transparent and accessible to the Malaysian public through \nsuch enactment. Providing for these rights through the standing orders \nwould not safeguard the public as their observance would largely depend \non the absolute discretion of the MACC officers concerned and would \nnot be transparent in light of the usual classification of such standing \norders as “official secrets’, \nto which the public will not be privy. \nIt \nis \na cardinal principle of transparency and the democratic process for a \nwitness \nor \na suspect \nto know what \nhis rights are when \nhe \nis called \nupon to assist in an investigation or when he \nis taken into custody. \n[261] \nIn \nthe course \nof the \ninquiry, we were concerned \nby the \ntotal \nlack of consideration for human sensitivities exhibited by the majority \nof the MACC officers. We were shocked to hear that racial expletives \nappeared to be the stock in trade of the interrogation procedure adopted \nby certain of the MACC officers in this case and \nin another. We hasten \nto add that such usage was of course denied by the officers concerned \nbut we have no reason to doubt that the same had been uttered having \nregard to the whole background circumstances in which the interrogation \ntook place. \n[262] \nWe are of the view that the recruitment process of MACC officers \nshould include psychological evaluation \nto assess their suitability for \ninvestigative work \nin the MACC and that they should further be given \npsychological counselling to apprise them of racial and religious sensitivities \nas well as the different levels of the breaking point which individuals \nwould have when subjected to severe or intense interrogation. \nProposed improvements \n[263] \nSubmissions put \nin included a non-exhaustive list of issues and \nproposals \nfor our consideration \n“as \na means \nto improving \nthe \nlegal \nprotection to be afforded to witnesses assisting in an MACC investigation’. \n86\n\n\n  \nWe have taken note \nof those submissions and reproduce below our \nviews on some of them as expressed during the course of this inquiry. \nSome \nof the proposals \nin those submissions coincide with our views \nand we reproduce them below with modifications. \nQualifications and training \n[264] \n(a) \n(b) \n(c) \nAll MACC officers who are to be employed and/or to carry out \nfunctions as surveillance/raiding/enforcement and investigating \nofficers should \nat the minimum \nhave completed \ntertiary \neducation. \nMACC officers who are to be employed and/or to carry out \nfunctions as surveillance, raiding, enforcement and investigating \nofficers should undergo a more extensive and comprehensive \ntraining programme. They ought to \nbe examined and only \nenlisted \nfor service \nif they meet \nthe \nrequired standards. \nSuch examination and training should include psychological \nevaluation and psychological counselling respectively. \nThe continuing education and training of all MACC officers \nshould be made compulsory. \ninfrastructure \n[265] \n(a) \n(b) \nThe infrastructure of MACC premises and offices should be \nimproved and upgraded. Every MACC office should be equipped \nwith cctv, surveillance cameras to record the movements and \nactions of every person who enters or leaves the office or \nany of its rooms. \nThere should \nbe \na specified waiting room for witnesses \nto \nbe placed in while waiting to be interviewed or to have their \nstatement recorded. Officers should wait with the witnesses \nto prevent anything untoward happening and also to prevent \n87\n\n\n  \n  \n(c) \n(d) \n(e) \n(f) \n(9) \nwitnesses involved in the same investigation from communicating \nwith each other. Witnesses should \nnot be required \nto wait \nfor more than thirty minutes except for good reason. \nThere should \nbe specified rooms for the interviewing and \nrecording of the statements of witnesses [“interview rooms’”]. \nInterviews should \nonly \nbe conducted \nin these rooms \nand \nstatements should also be recorded \nin these rooms. They \nshould be located on the ground floor of the MACC office and \nshould not be locked during the interviewing \nor statement- \nrecording session. This will enable the superior officers \nof \nthe interviewing or recording officers to check on them from \ntime to time to ensure that the interview or the recording of \nthe statements \nis done properly and \nin accordance with the \nlaw. \nInterview rooms \nshould \nbe equipped \nwith one-way \nglass \nmirrors to promote transparency in the interview process and \nto prevent allegations \nof force \nbeing \nused, \nhaving \nregard \nalso \nto our earlier recommendation that \nall proceedings \nin \nMACC offices be recorded on cctv. \nAll interviews and recording of statements of witnesses should \nbe captured by way of video or audio recording and equipment \nshould be installed \nin the rooms for this purpose. \nThere should be a computerised system recording the entry \nand exit of all persons into MACC offices including details \nsuch as the time, the purpose of the visit and details of the \nperson with whom he or she entered or exited the premises. \nThis system should be complemented by a witness logbook \nwhich \nmust \nbe \nsigned \nby \nthe witnesses and \nthe MACC \nofficers. \nThere should be proper rooms for MACC officers to rest and/ \nor sleep in \nif work requires them to lengthen their stay in the \noffice. MACC officers should no longer be allowed to sleep \n88\n\n\n  \nin their rooms. Evidence led during the proceedings was to \nthe effect that officers had \na rest area \nin the office but \nit \nwas not comfortable. They also slept wherever they could \nwhen they needed to rest. This is not conducive to efficiency \nat work as resting under the conditions they mentioned, for \nexample, sleeping on one’s work table, will not give proper \nrest and put one \nin the correct frame \nof mind \nto do one’s \nwork, thereby impacting \non how one deals with witnesses \nand potential suspects. \nCalling up witnesses \n[266] \nSection 30(1) of the MACC Act enables an MACC officer investigating \nan offence under the Act to order any person to attend before him \nto \nbe examined orally \nin relation \nto any matter under investigation or to \nproduce any book or other stipulated document which may be required \nfor the purpose of the investigation. \n[267] \nMACC officers are also given police powers under the Criminal \nProcedure Code [the CPC”]. Section 111(1) of the CPC is so worded that \nwhere a police officer investigating an offence requires the attendance \nbefore him of any person, then he “may by order in writing” require \nthe attendance before him of that person [emphasis added]. \n[268] \nWe observed that during the operation \nin question \nthe MACC \nofficers without exception relied on verbal! orders which were given to \nrequire the attendance of witnesses at the Selangor MACC office. While \nwe recognise that the urgency of the matter may necessitate the giving \nof verbal orders to attend, such practice must be observed with care. \nIn the inquiry before us, witnesses testified that when they questioned \nthe authority \nof the MACC officers to do what they were doing, they \nwere informed very curtly that the law empowered them to do so. This \nextended to the extent of the officers not even properly showing their \nauthority cards before proceeding to question the witnesses. \n89\n\n\n  \n[269] \nWe are of the view that MACC officers should \nin \nall instances \nproduce their authority cards as required under section 8 of the MACC \nAct when conducting \nany operation \nand \nnot \nact \nin \nthe high-handed \nmanner that they did in the present case by not even properly showing \ntheir authority cards before proceeding to question the witnesses. \n[270] We are also of the view that, except where the urgency of the \nsituation requires acting otherwise, atl MACC officers acting under section \n30(1) of the MACC Act should issue \na written order for witnesses to \nattend before them. \nIn the present case, witnesses testified that when \nthey questioned the authority \nof the MACC officers \nto do what they \nwere doing, they were informed very curtly that the \nlaw empowered \nthe officers to do so. \nWitnesses to be accompanied \n[271] \nAny witness or suspect under investigation by the MACC should \nat \nall times \nbe accompanied \nand escorted \nby \na designated MACC \nofficer who must regularly report the movement of the witness to the \ninvestigating officer to ensure that he \nis kept informed of the state and \nmovements of the witness. We cannot overstress the need for this as \nevents have shown that where witnesses or suspects are left to range \nunattended in the MACC office, there would be the probability of untoward \nincidents occurring. This practice would have the added advantage of \nmeeting challenges \nof any physical \nor mental abuse \ninflicted on \nthe \nwitness as there would be a person unconnected with the investigation \nwho would have had the charge of the witness [except when interviews \nor interrogation are \nin progress] and who would then be \nin \na position \nto state what took place \nin the event the question arises. \nInterviewing and statement-recording \n[272] \nAview was expressed that interviews and the statement-recording \nof witnesses should \nonly \nbe conducted during \noffice hours, \nnamely, \nbetween 9.00am and 5.00pm, and that each session must last for no \n90\n\n\n  \n‘more than one hour at \na stretch, and breaks between each session \nshould \nbe \nno \nless than \nfifteen minutes \neach. \nIt was observed \nthat \neven on the accounts of most MACC officers who conducted interviews \nand recorded statements \nin this operation, the officers said that they \n| regularly stayed overnight and were tired as they had to work for long \nhours. \n[273] \nThe MACC, on the other hand, was of the view that the present \npractice of the statement-recording of witnesses being continued beyond \nworking hours as necessitated by the circumstances of the case should \ncontinue. Reliance was placed on the case of Datuk Seri Ahmad Said \nHamdan and others \nv Tan Boon Wah [2010] \n6 CLJ 142 \nin support \nof its stand. \n[274] \nTan Boon Wah who was the plaintiff \nin the above case was \na \nwitness \nin the inquiry before us and the case itself emanated from the \ninvestigation carried out by the MACC pursuant to the complaint made \nin Shah Alam report No 0052/2009. \n[275] \nWe were apprised of facts in the inquiry which did not surface in \nthe proceedings \nin the High Court and the Court of Appeal. We found \nthat Tan Boon Wah was kept at the MACC office for a lengthy period \nof time \nto \nput pressure \non \nhim \nand \nto inconvenience \nhim. \nHe was \npresent \nin the MACC office on the evening of the 15\", ostensibly for \nthe purpose of his assisting \nin the ongoing investigation as a witness. \nHowever, we found that he was not only interviewed but was interrogated \nin circumstances that should not be permitted. He was confined \nin \na \nroom and \nleft there with no lights on, \nleft to sleep on the floor [when \nnot being questioned], and was not allowed \nto go home even though \nhis presence at the Selangor MACC office was not required after about \n2.30am on the 16\". \n[276] \nWe observed \nthat \nhe was subjected \nto \nintense pressure and \nthreat \nof physical \nviolence, \nand verbal \ninsults were heaped \non \nhim \nwhich included racial slurs. We have no reason, having observed \nhis \n91\n\n\n  \n  \ndemeanour, \nto doubt that this was what happened and we therefore \nreject the testimony of the MACC officers to the contrary \nin the form \nof denials. \nHis statement was only recorded \nin the late morning of the \n16\", a long time after his interrogation by the MACC officers was over. \nThis gives the lie to the testimony of the MACC officers that he chose \nto stay behind after being released as he wanted to wait for his wife \n| to bring the required documents over to the Selangor MACC office. His \nwife never came with the documents and despite that his statement was \nrecorded \nlater that morning. This can only mean that what Tan Boon \nWah said was true, namely, that he was purposely made to remain \nin \nthe Selangor MACC office after the officers were done with him around \n-2.30am that morning. \n[277] \nIn situations \nlike this where \na decision has \nto be made as \nto \nwhether to accept the evidence of one witness while rejecting that of \nothers, \nit would have helped immensely had there been cctv recording \nof what took place. We would stress that any cctv recording system \nthat \nis implemented \nin MACC offices should \nbe tamperproof so \nthat \nthere can be no possibility of the recording being doctored. \n[278] \nWhile accepting \nthat the authorities have \nto act \nto investigate \ncases \nof corruption and other crimes \nto protect society \nat large, \nthe \ngathering of evidence to so protect society should be done within the \nlaw with sufficient safeguards to protect the rights of the individual. \n[279] \nIn relation \nto the recording \nof statements outside office hours, \nwe would \npropose \nthat \nin \nexceptional \ncircumstances, \nwhere \nthe \ndiscontinuance \nof the recording \nof the statement of a witness would \nhave an adverse impact on the investigation, the recording should be \nallowed to continue beyond office hours but with sufficient rest periods \nand attention being given to the witness’ physical and mental condition \nand well-being. This \nis important because, \nas long as the witness \nis \nin the care \nof the MACC, \nthe MACC \nis liable for \nhis well-being and \n‘should the witness be kept for long hours and suffer any deterioration \nin his health, the MACC should be held accountable. \n92\n\n\n \n \n    \nABOUT US\nADVERTISE\nHOME\nMALAYSIA\nSINGAPORE\nMONEY\nWORLD\nLIFE\nEAT/DRINK\nSHOWBIZ\nOPINION\nSPORTS\nTECH/GADGETS\nWHAT YOU THINK\n精彩大马\n \nYOU MAY ALSO LIKE\n \nRELATED ARTICLES\nMALAYSIA\nWho was Teoh Beng Hock and why\nis the probe into his death being\nreopened 15 years later?\nTeoh Leong Hwee holds a picture of his late son Teoh Beng Hock after meeting Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar\nIbrahim about his case at Perdana Putra, August 1, 2024. — Picture by Sayuti Zainudin\nJoin us on our WhatsApp Channel, follow us on Instagram, and receive browser alerts for the\nlatest news you need to know.\nBy Muhammad Yusry\nFriday, 02 Aug 2024 5:19 PM MYT\nKUALA LUMPUR, Aug 2 — Fifteen years after the 2009 death of Teoh Beng Hock in Shah Alam, the\ngovernment has agreed to reopen the investigation into his death, promising a transparent and\nimpartial process free from interference.\nTeoh, a former journalist turned aide to former Selangor executive councillor Ean Yong Hian Wah, died\nafter being held for questioning overnight at the then Selangor Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission\noffice in Plaza Masalam, Shah Alam on July 16, 2009.\nHe had been called to provide information as a witness and not a suspect into a suspected corruption\ncase.\nIn July 2011, a Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded that his death was a suicide.\nHowever, in September 2014, the Court of Appeal ruled that Teoh’s death from a fall was caused by “an\nunlawful act or acts by unknown individuals.”\nTeoh’s family had long sought justice for his death, which occurred outside the Selangor office of anti-\ncorruption investigators in 2009.\nSo who was Teoh Beng Hock, and why is his case being reopened after 15 years?\nUKM graduate and a former journalist\nTeoh, born in 1979 in Melaka, graduated from Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia and began his career as\na journalist at Sin Chew Daily.\nFollowing the general election in 2008, Teoh transitioned to a political role where he served as a\npolitical aide to DAP’s Ean Yong Hian Wah, the then Seri Kembangan state assemblyman and a member\nof the Selangor State Executive Council.\nTimeline of events\nJuly 13, 2009: The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) probed seven Pakatan\nRakyat Selangor state assemblymen in relation to the use of state funds in their respective\nconstituencies.\nJuly 15, 2009: Ean’s office was raided by Selangor MACC officers and Teoh was detained\novernight for questioning as a witness at their headquarters on the 14th floor of Plaza\nMasalam in Shah Alam.\nJuly 16, 2009: Teoh was found dead on the fifth-floor landing of the Plaza Masalam building.\nJuly 29, 2009: The inquest into the death of Teoh began before Coroner Azmil Muntapha\nAbas.\nJanuary 5, 2011: The Shah Alam Coroner’s Court gave an open verdict for Teoh’s case and\nsaid it was not due to suicide or murder and no third party was involved in his death.\nJuly 21, 2011: The Royal Commission of Inquiry said Teoh’s death was due to suicide.\nDecember 5, 2011: The Shah Alam High Court rejected Teoh family’s application for judicial\nreview, the judges maintained the inquest’s open verdict.\nOctober 30, 2012: Four of Teoh’s family members filed a civil lawsuit claiming\ncompensation over sadness, loss of dependency and negligence by MACC and 13 others over\nhis death.\nSeptember 5, 2014: The Court of Appeal’s three-judge panel unanimously ruled that Teoh’s\ndeath “was caused by multiple injuries from a fall from the 14th floor of Plaza Masalam as a\nresult of or which was accelerated by an unlawful act or acts of person or persons unknown,\ninclusive of MACC officers who were involved in the arrest and investigation of the deceased.”\nMay 12, 2015: The defendants — 10 MACC officers, the MACC and the Malaysian government\n— settled the civil lawsuit by agreeing to pay Teoh’s family RM600,000 in damages and\nRM60,000 in cost and admitted to negligence on their part resulting in Teoh’s death.\nJanuary 4, 2022: Teoh’s parents filed a lawsuit through a judicial review application, to ask\nthe court to compel the police to complete investigations into his 2009 death.\nJune 6, 2022: The High Court granted leave for the lawsuit to be heard the next year.\nJuly 15, 2024: Members of the Teoh Beng Hock Association for Democratic Advancement\narrived at Parliament following a three-day 96km walk for justice to hand over a\nmemorandum with a list of their demands. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim agreed\nto meet Teoh’s family.\nAugust 1, 2024: Teoh’s family members met Anwar in a closed-door meeting. Anwar\nannounced the government agreed to reopen the investigation into Teoh’s death.\nThe Kuala Lumpur High Court has fixed October 29 to deliver a ruling on Teoh’s family’s application\nfor a judicial review on his death.\nRecommended reading:\nFamily of slain DAP aide Teoh Beng Hock finally meet PM Anwar, father now in wheelchair\nand son he never knew all grown up\nTeoh Beng Hock’s family gets Oct 29 date for ruling on judicial review application over his\ndeath\nPM Anwar says he will meet Teoh Beng Hock’s family next week\nMALAYSIA / 01 Aug 2024\nFamily of slain DAP aide\nTeoh Beng Hock finally meet\nPM Anwar, father now in\nwheelchair and son he never\nknew all grown up\nMALAYSIA / 29 Jul 2024\nTeoh Beng Hock’s family gets\nOct 29 date for ruling on\njudicial review application\nover his death \nMALAYSIA / 17 Jul 2024\nPM Anwar says he will meet\nTeoh Beng Hock’s family next\nweek\n \nJUST IN\n5 m ago\nMother-daughter duo win\nRM223,000 in damages after\n2019 Rottweiler attack\n \n1 h ago\nTwo children feared drowned\nafter being swept away in\nKeningau floods as SAR\noperation gets underway \n \n1 h ago\nIn SRC’s US$1.1b suit, Najib\ntestifies in court for the second\ntime five years later\n \nMALAYSIA\nSINGAPORE\nWORLD\nMONEY\nLIFE\nEAT/DRINK\nSHOWBIZ\nOPINION\nWHAT YOU THINK\nSPORTS\nTECH/GADGETS\nNews\nAbout\nARCHIVES\nABOUT US\nPRIVACY POLICY\nTERMS OF USE\nADVERTISE\nDownload\n \nSubscribe to Newsletter\n\n\nSHOWBIZ / 5 h ago\nAfter Merdeka 118, what was that KL\nbuilding spotted in the\n‘Thunderbolts*’ trailer and where i...\nMALAYSIA / 5 h ago\nAge is just a number: Dr Mahathir,\n‘99-year-old car guy’ puts pedal to\nthe metal and hits speeds over...\nEAT-DRINK / 5 h ago\nFind joy at PJ Sea Park's Restoran MJ\nWang's Ipoh Famous Apam Balik\nstall\nEAT-DRINK / 7 h ago\nYour guide to must-try white coffee\nspots in Ipoh: From traditional\nclassics to modern unique twists\nMALAYSIA / 7 h ago\nSuffering from sunset success: How\nTanjung Aru’s soaring popularity\nleads to traffic nightmare\n\n\nMOST READ","difficulty":"hard","domain":"Multi-Document QA","length":"medium","question":"What was the primary cause of Teoh Beng Hock's death, according to the initial investigations?","sub_domain":"Multi-news"}

Source: https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2

initial import

Posting: /agents

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