# LongBench v2 / 66f3d2fc821e116aacb2f269

task_id: 748ab071-9838-52e7-8d1b-c5d66134b850
task_key: train--66f3d2fc821e116aacb2f269
task_revision_id: 3

{"choice_A":"The simultaneous rise in interest rates across multiple major economies, leading to capital flight from developing markets while inflating costs for sustainable projects due to increased financing conditions.","choice_B":"The proliferation of international investment agreements (IIAs) that prioritize investor rights over regulatory sovereignty, potentially leading to a race to the bottom in environmental and social standards among developing nations.","choice_C":"The integration of digital governance mechanisms that, while enhancing transparency, inadvertently expose developing economies to increased volatility from global financial markets and speculative investments.","choice_D":"The shift in global supply chains due to heightened geopolitical tensions, resulting in the reallocation of FDI away from developing countries toward more stable and developed economies, thereby diminishing local capacities to meet SDGs.","context":"U NI T E D NAT I O NS CO NFE R E N C E  ON  T R A D E  A N D  D E VE L OP M E N T\nInvestment facilitation \nand digital government\n2024\nWorld  \ninvestment \nreport\n\n\n2024\nWorld  \ninvestment \nreport\nU NI T E D NAT I O NS CO NFE R E N C E  ON  T R A D E  A N D  D E VE L OP M E N T\nInvestment facilitation\nand digital government\nGeneva, 2024\n\n\n\n \nMention of any firm or licensed process does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations.\n \nThis publication has been edited externally.\nUnited Nations publication issued by UN Trade and Development.\nUNCTAD/WIR/2024\nISBN 978-92-1-003134-9\nPDF ISBN 978-92-1-358973-1\n   EPUB ISBN 978-92-1-358974-8\nPrint ISSN 1020-2218\nOnline ISSN 2225-1677 \nSales no. E.24.II.D.11\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\niii\nPreface\nInvestment is the fuel for sustainable development. Closing the SDG and climate financing \ngap will require an estimated $500 billion of international public finance and $500 billion of \ninternational private finance per year, much of which would be in the form of foreign direct \ninvestment.\nBut many developing countries are running on empty. Global and regional crises, trade tensions \nand tighter financing conditions have had a chilling effect on foreign direct investment, which \nremained subdued in 2023 for a second year in succession. Global flows of foreign direct \ninvestment stagnated at $1.3 trillion. Notably, foreign direct investment in new industrial and \ninfrastructure projects in developing countries declined, while new investment in sectors relevant \nto the Sustainable Development Goals fell by more than 10 per cent.\nStagnant SDG investment and insufficient funding is severely hindering implementation of the \n2030 Agenda and the SDGs, particularly in least developed countries. We need urgent action \nto remove obstacles and provide a transparent, streamlined investment climate for sustainable \ndevelopment.\nThis World Investment Report shows that the lacklustre financial flows to developing countries \nare not due to a lack of investment policy efforts. Investment facilitation has become a prominent \nfeature of national policies and international agreements. Digital government solutions are \nproliferating, aiding investors and strengthening governance and institutions.\nBut despite these efforts, finance is not flowing at sufficient scale, due to high interest rates and \ngeopolitical conditions. That means we must redouble our efforts.\nI urge all decision makers to prioritize the mobilization of sustainable finance at scale. The SDG \nStimulus we have proposed is a practical and achievable means of delivering this. Our call for \nreform and scaling up of multilateral development banks is intended to significantly increase the \ncrowding in of private investment.\nI also encourage policymakers to prioritize strengthening investment governance in developing \ncountries, to ensure financial flows are directed towards the SDGs. UNCTAD’s recommendations \nfor the use of business facilitation and digital government to ease sustainable investment can \nplay an important part in achieving these goals.\nAntónio Guterres  \nSecretary-General of the United Nations\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\niv\nForeword\nIn a world grappling with global and regional crises, the delicate balance of foreign direct \ninvestment (FDI) hangs precariously. This World Investment Report (WIR) serves as a stark \nreminder that investment, the lifeblood of sustainable development, is not merely a statistic \nbut a lifeline for developing nations. It is the fuel that powers progress towards the \nSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the  2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.     \nThe challenges we face are multifaceted and interconnected. Geoeconomic fragmentation \nis reshaping the landscape of global investment. Trade networks are fragmenting, regulatory \nenvironments are diverging and international supply chains are being reconfigured. These \nshifts create both obstacles and isolated opportunities, with some countries benefiting from \ninvestments in global value chain-intensive manufacturing while others struggle to participate \nin the global economy.\nOverall, however, these trends are leading to a further deterioration of the international investment \nlandscape as seen from the developing world. Last year, FDI fell by more than 10 per cent \nglobally, and by 7 per cent in the developing world. International project finance, crucial for \ninfrastructure development, was particularly hard hit, falling by 26 per cent. Prospects for 2024 \nremain challenging, with weakening growth prospects and continuing trade and geopolitical \ntensions.\nFurthermore, the WIR reveals a crisis in SDG investment, with a more than 10 per cent decrease \nin 2023. Two sectors, agrifood systems and water and sanitation, registered fewer internationally \nfinanced projects in 2023 than in 2015, when the SDGs were adopted. This decline, driven by \ntighter financing conditions and a slowdown in sustainable finance markets, underscores the \nneed for concerted action to steer investments towards projects that genuinely contribute to a \nsustainable future.\nMeanwhile, the mobilization of funds for SDG investment through sustainable finance products \nin global capital markets is still growing but slowing down. Sustainable bonds showed marginal \ngrowth in 2023, and new inflows in sustainable investment funds dropped by 60 per cent. \nGreenwashing concerns are increasingly affecting investor demand. More broadly, policy action \nis needed to mitigate the risk of a widening backlash against sustainable investment strategies. \nThe world needs a robust and credible sustainable finance industry, and no effort must be spared \nto fortify it before it is too late.\nBut the way we do that must be carefully considered. Policymakers should be mindful of the \nspillover effects of international sustainability reporting standards, particularly on small and \nmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries. These SMEs, the engines of inclusive \ngrowth and job creation, are precisely the ones that need sustainable finance flows the most. \nHowever they may struggle to meet increased disclosure requirements, potentially affecting their \nmarket access and participation in global supply chains. Striking a balance between promoting \ntransparency and avoiding undue burdens on businesses will be crucial for a sustainable and \ninclusive investment landscape.\nAgainst this complex backdrop, the WIR underscores the importance of investment facilitation \nand digital government as tools to attract and retain investment. By streamlining procedures, \nenhancing transparency and leveraging digital tools such as online single windows, we can \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nv\nfoster a more conducive investment climate, particularly in developing countries. Furthermore, \nthe report emphasizes that digital business and investment facilitation is not merely a technical \nsolution; it is a stepping stone towards wider digital government implementation, which can \naddress underlying weaknesses in governance and institutions that often hinder investment and \nimpede progress towards sustainable development. \nInvestment facilitation, while essential, is not a panacea for the challenges facing global \ninvestment flows. However, it is an undeniable prerequisite for fostering an environment conducive \nto sustainable investment. The proliferation of digital solutions for investment facilitation, as \nhighlighted in this report, exemplifies the WIR’s commitment to providing tangible and actionable \npolicy recommendations even in the most challenging of times.\nAs we navigate the complexities of the 21st century, the WIR reminds us that investment is \nnot just about capital flows; it is about human potential, environmental stewardship and the \nenduring pursuit of a more equitable and sustainable world. Let us embrace this vision with \nrenewed determination, recognizing that the choices we make today will shape the world we \nleave behind for generations to come.\nRebeca Grynspan\nSecretary General of UN Trade and Development\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nvi\nAcknowledgements\nThe World Investment Report 2024 was prepared by a team at UNCTAD led by Richard Bolwijn. \nUNCTAD team members included Dafina Atanasova, Vincent Beyer, Stephania Bonilla, Julien \nBornon, Bruno Casella, Joseph Clements, Mathilde Closset, Tiffany Grabski, Frank Grozel, \nNatalia Guerra, Hamed El Kady, Anastasia Leskova, Massimo Meloni, Anthony Miller, Bita \nMortazavi, Abraham Negash, Yongfu Ouyang, Marios Pournaris, Ian Richards, Diana Rosert, \nAmelia U. Santos-Paulino, Changbum Son, Astrit Sulstarova, Yihua Teng, Claudia Trentini and \nKee Hwee Wee.\nResearch support and inputs were provided by Ciman Araleh, Gregory Allan Auclair, Weijia Hu, \nOktawian Kuc, Corli Le Roux, Noé Michon, Elisa Navarra, Nelson Pérez, Lucas Ricardo, Lauren \nSatterthwaite, Prachi Sharma, Kjartan Sorensen, Rick van der Maas and Vanina Vegezzi. \nComments and contributions were provided by colleagues in UNCTAD: Kiyoshi Adachi, \nRodrigo Carcamo, Marco Fugazza, Ebru Gökçe-Dessemond, Poul Hansen, Igor Paunovic, \nLuisa Rodriguez, Mesut Saygili, Dawei Wang and Anida Yupari, as well as the Office of the \nSecretary-General. \nStatistical assistance was provided by Mohamed Chiraz Baly, Kerem Bayrakceken and Bradley \nBoicourt. IT assistance was provided by Chrysanthi Kourti.\nThe manuscript was copy-edited by Lise Lingo. The design of the charts and infographics, and \nthe typesetting of the report were done by Maria Teresa Arrigoni and Matteo Oldani. Production \nof the report was supported by Elisabeth Mareschal and Katia Vieu.\nAt various stages of the preparation of the theme chapter, including the peer review, brainstorming \nmeetings and discussions in the margin of the UNCTAD Investment and Enterprise Commission \nmeeting on Investment Facilitation for Sustainable Development, the team benefited from \ncomments and inputs received from external experts: Yasser Abbas, Isiaka Abdulqadir Imam, \nAxel Berger, Alejandro Encinas Nájera, Najwa Halaseh, Archie Kariuki, Olga Lucia Lozano, Victor \nMatassi, Ugo Panizza, Deniz Susar, Camilo Trigueros, Chhime Tshering, Ingmar Vali, Christian \nVolpe Martincus, Dana Akram Abdallah Al Zoubi, and Juwang Zhu.\nThe team is grateful for advice, input and comments received from numerous officials in central \nbanks, national government agencies, international organizations and non-governmental \norganizations.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nvii\nExplanatory notes\nThe terms country and economy as used in this report also refer, as appropriate, to territories \nor areas. In addition, the designations of country and economy groupings are intended solely \nfor statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgement about the \nstage of development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The \nmajor country and economic groupings used in this report follow the classification of the United \nNations Statistical Office: \n•\t\nDeveloped economies: the member countries of the OECD (other than Chile, Colombia, \nCosta Rica, Mexico and Türkiye), European Union member countries that are not OECD \nmembers (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania) plus Albania, Andorra, Belarus, \nBermuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Montenegro, North Macedonia, \nthe Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia and Ukraine, plus the \nterritories of Faroe Islands, Gibraltar, Greenland, Guernsey and Jersey. \n•\t\nDeveloping economies: in general, all economies not specified above. For statistical \npurposes, the data for China do not include those for Hong Kong Special Administrative \nRegion (Hong Kong SAR), Macao Special Administrative Region (Macao SAR) or Taiwan \nProvince of China. \nThroughout the report, data on investment trends for the Netherlands refer only to the \nNetherlands; information for Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten is reported separately. \nMethodological details on FDI and MNE statistics can be found on the report website (https://\nunctad.org/topic/investment/world-investment-report). \nThe following symbols have been used in the tables: \n•\t\nTwo dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. Rows in \ntables have been omitted in those cases where no data are available for any of the elements \nin the row. \n•\t\nA dash (–) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its value is negligible. \n•\t\nA blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable, unless otherwise indicated. \n•\t\nA slash (/) between dates representing years, e.g., 2020/21, indicates a financial year. \n•\t\nUse of a dash (–) between dates representing years, e.g., 2020–2021, signifies the full period \ninvolved, including the beginning and end years. \n•\t\nReference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated. \nAnnual rates of growth or change, unless otherwise stated, refer to annual compound rates. \nDetails and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nviii\nAbbreviations\nAfCFTA\nAfrican Continental Free Trade Area\nASEAN\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations \nASYCUDA\nAutomated System for Customs Data\nAIFF\nASEAN Investment Facilitation Framework\nBIT\nbilateral investment treaty\nCDP\nCarbon Disclosure Project\nCEPA\nComprehensive Economic Partnership \nAgreement\nCOVID-19\ncoronavirus disease 2019\nECT\nEnergy Charter Treaty\nEGDI\neGovernment Development Index\nESG\nenvironmental, social and governance\nEVs\nelectric vehicles\nFDI\nforeign direct investment\nFTA\nfree trade agreement\nGDP\ngross domestic product \nGER\nGlobal Enterprise Registration\nGHG\ngreenhouse gas\nGSFO\nGlobal Sustainable Finance Observatory\nGVC\nglobal value chain\nICC\nInternational Chamber of Commerce\nICSID\nInternational Centre for Settlement of Investment \nDisputes\nICT\ninformation and communications technology\nIFD\nInvestment Facilitation for Development\nIFRS\nInternational Financial Reporting Standards\nIIA\ninternational investment agreement\nIMF\nInternational Monetary Fund\nIPA\ninvestment promotion agency\nIPFSD\nInvestment Policy Framework for Sustainable \nDevelopment\nISDS\ninvestor–State dispute settlement\nISSB\nInternational Sustainability Standards Board \nIT\nInformation technology\nLDC\nleast developed country \nLLDC\nlandlocked developing country\nM&As\nmergers and acquisitions\nMNE\nmultinational enterprise\nMSMEs\nmicro-, small and medium-sized enterprises\nNAFTA\nNorth American Free Trade Agreement\nOECD\nOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and \nDevelopment\nOFDI\noutward FDI\nOFIO\nOffice of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman\nOHCHR\nOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for \nHuman Rights \nOIC\nOrganisation of Islamic Cooperation\nPPF\npublic pension fund\nPPP\npublic–private partnership\nSDGs\nSustainable Development Goals\nSEZ\nspecial economic zone\nSIDS\nsmall island developing States\nSIFA\nsustainable investment facilitation framework\nSMEs\nsmall and medium-sized enterprises\nSPAC\nspecial purpose acquisition company\nSWF\nsovereign wealth fund\nTIP\ntreaty with investment provision\nTNI\nTransnationality Index \nUN DESA\nUnited Nations Department of Economic and \nSocial Affairs\nUNCITRAL\nUnited Nations Commission on International \nTrade Law\nUNCTAD\nUnited Nations Conference on Trade and \nDevelopment\nUNEP\nUnited Nations Environment Programme \nUNIDROIT\nInternational Institute for the Unification of Private \nLaw\nUNODC\nUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime\nUSMCA\nUnited States–Mexico–Canada Agreement\nWASH\nwater, sanitation and hygiene\nWIR\nWorld Investment Report\nWTO\nWorld Trade Organization\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nix\nTable of contents\nExecutive summary.\n.......................................................................... xi\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends.\n....................................................... 1\nA. Foreign direct investment......................................................... 3\n1. Global trends.\n................................................................................. 3\n2. Trends by geography.\n..................................................................... 5\n3. Trends by project type and sector.\n............................................... 21\nB. Investment in the Sustainable Development Goals.\n................ 29\nC. International production.\n......................................................... 34\n1. Key indicators of international production.\n................................... 34\n2. Internationalization trends of the largest MNEs.\n........................... 36\n3. Shifting investment patterns among the top 100 MNEs.\n.............. 38\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends................................................................. 45\nA. National investment policies................................................... 47\n1. Overall trends.\n.............................................................................. 47\n2. Policy measures more favourable to investors.\n............................ 50\n3. Policy measures less favourable to investors.\n.............................. 55\n4. Outward foreign direct investment policies.................................. 60\nB. International investment policies............................................ 65\n1. Trends in international investment agreements............................ 65\n2. Trends in investor–State dispute settlement.\n................................ 73\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends.\n............................................................. 77\nA. Sustainability-themed capital market products.\n...................... 79\n1. Sustainable bond markets........................................................... 79\n2. Sustainable funds.\n........................................................................ 85\nB. Sovereign and public institutional investors.\n........................... 88\n1. Sustainability integration strategies and practices.\n...................... 90\n2. Sustainability disclosure.\n.............................................................. 93\nC. Policies, regulations and standards........................................ 96\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nx\nONLINE ONLY: Regional Trends\nAfrica\nDeveloping Asia\nLatin America and the Caribbean\nStructurally weak, vulnerable and small economies:\nLeast developed countries (LDCs) \nLandlocked developing countries (LLDCs) \nSmall island developing States (SIDS)\n1. International sustainability reporting standards.\n........................... 96\n2. Policymaking at national and regional levels .\n............................ 102\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government........................... 107\nA. Introduction.\n.......................................................................... 109\nB. Progress on digital investment facilitation worldwide........... 113\n1. The wider digital government context........................................ 113\n2. The spread and quality of business portals.\n............................... 115\n3. Foreign investor-specific online procedures.\n.............................. 119\n4. Portal ownership and the role of IPAs........................................ 122\nC. Facilitation in national and international investment policies.\n125\n1. National policies.\n........................................................................ 125\n2. International investment agreements......................................... 129\nD. The impact of investment facilitation and digital government.134\nE. From online business facilitation to digital government........ 140\n1. The basic architecture of digital government services............... 140\n2. Effective implementation.\n........................................................... 142\n3. Connecting with wider digital government................................. 145\nF. Conclusions and policy implications.\n..................................... 150\nReferences..................................................................................... 153\nAnnex tables.\n.................................................................................. 156\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxi\nExecutive summary\nInternational investment trends\nGlobal foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2023 decreased marginally, by 2 per cent, to $1.3 trillion. \nThis headline figure was affected by wild swings in financial flows through a small number of \nEuropean conduit economies; excluding the effect of these conduits, global FDI flows were more \nthan 10 per cent lower than in 2022.\nThe global environment for international investment remains challenging in 2024. Weakening \ngrowth prospects, economic fracturing trends, trade and geopolitical tensions, industrial policies \nand supply chain diversification are reshaping FDI patterns, causing some multinational enterprises \n(MNEs) to adopt a cautious approach to overseas expansion. However, MNE profit levels remain \nhigh, financing conditions are easing and increased greenfield project announcements in 2023 \nwill positively affect FDI. Modest growth for the full year appears possible.\nInternational project finance and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) were especially \nweak in 2023. M&As, which mostly affect FDI in developed countries, fell by 46 per cent in value. \nProject finance, important for infrastructure investment, was down 26 per cent. Tighter financing \nconditions, investor uncertainty, volatility in financial markets and – for M&As – tighter regulatory \nscrutiny were the principal causes of the decline.\nGreenfield investment project announcements provided a bright spot. Project numbers increased \nby 2 per cent, with the growth concentrated in manufacturing, interrupting a decade-long trend \nof gradual decline in the sector. Furthermore, growth was concentrated in developing countries, \nwhere the number of projects was up by 15 per cent. In developed countries new project \nannouncements were down 6 per cent.\nIn developed countries, the 2023 trend was strongly affected by MNE financial transactions, \npartly caused by moves to implement a minimum tax on the largest MNEs. FDI flows in Europe \njumped from negative $106 billion in 2022 to positive $16 billion because of volatility in conduit \neconomies. Inflows to the rest of Europe were down 14 per cent. Inflows in other developed \ncountries also stagnated, with a 5 per cent decline in North America and sizeable falls elsewhere. \nFDI flows to developing countries fell by 7 per cent to $867 billion, mainly due to an 8 per \ncent decrease in developing Asia. Flows fell by 3 per cent in Africa and by 1 per cent in Latin \nAmerica and the Caribbean. The number of international project finance deals fell by a quarter. \nGreenfield project announcements in developing countries increased by more than 1,000, but \nthese projects were highly concentrated; South-East Asia accounted for almost half, West Asia \nfor a quarter and Africa registered a small increase, while Latin America and the Caribbean \nattracted fewer projects.\n•\t\nFDI inflows to Africa declined by 3 per cent in 2023 to $53 billion. Greenfield announcements \nincluded several megaprojects, including the largest announcement worldwide – a green \nhydrogen project in Mauritania. International project finance fell by a quarter in number of \ndeals and by half in value, negatively affecting prospects for infrastructure investment.\n•\t\nFDI in developing Asia fell by 8 per cent to $621 billion. China, the second largest FDI \nrecipient in the world, saw a rare decline in inflows. Sizeable declines were recorded in India \nand in West and Central Asia. Only South-East Asia held steady. Industrial investment in \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxii\nAsia remains buoyant, as shown by greenfield announcements, but the global downturn in \nproject finance also affected the region.\n•\t\nFlows to Latin America and the Caribbean were down 1 per cent, at $193 billion. The number \nof international project finance and greenfield investment announcements fell, but the value \nof the latter increased because of large projects in commodity sectors and critical minerals, \nas well as in renewable energy, green hydrogen and green ammonia.\n•\t\nFDI flows to the structurally weak and vulnerable economies increased. FDI inflows to the \nleast developed countries (LDCs) rose to $31 billion, or 2.4 per cent of global FDI flows. \nLandlocked developing countries and small island developing States also saw increased \nFDI. In all three groups, FDI remains concentrated among a few countries. International \nproject finance is relatively more important in the poorest countries, which are therefore \ndisproportionally affected by the global downturn in this form of investment.\nIndustry trends showed lower investment in the infrastructure and digital economy sectors, but \nstrong growth in the global value chain-intensive sectors of manufacturing and critical minerals. \nWeak project finance markets negatively affected infrastructure investment, and digital economy \nsectors continued their slowdown after the boom ended in 2022. Global value chain-intensive \nsectors, including the automotive, electronics and machinery industries, grew strongly, showing \nthe effect of supply chain restructuring pressures. In critical minerals extraction and processing, \ninvestment project numbers and values nearly doubled.\nGlobal economic fracturing trends are affecting the investment strategies of manufacturing \nMNEs. The investment behaviour of the top 100 non-financial MNEs shows that, since 2019, the \ngeographical distribution of manufacturing projects, especially in strategic sectors, has shifted \ntowards locations closer to major MNE home markets in Europe and the United States. West \nAsia, North Africa and Central America are emerging as strategic locations for manufacturing \nMNEs. \nInternational investment in sectors relevant for the Sustainable Development Goals in developing \ncountries declined in 2023. Growth in greenfield project announcements, especially in renewable \nenergy, power and transportation, pushed up the numbers. In value terms, Goals investment \nin developing countries fell because of the downturn in international project finance, used for \nlarger projects in infrastructure sectors. Project numbers in agrifood systems and in water and \nsanitation were lower than they were in 2015 when the Goals were adopted. Goals investment is \nalso unequally distributed. The shares of global Goals investment projects attracted by Africa and \nby Latin America and the Caribbean are smaller than their shares in all projects. Only developing \nAsia attracts above-average Goals investment.\nInvestment policy trends\nThe number of investment policy measures adopted in 2023 was 25 per cent lower than in \n2022 but still in line with the five-year average. Most measures, 72 per cent, were favourable to \ninvestors. The overall balance between favourable measures (liberalization, promotion, facilitation) \nand less favourable ones (restrictions on entry and operation) was unchanged.\nDeveloping countries mostly aim to promote and facilitate investment, whereas developed \ncountries lean towards more restrictive measures. In developing countries, 86 per cent of \nmeasures were favourable to investors. In developed countries, 57 per cent of measures were \nless favourable to investors. Most of these concerned restrictions to address national security \nconcerns. \nInvestment facilitation and incentives were the main types of measures favourable to investors \nin both developed and developing countries. Facilitation measures reached almost 40 per cent \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxiii\nof favourable measures and 30 per cent of all measures – a record. For incentives, the services \nsector and renewable energy were the primary focus in 2023.\nHeightened caution towards foreign investments in critical sectors persisted in 2023. The \nintroduction or expansion of FDI screening mechanisms accounted for nearly half of the measures \nless favourable to investors. Four additional countries implemented FDI screening in 2023, with \nseveral more expected to follow in 2024. Countries that conduct FDI screening now account \nfor over half of global FDI flows and three quarters of FDI stock.\nFDI restrictions also increasingly affect outward FDI. Outward FDI policies have evolved over \nthe past decade, reflecting the growing importance of both sustainability and geopolitical \nconsiderations in shaping investment policies. \nIn 2023, countries and regions concluded 29 new international investment agreements (IIAs). \nTraditional bilateral investment treaties accounted for fewer than half of the new treaties; most \nwere broad economic agreements with investment provisions. \nEfforts to reform the IIA regime are continuing. New treaties tend to include features aimed at \nsafeguarding the right to regulate and they increasingly cover a broader range of issues, including \ninvestment facilitation. The recent finalization of the Investment Facilitation for Development \nAgreement by participating members of the World Trade Organization may provide further \nimpetus for this trend.\nReform of the stock of old-generation IIAs continues to be slow. About half of the global stock \nof FDI is still covered by IIAs that have not been reformed, which expose countries to higher \nrisk of investor–State dispute settlement cases. This share is about two thirds for developing \ncountries and closer to three quarters for LDCs. Only 16 per cent of global FDI stock is today \ncovered by a new-generation IIA; reform efforts have so far had a limited effect on mitigating the \nrisk of ISDS, especially in the poorest countries.\nThe total ISDS case count reached 1,332, with 60 new arbitrations initiated in 2023. About \n70 per cent of new cases were brought against developing countries, including three LDCs. \nInternational investors in the construction, manufacturing and extractive sectors accounted for \nover half of the claims in 2023.\nUNCTAD continues to play a leading role in facilitating IIA reform. It launched the Multi-Stakeholder \nPlatform for IIA Reform during the UNCTAD World Investment Forum to chart the way forward \ntowards an investment regime that puts sustainable development at its core.\nSustainable finance trends\nThe sustainable finance market continues to grow, but there are clear signs of a slowdown. In \n2023, the value of sustainable investment products, encompassing bonds and funds, increased \nby 20 per cent to more than $7 trillion. However, much of the increase was driven by cumulative \nissuance and rising valuations, and some segments of the market struggled.\nSustainable bonds showed marginal growth. Issuance climbed 3 per cent to $872 billion, bringing \nthe outstanding value of the market to more than $4 trillion. Green bonds were the main driver \nof growth, while issuance in other segments, especially social bonds, fell.\nSustainable funds experienced strong headwinds. Despite continued growth in the number of \nfunds and asset values, net inflows dropped from $161 billion in 2022 to $63 billion in 2023. In \nthe principal markets, funds in Europe lost growth momentum and those in the United States \nsaw significant net outflows, exceeding those of the broader fund market.\nGreenwashing poses the most significant challenge to the sustainable fund market. The average \nnet exposure of green funds to climate-positive assets (low-carbon assets minus fossil fuels) is \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxiv\nonly about 20 per cent, and fewer than 5 per cent of these funds are free from oil and gas assets. \nFurther systemic efforts are needed to tackle greenwashing, including well-defined product \nstandards, robust sustainability disclosures, external auditing and third-party ratings.\nInstitutional investors made progress on sustainability reporting, but significant gaps remain. \nIn 2023, 58 of the top 100 sovereign wealth and public pension funds monitored by UNCTAD \nreported on their sustainability performance, up from 55 in 2022. Only a quarter of reporting \nfunds used third-party verification.\nInstitutional investors are not moving fast enough to reorient portfolios. Most reporting funds \nhave set out strategies to address climate change. However, only one in three have set a target \nfor fossil fuel divestment and investment in renewables.\nGovernments in both developed and developing economies are accelerating sustainable finance \npolicymaking. In 2023, 35 economies tracked by UNCTAD, covering the world’s largest financial \nmarkets, introduced 94 new measures and initiatives, up from 63 in 2022. Policy measures \nmostly concerned disclosure rules, new national strategies, frameworks and guidelines, and \n(financial) sector- and product-specific requirements. \nDeveloping countries are becoming increasingly active in sustainable finance policymaking. They \naccounted for about 60 per cent of new policy measures in 2023. These measures were mostly \nconcentrated in the largest developing economies or financial centres. Developing countries \nas a group continue to face challenges in leveraging sustainable finance, as evidenced by the \npersistently low sustainable investment flows.\nInternational standards will have significant spillover effects. The new disclosure standards issued \nby the International Sustainability Standards Board and the European Union will affect firms \nbased outside the main financial markets for which they were primarily developed. Companies in \ndeveloping countries that are part of the supply chains of firms in those markets will face greater \npressure to meet higher sustainability standards, and compliance may become a prerequisite \nfor market access.\nA key policy challenge is to avoid widening resistance to sustainable investment strategies in \nfinancial markets and – more broadly – to sustainability and disclosure requirements. In the \nUnited States, 17 states have passed legislation prohibiting fund managers from considering \nenvironmental, social and governance factors in their investment decisions or prohibiting states \nfrom contracting with asset managers that exclude certain industries, such as fossil fuels, from \ntheir portfolios. For firms worldwide, the complexity and compliance costs associated with \nsustainability reporting are a growing concern.\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nInvestment facilitation has emerged as a top priority for investment policymakers worldwide. \nSince the publication of the UNCTAD Global Action Menu on Investment Facilitation in 2016, \nan international agreement on investment facilitation for development has been negotiated, \nfacilitation has become a mainstay in regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, \nand national implementation efforts have proliferated. \nBusiness and investment facilitation have become central to both private sector development \nand FDI attraction in developing countries. Making it easier to establish and operate a business \nnot only attracts foreign investors but also improves the business environment for local firms, \nsupporting the formalization and growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxv\nAt the core of facilitation efforts are information provision, transparent rules and regulations, and \nstreamlined administrative procedures. Because these elements revolve around information and \nprocedures, digitalization is central to their effective implementation.\nBusiness and investment facilitation have thus led to a wave of digital government initiatives, \nincluding information portals and online single windows. Such initiatives now make up a \nsignificant share of national investment policy measures monitored by UNCTAD; modern IIAs \nalso increasingly encourage digitalization to implement commitments. \nThe number of digital facilitation tools has grown significantly in recent years, and their quality \nhas improved. UNCTAD data show that the number of national government information portals \nfor business and investor registration in developing countries increased from 82 in 2016 to 124; \nin developed countries, it increased from 43 to 48. In developing countries, the number of online \nsingle windows – which allow for multiple procedures to be carried out online – increased from \n13 to 67 in the same period; in developed countries it increased from 12 to 28. The quality of \nportals has also improved, with some in LDCs rivaling those in developed countries, showing \nthat leapfrogging opportunities exist. \nChallenges remain in building, maintaining and enhancing digital platforms. Despite progress, \nissues such as outdated information, portal closures and “single window dressing” persist. \nContinuous updates, clear ownership and adequate resources are essential for the long-term \nsuccess of digital facilitation platforms. Technical support for developing countries is important; \nthe highest-rated portals in LDCs often were created through development assistance.\nDigital government tools can have a positive impact on FDI attraction. On average, for each \nadditional point in the quality of digital business and investment facilitation portals (in the rating \nmethodology of the UNCTAD Global Enterprise Registration initiative), developing countries \ngain about 8 per cent more FDI. This effect is not automatic; it is part of the impact of broader \ninvestment climate improvements.\nDigital business and investment facilitation also boosts formalization and inclusivity. Countries \nthat implement digital single windows see substantial increases in small business registrations. \nMany new businesses are established by women, young entrepreneurs and populations outside \nurban centres, indicating that platforms improve access to services, even in countries with a \nsignificant digital divide.\nGovernments should adopt a comprehensive approach to digital investment facilitation, avoiding \ndedicated processes for investment procedures. Progressively incorporating all mandatory \nprocedures for business establishment, such as business registration, tax and social security, \nand operating licenses, helps capture economies of scale and scope and ensures that benefits \nextend to all firms, foreign and domestic, large and small. \nDigital business and investment facilitation can be a stepping stone for wider implementation \nof digital government. Because the basic architecture of digital government solutions is \nfundamentally the same across many types of services, platforms can gradually extend \nbeyond the core mandatory procedures for investor entry and business establishment. Other \nadministrative procedures affecting business operations may be sector specific or cover policy \nareas ranging from the environment to health and safety, labour and social issues. \nBusiness and investment facilitation provides a bottom-up avenue to digital government \ndevelopment. Such an approach, starting from basic services for business – usually the first \ngovernment services to be digitized – and gradually expanding to adjacent policy areas can \nbegin in one or a very few public sector entities, does not necessarily depend on major legislative \ninterventions, is relatively low cost, and adds immediate value to users and revenue-generating \npotential for government.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\nxvi\nSuch a bottom-up approach provides a valuable complementary route for developing countries. \nThe prevailing guidance on digital government implementation favours a top-down approach \nbased on a national strategy and supported by a digital government authority. Although central \nsteering is necessary to push enabling legislation, budget support and stakeholder engagement, \nit can lead to lengthy and complex programmes that are often too costly for developing countries \nto pursue. Online single windows for businesses and investors can add value quickly and cheaply, \nand gradually expand coverage of services and institutions.\nWider implementation of digital government is a natural complement to investment policy. Online \ninformation and streamlined processes alone cannot bring the sea change in investment potential \nthat is needed in many developing countries. Surveys of investors and investment promotion \nagencies consistently show that weaknesses in governance and institutions are among the \nmost important challenges in attracting foreign investment. Digital government, by increasing \ntransparency, improving efficiency and reducing corruption, helps address those weaknesses \nand support investment for sustainable development objectives.\nThe digital tools for business and investment facilitation included in the UNCTAD Digital \nGovernment Platform are operational in more than 60 countries. Looking ahead, UNCTAD \nwill continue to support developing countries and – in collaboration with other international \norganizations – look for opportunities to maximize the benefits of digital government for the \npromotion of investment in sustainable and inclusive development.\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational \ninvestment \ntrends\n\n\n2022\n2023\n-2%\nEurope\nNorth America\nAfrica\nDeveloping Asia\nLatin America and \nthe Caribbean\n16\n361\n53\n621\n193\nRegions\nFDI value (Billions of dollars)\nGrowth rates\nGreenfeld\nprojects\nFDI\nInternational\nproject\nfnance\n..\n-5%\n-3%\n-8\n-1%\n-8%\n0\n+7%\n+22%\n-4%\n-25%\n-6%\n-26%\n-25%\n-30%\nFDI\nvalue\nGrowth\nrates\n464\n867\n31\nDeveloped\nDeveloping\nLDCs\nGreenfeld projects\n(mostly industry)\nFDI\nInternational project\nfnance (mostly\ninfrastructure)\nIncome groups\n+9%\n-6%\n-21%\n-7%\n+15%\n-26%\n+17%\n+51%\n-32%\nInfrastructure\n \n \nRenewable  energy\n \n \nWASH \n \n \nAgrifood systems\n \n \nHealth and education\n+8%\n-5%\n-17%\n+13%\n+6%\nInfrastructure\n \n \nGVC-intensive industries\nSemiconductors\nDigital economy\n \n \nExtractives\n0%\n+27%\n-1%\n-46%\n-9%\nGreenfeld projects\n(Number)\nCross-border M&As\n(Value)\nIndustries\n(Project numbers)\nSDG sectors\n(Developing economies, project numbers)\nInternational project fnance\n(Number)\nFDI\n(Value)\n2022\n2023\n-23%\n2022\n2023\n+2%\n2022\n2023\n-46%\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n3\nA. Foreign direct investment\nGlobal foreign direct investment (FDI) flows declined in 2023. \nInvestor uncertainty about the state of the economy and the \npotential impact of economic fracturing trends affected flows \nin both developed and developing economies. Tighter financial \nconditions depressed international project finance deals and \ncross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Greenfield project \nannouncements increased, potentially signalling better prospects \ngoing forward. Combining these trends with stabilizing costs of \nfinance makes expectations for 2024 moderately positive.\n1. Global trends\nFDI flows in 2023 amounted to $1.33 \ntrillion, 2 per cent less than in 2022. The \nheadline number was affected by wild \nswings in a small number of European \nconduit economies. Excluding the \neffect of these conduits, global inflows \ndeclined by more than 10 per cent. \nFDI inflows to developing economies, which \nhave been robust over the past few years, \ndeclined by 7 per cent in 2023. Flows to \ndeveloped economies, net of conduits, \nfell by 15 per cent. They were affected \nby corporate financial reconfigurations \n– driven in part by moves to introduce a \nglobal minimum tax for large multinational \nenterprises (MNEs) – and by a big drop \nin the value of cross-border M&As. \nM&As, which especially affect FDI in \ndeveloped countries, ended 2023 at \njust over half the value seen in 2022. \nInternational project finance was also \nweak, with both the number and the value \nof deals down by about a quarter. Tighter \nfinancing conditions, investor uncertainty, \nvolatility in financial markets and – for \nM&As – greater regulatory scrutiny were \nthe principal causes of the decline. \nConversely, greenfield project \nannouncements increased marginally, \nin both number and value terms. The \ngrowth was largely due to increased \nannouncements in manufacturing industries, \nin a break with a decade-long trend of \ngradual decline in the sector. Manufacturing \nproject announcements by Chinese \nfirms were a big contributing factor. The \ngains in greenfield investment occurred \nonly in developing countries, where the \nnumber of projects announced was up \nby 15 per cent (table I.1). In developed \ncountries, in contrast, new project \nannouncements were down 6 per cent.\nDiverging movements in greenfield projects \nand international project finance deals \nreflect the different drivers of investment \nin international production and industry \n(greenfield), on the one hand, and \ninfrastructure industries (project finance) on \nthe other. They also reflect the sensitivity of \ndifferent investor pools to current financial \nconditions. MNEs have realized large \nprofits over the past few years (figure I.1), \nboosting their capacity to finance asset \nexpansions, which also explains the rising \ngreenfield numbers. Project finance is \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n4\nFigure I.1\nThe profits of the largest multinational enterprises remain high \nProfits and profitability level of the largest firms\nProfts (Billions of dollars)\nProftability (Percentage)\n1 000\n2 000\n3 000\n4 000\n9\n6\n3\n2016\n2015\n2018\n2019\n2017\n2020\n2021\n2023\n2022\nSource: UNCTAD, based on data from Refinitiv.\nNotes: Covers 4,388 MNEs for which data were available for every year in the range. Profitability calculated as \nthe ratio of net income to total sales.\nValue \n(Billions of dollars)\nNumber \nEconomic grouping\nType of investment\n2022\n2023\nGrowth (%)\n2022\n2023\nGrowth (%)\nDeveloped economies\nGreenfield projects\n 687\n 631\n-8\n11 112\n10 435\n-6\nInternational project finance\n 728\n 562\n-23\n1 720\n1 357\n-21\nCross-border M&As\n 599\n 302\n-50\n6 710\n5 862\n-13\nDeveloping economies\nGreenfield projects\n 622\n 749\n 20\n6 949\n8 007\n 15\nInternational project finance\n 573\n 396\n-31\n1 138\n 839\n-26\nCross-border M&As\n 107\n 76\n-29\n1 053\n 855\n-19\nTable I.1\t\nAnnounced greenfield projects, international project finance deals and \ncross-border M&As\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\nAbbreviations: M&As = mergers and acquisitions.\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n5\nmore dependent on institutional investors \nand on debt financing, both of which are \nmore sensitive to capital costs and financial \nmarket trends. Higher interest rates may also \nlead governments to delay large projects \nas they wait for more favourable terms.\nThe global environment for international \nbusiness and cross-border investment \nremains challenging in 2024. Economic \ngrowth is expected to slow (table I.2). \nGlobal economic fracturing trends, \ntrade and geopolitical tensions, \nindustrial policies affecting strategic and \nmanufacturing sectors, and moves by \ncorporates to diversify supply chains \nare reshaping international production \nand FDI patterns. These trends are \ncausing some MNEs to adopt a cautious \napproach to overseas expansion. \nNevertheless, profit levels of the largest \nMNEs remain high, which will continue \nto be reflected in reinvested earnings – a \nsignificant component of FDI. Furthermore, \nfinancing conditions are easing after a \nperiod of high interest rates, which could \nsupport renewed growth of international \nproject finance. The market for M&As \nis expected to recover, although cross-\nborder transactions may take longer to \nreact. The growth in greenfield project \nannouncements in 2023 will also affect FDI \nflows as projects are realized over time. \nOverall, although early indicators for the \nfirst quarter of 2024 are still weak, modest \ngrowth for the full year appears possible. \nVariable\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2024a\nGross domestic product\n 6.2\n 3.0\n 2.7\n 2.6\nTrade in goods\n 10.0\n 3.8\n-0.6\n 2.0\nGross fixed capital formation\n 7.4\n-2.9\n 1.3\n 2.8\nForeign direct investment\n 64.7\n-16.4\n-1.8\nMemorandum: \nForeign direct investment value \n(Trillions of dollars) \n 1.6\n 1.4\n 1.3\nTable I.2\t\nGrowth rates of global gross domestic product, gross fixed capital \nformation, trade and foreign direct investment\n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD for foreign direct investment, gross domestic product and trade, and IMF for gross fixed \ncapital formation.\na Forecast.\n2. Trends by geography\na. FDI inflows\nIn developed economies, financial \ntransactions by MNEs led to volatility in \nFDI. Including the effect of conduit flows, \nthe headline number for FDI inflows shows \nan increase of 9 per cent (net of conduits, \nFDI declined by 15 per cent) (figure I.2). \nDeveloped countries accounted for 35 \nper cent of global FDI flows. Their share \nhas been in gradual decline. The first \ntime that they registered less than half \nof global flows was as recent as 2019. \nNevertheless, developed economies still \nattract the majority of greenfield projects \nand international project finance deals.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n6\nInflows to Europe shifted dramatically, \nfrom -$106 billion in 2022 to $16 billion in \n2023. Several economies, including Ireland, \nLuxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland \nand the United Kingdom of Great Britain and \nNorthern Ireland, reported large negative \nnumbers when the 2022 and 2023 inflows \nare taken into consideration together. Lower \nnegative flows in 2023 had a net positive \neffect on FDI flows of about $180 billion. \nExcluding these countries, inflows to the \nrest of Europe declined by 14 per cent. \nFDI inflows to North America fell, as did \nthose to most other developed countries. \nAll developed regions experienced a \nsharp downturn in M&A activity, with the \nvalue of cross-border M&As dropping \nby $300 billion in 2023. The number \nof greenfield project announcements \ndecreased by 6 per cent in developed \neconomies and the number of project \nfinance deals fell by 21 per cent (table I.3).\nFDI flows to developing economies \ndecreased by 7 per cent, to $867 billion, \nor 65 per cent of global flows. Developing \nAsia, the largest FDI recipient, experienced \nan 8 per cent decline in inflows, driving the \noverall result. Inflows to Africa dropped \nby 3 per cent, while in Latin America \nand the Caribbean they remained flat. \nFigure I.2\nForeign direct investment declined in most regions\nInflows by economic grouping and region\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\n2023\n1 332\n464\n16\n361\n867\n1 356\n426\n-106\n379\n930\n53\n54\nWorld\nDeveloped\neconomies\nEurope\nNorth America\nDeveloping\neconomies\nAfrica\nPer cent\n-2\n+9\n..\n-5\n-7\n-3\n7\n193\n196\nLatin America and\nthe Caribbean\n-1\n7\n621\n678\nAsia\n-8\n2022\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n7\nIn contrast, inflows to least developed \ncountries (LDCs) increased; their share in \nglobal FDI grew from 2 to 2.4 per cent. \nGreenfield investment in developing \ncountries was a bright spot in 2023, with the \nnumber of announcements increasing by 15 \nper cent and values climbing by 20 per cent. \nThis partially offset declines in international \nproject finance deals, which fell by 26 per \ncent in number and 31 per cent in value. \nThe overall number of greenfield projects \nincreased by 2 per cent (table I.3). Among \ndeveloped regions, the number of greenfield \nprojects held only in North America, which \nwas less affected by the downturn in project \nfinance deals as well. In other developed \nregions, greenfield project numbers were \nlower. In contrast, almost all developing \nregions saw growth in greenfield projects.\nTable I.3\t\nNumber of announced greenfield projects and international project \nfinance deals, by economic grouping and region\n(Number and percentage)\nAnnounced greenfield projects\nInternational project finance deals\nRegion/economic grouping\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\nWorld\n 15 514\n 18 061\n 18 442\n2\n 2 500\n 2 858\n 2 196\n-23\nDeveloped economies\n 10 438\n 11 112\n 10 435\n-6\n 1 496\n 1 720\n 1 357\n-21\nEurope\n 7 545\n 7 676\n 7 041\n-8\n  899\n 1 121\n  840\n-25\nEuropean Union\n 5 913\n 5 990\n 5 419\n-10\n  637\n  833\n  671\n-19\nOther Europe\n 1 632\n 1 686\n 1 622\n-4\n  262\n  288\n  169\n-41\nNorth America\n 2 084\n 2 491\n 2 499\n0\n  372\n  398\n  376\n-6\nOther developed countries\n  809\n  945\n  895\n-5\n  225\n  201\n  141\n-30\nDeveloping economies\n 5 076\n 6 949\n 8 007\n15\n 1 004\n 1 138\n  839\n-26\nAfrica\n  558\n  775\n  830\n7\n  138\n  178\n  132\n-26\nAsia\n 3 275\n 4 749\n 5 798\n22\n  489\n  624\n  469\n-25\nCentral Asia\n  53\n  49\n  158\n222\n  24\n  19\n  18\n-5\nEast Asia\n  713\n  597\n  703\n18\n  90\n  95\n  42\n-56\nSouth-East Asia\n  861\n 1 103\n 1 568\n42\n  157\n  237\n  135\n-43\nSouth Asia\n  512\n 1 093\n 1 167\n7\n  150\n  223\n  180\n-19\nWest Asia\n 1 136\n 1 907\n 2 202\n15\n  68\n  50\n  94\n88\nLatin America and the \nCaribbean\n 1 241\n 1 417\n 1 366\n-4\n  370\n  334\n  235\n-30\nOceania\n  2\n  8\n  13\n63\n  7\n  2\n  3\n50\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv. \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n8\nThe recent pickup in greenfield \nannouncements in developing countries \nfollows a long period of sluggishness \nand signals a potential recovery (figure \nI.3). Developing countries accounted for \nalmost half of all announcements at the \nstart of the last decade, but their share \nhad gradually fallen to one third by 2020. \nHowever, developing regions have regained \nmomentum over the past few years and \nthe number of projects has grown rapidly \nfollowing the pandemic, almost doubling \nfrom their recent nadir. Developing \ncountries now account for 43 per cent \nof greenfield project announcements.\nFDI inflows declined for most reporting \neconomies. About two thirds of developed \neconomies saw declines and about half \nof developing ones. The United States of \nAmerica remained the largest FDI recipient, \naccounting for almost a quarter of the global \ntotal (figure I.4). China and Hong Kong, \nChina account for a further 21 per cent. \nAmong the top 20 host economies, the \nlargest absolute drops were registered in \nFrance, Australia, China, the United States \nand India, in that order. Only Singapore \nregistered a significant gain. The United \nStates was the top destination for both \ngreenfield projects and international project \nfinance deals. India and the United Kingdom \nalso appear in the top five destinations \nfor both kinds of FDI. The United Arab \nEmirates gained two places in the ranking \nof top destinations for greenfield projects, \nafter entering the top five in 2022.\nFigure I.3\nGreenfield projects in developing economies are regaining lost ground\nAnnouncements by economic grouping\n(Number and percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).\nDeveloped\nDeveloping\nShare, developing (per cent)\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n0\n2 000\n4 000\n6 000\n8 000\n10 000\n12 000\n14 000\n47\n33\n43\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n9\nFigure I.4\nInflows declined in more than half of the top 20 recipients \nForeign direct investment inflows, top 20 host economies\n(Billions of dollars)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and based on information from The \nFinancial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and Refinitiv. \n2023\n2022\nTop fve recipients by number of projects\nGreenfeld project announcements\nUnited States (1)\n311\n332\nChina (2)\n163\n189\nSingapore (3)\n160\n141\nHong Kong, China (4)\n113\n110\nFrance (5)\n42\n76\nBrazil (6)\n66\n73\nAustralia (7)\n30\n63\nIndia (8)\n28\n49\nCanada (9)\n50\n46\nSpain (10)\n36\n45\nSweden (11)\n29\n45\nMexico (12)\n36\n36\nJapan (13)\n21\n34\nPoland (15)\n29\n31\nGermany (17)\n37\n27\nIndonesia (18)\n22\n25\nUnited Arab Emirates (21)\n31\n23\nChile (26)\n21\n17\nArgentina (27)\n23\n15\nBelgium (31)\n23\n12\n(x) = 2022 ranking\nUnited States\nUnited Arab Emirates\nUnited Kingdom\nIndia\nGermany\n2 152\n1 323\n1 184\n1 058\n1 036\nInternational project fnance deals\nUnited States\nIndia\nItaly\nSpain\nUnited Kingdom\n334\n163\n116\n107\n104\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n10\ni. Developed economies\nFDI flows to developed countries increased \nby 9 per cent in 2023, to $464 billion. \nHowever, large fluctuations and negative \nFDI realizations in several European \ncountries with significant conduit FDI flows \nover the past two years complicate the \npicture (figure I.5). Moves to implement \na minimum tax on large MNEs in 2024 \ncoincided with a wave of corporate financial \nrestructurings and divestments. Net of the \neffect of conduit flows, FDI in developed \ncountries was down by about 15 per cent. \nIn the United States, FDI inflows declined \nby 6 per cent to $311 billion, with a sharp \nreduction in cross-border M&As, which \nfell by 40 per cent to $81 billion – half \nof the average over the past 10 years. \nLower deal values in the information \nand communication technology (ICT) \nsector explained much of the decline. \nFDI in Canada increased by 9 per cent \nto $50 billion, but FDI in other developed \ncountries, including Australia, Japan and \nthe Republic of Korea, dropped sharply. \nIn 2023, the value of M&A sales in \ndeveloped countries declined by 50 per \ncent to $302 billion. Most transactions \nwere concentrated in a small group of \ncountries. Almost half of the M&A targets \nwere based in the United States and \nthe United Kingdom. Germany, Canada, \nSwitzerland and France accounted for \nan additional 30 per cent of deal values. \nAmong the top 10 cross-border M&A \ntransactions, 6 involved acquisitions by \ninvestor groups, either with the intent to list \ncompanies publicly through special-purpose \nacquisition company (SPAC) transactions \nor as part of private equity deals. The \nfinancial nature of these deals illustrates \nthe importance that financing conditions \nhave for cross-border M&A trends.\nFigure I.5\nForeign direct investment inflows turned negative in parts of Europe due \nto financial restructurings\nInflows to developed economies\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\n2023\n464\n59\n-42\n361\n87\n426\n-85\n-21\n379\n154\nDeveloped\neconomies\nOther\nEurope\nEuropean\nUnion\nNorth America\nOther developed\ncountries\nPer cent\n+9\n..\n..\n-5\n-44\n2022\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n11\nThe value of greenfield announcements \nin developed economies fell by 8 per \ncent. Notably, after a period of very high \ninvestment, ICT saw a significant drop \nin project numbers. Conversely, project \nnumbers in most other sectors increased, \nparticularly in energy and gas supply, \nwhich rose by more than half. The largest \ngreenfield projects are illustrative of \nmajor trends in international investment. \nFive projects of the top ten relate to \nsemiconductor and electronics production, \nreflecting efforts to diversify or de-risk \nsupply chains and to promote domestic \nproduction; firms based in Taiwan Province \nof China were the main investors in three of \nthese projects. Four projects pertained to \nrenewable energy, three of them in battery \nproduction. Canada and Japan emerged \nas top destinations for the largest projects, \naccounting for 5 of the 10 largest.\nThe downturn in international project \nfinance deals was widespread across \nmost developed economies and industries. \nHowever, about 80 per cent of the total \ndrop in deal values was attributed to just \nthree sectors: industrial real estate, power \nand telecommunication. Renewable energy, \ntypically the largest sector, registered a \nsmall gain of 2 per cent, with deal values \nreaching nearly $250 billion out of a total \nof $562 billion. The 10 largest international \nproject finance deals in developed \neconomies accounted for more than 20 \nper cent of the total value of all deals. Most \nof these were in the energy sector, which \nis capital-intensive. The top three deals \nrelated to renewable energy production, \nbut deals for oil and gas projects were also \nsignificant, constituting another 3 of the \ntop 10. Australia emerged as the second \nlargest destination for project finance \ndeals, by value, after the United States.\nii. Developing economies\nFDI inflows to developing economies \ndecreased by 7 per cent in 2023, \nmainly owing to a rare downturn in Asia. \nDespite this decline, FDI remained the \nleading source of external financing \nfor developing economies, accounting \nfor 44 per cent of total financial \ninflows in 2023, with remittances, \ndevelopment assistance and portfolio \ninvestment flows making up the rest. \nAlthough the number and value of \nannounced greenfield projects increased, \nthese gains were offset by a sharp drop in \nproject finance deals, with their value falling \nby almost $200 billion compared with 2022. \nCross-border M&A sales typically represent \na much smaller share of FDI in developing \ncountries than in developed ones. Still, \nthe value of M&A sales in developing \neconomies in 2023 dropped by $31 billion \n(to $76 billion), which explains about half of \nthe overall decline in FDI inflows. Despite \nthe drop, several large transactions took \nplace. The largest M&A sale in 2023 \nwas a $23 billion stock swap between a \nVietnamese electric vehicle maker and a \nUnited States-based SPAC. Singapore \nalso registered several multibillion-dollar \nM&A sales, including SPAC transactions.\nMost of the growth in greenfield projects \nin developing economies was in \nmanufacturing, in terms of both project \nvalues and numbers. Over the past \ntwo decades, project numbers in the \nmanufacturing sector have gradually \ndeclined and the services sector has \nbecome more prominent. The increase in \n2023 was a welcome break in the trend, \ngiven the importance of manufacturing \nprojects for economic growth, industrial \ndevelopment and the participation of \ndeveloping countries in global value chains \n(GVCs). In particular, the automotive \nsector registered strong growth. Notable \nprojects included a $10 billion expansion \nof Malaysian automaker Proton (foreign \nowned in part by Geely (China)), a $9 billion \njoint venture to establish a battery supply \nchain in Indonesia and a $6.4 billion electric \nvehicle production facility in Morocco. \nWhile most investment was in Asia, the \nvalue and number of manufacturing project \nannouncements in Africa and in Latin \nAmerica and the Caribbean also grew.\nRegional \ntrends and \nfactsheets on \ndeveloping \nregions \navailable \nonline\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n12\nThe downturn in international project \nfinance deals was widespread across most \nregions and industries. Renewable energy \nprojects continued to account for a large \nshare of deals in developing economies, \ncomprising almost 45 per cent of all \nprojects announced. Still, as in developed \neconomies, there was a notable decline in \nsuch deals in developing economies, with \na 24 per cent drop in the number and a \n31 per cent drop in value. The downturn \nalso affected megaprojects. In 2022, five \nrenewable energy projects valued at more \nthan $5 billion were announced; in 2023, \nthere were no deals of this magnitude.\n(a) Africa\nFDI inflows to Africa declined by 3 per \ncent in 2023, to $53 billion (figure I.6). \nThe number and value of project finance \ndeals fell, while outcomes for greenfield \nannouncements were mixed across \ncountries. Cross-border M&A sales, which \naccounted for about 15 per cent of FDI \ninflows to Africa in recent years, remained \nflat at $8.5 billion. European investors \nremain the largest holders of FDI stock in \nAfrica, holding three of the top four spots \n(the Netherlands at $109 billion, France at \n$58 billion, the United States at $46 billion \nand the United Kingdom at $46 billion).\nThe value of greenfield projects announced \nin Africa fell to $175 billion, from $196 billion \nin 2022. However, most countries registered \nincreases in project numbers, with the \noverall number of project announcements \nin the region rising by 7 per cent to more \nthan 800. If executed, these projects could \ngenerate an additional 200,000 jobs in the \nregion. The largest year-to-year increases \nin project value were in chemicals (to $13 \nbillion) and electronics (to $7.6 billion), while \nFigure I.6\nForeign direct investment to most regions in Africa declined\nInflows to Africa\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\n2023\n53\n13\n13\n6\n11\n7\n54\n15\n13\n7\n12\n9\n7\nAfrica\nNorth Africa\nWest Africa\nCentral Africa\nEast Africa\nSouthern Africa\nPer cent\n-3\n-12\n-1\n-17\n-3\n+22\n2022\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n13\nproject values for electricity and gas supply \nprojects dropped by $33 billion compared \nwith 2022. This drop alone explains much \nof the overall decline in greenfield values. \nThe region attracts a growing share of \nglobal megaprojects, with six valued at \nmore than $5 billion. The largest greenfield \nannouncement for any country in 2023 was \na green hydrogen project in Mauritania, \nexpected to generate $34 billion in \ninvestment (several multiples of the country’s \ngross domestic product). Several other large \nhydrogen projects were also announced: \nThe Suez Canal Economic Zone completed \nagreements for green ammonia and \ngreen hydrogen projects in Egypt totalling \n$10.8 billion. Three energy producers \nseparately announced green hydrogen \nprojects in South Africa totalling $7.1 billion, \nand there was substantial investment in \nMorocco as well. Value chains for electric \nvehicles have also prompted investment \nin Africa. Among the largest deals, a \nChinese manufacturer announced plans \nto establish a $6.4 billion electric vehicle \nbattery manufacturing facility in Morocco.\nThe estimated value of international project \nfinance deals in Africa declined by 50 per \ncent in 2023, to $64 billion, following a 20 \nper cent drop in 2022. Industries related to \nrenewable energy and power generation \nregistered large drops in both values and \nnumbers. However, momentum continued \nin some parts of the sector. Along with the \ngreen energy projects mentioned earlier, an \ninvestor group announced a deal for green \nhydrogen production totalling $4 billion \nin Egypt, and another group is planning \na $2 billion hydrogen project in Morocco. \nAfrica also attracted $10.8 billion in project \nfinance for wind and solar electricity \nproduction, with the largest projects located \nin Egypt, South Africa and Zimbabwe.\nThe African Continental Free Trade \nAgreement (AfCFTA) Investment Protocol \nadopted in 2023 is expected to contribute \nto growing intraregional FDI. The share \nof intraregional projects, though still \nrelatively low, is higher in services and \nselected manufacturing industries (with \n20 per cent of projects by investors from \nAfrica) than in resource-based processing \nindustries (with only 13 per cent of \nprojects originating from the region). This \nindicates the pool of investors undertaking \nprojects within the region is large for some \nsectors. Also, there is an opportunity \nto expand intraregional investment in \nprocessing industries as part of the \ngeneral drive to increase value addition.\n(b) Developing Asia\nFDI flows to developing Asia receded in \n2023 but remained elevated, at $621 billion \n(figure I.7). The region was by far the largest \nrecipient of FDI, accounting for nearly one \nhalf of global inflows. East and South-\nEast Asia were the main recipients. Flows \ndeclined in East Asia, with a significant drop \nin China breaking a decade-long growth \ntrend. In South-East Asia, inflows remained \nstable as a result of robust economic growth \nand extensive GVC linkages. The decline in \nflows to West Asia was moderate, whereas \nSouth and Central Asia registered sizeable \ndeclines, especially in India and Kazakhstan. \nM&A sales, which usually constitute 10 \nto 15 per cent of FDI in developing Asia, \ndeclined by almost $30 billion in 2023 to \n$57 billion, representing about half of the \ntotal drop in FDI inflows to the region.\nThe overall value and the number of \ngreenfield project announcements in \ndeveloping Asia increased significantly in \n2023, by 44 per cent and 22 per cent, \nrespectively. South-East Asia saw a 42 per \ncent increase in announcements, particularly \nin electronics and vehicle production. \nProjects in these sectors are expected to \ncreate nearly 145,000 jobs in the region (out \nof an estimated 1.4 million jobs expected to \nbe created in developing Asia as a whole). \nAsia continued to attract megaprojects, \nwith 6 of the 10 largest projects worldwide \nlocated in developing Asia, including 4 \nin South-East Asia. Indonesia was a top \ndestination for announced greenfield \nprojects by value. Notable projects \nincluded upstream investments \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n14\nby Chinese glass and solar manufacturer \nXinyi Group totalling $11 billion. In addition, \na consortium of European and Indonesian \ncompanies is developing a $9 billion \nbattery supply chain for electric vehicles.\nThe number of international project finance \ndeals in developing Asia declined by 25 per \ncent. West Asia was the only exception; \ntotal deals there increased to 94 in 2023 \nfrom 50 in 2022, with values growing by 32 \nper cent to $57 billion. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye \nand the United Arab Emirates all saw higher \nnumbers of deals. Elsewhere in Asia, most \ncountries registered lower numbers. An \nimportant trend in the region as a whole was \nthe decline in international project finance in \nrenewable energy (along with most industrial \nsectors) and the increase in petrochemicals.\n(c) Latin America and the Caribbean\nIn 2023, FDI in Latin America and the \nCaribbean remained stable, totalling $193 \nbillion (figure I.8). There was considerable \nheterogeneity across countries. In South \nAmerica, FDI in Argentina, Chile and Guyana \naccelerated. This offset lower values in \nBrazil and Peru. Brazil remains the largest \nrecipient in South America. In Central \nAmerica, Mexico accounted for the bulk of \nforeign investment, with stable FDI inflows. \nIn the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic \ncontinued its growth trend, with inflows \nrising 7 per cent year on year. M&A sales, \nwhich typically account for only a small share \nof FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, \ndeclined by $4 billion in 2023, to $11 billion.\nThe number of announced greenfield \nprojects decreased by 4 per cent in 2023, \nand the number of project finance deals \ndropped by 30 per cent. However, the \nestimated value of announced greenfield \nprojects increased, primarily driven by \nlarge projects in Brazil and Chile. Demand \nfor commodities and critical minerals \nFigure I.7\nForeign direct investment inflows declined across most of Asia\nInflows to developing Asia\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\n2023\n2022\n621\n286\n226\n36\n65\n7\n678\n315\n223\n58\n72\n10\nDeveloping Asia\nEast Asia\nSouth-East Asia\nSouth Asia\nWest Asia\nCentral Asia\nPer cent\n-8\n-9\n+1\n-37\n-9\n-27\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n15\ncontinues to drive a large share of \ngreenfield investment in the region. The \nprimary sector accounted for 23 per cent \nof project values over the past two years, \ncompared with less than 10 per cent in \nother developing regions. Investment \nin these industries can be sensitive to \nswings in commodity prices. Investment in \nrenewable energy was prominent, with 4 of \nthe top 10 announced projects (by value) \nin production of green hydrogen or green \nammonia. Overall, greenfield projects are \nexpected to create more than 300,000 \njobs in the region. Most large projects \nare undertaken by investors from outside \nthe region. Only 2 of 19 megaprojects \nvalued at more than $1 billion were \nundertaken by MNEs based in the region.\nThe global slowdown in international project \nfinance deals affected most subregions \nand countries in Latin America and the \nCaribbean. Among major FDI recipients, \nonly Chile posted higher project numbers \nthan in 2022. The downturn affected \nseveral industries, with renewable energy \namong the worst affected: there were \n40 per cent fewer deals and a $16 billion \ndrop in the value of announced projects \nin renewables compared with 2022. \n(d) Structurally weak, vulnerable \nand small economies\nWhile FDI to middle-income developing \ncountries has been robust, low-income \ncountries and vulnerable groups receive \na comparatively small share of global FDI \ninflows. They face pressing infrastructure \nneeds, so mobilizing external investors \ncould help these countries make faster \nprogress towards achieving the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals. In 2023, FDI inflows \nto LDCs increased to $31 billion, or 2.4 \nper cent of global FDI flows (figure I.9). \nComparing that with the LDC share \nin the world population of 14 per cent \nimplies large disparities in per capita \nterms. The same is true of landlocked \ndeveloping countries (LLDCs), which \naccounted for 7 per cent of the global \npopulation but only 1.8 per cent of FDI.\nFigure I.8 \nForeign direct investment to Latin America and the Caribbean remained \nstable\nInflows to Latin America and the Caribbean\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\n2023\n2022\n193\n143\n47\n4\n196\n146\n46\n4\nLatin America and\nthe Caribbean \nSouth America\nCentral America\nCaribbean\nPer cent\n-1\n-2\n+1\n+6\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n16\nAlthough project finance deals are a \nsmall share of all FDI, the typical project \nfinanced is large. An analysis comparing \nthe relative contribution of greenfield \nprojects, M&As and project finance deals \nto total announcement values over the \npast 10 years shows that LDCs and \nLLDCs are relatively more dependent \non international project finance than are \nother developing economies, in terms \nof both numbers and values. For this \nreason, they are more exposed to the \nrecent downturn in project finance deals.\n(e) Least developed countries\nFDI to the 45 LDCs increased 17 per cent \nin 2023, to $31 billion. Flows remained \nconcentrated, with the top five recipients \n(Cambodia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Uganda \nand Senegal, in that order) accounting for \nabout 50 per cent of the total. The growth of \nFDI in LDCs has lagged that of other sources \nof external finance over the last decade, and \nthe shares of official development assistance \nand remittances are significantly higher than \nin developing economies overall (figure I.10). \nNonetheless, FDI is an important source of \nfinance for LDCs, as it is often more directly \ntargeted to productive capacity creation, \ninfrastructure assets and economic activities \nthat can support industrial transformation \nand greater participation in GVCs.\nThe number and value of greenfield \nproject announcements in LDCs increased \nsubstantially in 2023 (by 51 per cent and \nalmost 300 per cent, respectively). A large \npart of the jump in values is explained by \nthe $34 billion green hydrogen project \nin Mauritania. Excluding this outlier, \nannounced greenfield project values rose \nby 51 per cent, to $42 billion. As with \nFDI, just a few countries explain the bulk \nof greenfield project announcements and \nexpenditures. Guinea, the Democratic \nRepublic of the Congo, Ethiopia, \nMozambique and Bangladesh (in that \norder) were the leading destinations in \nterms of project values. Combined, these \ncountries accounted for about 60 per cent \nof the total project values for LDCs in 2023 \n(excluding the outlier deal in Mauritania).\nThe primary sector has accounted for \nabout one fourth of greenfield project \nvalues in LDCs over recent years. For \ndeveloping countries overall, its share is \nFigure I.9\nInflows in structurally weak, vulnerable and small economies increased\nInflows to least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small island \ndeveloping States\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\nAbbreviations: LDCs = least developed countries, LLDCs = landlocked developed countries, SIDS = small \nisland developing States.\n2023\n2022\n31\n24\n8\n27\n24\n7\nLDCs\nLLDCs\nSIDS\nPer cent\n+17\n+3\n+15\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n17\nonly about 10 per cent. This highlights \nthat LDCs are significantly exposed \nto global commodity cycles, not only \nfor trade but also for investment.\nInternational project finance deals in \nLDCs fell by 24 per cent in value and 32 \nper cent in number in 2023. The lack of \nproject financing for sectors relevant to \nthe Sustainable Development Goals was \nparticularly acute, with a total of just $14 \nbillion – a significant drop compared with \nprevious years. Over the past decade, \nthe number of project finance deals has \ngradually increased, while the number \nof announced greenfield projects has \ndeclined (figure I.11). Some 32 per cent \nof international investment projects in \nLDCs were initiated using project finance \nin 2022, compared with less than 15 per \ncent in other developing countries. As a \nconsequence, although the 2023 downturn \nin project finance affected all countries, \nLDCs were among the worst affected.\nFigure I.10\t\nThe composition of financial flows to least developed countries differs \nfrom that of flows to other developing economies\nShares across categories of external financial flows, 2023\n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics), IMF balance-of-payments statistics, \nWorld Bank KNOMAD (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development) database and OECD.\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n44\n11\n12\n34\n20\n39\n41\nForeign direct investment\n \n \nRemittances\nDeveloping economies\nLDCs\nForeign portfolio investment\nOffcial development assistance\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n18\n(f) Landlocked developing countries\nFDI inflows to the 32 landlocked developing \ncountries (LLDCs) rose by 3 per cent \nin 2023, to $24 billion. Flows remained \nconcentrated in a few economies, with the \ntop five recipients (Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, \nUganda, Mongolia and Uzbekistan, in that \norder) accounting for about 55 per cent of \ntotal FDI to the group. A large share of FDI \nto LLDCs originates from just a few investor \ncountries. China was the home country \nof the largest investors by far in 2022, at \nabout $20 billion (with $7 billion of FDI stock \nin Kazakhstan alone); it was followed by \nThailand, Canada and the Netherlands.\nThe increase in announced greenfield \nproject values was most pronounced in \nmanufacturing, where the total jumped \nby $20 billion, in large part because of \na single $7.7 billion project announced \nfor a polyethylene production project in \nKazakhstan. Overall, the gains in greenfield \nannouncements for LLDCs outweighed \nthe downturn in international project \nfinance deals. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan \nwere the top destinations for greenfield \nprojects in 2023, receiving together a \nlarge share of the total value (53 per cent) \nand number (40 per cent). In addition \nto the polyethylene production project, \nKazakhstan entered into a power purchase \nagreement with TotalEnergies (France) for a \n$1.4 billion onshore wind farm and battery \nenergy storage system. The Uzbekistan \nGovernment awarded contracts for \nseveral solar projects, which are expected \nto generate $4 billion in investment. \nThe global downturn in the number and \nvalue of international project finance deals \naffected LLDCs. Overall, the number of \nsuch deals declined by 33 per cent and \nvalues were 13 per cent lower than in \n2022. There were a few exceptions. Activity \npicked up in Latin America, mainly in the \nPlurinational State of Bolivia with a string of \ndeals for lithium extraction and processing \nthat totalled $3.7 billion. In addition, the \nvalue of deals in renewables increased by \n24 per cent to $15 billion, with projects in \nKazakhstan and Uzbekistan accounting \nfor about half of the total. The largest \nprojects in Africa were in copper mining, \nwith a $2 billion expansion in Zambia and \na $1.9 billion acquisition in Botswana. \nFigure I.11\t\nInternational project finance deals have become relatively more \nimportant in least developed countries\nTypes of international investment in least developed countries\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n0\n100\n200\n300\n400\n500\n600\n2011\n2012\n2013\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\na. Greenfeld projects\nLinear trend\nb. International project fnance deals\nLinear trend\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n19\n(g) Small island developing States\nFDI inflows to the 29 small island developing \nStates (SIDS) rose by 15 per cent to $8.3 \nbillion in 2023 – about 0.6 per cent of \nglobal FDI. Divestments and the resulting \nnegative inflows in several countries \naffected outcomes in 2022 more than in \n2023. Putting these cases aside, actual \ngrowth in 2023 was about 10 per cent. The \nDominican Republic accounted for more \nthan half of FDI inflows to SIDS in 2023. \nGreenfield project announcements were \nup for most SIDS. There were strong gains \nfor the transportation and storage sector, \nwith project values up by $350 million and \nthe number of projects doubling to 10. \nHospitality accounted for about 30 per \ncent of greenfield projects announced over \nrecent years, but values fell by almost 50 \nper cent to $930 billion in 2023, with a large \ndrop in project numbers as well (down 33 \nper cent). Volatility in some sectors reflects \nunusually high investment in 2022 as project \nbacklogs resolved following the pandemic.\nThe number of international project finance \ndeals in SIDS increased by 18 per cent in \n2023, and their value also increased strongly. \nWith the small number of deals (49 from \n2021 to 2023), a few large deals caused \nmajor fluctuations. Three distinct investment \nstreams explained most deals: renewable \nenergy, leisure and hospitality, and oil and \ngas (along with petrochemicals). Maldives \naccounts for most projects in the hospitality \nsector. Other projects were more distributed. \nb. FDI outflows\nIn 2023, FDI flows from developed \neconomies increased by 4 per cent to \n$1.1 trillion. As with FDI inflows, corporate \nrestructurings in Europe affected FDI \noutflows. Several investment-hub countries \nwith significant conduit FDI reported large \nnegative outflows, albeit less negative \nthan in 2022 (i.e. a net positive gain). \nExcluding the effect of these conduits, global \noutflows were about 10 per cent lower. \nThe United States and Japan were the \nhome countries of the largest investors. \nOutward FDI increased by 10 per cent from \nthe United States and by 14 per cent from \nJapan, going against the overall trend for \ndeveloped countries. Outward investment \nfrom European countries fell by 11 per cent \n(excluding five conduit countries). Germany, \nSweden and Spain are home to large \noutward investors, and outflows declined \nfrom all three (figure I.12). Conversely, \nFDI outflows from France, another top \nhome country for investors, increased by \nabout one third. Looking at the 20 largest \neconomies by outward FDI flows, those in \nAsia now account for almost half (9 total), \nwith the relative ranks of India and Taiwan \nProvince of China both rising in 2023.\nThe value of cross-border M&As originating \nfrom developed countries dropped by 53 \nper cent in 2023 due, in part, to tighter \nfinancial conditions. The downturn was \ngeneral across developed economies, \nincluding in Europe, Australia, Canada and \nthe United States. Results for greenfield \nprojects were more heterogeneous. \nMNEs based in North America reduced \ntheir number of projects by 18 per cent. \nNumbers were flat in Europe but increased \nfor other developed economies.\nFDI outflows from developing economies \nslowed by 11 per cent in 2023, to $491 \nbillion. The decrease was general across \nmost regions, except South-East Asia. \nProspects appear stronger, as greenfield \nprojects announced by MNEs based in \ndeveloping countries increased by 23 \npercent in number and by 35 per cent in \nvalue. The value of cross-border M&As \noriginating from developing countries – \nwhich amount to only about one quarter \nof those originating in developed countries \n– was resilient, increasing by 25 per cent. \nIn large part, these results were driven by \na rebound in activity by Chinese MNEs.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n20\nFigure I.12\nNine economies in Asia are among the top 20 home economies of \noutflows\nForeign direct investment outflows, top 20 home economies\n(Billions of dollars)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\nNote: Negative outflows result from divestments and the repayment of intracompany loans.\n2023\n2022\n(x) = 2022 ranking\n184\n162\nJapan (3)\n148\n163\nChina (2)\n105\n-74\nSwitzerland (157)\n104\n106\nHong Kong, China (6)\n101\n146\nGermany (4)\n90\n83\nCanada (8)\n72\n53\nFrance (11)\n63\n52\nSingapore (12)\n47\n62\nSweden (10)\n35\n66\nRepublic of Korea (9)\n30\n43\nSpain (13)\n30\n32\nBrazil (15)\n29\n12\nRussian Federation (29)\n25\n16\nTaiwan Province of China (22)\n22\n25\nUnited Arab Emirates (17)\n21\n25\nMalta (18)\n16\n27\nSaudi Arabia (16)\n15\n6\nDenmark (36)\n13\n15\nIndia (23)\n404\n366\nUnited States (1)\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n21\nThe number of greenfield projects \nannounced by Chinese MNEs almost \ndoubled compared with 2022, explaining \nhalf of the total increase for developing \ncountries. In part, this doubling reflects the \nproject backlog following the pandemic, but \ninvestment patterns also changed in 2023. \nMost of the increase in projects announced \nby Chinese MNEs were in South-East \nAsia and concentrated in manufacturing \nindustries, particularly computers, \nelectrical equipment, motor vehicles and \nother transport. The number of greenfield \nprojects by Chinese MNEs in developed \neconomies was stable, at a relatively low \nlevel compared with earlier years. Other \ndeveloping countries also contributed \nto the rise in greenfield announcements. \nGreenfield project numbers increased by \n21 per cent for MNEs based in Africa and \nby 18 per cent for those in developing Asia \n(excluding China). The number of greenfield \nprojects announced by MNEs in Latin \nAmerica and Caribbean fell 19 per cent.\n3. Trends by project type and sector\nGreenfield project announcements – \nmostly concentrated in industrial sectors \n– increased in both value and number in \n2023 (figure I.13). The increase in value \nfollowed already strong growth in 2022, \nfuelled by a few very large announcements, \nincluding in renewable energy projects. \nValues in both years ended well above the \naverage for the last decade. Project finance \n– mostly in infrastructure sectors – declined. \nGreenfeld projects\n International project fnance deals\nCross-border M&As\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\n0\n5 000\n10 000\n15 000\n20 000\n6 717\n18 442\n2 196\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\n0\n200\n400\n600\n800\n1 000\n1 200\n1 400\n1 600\na. Value (Billions of dollars)\nb. Number\nFigure I.13\t\nAnnounced greenfield projects have regained momentum in recent years\nTypes of investment projects\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\nAbbreviations: M&As = mergers and acquisitions.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n22\nInfrastructure projects have a significant debt \ncomponent and are thus more sensitive to \ninterest rate changes. Total values remained \nhigh compared with the average before \n2021, when international project finance \ntook off. Fewer deals in services, particularly \nin the ICT sector, explain a large part of \nthe drop in cross-border M&A values.\na. Project types\ni. Greenfield investment\nThe overall increase in greenfield \nannouncements was powered by \na significant rise in the number of \nmanufacturing projects (table I.4). This \nmarked a notable departure from the \nlong-term decline in manufacturing share. \nSupply chain diversification pressures \nexplained much of the increase, with most \nGVC-intensive sectors registering growth. \nAnnouncements of manufacturing projects \nby Chinese investors in South-East Asia \naccounted for one third of the total increase. \nThe announced value of greenfield projects \nrose by 5 per cent to $1.4 trillion – the \nhighest level ever recorded – again mostly \ndue to the expansion of manufacturing \nprojects among developing economies. \nThe automotive, metals, petroleum, and \nchemicals sectors all expanded. Only the \nICT sector registered lower project numbers \nand values, after a period of unusually \nrapid growth between 2020 and 2022.\nii. International project finance\nIn 2023, the number of international project \nfinance deals declined by 26 per cent to \n$958 billion (table I.5). Nevertheless, project \nfinance deals have grown over the past 10 \nTable I.4\t\nAnnounced greenfield projects by sector and top industries\nSector/industry\nValue \n(Billions of dollars)\nGrowth (%)\nNumber\nGrowth (%)\n2022\n2023\n2022\n2023\nTotal\n1 309\n1 380\n5\n18 061\n18 442\n2\nPrimary\n 108\n 66\n-39\n 128\n 149\n16\nManufacturing\n 485\n 611\n26\n6 142\n7 521\n22\nServices\n 715\n 703\n-2\n11 791\n10 772\n-9\nTop 10 industries in value terms\nEnergy and gas supply\n 381\n 365\n-4\n 586\n 879\n50\nElectronics and electrical equipment\n 215\n 183\n-15\n1 200\n1 408\n17\nInformation and communication\n 129\n 110\n-14\n5 131\n3 339\n-35\nAutomotive\n 61\n 91\n50\n 729\n 977\n34\nConstruction\n 69\n 72\n4\n 218\n 358\n64\nBasic metal and metal products\n 49\n 70\n42\n 241\n 336\n39\nTransportation and storage\n 57\n 69\n20\n 997\n1 306\n31\nExtractive industries\n 107\n 65\n-40\n 97\n 117\n21\nCoke and refined petroleum\n 18\n 58\n216\n 41\n 78\n90\nChemicals\n 27\n 57\n111\n 488\n 590\n21\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n23\nyears and are well above their 2015 nadir \nof $400 billion. Following a boom in 2022, \nthe number and value of announcements \nin industrial real estate fell sharply, though \nthey remain at historically high levels. The \naverage cost of debt has substantially \nincreased. The most common reference \nrates for deals all increased sharply over \nthe course of 2022 and early 2023.\nInternational project finance deals in \nrenewable energy – the biggest sector – \nalso declined, with a 12 per cent drop in \nannounced values in 2023. This mostly \noccurred in developing countries, where \ndeclines in oil and gas and in transport \ninfrastructure were also severe. Both the \nnumber and the value of public–private \npartnership announcements fell in 2023, \nfurther contributing to the decline. Over \nthe past 10 years, the value of such \nannouncements averaged about $65 billion, \nwhereas in 2023 the total was $6 billion. \nSimilarly, their share in the number of total \nproject finance deals averaged about 5 per \ncent but fell to less than 1 per cent in 2023.\niii. Cross-border mergers and \nacquisitions\nCross-border M&A sales were down by 46 \nper cent (table I.6). This decline primarily \nderives from the services sector, where \nvalues dropped by more than half and \nnumbers fell by one fifth. A significant part \nof the decline in services occurred in the \nICT sector, which experienced a boom \nduring the pandemic. Both the number \nand the value of cross-border M&As in \nmanufacturing remained flat. M&A values \nfor the primary sector also normalized after \nquintupling in 2022. The number of M&A \nsales decreased across all major industries \nexcept for extraction and automobiles. \nThe $23 billion reverse merger of VinFast \nAuto in Viet Nam with a SPAC based in \nthe United States accounts for a large part \nof the uptick in the automobile sector.\nTable I.5\t\nInternational project finance deals by top industries\nIndustry\nValue \n(Billions of dollars)\nGrowth (%)\nNumber\nGrowth (%)\n2022\n2023\n2022\n2023\nTotal\n1 301\n 958\n-26\n2 858\n2 196\n-23\nTop 10 industries by number\nRenewable energy\n 418\n 368\n-12\n1 454\n1 177\n-19\nIndustrial real estate\n 266\n 146\n-45\n 308\n 231\n-25\nPower\n 134\n 79\n-41\n 193\n 149\n-23\nResidential/commercial real estate \n 67\n 43\n-36\n 228\n 129\n-43\nTelecommunication\n 119\n 82\n-31\n 140\n 111\n-21\nOil and gas\n 93\n 72\n-22\n 114\n 103\n-10\nTransport infrastructure\n 52\n 33\n-36\n 111\n 81\n-27\nPetrochemicals\n 69\n 59\n-15\n 83\n 77\n-7\nMining\n 42\n 47\n11\n 88\n 51\n-42\nWater and sewerage\n 18\n 12\n-37\n 35\n 27\n-23\nSource: UNCTAD, based on data from Refinitiv.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n24\nSeveral factors explain the drop in \nM&A activity overall, including tight \nfinancial conditions and uncertainty in \nfinancial markets. Greater scrutiny from \nantitrust bodies and foreign investment \nregulators also affected M&As in the \nUnited States, the biggest market. \nb. Selected industries\ni. Infrastructure\nInternational project finance is the main \nfunding source for infrastructure industries, \nand the decline in the value and number of \nproject finance deals in 2023 affected this \nsector in particular (table I.7). The number of \nannounced greenfield infrastructure projects \nrose, driven by renewables. However, across \ninfrastructure industries, the drop in the \nvalue of project finance deals outweighed \nthe gains in greenfield project values.\nMost infrastructure projects were in \nrenewable energy, constituting more \nthan 45 per cent of announcements and \naccounting for 65 per cent of estimated \nproject outlays. Both the number of projects \nand the total project value have grown \nrapidly in this category, from fewer than \n700 announcements in 2015 to more \nthan 2,000 in 2023. There is evidence that \ninvestors switch between project finance \nand greenfield FDI as financial conditions \nchange. When debt finance is costlier and \nproject finance is below trend, greenfield \nproject announcements tend to increase.\nTable I.6\t\nNet cross-border M&A sales by sector and top industries\nSector/industry\nValue \n(Billions of dollars)\nGrowth (%)\nNumber\nGrowth (%)\n2022\n2023\n2022\n2023\nTotal\n 707\n 378\n-46\n7 763\n6 717\n-13\nPrimary\n 122\n 36\n-71\n 389\n 505\n30\nManufacturing\n 142\n 141\n-1\n1 406\n1 431\n2\nServices\n 442\n 201\n-54\n5 968\n4 781\n-20\nTop 10 industries in value terms\nInformation and communication\n 166\n 67\n-60\n1 799\n1 432\n-20\nExtractive industries\n 121\n 33\n-73\n 216\n 400\n85\nChemicals\n 15\n 32\n108\n 147\n 132\n-10\nPharmaceuticals\n 36\n 31\n-12\n 169\n 129\n-24\nAutomotive\n 8\n 31\n273\n 59\n 62\n5\nProfessional services\n 23\n 29\n25\n 730\n 594\n-19\nUtilities\n 18\n 18\n-5\n 279\n 229\n-18\nTrade\n 27\n 17\n-35\n 592\n 523\n-12\nFood, beverages and tobacco\n 21\n 13\n-41\n 157\n 156\n-1\nFinance and insurance\n 88\n 12\n-87\n 602\n 539\n-10\nSource: UNCTAD, based on data from Refinitiv.\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n25\nii. Global value chain-intensive \nindustries\nGVC-intensive industries registered a \nsignificant increase in investment projects \n(table I.8). Greenfield project announcements \nfor the automotive, machinery and textile \nsectors were all up. Project values for \nsemiconductors declined, but mainly \nafter exceptionally high numbers in 2021 \nand 2022 as MNEs responded to global \nsemiconductor shortages and concerns \nabout supply chain bottlenecks. In the \nautomotive sector, growth is driven \nby strong demand for hybrid and fully \nelectric vehicles, and by several new \nfirms entering global markets. The GVCs \nneeded to build electric vehicles (EVs) are \nalso spurring new investment in mining, \nprocessing and battery production.\nA recent UNCTAD analysis examines how \neconomic fracturing is affecting international \nproduction in GVCs (UNCTAD, 2024d). \nSince the 2010s, GVCs have undergone \nsignificant restructuring, partially reversing \nthe earlier trend towards offshoring. This \nshift has been driven by several factors, \nincluding technological advancements, \npolicy changes, sustainability concerns and \nTable I.7\t\nInvestment project announcements in infrastructure\n(Millions of dollars, number and percentage) \nIndustry\nAnnounced greenfield projects \nInternational project finance deals\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\nInfrastructure industries\nValue\n265 712\n497 837\n506 811\n 2\n848 256\n722 677\n562 380\n-22\nNumber of projects\n2 179\n2 377\n2 775\n 17\n1 724\n1 898\n1 518\n-20\nPowera\nValue\n6 538\n8 775\n13 537\n 54\n199 493\n134 319\n78 977\n-41\nNumber of projects\n 50\n 52\n 70\n 35\n 154\n 193\n 149\n-23\nRenewable energy\nValue\n141 198\n372 441\n352 883\n-5\n506 693\n417 889\n367 815\n-12\nNumber of projects\n 515\n 560\n 859\n 53\n1 355\n1 454\n1 177\n-19\nTransportb\nValue\n36 579\n53 335\n68 421\n 28\n61 549\n51 959\n33 229\n-36\nNumber of projects\n 763\n 988\n1 298\n 31\n 105\n 111\n 81\n-27\nTelecommunicationc\nValue\n81 397\n63 287\n71 970\n 14\n80 521\n118 511\n82 359\n-31\nNumber of projects\n 851\n 777\n 548\n-29\n 110\n 140\n 111\n-21\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\na Excluding renewable energy. \nb Transport services for greenfield projects and transport infrastructure for project finance. \nc Including information services activities.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n26\nsupply chain resilience needs. Robotics \nand automation are reducing the share of \nlabour in total production costs, enabling \nthe reshoring of production processes. \nRising trade and investment interventionism \nis evident, along with a shift towards \nregional economic cooperation. Large-scale \npublic interventions, such as the Inflation \nReduction Act of the United States and \nthe Recovery and Resilience Facility of the \nEuropean Commission, are reshaping the \nFDI landscape with numerous incentives \nfor investment in targeted industries. Finally, \nsustainability concerns, including carbon \nborder adjustments, are also likely to affect \ntrade flows and investment decisions.\niii. Digital industries\nFollowing the pandemic, digital industries \nexpanded rapidly. In 2023, the number of \ngreenfield project announcements returned \nto close to pre-pandemic levels (table I.9). \nThe number of greenfield projects fell by \nhalf. Declines were general across all digital \nindustry subgroups. The introduction of \nadvanced large language models over the \npast two years has led firms in some digital \nindustries to pause investment as they \nadjust to the new technology. Developing \ncountries that rely on offshore digital services \n(e.g. call centres or software programming) \nface the growing risk that automation could \nharm prospects for new investment projects. \nTable I.8\t\nAnnounced greenfield projects in global value chain-intensive industries\n(Millions of dollars, number and percentage)\nIndustry\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 (%)\nGlobal value chain-intensive industries\nValue\n255 426\n302 371\n314 039\n 4\nNumber of projects\n3 264\n3 505\n4 441\n 27\nElectronics and electrical equipment\nValue\n192 678\n214 518\n182 574\n-15\nNumber of projects\n1 116\n1 200\n1 408\n 17\nSemiconductors\nValue\n125 161\n109 478\n55 231\n-50\nNumber of projects\n 114\n 142\n 140\n-1\nAutomotive\nValue\n40 846\n60 567\n90 979\n 50\nNumber of projects\n 725\n 729\n 977\n 34\nMachinery and equipment\nValue\n9 490\n14 815\n23 424\n 58\nNumber of projects\n 656\n 751\n 985\n 31\nTextiles, clothing and leather\nValue\n12 411\n12 470\n17 062\n 37\nNumber of projects\n 767\n 825\n1 071\n 30\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n27\nDigitalization is also a factor in reshaping \nGVCs. Along with the growth of services, the \ngrowth of digital industries is transforming \nmanufacturing. Data-driven tools allow \nfor real-time analysis and optimization of \nmaintenance and logistics. E-commerce \nplatforms blur the line between physical \nproducts and services, facilitating the \nsale of both and often bundling them \ntogether. Finally, digital technologies \nenable the remote provision of service, \nreducing the need for a physical presence \nclose to manufacturing facilities or \nfinal sales points. These factors have \nincreased the share of services activities \nwithin manufacturing, and lead to more \nasset-light international investment. \niv. Extractive sectors and critical \nminerals\nGreenfield project announcements in \nmining and critical minerals (including \nprocessing) increased significantly in 2023 \n(table I.10), doubling in both their number \nand their value. The growth in investment \nin critical minerals for the energy transition \nand the decline in new investment in oil \nand gas extraction show how climate \ngoals are reshaping investment patterns.\nOne third of greenfield projects in critical \nminerals were invested in by Chinese firms, \nmostly for the extraction, processing and \nproduction of materials for the battery supply \nchain. Australia, the Republic of Korea, \nTable I.9\t\nGreenfield project announcements in digital industries\n(Millions of dollars, number and percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).\nNote: For the classification of digital industries see WIR 2017 (UNCTAD, 2017).\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 (%)\nDigital industries\nValue\n33 035\n34 518\n20 382\n-41\nNumber of projects\n 378\n 344\n 187\n-46\nDigital content\nValue\n2 084\n 515\n 121\n-77\nNumber of projects\n 44\n 37\n 12\n-68\nDigital solutions\nValue\n3 090\n3 842\n2 262\n-41\nNumber of projects\n 48\n 61\n 51\n-16\nE-commerce\nValue\n25 229\n23 935\n17 178\n-28\nNumber of projects\n 232\n 190\n 102\n-46\nInternet platforms\nValue\n2 632\n6 226\n 822\n-87\nNumber of projects\n 54\n 56\n 22\n-61\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n28\nCanada and the United Kingdom were \nother important investor home countries.\nThe United States, Indonesia and Canada \nattracted the most projects overall. The \nhighest project values were in Indonesia, \nChile and the United States, in that \norder. Three quarters of projects were in \ndeveloping countries; about half were in \nprocessing or production of materials. \nTen projects were announced in LDCs, \ntwo of which including a processing \nor manufacturing component.\nInternational project finance in the extractive \nsector is generally deployed for larger \nprojects. The average estimated value of \nthese projects in 2023 was close to $1 \nbillion, which compared with an average \nvalue of about $500 million for greenfield \nprojects. The highest total values of \ninternational project finance deals were \nannounced in Chile, Indonesia, Zambia, \nBotswana and Argentina, in that order.\nTable I.10\t\nInvestment project announcements in extractives and critical minerals\n(Millions of dollars and percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\nAnnounced greenfield projects \nInternational project finance deals\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n \n(%)\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n \n(%)\nExtractive industries\nValue\n12 655\n107 256\n64 589\n-40\n242 825\n134 906\n118 652\n-12\nNumber of projects\n 61\n 97\n 117\n 21\n 246\n 202\n 154\n-24\nOil and gas\nValue\n6 112\n89 567\n25 850\n-71\n198 306\n92 756\n72 072\n-22\nNumber of projects\n 23\n 58\n 47\n-19\n 124\n 114\n 103\n-10\nMining\nValue\n6 542\n17 689\n38 740\n 119\n44 519\n42 150\n46 580\n 11\nNumber of projects\n 38\n 39\n 70\n 79\n 122\n 88\n 51\n-42\nMemorandum:\nCritical minerals \n(including processing)\nValue\n13 106\n30 396\n57 964\n 91\n19 553\n24 430\n23 230\n-5\nNumber of projects\n 56\n 61\n 114\n 87\n 28\n 27\n 28\n 4\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n29\nB. Investment in the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals\nThe drop in international project finance will exacerbate the \n$4 trillion gap in investment needed to meet the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals in developing countries. Several sectors \nimportant for such investment saw a decline in project numbers \nin 2023; two of them, agrifood systems and water and sanitation, \nattracted fewer projects in 2023 than in 2015 when the Goals were \nadopted.\nThe past year marked the mid-point of the \n2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. \nWIR 2023 updated the estimate for the \nGoals investment gap for developing \ncountries to $4 trillion, from $2.5 trillion in \n2015 (UNCTAD, 2023f). Between 2015 \nand 2023, the overall number of projects \nin Goals-relevant sectors grew about 4 per \ncent annually, outpacing overall growth in \nnumbers of deals (at 3 per cent). However, \nthese gains occurred in just a few Goals-\nrelevant sectors, mainly infrastructure and \nrenewable energy (table I.11). Furthermore, \ninvestment has been unequal across \ncountries and LDCs still account for only a \nsmall share of Goals-relevant investment.\nTable I.11\t\nDeveloping countries: investment in sectors relevant to the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals\n(Number and percentage)\n2015\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2015–2023 (%)\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 (%)\nInfrastructurea\n730\n945\n1 022\n40\n8\nRenewable energy\n372\n687\n655\n76\n-5\nWater, sanitation and \nhygiene (WASH)\n32\n36\n30\n-6\n-17\nAgrifood systemsb\n368\n305\n346\n-6\n13\nHealth and education\n277\n317\n337\n22\n6\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\na Including transport infrastructure, power generation and distribution (except renewables) and \ntelecommunication.  \nb Including agricultural production and processes; fertilizers, pesticides and other chemicals; research and \ndevelopment; and technology.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n30\nMost Goals-relevant investment is \nin infrastructure sectors, which were \nheavily exposed to the global decline in \ninternational project finance in 2023. This \nhad a significant negative effect on total \nGoals investment flows. International \nproject finance deals in Goals-relevant \nsectors in developing economies fell by \n36 per cent in value and 28 per cent in \nnumber (table I.12). Declines in renewable \nenergy, power generation and transport \ninfrastructure were the main contributors. \nCollectively, the value of project finance \ndeals in these sectors fell by almost $100 \nbillion compared with 2022, marking the \nsecond consecutive year of declines.\nTable I.12\nSectors relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals: announced \ninternational project finance deals in developing economies\n(Millions of dollars, number and percentage)\nGoals-relevant sector\nDeveloping economies\nLeast developed countries\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\nTotal\nValue\n442 629\n313 161\n200 064\n-36\n55 102\n26 742\n14 154\n-47\nNumber of projects\n 641\n 724\n 524\n-28\n 55\n 55\n 36\n-35\nPowera\nValue\n145 722\n63 548\n40 632\n-36\n42 148\n4 764\n 766\n-84\nNumber of projects\n 60\n 67\n 50\n-25\n 6\n 8\n 1\n-88\nRenewable energy\nValue\n217 440\n175 502\n121 623\n-31\n7 800\n11 849\n10 078\n-15\nNumber of projects\n 443\n 500\n 378\n-24\n 34\n 31\n 28\n-10\nTransport infrastructure\nValue\n29 408\n28 514\n8 858\n-69\n3 637\n5 103\n..\n..\nNumber of projects\n 58\n 58\n 26\n-55\n 7\n 5\n..\n..\nTelecommunicationb\nValue\n25 013\n21 009\n14 356\n-32\n 749\n 320\n2 367\n 639\nNumber of projects\n 38\n 43\n 35\n-19\n 3\n 2\n 4\n 100\nWater, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)\nValue\n11 947\n14 475\n9 942\n-31\n 179\n2 458\n 522\n-79\nNumber of projects\n 16\n 21\n 19\n-10\n 2\n 5\n 1\n-80\nFood and agriculture\nValue\n9 678\n7 452\n2 974\n-60\n..\n2 231\n 421\n..\nNumber of projects\n 12\n 22\n 11\n-50\n..\n 3\n 2\n..\nHealth\nValue\n2 253\n1 300\n1 678\n 29\n..\n 16\n..\n..\nNumber of projects\n 6\n 5\n 5\n 0\n..\n 1\n..\n..\nEducation\nValue\n1 167\n1 360\n..\n..\n 589\n..\n..\n..\nNumber of projects\n 8\n 8\n..\n..\n 3\n..\n..\n..\nSource: UNCTAD, based on data from Refinitiv.\na Excluding renewable energy. \nb Including information services activities.\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n31\nGreenfield investment provided some \ncounterweight, as the value of cross-\nborder greenfield project announcements \nfor Goals-relevant sectors grew by 14 per \ncent in 2023 (table I.13). Project numbers \nincreased even more, to 19 per cent. Still, \na few sectors explain most of the growth. \nTransport services accounted for about one \nhalf of the increase in project numbers and \nvalues. Renewable energy accounted for \nabout one quarter. At the same time, the \nestimated value of international investment in \nagrifood, health and education, and WASH \n(water, sanitation and hygiene) declined \ncompared with 2022. Raising investment \nin these sectors is key to achieving the \nGoals, and the needs are substantial.\nTable I.13\t\nSectors relevant to the Sustainable Development Goals: announced \ngreenfield projects in developing economies\n(Millions of dollars, number and percentage) \nGoals-relevant sector\nDeveloping economies\nLeast developed countries\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n(%)\nTotal\nValue\n126 820\n261 481\n297 746\n 14\n10 147\n9 437\n49 157\n 421\nNumber of projects\n1 312\n1 566\n1 866\n 19\n 73\n 66\n 91\n 38\nPowera\nValue\n4 173\n4 080\n7 155\n 75\n2 000\n1 865\n 671\n-64\nNumber of projects\n 20\n 17\n 29\n 71\n 1\n 3\n 1\n-67\nRenewable energy\nValue\n56 040\n176 342\n183 327\n 4\n4 809\n4 824\n41 614\n 763\nNumber of projects\n 149\n 187\n 277\n 48\n 13\n 13\n 24\n 85\nTransport services\nValue\n14 438\n23 347\n39 730\n 70\n 436\n 776\n4 849\n 525\nNumber of projects\n 275\n 435\n 599\n 38\n 22\n 18\n 31\n 72\nTelecommunicationb\nValue\n29 441\n25 672\n39 502\n 54\n2 018\n 917\n1 359\n 48\nNumber of projects\n 295\n 325\n 283\n-13\n 20\n 12\n 13\n 8\nWater, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)\nValue\n4 127\n1 619\n1 208\n-25\n 136\n 139\n 75\n-46\nNumber of projects\n 19\n 15\n 11\n-27\n 1\n 1\n 1\n 0\nFood and agriculture\nValue\n11 900\n19 829\n17 041\n-14\n 426\n 739\n 437\n-41\nNumber of projects\n 275\n 283\n 335\n 18\n 7\n 14\n 14\n 0\nHealth\nValue\n5 679\n9 668\n8 866\n-8\n 187\n 171\n 109\n-36\nNumber of projects\n 194\n 207\n 227\n 10\n 3\n 4\n 3\n-25\nEducation\nValue\n1 021\n 925\n 916\n-1\n 136\n 7\n 44\n 535\nNumber of projects\n 85\n 97\n 105\n 8\n 6\n 1\n 4\n 300\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).\na Excluding renewable energy. \nb Including information services activities.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n32\nLDCs accounted for only a small share \nof Goals-relevant investment among \ndeveloping countries. The combined value \nof Goals-relevant greenfield investment \nand international project finance deals in \ndeveloping countries reached $500 billion \nin 2023. Of this, $63 billion went to LDCs \n(about 13 per cent). A $34 billion green \nhydrogen project in Mauritania accounted \nfor more than half the total. The downturn in \nproject finance deals also disproportionately \naffected LDCs and the number of projects \nfell by 35 per cent compared to 2022. Still, \na few Goals-relevant sectors performed \nwell: renewable energy saw net gains in \nproject values and numbers in LDCs, as \ndid telecommunication, where numbers \nand values increased for both greenfield \ninvestment and project finance deals.\nThe distribution of Goals investment across \ndeveloping regions is also unequal; only \ndeveloping Asia attracts above-average \ngreenfield projects and international \nproject finance in Goals-relevant sectors \n– the share of the region in the global \nnumber of Goals projects was higher in \n2023 than its share in all projects (figure \nI.14). Other developing regions not only \nattract less investment overall, but even \nlower levels of Goals investment.\nAfrica remains one of the most underserved \nregions and its share of international \ninvestment projects is low. However, it has \nattracted sizeable investment in power, \ninfrastructure and renewable energy; over \nthe last three years, it accounted for about \n30 per cent, on average, of all Goals-\nrelevant investment values in developing \ncountries. In 2023, the region’s share was \nonly slightly lower (27 per cent). Yet there is \nless progress in other Goals-relevant sectors \nin Africa. This is particularly true for health \n(about 5 per cent of total value in developing \ncountries), but also for more capital-intensive \nsectors such as telecommunication and \ntransport (about 15 per cent for each).\nFigure I.14\t\nOnly developing Asia attracts above-average investment for the \nSustainable Development Goals\nShares in numbers of investment projects, by region and economic grouping\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) and \nRefinitiv.\nNote: Shares are calculated by sector.\nShare in total projects\nShare in Goals projects\n5.4\n25.4\n4.8\n30.4\n2.2\n1.6\n9.6\n7.8\nAfrica\nDeveloping Asia\nLatin America and\nthe Caribbean\nLeast developed \ncountries\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n33\nWIR 2023 identified gaps of $500 billion \nin annual investment for WASH and $300 \nbillion for agrifood systems (UNCTAD, \n2023f). As mentioned, the number of \ndeals in these sectors is less than in \n2015. The lack of foreign participation \nin WASH projects is a particular area of \nconcern. It hampers progress towards \nGoal 6, which targets universal access \nto safe drinking water, sanitation and \nhygiene. In 2023, there were only 11 \ngreenfield project announcements related \nto WASH, amounting to $1.2 billion \nin developing countries, and only one \nannouncement in LDCs. Project finance \nand public–private partnerships are more \nimportant in WASH, but there were large \ndeclines in the value of WASH-related \ninternational project finance deals in 2023, \nincluding public–private partnerships, \nwith only one deal among LDCs.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n34\nC. International production\nInternational production continues to expand, but investment \npatterns and GVCs are shifting under the influence of economic \nfracturing trends. The overall transnationality of the top 100 MNEs \nstill increased marginally in 2023. However, they are beginning \nto alter their international footprint, bringing strategic activities \ncloser to home and considering options to de-risk supply chains. \n1. Key indicators of international production\nDespite the lacklustre growth of international \ninvestment in the last decade, international \nproduction through the networks of MNEs \nremains an important part of the globalized \neconomy (table I.14). The value of FDI \nflows is about 5 per cent of gross fixed \ncapital formation, production of foreign \naffiliates as a share of global output is \nmore than 6 per cent, and the sales of \nforeign affiliates are higher than the value of \nglobal exports, confirming the importance \nof FDI as a modality to reach overseas \nmarkets. Furthermore, the global production \nnetworks of MNEs are estimated to govern \nabout 80 per cent of global trade. \nHowever, significant changes in the global \neconomy are reshaping international \nproduction networks and GVCs. A recent \nUNCTAD report on global economic \nfracturing and shifting FDI patterns \n(UNCTAD, 2024d) identifies several key \ntrends. First, it shows three types of \ndivergence. The growth of FDI and GVCs \nhas lost pace with GDP and trade – their \ngrowth paths have disconnected. There \nis a widening gap in investment trends \nbetween the manufacturing and services \nsectors. And investment patterns in China \nhave delinked from the rest of the world. \nSecond, it points out that, in recent years, \ngeopolitical differences and global crises \nhave led to a transition from divergence \nto fracturing. This leads to more volatile \ninvestment patterns and shifting home- \nand host-country relationships, and it \ncauses geopolitical factors to become \nincreasingly important in investment \ndecisions, at times overriding economic \nconsiderations. Third, it shows that the \nsustainability imperative and the drive to \nstimulate investment in the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals are opening up new \nopportunities for investment-driven industrial \ndevelopment, particularly in environmental \ntechnologies. However, it also shows that \nthese opportunities are available to only a \nsmall group of countries with larger markets. \nIn many smaller developing countries, \nand especially LDCs, marginalization \nand vulnerability continue to grow. \n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n35\nTable I.14\t\nSelected indicators of foreign direct investment and international \nproduction\n(Billions of dollars at current prices and number)\nSources: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database, IMF (2024), information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.\nfDimarkets.com) and Refinitiv.\nNotes: Not included are the value of worldwide sales by foreign affiliates associated with their parent firms \nthrough non-equity relationships and the value of sales of parent firms themselves. Worldwide sales, gross \nproduct, total assets, exports and employment of foreign affiliates are estimated by extrapolating worldwide \ndata of foreign affiliates of MNEs from countries for which data are avaiable, on the basis of three-year average \nshares of those countries in worldwide outward FDI stock.\nAbbreviations: FDI = foreign direct investment, M&As = mergers and acquisitions.\na Based on data from 168 countries for income on inward FDI and 142 countries for income on outward FDI in \n2023, in both cases representing more than 90 per cent of global inward and outward stocks. \nb Calculated only for countries with both FDI income and stock data. The stock is measured in book value.\nItem\n1990\n2005–2007 \n(average)\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nFDI inflows\n 205\n1 415\n 985\n1 622\n1 356\n1 332\nFDI outflows\n 244\n1 464\n 780\n1 882\n1 575\n1 551\nFDI inward stock\n2 196\n14 573\n41 893\n47 156\n44 375\n49 131\nFDI outward stock\n2 255\n15 296\n40 718\n43 386\n40 570\n44 381\nIncome on inward FDIa\n 82\n1 123\n2 173\n2 883\n3 002\n2 498\nRate of return on inward FDIb\n5.4\n9.6\n6.8\n8.2\n8.2\n6.0\nIncome on outward FDIa\n 128\n1 235\n1 954\n2 857\n2 923\n2 516\nRate of return on outward FDIb\n8.4\n10.7\n5.8\n7.7\n7.8\n6.4\nAnnounced greenfield projects\n..\n..\n 641\n 830\n1 309\n1 380\nInternational project finance deals\n..\n..\n 585\n1 440\n1 301\n 958\nCross-border M&As\n 98\n 729\n 475\n 737\n 707\n 378\nSales of foreign affiliates\n4 801\n19 758\n31 298\n33 194\n..\n..\nValue added (product) of foreign affiliates\n1 074\n4 662\n6 547\n7 030\n..\n..\nTotal assets of foreign affiliates\n4 649\n47 065\n97 467\n91 386\n..\n..\nEmployment by foreign affiliates (thousands)\n20 449\n49 780\n82 405\n74 402\n..\n..\nMemorandum:\nGross domestic product\n22 612\n52 680\n84 961\n96 488\n100 135\n104 476\nGross fixed capital formation\n5 838\n12 482\n22 055\n25 270\n26 142\n27 161\nCharges for the use of intellectual property, \nreceipts\n 31\n 191\n 507\n 615\n 590\n 460\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n36\n2. Internationalization trends of the largest MNEs\nThe average transnationality index of the \ntop 100 non-financial MNEs – the weight of \ntheir overseas assets, sales, and employees \nin their global operations – increased \nmarginally in 2023 (table I.15). This increase \nwas driven by MNEs in the automotive \nindustry, where the transition to EVs and \nnew technologies attracted more foreign \ninvestment. Falling revenues in other sectors \nand several MNEs’ divestments in the \nRussian Federation held back the index.\nThe 12 car producers in the top 100 \nsignificantly expanded their international \nTable I.15\t\nInternationalization levels of top 100 MNEs increased marginally in 2023  \nInternationalization statistics of 100 largest non-financial MNEs, worldwide and from \ndeveloping economies\nSource: UNCTAD.\nNotes: Data refer to fiscal year results reported between 1 April of the base year and 31 March of the following \nyear. Complete 2023 data for the 100 largest MNEs from developing economies are not yet available.\nAbbreviations: MNEs = multinational enterprises, TNI = Transnationality Index.\na Revised results \nb Preliminary results.\nVariable\n100 largest MNEs, global\n100 largest MNEs,  \ndeveloping economies\n2021a\n2022a\nGrowth, \n2021–2022 \n \n(%)\n2023b\nGrowth, \n2022–2023 \n \n(%)\n2021a\n2022\nGrowth \n(%)\nAssets (Billions of dollars)\nForeign\n 10 449\n 10 127\n-3.1\n 10 230\n1.0\n 2 953\n 2 896\n-1.9\nDomestic\n 8 902\n 10 566\n18.7\n 10 665\n0.9\n 7 054\n 8 694\n23.3\nTotal\n 19 351\n 20 693\n6.9\n 20 895\n1.0\n 10 007\n 11 590\n15.8\nForeign as share of total (%)\n  54\n  49\n  49\n  30\n  25\nSales (Billions of dollars)\nForeign\n 6 703\n 7 438\n11.0\n 6 965\n-6.4\n 2 272\n 2 490\n9.6\nDomestic\n 4 949\n 6 744\n36.3\n 6 596\n-2.2\n 4 094\n 5 523\n34.9\nTotal\n 11 651\n 14 182\n21.7\n 13 562\n-4.4\n 6 366\n 8 013\n25.9\nForeign as share of total (%)\n  58\n  52\n  51\n  36\n  31\nEmployment (Thousands)\nForeign\n 8 998\n 9 096\n1.1\n 9 553\n5.0\n 4 064\n 4 150\n2.1\nDomestic\n 11 102\n 11 316\n1.9\n 10 606\n-6.3\n 9 265\n 9 665\n4.3\nTotal\n 20 100\n 20 413\n1.6\n 20 159\n-1.2\n 13 328\n 13 815\n3.7\nForeign as share of total (%)\n  45\n  45\n  47\n  30\n  30\nUnweighted average TNI\n  62\n  61\n  62\n  48\n46\nMedian TNI\n  63\n  63\n  66\n  47\n45\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n37\nnetworks, focusing on the United States \nand China, the two largest EV markets. \nSince passage of the Inflation Reduction \nAct of 2022 in the United States, top \nautomotive MNEs have announced \ngreenfield projects in the EV and battery \nsupply chain amounting to nearly $17 \nbillion. In China, the competitiveness \nof local brands led some, such as Ford \n(United States) and Honda Motors (Japan), \nto scale back investment. However, \nother MNEs such as Stellantis (Italy) and \nVolkswagen (Germany) started more joint \nventures to leverage local technological \nadvancements. For instance, in 2023, \nStellantis invested $1.5 billion in Chinese \nEV start-up Leapmotor, and Volkswagen \ninvested $1 billion in Horizon Robotics, a \nBeijing-based manufacturer of electronic \ncomponents, to strengthen its position in \nthe autonomous driving and EV markets.\nThe number of technology MNEs in the \ntop global rankings remained steady at \n14 companies, with S&P Global (United \nStates) entering the list as Legend Holdings \n(China) exited. S&P Global bolstered its \ncapabilities by merging with IHS Markit \n(United Kingdom) in a $43 billion transaction. \nKey trends driving investment in the \ntechnology industry are the competition \nto acquire expertise in artificial intelligence \nand machine learning and to consolidate \nmarket presence across neighbouring \nindustries, resulting in more deals. While \nmost of these deals occurred within \nhome economies, larger ones implied an \nincrease in foreign assets. The $75 billion \nacquisition of video game maker Activision \nBlizzard by Microsoft (both United States) \nled to a 22 per cent increase in Microsoft’s \nforeign assets. Not all technology MNEs \nhave expanded their foreign operations. \nApple (United States) scaled down its \noperations in China, diversifying its supply \nchain. SAP (Germany) divested its stake in \nQualtrics (United States) of approximately \n$12 billion to focus on its core services.\nIn 2023, the pharmaceutical industry saw \na modest expansion of its international \nfootprint, with 10 MNEs driving growth \nthrough strategic acquisitions. Similar to \ndevelopments in the technology sector, \nmany of these transactions occurred \nwithin the United States but significantly \ninfluenced the international profile of the \nacquiring companies. For instance, the $43 \nbillion merger of Pfizer (United States) with \nSeagen (United States) led to a 15 per cent \nincrease in foreign assets. The $7.1 billion \nacquisition of Telavant (United States) by \nRoche (Switzerland) reinforced the position \nof Roche in the United States market.\nThe internationalization rate of the remaining \n21 manufacturing MNEs in the top 100 (light \nand heavy industry) remained stable. British \nAmerican Tobacco (United Kingdom) \nreduced its foreign assets by 20 per cent, \nwhile Philip Morris International (United \nStates) bolstered its global presence with \na $15 billion acquisition of Swedish Match \n(Sweden). Siemens (Germany) led in digital \ntransformation, acquiring Brightly Software \n(United States) for nearly $1.9 billion.\nIn the extractive industries, most of the \n15 MNEs in the top 100 held back from \npursuing large-scale international investment \nin 2023. Notable exceptions were Rio Tinto \nand Shell (both United Kingdom), which \nactively engaged in strategic acquisitions \nand new ventures. Rio Tinto finalized the \nacquisition of copper and nickel miner \nTurquoise Hill (Canada) for nearly $3.3 \nbillion, to enhance its portfolio of critical \nminerals for the energy transition. Rio \nTinto announced initiatives to increase its \nproduction of copper and lithium for the \nsame reason. Shell has also expanded \noperations in view of the energy transition, \nexemplified by its acquisition of Sprng \nEnergy (India), which develops and operates \nrenewable energy facilities, for about $1.5 \nbillion. The latter part of 2023 and early 2024 \nsaw several more announcements from \nmining companies about deals intended \nto boost investment in critical minerals. \nThe telecommunication sector saw \nsignificant portfolio shifts in foreign \nassets. Vodafone (United Kingdom) exited \nmarkets in Ghana and Hungary and sold \nits operations in Italy. Deutsche Telekom \nSupply chain \nrestructuring \nis affecting the \ninternational \nfootprint of \ntechnology \nMNEs\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n38\n(Germany) and Orange (France) focused \non expansion in more profitable regions, \nincluding North America, Africa and the \nMiddle East. The utilities sector experienced \nseveral reconfigurations that affected its \ninternationalization rate. EDF (France) was \nfully nationalized, and Enel (Italy) continued \nstrategic divestments, generating $1.3 billion \nfrom the sale of its business in Romania. \nAmong construction companies, Vinci \n(France) moved up the ranking of the top \n100 with strategic expansions in airport \nconcessions and energy ventures. A.P\n. \nMøller–Maersk (Denmark) exited the ranking \nafter reshuffling operations in East Asia.\nFinally, the ranking of the top 100 MNEs \nwas also affected by divestments or \nexits from the Russian Federation. OMV \n(Austria) dropped out of the ranking after \nsuffering losses due to the expropriation \nof its stake in the Yuzhno-Russkoye oil \nand gas field. Between 2022 and 2023, \nMNEs in the ranking made 36 significant \ndivestments from the Russian Federation, \nwith the largest write-downs and charges \nconcentrated among MNEs in the oil \nand gas and extractive industries.\nEmerging-economy MNEs favoured \ngreenfield investment over equity \nacquisitions. TSMC (Taiwan Province of \nChina), CATL (China) and Zijin Mining Group \n(China) – in that order by investment size – \nannounced large-scale projects in developed \neconomies. Starting in 2021, TSMC has \nlaunched greenfield projects first in the \nUnited States, then in Japan and Germany. \nIn 2020 CATL invested over $5 billion in \nIndonesia and almost $7.5 billion in Hungary, \nforming multiple joint ventures with top \nautomotive MNEs. Zijin Mining Group has \ninvested more than $5 billion in Serbia and \nexpanded its global footprint by developing \nmines in Argentina and Kazakhstan.\n3. Shifting investment patterns among the top 100 MNEs\nUNCTAD recently published a diagnostic \nof 10 major trends in global FDI patterns, \nexamining the effects of long-term structural \nchanges in international production and \nthe more recent pressures caused by \neconomic fracturing (box I.1). This section \nlooks at how the trends observed in that \ndiagnostic are reflected in the investment \nbehaviours of the top 100 MNEs.\nThe main drivers of the structural \nchanges in FDI patterns are technological \ndevelopments, most visible in high-\ntechnology industries; sustainability \ntrends, evident in intense investment \nactivity in environmental technologies \nand critical minerals; the push for supply \nchain resilience, which affects most GVC-\nintensive industries; and geopolitical and \ntrade tensions, felt across all strategic \nsectors. These sectors include industries \nsuch as high-technology, semiconductors, \npharmaceuticals, instruments and machinery \nmanufacturing, environmental technologies \nand other activities deemed essential for \nthe future competitiveness of countries \nand which therefore play a key role in their \nindustrial and trade policies (IMF, 2023).\nOver the last 10 years, two thirds of \ngreenfield investment by the top 100 MNEs \nrelated to setting up services subsidiaries \n(figure I.15). Even within manufacturing \nsectors often considered strategic such \nas automotive and pharmaceuticals, more \nthan half of the greenfield projects focused \non establishing sales and marketing offices, \nsupport and technical services centres, or \nother professional services, thus making \nthese projects less sensitive. The effects of \nfracturing are mostly seen in the remaining \nprojects, in physical manufacturing activities. \nThe deceleration of global FDI after 2010 \nis also reflected in the decreasing total \nnumber of deals and projects undertaken \nby top MNEs. The number of greenfield \nprojects announced in the last five years \n(2019–2023) was about 10 per cent \nlower than in the preceding five years \n(2014–2018). While the overall number \nof projects has declined, notable shifts in \ntheir regional distribution have emerged.\nCritical \nminerals are \ndriving major \ncross-border \ninvestment \ndeals among \ntop MNEs\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n39\nTrend 1: Long-term FDI stagnation\nThe long-term trend in cross-border investment shows that a slowdown in global FDI started in about 2010. It no \nlonger keeps pace with global trade and GDP\n. Trade within global value chains (GVCs) also slowed, confirming \nthe close link between FDI and GVCs.\nTrend 2: The increasing weight of services\nThe overall stagnation in FDI conceals sectoral differences. Cross-border investment in services flourishes while \nmanufacturing lags. This reflects a global shift towards more services-centric and asset-light investment. \nTrend 3: The deglobalization of manufacturing (from an FDI perspective)\nManufacturing FDI, stagnant for two decades, showed negative growth after the outbreak of the COVID-19 \npandemic. Although global manufacturing activity and investment remain robust, their international component is \nshrinking, suggesting a trend towards deglobalization. \nTrend 4: The growing ends of the smile curve\nThe transition from manufacturing to services is part of a broader change in the role of FDI in global value creation. \nCross-border investment is moving from the centre to the two ends of the “smile” curve, most notably towards \nservices in business and information and communication technology upstream and in marketing downstream. \nTrend 5: Convergence of sectoral patterns across regions\nAll regions are feeling the effects of the transition towards services-oriented, asset-light FDI. Consequently, traditional \ndifferences in sectoral patterns between developed and developing regions are increasingly blurring.\nTrend 6: The diminishing role of FDI in China\nThe regional rebalancing of global FDI has been significantly influenced by the declining share of China as a recipient \ncountry. Despite waning interest from multinational corporations in initiating investment projects in China, the \ncountry continues to maintain a dominant position in global manufacturing and trade, signifying a transformation \nin its global production model.\nTrend 7: Unstable investment relationships\nHeightened geopolitical tensions are exacerbating the volatility of investment sources and destinations, and the \nsusceptibility of traditional investment links to disruptions. Instability in investment relationships limits the capacity \nof developing countries to strategically capitalize on diversification opportunities arising from shifts in investment \npatterns.\nTrend 8: Fracturing along geopolitical lines\nGeopolitical differences are causing a fracturing trend in global FDI, with the reduction in investment between \ngeopolitically distant countries highlighting the significant influence of such differences on investors’ location \nchoices, overshadowing traditional determinants of FDI.\nTrend 9: The sustainability imperative driving new FDI sectors\nFDI in environmental technologies stands out as the main pocket of growth outside services. Since 2010, while \nmanufacturing investment stagnated across all industries, the number of greenfield projects along the entire value \nchain of environmental technologies sectors has increased steadily.\nTrend 10: The increasing concentration of FDI and marginalization of developing countries\nAmid historical shifts and economic fracturing, the share of greenfield projects in smaller developing countries \nand least developed countries is diminishing. This trend exacerbates the marginalization and vulnerability of those \ncountries, as FDI becomes increasingly concentrated in developed and emerging economies.\nSource: UNCTAD (2024d).\nBox I.1\t\nGlobal economic fracturing and shifting FDI patterns: 10 major trends\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n40\nUntil 2018, manufacturing projects were \npredominantly directed towards developing \neconomies, with East Asia and South-East \nAsia being key destinations. In services, \nhowever, more than a third of projects \nwere concentrated in Europe. Within the \nmanufacturing sector, strategic projects \n– often involving high-value activities \n– were relatively more concentrated in \ndeveloped economies and East Asia.\nSince 2019, the geographical distribution of \nmanufacturing projects has shifted towards \nlocations closer to MNE home markets, \nespecially in strategic sectors (figure I.16). \nEurope and North America have emerged \nas primary destinations – unsurprisingly, \nconsidering that the majority of MNEs in \nthe ranking are from the United States (19), \nEurope (53) and Japan (10) – with Central \nAmerica (including Mexico), North Africa, \nand West and Central Asia also gaining \ntraction. This trend reflects a strategic pivot \ntowards regionalization and nearshoring, \ndriven by the need to enhance supply chain \nresilience and reduce geopolitical risks. \nFigure I.15\t\nManufacturing activities represent about one third of projects by top 100 \nmultinational enterprises\nGreenfield projects, by type and industry, 2014–2023\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).\nNotes: Refers to the ranking of top 100 multinational enterprises in WIR 2023. Manufacturing includes \nseveral activities normally classified as services but physical asset-heavy in nature, in the construction, \nelectricity, extraction and infrastructure segments. Strategic manufacturing includes activities in environmental \ntechnologies, explaining their presence in extractive industries and utilities. “Services” includes all remaining \nservices-related business activities and services activities in typical manufacturing industries (e.g. sales offices \nof car manufacturers).\n0%\n20%\n40%\n60%\n80%\n100%\nStrategic manufacturing\nOther manufacturing\nServices\nAutomotives\nSector\nNumber of\nenterprises\nNumber of\nprojects\nPharmaceuticals\nHeavy industry\nExtractives\nTechnology\nUtilities\nTrade\nLight industry\nTransport and logistics\nTelecommunication\nOther\nTotal\n48\n52\n12\n1 826\n9\n 527\n9\n1 035\n16\n1 035\n14\n2 720\n11\n 835\n6\n 491\n9\n 769\n4\n 798\n6\n 761\n4\n 256\n100\n10 787\n43\n57\n41\n13\n46\n9\n49\n42\n9\n91\n7 65\n28\n19\n3\n2\n1\n79\n56\n42\n99\n100\n27\n15\n58\n18\n15\n66\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n41\nFigure I.16\t\nManufacturing projects by top 100 multinational enterprises moved \ncloser to headquarters\nShares of selected regions/subregions in types of manufacturing projects, difference \nbetween 2019–2023 and 2014–2018\n(Percentage points)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).\nNotes: Refers to the ranking of top 100 multinational enterprises in WIR 2023. Manufacturing includes several \nactivities normally classified as services but physical asset-heavy in nature, in the construction, electricity, \nextraction and infrastructure segments. Caribbean economies are included in Central America. Other regions \nand subregions (developed Asia and Oceania) are not included as there were no significant changes in the \nshare of projects attracted.\nStrategic manufacturing\nNon-strategic manufacturing\nAfrica\nEast Asia\nSouth-East Asia\nSouth Asia\nWest and Central Asia\nEurope\nCentral America\nSouth America\nNorth America\n-8\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n10\n12\n14\n0.3\n-5\n-5\n-2\n-4\n-7\n-2\n-3\n0.2\n-0.1\n7\n13\n1\n-5\n-0.3\n4\n3\n5\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n42\nIn contrast, the number of strategic \nmanufacturing projects in East Asia \ndecreased. Among the top MNEs, the \nlargest manufacturing investors in China \ninclude the electronics company Hon \nHai Precision Industry (Taiwan Province \nof China), the chemicals company BASF \n(Germany) and a range of car manufacturers \nsuch as Toyota (Japan), Volkswagen and \nBMW (both Germany) and Samsung \nElectronics (Republic of Korea). These \ncompanies have historically maintained \nsignificant manufacturing operations in \nChina. However, since 2019 they have \nhalved their greenfield investment in the \ncountry in favour of partnerships with local \nmanufacturers, especially in the EV market. \nAmong these companies, Hon Hai \nPrecision Industry and Samsung Electronics \nhave reassessed their manufacturing \nfootprint in China because of trade \ntensions. A significant portion of their \nproducts, especially chips and high-\ntechnology electronics, are produced in \nfabrication plants in China and exported \nto the United States. Hon Hai reduced its \ngreenfield projects in China from 23 to 6, \nwhile Samsung reduced its from 9 to 1. \nBoth companies have started investing \nin new manufacturing facilities in their \nhome markets and in other countries \nsuch as Viet Nam, India and Mexico \n– in order of investment size. Hon Hai \nPrecision Industry tripled the number of \nmanufacturing projects in Viet Nam.\nThe share of strategic manufacturing \ninvestment in Central America has \nincreased. Manufacturers in the automotive \nindustry, such as Robert Bosch (Germany), \nToyota Motor (Japan) and Volkswagen \n(Germany), have chosen to invest in Mexico, \nlargely for its proximity to the United \nStates and its market access under the \nUnited States–Mexico–Canada Agreement \n(USMCA). MNEs in the pharmaceutical and \nmedical instrument industries, including \nBayer (Germany), Medtronic (Ireland) and \nJohnson & Johnson (United States), have \ntargeted Costa Rica for investment projects.\nNorth Africa and West and Central Asia \nhave also emerged as strategic locations \nfor manufacturing MNEs, offering proximity \nto both European and Asian markets. In \nNorth Africa, Morocco and Egypt stand out \nas key investment destinations. Morocco \nhas attracted projects by automotive MNEs \nincluding Stellantis (Italy) and Renault \n(France). Egypt has attracted not only \nautomotive MNEs such as BMW and Robert \nBosch (both Germany) and Nissan (Japan) \nbut also pharmaceutical companies such \nas GlaxoSmithKline (United Kingdom) and \nelectronics producers such as Samsung \nElectronics (Republic of Korea). In West \nand Central Asia, Türkiye attracted the \nlargest share of manufacturing projects.\nThe decreasing share of manufacturing \nprojects in South-East and South Asia might \nseem counterintuitive. However, the top 100 \nMNEs had already established a significant \npresence in ASEAN by the early 2010s. \nThis is the case, for example, for the two \nleading investors in manufacturing MNEs in \nSouth-East Asia: Toyota Motors (Japan) and \nSamsung (Republic of Korea). From 2011 to \n2013, Toyota announced 23 manufacturing \nprojects in South-East Asia. This number \ndeclined to 13 projects during 2014–2019 \nand dropped farther to only 5 projects \nsince then. Similarly, Samsung experienced \na peak of 10 projects in South-East Asia \nduring 2014–2019, but this number fell to \n4 projects in the following years. Of the top \nmanufacturing investors in South-East Asia, \nonly Hon Hai Precision Industry (Taiwan \nProvince of China) started reconfiguring its \nsupply chain in the last five years, increasing \nits number of projects in the region from \n3 during 2011–2019 to 12 since then.\nGreenfield projects in services activities \nhave also shifted closer to home economies \n(figure I.17) with one notable exception. \nOver the last 10 years, about 10 per cent \nof services projects have been aimed at \nestablishing regional headquarters and \nback-office functions. MNEs from Europe \nand North America have increasingly \nestablished regional headquarters \nthroughout developing Asia, particularly \nInvestment \nprojects by \ntop 100 MNEs \nin strategic \nmanufacturing \nsectors are \nmoving closer \nto home\n\n\nChapter I\nInternational investment trends\n43\nFigure I.17\t\nTop multinational enterprises are establishing regional headquarters \ncloser to key markets\nShares of selected regions/subregions in types of services projects, difference between \n2019–2023 and 2014–2018\n(Percentage points)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from The Financial Times, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).\nNotes: Projects aimed at setting up headquarters include the following business activities: headquarters, \nbusiness services, shared and technical services. Caribbean economies are included in Central America. Other \nregions (developed Asia and Oceania) are not displayed as there were no significant changes in the share of \nprojects attracted.\nHeadquarters and back offce functions\nAll other services\nAfrica\nEast Asia\nSouth-East Asia\nSouth Asia\nWest and Central Asia\nEurope\nCentral America\nSouth America\nNorth America\n-6\n-4\n-2\n0\n2\n4\n6\n8\n2.2\n-1.6\n2.7\n-5.4\n-5.5\n-3.4\n-4.7\n-3.4\n-0.4\n1.5\n6.5\n6.3\n1\n-0.4\n-0.1\n2.3\n0.8\n-0.4\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n44\nin East Asia. These regional hubs provide \nessential services and can help mitigate \nrisks to local operations from geopolitical \nand trade tensions as well as supply chain \ndisruptions. Specifically for investment in \nlarge markets, many MNEs are establishing \nalmost autonomous subsidiaries that \nproduce for the domestic rather than \nthe global market. For example, the \npharmaceutical MNE AstraZeneca (United \nKingdom) announced five projects in China \nto set up headquarter offices and back-office \nfunctions. Its business there would become \na legal entity listed in Hong Kong, China \nor Shanghai and controlled by the MNE. \nConsistent with the global FDI slowdown \nand similar to the trend observed in \ngreenfield investment, the number of \nequity acquisitions since 2019 also \ndecreased, by a little more than 10 per \ncent. M&As often respond to different \ndrivers than greenfield investment. \nImportantly, acquisitions can be subject \nto screening and approval procedures. \nM&A deals traditionally are more prevalent \nin developed economies, and this \nconcentration has only increased in the \nlast five years, particularly for MNEs in \nstrategic industries. Trends in M&As are \nconsistent with those seen in greenfield \nprojects. MNEs have decreased their shares \nof equity acquisitions in manufacturing \ncompanies in East Asian economies. \nHowever, the value of deals in the subregion \nhas increased, driven largely by significant \ninvestment in the automotive sector, \ntargeting Chinese producers. Although \nthe number of transactions has fallen, \ntheir strategic importance and associated \nfinancial commitment have risen.\nDivestment trends among the top 100 MNEs \ndo not reveal any clear relocation strategy. \nOn the contrary, the number of divestments \nfrom China has decreased since 2019, \nindicating that MNEs recognize the strategic \nimportance of maintaining a presence in \nthe world’s second-largest economy, not \nonly to tap into its large market but also to \nbenefit from its advanced manufacturing \ncapabilities and extensive supply chains.\nRegional \nheadquarters \nfunctions are \nproliferating \nto increase \nregional \nautonomy and \nmitigate risks \n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy \ntrends\n\n\nFDI stock covered by old-generation IIAs\nNot covered\nNew-generation\nOld-generation\nDeveloped\nDeveloping\nLeast developed\n71%\n65%\n46%\n137\nnational\nmeasures \nKey trends: facilitation and entry restrictions on the rise\nLess favourable measures by type\nOld-generation agreements cover half of global foreign direct investment\nstock – with greater exposure for developing countries\nDeveloping countries continue to prioritize investment attraction\nShare of measures more favourable to investors\nDeveloped countries\nDeveloping countries\n43%\n86%\n68%\n32%\nTreatment and\noperation\nEntry restrictions\nMore favourable measures by type\nCountries with FDI screening\n39%\n33%\nIncentives\n14%\n12%\n2%\nPromotion\nLiberalization\nOther\nFacilitation\n2014\n2023\n+141%\n17\n41\n2023 agreements address new investment governance issues, yet old-generation\nones persist, raising the risk of investor–State disputes\nCommitments in 2023 IIAs\nGlobal FDI stock: IIA coverage\nParties involved in 2023 cases\n2023 cases: top sectors\n16\n15\nProtection\n14\n9\nFacilitation\nLiberalization\nCooperation\n75%\n30%\n25%\n70%\nDeveloping\nDeveloped\nRespondent\nClaimant\nConstruction\n \n \nOil, gas, coal, mining\nManufacturing\n12\n10\n10\n60\nnew ISDS \ncases\n29\nIIAs signed\n49%\n16%\n35%\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n3\nA. National investment policies\n1. Overall trends\nThe number of investment policy measures adopted in 2023 \nremained consistent with the five-year average, despite declining \nby 25 per cent compared with 2022. In developing countries, \nmost measures aimed at promoting and facilitating investment. \nDeveloped countries continued to introduce restrictive measures \nto address national security concerns related to investment.\nIn 2023, 73 countries introduced a total \nof 137 policy measures affecting foreign \ndirect investment (FDI), a 25 per cent \ndecrease from 2022 but in line with the \nfive-year average (figure II.1). The majority \n— 72 per cent — were favourable to \ninvestors (70 per cent in 2022) (box II.1). \nThis confirms a return to the pre-pandemic \ndistribution between policy measures \nmore and less favourable to investors.\nFigure II.1\t\nLower numbers of new investment policy measures in 2023\nNature of measures, worldwide\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\n50\n100\n150\n200\n2022\n2021\n2023\n2019\n2018\n2020\n2016\n2015\n2014\n2017\n58\n17\n15\n88\n16\n15\n88\n24\n27\n99\n23\n22\n69\n29\n18\n67\n20\n20\n79\n50\n30\n63\n41\n13\n123\n53\n7\n99\n38\n90\n119\n139\n144\n116\n107\n159\n117\n183\n137\nMore favourable\nLess favourable\nNeutral/indeterminate\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n4\nThe analysis of national investment policy trends in this chapter is based on official measures affecting FDI \nadopted by United Nations Member States, as compiled in the UNCTAD Investment Policy Monitor database. \nThese encompass measures explicitly targeting FDI (FDI-specific), as well as general investment measures \nwith a clear impact on foreign investment (FDI-related). \nThe measures are either reported directly to UNCTAD by Member States through annual surveys or identified \nby UNCTAD researchers through publicly accessible sources (such as government websites and specialized \npolicy databases). The analysis excludes restrictive economic measures that affect investment.\nThe classification of measures as more or less favourable is based solely on their potential impact on \ninvestors. The types of measures included in each category are described in box table II.1.1. When a measure \n– for example, the adoption of an investment promotion strategy – contains more than one component, \nsuch as incentives and facilitation, these components are analysed separately. This classification does not \nreflect any value judgement by UNCTAD on the merit or suitability of the measure. \nBox table II.1.1\t\nClassification of measures\nSource: UNCTAD.\nAbbreviations: FDI = foreign direct investment, SEZ = special economic zone.\nCategory\nType of measure\nMore favourable\nLiberalization\nPrivatization\nLifting of entry restrictions (e.g. opening of sectors to FDI) and entry conditions (e.g. minimum \ncapital requirement)\nRemoval (total or partial) of FDI screening or approval mechanisms\nOther (e.g. liberalization of land access)\nFacilitation\nStreamlining of investment procedures (e.g. one-stop shops)\nGreater transparency of investment-related laws and procedures (e.g. information portals) \nServices by investment promotion agencies and other entities to assist investors (e.g. linkages \nprogrammes, investor visa facilitation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms)\nPromotion\nEstablishment of investment promotion agencies or other institutions with a remit as investment \npromoters\nAdoption of investment promotion strategy and plans\nPublic–private partnership initiatives, auctions and concessions\nOutward FDI promotion initiatives\nIncentives\nTax and financial incentives for investment\nOther incentives (e.g. citizenship by investment programmes)\nSEZ-related incentives\nOther\nEnhanced investor treatment and protection guarantees\nEasing of labour or migration regulations concerning foreign hires and key personnel \nRemoval of operational restrictions on investment (e.g. local content requirements)\nLess favourable\nEntry\nEntry restrictions (e.g. total and partial ban on FDI in specific sectors) \nEntry conditions (e.g. minimum investment threshold, joint venture requirements or State \nparticipation in strategic sector)\nIntroduction or expansion of screening mechanisms for national security\nTreatment and operation\nForeign exchange restrictions \nRestrictions on foreign hires and key personnel\nRemoval or reduction of investment incentives\nPost-establishment local content requirements or prioritization of national companies in procurement\nOther measures reducing guarantees for investment treatment and protection\nRestrictions on outward FDI\nBox II.1\t\nMethodology for analysing national investment policy trends\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n5\nSignificant differences persist between \ndeveloping and developed countries (figure \nII.2). Developing countries continue to \nprioritize investment attraction as part of \ntheir economic development strategies. \nThe proportion of policies more favourable \nto investors in developing countries has \nremained stable at well above 80 per \ncent since 2014, except for a low point \nregistered during the pandemic. In 2023, \n86 per cent of the measures adopted by \ndeveloping countries were favourable to \ninvestors. Initiatives to promote and facilitate \ninvestment by simplifying or streamlining \nadministrative processes and introducing \nincentive schemes were among the \nmeasures most frequently adopted (see \nsection A.2). In contrast, in developed \ncountries, policies more favourable to \ninvestors, which represented between \nhalf and two thirds of the total in the mid-\n2010s, started to decline in importance \nwell before the pandemic. They reached an \nall-time low of 17 per cent in 2020 and have \nsince stabilized at about 40 per cent of the \ntotal. In 2023, measures less favourable to \ninvestors adopted by developed countries \nmade up two thirds of the world total. \nMany of these policies related directly or \nindirectly to national security concerns \nregarding foreign ownership of critical \ninfrastructure, core technologies, or other \nsensitive assets (see section A.3).\nAfrican countries were the most active in \nadopting new investment policy measures \nin 2023, followed closely by developing \ncountries in Asia. Africa and developing Asia \nalso produced the highest share of policy \nmeasures more favourable to investors. \nAmong developed regions, Europe led \nin the adoption of new investment policy \nmeasures, despite a decrease compared \nwith 2022. Most new measures were less \nfavourable to investors. The number of \nnew investment policy measures in North \nAmerica and other developed regions also \ndeclined significantly. Three quarters of them \nwere less favourable to investors (figure II.3).\nFigure II.2\t\nDeveloping countries continue prioritizing investment attraction\nShare of policy measures more favourable to investors in total measures\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\nDeveloping\ncountries\n86\nWorld\n72\nDeveloped\ncountries\n43\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n6\n2. Policy measures more favourable to investors\nIn 2023, investment facilitation measures and incentives remained \nthe primary components of investment attraction initiatives in \ndeveloped and developing countries. Facilitation measures reached \na record 39 per cent of the measures favourable to investors.\nOver the last decade, the investment \npolicy landscape has evolved significantly, \nwith noticeable shifts not only in the \ndistribution between measures more \nand less favourable to investors but \nalso in their composition (figure II.4).\nA marked change has been the diminishing \nprominence of liberalization measures, \nespecially following the pandemic. In the \nperiod from 2014 to 2019, liberalization \nmeasures constituted approximately 40 \nper cent of the total – peaking at 44 per \ncent in 2018. Yet from 2020 to 2022, they \nrepresented less than a quarter and in 2023 \nfurther declined to a mere 12 per cent. \nIn contrast, the weight of investment \nincentives has increased significantly since \nthe pandemic. Prior to 2020, measures \nrelated to the introduction of incentives \nrepresented about a quarter of all favourable \nmeasures. They have since grown to over \na third of favourable measures, indicating \na strategic pivot towards using incentives \nas a tool to foster investment. This trend is \noccurring despite ongoing international tax \nreforms that should make fiscal incentives \na less effective tool for the attraction of FDI \nfrom large multinational enterprises (MNEs).\nInvestment facilitation and investment \npromotion measures also display a \nnotable upward trend since the pandemic. \nTogether with incentives, they were all \ncomplementary components of country \nefforts to promote economic recovery and \nresilience. In 2023, investment facilitation \nand investment promotion initiatives reached \nrecord shares of 39 and 14 per cent of \nall favourable measures, respectively. \nInvestment promotion measures were fuelled \nFigure II.3\t\nAfrica and developing Asia adopted the most investment policy \nmeasures in 2023\nNature of measures by region, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nMore favourable\nLess favourable\nAfrica\nDeveloping Asia\nEurope\nLatin America and the Caribbean\nOther developed countries\n34\n4\n33\n4\n16\n19\n14\n5\n2 6\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n7\nFigure II.4\t\nInvestment policy shifts from liberalization to facilitation\nMeasures more favourable to investors by category \n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2014\n2015\n2017\n2019\n2021\n2023\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\n23\n26\n39\n5\n7\n24\n23\n39\n6\n8\n31\n19\n39\n7\n4\n33\n23\n34\n5\n5\n24\n28\n36\n7\n5\n24\n35\n23\n8\n10\n25\n34\n23\n10\n8\n28\n38\n16\n12\n6\n39\n33\n12\n14\n2\nFacilitation\nIncentives\nLiberalization\nPromotion\nOther\n23\n26\n44\n2\n5\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nFigure II.5\t\nInvestment facilitation is important across regions  \nMeasures more favourable to investors by category and region, 2014–2023\n(Percentage)\n50\n100\n29\n41\n16\n8\n6\n29\n18\n37\n8\n8\n26\n40\n19\n13\n2\n26\n32\n30\n6\n6\nAfrica\nDeveloping Asia\nLatin America and\nthe Caribbean\ncountries\nDeveloped\nFacilitation\nIncentives\nLiberalization\nPromotion\nOther\nby an increase in the adoption of \nnew investment promotion strategies \nand the creation of new investment \npromotion agencies (IPAs). \nThe regional breakdown of policy measures \nmore favourable to investors adopted in the \nlast decade reveals important differences \n(figure II.5). In Africa and in Latin America \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n8\nand the Caribbean, incentives were the \nmost common policy initiative, accounting \nfor approximately 40 per cent of all \nmeasures in both regions. In contrast, Asia \nfavoured liberalization, which accounted \nfor 37 per cent of the measures, notably \nhigher than in Africa (16 per cent) and in \nLatin America and the Caribbean (19 per \ncent). Investment facilitation measures \nconsistently represented more than a \nquarter of the total across all regions. This \nunderscores the widespread recognition \nof investment facilitation as a cornerstone \nof investment attraction efforts globally.\na. Facilitation \nIn 2023, investment facilitation measures \nreached a peak, constituting 39 per cent \nof the policy measures more favourable \nto investors implemented by countries \nworldwide, 45 per cent of the measures \nadopted by developed countries and 38 per \ncent of those adopted by developing ones.\nInvestment facilitation measures fall into \nthree main categories: transparency, \nstreamlining and facilitation services. \nTransparency measures aim at improving \nthe clarity and accessibility of laws and \nprocedures related to investment. They \nmade up 21 per cent (12) of the facilitation \nmeasures in 2023. Streamlining measures \nencompass initiatives designed to enhance \nthe efficiency of procedures related to \ninvestments. They accounted for almost \n1\t Accessible at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-policy-monitor.\nhalf (27) of the facilitation measures. \nFacilitation services are provided by \nIPAs, special economic zones or other \nadministrative entities. They constituted \n28 per cent (16) of the total (figure II.6). \nThe introduction of single windows for \ninvestment figured prominently among \nthe facilitation measures adopted in 2023. \nFor instance, Egypt introduced a single-\napproval system for investment projects, \nencompassing various licences and \npermits relevant to investment activities. \n(Unless indicated otherwise, all examples \nprovided in this section, including additional \ninformation and links to official sources, \ncan be found in the UNCTAD Investment \nPolicy Monitor database).1 The General \nAuthority for Investment and Free Zones \nalso announced plans to launch an online \nplatform for company establishment. \nUruguay introduced an online single \nwindow for investment, integrating various \nservices related to company establishment \nand operation. Uzbekistan established a \nphysical one-stop shop to assist investors \nupon entry and facilitate visa processes. \nTransparency measures included the \nintroduction of information portals for foreign \ninvestors. Jordan and Mexico, for example, \nunveiled platforms providing detailed \ninvestment procedures, opportunities \nand incentives. Additional measures \ninvolved initiatives to clarify investment-\nrelated procedures. For instance, the \nFigure II.6\t\nStreamlining of administrative procedures is top priority  \nInvestment facilitation measures by category, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nStreamlining\nOther\n27\nTransparency\n12\nFacilitation services\n16\n2\nInvestment \nfacilitation \nmeasures \nhit record \nhigh (39%)\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n9\nKingdom of the Netherlands and the United \nKingdom issued guidance on the approval \nprocesses of their FDI screening regimes.\nFacilitation services ranged from \nassistance in obtaining specific permits \nto comprehensive support for foreign \ninvestors. Chile implemented a multi-\nagency cooperation agreement involving \nthe Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, \nthe National Immigration Service and \nthe Economic Development Agency \nto streamline visa services for foreign \ninvestors and skilled professionals. Malaysia \nintroduced a dedicated visa facilitation \nservice for strategic investors identified by \nthe Malaysian Investment Development \nAuthority. Uzbekistan introduced the \nposition of “investment managers” within \nthe Ministry of Investments, Industry and \nTrade, to provide dedicated support to \ninvestors throughout the project life cycle, \nfrom resolving land acquisition issues \nto securing necessary permits. The rise \nin investment facilitation initiatives is \ndiscussed in greater detail in chapter IV.\nb. Incentives\nThe introduction or expansion of investment \nincentives represented one third of the policy \nmeasures more favourable to investors in \n2023 in both developed and developing \ncountries. Although the number of new \nincentives decreased in comparison with \n2022, it remained significantly higher than \nthe average for the decade. Investment \nincentive measures encompass tax and \nfinancial incentives, including incentives \nrelated to special economic zones, \nalongside other types, such as infrastructure \nfacilities or visa and work permits (e.g. \ncitizenship-by-investment programmes). \nApproximately 50 per cent of the sector-\nspecific incentives introduced in 2023 \naimed at promoting investment in the \nservices sector, followed by manufacturing \nand agriculture (figure II.7). This confirms a \ngrowing focus on promoting investment in \nservices, illustrated by the increase in the \nshare of new incentives for the services \nsector from 35 per cent of non-industry-\nspecific incentives in 2014–2018 to 46 per \ncent in 2019–2023. New incentives for \nmanufacturing and agriculture remained \nstable at 31 per cent and 15 per cent, \nrespectively. New incentives for extractive \nindustries declined from 19 per cent in \n2014–2018 to 9 per cent in 2019–2023. \nAs in 2022, the push for renewable energy \ninvestment stood out as the primary \nfocus of new incentives enacted in 2023. \nItaly, Nigeria and South Africa adopted a \nrange of fiscal and non-fiscal incentives \naimed at encouraging investments in \nrenewable energy. Canada and Egypt \nintroduced an investment tax credit and \nother fiscal incentives focused specifically \non the promotion of green hydrogen. \nNew incentives in manufacturing also \naimed to support clean technologies, \nas well as high-tech manufacturing. For \ninstance, France introduced a tax credit \nfor producing batteries, solar panels, wind \nturbines and heat pumps. The United \nFigure II.7\t\nSector-specific incentives primarily target services \nIncentive schemes by sector, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nAgriculture\n4\nManufacturing\n11\nServices\n16\nCross-industry\n27\nRenewable \nenergy: key \ntarget of \nincentives \nin 2023\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n10\nKingdom established new green freeports \noffering several fiscal incentives for \nadvanced manufacturing and the production \nof renewable energy equipment. Israel \noffered a tax credit in the high-technology \nsector. Mexico launched incentives \nfor nearshoring in semiconductors, \nelectromobility and medical devices.\nc. Promotion\nInvestment promotion measures \naccounted for 14 per cent of all \nmeasures more favourable to investors \nin 2023. They included the formulation \nof new national investment policies \nand investment promotion strategies, \nthe establishment or strengthening \nof investment promotion institutions \nand the adoption of public–private \npartnership (PPP) initiatives (figure II.8).\nIn recent years, several countries have \nadopted national investment policy \ndocuments to emphasize investment-\nrelated priorities and introduce measures \nto improve investment attraction. Notable \nexamples include Kenya in 2019, Jamaica \nin 2020, El Salvador and New Zealand \nin 2021 and Australia in 2022. In 2023, \nNigeria and Pakistan also introduced \nnational investment policies. Both outlined \ncomprehensive frameworks for regulating \nand promoting investments, identifying \ntarget sectors for investment attraction \nand enhancing the coordination among \nvarious entities involved in investment \npromotion at different levels of Government. \nThe national investment policies of both \nKenya and Nigeria were prepared with \ntechnical assistance from UNCTAD.\nEnhancing the coordination and \neffectiveness of investment promotion \nactivities was also the key objective \nbehind the creation or strengthening of \ninvestment promotion institutions in 2023. \nIn Botswana, for instance, four investment-\nrelated institutions were merged into the \nBotswana Investment and Trade Centre. \nEgypt established a Supreme Council \nfor Investments under the chairmanship \nof the country’s president. Papua New \nGuinea passed reforms to strengthen \nthe Investment Promotion Authority, \nincluding through improved inter-agency \ncoordination on investment matters.\nIn addition, several investor targeting \nstrategies were implemented in 2023. \nJordan introduced the Investment \nPromotion Strategy for 2023–2026, \nentrusting all international promotion \nactivities to specialized marketing \nagencies charged with identifying potential \ninvestors and conducting focused \ncampaigns in select countries. China \nlaunched the Invest in China initiative, \ntargeting foreign investment from specific \ncountries. Costa Rica debuted an FDI \nstrategy aimed at attracting investment \nbeyond the capital’s metropolitan area.\nEfforts to foster investment through \nPPPs were undertaken by Ecuador, \nEthiopia, Kenya, Peru and the Russian \nFederation. Ecuador rolled out a new \nPPP framework, and Ethiopia introduced \na mechanism for direct PPP negotiations \nwith foreign firms. Kenya encouraged \nthe development and operation of port \ninfrastructure through PPPs. Peru made \nland access easier for PPP investors. The \nRussian Federation strengthened its PPP \nFigure II.8\t\nAdoption of new strategies leads investment promotion efforts\nMeasures by type, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nInvestment promotion institutions\n4\nPublic–private partnership initiatives\n5\nInvestment promotion strategies\n11\nNational \ninvestment \npolicies on \nthe rise\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n11\nframework to reduce investment risks and \ninitiated an electronic tender process.\nd. Liberalization\nLiberalization initiatives accounted for 12 \nper cent of all measures more favourable to \ninvestors in 2023. All of them were adopted \nby developing countries. The removal of FDI \nentry restrictions and conditions represented \nthe majority of liberalization measures, \nfollowed by the removal of restrictions on \nforeign exchange, privatization initiatives \nand liberalization of land access (figure II.9).\nAs in the case of incentives, though most \nmeasures were cross-sectoral, sector-\nspecific liberalization initiatives concerned \nprimarily services. For instance, Ethiopia \nallowed foreign investment in digital payment \nsystems. India permitted foreign lawyers \nand law firms to “practice foreign law \nwithin the country” (i.e. to advise clients \non the international elements of mergers \nand acquisitions or appear as arbitrators). \nNigeria opened its electricity sector to \nFDI at the state level, granting each state \nthe authority to create an independent \nelectricity market within its jurisdiction.\nFigure II.9\t\nMost liberalization measures lifted entry restrictions  \nLiberalization measures by type, 2023 \n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\nPrivatizing\n2\nEasing access to land\n1\nRelaxing foreign exchange restrictions\n3\nEasing entry conditions\n3\nLifting entry restrictions\n8\n3. Policy measures less favourable to investors\nHeightened caution towards foreign investments in critical sectors \npersisted in 2023. New or expanded FDI screening mechanisms \naccounted for nearly half of the measures less favourable to \ninvestors (45 per cent). Four additional countries implemented FDI \nscreening in 2023, and several others will follow in 2024.\nA series of global crises, including the \npandemic, have intensified geopolitical \ntensions, disrupted global supply chains \nand raised food and energy prices. This \nhas led to greater caution towards foreign \ninvestment in sectors that are essential for \nnational and economic security, prompting \nmany countries, particularly developed \nones, to tighten regulations on foreign \ninvestment. FDI-specific restrictions, which \naccounted for the minority of measures \nunfavourable to investors a decade ago, \nhave since represented about 60 per \ncent of the total number of measures, \nwith peaks of more than 80 per cent \nduring the pandemic (figure II.10).\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n12\nFDI entry restrictions represented the \nmajority of the measures less favourable \nto investors over the last decade. \nThese primarily involved the adoption \nof investment screening mechanisms in \ndeveloped regions, especially Europe. \nOther entry-related measures adopted by \nboth developed and developing countries \nincluded primarily restrictions on foreign \nownership of land and limitations on foreign \ninvestment in strategic sectors (e.g. financial \nservices, mining, media or transport). \nTax-related measures, e.g. the removal \nor reduction of investment incentives, \naccounted for the bulk of treatment and \noperation measures affecting FDI. \na. Investment screening for \nnational security\nNearly half of the investment policy \nmeasures less favourable to investors \nadopted in the last decade concerned \ninvestment screening for national security. \nAs documented in recent World Investment \nReports and in a dedicated issue of the \nInvestment Policy Monitor (UNCTAD, \n2023d), screening has been the largest \ncategory among all less favourable \nmeasures adopted by countries since \n2017, except in 2022, when tax measures \npredominated (UNCTAD, 2023f). In 2023, \nthis trend persisted, with investment \nFigure II.10\t\nEntry restrictions remain prominent \nPolicy measures less favourable to investors by category \n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\n2023\n2021\n2019\n2017\n2015\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n23\n18\n59\n50\n12\n38\n42\n25\n21\n12\n48\n17\n13\n22\n49\n10\n10\n31\n55\n10\n35\n80\n2\n4\n14\n61\n20\n7\n12\n36\n6\n9\n49\n52\n8\n16\n24\nFDI entry\nFDI treatment and operation\nGeneral investment entry\nGeneral investment treatment and operation\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n13\nFigure II.11\t\nScreening regimes continue to expand\nCountries introducing or expanding security-related investment screening\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 31 March 2024.\n5\n10\n15\n20\n25\n30\n35\n40\n45\n2006\n1995–\n2005\n2008\n2010\n2012\n2014\n2016\n2018\n2020\n2022\n2023\n2021\n2019\n2017\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2007\n3\n2\n1\n1\n3\n1\n1\n1\n1\n4\n4\n3\n2\n4\n1\n5\n3\n5\n17\n5\n12\n5\n13\n2\n11\n4\nExpands screening\n \nIntroduces screening\nCumulative number of countries with screening\n1\nscreening accounting for 45 per cent of all \nmeasures less favourable to investors.\nNew FDI screening regimes were \nimplemented in Belgium, Estonia, \nLuxembourg and Sweden, bringing the total \nnumber of countries with comprehensive \nFDI screening regimes to 41 (figure II.11). \nOf these, 26 are in Europe. Collectively, \ncountries that conduct FDI screening for \nnational security now represent more \nthan half of global FDI flows and three \nquarters of FDI stock. As in previous \nyears, countries continued to address \nvulnerabilities in their existing FDI screening \nmechanisms by covering a broader range \nof transactions to improve the detection \nof potential risks related to FDI.\nOnly a limited number of countries report \non their screening mechanisms. Table \nII.1 displays data compiled by UNCTAD \nfrom country surveys and official sources. \nUNCTAD has previously pointed out the \nlack of a standardized methodology for \ncollecting data on screened projects, \nhighlighting the variety in metrics and \nreporting periods employed by various \nscreening authorities (UNCTAD, 2023f). \nDespite these methodological differences, \ndiscernible trends emerge. In the majority \nof countries for which historical data are \navailable, there has been an uptick in the \nnumber of projects subject to review. \nThe rejection rate remains low, at less \nthan 1 per cent in most countries. \nTransactions that underwent screening for \nnational security concerned a variety of \nsectors, including defence and security, \nenergy and utilities, critical infrastructure, \nautomotives, financial services, health \ncare and pharmaceuticals, electronics and \nsemiconductors, media, communication and \nInternet services, and metals and mining. \nThe growing number of cases screened \nby authorities across several jurisdictions \ninevitably signifies a growing burden \non administrative resources and \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n14\nTable II.1\t\nScreened investment projects on the rise but low rejection rates \nSource: UNCTAD, based on official sources and country inputs.\na The total number of cases screened by the end of the period may include cases carried over from previous \nperiods, depending on the methodology employed by each country.\nb For Germany, the number of projects modified or authorized with conditions includes prohibitions, side \nconditions, public legal contracts and administrative orders.\nc In the United Kingdom, the review mechanism applies equally to domestic and foreign parties. The cumulative \nnumber of cases is subject to continuous adjustment as a result of verification processes, which may result in \ndiscrepancies with case numbers reported in previous years.\nCountry\nPeriod\nScreeneda\nAuthorized\nModified or authorized \nwith conditions\nRejected\nWithdrawn\nAustralia\n4/2020–3/2021\n..\n28\n4\n..\n..\n7/2021–6/2022\n..\n75\n39\n..\n..\n7/2022–6/2023\n..\n100\n18\n..\n..\nBelgium\n7/2023–12/2023\n32\n26\n..\n0\n..\nCanada\n2022\n35\n24\n0\n3\n8\n2023\n27\n16\n0\n0\n3\nCzechia\n2022\n13\n7\n0\n0\n3\n2023\n28\n20\n0\n0\n1\nFinland\n2019\n15\n..\n..\n0\n..\n2020\n15\n..\n..\n0\n..\n2021\n32\n..\n..\n0\n..\n2022\n34\n..\n..\n0\n1\n2023\n39\n..\n..\n0\n0\nFrance\n2021\n328\n57\n67\n..\n..\n2022\n325\n61\n70\n..\n..\nGermanyb\n2019\n106\n..\n12\n..\n..\n2020\n160\n..\n12\n..\n..\n2021\n306\n..\n14\n..\n..\n2022\n306\n..\n12\n..\n..\n2023\n257\n..\n10\n..\n..\nItaly\n2019\n83\n39\n13\n0\n..\n2020\n342\n135\n40\n2\n..\n2021\n496\n183\n26\n3\n1\n2022\n608\n242\n18\n4\n3\nMalta\n2021\n81\n2\n6\n2\n0\n2022\n22\n0\n10\n1\n3\n2023\n20\n1\n2\n0\n3\nSpain\n2019\n6\n6\n0\n0\n0\n2020\n37\n34\n3\n0\n1\n2021\n57\n51\n6\n0\n1\n2022\n78\n67\n9\n1\n1\n2023\n108\n94\n10\n0\n4\nUnited Kingdomc\n1/2022–3/2022\n209\n3\n0\n0\n..\n4/2022–3/2023\n776\n757\n9\n5\n11\nUnited States\n2019\n231\n..\n28\n2\n12\n2020\n313\n..\n16\n2\n9\n2021\n436\n..\n26\n0\n11\n2022\n440\n..\n46\n1\n20\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n15\ncase management. In response, in \n2023, some countries established \nprocedures such as pre-authorization \nand consultation (e.g. Denmark and \nSpain). Others introduced fees for FDI \nscreening (e.g. Germany and Romania).\nThe trend towards the adoption of FDI \nscreening regimes will continue in the \ncoming years. The screening regimes of \nBulgaria and Singapore entered into force \nin March 2024. The regime in Ireland is \nexpected to become operational before \nthe end of the year. The European Union \nhas also put forward a reform proposal \naimed at revising the current framework.2 \nIt emphasizes the need for all member \nStates to adopt ex ante screening \nmechanisms and suggests extending \nthe scope of the screening regimes to \ncover intra-European Union transactions \ncontrolled by foreign investors. \nBilateral initiatives also play a role in the \nexpansion of FDI screening. They focus \npredominantly on establishing formal or \ninformal mechanisms for exchanging \ninformation relating to national security \nand investment. In December 2023, \nMexico and the United States signed a \nmemorandum of intent to create a bilateral \nworking group for regular exchanges of \ninformation.3 The United States and the \nEuropean Union have created a working \ngroup on investment screening to promote \nbest practices and develop a holistic policy \napproach to addressing risks pertaining \nto specific sensitive technologies.4\nb. Other entry-related measures\nOther types of entry restrictions on \ninvestment accounted for 23 per cent of \nthe measures less favourable to investors \n2\t European Commission, 2024, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on \nthe screening of foreign investments in the Union and repealing Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European \nParliament and of the Council, COM(2024 23 final, 2024/0017 (COD), https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/\ngroup/aac710a0-4eb3-493e-a12a-e988b442a72a/library/f5091d46-475f-45d0-9813-7d2a7537bc1f/\ndetails?download=true.\n3\t United States, Department of the Treasury, 2023, Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen and Mexico’s \nSecretary of Finance and Public Credit Rogelio Ramírez de la O announce intent to establish bilateral working \ngroup on foreign investment review, 7 December. See https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1965.\n4\t European Commission, Working Group 8 – Investment Screening, Part of EU–US Trade and Technology \nCouncil, https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/EU-US-TTC/wg8.\nin 2023, with a significant emphasis on \nenhancing State control over extractive \nindustries. Key examples included \nthe National Lithium Strategy in Chile, \nmandating State majority ownership \nthroughout the lithium production cycle, \nand the revised Mining Code of Mali, \ngranting the State a 10 per cent stake in \nnew mining ventures. Mining law reforms \nin Mexico tightened concession conditions \nand removed the expropriation rights of \nconcessionaires for mining exploitation. \nPanama introduced a moratorium on \nnew metallic mineral concessions.\nConcerns regarding foreign investors’ \nownership of certain types of property \nalso prompted various countries to enact \nnew prohibitions. Canada, for instance, \nrestricted the purchase of residential \nproperties by foreign investors. The Russian \nFederation limited foreign ownership of \nnews aggregators, and the United States \nimposed restrictions on foreign acquisition \nof agricultural and forest properties, as \nwell as land or property near military \ninstallations and critical infrastructure. \nc. Investor treatment and \noperation\nThe remaining one third of policy measures \nless favourable to investors in 2023 (12 \nmeasures) comprised various treatment \nand operation provisions adopted by both \ndeveloping and developed countries that \naimed to address a diverse array of specific \npolicy concerns. The extractive sector \nwas often affected by these measures. For \ninstance, Chad nationalized the assets of \nEsso Exploration and Production Chad, \nand Mali abolished several tax incentives \npreviously available to mining companies. \nCountries with \nFDI screening \nrepresent more \nthan half of \nglobal FDI \nflows, three \nquarters of \nFDI stock\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n16\nIn line with the recent trend towards more \nstringent controls on outbound investment, \nthree countries introduced measures to \naddress concerns directly related to outward \nFDI (OFDI). South Africa established an \napproval requirement for transfers abroad \nof capital funds in amounts greater than R1 \nmillion per year (approximately $50,000) \nand increased related documentation \nrequirements. Spain expanded the \nmandatory reporting of OFDI to encompass \nnew types of transactions. The United \nStates introduced outbound investment \ncontrols on certain transactions relating to \nnational security technologies and products.\nFrom near the end of 2023 into the early \nmonths of 2024, at least 26 countries, \nprimarily developed economies in Europe, \n5\t Based on data from OECD Pillar Two Country Tracker and Pillar Two Navigator, available at oecdpillars.com.\nenacted laws to implement the global \nminimum tax as outlined in the Pillar II \nreform of the Organisation for Economic \nCo-operation and Development (OECD).5 \nKnown as the Global Anti-Base Erosion \nModel Rules, the objective is to ensure \nthat MNEs contribute a minimum amount \nof tax on earnings within each operating \ncountry (UNCTAD, 2023f). The reform \ntargets multinationals with annual revenues \nabove €750 million, enabling jurisdictions \nto levy a top-up tax to achieve a minimum \neffective rate of 15 per cent on income taxed \nbelow this threshold. These developments \nare not captured in the Investment \nPolicy Monitor database because of its \nmethodological specifications (see box II.1).\n4. Outward foreign direct investment policies\nThe global landscape of OFDI promotion, facilitation and \nregulation has undergone substantial changes since the early \n2000s. These changes reflect the evolving patterns of global \ninvestment and production, the sharpening focus on sustainability \nand the heightened geopolitical tensions and gradual shift from \nliberalization to regulation that have characterized FDI policies \nover the past decade.\na. Promotion and facilitation of \noutward investment\nAs highlighted in a recent issue of the \nInvestment Policy Monitor (UNCTAD, \n2024b), OFDI promotion and facilitation \npolicies have been a significant component \nof economic strategies of developed \ncountries for several decades. At least \n31 of them (79 per cent of the total \ntracked) have adopted initiatives to \npromote outbound investment. Support \nfor companies that are investing abroad \ntypically serves two main objectives: the \ndevelopment and internationalization of \ndomestic businesses, particularly small \nand medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and \nthe promotion of international cooperation \nand development efforts. The number of \ndeveloping countries that have adopted \nOFDI promotion mechanisms has expanded \nin line with their expanding role as sources of \ninvestment. At least 19 developing countries \n(14 per cent) have established formal \nmechanisms to promote OFDI, including 11 \ncountries in Asia, 6 in Africa, and 2 in Latin \nAmerica and the Caribbean (figure II.12).\nFour principal types of direct promotion \ninstruments to support OFDI exist: fiscal and \n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n17\nfinancial support, investment guarantees, \ninvestment facilitation services and direct \ncapital participation. Facilitation services \nare the most widespread, adopted by 23 \nper cent of countries globally, including 64 \nper cent of developed countries and 11 \nper cent of developing countries. These \nservices may include providing advisory \nassistance, supporting participation in \ninternational events, coordinating economic \nmissions abroad, connecting with partners \nin the host country, training, and preparing \nfeasibility and country risk analyses.\nFiscal or financial support encompasses \nloans, grants and tax incentives for \ncompanies that venture into OFDI. Loans \nare usually provided by home-country \nexport promotion agencies, development \nbanks or similar institutions. They generally \noffer better conditions than market \nstandards or support projects that might \notherwise struggle to secure private \nfinancing. This type of support is common \nin developed countries (62 per cent) but \nrare in developing countries (10 per cent). \nForeign investment insurance or guarantees \nsecure some level of political risk protection \nfor domestic firms investing in more \nunpredictable and volatile markets. They are \noffered by 18 per cent of countries globally \n– 67 per cent of developed countries and \n5 per cent of developing countries. \nDirect capital participation through State-\nsponsored programmes is offered in 49 \nper cent of developed countries and 3 \nper cent of developing countries (figure \nII.13). These programmes enable domestic \nfirms to invest abroad by providing patient \ncapital through direct equity participation \nand private enterprise funds. These are \nmade available through import–export \nbanks, development banks or dedicated \nfunds targeting particular sectors, countries \nor types of firms, such as SMEs.\nA growing number of countries are \nleveraging OFDI as a tool to further the \ngoals of the 2030 Agenda. Among the 50 \ncountries worldwide with OFDI promotion \nmechanisms, 18 developed countries \n(58 per cent) and 5 developing countries \n(26 per cent) have put in place at least \none instrument specifically designed to \nencourage OFDI in developing countries. In \naddition, numerous developed countries, \nespecially in Europe, have integrated OFDI \npromotion schemes into their broader \ndevelopment assistance strategies. \nThey actively engage the private sector \nin development cooperation initiatives, \nso as to capitalize on its strengths and \ncapabilities to advance development \ngoals, while promoting growth and \nglobal competitiveness of domestic \nfirms. Consequently, OFDI promotion \nschemes often incorporate criteria that \nemphasize the benefits to the host country, \nparticularly as regards investments that \ntarget developing countries (figure II.14).\nFigure II.12\t\nOutward investment promotion and facilitation schemes introduced \nmainly in developed countries\nCountries with a scheme, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD.\nLatin America and the Caribbean\n2\nAfrica\n6\nDeveloping Asia\n11\nDeveloped countries\n31\nMore countries \nusing outward \ninvestment \nas a tool for \nAgenda 2030\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n18\nFigure II.14\t\nLeveraging promotion of outward investment to achieve the Sustainable \nDevelopment Goals \nCriteria for accessing support schemes, by economic grouping \n(Percentage) \nSource: UNCTAD.\nDeveloped countries\nDeveloping countries\nInvestment in developing economies\nHost-country benefts\nSustainability\n58\n26\n52\n16\n39\n11\nFigure II.13\t\nFacilitation is the main support tool worldwide for outward \ninvestment \nTools offered and share of countries using them, 2023\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD.\nDeveloped countries\nDeveloping countries\nWorld\nFiscal/fnancial support\n62\n10\n21\nDirect capital participation\n49\n3\n13\nInvestment facilitation services\n64\n11\n23\nInvestment guarantee\n67\n5\n18\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n19\nb. Regulation and screening of \noutward investment\nOFDI promotion and regulation policies often \ncoexist within the same country. Historically, \nrestrictions on OFDI were mainly observed in \ndeveloping countries and related to balance-\nof-payments risks (UNCTAD, 2024b). In \nthe early 2000s, the liberalization of OFDI \ngained momentum, as countries increasingly \nremoved foreign exchange restrictions. \nIn the last decade, by contrast, an \nobservable shift in the regulatory approach \nto OFDI has seen restrictions increase \nby nearly one third in both developing \nand developed countries (figure II.15).\nThis increase can be partially explained \nby growing concerns over money-\nlaundering practices, tax evasion and \nother illicit financial flows disguised as FDI. \nIt was accentuated by the coronavirus \npandemic of 2019, which led to a general \nslowdown in both inward and outward \nliberalization efforts. Finally, in recent \nyears, concerns have been brought \nforward related to the potential risks \nthat OFDI could pose to national and \neconomic security, particularly in relation \nto strategic sectors and technologies.\n6\t President of the United States, 2023, Addressing United States investments in certain national security \ntechnologies and products in countries of concern, Presidential Documents: Executive Order 14105 of August \n9, 2023, Federal Register, 88:154, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/11/2023-17449/\naddressing-united-states-investments-in-certain-national-security-technologies-and-products-in.\nIn 2023, restrictions on OFDI were in \nplace in nearly half (95) of the world’s \neconomies, including a majority of \ndeveloping countries and least developed \ncountries. The most common involve either \nthe necessity for investors to secure prior \napproval for their projects (69 per cent \nof countries with OFDI restrictions) or to \nregister their planned OFDI with authorities \n(14 per cent). Total bans on OFDI are in \nplace in only three countries: Ethiopia, \nNepal and the Syrian Arab Republic. \nScreening mechanisms for OFDI based on \nnational security concerns are also gaining \ntraction. While some Asian countries have \nimplemented them for decades (e.g. China, \nIndia and Japan), the focus on the security \naspects of OFDI has recently broadened \nto include other major sources. Since \n2020, the United States has introduced \nseveral initiatives to monitor and regulate \nOFDI, culminating in an executive order \naimed at scrutinizing investments in key \nnational security technologies in certain \ncountries (August 2023).6 In January 2024, \nthe European Commission responded to \ngrowing national security concerns related to \nOFDI by proposing a framework to monitor \noutbound investment in critical sectors \nFigure II.15\t\nOutward investment restrictions on the rise\nMeasures by nature and economic grouping \n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD, based on Investment Policy Monitor database and IMF Annual Report on Exchange \nArrangements and Exchange Restrictions database, both accessed on 31 March 2024.\nLess favourable\nMore favourable\nDeveloping countries\n1999–2010\n2011–2022\n1999–2010\n2011–2022\nDeveloped countries\n22\n78\n49\n51\n21\n79\n54\n46\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n20\nsuch as advanced semiconductors and \nbiotechnology. Member States have been \ntasked to provide initial risk assessments by \nmid-2025. Based on these assessments, \nthe Commission will advise member States \n7\t European Commission, 2024, White paper on outbound investments, 24 January, https://circabc.europa.eu/\nui/group/aac710a0-4eb3-493e-a12a-e988b442a72a/library/51124c0d-58d8-4cd9-8a22-4779f6647899/\ndetails?download=true.\non the extent to which existing tools can \nmitigate these risks and whether additional \nproportionate policy actions are warranted \nat the European Union or national level.7\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n21\nB. International investment policies\n1. Trends in international investment agreements\nIn 2023, new-generation international investment agreements \n(IIAs) included innovative provisions on investment facilitation and \ncooperation and tended to safeguard States’ right to regulate. \nHowever, old-generation IIAs still cover about half of global FDI \nstock, making IIA reform more urgent. The year was also marked \nby intensified efforts to reform the IIA and ISDS regimes.\na. Conclusion and termination \nof investment agreements\nIn 2023, countries and regional organizations \nconcluded at least 29 IIAs – 12 bilateral \ninvestment treaties (BITs) and 17 treaties \nwith investment provisions (TIPs). This \nbrought the size of the IIA universe to 3,291 \n(2,831 BITs and 460 TIPs), according to \nthe UNCTAD IIA Navigator (figure II.16). \nFigure II.16\t\nAgreements from the 1990s and 2000s dominate the international \ninvestment agreements universe\n(Annual number of agreements signed)\nSource: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\nNote: The UNCTAD IIA Navigator is updated continuously as new IIA-related information becomes available.\nAbbreviations: IIA = international investment agreement.\n50\n100\n150\n200\n250\n1959\n2023\n2018\n2013\n2008\n2003\n1998\n1993\n1988\n1983\n1978\n1973\n1968\n1963\nIIAs in force\nIIAs signed, not in force\nIIAs terminated\nNumber of\nIIAs in force\n2 608\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n22\n100\n200\n300\n400\n1994–2003\n2004–2013\n2014–2023\nTotal number\nof IIAs terminated\n585\nIn addition, at least 15 IIAs entered into force \nand 4 were terminated in 2023, bringing \nthe total number of IIAs in force to at least \n2,608 by the end of the year. These IIAs \nare largely dominated by old-generation \ntreaties, signed in the 1990s and 2000s.\nThe total number of terminations reached \nat least 585 by 2023; about 70 per cent \nof these IIAs were terminated in the last \ndecade (figure II.17). Under sunset clauses, \nIIAs may continue to protect investments \nin existence at the time of termination or \nwithdrawal and grant investors access \nto investor–State dispute settlement \n(ISDS) for up to 20 years afterward.\nIIAs signed and/or adopted in 2023 \ncover a range of investment governance \nissues that go beyond protection, such \nas investment facilitation, cooperation \nor liberalization (figure II.18). Notably, \nthe majority of TIPs signed or adopted \nin 2023 included commitments on \nfacilitation or cooperation. About half \ncontained protection or liberalization \nprovisions. In the Agreement Establishing \nthe African Continental Free Trade Area \n(AfCFTA), the Protocol on Investment – \nadopted in February 2023 – provides an \nexample of this nascent shift (box II.2).\nNewly concluded protection-focused IIAs \ncontinued the trend towards safeguarding \nStates’ right to regulate as well as \nreforming or omitting ISDS. It remains to \nbe seen whether these refinements will be \ninterpreted in line with the treaty parties’ \nintent in ISDS. A lot remains to be done to \nfocus the coverage of IIAs on sustainable \ninvestment and foster responsible business \nconduct by investors. New IIAs also \ncommonly continue to bind countries for \nlong periods of time, limiting their ability to \nadapt to changing economic realities and \nnew regulatory imperatives (figure II.19). \nThe reform of old-generation IIAs continues \nto advance at a slow pace. Only 19 \nper cent of the IIAs signed since 2020 \nreplace an old-generation IIA; 39 per \ncent ensure that the reformed provisions \nthey contain would be effectively applied \nwhere parallel old-generation IIAs exist. \nSource: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\nAbbreviations: IIAs = international investment agreements.\nFigure II.17\t\nTerminations of investment agreements reach nearly 600\n(Annual number of terminations)\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n23\nThe Investment Protocol to the AfCFTA, which involves 54 countries, is the first megaregional IIA covering the \nAfrican continent in its entirety. It was adopted by the Heads of the State and Government during the Assembly \nof the African Union on 18–19 February 2023. \nThe Protocol builds on existing investment treaty reform objectives and best practices recognized by the African \nUnion and the regional economic communities, as well as UNCTAD. UNCTAD’s work on IIA reform is recognized in \nthe preamble of the Protocol. The Protocol provides a balanced approach to international investment governance \nand contains the following elements:\n•\t\nProactive promotion and facilitation commitments for investment that fosters sustainable development\n•\t\nRefined investment protection provisions that preserve the contracting parties’ right and duty to regulate in \nthe public interest and are extended to sustainable investments only\n•\t\nA dedicated chapter on investment and sustainable development, with proactive commitments on climate \naction, health and pandemics, human capital development and technology transfer\n•\t\nEnforceable investor obligations related to environmental and labour protection, human rights, the rights of \nlocal communities, transparent corporate governance, tax and non-interference in local governance\n•\t\nFirm commitments on technical assistance and capacity-building for contracting parties, as well as support \nfor implementation by the Pan-African Trade and Investment Agency established under the Protocol.\nUpon entry into force, the Protocol will consolidate the IIA regime in Africa. Under its terms, 183 intra-African \nBITs will be replaced and regional economic organizations in Africa undertake to harmonize regional IIAs with the \ncontent of the Protocol.\nUNCTAD is a member of the task force that assisted the AfCFTA Secretariat in the negotiation of the Investment \nProtocol and continues to assist in the negotiation of the Investment Dispute Settlement Annex to it.\nSource: UNCTAD.\nBox II.2\t\nAfCFTA Investment Protocol (2023)\nFigure II.18\t\nContent of investment agreements is becoming more diverse \n(Number of agreements signed in 2023 by type of commitment)\nSource: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\nNotes: Based on 22 IIAs (14 TIPs and 8 BITs) signed and/or adopted in 2023 for which text or other public \ninformation on content is available. Cooperation commitments refer to the establishment of institutional \nframeworks to cooperate on investment activities (investment committee) and/or undertakings to conduct joint \nactivities on investment in one or more economic sectors.\nAbbreviations: BIT = bilateral investment treaty, IIA = international investment agreement, TIP = treaty with \ninvestment provisions.\nBITs\nTIPs\nCooperation\n5\n11\nProtection\n8\n7\nFacilitation/promotion\n4\n10\nLiberalization\n1\n8\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n24\nIIAs in force cover 65 per cent of global \nFDI stock. TIPs, which include regional and \nmegaregional agreements and relate to a \nbroad range of economic issues beyond \ninvestment disciplines, account for the \nlargest share – 53 per cent. BITs, which \ntypically include investment protection \nprovisions only and apply bilaterally, cover \nabout 7 per cent. The remaining 5 per cent \nare covered simultaneously by a TIP and a \nBIT (figure II.20). The coverage of TIPs has \nincreased by at least 10 per cent in the past \ndecade, following the growing relevance \nof regional investment policymaking.\nOld-generation IIAs, which provide broad \nand unrefined provisions that often expose \nhost countries to greater risk of ISDS, \ncover 49 per cent of the total global FDI \nstock. For 53 countries, more than 80 per \ncent of total FDI stock is covered by an \nold-generation IIA. The exposure to ISDS \nis overall higher for developing economies \nand LDCs. Old-generation IIAs cover 65 \nFigure II.19\t\nRecently signed investment agreements include reform features\nAgreements signed between 2020 and 2023 with selected reform features \n(Percentage) \nSource: UNCTAD.\nNote: Based on 36 IIAs concluded in 2020–2023 for which texts are available, not including agreements that \nlack investment protection provisions.\nAbbreviations: IIA = international investment agreement, ISDS = investor–State dispute settlement.\na The IIAs counted contain reform language for five or more key substantive provisions, including at least a \ncircumscribed fair and equitable treatment standard and a clarified indirect expropriation clause, or a general \nexceptions clause with other reformed clauses, in line with the UNCTAD IIA Reform Accelerator (UNCTAD, \n2020a).\nRight-to-regulate safeguards\nPromotion/facilitation commitments\nISDS reformed\nImportation excluded\nDuration/survival clause of fewer than \n10 years\nOld-generation IIA(s) replaced\nInvestor obligations\nScope defned by reference to\nsustainability\n72\n64\n50\n39\n31\n19\n14\n3\nSelected features of IIAs\nRight-to-regulate safeguards. Reforms language of the majority of \nkey substantive IIA provisions, as defned in the UNCTAD IIA Reform \nAccelerator, including those most often invoked in ISDS.a \nDuration/survival clause of fewer than 10 years. Provides for initial \nduration of validity and survival clause of fewer than 10 years or omits \nthem.\nISDS reformed. Contains procedural improvements, limits the access to \nISDS for certain types of claims or omits ISDS altogether.\nOld-generation IIA(s) replaced. Provides for the termination or \nsuspension of at least one IIA upon entry into force.\nPromotion/facilitation commitments. Includes commitments to \ntransparency and/or the improvement of the regulatory environment, \nstakeholder engagement on investment policies or cooperation.\nInvestor obligations. Contains obligations applicable to investors, such \nas responsible business conduct, avoiding corruption, environmental \nmanagement and the like.\nImportation of elements from unreformed IIAs excluded. Excludes \napplication of most-favoured-nation and non-derogation provisions to \nobligations in other IIAs.\nScope defned by reference to sustainability. The IIA scope of \ncoverage is defned by reference to \"sustainable development\" and/or \n\"sustainable investment\".\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n25\nper cent of developing countries’ FDI stock. \nThis is 16 per cent higher than the global \naverage and more than 20 per cent higher \nthan the share for developed economies. \nThe difference is even higher for LDCs, \nfor which old-generation treaties cover \n71 per cent of FDI stock (figure II.21). \nIIA terminations and replacements since \n2012 have affected the IIA coverage of \nabout 13 per cent of the total FDI stock.8 \nFollowing terminations, 6 per cent of the \nstock is no longer covered; 4 per cent \nrelates to developed economies and 2 \nper cent to developing economies. The \nremaining 7 per cent are now covered \nby a new-generation IIA. Barely any \n8\t Analysis based on 424 IIAs (415 BITs and 9 TIPs) terminated since 2012 (including IIAs that were terminated \nby mutual consent, unilaterally terminated, expired or replaced by a new treaty).\nFDI stock of LDCs has been affected \nby terminations or replacements.\nTaken together, these data suggest that to \ndate IIA reform has had a limited effect on \nmitigating the risk of ISDS in developing \ncountries and has largely left the FDI stock \nof LDCs subject to old-generation IIAs. \nOld-generation IIAs have served as the \nbasis for almost all ISDS cases to date \n(about 97 per cent), and developing \ncountries have been respondents in the \nmajority of them (about 62 per cent). Of \nthese, at least 58 cases based on old-\ngeneration IIAs were initiated against LDCs. \nISDS proceedings represent a significant \nfinancial risk for developing countries and \nTIPs\n53\nNone\n35\nBITs and TIPs\n5\nBITs\n7\nFigure II.20\t\nInvestment agreements in force cover 65 per cent of global stock of \nforeign direct investment\nShare of stock covered, by type of IIA \n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024, and IMF Coordinated Direct Investment \nSurvey database, accessed 19 March 2024.\nNotes: FDI stocks estimated on the basis of information about 193 United Nations Member States’ shares of \nworld FDI inward stock for 2022. Does not include confidential and unspecified stock data. Analysis based on \n2,429 IIAs in force (2,220 BITs and 209 TIPs) with substantive investment commitments. For TIPs that include a \nrelevant regional economic integration organization, only the FDI stock of members for which the IIA is in force \nwas counted. Excludes the Energy Charter Treaty (1994) in view of its sector-specific scope.\nAbbreviations: BIT = bilateral investment treaty, FDI = foreign direct investment, IIA = international investment \nagreement, TIP = treaty with investment provisions.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n26\nLDCs, in particular. The average amount \nsought by investors in ISDS cases is $1.1 \nbillion and the average amount awarded is \n$385 million. In at least eight ISDS cases \ndeveloping countries were required to pay \ncompensation of more than $1 billion. At the \nend of 2023, the amount that LDCs were \nrequired to pay totalled $595 million, with \none case alone accounting for $270 million.\nb. Other developments relating \nto investment rule-making \nThe withdrawals of France, Germany and \nPoland from the Energy Charter Treaty \n(ECT) (1994) became effective in 2023. At \nleast three more countries have deposited \nnotices to exit the ECT over concerns \nrelated to climate change, and the European \nParliament voted in favour of the withdrawal \nof the European Union in April 2024.\nThe trend towards negotiating flexible \ninternational instruments aimed at \nchannelling investment towards the \ngreen economy also continued. \nPartners concluded negotiations on \nthe Clean Economy Agreement in the \ncontext of the Indo-Pacific Economic \nFramework for Prosperity. \nFigure II.21\t\nOld-generation investment agreements cover the majority of foreign \ndirect investment stock in developing and least developed countries\nStock covered, by economic grouping and generation of agreement\n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD, IIA Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024, and IMF Coordinated Direct Investment \nSurvey database, accessed 19 March 2024.\nNotes: FDI stocks estimated on the basis of information about 193 United Nations Member States’ shares of \nworld FDI inward stock for 2022. Does not include confidential and unspecified stock data. Analysis based on \n2,429 IIAs in force (2,220 BITs and 209 TIPs) with substantive investment commitments. For TIPs that include a \nrelevant regional economic integration organization, only the FDI stock of members for which the IIA is in force \nwas counted. Excludes the Energy Charter Treaty (1994) in view of its sector-specific scope. Where a new-\ngeneration IIA coexists with an old-generation IIA covering the same FDI stock without suspending its effect, \nthe relevant FDI stock is considered covered by an old-generation IIA.\nAbbreviations: BIT = bilateral investment treaty, FDI = foreign direct investment, IIA = international investment \nagreement, TIP = treaty with investment provisions.\n49\n16\n35\n45\n18\n37\n65\n8\n27\n71\n2\n27\nWorld\nDeveloped\nDeveloping\n(except least developed)\nLeast developed\nOld-generation\nNew-generation\nNot covered\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n27\nThe year witnessed the first outputs of the \nwork of the United Nations Commission on \nInternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working \nGroup III on ISDS reform. In July 2023 the \nUNCITRAL Commission adopted the Model \nProvisions and the Guidelines on Mediation \nfor International Investment Disputes, and \nthe Code of Conduct for Arbitrators in \nInternational Investment Dispute Resolution. \nIn April 2024, Working Group III finalized \nthe draft statute for the establishment of an \nadvisory centre on investment disputes.\nThe text of the Investment Facilitation for \nDevelopment Agreement was made public \non 25 February 2024 by the ministers of \n123 participating members of the World \nTrade Organization. The status of \nthe text in relation to the Organization’s \narchitecture remains to be determined. \nThe UNCTAD World Investment Forum \n2023 took place in Abu Dhabi on 16–20 \nOctober 2023 ahead of the twenty-eighth \nConference of the Parties (COP28). At the \nForum investment policymakers and experts \ndiscussed urgent reforms of the IIA regime \nin light of the climate crisis, resulting in the \nlaunch of the UNCTAD Multistakeholder \nPlatform for IIA Reform (box II.3).\nWork on diverse aspects of international \ninvestment governance continued in a \nnumber of international forums (table II.2). \nNotably, Brazil – which holds the Group \nof 20 Presidency in 2024 – identified \nsustainable development in IIAs as one \nof the key priorities for the Group of 20 \nTrade and Investment Working Group. \nThe events in the IIA track at the UNCTAD World Investment Forum 2023 brought together key actors in \nIIA reform:\nHigh-level IIA conference 2023 (18 October 2023). Investment policymakers and experts from \ngovernments, international organizations, think tanks, academia and the private sector noted the challenges \nthat the current IIA regime may pose to climate action, explored options for aligning IIAs with climate \nmitigation and adaptation goals, and called for the urgent reform of the stock of old-generation treaties. \nBased on requests by participants to identify ways to fast-track investment treaty reform for sustainable \ndevelopment and climate action, UNCTAD launched a Multi-Stakeholder Platform for IIA Reform.\nInternational policy developments in investment facilitation (19 October 2023). The session united \nkey actors in investment facilitation from Governments, development partners, private sector representatives \nand regional/international organizations, to analyse global trends and challenges in investment facilitation \npolicies for sustainable development. Speakers welcomed UNCTAD’s policy options for facilitating investment \nin sustainable development, part of the IIA Issues Note Investment Facilitation in IIAs: Trends and Policy \nOptions (UNCTAD, 2023a).\nRegional sessions (16–18 October 2023). Three sessions co-organized with key regional partner \norganizations complemented the UNCTAD World Investment Forum IIA track and highlighted the role that \nsuch organizations can play in shaping coherent international investment policies among their members:\n•\t\nD-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation – UNCTAD Guiding Principles for Investment\n•\t\nAfCFTA Investment Protocol: towards a new generation of investment policies in Africa\n•\t\nIslamic Development Bank–UNCTAD Investment Policy Principles\nSource: UNCTAD.\nNotes: For more information on the UNCTAD World Investment Forum, see https://\nworldinvestmentforum.unctad.org/wif-events-programme?event=80. For information on the \nUNCTAD Multi-Stakeholder Platform for IIA Reform, see https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/news/\nhub/1732/20231020-launch-of-multi-stakeholder-platform-for-investment-treaty-reforms.\nBox II.3\t\nUNCTAD World Investment Forum 2023 – IIA track highlights\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n28\nTable II.2\t\nWork relating to investment rule-making in international forums, \n2023–2024\nSource: UNCTAD, based on various sources.\nAbbreviations: ICC = International Chamber of Commerce, IIA = international investment agreement, ISDS \n= investor–State dispute settlement, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, \nOHCHR = Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, OIC = Organisation of Islamic \nCooperation, UNCITRAL = United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNIDROIT = International \nInstitute for the Unification of Private Law, WTO = World Trade Organization.\nOrganization/initiative\nIIA-related coverage\nMost recent outputs/events\nAmericas Partnership for Economic \nProsperity\nFinancing/investment for sustainable \ninfrastructure\nEast Room Declaration (November 2023)\nAsia-Pacific Economic Cooperation\nSustainability considerations for investment \npolicy\nSan Francisco principles on integrating \ninclusivity and sustainability into trade and \ninvestment policy (November 2023)\nDraft legally binding instrument on the \nright to development\nRight to regulate\nDraft instrument presented to Human Rights \nCouncil (September 2023)\nInteraction with the scope of IIAs\nGroup of 20 Trade and Investment \nWorking Group\nSustainable development in IIAs\nSecond meeting (April 2024)\nInvestment facilitation in IIAs\nUNCTAD-OECD Report mapping of \nsustainable development and investment \nfacilitation provisions in IIAs by Group of 20 \nmembers and invited countries (April 2024)\nInvestment Facilitation for \nDevelopment, WTO\nInvestment facilitation\nJoint Ministerial Declaration on the \nInvestment Facilitation for Development \nAgreement by participating countries \n(February 2024)\nOECD Work Programme on the Future \nof Investment Treaties\nIIAs and climate change\nOECD Investment Treaty Conference (March \n2024)\nIIA reform\nOHCHR Special Rapporteur on the issue \nof human rights obligations relating to \nthe enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy \nand sustainable environment\nISDS\nReport on risks of ISDS for the right to a \nhealthy environment (July 2023)\nSafe, clean, healthy and sustainable \nenvironment\nOIC Intergovernmental Experts Group \non ISDS\nISDS, permanent mechanism\nSecond expert meeting (September 2023)\nOIC investment agreement\nUNCITRAL Working Group III\nISDS reform\nModel provisions and guidelines on \nmediation, and codes of conduct for \narbitrators and judges adopted by the \nUNCITRAL Commission (July 2023)\nDraft statute of advisory center for ISDS \nfinalized (April 2024) \nUNCTAD\nIIA reform for sustainable development\nFirst meeting of Multi-stakeholder Platform \nfor IIA Reform (February 2024)\nPolicy analysis, technical assistance, \nconsensus building \nCapacity-building and technical assistance \non IIA reform provided for more than 90 \ncountries \nUNIDROIT and ICC Working Group\nInternational investment contracts \n(codification)\nSecond working group meeting (March 2024)\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n29\n2. Trends in investor–State dispute settlement\nThe total ISDS case count reached 1,332, with 60 new arbitrations \ninitiated in 2023. About 70 per cent of them were brought \nagainst developing countries, including three LDCs. Investors in \nconstruction, manufacturing and extractives accounted for over \nhalf of the claims.\na. New cases initiated in 2023\nIn 2023, 60 known treaty-based ISDS cases \nwere initiated – 48 cases at the International \nCentre for Settlement of Investment \nDisputes (ICSID) and 12 cases before other \nforums (figure II.22). As some arbitrations \ncan be kept confidential, the actual number \nof arbitrations filed in 2023 (and previous \nyears) is likely to be higher. In the past 10 \nyears, the total number of ISDS cases has \nmore than doubled. There were fewer than \nFigure II.22\t\nInvestor–State dispute settlement cases surpassed 1,300 at the end of \n2023 \n(Annual number of known treaty-based cases)\nSource: UNCTAD, ISDS Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\nNotes: Information has been compiled from public sources, including specialized reporting services. UNCTAD \nstatistics do not cover investor–State cases that are based exclusively on investment contracts (State \ncontracts) or national investment laws, or cases in which a party has signalled its intention to submit a claim to \nISDS but has not commenced the arbitration. Annual and cumulative case numbers are continually adjusted as \na result of verification processes and may not match exactly case numbers reported in previous years.\nAbbreviations: ICSID = International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ISDS = investor–State \ndispute settlement.\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n1987\n1993\n1997\n1995\n2001\n1999\n2005\n2003\n2007\n2015\n2013\n2011\n2009\n2017\n2021\n2019\n2023\nICSID\nNon-ICSID\nCumulative number\nof known ISDS cases\n1 332\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n30\n600 known ISDS cases at the end of 2013, \nagainst more than 1,300 at the end of 2023.\nTo date, 132 countries and one economic \ngrouping are known to have been \nrespondents to one or more ISDS claims. \nThe new cases in 2023 were initiated \nagainst 37 countries and one economic \ngrouping (the European Union). About 70 \nper cent of them were brought against \ndeveloping countries, including LDCs \n(Myanmar, Senegal and the United Republic \nof Tanzania). Mexico was the most frequent \nrespondent, with 10 new known cases. \nHonduras faced five cases, followed by \nArgentina and the Bolivarian Republic of \nVenezuela with three cases each. The largest \nshare of claims was directed at countries \nin Latin America and the Caribbean, with \nabout half of the 60 cases. In regional terms, \nbetween 1987 and 2023, respondent States \nin Europe and in Latin America and the \n9\t Fossil fuel-related cases include those related to mining of coal and lignite; extraction of crude petroleum \nand natural gas; power generation from coal, oil and gas; transportation and storage of fossil fuels; and \nmanufacture of coke and refined petroleum products.\nCaribbean each accounted for about 30 per \ncent of the total 1,332 known ISDS cases. \nDeveloped-country claimants brought most \n– about 75 per cent – of the 60 known \ncases in 2023. The highest numbers of \ncases were brought by claimants from the \nUnited States (13), the United Kingdom (8) \nand Switzerland (5). Between 1987 and \n2023, claimants invoking the IIAs of five \ncountries – the United States, the Kingdom \nof the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, \nGermany and Spain – initiated about 45 \nper cent of the 1,332 known ISDS cases.\nThe ISDS cases filed in 2023 involved \ndisputes related to several economic \nsectors (figure II.23). Construction, \nmanufacturing and extractive industries \naccounted for over half of them, with 10 \nor more cases each. By the end of 2023, \ninvestors had filed a total of 235 fossil \nfuel-related cases,9 making such activities \nConstruction\nManufacturing\nMining, oil, gas and coal extraction\nTransportation and storage\nFinancial and insurance services\nSupply of electricity, gas and related\nReal estate\nWASH and waste management\nInformation and communication\nAgriculture, forestry and fshing\nTourism and sports\n12\n10\n10\n7\n6\n6\n5\n3\n2\n2\n2\nFigure II.23\t\nConstruction, manufacturing, and extraction activities account for over \nhalf of investor–State cases filed in 2023\n(Number of known cases by sector)\nSource: UNCTAD, ISDS Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\nNote: Some cases concerned multiple sectors. \nAbbreviations: WASH = water, sanitation and hygiene.\n\n\nChapter II\nInvestment policy trends\n31\namong those most frequently brought \nto the ISDS system. Construction and \nmanufacturing activities, which commonly \ninvolve lengthy and asset-intensive projects, \nare typically prone to litigation risk.\nAbout 70 per cent of investor–State \narbitrations in 2023 were brought under \nBITs and TIPs signed in the 1990s or \nearlier. In combination, the North American \nFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (1992) \nand the Agreement between Canada, \nthe United States and Mexico (USMCA) \n(2018) were the IIAs most frequently \ninvoked in 2023. They gave rise to 11 \ncases based on so-called “legacy claims” \nunder the NAFTA. Five cases were based \non the ECT (1994), followed by the Central \nAmerica–Dominican Republic Free Trade \nAgreement (FTA) (2004) with three cases \nand the Association of Southeast Asian \nNations–Australia–New Zealand FTA \n(2009) with two cases. Between 1987 \nand 2023, about 20 per cent of the 1,332 \nknown ISDS cases invoked either the ECT \n(162 cases) or the NAFTA (92 cases).\nb. Outcomes of investor–State \ndispute settlement\nIn 2023, ISDS tribunals rendered at least 49 \nknown substantive decisions in investor–\nState disputes, 28 of which were in the \npublic domain at the time of writing. Ten of \nthe public decisions principally addressed \njurisdictional and preliminary objections. \nIn four of them, tribunals dismissed such \nobjections (at least in part) and continued \nthe arbitration proceedings; in six of them, \ntribunals upheld the objections and ceased \nthe proceedings for lack of jurisdiction or \nadmissibility. Another 18 public decisions \nwere rendered on the merits, with 9 holding \nthe State liable for IIA breaches and 9 \ndismissing all investor claims. In addition, \nsix publicly available decisions in annulment \nproceedings at ICSID were rendered. In all \nof them, the ad hoc committees of ICSID \nrejected the applications for annulment.\nBy the end of 2023, at least 958 ISDS \nproceedings had been concluded, \nleading to different results (figure II.24).\nFigure II.24\t\nOutcomes of investor–State dispute settlement cases can differ greatly\nShare of concluded cases, 1987–2023\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, ISDS Navigator database, accessed 25 March 2024.\na Decided in favour of neither party (liability found but no damages awarded).\nDecided in favour of \nState\n38\nBreach but no\ndamagesa\n3\nDiscontinued\n13\nSettled\n18\nDecided in favour of\ninvestor\n28\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n32\nNewly concluded IIAs increasingly \nincorporate proactive commitments aimed \nat improving the investment climate in the \ncontracting parties. They increasingly steer \ntowards investment facilitation commitments \n(see chapter IV.C). There is growing interest \nalso in establishing continuous cooperation \nmechanisms for investment activities, \nsometimes geared towards specific \ndevelopment objectives. The majority of \ninvestment protection elements in newly \nconcluded IIAs also continued to include \nrefinements, clarifications and flexibility \nmechanisms that aim to preserve countries’ \nright to regulate in the public interest. \nIIA reform continues to advance at a slow \npace, accentuating the dichotomy in the IIA \nregime between newer and older treaties. \nOld-generation IIAs continue to dominate \nthe regime as much in terms of number of \nIIAs in force as in coverage of FDI stock. \nThey also continue to form the basis of \nmost ISDS cases. Developing countries \n– and LDCs in particular – are the most \ndisadvantaged by the slow pace of reform, \nas their exposure to the risks of ISDS is \nsignificantly higher than that of developed \neconomies. In addition, the dichotomy is \nproducing a progressively more complex \nIIA regime with overlapping and sometimes \ncontradictory commitments, making it \ndifficult for countries to navigate, especially \ndeveloping ones and least developed ones. \nUNCTAD’s Multi-Stakeholder Platform \nfor IIA Reform, established in 2023 as an \noutcome of UNCTAD’s World Investment \nForum, aims to fast-track IIA reform and \nunderscores the importance of providing \nan inclusive forum that promotes the \nalignment of investment governance with \nsustainable development priorities. Since \n2012, UNCTAD has played a leading role in \nfacilitating IIA reform action by developing \ncore policy guidance tools. UNCTAD will \ncontinue to work with all stakeholders to \nbuild the capacity of country negotiators \nand policymakers to ensure that the IIA \nregime works for – rather than impedes \n– sustainable development objectives.\n* * *\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable \nfinance trends\n\n\nRegulations and standards are proliferating; greenwashing remains a challenge\nStock exchanges help drive \nsustainability disclosure\nThe sustainable finance market grew but signs of a slowdown persist\nMore institutional investors\nreported on sustainability\nperformance in 2023\nSustainable bond market\nSustainable fund market\nSustainable finance regulation\nSustainability disclosure\nGlobal issuance, 2023: $872 billion\nCumulative issuance since 2018: $4 trillion\n2022\n2023\n63\n94\nGreen\nSocial\nSustainability\nSustainability-\nlinked\n587\n154\n109\n22\nMarket value, 2023: $3 trillion\n+7%\nNet inflows\n($ billions)\n-89%\n2018\n2019\n2020\n557\n2021\n161\n2022\n63\n2023\n58 public pension funds and\nsovereign wealth funds report…\n50% growth in sustainable\nfinance measures, 2023\nDeveloping economies: \n60% of new policies\n59% provide written guidance\n31% enforce mandatory rules\n…but only 17 target fossil\nfuel divestment and renewables\ninvestment\nTop\n100\n58\n42\n17 countries adopted\nnew ISSB standards\nGreenwashing: only 20%\nof “green fund” portfolios are\nexposed to climate-positive assets\nprovide training\n66%\n3%\n12%\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n79\nA. Sustainability-themed capital \nmarket products\nThe sustainable finance market continues to grow. In 2023, the \nvalue of sustainable investment products, encompassing bonds \nand funds,1 reached more than $7 trillion, a 20 per cent increase \nfrom 2022. Although the picture is nuanced, the overall positive \ntrend in the sustainable finance market points to continued investor \nconfidence and the resilience of sustainable investment strategies. \nSustainable bonds were the main driver of growth in sustainable \ncapital market products. Issuance climbed to $872 billion, a 3 per \ncent rise from 2022, bringing the cumulative value of the market \nsince 2018 to more than $4 trillion. Despite continued growth in \nnumber and asset value, though, sustainable funds experienced \nstrong headwinds in 2023. Net inflows dropped from $161 billion \nin 2022 to $63 billion in 2023. Greenwashing remains the most \nsignificant challenge to the sustainable fund market.\n1. Sustainable bond markets\n1\t This chapter covers publicly traded sustainable finance products only, namely bonds and funds. It excludes \nderivatives whose value may be unrealized, as well as voluntary carbon markets, whose value  - for now  - \nremains insignificant \nGlobal issuance of green, social, \nsustainability and sustainability-linked \nbonds (box III.1) has grown fourfold since \n2018. As a share of global bond markets, \nthe sustainable segment represented 5 \nper cent in 2023, unchanged from 2022. \nThis consistent share as well as record \nlevels of outstanding bonds and increased \nannual issuance of sustainable bonds signal \nthe rising importance of such bonds as \na mechanism for financing sustainable \ndevelopment. However, the near-record \nlevels of issuance of green bonds and \nsustainability-linked bonds were offset by \nfalls in issuance of social and sustainability \nbonds – partly related to the phasing out of \nsocial and sustainability bonds related to the \ncoronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic \n(generally referred to as COVID-response \nbonds) – which contributed to a slowing in \nthe five-year compound annual growth rate \nof the sustainable bond segment (figure III.1).\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n80\nBox III.1\t\nWhat is the difference between green, social, sustainability and \nsustainability-linked bonds?\nAll four types of sustainable bonds are fixed-income securities designed to target sustainable outcomes while offering a \nfinancial return to investors. Green, social and sustainability bonds are generally tied to the financing of a specific project or \nuse of proceeds, whereas sustainability-linked bonds instead integrate in their design a level of sustainability performance \n(such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions).\nGreen bonds raise funds specifically for projects with environmental benefits, such as renewable energy or pollution \nprevention, with issuers providing transparency on how the proceeds are used. These bonds are typically linked to assets \nand backed by the issuer’s balance sheet. Historically, the focus has been on direct financing of physical assets and \nprojects and indirect financing thereof (e.g. loans to suitable assets or projects).\nSocial bonds raise funds for projects with positive social outcomes, such as education, health care, affordable housing \nand employment generation, especially for underserved or marginalized communities. Issuers of social bonds also commit \nto transparency regarding the use of proceeds and the impact of the projects funded, ensuring that investors can see \nthe social benefits derived from their investments.\nSustainability bonds combine elements of both green and social bonds to finance projects with both environmental and \nsocial benefits. The proceeds from these bonds are used to fund a diverse range of initiatives, such as renewable energy \nprojects, water conservation, sustainable agriculture, affordable housing and health-care facilities. Sustainability bonds are \nalso designed for investors looking to support comprehensive projects that contribute to the Sustainable Development \nGoals. Like green and social bonds, issuers of sustainability bonds provide transparency and reporting on the allocation \nof proceeds and the impact of the projects financed, ensuring accountability and alignment with sustainability objectives.\nSustainability-linked bonds tie the cost of financing to key performance indicators of sustainability. These bonds \ndiffer from green, social and sustainability bonds in their structure and objectives. Whereas traditional green, social \nand sustainability bonds focus on financing or refinancing projects that have specific environmental or social benefits, \nsustainability-linked bonds are uniquely characterized by their performance-based approach. The financial or structural \ncharacteristics of the bond (such as the interest rate) are directly linked to the issuer’s achievement of predefined \nsustainability targets. Transparency and credibility are maintained through regular reporting on progress towards the \ntargets and through third-party verification to ensure objectives are met, making these bonds a powerful tool for promoting \nsustainability in finance.\nSources: UNCTAD and Climate Bonds Initiative.\nFigure III.1\t\nThe sustainable bond market recovered in 2023, aided by green \nbond growth\nGlobal sustainable bond issuance by year and by category\n(Billions of dollars and percentage year-on-year growth)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative.\n227\n358\n716\n1 015\n843\n872\n587\n154\n109\n22\n+27%\n+58%\n+100%\n+42%\n-17%\n+3%\n+15%\n-7%\n-31%\n+83%\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nGreen\nSocial\nSustainability Sustainability-\nlinked\nTotal sustainable bond market\n25%\nCAGR\n2018−2023\n$4 trillion\ncumulative \nissuance since \n2018\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n81\nIssuers based in Europe account for 46 \nper cent of the global market, with 2023 \nissuance up slightly from 2022 (figure III.2). \nThe Asia-Pacific region accounted for a \nthird of total issuance, a rise of nearly 40 per \ncent from 2022. Issuers in North America \naccounted for 11 per cent of the global \nmarket in 2023. Supranational issuance, \nwhich is an important source of sustainable \nbonds, fell to $24 billion in 2023, from $106 \nbillion in 2022, a drop of 77 per cent. \nReflecting this regional distribution, the \neuro is the most common currency used \nfor sustainable debt issuance, accounting \nfor over 40 per cent of total cumulative \nissuance to date (in equivalent United \nStates dollars). This is followed by the \ndollar (30 per cent), renminbi (9 per cent) \nand pound sterling (4 per cent), with the \nremaining 17 per cent in other currencies. \nDeveloping countries that issue bonds in \nmajor reserve currencies while generating \nrevenues in local currencies encounter \ncurrency mismatch risks. Investors, \nespecially large institutional ones, often \nhave better access to a variety of financial \ninstruments such as futures, options or \nswaps, allowing them to hedge against \nthese currency risks. However, this \nhedging can lead to demand for higher \nyields to compensate for the additional \nrisks, ultimately increasing the costs of \nfinancing. The involvement of international \ndevelopment finance institutions such as \nthe World Bank, the International Finance \nCorporation and regional development \nbanks can be crucial in mitigating \nthese risks and reducing the financing \ncosts linked to currency mismatches in \nbond issuances (UNCTAD, 2023f). In \naddition, deepening local capital markets \nand issuing debt instruments in local \ncurrencies can also be effective, ensuring \nthat sustainable bonds make a greater \ncontribution to sustainable outcomes. \nIn terms of cumulative issuance (outstanding \ndebt), supranational issuance remains \nlarger than any single country and thus \nan important generator of finance for \nsustainable projects. As a group, developing \ncountries remain underrepresented in global \nsustainable bond markets, even compared \nwith traditional bond markets, although \nChina and Chile rank among the top 15 \nissuers for cumulative sustainable bond \nissuance, with $431 billion and $53 billion, \nrespectively, at the end of the third quarter \nof 2023. Their sustainable bond issuance \nhas been helped by strong policy support \nFigure III.2\t\nEuropean issuers of sustainable bonds lead the market\nGlobal sustainable bond issuance by region, 2023\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change from 2022)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative and Environmental Finance.\na Percentage change not available because data source and coverage for 2022 differed.\nAsia-Pacifc\nNorth America\nLatin America and the Caribbean\nSupranational\nAfricaa\n288\nEurope\n405\n97\n54\n24\n4\n+0.75%\n+39%\n-28%\n+74%\n-77%\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n82\nfor the growth of local and international \nmarkets (Climate Bonds Initiative, 2023).\nFinancial and non-financial corporate entities \nwere the largest issuers of sustainable \nbonds in 2023, followed by government-\nbacked entities (figure III.3). Among the \nlatter, public pension and sovereign wealth \nfunds (PPFs and SWFs) have become more \nactive issuers of sustainable debt as well \nas more active buyers. Sovereign issuers, \nthe next largest issuer type, account for \none tenth of total cumulative issuance of \nsustainable bonds but about two thirds of \nthe overall debt market, suggesting that \nthere is significant potential to expand \nthe share of sovereign debt in sustainable \nbond markets (Climate Bonds Initiative).\na. Green bonds\nThe value of green bonds issued grew 15 \nper cent to $587 billion in 2023, from $509 \nbillion in 2022, representing two thirds of \nsustainable bond issuance. Looking at \nuse of proceeds categories, this strong \ngrowth – reversing 2022 trends – was \nmainly driven by increases in the energy, \ntransport, information and communication \ntechnology, waste and industry sectors \n(figure III.4). The increase was also \nsupported by a recovery in sustainable \nbonds issued by financial corporates to \n$163 billion, eclipsing the record highs of \n2021, and by non-financial corporates to \n$172 billion, which was just short of the \n2021 high point of $174 billion. Notably, \nsovereign issuance jumped 45 per cent to \n$120 billion in 2023, up from $83 billion in \n2022 and surging past the previous all-time \nhigh in 2021 of $92 billion (figure III.5). \nIn a year of declining values for some \nsustainable equity investments, the rising \ndemand for green bonds in 2023 could \nbe the result of investors looking for lower-\nrisk routes to gain exposure to sustainable \nsectors and/or emerging markets, in \naddition to a general rebalancing towards \nfixed income in an environment of higher \ninterest rates. Research by the Climate \nBonds Initiative has shown that investors \nare willing to absorb a “greenium” (lower \nyield and/or higher price) that is usually \nassociated with green bonds, indicating \nthe strength of demand for green versus \ntraditional bonds (Climate Bonds Initiative, \n2021). On the supply side, the rise in \nsovereign issuance may be helping \ncountries to diversify their investor base \nand provide credibility to green policies. \nFigure III.3\t\nCorporate issuers dominated sustainable bond issuance in 2023\nGlobal sustainable bond issuance by issuer type\n(Billions of dollars)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative.\nGreen\nSustainability-linked\nSocial\nSustainability\nNon-fnancial corporate\n172\n22\n13\n2\nFinancial corporate\n163\n25\n1\n17\nGovernment-backed entity\n73\n91\n11\nSovereign\n120\n25\n7 6\nDevelopment bank\n48\n15\n10\nLocal government\n18\n12\n18\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n83\nb. Social, sustainability and \nsustainability-linked bonds\nThe values of both social and sustainability \nbond issuance both fell in 2023. Social \nbonds issuance declined by 7 per cent, \nfrom $165 billion to $153 billion, while that \nof sustainability bonds fell by 30 per cent, \nfrom $157 billion to $109 billion. Despite \nthe growing awareness of climate and \nenvironmental sustainability issues and the \nopening of more investment opportunities \nin social and sustainable projects, both \ntypes of bonds continued falling to pre-\npandemic levels of issuance (figure III.6). \nThe fall is likely directly related to recovery \nFigure III.4\t\nEnergy, transport and buildings accounted for 75 per cent of the green \nbond market in 2023 \nGlobal green bond issuance by sector\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative.\nEnergy\nTransport\nGreen buildings\nLand use and marine resources\nWater\nWaste\nClimate adaptation and resilience\nInformation and communication \ntechnology\nIndustry\n35\n22\n18\n6\n6\n5\n4\n2\n2\nFigure III.5\t\nSovereign issuance of green bonds saw the largest gains in 2023 \nGreen bond market size by type of issuer\n(Billions of dollars and percentage change from 2022)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative.\n+35%\n+13%\n+45%\n-26%\n+2%\n–\nNon-financial corporate\n172\nFinancial corporate\n163\nSovereign\n120\nGovernment-backed entity\n73\nDevelopment bank\n48\nLocal government\n12\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n84\nfrom the pandemic, during which the \nvalue of COVID-response bonds surged \n– momentum that has now subsided. \nNevertheless, together these two categories \nstill represent 38 per cent of cumulative \nsustainable bond issuance since 2018.\nIn contrast, the annual issuance of \nsustainability-linked bonds increased 83 \nper cent, from $12 billion in 2022 to $22 \nbillion in 2023. This continues a constant \nannual increase since the introduction of \nthe first such bond by Enel (Italy) in 2019, \nbringing cumulative issuance of such bonds \nto $47 billion. Unlike green, social and \nsustainability bonds, sustainability-linked \nbonds are not tied to use of proceeds. This \npotentially gives issuers more flexibility but \nmay also call into question the sustainability \nimpact of this debt instrument, reflected in \nthe lower alignment of this category with \nsustainability screening criteria (for further \ndiscussion, see WIR 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020).\nLatin America and the Caribbean is the \nonly region where the value of outstanding \nsocial, sustainability and sustainability-\nlinked bonds is higher than that of green \nbonds; they account for more than 90 \nper cent of total cumulative issuance, \naccording to the Climate Bonds Initiative. \nDespite social bond issuance there \nbeing on a par with that in Europe and in \nAsia, the region could be missing out on \nconsiderable financing opportunities in the \ngreen bond segment, especially in sectors \nsuch as energy, transport and industry. \nIn 2023, social bonds were more favoured \nby government-backed entities and financial \ncorporate entities. Sustainability bonds \nwere more popular with local government, \nnon-financial corporates and sovereign \nissuers. Sustainability-linked bonds were \noverwhelmingly favoured by non-financial \ncorporates and sovereign lenders.\nFigure III.6\t\nSocial and sustainability bond issuance continued to decline in 2023 \n(Billions of dollars)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from Climate Bonds Initiative.\n15\n39\n15\n68\n238\n169\n212\n199\n165\n157\n154\n109\nSocial\nSustainability\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n$1.5 trillion\ncumulative \nissuance since \n2018\n-7%\ncombined CAGR\n2020–2023\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n85\n2. Sustainable funds\na. Market trends\nThe sustainable fund market continued to \nexpand in 2023, albeit at a slower pace. \nThe number of sustainability-themed funds \nworldwide reached 7,485, up 7 per cent \nfrom 2022. These funds remain highly \nconcentrated in Europe and the United \nStates, representing 73 per cent and 9 per \ncent of the global market, respectively. The \nshare of the market in the rest of the world \nincreased slightly, from 16 per cent to 19 per \ncent, with growth witnessed in Australia and \nCanada and in developing Asia (figure III.7).\nThe total assets of sustainable funds \nreached almost $3 trillion in 2023, mainly \ndriven by rising share prices in equity \nmarkets, in particular in Europe and the \nUnited States. Europe remains by far \nthe largest market, with assets of nearly \n$2.5 trillion, or 85 per cent of the global \nmarket. The value of sustainable funds in \nthe United States increased from $286 \nbillion in 2022 to $324 billion in 2023, \nrepresenting about 11 per cent of the global \nmarket. The market share in the rest of \nthe world remains at about 5 per cent. \nAlthough the increasing number and value of \nsustainable funds indicate continued growth, \nsustainable funds faced a challenging \nenvironment in 2023. High interest rates, \nlagging performance, lukewarm demand and \nrising concerns about greenwashing issues \nall contributed to growing uncertainties in \nthe market. As a result, the number of new \nlaunches has continued to drop, from a \nrecord high of 240 in the fourth quarter of \n2021 to 121 in the fourth quarter of 2023. \nIn total, 565 launches were recorded in \n2023, down from 682 in 2022. The decline \nwas more than offset by the restructuring of \nconventional funds into sustainable ones, \nin particular in Europe, leading to continued \nexpansion of the universe of sustainable \nfunds. Sustainability-themed funds remain \nan important tool to tilt capital markets \nFigure III.7\t\nThe market value of sustainable funds recovered in 2023, reaching a \nrecord high \n(Billions of dollars and number) \nSource: UNCTAD, based on Morningstar data.\n277\n262\n302\n389\n428\n673\n1 460\n2 231\n2 078\n2 492\n49\n51\n63\n82\n89\n140\n236\n74\n357\n286\n324\n40\n56\n68\n91\n106\n83\n112\n1 714\n7 485\n0 \n1 000\n2 000\n3 000\n4 000\n5 000\n6 000\n7 000\n8 000\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nEurope\nUnited States\nRest of the world\nNumber of sustainable funds\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n86\ntowards more sustainable investment and \nthus direct capital to sectors and areas that \ncan contribute to sustainable development. \nNet investment flows to sustainable funds \nalso continued to drop, from $161 billion \nin 2022 to $63 billion in 2023, marking \na significant decrease from the record \nof $557 billion set in 2021 (figure III.8). \nThroughout 2023, European sustainable \nfunds received net investment inflows of \n$76 billion, nearly halved from the $149 \nbillion of 2022. In addition to a challenging \nmacroeconomic environment and persistent \ngeopolitical risks, some investors have \nremained cautious about environmental, \nsocial and governance (ESG) investing \nbecause of the overall underperformance \nin 2022 and lukewarm returns from popular \nsustainable investment assets, such as \nrenewables, in 2023. However, compared \nwith annual outflows of $50 billion from \nEuropean conventional funds, the European \nsustainable fund market has remained \nrelatively resilient, demonstrating continued \ninterest by investors in this asset category.\nThe investment momentum in sustainable \nfunds in the United States reversed \ncompletely in 2023. Following a surge in \ninflows in 2020 and 2021 ($290 billion \nand $472 billion, respectively), new \ninflows plummeted to only $3 billion in \n2022. Moreover, 2023 marked the first \nannual outflows, which totalled $13 \nbillion. In addition to dismal returns, \npersisting greenwashing concerns and a \nbacklash against sustainable investment \nstrategies in the United States market \n(see section C.2) also contributed \nto a chilling effect on demand.\nIn terms of financial performance, \nsustainable equity funds underperformed \nrelative to conventional funds for the second \nconsecutive year (Henry and Furdak, \n2024). Article 9 funds, the “dark green” \nproducts known for their commitment \nto specific sustainable investment \nobjectives and substantive approach to \nsustainability integration under the European \nUnion Sustainable Finance Disclosure \nRegulation (SFDR), underperformed their \nbenchmark by more than 6 per cent in \n2023. Article 8 funds, the “light green” \nproducts that take environmental or social \nsustainability into consideration in asset \nallocation, also underperformed, but by \na narrower margin of less than 1 per \ncent. Only Article 6 funds, which do not \nincorporate sustainability considerations \ninto their investment strategies beyond \nbasic ESG risk assessments, nearly \nmatched their benchmarks.\nFigure III.8\t\nNet flows to sustainable funds continued their slide in 2023 \n(Billions of dollars) \nSource: UNCTAD, based on Morningstar data.\na The figure for 2022 has been updated since its publication in WIR 2023.\n28\n24\n33\n72\n60\n159\n352\n557\n161\n63\n2014\n2015\n2017\n2016\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022a\n2023\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n87\nThis disparity in performance may be \nattributed to short-term market dynamics \nthat work against some popular sectors \nin sustainable investments. Renewable \nenergy, for example, has been particularly \naffected by elevated interest rates, since \nthe sector is particularly characterized by \nhigher upfront costs and lower operational \nexpenses over time. Such short-term \nfluctuations should not overshadow \nthe long-term benefits of sustainable \ninvesting, underscoring the importance \nof taking a long-term perspective.\nb. The greenwashing challenge\nAs sustainable investment products gain \npopularity, concerns about greenwashing \nare also growing. Greenwashing poses \nthe most significant challenge to the \nsustainable fund market, primarily because \nof the lack of specific product standards \nfor sustainable funds, including in leading \nmarkets. UNCTAD analysis of global green \nfunds published in WIR 2023 revealed \nthat their average net exposure to climate-\npositive assets (low-carbon assets minus \ntotal fossil fuels) is slightly more than 20 \nper cent, casting doubt on their proclaimed \ngreen credentials. According to Morningstar \ndata, just over 20 per cent of Article 9 funds \nreported minimum sustainable investments \naligned with the European Union taxonomy \nbetween 0 and 10 per cent, and only 8 per \ncent target taxonomy-aligned investments \nof at least 10 per cent. Meanwhile, only \n4 per cent are completely free from oil \nand gas investments, and 15 per cent \nallocate more than 5 per cent of their \nassets to oil and gas as of December 2023 \n(Bioy et al., 2024). These figures suggest \nthat, even among products regarded \nas “dark green”, a substantial portion \nmight not live up to their sustainability \nclaims. It is not surprising that concerns \nabout greenwashing have dampened \ninvestor demand, partly explaining the \nloss of momentum in investment within \nthe European market and leading to \noutflows in the United States market. \nThe persistence of greenwashing has \ndemonstrated that more systemic efforts \nare needed to tackle the issue. In response \nto concerns about the implementation \nof the SFDR, in December 2023 the \nEuropean Union Commission launched a \nconsultation with the industry and other \nstakeholders on a general review of the \nregulation, focusing on bringing more \nclarity and credibility to the sustainable \nfund market so as to tackle greenwashing \nconcerns. This consultation addresses \ncritical issues such as the interaction with \nthe European Union taxonomy and other \nsustainable finance legislation, potential \nchanges to disclosure requirements and \nthe establishment of a categorization \nsystem for financial products. In parallel, the \nEuropean Supervisory Authorities published \na final report amending the draft Regulatory \nTechnical Standards for the Delegated \nRegulation supplementing the SFDR. The \nreport proposes additional social indicators \nfor disclosing the principal adverse impacts \nof investment decisions on the environment \nand society, new product disclosure \nrequirements regarding GHG emissions \nreduction and improvements to disclosures \non the “do no significant harm” principle. \nThese measures are designed to bring more \nclarity to the SFDR and its implementation \nstandards and enhance its consistency \nwith the European Union Taxonomy \nRegulation with the aim of improving its \nrobustness and effectiveness in addressing \ngreenwashing. (For further discussion \nof policy responses to greenwashing \nin other countries, see section C.)\nThe complexity of defining and combating \ngreenwashing underscores the critical need \nfor clear, verifiable sustainability disclosure \nrules and effective enforcement to ensure \nmarket integrity. In addition, it is essential \nto establish well-defined rules and product \nstandards that clearly outline the criteria \nrequired for a product to be labelled as \nsustainable. Moreover, reliance on self-\nassessment should be replaced by external \nauditing and third-party ratings to ensure \nmarket transparency and credibility.\nExposure \nto climate-\npositive assets \nonly 20 per \ncent, casting \ndoubt on green \ncredentials\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n88\nB. Sovereign and public institutional \ninvestors\nInstitutional investors made progress on sustainability performance \nand \ncompliance \nwith \ninternational \nsustainability \nreporting \nstandards in 2023. Since UNCTAD began monitoring in 2019, the \nnumber of these funds that report has grown from one in four to \nalmost three in five. Nevertheless, this means that a significant \nnumber of these funds still do not disclose any information on their \nsustainability performance. SWFs and PPFs, with their long-term \ninvestment horizons, continued to integrate sustainability into their \ninvestment strategies and improve their climate risk management. \nYet, a majority of funds still have not committed to net zero in \ntheir investment strategies. Both SWFs and PPFs must comply \nwith a range of reporting standards and obligations and have tried \nto keep pace with the rapidly evolving international landscape for \nsustainability reporting, especially on climate action. \nWith assets of more than $30 trillion at \nthe end of 2023 – a significant portion \noriginating from developing economies – \nSWFs and PPFs have received growing \nattention as potential sources of investment, \nespecially in sectors relevant to the \nSustainable Development Goals and in \ndeveloping countries. As the world’s largest \ninstitutional asset owners, some SWFs and \nPPFs have substantial market influence \nthrough their allocation decisions and \nstrategic influence over the investments \nthey hold through active ownership. PPFs \nand SWFs also differ from other investors \nin terms of their liabilities, which are \ngenerally long term, and their mandates, \nwhich are often aligned with public policy \nobjectives, such as achieving net zero. \nHowever, these funds are not always \nrequired to disclose and report on their \ngovernance or sustainability performance. \nRobust regulatory and policy frameworks \nare needed to ensure that institutional \ninvestment can contribute to the sustainable \ndevelopment agenda, especially in \ndeveloping countries. For many funds, \nfiduciary obligations still limit their \nexposure to sustainable sectors and \nto developing countries, which have a \nhigher risk premium. Addressing this \nchallenge may require education and \ntraining for funds about markets and \nopportunities in developing countries. \nUNCTAD analysis of the top 100 institutional \nasset owners identified 70 PPFs and \n30 SWFs, representing more than $24 \ntrillion in assets under management in \n2023, or 80 per cent of global PPF and \nSWF assets. More than two thirds of the \ntop 100 are from developed economies; \nSWFs are predominantly based in \ndeveloping countries (figure III.9).\nIn 2023, some 58 of them reported on \ntheir sustainability performance, either in a \ndedicated sustainability report or in annual \nfinancial reporting. Among these funds, \nPPFs are, in general, relatively better at \ndisclosing sustainability-related information \n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n89\nthan SWFs (60 per cent of PPFs disclose, \nagainst just over 50 per cent of SWFs). \nDisclosure is strongly linked to the regulatory \nenvironment in a fund’s jurisdiction. Europe \nstands out, where 90 per cent of the funds \nreport on sustainability performance, a figure \nrelated to the more comprehensive reporting \nrequirements of the European Union. \nAmong the funds that report, Canadian \npension funds make up the majority of \nthose in North America, again reflecting \nthe relatively advanced regulatory \nenvironment in that country. Conversely, \n2\t Economist Intelligence Unit (2023), Anti-ESG sentiment in the US weakens ESG markets, 29 June, https://\nwww.eiu.com/n/anti-esg-sentiment-in-the-us-weakens-esg-markets.\n3\t UNCTAD Sustainable Finance Regulation Platform: http://gsfo.org. \nsome funds in the United States recently \nexperienced pushback against their \nsustainable investment strategies and \nsustainability disclosure at the State level \nas well as from public campaigning.2 \nAmong the top 100, developing-country \nfunds tend to report on sustainability \nperformance less than developed-country \nfunds. A majority of funds in the emerging \nAsia-Pacific markets do report, but even \nin countries that have relatively advanced \npolicy environments, such as China \nand Singapore (see section C),3 several \nFigure III.9\t\nThe top 100 sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds manage \n$24 trillion in assets \nFunds by type and by region and economic grouping\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on Global SWF (2023).\nAbbreviations: PPF = public pension fund, SWF = sovereign wealth fund.\n$24\ntrillion\nMiddle East\n11\nEmerging\nAsia-Pacifc\n9\nDeveloped Asia-Pacifc\n4\nNorth America\n2\nEurope\n3\nAfrica\n1\nMiddle East\n2\nEmerging Asia-Pacifc\n7\nDeveloped Asia-Pacifc\n12\nNorth America\n33\nEurope\n15\nAfrica\n1\nDeveloped-\neconomy\nfunds\n69\nDeveloping-\neconomy\nfunds\n31\nPPFs\n70\nSWFs\n30\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n90\nfunds in the top 100 do not report. This \nreflects some implementation challenges \nand weaker disclosure obligations in \nthese jurisdictions. In the Middle East, a \nregion with many SWFs, fewer than one \nin three SWFs – and no PPF – reports \nsustainability-related information, indicating \nthat policy measures to strengthen \nsustainability reporting would be helpful.\nDespite advances, the dichotomy in \ndisclosure persists. Forty-two funds \nstill do not report on their sustainability \nperformance. This group includes almost \nhalf of the SWFs in the top 100, with a \nnoticeable concentration in the Middle East \nand emerging Asia. In the case of PPFs, the \ntendency not to report is skewed towards \nNorth America. This is partly the result of the \nweight of these regions in the top 100 but \nalso likely related to regulatory requirements \nthat are weaker than in Europe. \nAt the same time, the funds that do report \nexhibit some of the most advanced policies \non sustainability integration. They are making \nsustained efforts to address sustainability \nrisks, both for the material threat to their \nbusiness models and out of an ethical \nstance towards future generations. This \ngroup of asset owners comprises many \nfirst movers, several of which have been \naddressing sustainability issues for many \nyears already and now employ, for example, \ncomplex climate modelling analysis and \nvaluation models and rigorous screening \nof investments. The following analysis is \nbased on the public disclosures of the \n58 reporting funds in the top 100. \n1. Sustainability integration strategies and practices\nMost reporting funds articulate a clear \nvision for sustainability integration and have \nimplemented policies and guidelines to \nmanage sustainability risk, such as specific \nstrategies on climate change mitigation. \nMany funds have also created dedicated \nsustainable investment teams. Yet, despite \nthe existence of such climate strategies, \nonly one in three of these funds reported a \ntarget for fossil fuel divestment in 2023, a \nshare unchanged from the preceding year.\na. Investment strategies\nSustainability risk has been driving PPF and \nSWF investment strategies and decision-\nmaking for several years. In 2023, 9 out \nof every 10 funds reported the general \nintegration of sustainability considerations \nin their investment strategies (figure III.10). \nFour out of every five funds reported the \nintegration of social and governance \ndimensions in their investment strategies by \ntaking into account issues such as labour \nrights, executive pay, tax contributions \nand board diversity. A similar number of \nfunds also reported impact strategies, \nespecially on the environmental side; \nthese can involve sectoral targeting, \nsuch as renewables, and capital market \ninstruments, such as green or sustainability \nbonds. Less than half mentioned the \nintegration of the Sustainable Development \nGoals in their investment decisions. \nAnother way funds integrate a sustainability \nperspective in their investment strategies \nis through active ownership. In 2023, \nalmost 80 per cent report engagement with \ntheir investees (figure III.11). This enables \nfunds to influence the behaviour of their \nportfolio holdings through discussion or \nvoting for policy changes. While more than \ntwo thirds of funds reported providing \nguidance on ESG criteria and Goals criteria \nto their asset managers and investees, \nless than a quarter offered their asset \nmanagers training on these topics.\n58 of top 100 \nPPFs and SWFs \nreported on \nsustainability \nperformance \nin 2023\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n91\nFigure III.10\t\nSustainability shapes investment strategies used by funds in 2023 \n(Percentage of reporting funds) \nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting (2023); some latest reports from 2021 and 2022.\nNote: Funds can report more than one strategy.\nAbbreviation: ESG = environmental, social and governance.\na Includes issues related to child labour, diversity and others.\nb Includes issues related to to executive pay, board diversity, tax and others.\nc Includes ESG-oriented sectors (e.g. renewable energy, green housing) or capital market instruments\n(e.g. green bonds, ESG funds) or markets (emerging and developing economies) in ESG investment.\nGeneral integration of sustainability\nconsiderations\nIntegration of social dimensiona\nIntegration of governance dimensionb\nImpact investmentc\nNegative screening or exclusion\nPositive or best-in-class screening\nIntegration of Sustainable\nDevelopment Goals considerations\n91\n84\n80\n79\n61\n59\n45\nFigure III.11\t\nInstitutional investors are active owners of their assets \n(Percentage of reporting funds)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting (2023); some latest reports from 2021 and 2022.\nAbbreviation: ESG = environmental, social and governance;\nActive engagement activities\nGuidance on ESG (and Sustainable\nDevelopment Goals) provided to\nasset managers or investees\nVoting policy that takes ESG factors\ninto account\nTraining provided for asset managers or\ninvestees\n79\n68\n63\n23\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n92\nb. Climate-related actions \nReporting funds demonstrate significant \nengagement on climate change mitigation, \nwith 9 out of 10 funds having developed \nspecific strategies addressing climate \nissues. This is partly the result of regulations \nand fund commitments in this area and \npartly because of the nature of climate-\nrelated reporting metrics available to \nfunds. Nonetheless, while this commitment \nis significant, the actions taken vary in \ndepth and potential effectiveness and \npoint to areas for further development.\nFunds are more likely to set targets for \ninvestment in renewable energy than to \ndefine a target for divestment from fossil \nfuels, with just under a third of funds \ndoing both (figure III.12). Among those \nthat do have targets for both, funds \nin Europe, particularly those in Nordic \ncountries, take the lead with a dual strategy \nthat includes significant investments in \nrenewable energy and assertive fossil fuel \ndivestments. This approach aligns with the \ncomprehensive climate policies in Europe \nand reflects strategic diversification. This \nis also true for hydrocarbon funds, such \nas Norges Bank Investment Management \n(Norway), which are transitioning towards \nmore sustainable energy solutions. \nDespite robust investments in renewable \nenergies, PPFs in North America \ntake varied approaches to fossil fuel \ndivestment, influenced by diverse state-\nlevel policies and public opinion. PPFs, \nsuch as the Healthcare of Ontario Pension \nPlan (Canada) and the New York State \nCommon Retirement Fund (United States), \nlean heavily towards renewable energy \ninvestments, but these funds are less \nproactive in divesting from fossil fuels. This \ndifference reflects the balancing act between \nsustainable commitments and funds’ \nfiduciary duty to ensure stable returns. \nMiddle Eastern and African funds, such \nas Mubadala (United Arab Emirates), \nwhich receives funding from sources \nin the hydrocarbons industry, and the \nPublic Investment Corporation (South \nAfrica), which is linked to an energy sector \nstill dependent on coal, temper their \napproach. The result is a careful balance \nbetween exploring renewable energy \ninvestments and maintaining stakes in \nfossil fuels. This nuanced approach reflects \nthe complex interplay between these \nFigure III.12\t\nOnly 30 per cent of funds have targets for renewables investment and \nfossil fuel divestment\nFunds by type of target\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting (2023); some latest reports from 2021 and 2022.\nTarget for investment \nin renewable energy\n22\nTarget for divestment \nfrom fossil fuels\n2\nTargets for both\n17\nNo targets for either\n17\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n93\nregions’ economic priorities, including \nemployment in fossil fuel industries, and \ntheir sustainable development objectives.\nAmong funds that have committed to \nachieving net zero or carbon neutrality, \nmost have set the target year of \n2050. Some have set more ambitious \ntargets, while others, particularly those \nassociated with hydrocarbon sectors, \nhave set later targets, such as 2060. \nThree quarters of reporting funds have \nadopted sophisticated, systematic climate \nrisk assessment strategies. This signifies \na commitment by a majority of reporting \nfunds to integrate climate risk into their \nrisk management frameworks, aiming \nto mitigate vulnerabilities and exposure \nto transitional and physical risks, and to \nexplore new opportunities (table III.1). North \nAmerican funds, such as the California \nState Teachers’ Retirement System, are \npioneers in climate scenario analysis, \nexploring how various global warming \nscenarios could influence its portfolio. SWFs \nin oil-rich regions often integrate broader \nrisk management approaches, possibly \nbecause of their exposure to the fluctuating \ndynamics of the energy sector amid global \ndecarbonization efforts. Sectoral analysis \nis gaining traction among European funds, \nwhich scrutinize specific industries for \nclimate-related vulnerabilities, allowing for \nmore targeted risk mitigation efforts. About \n20 per cent of funds also conduct climate \nstress testing of their investment portfolio.\nTable III.1\t\nMost funds systematically assess sustainability and climate risk\nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting (2023); some latest reports from 2021 and 2022.\nNote: Number of reporting funds = 41.\nCategory\nNumber of funds\nIntegrated risk management\n25\nClimate scenario analysis\n20\nSectorial analysis\n7\nStress testing\n7\nPortfolio testing\n6\n2. Sustainability disclosure\na. Reporting frameworks and \nstandards used by funds\nIn 2023, PPFs and SWFs maintained \ntheir commitment to the standardization \nof sustainability reporting. The Task \nForce on Climate-related Financial \nDisclosures (TCFD) and the Principles \nfor Responsible Investment are the two \nmain frameworks that funds use for their \nsustainability reporting (figure III.13). \nFollowing closely are the new International \nFinancial Reporting Standards (IFRS) \nSustainability Disclosure Standards set by \nthe International Sustainability Standards \nBoard (ISSB), the Global Reporting \nInitiative (GRI) and the Sustainability \nAccounting Standards Board (SASB). \nThe growing adoption of the new ISSB \nstandard, which incorporates the elements \nof the TCFD standard, represents a \nsignificant development in SWF and \nPPF sustainability reporting, showing the \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n94\npotential rise of the standard as a global \nbaseline for sustainability disclosure. \nNonetheless, the variety of frameworks \nand standards in use shows that further \nconvergence will be beneficial for \nenhancing comparability and consistency \nin disclosure among SWFs and PPFs.\nb. The main reporting metrics \nused for sustainability \ndisclosure\nWhile almost 95 per cent of reporting \nfunds have put in place policies on \nsustainability, fewer funds – 64 per \ncent – clearly disclose the metrics or \nmethodologies they use to measure \nsustainability performance and impact.\nReporting funds mainly use 16 indicators to \nmeasure their sustainability performance, \ncategorized into five reporting areas (figure \nIII.14). Climate and GHG emissions are the \nmain area of disclosure and measurement: \namong the 37 funds reporting on \nindicators, more than 60 per cent have \nset specific ones for GHG accounting. \nThe indicators are categorized into three \ntypes: absolute emissions, emissions \nintensity and total carbon footprint. \nThese calculations are typically applied \nto portfolios: funds generally monitor \nscope 1 and scope 2 GHG emissions (in \ntons of carbon dioxide equivalent), with \na small minority of funds going further \nand reporting on scope 3 emissions.\nFor those funds that use emissions \nintensity metrics, the largest number use \nthe carbon footprint indicator, describing \nthe total carbon emissions for a portfolio. \nNearly half use the TFCD-recommended \nweighted average carbon intensity, which \nindicates the portfolio’s exposure to carbon-\nintensive companies, expressed in tons \nof carbon dioxide equivalent per million \ndollars of revenue. It assesses a portfolio’s \ncarbon efficiency by considering each \ninvestment asset’s revenue-based emissions \nintensity and its weight in the portfolio. \nSome funds consider operational emission \nreduction actions of invested companies, \nincluding energy consumption, renewable \nenergy usage and operational carbon \nfootprint calculation. However, few funds \nincorporate science-based climate targets \ninto their metrics system. Regarding \nenvironmental protection and resource \nconsumption, specific indicators include \nFigure III.13\nMost funds use a global sustainability reporting standard or framework \n(Number of reporting funds)\nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting (2023); some latest reports from 2022.\na CDP was formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project.\nTask Force on Climate-Related Financial \nDisclosures\nPrinciples for Responsible Investment\nInternational Sustainability Standards \nBoard\nGlobal Reporting Initiative\nSustainability Accounting Standards \nBoard\nCorporate Sustainability Reporting \nDirective\nCDPa\nEuropean Union Taxonomy\n33\n22\n16\n13\n12\n5\n5\n4\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n95\nexpenditure on environmental protection \nby portfolio companies, water withdrawal \nrates and whether portfolio companies \nhave a responsible waste management \nsystem. Regarding corporate governance, \nfunds predominantly use ESG and \nsustainability-related metrics; company \ndiversity and issues such as employee \ntraining are also reported. In general, social \nareas are underreported compared with \nenvironmental and climate areas. Social \nissues are typically considered within the \nbroader context of sustainability, with \nonly one fund specifically addressing the \nsocial impact of portfolio companies.\nTo ensure the quality of sustainability \nreporting, third-party verification or auditing \nis important, in the same way that financial \nreporting is audited. Yet only one in four \nreporting funds use third-party verification. \nDespite its importance for ensuring credibility \nand trust (and combating greenwashing), \nauditing is currently voluntary. Nevertheless, \nthe International Auditing and Assurance \nStandards Board (IAASB) is developing \nthe International Standard on Sustainability \nAssurance (ISSA) 5000, General \nRequirements for Sustainability Assurance \nEngagements, which will be issued before \nthe end of 2024. It is intended to serve as a \ngeneral standard suitable for any assurance \npurpose. According to the IAASB, it will \napply to sustainability information reported \nacross any sustainability topic and prepared \nunder multiple frameworks, including \nthe recently released IFRS Sustainability \nDisclosure Standards S1 and S2.\nFigure III.14\t\nSWFs and PPFs reported sustainability metrics in five areas in 2023\nSource: UNCTAD, based on latest fund reporting.\nAbbreviations: ESG = environmental, social and governance, GHG = greenhouse gas, PPF = public pension \nfund, SWF = sovereign wealth fund, tCO2e = tons of carbon dioxide equivalent.\nReporting indicator\nNumber of\nfunds reporting\nExamples\n• Carbon footprint of investments\n• Scope 1 and 2 GHG emissions of investments\n• Carbon intensity (no specifc calculation methods)\n• Scope 3 GHG emissions of investments\n• Weighted average carbon intensity\n• Absolute emissions of investments (no scope)\n• Total portfolio emissions (tCO2e)\n• Portfolio carbon intensity (tCO2e/$ million of portfolio value)\n• Portfolio weighted average carbon intensity (tCO2e/$ million of revenue)\n• Electricity production from renewable energy sources\n• Fossil fuel revenue\n• Climate-neutral and circular internal business operations\n• Number of portfolio companies with science-based net-zero  \n   2050 target\n• Waste management, environmental performance of properties\n• Water withdrawal\n• Sustainability considerations in investments\n• Investments in Sustainable Development Goals and climate solutions\n• Exposure to fossil fuels\n• Climate risk and climate stress test\n• Emissions reduction of operations\n• Science-based climate target\n• Work-related injuries, net new hires and employee engagement\n• Gender, age, ethnic and cultural background, and work capacity\n• ESG/sustainability related\n• Others\n• Diversity related\n13\n7\n5\n4\n4\n3\n5\n4\n3\n8\n6\n3\n7\n7\n3\n36\nGHG accounting\n17\nClimate risk and emissions reduction\n17\nCorporate governance-related targets\n12\nEnvironment-related targets\n5\nSustainable investment targets\n• Environmental protection and resource consumption\n5\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n96\nC. Policies, regulations and \nstandards\nIn 2023, the IFRS Foundation launched the Sustainability \nDisclosure Standards, which have attracted significant interest \nglobally. The emergence of international standards, including the \nIFRS and European standards, has created spillover effects that \naffect developing economies and their small and medium-sized \nenterprises (SMEs). Progress has been made in enhancing the \ninteroperability of international standards. Stock exchanges also \ncontinue to play a vital role in the adoption and implementation \nof sustainability reporting. Governments from both developed \nand developing economies have accelerated sustainable finance \npolicymaking, focusing on leveraging capital markets for climate \ntransition. In 2023, 26 of the 35 economies tracked by the UNCTAD \nGlobal Sustainable Finance Observatory introduced more than 90 \nmeasures dedicated to sustainable finance, marking a significant \nincrease from the 63 measures adopted in 2022. Countries are \nintegrating \nsustainable \nfinance \ninto \nnational \ndevelopment \nstrategies \nmore and more, prioritizing policy impact and effectiveness.\n1. International sustainability reporting standards\na. New standards \nJune 2023 saw the launch of the first \ntwo of the IFRS Sustainability Disclosure \nStandards by the ISSB, after a global \nconsultation process. The International \nOrganization for Securities Commissions \n(IOSCO) issued a statement endorsing the \nstandards and called on its 130 member \njurisdictions, which regulate more than 95 \nper cent of the world’s financial markets, \n“to consider ways in which they might \nadopt, apply or otherwise be informed by \nthe ISSB standards within the context of \ntheir jurisdictional arrangements, in a way \nthat promotes consistent and comparable \nclimate-related and other sustainability-\nrelated disclosures for investors.” This \nstatement has been received as a strong \nsignal from market regulators to encourage \nthe adoption of the ISSB standards.\nThe ISSB, created in 2021 by the IFRS \nFoundation, develops standards that \nform a global baseline for disclosure of \nsustainability-related risks and opportunities, \nto meet the needs of investors and other \ncapital market participants. It was formed \nin response to strong demand from capital \nmarket participants and international \npolicymakers, including the members of \nthe Group of Seven, the Group of 20 and \nthe Financial Stability Board, to harmonize \nand simplify the landscape of investor-\noriented sustainability disclosure standards.\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n97\nThe first standard, IFRS S1 General \nRequirements for Disclosure of \nSustainability-related Financial Information, \nsets out a requirement for an entity \nto disclose information about all risks \nand opportunities related to material \nsustainability that could reasonably be \nexpected to affect the entity’s prospects. \nIt provides conceptual foundations to aid \nthe disclosure of this information, as well as \ncore content requirements applicable to all \nsustainability-related risks and opportunities. \nIFRS S2 Climate-related Disclosures \nprovides more detailed requirements for the \ndisclosure of climate-related information.\nAt its formation, the ISSB merged with four \nformerly independent bodies: the TCFD, the \nClimate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), \nthe SASB and the International Integrated \nReporting Council (IIRC). As a result, the \nISSB standards draw heavily from the \nvoluntary investor-focused standards and \nframeworks produced by those four bodies. \nCompanies using ISSB standards should \nmake disclosures about their governance \nand risk management of sustainability and \nclimate-related risks and opportunities, \nas well as the strategy, metrics and \ntargets used to manage those risks and \nopportunities. In line with the concept of \nproviding a globally consistent baseline, \nnational policymakers may add building \nblocks to the ISSB’s standards in order to \nmeet local reporting objectives, provided \nthat local provisions do not obscure \ninformation required by the global baseline.\nFollowing the launch of the ISSB standards \nand their endorsement by IOSCO, the ISSB \nset three new priorities. First, for future \nareas of disclosure standardization, the \nISSB is exploring biodiversity, ecosystems \nand ecosystem services, as well as human \ncapital. It has also published educational \nmaterial on nature and social aspects of \nclimate-related risks and opportunities. \nSecond, in support of adoption of the \nstandards by market participants, the ISSB \nhas established a partnership framework \nfor capacity-building, working with public \nand private organizations, global and local, \nto ensure accelerated readiness among \njurisdictions to adopt the standards. A \ndedicated IFRS Sustainability Knowledge \nHub was also launched to guide report \npreparers. Third, in support of adoption \nof the standards by jurisdictions, the \nISSB has been engaging with regulators \nworldwide and has published a preview \nof a jurisdictional guide for the adoption \nor other use of the standards. \nb. Status of adoption\nAn increasing number of jurisdictions have \nalready adopted the ISSB standards, with \nmany others working on adoption (table \nIII.2). While some intend to implement the \nstandards fully as the globally consistent \nbaseline, others plan to introduce \namendments to them, which may result \nin inconsistencies in the information \nreported by complying entities.\nIn response to the rise of international \nand regional standards and their \nspillover effects through global supply \nand investment chains, many countries, \nincluding developing ones, are taking \naction to modernize their company \nreporting systems by aligning them more \nclosely with international best practices.\nHowever, several challenges could pose \nsevere barriers to policymaking in this \narea in developing economies (UNCTAD, \n2024c). They include (a) the fragmentation \nof international standards, (b) the lack of \nrobust national sustainability reporting \ninfrastructure, (c) insufficient knowledge \nand human capacity, and (d) limited access \nto sustainability data. Addressing these \nissues would require enhanced international \ncoordination on sustainable finance \nregulations, especially in standard-setting, \nwhile considering the specific needs and \nchallenges faced by developing economies. \nTechnical support will also be essential. \nTowards this end, UNCTAD, through its \nIntergovernmental Working Group of \nExperts on International Standards of \nAccounting and Reporting, is supporting \ncountries in reinforcing their regulations and \n17 \njurisdictions \nusing ISSB \nstandards, with \nothers working \ntowards \nadoption\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n98\ninstitutions, and building human capacity \nto implement international standards, such \nas those of the ISSB. Since 2021, UNCTAD \nhas been launching regional partnerships \nto promote high-quality sustainability \nreporting in developing countries. The \nPartnerships in Africa (29 countries and \n58 institutions)  and in Latin America (30 \ninstitutions in 15 countries) have become \noperational over the past two years. At the \n2023 World Investment Forum, UNCTAD \nannounced additional regional partnerships \nfor Asia, Eurasia, and the Gulf States and \nneighbouring countries. These partnerships \nare vehicles for facilitating the exchange \nof good practices in the implementation \nof sustainability reporting standards.\nc. Policy spillover effects\nThe effects of these international standards \ncan extend beyond the jurisdictions where \nthey are formally adopted, through global \nsupply chains. Large companies and \nfinancial institutions increasingly require \ntheir suppliers or investee companies \nto report on sustainability. For example, \nbeyond disclosing scope 3 GHG emissions \nTable III.2\t\nJurisdictions move toward adopting ISSB standards\nSource: UNCTAD.\nJurisdiction\nStatus as of April 2024\nImplementation date\nAustralia\nConsulting on standards until 1 March (currently adopting \nonly IFRS S2)\nStaggered implementation from January 2025\nBangladesh\nIntroduced mandatory requirements for banks and finance \ncompanies\nJanuary 2024\nBrazil\nAdopting in full (IFRS S1 and S2)\nJanuary 2026\nCanada\nConsulting on draft standards from March to June 2024\nJanuary 2025 for listed companies, January 2027 for \nunlisted companies with assets of more than $1 billion\nCosta Rica\nAdopted in full (IFRS S1 and S2) in 2024\nPhased mandatory adoption for public companies (January \n2025) and companies classed as large taxpayers (January \n2026)\nJapan\nIssued standards for consultation\nMarch 2025\nKenya\nDeveloping a road map\n-\nMalaysia\nConsulted on standards\nPhased mandatory adoption for listed and unlisted \ncompanies December 2025–December 2027\nMorocco\nReviewing disclosure and target-setting requirements\nEarly 2025 (currently only for banks)\nNigeria\nConsulted on adoption road map\nPhased mandatory adoption for listed companies and \nSMEs between January 2027 and January 2030\nPakistan\nConsulting on adopting IFRS S1 and S2\nPhased mandatory reporting between January 2025 and \nJanuary 2027\nPhilippines\nRevising sustainability reporting guidelines for listed \ncompanies to incorporate IFRS S1 and S2\nJanuary 2025 for listed companies, January 2027 for \nunlisted companies with assets of more than $1 billion\nRepublic of Korea\nFinalizing standards for June 2024\nJanuary 2026 or later\nSingapore\nIntroduced mandatory climate-related disclosures \n(currently adopting only IFRS S1 for climate reporting)\nJanuary 2025 for listed companies, January 2027 for \nunlisted companies with assets of more than $1 billion\nTürkiye\nAdopted in full (IFRS S1 and S2)\nJanuary 2024\nUnited Kingdom\nConsulting on standards until July 2024\n-\nHong Kong, China\nDeveloping adoption road map\n-\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n99\nalong supply chains, the ISSB S2 standard \nrequires financial institutions to report \n“financed emissions” – the emissions \nassociated with their investments, including \nthose in SMEs. The SFDR of the European \nUnion includes similar requirements. As \nsustainable finance gains traction, all \ncompanies, including SMEs, are increasingly \nexpected to provide sustainability \nreports to meet investor demands.\nIn some cases, companies may need to \ncomply with regulations in markets where \nthey have significant operations, even if \nthey are not listed there. For example, \nunder the European Union Corporate \nSustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), \nnon-European Union companies will have \nto report if they generate more than €150 \nmillion in the European Union market. \nIt is estimated that about 3,000 United \nStates companies and more than 10,000 \nbusinesses worldwide will be affected by \nthe requirements (Huck, 2023). Similarly, \nthe climate disclosure rules released \nrecently by the United States Securities \nand Exchange Commission (SEC) include \nrequirements for not only local, but also \nforeign incorporated entities (SEC, 2024). \nSustainability reporting requirements can \nfurther arise from legislative developments \nbeyond the immediate standard-setting \ncommunity. For instance, the European \nUnion Carbon Border Adjustment \nMechanism is not specifically a sustainability \ndisclosure regulation, yet its implications \nfor climate-related disclosures will extend \nwell beyond Europe. Starting in October \n2023, importers of certain goods into \nthe European Union are required to \nreport quarterly on the direct and indirect \nemissions embedded in each product. \nThe requirements related to these standards \nand related regulations will have a cascading \neffect, affecting exporters and their suppliers, \nincluding SMEs from other regions, and \nposing notable challenges for developing \neconomies. This challenge urgently requires \ninternational coordination, including \nenhanced interoperability and consistency \namong international and regional standards.\nd. Interoperability \nWith the shift from voluntary disclosure \ninitiatives towards mandatory reporting \nrequirements, there has been a renewed \nimpetus to examine the consistency and \ninteroperability of the sustainability reporting \nlandscape. As new requirements are \nintroduced, businesses operating across \njurisdictions may face inconsistent disclosure \nobligations, leading to greater workloads \nand potential inconsistencies in the \ninformation reported from one jurisdiction \nto another. Similarly, investors operating \ninternationally may face an additional \nchallenge when comparing the disclosures \nof companies they are assessing.\nOverall, the newly developed requirements \ncan be classified by their focus on single \nmateriality or double materiality. Single \nmateriality (sometimes referred to as \n“investor materiality” or “financial materiality”) \nis primarily intended to inform a general \ninvestor audience and thus focuses on \nthe impact of sustainability on an entity’s \nprospects and financial performance. \nExamples of such requirements include \nthe ISSB standards and the climate rule of \nthe United States Securities and Exchange \nCommission. Other requirements, such \nas the European Sustainability Reporting \nStandards and the proposed requirements \nin China, take a double materiality (also \nknown as “impact materiality”) approach, \ncovering both the impact of sustainability \non the entity and the impact of the entity \non sustainability. The GRI standards \nfocus specifically on double materiality. \nTo minimize potential inconsistencies and \nissues with interoperability, standard-\nsetters have been working to align their \nstandards more closely. Notable examples \nare the efforts by the European Financial \nReporting Advisory Group, which develops \nthe European Sustainability Reporting \nStandards, in achieving a “high level of \nalignment” with the GRI standards and the \nISSB IFRS S2 standard on climate change. \nThe IFRS Foundation and GRI have also \npublished a summary of interoperability \nInconsistent \ndisclosure \nobligations \nacross \njurisdictions \ncreates \nmore work \nfor reporting \nentities\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n100\nconsiderations for GHG emissions, \nto support more efficient reporting for \ncompanies that use both the ISSB \nstandards and the GRI standards. This \nresource was developed under the two \norganizations’ collaboration agreement, to \ncoordinate their sustainability-related work \nprograms and standard-setting activities.\nAs jurisdictions continue their \nimplementation of sustainability disclosure \nregimes, international investors and others \ncontinue to highlight the importance of \nconsistent requirements. Where existing \nrequirements are in place or well under \nway, some have proposed that international \nstandards should be given equivalence to \nlocal requirements, especially in the case of \nforeign entities, to avoid potential conflicts \nwithin the requirements and allow for more \nstreamlined global sustainability reporting. \nSuch equivalence has been achieved in \nfinancial reporting, where for example \nforeign private issuers listed on a United \nStates exchange are permitted to prepare \ntheir financial statements according to IFRS \naccounting standards as an alternative \nto the Generally Accepted Accounting \nPrinciples standards more commonly \nused by United States companies.\ne. Stock exchanges promoting \nadoption and implementation\nAs the interface between market regulators, \nissuers (both bond and equity), investors \nand standard-setters, stock exchanges \nare playing an important practical role in \npromoting the implementation and adoption \nof sustainability reporting standards and new \nsustainable finance products (figure III.15). \nIn 2023, the number of exchanges with \nESG-themed bond segments increased, \ncontinuing a sharp rise in these segments \nsince 2017 and for the first time exceeding \nthe number of markets covered by an ESG \nequity index. For many years, sustainable \nfinance focused primarily on equity markets, \nbut this has changed in recent years \nas sustainability-themed products also \nemerged in the bond market, derivatives \nmarkets and elsewhere. The past year also \nsaw a continued upward trend in mandatory \nlisting requirements related to sustainability \nreporting, with 38 markets having such \nrules, up from close to zero just a decade \nago. The standardization and regulation \nof sustainability reporting is also creating \ngreater demand for market education on \nthis topic, as a core mandate of exchanges \nis to educate market participants on \ncompliance issues and transparency and \nreporting. The past year saw a continued \nsharp upward trend in the number of \nexchanges providing such training.\nAs of the close of 2023, about 59 per \ncent (71) of all exchanges offered written \nguidance to issuers on sustainability \nreporting, a more than tenfold increase from \na decade earlier. This written guidance, often \nvoluntary, plays a critical role in preparing \nmarket participants for mandatory rules that \ntypically follow. The trend lines over the past \ndecade show a strong relationship between \nexchange guidance issuance and mandatory \nlisting rules. In light of these ongoing trends, \nthe objective of Sustainable Development \nGoal 12.6 concerning sustainability reporting \nis on track to be attained by 2030. The \nmarket is gravitating towards a more \nconcentrated set of standards. Exchanges \nare actively endorsing global ESG reporting \nframeworks. The GRI standards remain \nthe most frequently cited, followed by the \nfour component standards of the ISSB \n(those of CDSB, IIRC, SASB and TCFD). \nMarkets \nthat require \nsustainability \nreporting: 38 \nand growing. \nSDG 12.6 \non track\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n101\nFigure III.15\t\nStock exchanges continue to play an important role in promoting \nsustainability standards and products \n(Number of exchanges with standard or product)\nSource: UNCTAD, Sustainable Stock Exchanges database.  \nAbbreviation: ESG = environmental, social and governance. \n2004 2005\n2007\n2003\n2006\n2008 2009 2010 2011\n2013\n2012\n2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023\n0\n10\n20\n30\n40\n50\n60\n70\n80\n90\n100\nSustainability reports\n \n \nWritten guidance on ESG reporting\n \nTraining on ESG topics\n \nMarkets covered by an ESG index\n \nMandatory ESG listing requirements\n \nESG bond segments\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n102\n2. Policymaking at national and regional levels \na. Overview\nThe rapid expansion in the sustainable \nfinance market has brought about the \nparallel growth of national sustainable \nfinance measures. National and regional \ngovernments are increasingly creating \npolicies and regulatory frameworks to \nleverage capital markets to achieve their \nnet-zero goals. The UNCTAD Global \nSustainable Finance Observatory monitors \nsustainable finance regulations and policy \nmeasures in 35 economies (countries and \neconomic groupings). They include the \nmembers of the Group of 20, the largest \ndeveloping economies outside the Group \nof 20 and selected financial centres. \nTogether these economies represent \nmore than 90 per cent of global GDP \nand the world’s largest capital markets.\nIn 2023, these economies introduced a \ntotal of 94 sustainable finance policies and \nregulations. This brings the cumulative \nnumber of sustainable finance measures \nsince 2014 to 516, with nearly 60 per \ncent of them introduced in the past five \nyears, partly in response to the rapid \nexpansion of the sustainable finance \nmarket and product availability (figure \nIII.16). Meanwhile, at least 69 sustainable \nfinance measures are in development.\nFigure III.16\t\nRecord level of new sustainable finance policy measures and regulations \nadopted in selected economies in 2023  \n(Number of measures adopted by year)\nSource: Global Sustainable Finance Observatory (GSFO.org), based on UNCTAD, PRI and World Bank data.\nNotes: Encompasses seven key policy areas for sustainable finance: national strategy, national framework \nand guidelines, taxonomy, product standards, sustainability disclosure, sector-specific regulations and carbon \npricing. Other economies are Switzerland; 13 developing economies (Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, \nKenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Viet Nam, as \nwell as Hong Kong, China); and ASEAN. Relevant measures of the European Union included in Group of 20 \neconomies.\na Number updated to include incentive-related measures.\n2014\n2015\n2016\n2017\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n14\n2\n12\n7\n10\n7\n18\n8\n20\n5\n24\n6\n14\n15\n75\n9\n50\n13\n64\n30\nGroup of 20 economies\nOther economies\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n103\nThe most popular policy area is sustainability \ndisclosure, accounting for 37 per cent of all \nmeasures (figure III.17). This highlights the \npriorities of improving market clarity and \ncredibility and addressing greenwashing \nconcerns. Sector-specific measures, \nwhich covered sustainable banking, \ninsurance, asset management and others, \nconstituted 23 per cent of total measures, \nand national strategies and frameworks \nanother 17 per cent. Although specific \nmeasures targeting products such as \nsustainable bonds and funds, carbon \npricing and taxonomy represent a smaller \nportion of the policy pool, policymaking \nin these areas has been notably dynamic \nin recent years, with a significant number \nof measures currently in development.\nThematically, most of the policy measures \nintroduced in the last five years have focused \non climate change and the green transition; \nhowever, social sustainability and inclusive \ndevelopment have started to attract more \nattention. Examples include the development \nin the European Union of a social taxonomy, \nthe inclusion of economic activities \ntargeting social sustainable development \nin the South Africa taxonomy and policy \nmeasures adopted by Bangladesh \nand China and by the Association of \nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to \nsupport the development of SMEs.\nFigure III.17\t\nSustainability disclosure measures remain the most common policy \ncategory \nSustainable finance policy measures by category, 2014–2023 \n(Percentage)\nSource: Global Sustainable Finance Observatory (GSFO.org).\nSustainability\ndisclosure \n37\nSector-specific\nmeasures \n23\nTaxonomy\n3\nCarbon pricing\n9\nProduct-specific\nmeasures\n11\nNational strategy or\nframework\n17\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n104\nb. Regional developments\nIn 2023, the 35 economies or country \ngroupings tracked by the Global Sustainable \nFinance Observatory adopted substantive \nmeasures across six key policy areas: \nnational strategy or framework, taxonomy, \nsustainability disclosure, sector-specific \nmeasures, product-specific measures \nand carbon pricing. Policymaking was \nmost active in national strategies and \nframeworks, sustainability disclosure, \nand sector- or product-specific measures \nfocusing on green bonds, sustainable \nbanking and investment (table III.3).\nThe European Union established a \ncomprehensive sustainable finance \nregulatory framework with the CSRD, \nwhich entered into force in January 2023. \nTogether with the Taxonomy Regulation \nand the SFDR, these regulations lay \nthe foundation of an integrated policy \nframework governing sustainable finance in \nthe European Union. To further strengthen \nthe framework, the European Union is \nconducting a comprehensive review of \nthe SFDR, the taxonomy and related \ntechnical standards, aiming to improve \ntheir usability and effectiveness and to \nensure consistency among different pillars \nof the framework. It also announced a new \npackage of measures to further strengthen \nits sustainable finance regime, which \nincludes expanding the taxonomy to cover \nadditional activities contributing to climate \nas well as non-climate environmental \nobjectives, such as water and marine \nresources protection, circular economy \ntransition, pollution prevention and control, \nand biodiversity and ecosystem restoration. \nThe measures also bring more transparency \nand integrity to the market by introducing \nrules on the ESG rating and provide \nguidance to support transition finance.\nIn the United States, at the federal level, \nmeasures were adopted to promote \nclimate disclosure and sustainable finance; \nhowever, at the State level, the backlash \nagainst sustainable investment strategies \ncontinues: 17 States have passed legislation \nprohibiting fund managers from considering \nESG factors in their investment decisions \nor prohibiting States from contracting \nwith asset managers that exclude certain \nindustries, such as fossil fuels, from \ntheir portfolios (Malone et al., 2023).\nA sharpening focus on policy effectiveness \nhas also led to policy consolidation in other \ndeveloped economies. Australia, Japan, \nSwitzerland and the United Kingdom are \nreviewing legislation related to sustainable \nPolicy area\nEconomy\nNational strategy or framework\nArgentina, Brazil, China, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, Türkiye, United \nArab Emirates, ASEAN\nTaxonomy\nMexico\nSustainability disclosure\nBrazil, China, France, Germany, India, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United \nStates, European Union \nSector-specific measures\nArgentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Switzerland, \nEuropean Union\nProduct-specific measures\nArgentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Republic of Korea, European Union\nCarbon pricing\nAustralia, Canada, European Union\nTable III.3\t\nMeasures in six policy areas adopted by monitored economies, 2023\nSource: UNCTAD GSFO Sustainable Finance Regulations Platform.\nNote: Sector-specific measures cover sustainable banking, insurance, investment and credit ratings; product-\nspecific measures cover sustainable funds and bonds. Measures in development are not included.\n\n\nChapter III\nSustainable finance trends\n105\nfinance, with a focus on sustainability \ndisclosure and the development of \nsustainable finance taxonomies.\nDeveloping economies are becoming \nincreasingly active in sustainable finance \npolicymaking. They accounted for 60 per \ncent of new policy measures in 2023 – a \nrecord high. This surge demonstrates their \nsystemic efforts to leverage sustainable \nfinance for sustainable development. They \nare actively developing national strategies \nand frameworks for sustainable finance. \nIn 2023, seven of them (Argentina, Brazil, \nChina, India, Mexico, Türkiye and the United \nArab Emirates), together with ASEAN \nmember States, rolled out national strategies \nor frameworks on sustainable finance. Most \nof these national strategies were informed \nby the overall national development agenda, \naligning with national objectives under the \n2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development \nand the Paris Agreement. Such strategies \nhelp establish policy objectives, priorities \nand key areas for actions to provide \nguidance and stimulate national efforts to \nsupport the growth of sustainable finance.\nThis trend underscores a growing \ncommitment among countries to adopt \na systematic approach to policymaking \nrelated to sustainable finance. \nAnother important development concerns \nthe increase in sector- or product-specific \nmeasures, focusing on sustainable banking, \nsustainable insurance and green bonds. For \nexample, in 2023, Brazil and Chile adopted \nnational frameworks for sustainable bonds; \nthe Philippines released guidelines on the \nissuance of “blue” or ESG bonds; and \nBangladesh, China, India, Singapore and \nThailand released policies to support the \nbanking industry in integrating sustainable \ndevelopment considerations into operations, \ncovering sustainable deposits, sustainable \nloans and green credits (see table III.3).\nExcept for the largest States, developing \ncountries in general continue to face \nchallenges in leveraging sustainable \nfinance for development owing to a lack \nof human resources and knowledge, \nweak market infrastructure, and the \nfragmentation and inconsistency in \ninternational standards (UNCTAD, 2024c). \nThe persistently low level of sustainable \ninvestment in many developing economies \nposes another challenge to their adoption \nof sustainable finance policies.\nLarger \ndeveloping \neconomies \nare active in \nsustainable \nfinance \npolicymaking, \nbut smaller \neconomies \nface multiple \nchallenges\nSome of the findings in this chapter are \npositive and give hope for a future financial \nsystem that is sensitive to sustainability \ncriteria and measures of performance that \ngo beyond financial return. Other findings \nare less positive, including the continued \nprevalence of greenwashing, a backlash \nagainst sustainable investment in some \njurisdictions and foot-dragging by some \nimportant categories of investors that are \nreluctant to report on sustainability risks. \nOverall, the analysis in this chapter shows \nthat the sustainable finance market \ncontinues to expand and offers further \npotential for financing sustainable growth, \nincluding in developing countries. It shows \nthat a majority of the top 100 PPFs and \nSWFs, with patient capital, understand the \nthreat of sustainability risks to their business \nmodel. Finally, it reveals the positive trend \nin sustainable finance policymaking, as \ngovernments have made more efforts to \nleverage the potential of sustainable finance, \nincluding through better harmonization \nof international standards to achieve \ncomparable, high-quality reporting criteria. \nGoing forward, policymakers, regulators \nand other stakeholders will have \nto address three challenges: \nFirst is spillover effects resulting from \nnational and regional standard-setting and \nregulation, which have implications for \ncompanies around the world. These effects \nprimarily occur through global supply and \n* * *\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n106\ninvestment chains, where large companies \nand financial institutions increasingly require \ntheir suppliers or investee companies \nto report on their sustainability. \nSecond is integrating sustainable finance \nframeworks into national sustainable \ndevelopment strategies. Most such \nstrategies have been informed by the overall \nnational development agenda, aligning \nwith national objectives under the 2030 \nAgenda for Sustainable Development and \nthe Paris Agreement. Such strategies help \nestablish policy objectives, priorities and \nkey areas for actions to provide guidance \nand stimulate national efforts in supporting \nthe growth of sustainable finance.\nThird is ensuring that sustainable finance \npolicymaking becomes more impact \noriented, focusing on policy effectiveness. \nPrioritizing the impact and effectiveness \nof sustainable finance measures is \nessential, given the concerns about a rising \nbacklash against sustainable investment. \nAddressing the issue will require improving \nthe credibility of sustainable finance and \ncombatting the persistent challenge \nof greenwashing, in particular through \nenhanced disclosure aligned with leading \ninternational standards, and the clear \ndefinition of sustainability concerning \neconomic activities and sustainable financial \nproducts. Meanwhile, delivering visible \nimpact would also be important, particularly \nfor developing economies that have not \nyet benefited from increased sustainable \ninvestment flows to the real economy.\nThe signals sent through capital markets \ncan influence, direct and ultimately shape \na future economy that is environmentally \nsustainable, socially equitable and fairly \ngoverned. Addressing policy challenges \nand implementation issues, including \npolicy harmonization and spillover effects, \nwill be essential for realizing any benefits \nfrom sustainable finance for the 2030 \nAgenda for Sustainable Development. \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment \nfacilitation \nand digital \ngovernment\n\n\nMore investment agreements\nencourage digitalization\nInvestment facilitation policy\nmeasures are increasingly digital\n2015–2016\n2021–2023\n36%\n60%\n+67%\n2012–2015\n2016–2019\n64\n3\n89\n22\n2020–2023\n121\n34\nNon-digital\nDigital\n2016\nDeveloped\n2024\n43\n48\n2016\nDeveloping\n2024\n82\n124\nNumber\nQuality (1–10)\n4.6\n6.5\n4.8\n5.8\n2016\nDeveloped\n2024\n12\n28\n2016\nDeveloping\n2024\n13\n67\nNumber\nQuality (1–10)\n6.4\n8.2\n5.3\n6.8\nInvestment facilitation portals are growing in number and quality\nInformation portals\nSingle windows\nDigitalization has broad benefits\nTop three business services\nprovided online\nCountries with better\ndigital government solutions… \nHigher FDI\ninflows \nHigher business\ncreation rates \nHigher\ninstitutional\nquality \n+8%\nFiling taxes\nRegistering\nbusinesses\nObtaining\nlicences\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n109\nA. Introduction\nBusiness and investment facilitation have become central to efforts \nto develop the private sector and attract foreign direct investment \n(FDI) in developing countries. Facilitation aims to make it easier for \ndomestic firms and international investors to establish and operate \ntheir businesses. Core elements include providing information, \nmaking rules and regulations transparent, and streamlining \nadministrative procedures. Because these elements are based on \nboth information and procedures, digitalization is central to their \neffective implementation. They have thus led to a wave of digital \ngovernment initiatives, including information portals and online \nsingle windows.\nInvestment facilitation encompasses policies, \nmeasures and practices aimed at minimizing \nor eliminating obstacles faced by investors \nin a country (UNCTAD, 2016). Key elements \ninclude enhancing transparency and access \nto information for investors, streamlining \nadministrative procedures, ensuring the \npredictability of the policy environment and \npromoting the accountability and efficiency \nof government officials. Facilitation can also \ninclude initiatives focused on preventing or \nresolving investment disputes. Distinct from \ninvestment promotion, which is focused \non marketing a location as an investment \ndestination, investment facilitation \ninvolves a government-wide approach, \nengaging multiple agencies and levels. \nBusiness and investment facilitation are \nclosely intertwined. Business facilitation \naims to create a favourable environment \nfor all firms – large and small, foreign and \ndomestic – to start, operate and grow \ntheir operations. Investment facilitation \nadds mechanisms and initiatives aimed \nat easing processes specific to foreign \ninvestors, such as foreign investment \napprovals or the admission of foreign \npersonnel. Facilitation efforts can extend \ninto other policy areas. Trade facilitation, \nfor example, complements business \nand investment facilitation by reducing \ncomplexities in cross-border commerce. \nBusiness and investment facilitation can play \na pivotal role not just in attracting investment \nbut also in supporting attainment of the \nSustainable Development Goals. By creating \na more transparent and accessible business \nenvironment, they can encourage small \nfirms to move from the informal to the formal \nsector, a vital step in enhancing domestic \nrevenue mobilization. By removing barriers to \ninvestment and providing equal opportunities \nfor all, business and investment facilitation \ncan also play a role in promoting more \ninclusive economic growth, enhancing \nthe access of women, young people and \nrural populations to economic activity.\nThe UNCTAD Division on Investment \nand Enterprise has been instrumental \nin supporting progress on investment \nfacilitation. Since 1999, its Investment Policy \nReviews have provided comprehensive \nadvice to nearly 60 countries and regions \non a wide array of investment facilitation \npolicies. The Division offers advisory \nservices on investment facilitation to \ninvestment promotion agencies (IPAs) and \nspecial economic zones (SEZs). Its digital \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n110\ngovernment platforms, including information \nportals and single windows for business, \ninvestment and trade facilitation, have \nbeen deployed in more than 60 countries. \nUNCTAD guides on digital investment \nprovide investors with essential information \nto evaluate investment opportunities in \nspecific countries and regions (box IV.1). \nUNCTAD has been a catalyst for \ninternational debate on investment \nfacilitation. In 2016, the Global Action \nMenu on Investment Facilitation outlined \nthe main elements of investment facilitation \n(box IV.2). Since its publication, an \ninternational agreement on investment \nfacilitation for development has been \nnegotiated, facilitation has become a \nmainstay in regional and bilateral trade \nand investment agreements, and national \nimplementation efforts have proliferated.\nBy 2023, more than a quarter of investment \npolicy measures worldwide centred \non facilitation mechanisms (chapter \nII). Together with the Action Menu, \nUNCTAD launched the Global Enterprise \nRegistration (GER) index, an objective \nrating of countries’ provision of digital \ninformation and services for businesses \nand investors. It was used as a baseline \nfor the state of play on these instruments \nduring the early stages of discussions on \nthe IFD agreement, which was finalized by \nBox IV.1\t\nUNCTAD: Tools and technical assistance for digital business and \ninvestment facilitation\nUNCTAD offers a series of tools and participatory methodologies for documenting and simplifying procedures and \nfor implementing online platforms. Applied sequentially, they form an integrated programme for the modernization \nof public administration.\nDocument and publish procedures: the eRegulations information portal\nThe eRegulations system offers an affordable, turnkey solution for governments aiming to simplify administrative \nprocedures and to make them transparent. Designed from the user’s perspective, it breaks down each procedure \nstep by step, providing essential information for each. This includes contact details (entity, office, responsible \nperson), expected outcomes, required documents, costs, duration, legal justifications and options for lodging \ncomplaints. Importantly, creating and maintaining the eRegulations portal requires no programming skills, making \nit accessible for government staff who lack technical backgrounds. The system’s versatility allows its use for any \nadministrative process, including company registration, tax payments, licensing activities, construction permits and \nimport–export operations. Currently, eRegulations portals are operational in more than 50 countries.\nSimplify procedures: 10 principles to simplify administrative procedures\nOnce administrative procedures are clearly defined, they become easier to simplify. This can be achieved by \ncomparing existing practices with legal requirements and reducing interactions and document demands to only \nwhat is necessary and sufficient. The “10 principles to simplify administrative procedures” from UNCTAD guide \nGovernments in reducing procedural steps and requirements, often by more than 50 per cent, without necessitating \nchanges to existing laws.\nDigitalize procedures: the eRegistrations system\neRegistrations is a no-code development platform that allows the creation of online services without programming \nskills. It can be easily adapted and configured to any administrative process and may apply to procedures such as \ncompany registration, construction permits, export licences or transfers of property titles. eRegistrations is suited \nboth to operations involving only one administration (such as the business registry) and to simultaneous operations \nat multiple administrations (such as registering a company at the tax office, with the municipal council, with social \nsecurity, at the labour department and at the business registry). It can thus operate as an online single window. It \ncan be installed at any level of government.\nMonitoring progress: regional digital investment facilitation monitors\nUNCTAD has developed online tools to support the monitoring of progress on digital business and investment \nfacilitation within the context of regional economic integration organizations. The tools are based on the GER.co \nmethodology, which assesses the coverage, quality and user-friendliness of information portals and online single \nwindows for establishing a business. Examples include the digital investment facilitation monitor of the Association \nof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (https://asean.investmentfacilitation.org) and, most recently, the Southern \nAfrican Customs Union monitor (https://sacu.investmentfacilitation.org).\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://digitalgovernment.world/ and https://businessfacilitation.org.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n111\nsome 120 members of the World Trade \nOrganization (WTO) in February 2024.\nAt the regional level, UNCTAD assisted \nthe members of ASEAN in reviewing the \nimplementation of the ASEAN Investment \nFacilitation Framework (AIFF) in 2022 \n(box IV.3). It was also part of the task \nforce assisting African countries during \nthe negotiations of the Protocol on \nInvestment to the African Continental \nFree Trade Area (AfCFTA), which includes \na chapter on investment facilitation. \nAt the bilateral level, UNCTAD has been \nadvocating for the introduction of proactive \ninvestment promotion and facilitation \nprovisions for sustainable investment \nin international investment agreements \n(IIAs), based on the Investment Policy \nFramework for Sustainable Development \n(UNCTAD, 2015). UNCTAD recently \ndeveloped a set of policy options to enable \ngovernments to transform their IIAs into \ntools to channel investment towards \nsustainable development (UNCTAD, \n2023a). It is working with the Group \nof 20 Trade and Investment Working \nGroup under the Brazilian Presidency \non mapping investment facilitation and \nsustainable development provisions in \nthe IIAs of members of the Group.\nNotwithstanding the diverse positions in \ndebates on investment facilitation at the \ninternational level, the need for robust \ninvestment facilitation practices at the \nnational level is universally acknowledged. \nPolicymakers have firmly shifted their \nfocus to the most effective implementation \nstrategies and tools. Because investment \nfacilitation is about enhancing transparency \nand providing information to investors and \nabout making administrative procedures for \nbusinesses easier to complete, digitalization \nis at the heart of most facilitation initiatives. \nThe use of digital government tools for \ninvestment facilitation has several important \nbenefits. Because of the economies of \nscale and scope in the establishment of \ndigital platforms, they tend to improve not \nonly foreign investment procedures but also \ngeneral business establishment procedures \n(e.g. business registration tax, social \nsecurity and operating licences), thereby \nreducing administrative hurdles not only \nfor foreign investors but also for domestic \nBox IV.2\t\nThe UNCTAD Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation\nUNCTAD published its Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation in 2016. It was debated among investment \nstakeholders at the World Investment Forum 2016 and subsequently endorsed by the Trade and Development \nBoard, the governing body of UNCTAD. \nThe Menu lists 10 action lines, each with a series of options for policymakers:\n1.\t Promote accessibility and transparency in investment policies, and regulations and procedures relevant to \ninvestors. \n2.\t Enhance predictability and consistency in the application of investment policies. \n3.\t Improve the efficiency of investment administrative procedures. \n4.\t Build constructive stakeholder relationships in investment policy practice.\n5.\t Designate a lead agency, focal point or investment facilitator. \n6.\t Establish monitoring and review mechanisms for investment facilitation. \n7.\t Enhance international cooperation on investment facilitation. \n8.\t Strengthen investment facilitation efforts in developing-country partners. \n9.\t Enhance proactive investment project development in developing-country partners through capacity-building.\n10.\tComplement investment facilitation by enhancing international cooperation for investment promotion for \ndevelopment through provisions in international investment agreements.\nSource: UNCTAD (2016).\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n112\nfirms, including micro, small and medium-\nsized enterprises (MSMEs). Moreover, the \nimplementation of digital government can \npositively affect the business climate in ways \nthat go beyond the immediate scope of \nbusiness and investment facilitation and the \nreduction of red tape. It has the potential \nto tackle the root causes of low investment \nattractiveness in many developing \ncountries by mitigating weaknesses in \ngovernance and institutions more broadly.\nFor that reason, the focus of this chapter \nis on investment facilitation and digital \ngovernment. The aim is to take stock of \nprogress in the implementation of digital \nbusiness and investment facilitation \nworldwide; to look at the challenges, \nopportunities and policy priorities for \nits effective implementation; and to \nexamine how it connects with wider digital \ngovernment strategies to promote good \ngovernance and institutional robustness; \nto create a more transparent, efficient \nand investor-friendly environment; and \nto accelerate economic development.\nSection B provides an overview of progress \nin digital investment facilitation worldwide, \nwith a focus on information portals and \nonline single windows, including through \nan update on the UNCTAD GER survey on \nthe spread and quality of digital services for \nbusiness in all Member States of the United \nNations. Section C examines the growing \nimportance of investment facilitation and \nits digital component in national investment \npolicies and IIAs. Section D evaluates the \nimpact of digital business and investment \nfacilitation on investment attraction, business \ncreation, and institutional governance and \ntransparency. Section E looks at lessons \nlearned about the implementation of \ndigital business and investment facilitation, \nidentifying challenges and opportunities, \nand exploring wider implications for the \ndevelopment of digital government. Section \nF summarizes policy implications and \nrecommendations spanning investment \npolicy and digital government development.\nBox IV.3\t\nASEAN: regional cooperation on digital investment facilitation\nIn 2021, the ASEAN countries adopted the ASEAN Investment Facilitation Framework (AIFF), a significant step in \nregional investment cooperation. This framework aims to enhance investment attraction across member States \nby increasing transparency, streamlining administrative procedures, promoting policy alignment and building the \ncapacity of investment-related agencies.\nThe ASEAN region has long been proactive in adopting strategies and policy measures to support investment. These \nefforts have intensified in recent years, accelerating during the pandemic, with an increase from 6 new investment \nfacilitation measures in 2019 to 28 in 2020. These included the introduction of online facilities, e-application systems \nand streamlined administrative processes, reflecting a strong regional commitment to digitalizing and simplifying \ninvestment procedures.\nNotable initiatives include the Philippines and Malaysia implementing fast-track “green” lanes and simplified \nprocesses to ease investment. Member countries have also developed investment portals and digital platforms for \ne-payment and acceptance of electronic documents and certificates, further enhancing the investment landscape.\nOverall, investment facilitation efforts in ASEAN are characterized by a dynamic policy environment and innovative \napproaches to attract and streamline investment, emphasizing digitalization and institutional strengthening. The \nAIFF acts as a strategic blueprint to guide efficient and integrated investment facilitation across the region, including \nthrough the creation of a digital investment facilitation monitor. Progress on AIFF implementation was assessed in \nthe ASEAN Investment Report 2022 (produced with the support of UNCTAD).\nSource: UNCTAD; ASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD (2022). See also https://asean.investmentfacilitation.org.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n113\nB. Progress on digital investment \nfacilitation worldwide\nAdministrative procedures for businesses and investors are often \nthe first government services to be digitalized. Information portals \nand online single windows covering mandatory procedures for \nthe establishment of a business have spread rapidly and are now \navailable in most countries. Their quality and level of sophistication \nvaries. Some portals in the least developed countries (LDCs) rival \nthose in developed countries, showing that digital business and \ninvestment facilitation can provide leapfrogging opportunities. \nHowever, gaps remain, as evidenced by missing coverage, portal \nclosures, problems in the maintenance of information and “single \nwindow dressing”. \n1\t UNCTAD contributed to the development of the self-assessment tool, with inputs on sections dealing with \ntransparency and streamlining of administrative procedures, as well as single windows and technical cooperation.\nIt is challenging to assess the state \nof progress in the implementation of \ninvestment facilitation – in general, not just \ndigital – around the world in a systematic \nmanner. Early World Bank research and \nthe World Bank Doing Business indicators \nwere among the more comprehensive \nefforts before investment facilitation was \nclearly defined. Investment Policy Reviews \nby both UNCTAD and the Organisation for \nEconomic Co-operation and Development \ninclude many elements of investment \nfacilitation assessments. The lack of \nupdated systematic information across \ncountries was one of the reasons for the \ndevelopment of a self-assessment tool \nto support the implementation of the \nIFD agreement.1 The WTO Secretariat \nhas developed a standardized self-\nassessment guide to help countries \nwith such assessments (WTO, 2023).\nThe number of investment facilitation \nmeasures implemented worldwide is on the \nrise (chapter II), and with the use of digital \ntechnologies and platforms, these measures \nare evolving. This section mostly discusses \nprogress in the development of information \nportals for businesses and investors, which \nare platforms that explain the administrative \nsteps required to establish and operate a \nbusiness, and online single windows, which \nare transactional portals that allow users to \ncomplete multiple procedures administered \nby multiple government agencies online.\n1. The wider digital government context\nWhile systematic research on the application \nof business and investment facilitation \npractices is scarce, information is available \nto assess the state of progress on digital \nservices for business as part of broader \ndevelopment of digital government. The \nUnited Nations Department of Economic \nand Social Affairs (UN DESA) conducts a \nbiennial eGovernment Survey that provides \nan assessment of the digital government \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n114\nlandscape across 193 Member States. The \nsurvey uses the eGovernment Development \nIndex (EGDI) to rank countries, shedding \nlight on online services and specific \neGovernment components that benefit \nbusinesses. In its latest edition, the report \nexamines these online services: business \nregistration, business licence application, \nbusiness tax filing and payment, land title \nregistration application, environmental \npermit application, and access to and \nmodification of a business’s own data. \nThe 2022 survey findings unequivocally \nunderscore the pivotal role of business \nfacilitation as one of the foremost priorities \nin digital government (figure IV.1). Of \nthe 20 administrative procedures that \nare most commonly available as online \ngovernment services, half relate to business \nestablishment and operation (others include \nservices to citizens such as provision of birth \ncertificates or residency documentation, and \ngovernment administrative functions such \nas public sector vacancy announcements \nor public procurement). The two most \ncommon procedures – ranked first and \nsecond by some distance – are business \nregistration and business licensing. \nBusiness and investment facilitation are \nclearly important entry points for the \ndevelopment of digital government.\nThe survey highlights a global trend in the \nuse of online services, especially related \nto the registration of new businesses. \nAccording to the survey, the number of \ncountries offering this online service, either \nas an information portal or within a single \nwindow – a transactional portal where \n(part of) the service can be conducted \nonline – has grown from 162 in 2020 to \n176 in 2022. Similarly, there has been \nnotable growth in other online services, \nsuch as applications for business licences \n(from 151 to 167) and options for payment \nof value added tax (from 130 to 141). \nThe EGDI survey primarily assesses the \npresence of some form of eGovernment \nservice (more than its substance or \ncomprehensiveness) and does not focus \nsolely on business and investment facilitation \nservices. EGDI ratings are highly correlated \nwith levels of development. Europe and \nNorth America lead in eGovernment \ndevelopment, with an average EGDI value \nexceeding 0.80 out of 1, followed by Asia \n(0.65), Latin America (0.64), Oceania \nFigure IV.1\t\nBusiness services are usually the starting point for digital government\nDigital government services available to businesses, 2022 \n(Number of countries with service)\nSource: UNCTAD. Elaborated from the questionnaire of the 2022 Online Services Index (most recent \nsurvey year), a component of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs eGovernment \nDevelopment Index.\nNote: Includes information portals and online single windows.\nBusiness registration\nBusiness licenses\nUtilities payment (electricity)\nBuilding permits\nLand title registration\nUtilities payment (water)\nEnvironmental permits\n0\n20\n40\n60\n80\n100\n120\n140\n160\n180\n176\n167\n152\n149\n145\n141\n138\n136\n134\nBusiness tax filing\nValue added tax filing\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n115\n(0.51) and Africa (0.41). Despite significant \nprogress in Africa, the EGDI average for \nthe continent remains low, highlighting \nthe persistence of a digital divide. \nThe new Business Ready (B-READY) \nindex of the World Bank Group, intended \nto replace its well-known Ease of Doing \nBusiness rankings, also places significant \nweight on the provision of digital government \nservices, including single windows and \ninformation portals. The UN DESA and \nWorld Bank initiatives reflect a global trend: \ncountries are increasingly leveraging digital \ntechnologies to streamline information \nprovision and administrative procedures to \nenhance their efforts to facilitate investment.\n2. The spread and quality of business portals\nUNCTAD survey data (based on the GER \nmethodology; box IV.4) confirm many of the \nfindings of the EGDI. In contrast to the EGDI, \nthe GER survey focuses specifically on \nbusiness and investment facilitation portals. \nIt distinguishes between types (information \nportals and single windows), and it assesses \ntheir content and quality. These differences \nexplain several discrepancies between the \ntwo surveys. Nevertheless, the data show \na clear trend in the development of digital \ntools to streamline business registration \nprocesses and other procedures (figure \nIV.2). The growth trajectory is evident, \nwith the utilization of information portals \nfor business and investment processes in \nBox IV.4\t\nThe UNCTAD Global Enterprise Registration survey\nTo comprehensively evaluate the landscape of digital business and investment facilitation, UNCTAD introduced the \nGlobal Enterprise Registration (GER.co) online rating system and associated index in 2016. In its inaugural version, \nthe platform was developed in collaboration with the Kauffman Foundation’s Global Entrepreneurship Network and \nthe United States Department of State. \nGER.co assesses information portals, gauging their transparency regarding mandatory procedures for the \nestablishment of a business. These typically include business registration, tax and social security enrolment and \noperating licence procurement, and – in the case of foreign investors – investment approval. GER.co also evaluates \nonline single windows, measuring their effectiveness in enabling businesses and investors to complete mandatory \nprocedures online. \nThe assessment uses a 10-point scale, calculated on the basis of objective criteria, thus ensuring a standardized \nand transparent evaluation process. The highest-rated information portals provide comprehensive information \nabout each step of an administrative procedure, what documents are required, how much the procedure costs, \nhow long the process takes, which laws apply and how to appeal a negative decision. The highest-rated online \nsingle windows enable firms to complete a single form, submit a unified set of documents and make a single \npayment covering multiple procedures administered by multiple agencies. In return, investors receive digitally \nverifiable certificates. \nGER.co provides an interactive interface, allowing stakeholders in each country to submit revised ratings. This \nfeature ensures that the platform remains current and reflects the evolving digital landscape in different countries.\nFor this World Investment Report, UNCTAD reviewed the GER ratings of United Nations Member States in \n2016, 2021 and 2024. The information portals or single windows evaluated may have changed across the three \nassessments as older sites were replaced or new government agencies created. Given the overlapping mandates \nof government agencies in investment promotion and business registration, multiple sites may be available for \nevaluation in a single country. In each such case, for this analysis UNCTAD retained the information portal or single \nwindow with the best score. In countries with federal systems or where business registration is administered \nby a subnational entity, UNCTAD evaluated the situation in the main commercial city. Since GER.co focuses on \nbusiness registration, evaluations were made separately of the extent to which the sites benefit foreign investors \nand registrations for special economic zones.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://www.genglobal.org/ger.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n116\ndeveloping countries increasing from 82 \neconomies in 2016, when the UNCTAD \nGlobal Action Menu for Investment \nFacilitation was launched, to 124 today. \nThe number of developing economies \nwith online single windows has risen \nfrom a modest 13 to 67 (figure IV.3). \nThe observed increase in the number \nof portals is the result of growing policy \nattention to investment facilitation since \n2016 as well as a push following the \nCOVID-19 pandemic, which accelerated \nthe implementation of digital business \nfacilitation measures in many countries. \nSeveral developing countries responded \nby streamlining business establishment \nprocedures, adopting online application \nsystems, reinforcing one-stop centres, \nexpediting operating licence approvals \nand providing additional support to \ninvestors. Digital tools also became \nimportant for administering support \nservices for small businesses.\nThe quality of both information portals and \nsingle windows has also generally increased, \nin terms of their comprehensiveness \nand coverage of mandatory procedures, \naccessibility and user-friendliness. A slight \ndecline in the average rating of information \nportals in LDCs can be explained by the \naddition to the sample of new countries \nwith relatively basic portals. For developing \ncountries as a group, the average rating \nhas gone up significantly despite the \nincrease in the number of portals. \nAlthough information portals in developed \ncountries improved over the observation \nperiod, their ratings still barely exceed \nthose in developing countries. This may be \nbecause developed-country governments \nare generally considered to have greater \nregulatory transparency and more \nsophisticated public services, reducing their \nincentive to develop comprehensive online \nportals. There may also be a displacement \neffect: where comprehensive online single \nFigure IV.2\t\nInformation portals are now present in most countries and their quality is \nimproving\nInformation portals for business registration\nSource: UNCTAD, GER.co survey.\nNotes: Includes only Member States of the United Nations. GER.co rates quality on the basis of 10 objective \ncriteria (box IV.4). The last assessment for GER.co was undertaken between February and April 2024.\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n43\n41\n48\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n56\n73\n85\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n26\n35\n39\nb. Developing countries excluding\nleast developed (n = 97)\nc. Least developed countries (n = 45)\nNumber (left axes)\n \nQuality (right axes)\na. Developed countries (n = 51)\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n117\nFigure IV.3\t\nThere is still room for growth in online single windows\nOnline single windows for business registration\nSource: UNCTAD, GER.co survey.\nNotes: Includes only Member States of the United Nations. GER.co rates quality on the basis of 10 objective \ncriteria (box IV.4). The last assessment for GER.co was undertaken between February and April 2024.\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n12\n17\n28\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n12\n31\n51\n20\n0\n40\n60\n80\n100\n2\n0\n4\n6\n8\n10\n2016\n2021\n2024\n1\n14\n16\nNumber (left axes)\n \nQuality (right axes)\nb. Developing countries excluding\nleast developed (n = 97)\na. Developed countries (n = 51)\nc. Least developed countries (n = 45)\nwindows are introduced but separate \ninformation portals remain operational, \nthe value of such portals is reduced.\nFor online single windows, which can be \nmore technologically complex and require \ngreater integration and coordination \nbetween government agencies, the ratings \nfor developed countries remain higher \nthan those for developing countries. Yet \nratings among developing countries vary \nsignificantly, with some clear outliers. \nSeveral developing countries, among \nthem some LDCs, feature among the \ncountries with the world’s best information \nportals and single windows, illustrating \nthat there is a leapfrogging opportunity. \nThis effect is especially strong for online \nsingle windows, as countries with \nrelatively few legacy systems may have \nan advantage in building online services.\nCrucially, many of the developing countries \nthat lead in the adoption of these digital \ntools have received technical assistance, \nincluding from UNCTAD. This underscores \nthe importance of international cooperation \nin facilitating the digital transformation \nof business and investment processes, \nensuring that developing countries \ncan harness the full potential of these \ntools to drive economic growth and \nattract investment. Appropriately, the \nIFD agreement includes provisions \nthat promote international cooperation \nand technical assistance to developing \ncountries (box IV.5). Such cooperation \ncan also take place at regional levels, \nsupporting regional integration efforts.\nWhereas almost all LDCs now have \ninformation portals that detail mandatory \nbusiness registration and investor \nprocedures, only one third have introduced \nonline single windows, as compared with \nmore than half of the other developing \ncountries. LDCs face considerable \nchallenges in consolidating relevant \nadministrative procedures into a unified \nplatform. Key difficulties include costs, gaps \nin skills and know-how, greater divergence \nin the way regulations are translated into \nadministrative procedures across agencies \nand subnational bodies, and frictions in \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n118\ncoordination among the agencies involved \nin facilitating businesses and investment. \nThese difficulties are also evident from \nother findings of the survey. In 2024, seven \neconomies discontinued online single \nwindows that had been rated in the previous \nassessments.2 Ten discontinued information \nportals, and nine of these were developing \neconomies. The cessation of these single \nwindows and information portals could be \nthe result of resource constraints, changes \nin ownership and responsibility for sites \nbetween ministries or agencies, changes in \nregulations prompting the need for updates \nor issues with information maintenance. \nA significant number of portals refer to \ndated legislation or procedures or offer \nrelatively old forms. Both information \nportals and online single windows need \nclear ownership and resources for \ncontinuous updates and improvements.\nAnother phenomenon found during the \nsurvey is that of “single window dressing”, \nwhere significant communication efforts \nappear to have been made to market a \nportal to investors or the public, but upon\n2\t Discontinued online single windows were found in Eswatini, Ghana, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda \nand Zambia. Discontinued information portals were found in Azerbaijan, the Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, \nEritrea, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mali, Micronesia, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Zimbabwe.\nclose inspection key procedures either are \nnot accessible, refer to physical processes \nthat cannot be conducted online or present \nother technical barriers that diminish the \nvalue of the portal. Such limitations are often \nrevealed only when testing the process \nthrough the creation of a dummy company. \nAs observed earlier, business registration \nis usually the first step in and the basis \nfor wider digitalization programmes. \nThe GER survey results indicate that tax \nservices, social security enrolment and \noperating licence acquisition are the most \ncommon additional services included in \nonline single windows for business and \ninvestment facilitation. Together, these \nservices constitute the core mandatory \nprocedures for business establishment. \nOther, complementary services often \nprovided online on the same platform \ninclude the reservation of company \nnames (part of business registration \nprocedures), processes to obtain digital \nidentities or signatures, registrations for \nstatistical purposes and connections with \nchambers of commerce (figure IV.4).\nBox IV.5\t\nInvestment Facilitation for Development agreement: Digitalization aspects\nThe Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) agreement encourages the use of digitalization expressly through \ncommitments related to the creation of single information portals for transparency; the acceptance of electronic \napplications, documents and payments for streamlining; and the establishment of local supplier databases to \nfacilitate investment. In addition to such digital government tools, digitalization can also ensure the effective \nimplementation of other IFD commitments. These include avoiding multiple applications, establishing focal points \nfor informational purposes and providing investors with the opportunity to comment on proposed measures.\nInvestment facilitation commitments can be resource intensive. Under the IFD agreement, developing and least \ndeveloped countries may designate provisions for which implementation is conditional upon the receipt of technical \nassistance and capacity-building. Donor-country signatories commit to facilitate the provision of technical assistance \nfor the implementation of the IFD agreement. Both donor and recipient countries can direct such support towards \ndigitalization.\nSource: UNCTAD, based on the text of the IFD agreement.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n119\n3. Foreign investor-specific online procedures\n3\t Available on the Investment Policy Hub, at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-laws.\nThe distinction between business facilitation \nand investment facilitation through digital \ngovernment platforms depends on the \ndegree to which countries require foreign \ninvestors to complete additional or distinct \nadministrative procedures to establish \ntheir operations. Several scenarios \ncan be distinguished (table IV.1).\nIn most countries, foreign investors follow \nthe same procedures as domestic investors \nto establish a business. This is the case \nfor three quarters of the 141 countries \nwith an investment law recorded in the \nUNCTAD Investment Laws Navigator.3 \nThe same information portals and single \nwindows created for domestic firms \ntherefore also serve foreign investors. \nThis can be especially beneficial for SME \nforeign investors and entrepreneurs from \nneighbouring countries (box IV.6).Some \ncountries (16 per cent of those with an \ninvestment law) require foreign companies \nto seek government approval to invest. \nThis authorization, typically referred to as \nan investment licence or permit, is usually \ndelivered after an evaluation process that \nconsiders the investor’s business plan in \nlight of host-country criteria that can range \nfrom economic development objectives to \nnational security considerations. This is the \ncase for several small island developing \nStates (SIDS) (e.g. Cook Islands, Kiribati, \nMaldives, Niue, Papua New Guinea and \nSolomon Islands), as well as countries in \nthe Middle East (e.g. Iran, Oman, Qatar, \nSaudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) \nand in Africa (e.g. Ethiopia, Namibia and \nSomalia). In these cases, digital government \nsolutions need to provide additional \nservices for foreign investors, either through \ndedicated portals or through separate \nprocedures on the same platform.In other \ncases, government approval is required for \ninvestment in specific sectors only. Where \nthe list of sectors is limited to activities \nconsidered sensitive from a national \nsecurity perspective, as in most developed \ncountries, such approval processes are \nreferred to as FDI screening (UNCTAD, \n2023c). In some countries (e.g. China, \nIndia, Nepal and Thailand), the approval \nrequirement can extend to a broad range \nof sectors and aim to protect domestic \nindustries or address other public interest \nconcerns. In this scenario, foreign investors \nFigure IV.4\t\nOnline single windows offer various services in addition to business \nregistration\nAdditional services provided by online single windows, 2024\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, GER.co survey.\nNotes: Includes only Member States of the United Nations. The last assessment for GER.co was undertaken \nbetween February and April 2024.\nTax registration\nSocial security\nBusiness licenses\nDigital signature\nChamber of commerce registration\nStatistics office registration\n66\n42\n30\n14\n4\n3\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n120\nTable IV.1\t\nDigital government solutions for foreign investment facilitation are \nshaped by legislative scenarios\nForeign investor-specific requirements and implications for digital investment facilitation\nSource: UNCTAD.\nScenario\nDescription\nCommon business facilitation \npractices\nExample countries\nNo distinction\nForeign and domestic investors follow \nthe same business establishment \nprocedures\nGeneral-purpose business \nfacilitation portals\nMost countries\nForeign investment \nlicense/permit\nAll foreign investors are required to \nfollow an approval procedure\nGeneral-purpose business \nfacilitation portals with dedicated \ndigital procedures\nPapua New Guinea\nSolomon Islands\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, digital \nprocedures\nEthiopia\nSaudi Arabia\nSomalia\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, non-digital \nprocedures\nLesotho\nMaldives\nSector-specific FDI \napproval\nMost foreign investors follow \ndomestic procedures but approval is \nrequired in specific sectors based on \nnational security (screening) or other \npublic interest concerns\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, digital \nprocedures\nFrance\nGermany\nIndia\nNepal\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, non-digital \nprocedures\nBelgium\nCanada\nThailand\nUnited States\nForeign investor registry\nForeign investors are included in \na dedicated registry, often as a \nprerequisite to obtain the advantages \nof the investment law (e.g. incentives)\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, digital \nprocedures\nBhutan\nDominican Republic\nSeparate foreign investment \nfacilitation portals, non-digital \nprocedures\nChile\nColombia\nPeru\ncan use business facilitation portals, \nbut with some restrictions or additional \nrequirements in sectors of concern.\nA small share of countries (11 per cent \nof countries with an investment law) \nrequire foreign investors to register their \ncompanies in a dedicated registry, either as \nan alternative or in addition to registering \nthem as domestic businesses. Registration \nis typically done at the IPA or investment \nauthority or at the central bank. The \npurpose of the registration is often to collect \nstatistics on FDI (e.g. in the Plurinational \nState of Bolivia, Cabo Verde, Colombia, \nthe Dominican Republic and Georgia), or \nto enable investors to access the benefits \nof the investment law, including incentives \n(e.g. in Chile, Nicaragua, Peru and the \nBolivarian Republic of Venezuela). The \ndedicated registry can either be separate \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n121\nfrom a general business registration portal \nor be connected to or integrated in it.\nSome countries (17 per cent) impose \ninvestment registration requirements on \nboth foreign and domestic investors. \nThe purpose is often to benefit from \nthe provisions of the investment law – \nwhich usually applies to both foreign and \ndomestic investment – including eligibility \nfor incentives (e.g. in Cambodia, Chad, \nKenya, Malawi, the Philippines and Uganda). \nAccess to the treatment and protection \nguarantees of the law can be a crucial \nconsideration for investors in their decision \nto establish and operate in a country, \nmaking this registration equivalent to an \ninvestment permit. In Angola, for instance, \nto benefit from the provisions of the Private \nInvestment Law, both domestic and foreign \nbusinesses that invest more than $1 million \nmust obtain an investment licence. The \nprovisions include the ability to access \nland concessions, secure fiscal incentives, \ntransfer funds abroad and obtain other \nnecessary permits. Complex procedures \nspecific to foreign investors usually prompt \nthe establishment of dedicated information \nportals or online single windows, distinct \nfrom those for domestic investors.\nThese different scenarios are reflected \nin the accessibility to foreign investors of \nonline single windows (figure IV.5). For such \ninvestors, portals in developing countries, \nand especially in LDCs, have comparatively \nmore dedicated services or additional forms \nor procedures. Most investment laws are \nadopted in developing countries, whereas \ndeveloped countries tend to rely instead \non general commercial law for business \nestablishment procedures. Nonetheless, \naccessibility to foreign investors is not \nactually better in developed countries. \nMany developed-country single windows \nprevent foreign investors from carrying out \nprocedures online through requirements \nsuch as electronic identities or certified email \naddresses that can be obtained only through \ngovernment offices that require residency \nor physical presence in the country. These \nrequirements often stem from anti-money-\nlaundering legislation or general efforts to \ncurb illicit financial activities. Such legitimate \nregulatory obstacles to the complete \ndigitalization of business establishment \nprocesses are an important reason for the \ncontinued relevance of information portals \nin addition to online single windows.\nBox IV.6\t\nBurundi: Fueling business creation and regional integration through digital \ninvestment facilitation\nIn November 2022, the Burundi Development Agency introduced a digital platform designed to simplify the process \nof starting a business in the country (EasyBusiness.bi). Developed using the eRegistrations platform of UNCTAD \nand supported by the World Bank through the Local Development Project for Employment, the platform offers a \ncomprehensive online service for business registration across the country, eliminating the need for entrepreneurs \nto travel to the capital.\nThe platform has reduced the registration requirements by 70 per cent, which has had a profound effect on the \nnumber of businesses being established. Since its launch, registrations have increased by 59 per cent, including \na notable rise in participation from foreign individuals in limited liability companies. More than half of these foreign \npartners are from neighbouring countries, and more than 70 per cent from the region. The introduction of the \nplatform has not only facilitated local business creation but also attracted international interest, fostering economic \ngrowth and development in Burundi.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://easybusiness.bi.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n122\n4. Portal ownership and the role of IPAs\nBoth information portals and online single \nwindows for business and investment \nfacilitation can be managed by different \ngovernment entities, depending on their \nscope. In countries surveyed by the \nGER, over 40 per cent of both types are \nadministered by line ministries, often for \neconomic affairs or for trade and investment \n(figure IV.6). Investment authorities and \nIPAs also frequently manage information \nportals, including for general-purpose \nbusiness facilitation (not just foreign investor \nprocedures). Transactional online single \nwindows are more commonly managed by \nbusiness registries and developed as part of \nthe process of automating such registries.\nThe lower involvement of IPAs in the \nmanagement of online single windows \nis understandable, as they are not \ndirect owners of the resulting registries. \nNonetheless, many IPAs do play a role in the \ndevelopment of online services for investors \nin their country. Only about one quarter of \nrespondents in the annual UNCTAD IPA \nsurvey reported having no involvement of \nany kind in the development of an online \nsingle window for business and investment \nfacilitation (figure IV.7). The rest reported \nvarious levels of engagement, ranging from \nadvocacy to advisory roles to participation \nin government-wide task forces. \nThe result of this active engagement is that \nIPAs have a generally positive perception \nof the share of mandatory administrative \nprocesses that can be completed online, a \nperception that contrasts to some degree \nFigure IV.5\t\nSingle windows in developing countries are often more accessible to \nforeign investors than those in developed countries\nAccessibility to foreigners of online single windows, 2024\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, GER.co survey. \nNotes: Rules-based barriers pose requirements that are not immediately accessible or available to foreigners \n(e.g. certified e-identities or work permits). Technical barriers are challenges in accessing the platform at the \ntime of research (e.g. website inaccessible).\n25\n14\n18\n43\n39\n14\n22\n20\n6\n25\n19\n50\n6\nDeveloped countries\nDeveloping countries\n(excluding least developed)\nLeast developed countries\nFully accessible\n \nDedicated services that redirect to other sites \nDifferent forms or procedures \nRules-based barriers\nTechnical barriers \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n123\nFigure IV.6\t\nPortals are generally managed by government ministries, IPAs and \nbusiness registries\nOwnership of information portals and digital single windows, 2024\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD, GER.co survey.\nAbbreviation: IPA = investment promotion agency.\nMinistry\nTrade and investment\nEconomic affairs\nFinance\nJustice\nIndustry\nOther line ministry\nBusiness registry\nDigital government body\nInvestment promotion agency\nChamber of commerce\nOther\n43\n15\n7\n6\n5\n2\n7\n25\n14\n10\n3\n4\nMinistry\nEconomic affairs\nTrade and investment\nFinance\nIndustry\nJustice\nOther line ministry\nInvestment promotion agency\nDigital government body\nBusiness registry\nChamber of commerce\nOther\n44\n12\n12\n7\n4\n3\n6\n32\n14\n3\n2\n5\nb. Single windows\na. Information portals\nFigure IV.7\t\nOnly about one quarter of IPAs have no involvement in developing online \nsingle windows\nRole of IPAs in development of online single windows, 2024\n(Percentage of survey respondents)\nSource: UNCTAD, 2024–2026 World Investment Prospects Survey. \nNotes: The survey, conducted in April 2024, collected 96 responses from national and subnational IPAs. \nPercentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.\nAbbreviation: IPA = investment promotion agency.\n26\n19\n18\n18\n14\n12\nNo direct\ninvolvement\nAdvocacy\nrole\nLeading\ndevelopment\nof online\nsingle window\nPart of task\nforce\ndeveloping\ndigital service\nAdvisory\nrole\nLeading\ndevelopment\nof selected\ndigital service\nwith the results of the GER survey. Some 70 \nper cent of IPAs report that most mandatory \nprocedures for business establishment – \nincluding registration, tax and social security \nenrolment, and operating licence acquisition \n– can be conducted online in their country, \nwhereas the GER survey of transactional \nportals shows lower shares for social \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n124\nsecurity enrolment and operating licence \nacquisition. Either IPAs have lower visibility of \nrequirements that may be sector specific or \nnot immediately urgent in the establishment \nphase, or these services are provided \nmostly through separate online systems \nnot connected to an online single window.\nThere is scope for further engagement \nby IPAs in the development of digital \ngovernment (see, for example, the proactive \nrole that the Kenyan IPA Keninvest is \ntaking in this regard (box IV.7)). The digital \ntransformation of IPAs is ongoing (UNCTAD, \n2023b). They often provide other types of \ndigital investment promotion and facilitation \ntools, in combination with or separate \nfrom information portals that deal purely \nwith administrative procedures. Tools \nthat connect well with typical investment \nfacilitation practices include investor \nfeedback and grievance communication, \nonline databases to support searches for \nlocal suppliers, and incentives calculators.\nBox IV.7\t\nKenya: Connecting digital tools for investment promotion and facilitation\nDespite significant advances in digital government services in Kenya, notably through the eCitizen platform, new \nbusinesses and investors still encounter multiple, disjointed registration processes and authorizations, including \nfor licences and permits needed to operate in regulated sectors and counties.\nAlthough some applications can be completed online, the lack of integration among systems adds significant \nbarriers for investors and entrepreneurs. There is a pressing need for enhanced facilitation to elevate investment \nlevels sufficiently to address interconnected economic, health, security and climate challenges.\nThe Kenya Investment Authority (Keninvest) offers one-stop, in-person services such as assistance with foreign \ntaxpayer registration, electrical grid connection and work permits. However, its services do not extend to \ncrucial permits and licences at the county, sectoral or environmental levels. In addition, it lacks the capability to \ncomprehensively register investment projects online, collect data or provide effective investor aftercare services, \nwhich are essential for monitoring and supporting successful investment outcomes.\nThe Kenya Investment Single Window project, being developed by UNCTAD, aims to tackle these issues. It will \nintroduce an online system to streamline the investment process in the country and enhance the Government’s \ncapacity to attract and monitor investments effectively.\nThe system will connect with existing government databases such as the eCitizen portal, the Kenya Revenue \nAuthority’s iTax system and county government portals. This integration will enhance the functionality of existing \nplatforms, making it easier for businesses to navigate the regulatory environment.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://eregulations.invest.go.ke.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n125\nC. Facilitation in national and \ninternational investment policies\nInvestment facilitation plays an increasingly prominent role in \nboth national and international investment policies. Facilitation \nmeasures are now the largest category of national investment \npolicy measures, and especially important in developing countries. \nMore recent national policy measures refer explicitly to digital \ngovernment tools. Most modern IIAs and instruments also include \nfacilitation provisions and act as catalysts for the use of digital \ngovernment solutions.\n1. National policies\n4\t For more details regarding the definition of investment-related policy measures and their classification into less \nand more favourable to investors, see chapter II, box II.2.\n5\t The facilitation measures included in this analysis relate to FDI and primarily encompass policy measures \nenacted through national legislation. They comprise 333 measures implemented across 99 countries, \nincluding 23 developed and 76 developing countries, over the past 12 years.\nInvestment facilitation measures have \nbecome a key component of the global \ninvestment policy landscape, constituting \nbetween a quarter and a third of the \ninvestment policy measures more favourable \nto investors that countries adopted over \nthe last decade, and nearly two fifths of \nsuch measures in 2023 (chapter II).4 The \ntotal number of investment facilitation \nmeasures introduced each year has more \nthan doubled since the early 2000s, growing \nby 150 per cent in developing countries \nand 82 per cent in developed countries \nfrom 2012–2015 to 2020–2023 (figure \nIV.8).5Streamlining initiatives emerged as the \npredominant type of investment facilitation \nmeasure over the past decade (53 per \ncent), followed by facilitation services (31 \nper cent) and transparency initiatives (16 \nper cent). This trend was similar across \ndeveloping and developed regions.\nDuring the second half of the 2010s, \ndigital tools emerged in investment policy \nmeasures. Digital investment facilitation \nservices, absent from the measures adopted \nbetween 2012 and 2015, constituted \n15 per cent of all investment facilitation \nservice initiatives in 2020–2023. Between \nthe two periods, the share of digital \nstreamlining measures grew from less \nthan 10 to 25 per cent and the share of \ndigital transparency measures grew from \n0 to almost 30 per cent (figure IV.9). \nTransparency measures related to \ninvestment included primarily the \nconsolidation of investment-related \nprovisions (for instance, in Fiji and \nUzbekistan), the issuance of guidelines \non investment legislation (notably in China \nand India) and the establishment of online \ninvestment portals (as seen in Oman and \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n126\nUruguay). In addition, the recent expansion \nof investment screening regimes (chapter \nII) – by itself not among the measures \nthat are favourable to investors – has \nprompted several developed countries \n(including Australia, France, the Kingdom \nof the Netherlands and the United \nKingdom), to clarify their investment review \nframeworks by publishing guidelines. \nStreamlining initiatives span a wide \narray of measures designed to simplify \nand modernize investment policies and \nadministrative procedures. Non-digital \nmeasures include the simplification of \nbusiness registration (e.g. in Mauritius, \nRomania and Viet Nam), licensing \nprocedures (e.g. in Jordan, Mozambique, \nPeru and the Philippines) and screening \nmechanisms (e.g. in Canada and New \nZealand). They also include the creation \nof physical one-stop shops (e.g. in \nAlgeria, Mongolia and South Africa).\nDigital initiatives represented a quarter of \nstreamlining efforts. The largest category \nwas the establishment of digital one-\nstop shops (10 per cent) or online single \nwindows. Other digital streamlining initiatives \nencompass the digitalization of various \ninvestment-related processes (e.g. the \nintroduction of online applications, forms, \ncertificates and payment facilities). As \nin the case of transparency measures, \nseveral new digital initiatives aim to \nsimplify investment screening processes \nby introducing portals designed for this \npurpose (e.g. in France and Germany).\nFacilitation services provide tailored support \nfrom IPAs, SEZs or other entities designed \nto aid investors in establishing or expanding \ntheir operations within a country. During \nthe last decade, measures in this category \nwere evenly split between services related \nto SEZs and those offered by IPAs or \ngovernmental agencies. The latter included \nservices such as alternative dispute \nresolution mechanisms, visa facilitation, \nlinkage programmes and aftercare services. \nDigital tools are increasingly utilized in \ndelivering investment facilitation services. \nThis trend strengthened after the COVID-19 \npandemic, which saw an expansion in the \noffering of digital investment facilitation and \naftercare services by IPAs, with a sharper \nfocus on promoting linkages between \nforeign companies and the local economy \n(UNCTAD, 2020b). Oman, for instance, \nrecently launched an online platform to \nconnect local companies with global \ninvestors. In Cambodia, the online supplier \ndatabase aims not only to link foreign and \nFigure IV.8\t\nFacilitation measures are increasingly prevalent in national investment \npolicies\nFacilitation measures by economic grouping and period of adoption\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 15 April 2024.\nDeveloping countries\nDeveloped countries\n50\n17\n95\n16\n124\n31\n2012–2015\n2016–2019\n2020–2023\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n127\ndomestic firms, but also to generate a \n“sustainable investment cycle” by rewarding \nand motivating sustainable operations. \nTraditional approaches to resolving investor \ngrievances are increasingly incorporating \ndigital solutions. The Investment \nOmbudsman model of the Republic of Korea \nserves as a prime example (box IV.8). \nFacilitation provisions are increasingly \ncommon not only in investment policy \nmeasures and initiatives, as discussed \nearlier, but also in investment laws. Of \n141 such laws currently in force, as \nrecorded by UNCTAD in the Investment \nLaws Navigator, 64 (45 per cent) include \nclauses on investment facilitation. These \nclauses have become more common \nin laws enacted after the early 2000s \n(figure IV.10). There are some regional \ndifferences; 63 per cent of investment laws \nin Africa incorporate investment facilitation \nprovisions, but only 20 per cent do so \nin Latin America and the Caribbean.\nAs in the case of policy measures, \ninvestment facilitation provisions in \ninvestment laws relate to streamlining, \nservices and transparency (figure IV.11). \nTransparency provisions are present in \n19 investment laws currently in force. \nThey typically commit the State to \npublishing all laws, rules and regulations \nconcerning investment. Only two such \nlaws emphasize the digital accessibility \nof such information, and one mandates \nits publication on the official Government \nwebsite. Another law requires the \nonline publication of supplementary \ninformation relevant for investors, such \nas socioeconomic data on the country.\nStreamlining provisions largely involve \nthe establishment of one-stop shops for \ninvestors (in 33 of 36 investment laws with \nstreamlining provisions). Most of these \none-stop shops serve all investors, but \nsome are tailored specifically to foreign or \nstrategic investors. Only five laws establish \nFigure IV.9\t\nDigital government tools are increasingly common in investment \nfacilitation measures\nMeasures by type and period of adoption\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database, accessed 15 April 2024.\n7\n15\n4\n21\n8\n33\n3\n44\n17\n58\n19\n24\n30\n1\n42\n7\n2012–2015\n2016–2019\n2020–2023\n2012–2015\n2016–2019\n2020–2023\n2012–2015\n2016–2019\n2020–2023\nNon-digital\nDigital\nb. Streamlining\na. Transparency\nc. Facilitation services\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n128\nFigure IV.10\t\nRecent investment laws frequently include facilitation provisions\nLaws by period of adoption\n(Number) \nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Laws Navigator database, accessed 14 April 2024.\nBefore 1988\n1988–1999\n2000–2011\n2012–2023\n6\n11\n29\n22\n13\n31\n29\nWith faciliation provisions\nWithout facilitation provisions\nBox IV.8\nRepublic of Korea: Digital solutions improve investment grievance \nsettlement\nThe Republic of Korea pioneered the institutionalization of an ombudsman mechanism for resolving foreign \ninvestment-related grievances. The Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman (OFIO), introduced in \n1999, acts as a grievance resolution centre and advocacy body for foreign investors. Its digital portal offers \na real-time grievance management system, enabling foreign companies to report issues and monitor case \nprogress online. The portal also allows virtual meetings with experts, who then coordinate solutions with \nrelevant ministries or organizations.\nThe digitalization of OFIO services has accelerated the exchange of information with public entities, which \nis critical for resolving foreign investors’ grievances. From 2018 to 2022, OFIO settled 1,746 grievances, \ncontributing to an increase in decisions to reinvest and a better business environment. This support resulted \nin $1.73 billion in reinvestment in 2022 alone. These results have led several countries, including Brazil, \nKazakhstan and the Russian Federation, to adopt similar investment ombudsman mechanisms. \nSource: UNCTAD, based on information from the Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman and the Korea Trade-\nInvestment Promotion Agency.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n129\ndigital one-stop shops. Additional provisions \nto streamline investor processes include \nsimplifying administrative procedures, \npromoting digitalization and establishing \nmaximum timelines for government \nprocesses related to investment.\nFacilitation services provisions in investment \nlaws encompass alternative dispute \nresolution (22 laws), including mediation, \nconciliation and dedicated mechanisms for \nresolving investment-related grievances, \nsuch as investment ombudsmen. They also \ninclude investor support services by IPAs \nor other agencies (12 laws). These services \ncomprise counselling, administrative \nassistance for permits and licensing, visa \nfacilitation for investors and skilled workers, \nand assistance in access to land and utilities.\n2. International investment agreements\nNew-generation IIAs increasingly \nembrace proactive investment facilitation \nfeatures. Yet, much more is needed \nto direct facilitation commitments in \nIIAs towards sustainable investment \nand to ensure that treaty provisions \ntranslate into practical interventions.\nRecent IIAs increasingly contain \nprovisions aimed at improving the \nregulatory environment in host countries, \nencouraging stakeholder engagement, \nsetting up regular cooperation mechanisms \nbetween the contracting parties and \nfacilitating investment for sustainable \ndevelopment (figure IV.12). Prominent \nexamples of these provisions appear in \ntreaties and instruments concluded at the \nplurilateral, regional and bilateral levels.\nThe plurilateral Investment Facilitation for \nDevelopment (IFD) agreement strongly \nemphasizes transparency and streamlining \nof administrative procedures and \ncontains elements to support sustainable \ndevelopment, responsible business conduct \nand international cooperation. At the regional \nlevel, the Protocol on Investment (2023) \nto the AfCFTA, as well as the Association \nof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) \nInvestment Facilitation Framework (2021) \nand the Intra-MERCOSUR Cooperation \nand Facilitation Investment Protocol \n(2017), contain proactive commitments \nto sustainable investment, digitalization \nand cooperation. At the bilateral level \nvarious models promote investment \nfacilitation, including the Cooperation \nand Facilitation Investment Agreements \nconcluded by Brazil, the Angola–European \nUnion Sustainable Investment Facilitation \nAgreement (SIFA) (2023) or the framework \nagreements such as the Australia–Singapore \nGreen Economy Agreement (2022).\nDigitalization, expressly encouraged \nin several recent IIAs, can serve as \na tool for effectively implementing \nIIA facilitation commitments. It is the \nnatural implementation mechanism for \ntransparency commitments, the most \ncommon facilitation feature in recent IIAs. \nFigure IV.11\t\nStreamlining and facilitation services are more common than \ntransparency provisions in investment laws\nLaws with specific investment facilitation measures, 2023\n(Number)\nSource: UNCTAD, Investment Laws Navigator database, accessed 14 April 2024.\nStreamlining\nFacilitation services\nTransparency\n19\n36\n31\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n130\nFigure IV.12\t\nRecent IIAs include a wide range of facilitation commitments\nShare of IIAs signed during 2015–2023, by investment facilitation feature\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD.\nNote: Based on 235 IIAs, 148 BITs and 87 TIPs concluded in the period 2015–2023 for which texts are \navailable.\nAbbreviations: BIT = bilateral investment treaty, IIA = international investment agreement, TIP = treaty with \ninvestment provision.\nRegulatory environment\n \nStakeholder engagement\n \nCooperation mechanisms\n \nSustainable investment\nTransparency of investment-related \nmeasures\nEntry and stay of personnel\nObjective application of investment-\nrelated measures\nRegulatory practices and coherence\nStreamlining of administrative \nprocedures\nRight to comment on proposed \nregulatory measures\nFocal points for investors\nInstitutional framework for cooperation\nTechnical assistance and capacity-\nbuilding\nProactive provisions facilitating \nsustainable investment\n54\n37\n22\n14\n7\n30\n17\n46\n14\n24\nSelected features of IIAs\nTransparency of investment-related measures. Commitment to \npublish investment-related measures and/or measures that affect the \napplication of the IIA, including online.\nRight to comment on proposed regulatory measures. Commitment \nto provide investors the opportunity to comment on proposed measures.\nEntry and stay of personnel. Commitment to streamline and/or render \nmore transparent procedures for granting entry and stay of investors, \nincluding sympathetic consideration commitments.\nFocal points for investors. Commitment to establish institutions \navailable to investors with information, aftercare, dispute avoidance \nand/or broader functions.\nObjective application of investment-related measures. Commitment \nto objective and predictable application, independence of administering \nauthorities and/or maintenance of appeal and review mechanisms.\nInstitutional framework for cooperation. Establishment of a \ncooperation mechanism under the IIA, including for contracting parties’ \ninstitutions responsible for investment.\nStreamlining of administrative procedures. Commitment to \neliminate redundant bureaucratic steps and clarify the administrative \nprocess, including through digitalization and eGovernment tools.\nRegulatory practices and coherence. Encouragement of good \nrule-making practices (e.g. regulatory impact assessment, periodic \nreview) and/or inter-agency coordination.\nTechnical assistance and capacity-building. Reference to technical \nassistance and/or capacity-building activities in the IIA.\nProactive provisions facilitating sustainable investment. \nCommitment to proactive measures aimed at promoting and facilitating \ninvestment linked to the Sustainable Development Goals\n(e.g. environment, health, climate action). \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n131\nIt can also operationalize IIA commitments \nto streamline investment administrative \nprocedures and improve stakeholder \nengagement. Recent treaties increasingly \nencourage digitalization or include \ncommitments regarding online information \nprovision or single windows (figure IV.13).\nOver half of all IIAs signed since 2015 \ncontain a commitment to publish \ninvestment-related measures. Such \ntransparency provisions are among the \nearliest investment facilitation commitments \nto appear in IIAs, and the share of IIAs \nthat contain them has grown steadily. IIAs \ncommonly extend this commitment to \nproposed measures and at times include \na detailed indicative list of measures to \npublish. These can cover regulations \ndirected specifically at investors, such as \nincentive schemes, as well as measures \nor laws that are likely to affect investments \nindirectly, such as regulations concerning \ncorporate governance, insolvency, property \nor taxation. Examples of such detailed \nprovisions can be found in the Angola–\nEuropean Union SIFA, the IFD agreement, \nthe Türkiye–United Arab Emirates \nComprehensive Economic Partnership \nAgreement (CEPA) (2023) and the ASEAN \nInvestment Facilitation Framework, among \nothers. These treaties illustrate the catalytic \nrole that international agreements can play \nin the adoption of facilitation measures \nand digital government tools – an effect \nalready observed with the WTO Trade \nFacilitation Agreement (box IV.9).\nDigital government tools are the most \neffective way to operationalize transparency \ncommitments. About half of IIAs with \ntransparency provisions signed in the \nFigure IV.13\t\nIIAs increasingly encourage digitalization\nFacilitation provisions in IIAs that refer to digital tools\n(Percentage)\nSource: UNCTAD.\nNote: Based on 131 IIAs, 70 BITs and 61 TIPs concluded in 2015–2023 that contain at least one facilitation \nprovision. Data based in part on International Economic Law Clinic (2024).\nAbbreviations: BIT = bilateral investment treaty, IIA = international investment agreement, TIP = treaty with \ninvestment provision.\n2015–2016\n2017–2018\n2019–2020\n2021–2023\n36\n40\n47\n60\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n132\npast five years contain a commitment to \nonline publication, and several expressly \nencourage the contracting parties to create \na digital information portal. For example, \nunder the Angola–European Union SIFA, \neach contracting party commits to make \na wide range of information available to \ninvestors by electronic means and, where \npracticable, through a single portal.\nA key national policy component that \nrecent IIAs have begun to incorporate \nis the simplification and streamlining \nof investment-related administrative \nprocedures. These provisions usually aim \nto eliminate redundant bureaucratic steps \nand to clarify the administrative process for \ninvestment-related application procedures. \nThey often require a reasonable time frame \nand cost for licence applications, encourage \ncountries to consolidate the application \nprocess under a single agency and establish \ncertain procedural commitments for the \napplication process. Recent examples \ninclude the Angola–European Union \nSIFA, the China–Ecuador FTA (2023), the \nIFD agreement, the Türkiye–United Arab \nEmirates CEPA and the ASEAN IFF.\nMore recently, treaty partners have \nalso begun to commit to streamlining \nprocedures in the energy sector to support \nenergy transition efforts or to facilitate \ninvestment in the energy transition (see \nthe AfCFTA Investment Protocol and \nthe European Union–New Zealand FTA) \n(UNCTAD, 2023d). Another provision \nthat can benefit from digitalization is \nthe streamlining of procedures for \nthe entry and stay of investors and \nkey personnel (see, for example, the \nRegional Comprehensive Economic \nPartnership Agreement (2020) and the \nIsrael–Republic of Korea FTA (2021)).\nBox IV.9\nInformation portals for trade\nTransparency in import, export and transit procedures is essential for businesses to ensure predictability in \ncross-border trade. Despite progress in trade facilitation, many companies – particularly micro, small, and \nmedium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) – still find it challenging to complete trade formalities and documentation. \nThe challenge often arises from a lack of transparency, cumbersome and redundant procedures, and \nuncoordinated legal frameworks, causing businesses to spend excessive time and resources to comply \nwith trade and customs procedures.\nThe WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement includes transparency provisions that require members to make \ncertain information available online, such as detailed descriptions of import, export and transit procedures; \nrequired forms and documents; and contact information for enquiry points. Although the Agreement does \nnot specify that this information be centralized, it is most effective when presented on a user-centric website \nthat offers comprehensive, step-by-step guides to trade-related procedures.\nBuilding on extensive experience in developing digital solutions for business and investment procedures, \nUNCTAD has created a model Trade Information Portal. This online tool aims to enhance transparency and \nassist traders by simplifying the completion of international trade procedures. Launched first in Kenya in \n2017, the portal has proven effective. Traders have seen reductions in time and costs to access information \nabout clearance procedures. By 2022, the National Trade Facilitation Committee of Kenya had simplified \nnumerous procedures through the portal, eliminating steps and required documents and moving several \nprocesses online.\nThe UNCTAD Trade Information Portal model, which is based on the eRegulations technology, emphasizes \npresenting information from the user’s perspective and providing step-by-step guidance for all import, export \nand transit procedures. To date, this approach has been implemented in 28 countries, significantly aiding \ntraders by simplifying and demystifying the required legal and procedural steps.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://digitalgovernment.world/trade-information-portals.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n133\nDigital government solutions can help \neliminate redundant bureaucratic steps \nand streamline the administrative process. \nThe AIFF (2021) offers a regional example \nin which parties endeavour to establish \nand maintain single online digital platforms \nfor investor applications. Similarly, at the \nbilateral level, the Türkiye–United Arab \nEmirates CEPA contains a commitment \nto work towards the “the highest possible \nlevel of digitalization of procedures related \nto investments”. Parties also refer to \nmeasures that have proven to be effective, \nsuch as one-stop shops, single portal \nsubmissions or commitments to accept \nthe submission of electronic applications, \ndocuments and payments (see the AfCFTA \nProtocol on Investment and the Angola–\nEuropean Union SIFA, among others).\nUsed strategically, digitalization can not \nonly improve the overall investment climate \nbut also contribute to operationalizing IIA \nprovisions aimed at facilitating sustainable \ninvestment. For example, to render \ntangible recent IIA commitments to \nfacilitate investment in renewable energy, \nparties may prioritize the digitalization of \nlicencing processes related to construction \nof energy installations or laying of \ncables, disbursement of renewable \nenergy incentives or connections to \nelectricity grids (UNCTAD, 2023c).\nAbout 30 per cent of IIAs signed since 2015 \ninclude a commitment to offer investors and \nrelevant other stakeholders the opportunity \nto comment on proposed investment-related \nmeasures (see for example the Australia–\nUnited Kingdom FTA (2021)). Some 17 \nper cent also require the creation of focal \npoints for investors, with informational \nor grievance functions. Examples \ninclude the Cooperation and Facilitation \nInvestment Agreements of Brazil, the \nintra-MERCOSUR Protocol on Investment \nFacilitation and the Regional Comprehensive \nEconomic Partnership Agreement \n(2020). Some recent IIAs also encourage \nthe establishment of local supplier \ndatabases (see the Angola–European \nUnion SIFA and the IFD agreement, \nwhich are by default digital) (box IV.2).\nThe use of digital tools can improve the \nefficiency of all these commitments, as \nwell as their accessibility, including for \nunderrepresented economic actors and civil \nsociety. The work of focal points can be \noptimized by, for example, a first-response \nautomated chat assistant for simple \ninformation requests and a mechanism \nto direct grievances to relevant officers, \nwhich allows an overall higher number \nof inquiries to be processed. Similarly, \nmaintaining an online portal for investor \nand civil society comments on proposed \ninvestment-related measures can allow a \nbroader range of stakeholders to access \nit and improve the efficiency of collecting, \nprocessing and disaggregating comments.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n134\nD. The impact of investment \nfacilitation and digital government\nDigital investment facilitation has positive effects on governance \nand institutions, business creation and investment attraction. It \ncan support the promotion of sustainable investment, although \nfacilitation measures are difficult to target. Much of the sustainable \ndevelopment impact occurs through business facilitation, which \ncontributes to the formalization of local firms, domestic resource \nmobilization and higher rates of inclusivity and participation in the \nMSME sector.\nSystematic research on the impact of \ninvestment facilitation on FDI is both \nscarce and difficult to conduct because \nof the limited data available on investment \nfacilitation measures, the interlinked nature \nof investment facilitation measures with other \npolicies and the interdependencies of effects \nwith other factors that affect FDI flows.\nThe lack of conclusive evidence and of \na definitive estimate of impact has not \nstopped policymakers from pursuing \ninvestment facilitation efforts in international \ninitiatives and national policy measures. \nIt is generally accepted that investment \nfacilitation is an important component \nof a conducive business environment, \nlong identified as one of the three key \nfactors influencing FDI, together with \neconomic and policy determinants \n(UNCTAD, 1998; Alfaro et al., 2008). \nFacilitation efforts affect several dimensions \nof the business environment, including \nthe ease of doing business and the \nquality of investment institutions, which \ndirectly influence the establishment and \noperations of foreign investors. They \nfurther affect institutional factors such \nas levels of corruption, rule of law and \nquality of governance, which indirectly \ncontribute to improving the attractiveness \nof a location for foreign investment.\nThe advantage of investment facilitation \nis that it often does not require changes \nin policies or legislation. Most investment \nfacilitation practices, from information \nprovision to transparency and streamlining, \nare about how rules and regulations are \ncommunicated and applied and how \neasy they are to comply with, rather than \ntheir substance. Therefore, unlike other \nFDI determinants, investment facilitation \nmeasures often require less policy space \n(such as for policy determinants) and \ndo not rely on economic conditions \n(such as for economic determinants).\nThe relevant literature on FDI determinants \nsubstantially supports the attractiveness of \ninvestment facilitation measures as policy \ntools for increasing FDI. Empirical studies \nhave reached broad consensus on the \nfact that countries with better business \nenvironments are more likely to attract \nhigher FDI flows. The impact of investment \nfacilitation measures – as measured through \ntheir effect on the business environment – is \nlikely to be economically sizeable. An early \nsimulation by UNCTAD – used to underpin \nits Global Action Menu for Investment \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n135\nFacilitation (UNCTAD, 2016) and based on a \nWorld Bank study analysing the relationship \nbetween FDI and the number of procedures \nto start a foreign business – suggests \nthat aligning developing countries to the \nmedian level of administrative complexity \n(i.e. reducing procedural complexity in \ncountries above the median) would be \nassociated with an average increase in \naggregate FDI stock of 20 per cent. Older \nstudies corroborate the finding (Jayasuriya, \n2011; Anderson and Gonzalez, 2013).\nInvestment facilitation measures can also \ncontribute to inclusive and sustainable \ndevelopment. Because of their relatively low \ncost (compared with, for example, subsidies, \nincentives or the construction of SEZs), they \nare expected to disproportionally benefit \nsmaller and resource-poor economies, \nand in general those that have few other \nlevers to attract FDI. The positive effect \nof facilitation practices on governance \nand institutions would benefit countries \nwith weaknesses in these areas relatively \nmore. Furthermore, investment facilitation \nmeasures will support FDI in manufacturing \nand services more than in extractives \n(FDI that is mostly resource-seeking and \nless sensitive to other determinants), \nthereby contributing to economic \ndiversification. Finally, facilitation measures \nwill have a greater impact on FDI by \nSMEs, which tend to be disproportionately \nhindered by administrative hurdles.\nPromoting sustainable development through \ninvestment facilitation is not automatic, \ndespite the prominence of sustainable \ndevelopment objectives in international \nagreements and instruments, including \nthe recent IFD agreement. Targeting \ninvestment in sectors that contribute more \nto sustainable development, or investors \nwith more sustainable operations, can be \ndone through typical investment promotion \nmeasures such as incentives, which can be \napplied selectively and made conditional on \nspecific criteria. It is more difficult to envisage \nproviding information or transparency \nselectively. The logic and the economies \nof scale of typical investment facilitation \nmeasures would normally dictate that they \nare applied across the board. The main \nlever that governments can use to support \nsustainable development through investment \nfacilitation is to sequence the implementation \nof sector-specific streamlining measures, \nprioritizing relevant sectors (e.g. operating \nlicences in the health sector or planning \npermits in the renewable energy sector).\nDigital government solutions for business \nand investment facilitation, for the most part, \njust reinforce the effects of such efforts. \nFirst and foremost, they tend to focus \nimplementation efforts on the aspects of \ninvestment facilitation that are likely to have \nthe greatest direct impact on investment \nattraction and business creation. Common \nprovisions in investment facilitation policies \nor treaties include elements such as \ninvestor focal points, dispute prevention \nmechanisms and stakeholder engagement. \nWhile these are important benefits for \ninvestors and they have the potential to \nimprove governance, institutions and the \ninvestment climate in the long run, none \nare as immediately and continuously \nrelevant to businesses and investors as \naccurate information, transparency of \nrules and regulations, and streamlined, \nefficient and effective administrative \nprocedures – all of which feature prominently \nin every objective assessment of the \nrelative attractiveness of business and \ninvestment climates across countries.\nImprovements in government digitalization \nmore broadly, including in areas beyond \nbusiness and investment facilitation, can \nalso positively influence the investment \nclimate in a country (Al-Sadiq, 2021). \nResearch has shown a positive correlation \nbetween digital government services and \nFDI inflows, stemming from streamlined \nprocedures, improved information access, \nheightened government efficiency, reduced \ncorruption and cost-saving mechanisms \nmade possible through the consolidation \nof services on a single platform (Opertti \nand Volpe Martincus, 2023).\nCountries that rank in the top quartile of \nthe EGDI receive more than 10 times the \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n136\naverage inward FDI flows per capita as \nthose in the bottom quartile (UNCTAD, \n2024a). The same ratio holds for gross fixed \ncapital formation. This is, of course, largely \nexplained by the fact that the EGDI rankings \ncorrelate closely with GDP per capita and \nthe development status of economies, \nwith mainly higher-middle-income \ndeveloping countries in the top quartile, \nand LDCs typically in the lower quartiles.\nSimilar but more nuanced results derive \nfrom correlating investment, business \ncreation and institutional quality with the \nUNCTAD GER ratings, which are less \nobviously aligned with development levels \nand allow for LDCs to leapfrog higher-\nincome countries in the quality of their \ninformation portals and online single \nwindows. On average, GER ratings still fully \nalign with institutional quality (as measured \nby the World Bank’s Governance Index; \nfigure IV.14), but the differences between \nthe top three quartiles become marginal, \nwith significant variance within the top \nquartiles. Those quartiles combine more \nadvanced developing economies with \nsome LDCs that have created – often with \ntechnical support, including from UNCTAD \n– high-quality online single windows.\nThe same analysis of business creation \nrates also shows a positive correlation \nbetween the presence and quality of \ninformation portals and single windows for \nbusiness and investment facilitation and the \nestablishment of new firms (figure IV.15). \nAverage rates of business creation in the \ntop three quartiles are again very similar, \nand the rate in the top quartile is slightly \nbelow that in the second quartile, as a result \nof a combination of lower rates in some \nLDCs and in several higher-income, already \nmore mature, developing economies.\nComparing GER ratings with FDI attraction \nrates makes the influence of several \nleapfrogging LDCs in the top quartile \neven more pronounced than for business \ncreation rates (figure IV.16). The low levels \nof FDI in these LDCs brings down FDI \nperformance in the group of countries \nwith the best digital government tools for \nbusiness and investment facilitation by a \nsignificant margin. Evidently, high-quality \nFigure IV.14\t\nDigital investment facilitation is associated with higher institutional \nquality​\nInstitutional quality index by GER quartiles, developing countries, 2022\nSources: UNCTAD, GER.co, and World Bank Governance Indices (2022).\nNotes: Quartiles were constructed from the average score between information portals and single windows \nfrom GER.co data for 2024 (or latest available) in developing countries. The institutional quality index represents \nthe average for indicators of government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption \non a scale from -2 to 2. It assigns higher scores to countries with better institutional quality, according to \nratings by non-governmental organizations and international organizations. For better representation, a linear \ntransformation was applied to regulatory quality scores.\n1.35\n1.4\n1.45\n1.5\n1.55\n1.6\n1.65\n1.7\nBottom quartile 4\nQuartile 3\nQuartile 2\nTop quartile 1\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n137\nFigure IV.15\t\nDigital investment facilitation is associated with higher rates of business \ncreation​\nNew business index by GER quartiles, developing economies, 2016–2022\nSources: UNCTAD (GER.co) for ratings and World Bank (Entrepreneurship Database, 2016–2022) for business \ncreation.​\nNotes: Quartiles were constructed from the average score between information portals and single windows \nfrom GER.co data for 2024 (or the latest available) in developing countries. The new business creation index is \nmeasured as the number of newly registered companies with limited liability over the total number of companies \nwith limited liability in the same year (average, 2016–2022).  In case of missing data for the total number of \ncompanies with limited liability, the observation from the year before plus the number of newly registered \ncompanies was used. One outlier (Mauritania) was removed from the first quartile. \n0.102\n0.104\n0.106\n0.108\n0.11\n0.112\n0.114\n0.116\nQuartile 3\nQuartile 2\nTop quartile 1\nBottom quartile 4\nFigure IV.16\t\nDigital investment facilitation does not automatically lead to more FDI​\nInward FDI as a percentage of GDP by GER quartiles, developing countries, average \n2021–2023\nSources: UNCTAD for FDI inflows, UNCTADstat for GDP data, and GER.co for ratings.\nNotes: FDI is the average of FDI flows between 2021 and 2023. GDP is the average between 2021 and 2022 \n(latest year available). \nAbbreviations: FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product.\nBottom quartile 4\nQuartile 3\nQuartile 2\nTop quartile 1\n0\n0.01\n0.02\n0.03\n0.04\n0.05\n0.06\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n138\nBox IV.10\nImpact assessments of digital government tools for business facilitation\nInsights from post-implementation reviews of UNCTAD technical assistance programmes in business facilitation \nunderscore that the ability to register a business online represents a critical step for business creation. It eliminates \na significant barrier to formalization and alleviates the need for MSMEs to visit central government offices, thereby \nimproving acccess, enhancing consistency in service delivery and reducing corruption risks. \nGovernments also reported the following benefits:\n•\t Higher rates of formalization of local businesses, and creation of more businesses (local and foreign) overall\n•\t Reduced time, costs, forms and documents required for creating and operating a business\n•\t Positive effect on women, young people and rural populations, who previously faced greater obstacles with    \ntraditional paper-based and urban-based business registration procedures\n•\t Increased tax, social security and other government revenues, with single windows paying for themselves in \ntwo to three years from additional fee generation alone\n•\t Greater formal sector employment opportunities\n•\t Better data on the business sector, enabling more targeted and inclusive policies, particularly if cross-referenced \nwith tax and social security data \n•\t A more client-friendly approach in government administration\n•\t Enhanced trade and development, through the use of digital information portals for importers and exporters\nImpact measurements of selected projects after the implementation of online single windows for business and \ninvestment facilitation show positive effects on the participation of women and young people in the economy. \nImpact on women:\n•\t In Benin, one third of business owners registering online are women.\n•\t In Bhutan, 52 per cent of those applying to register their companies are women.\n•\t In El Salvador, 56 per cent of business owners registering online are women.\n•\t In Lesotho, before online registration was possible, women held 26 per cent of business permits. Afterward, \nthat figure rose to 34 per cent.\nImpact on young people:\n•\t In Benin, registration by young people (age 18–30) increased 181 per cent in the first two years of operation.\n•\t In Mali, registration by young people increased 263 per cent after implementation.\nSource: UNCTAD. \ninformation portals and online single \nwindows in and by themselves do not \nlead to higher FDI inflows. Improvements \nin governance and institutions take time \nto affect investor perceptions, and other \nfundamental FDI determinants – ranging \nfrom macroeconomic and political stability to \nmarket size and income levels, labour costs \nand the quality of physical infrastructure \n– are ultimately more important. \nThe comparison of the correlations of GER \ndata with business creation rates, on the one \nhand, and FDI attraction on the other can be \nconsidered a confirmation that the benefits \nof business and investment facilitation \nare more significant for domestic firms \nthan for international investors (box IV.10). \nThe latter tend to have more resources \nfor engaging local advisers to support \ncompliance with regulatory requirements \nand to navigate administrative procedures. \nDomestic MSMEs and informal businesses \nstand to gain much more from streamlined \nprocedures for business formalization \n– hence the insistence by UNCTAD \non combining, as much as possible, \ndigital government tools for business \nfacilitation and investment facilitation, and \nsynergizing programmes for private sector \ndevelopment and investment attraction.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n139\nThe sustainable development impact \nof business and investment facilitation \nmeasures is also often more tangible \nthrough their effect on domestic businesses \nand MSMEs. The effect on formalization \nrates is significant, which contributes to \ndomestic resource mobilization. There can \nalso be positive effects on participation rates \nfor women and vulnerable groups in the \neconomy, and for rural populations, owing \nto easier access to information through \nremote access to government services.\nFinally, the analysis for this report empirically \nevaluated the influence of the quality of \nonline business registration portals on FDI \ninflows in a cross-country data regression \nmodel. Each additional point in the GER \nscore is associated with 8 per cent more \nFDI. The effect is stronger for developing \nthan for developed countries, presumably \nbecause of higher marginal gains in \ngovernance and institutional quality. \nThese results are corroborated by other \nstudies, which consistently find a positive \ncorrelation between a favourable business \nenvironment and FDI inflows. For instance, \na unit increase in the (now defunct) \nDoing Business rankings leads to higher \nFDI inflows, by $300 million (Jayasuriya, \n2011); moving 1 percentage point closer \nto the frontier regulatory environment is \nassociated with an increase in annual FDI \nof between $250 million and $500 million \n(Anderson and Gonzalez, 2013). More \nrecent studies suggest that a reduction in \nprocedural complexity in countries leads \nto higher FDI inflows of about 4 per cent \nwithin the first two years following the \nimplementation of digital tools (e.g. World \nBank, 2017). These findings highlight the \nimportance of streamlined administrative \nprocesses in attracting investment. \nEmpirical analyses specifically focusing on \ndigital government find that accessibility \nto government information and services \nonline, as measured by the eGovernment \nSurvey Index of UN DESA, is associated \nwith about a 2 per cent increase in FDI per \ncapita inflows, on average (e.g. Al-Sadiq, \n2021). The positive relationship between \nonline digital government tools and FDI \nis attributed to streamlined procedures, \nenhanced access to information, \nimproved government efficiency, reduced \ncorruption, and cost-saving mechanisms \nfacilitated by service consolidation \non unified platforms (Lögün, 2020; \nMáchová et al., 2018; Al-Sadiq, 2021).\nFigure IV.17\t\nHigher-quality digital investment \nfacilitation is associated with more \ninvestment​\nImpact of gains in GER ratings\non inflows, average 2021–2023\n(Percentage)\nSources: UNCTAD for FDI inflows, UNCTADstat for \nGDP data and GER.co for ratings.\nNotes: Depicts the marginal effects (semi-elasticities) \nof higher quality of information portals and single \nwindows on FDI inflows. Vertical lines represent \nconfidence intervals at the 90 per cent level. \nPredictions based on an ordinary least squares \ncross-country model, with robust standard errors. \nThe independent variable is the average rating \nbetween information portals and single windows in \n2024 (or latest available); controls include population \n(2021), GDP (2021) and development status.\n-10\n-5\n0\n5\n10\n15\n20\nDeveloping countries\nWorld\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n140\nE. From online business facilitation \nto digital government\nThe basic architecture of digital government solutions for \nbusinesses and investors is fundamentally the same across many \ntypes of services. Thus, expanding their scope to cover more \nservices helps capture economies of scale and scope. Effective \nimplementation requires accurate documentation and thorough \nsimplification of procedures, and a focus on putting in place \nenabling legislation rather than reforming the laws underpinning \nthe procedures. For developing countries, using digital business \nand investment facilitation to strengthen public administration \nmore broadly is an important opportunity.\n1. The basic architecture of digital government services\nInvestment operations encompass a range \nof administrative requirements, including \ncompany registration, obtaining various \nlicences and permits (such as investment, \nbusiness activity, environmental and building \npermits), property acquisition registration, \ncompliance with social security, pension \nschemes and tax obligations at both \nnational and local levels (UNCTAD, 2023e).\nThe administrative processes associated \nwith these obligations all follow a similar \npattern. Investors submit the necessary \ndata, documents and payments to one \nor more administrative bodies. The \napplication file is reviewed by the respective \nadministrations. Upon approval, the \ndata provided is recorded in a registry, \nand a formal certificate – whether \ncalled a licence, permit, registration, \ndeclaration or authorization – is issued.\nThe application file consistently comprises \nthree fundamental elements: data (entered \non a form), documents (such as proof of \nregistration in other registries, identity cards \nand authorizations) and payment. The \nprocessing involves a varying number of \noperators within the authorizing entity that \nassess the file until it is either approved, \nrejected or returned for correction or \nrequests for additional information. The \nregistry where the information is stored \ncan take various forms, ranging from \na physical logbook to a spreadsheet \nor an online database. Building on this \nstandard administrative pattern, the basic \narchitecture of digital government services \nmirrors the sequence of steps through a \nseries of online interactions (figure IV.18).\nAn online service is a succession of screens \nand actions actions through which the \napplicant can complete a form, upload the \nnecessary documents, make a payment, \nand submit the application. Subsequently, \none or more operators review the application \nfile, deciding to either approve or reject \nit. Once approved, the applicant’s data \nare transmitted to an online registry, and \na digital registration certificate is issued.\nOnce the application – a platform or \ninterface – has been put in place to manage \n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n141\nFigure IV.18\t\nBasic architecture of digital government service​\n​\nSource: UNCTAD.\nOnline service\n(register, modify, cancel, consult)\nGovernment portal\nRegistry\nAccess to services\nAuthentication\nUser account\nData (form)\nControl\n1\nControl\nn\nGenerate\ncertifcate\nDocuments\nPayment\nCreate\nUpdate\nDelete\nConsult\ninteractions with users, the processing \ncomponents that constitute the actual \nservice have been developed, and a \ndatabase or registry has been created to \nmanage a particular service such as the \nregistration of a company name, services \ncan be added with essentially the same \ntools. A single service such as business \nregistration will usually already comprise a \n“family” of services or multiple versions of \nitself for different types of legal entities, such \nas sole traders, limited liability companies, \nand branches or subsidiaries of foreign \nfirms. But services can equally be extended \nto other areas, such as construction \npermits, operating licences or obtaining \nsocial security or tax registration numbers. \nDigital government services are often \ndeveloped through a series of evolutionary \nsteps. Initially, each government agency \ntends to develop its own digital services \nindependently, leading to a collection \nof uncoordinated processes. This \nfragmentation forces users to interact \nseparately with each agency, inputting \nthe same information multiple times. \nSuch set-ups lead to discrepancies in \nuser data across different registries, \nas updates in one are not reflected in \nothers. If an agency requires verification \nof a permit from another, it typically \nrequests a physical copy from the user.\n6\t See https://e-estonia.com/solutions/x-road-interoperability-services/x-road.\nTo improve efficiency, some systems allow \nagencies to share applicant data among \nthemselves; an example is X-Road in \nEstonia.6 While this reduces redundancy – \napplicants do not need to provide the same \ninformation multiple times – it still requires \nthem to initiate applications with each \nagency separately. This model enhances \nthe user experience and ensures data \nquality but depends heavily on inter-agency \ncooperation, which can be a limiting factor.\nAn integrated services approach further \nconsolidates the user experience by enabling \napplicants to interact simultaneously \nwith multiple agencies through a single \nservice. Applicants fill out one form, upload \ndocuments once and make a single \npayment, even as their applications are \nprocessed separately by each relevant \nagency. In this system, which ensures data \nconsistency, agencies interact seamlessly \nand offer a unified service to the applicant, \nbut they continue to operate independently.\nA new approach that holds promise for \nthe future is a fully user-centric model in \nwhich the applicant is placed at the centre \nof public administration (figure IV.19). \nAll personal and official data, such as \nregistrations and permits, are consolidated in \nan online “safebox” that is accessible to any \ngovernment agency the user has dealings \nwith. This fundamentally changes how data \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n142\nare managed, by eliminating the need for \napplicants to submit data or documents \nmultiple times. Instead, applicants simply \ngrant agencies access to their safebox, \nwhere all required information is stored and \ncontinually updated. Rather than issuing \ntraditional certificates, agencies validate the \ndata directly within the safebox, streamlining \nprocesses and ensuring that all information \nremains accurate and current. Several \nnovel technologies are being developed \nto bring the user-centric model closer to \nreality, such as systems that allow users to \nmanage access and usage permissions for \ntheir data, and blockchain-enabled verifiable \ncredentials to improve data security.\nLooking at these advanced models and \nconfigurations is especially helpful for \ncountries that are at the early stages of \ndeveloping digital government, those \nthat have relatively few legacy systems \nin place with limited sunk costs, and \nthose where basic services in support of \nbusiness entities of any size can make \nan immediate and sizeable difference \nin the quality of public administration \nand the ease of doing business. \n2. Effective implementation\nFacilitation is fundamentally about \nsimplifying compliance. It ensures that \nadministrative procedures are transparent, \nclearly understood and designed to \nrequire minimal effort from users. The \nadoption of good business and investment \nfacilitation practices demands a significant \nshift in mindset within public agencies \n– from a traditional focus on control \nand enforcement, which primarily aims \nto prevent fraud and detect violations, \nto a supportive role that helps firms \nmeet administrative requirements. \nThe initial step involves first acknowledging \nthat administrative procedures pose \nchallenges for firms – whether foreign or \nlocal, large or small – and then conducting \nan uncompromising analysis of the \nunderlying causes. The root causes of \nadministrative complexity are mostly \nnot in the rules but in the way they \nare applied. Rules can be interpreted \ndifferently by different parts and levels of \ngovernment. Procedures will vary across \ndifferent agencies and local authorities. \nThey evolve over time depending on \nthe risk aversity and control mindset of \nFigure IV.19\t\nEvolution of digital government services\nSource: UNCTAD.\nAgency 1\nAgency 2\nAgency 3\nService 1\nService 2\nService 3\nAgency 4\nAgency 5\nAgency 6\nIntegrated\nservice\n(4, 5, 6)\nAgency 1\nAgency 2\nAgency 3\nService 1\nService 2\nService 3\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n143\nindividual civil servants, or in reaction to \noccasional instances of malfunction or \nmalfeasance. The design of procedures to \nimplement rules often prioritizes form over \nsubstance, causing them, over time, to \ndepart from the original intent of the rule.\nIt is therefore important to differentiate \nbetween administrative procedures – \nwhich include the interactions, forms, \ninformation and payments demanded \nby administrations to enforce laws – and \nthe actual laws they aim to implement. \nTypically, administrative procedures are more \ncomplex than the laws they are based on, \noften incorporating unnecessary conditions \nand delays. Streamlining administrative \nprocedures, in the vast majority of cases, \ndoes not necessitate changes to the \nlaw. It mostly represents a more efficient \nand effective application of the law. \nFrom a practical perspective, the \nimplementation of digital government \nservices involves three main steps: \n(1) accurate documentation of the \nprocedure that is to be brought online in \nits existing form; (2) design of the online \nservice, including, where possible, the \nstreamlining of the procedure; and (3) \nimplementation of the online service.\nDocumentation of the procedure for which \nthe digital government solution is being \ndeveloped requires the involvement of \nadministrative officers from the entities \ninvolved in the relevant registration or \nauthorization processes. It does not require \nany technical expertise on information \ntechnology (IT) or online systems. Instead, \nit requires detailed knowledge of the \nstep-by-step process that the user of \nthe service needs to follow to obtain the \ndesired certification. The result should \nbe a breakdown of the steps, and for \neach step a detailed mapping including \nthe entity with which each transaction \ntakes place, the requirements for \neach transaction (e.g. information to \nprovide, documents to submit, fees to \npay), the possible scenarios that follow \n(e.g. further information or documents \nneeded, referrals to other entities), the \nresults of the transaction (e.g. rejections, \ncertifications), possible complaints or \nrecourse procedures, and the legal basis \nfor each transaction and administrative \nrequirement. The latter element is needed \nto distinguish between the requirements \nand controls actually required by the law \nand those that have been added over time \nby implementing agencies, as well as to \nidentify discretionary aspects of procedures.\nThe administrative officers responsible for \nproviding the service will be familiar with \nindividual procedures, yet they may be \nlimited in their ability to oversee the complete \nprocess from the user’s perspective. \nVery often, only after a detailed mapping \nof the process does it become clear \nthat the process has many unnecessary \ncomplexities, redundancies and overlaps, \nsuch as the need to visit the same entities \nin different steps or the need to supply the \nsame information or document multiple \ntimes. Officers may also not be trained \nin process documentation techniques; \nan important part of capacity-building \nprogrammes in this area is not about IT, \nbut about process mapping and design.\nDesign of the online service is still not driven \nprimarily by IT, although it is important to \ninvolve project managers who are used \nto translating rules and administrative \nrequirements into “code” – logical \ninstructions that cover every eventuality \nof the transactions involved (box IV.11).\nA service is usually not designed to exactly \nmirror the physical procedure, because \nthe inefficiencies identified during the \ndocumentation process can be reduced \nthrough a process of streamlining. \nSimplification means focusing on those \nrequirements and controls that are required \nby the law, minimizing information and \ndocumentation required at each step, \nand regrouping or resequencing steps. \nUltimately, the design of the online service \ninvolves creating a database by defining \nexactly what fields of data are required, \ndesigning the user form and document \nupload page, creating approval roles for \nadministrative officers and integrating \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n144\nonline payment (often using a commercial \nprovider of online payment services). \nImplementation of the online service \ninvolves not only the installation of the \ntechnical elements of the system – through \neither physical servers or cloud-based \nproviders – but various other aspects, \nincluding the management of the transition \nprocess, with each entity responsible for \nthe relevant registrations or authorizations, \nthe training of operators in charge of \napprovals or controls, and others who \nwill assist the public or staff call centres, \nthe testing of the system using real cases \nand focus groups, and a communication \ncampaign. Institutional capacity-building, \nboth on the service documentation and \ndesign process and, subsequently, on the \noperation of the system, is crucial to ensure \ncontinued service development and the \ngradual expansion of digital government \nto cover all services to business.\nIn this process, effective communication \non the positive impact of digital investment \nfacilitation is crucial to maximize buy-in from \nimplementing agencies and to overcome \nresistance. In Benin, the tripling of business \ncreation also tripled fee income, generating \nmore jobs for government workers (box \nIV.12). In Lesotho, staff using a digital \nbusiness licensing system reported greater \nsatisfaction as their role shifted from \nprocessing forms to advising clients. In \nBhutan, government staff involvement in \ndeveloping new online services expanded \ntheir skills and responsibilities, providing \nadditional motivation. Digital tools, by \nbetter capturing data on business creation, \nincluding user demographics, enable \npolicymakers to understand the impact \nof investment facilitation, measure effects \non communities and ensure inclusivity.\nBox IV.11\nBhutan: Empowering civil servants to design their own digital services\nIn 2021, the Government of Bhutan introduced a groundbreaking government-to-business digital portal specifically \ntailored for cottage and small industries, using the customizable digital platform of UNCTAD. This initiative targets \nfirms valued at less than $14,000, which represent 95 per cent of the country’s economy.\nThe process is streamlined and user-friendly: entrepreneurs can complete a simple form on a mobile phones and \nreceive all necessary registration documents instantly and free of charge. The impact was significant: in 2022, about \n1 per cent of the population, or 5,500 people, used the service to register a business. This marked a threefold \nincrease in the registration rate, with women making up 52 per cent of the new users. This surge reflected a \nsignificant transformation in public administration and set a benchmark for digital government worldwide.\nThe platform empowers civil servants who, after initial training, can independently customize the digital platform to \nadd online services. These services now encompass a wide array that includes bus service permits, drone flying \nauthorizations and industrial park leases. This approach helps civil servants empathize with users, enhancing their \nunderstanding of potential bottlenecks and frustrations in the process.\nThe Government plans to expand the platform over the next two years to include all permits, authorizations and \nprocedures. The system could extend to encompass all government departments, allowing civil servants to shift \ntheir focus towards more strategic tasks by alleviating administrative burdens. This strategic development has \nboosted economic diversification and new businesses, tripling formal employment opportunities, demonstrating \nthe impact of digital transformation on economic growth and public administration efficiency.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://unctad.org/news/bhutans-entrepreneurs-can-now-open-business-under-minute.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n145\nBox IV.12\nBenin: Using digital government to promote sustainable impact and \ninclusivity\nSince 2020, the Investment and Export Promotion Agency of Benin has used the digital government platform \nof UNCTAD to streamline the registration process for foreign and domestic companies. It allows businesses to \nhandle all registration steps, including for tax and social security, from a mobile phone. Users fill in one form, scan \nand upload documents, and pay with a credit card or mobile money, reducing the time required from five days \nto just two hours.\nThe implementation of the digital platform (monentreprise.bj) nearly tripled the number of business registrations. \nthe number of business registrations. Notably, a third of these new business owners are women, half are under \nage 30 and half are located in rural areas, indicating broad demographic reach. Interviews with users revealed that \nthe system not only facilitates business creation but also helps in business formalization. Formalized businesses \nreport greater ease in hiring qualified staff, accessing credit, obtaining insurance, receiving formal training and \nexporting to members of the West African Monetary Union. The revenue generated from the increased number of \nregistrations has provided the Agency with additional funds. These funds have been used to expand staff, enhance \noutreach to entrepreneurs and invest further in improving the system, fostering a sustainable impact and inclusivity \nin the country’s business environment.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://www.gouv.bj/article/512/lapiex-lance-monentreprise.bj.\n3. Connecting with wider digital government\nThe prevailing guidance on digital \ngovernment implementation favours a \ncentrally driven approach based on a \nnational digital government strategy and \nsupported by a digital government authority \nor unit. For example, the Recommendation \nof the Council on Digital Government \nStrategies of the OECD (2024) recommends \nthe development of a digital government \nstrategy aligned with other sectoral \nstrategies; government-wide coordination \nmechanisms; development of digital skills, \njob profiles, technologies, contracts and \ninter-agency agreements; and review of \nlegal and regulatory frameworks. A World \nBank (2016) report, which notes that 30 \nper cent of digital government projects fail \nand that only 20 per cent are considered \nsuccessful, explains that this imbalance is \ndue not only to technical issues such as \ninadequate infrastructure, interoperability \nand cybersecurity risks, but also to \npolicies, legal frameworks and institutional \nfactors. The e-Government Survey of \nUN DESA (2022) measures factors such \nas the presence of legal and institutional \nframeworks as the basis for effective \nimplementation. Technical assistance \nand capacity-building by development \nagencies generally provide overarching \nassessments of digital government \nreadiness and associated policy advice.\nSeveral practical experiences illustrate \nhow central steering can be important:\n•\t\nDigital government strategies. \nSuccessful digital initiatives are often \nunderpinned by a comprehensive \nstrategy. Bhutan and Uruguay exemplify \nthis approach, with their strategic \nframeworks for digitalization. Bhutan \nlaunched its eGovernment Master \nPlan in 2014, and Uruguay initiated its \ndigital agenda with an eGovernment \nsection in 2007, culminating in 2021 \nin the Plan de Gobierno Digital 2025. \n•\t\nDigital government entity. The creation \nof institutions to manage and coordinate \ndigital strategies can provide valuable \nsteering. In Benin, the consolidation of \ndigital strategy entities into the Agency \nfor Information Systems and Digital in \n2022 and in Uruguay the establishment \nof the Agency for Digital Government, \nInformation Society and Knowledge \nin 2005 are notable examples. \n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n146\n•\t\nLegal and regulatory framework. \nThe development of effective digital \nservices can be accelerated by enabling \nlegislation in such areas as personal \ndata protection, digital payments, \ne-signatures and digital identities. The \nDigital Code (2018) of Benin and the \nNational Digital Agenda of El Salvador \nare examples of comprehensive \nlegal frameworks that support digital \nstrategies, cybersecurity and regulatory \nneeds in the digital domain. \n•\t\nStakeholder engagement and \ncommunication. Successful digital \ngovernment initiatives require \neffective stakeholder engagement, \ncommunication strategies and initiatives \nto build trust to foster adoption. In \nRwanda, the introduction of a law that \nensures data protection, coupled with \neducational and awareness initiatives, \nhas been credited by the Minister \nof Information and Communications \nTechnology and Innovation for a \n30 per cent increase in adoption \nof the e-Government platform.\nCentral steering and support for the roll-\nout of digital government are important \nand help push the necessary enabling \nlegislation, budget support and broad-\nbased stakeholder engagement, yet it can \nalso lead to complex, costly and lengthy \nimplementation programmes. The basic \narchitecture of online services and the \ntenets of effective implementation suggest \nthat there is a complementary approach \nthat can be used in parallel with or even \nin anticipation of major centralized efforts. \nThis approach is particularly helpful for \ndeveloping countries that are still in the early \nstages of government digitalization and \nthat lack the significant resources required \nfor centralized digitalization projects.\nA bottom-up approach, starting from basic \nservices for business – usually the first \ngovernment services to be digitalized – and \ngradually expanding to adjacent policy \nareas, has several benefits. It can begin in \none or very few public sector entities, does \nnot necessarily depend on major legislative \ninterventions, is relatively low cost and adds \nimmediate value to users and revenue-\ngenerating potential for government. Such \na bottom-up approach can be an integral \npart of a wider digital government strategy, \nas a “sandbox” approach in which new \ndigitalization initiatives are rolled out for a \nclearly delimited administrative process \nbefore expanding to broader applications. It \nallows agencies or subnational entities with \nhigher levels of capacity or a higher state \nof readiness to race ahead (box IV.13).\nBox IV.13\nTogo: Digital investment facilitation by subnational authorities: special \neconomic zones\nIn Togo, digital transformation has significantly enhanced FDI attraction efforts. Launched in 2022, the first \nphase of the country’s investment portal (investirautogo.tg) offers a comprehensive online information service. \nManaged by the Investment Promotion and Free Zone Agency, the portal provides detailed guidance on \nadministrative procedures to start and operate a business. It covers nearly 40 procedures and outlines \nmore than 150 formalities. It also provides contact points for investors who need assistance. It was used \nby 13,000 investors in 2023. The portal is part of a collaboration between the United Nations Development \nProgramme and UNCTAD, begun at the Government’s request and coordinated with the Togo Digital Agency.\nThe second phase, planned for launch in 2024, is a digital investment window for the Port of Lomé SEZ. It \nwill facilitate the digitalization of processes such as authorization requests, employee exemption from social \ncharges and vehicle registration. Expansion into the SEZ underscores the comprehensive involvement of \nnational institutions in investment facilitation, extending beyond the traditional scope of IPAs.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://investirautogo.tg.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n147\nImplementing agencies can very \noften achieve much independently \nof Government-wide efforts or major \nlegislative reform programmes. A balance \nmust be found between the need for \noverarching strategies and institutions and \npractical implementation requirements. \nAs noted earlier, digitizing administrative \nprocedures mostly does not require \nsignificant changes in laws. This does not \nmean that no legislative action is needed \nto support the development of digital \ngovernment. However, the emphasis \nshould be on enabling legislation rather \nthan on substantive laws underpinning \nthe administrative procedures. And \nwhile comprehensive legal frameworks \ngovern personal data protection, digital \npayments, e-signatures and digital \nidentities, basic reforms of mundane \nbureaucratic requirements enabling, for \nexample, the acceptance of electronic \ncopies of documents, are often sufficient \nto allow agencies to proceed with the \nimplementation of digital services. \nSimilarly, while the whole-of-government \napproach that is usually advocated should \nbe the ultimate goal for the roll-out of digital \ngovernment, it has clear drawbacks for the \npace of development of individual services. \nDifferent institutions tend to operate at \ndifferent speeds and find themselves at \ndifferent stages of readiness. Centrally \nsteered programmes that aim to bring along \nall public institutions and agencies can miss \nout on opportunities to develop individual \nservices more quickly with a limited number \nof first-mover entities (ITU and UNDP\n, 2023). \nThe bottom-up approach defines a limited \ninitial project scope and digitalizes one \nprocess at a time without necessarily waiting \nfor lengthy, government-wide reviews of \nstrategy, legality or IT that risk being divorced \nfrom the reality faced by front-line agencies \nand service staff. It helps minimize resistance \nand builds momentum for broader digital \ntransformation at a relatively low monetary \nand political cost. It is an approach that \nlearns from the failures of approaches in \nmany countries by encouraging agencies \nwith innovative mindsets to take the \nfirst steps, with others joining as the \nadvantages of digitalization become clear.\nThere is significant scope to expand the \narray of services on digital government \nplatforms once the core business and \ninvestment facilitation services (registration, \ntax, social security and operating licences) \nare covered. Using the online single \nwindow platform developed by UNCTAD, \nEl Salvador has added services for the filing \nof accounts, to support MSMEs not only \nin the process of becoming formal but also \nin the effort to stay formal (which requires \nfiling periodic accounts and paying taxes) \n(box IV.14). Mali is developing a system \nto speed up approval processes for new \npharmaceutical products to streamline the \nmarket for essential medicines (box IV.15). \nAnd Colombia is piloting an emissions \nregistry to allow firms to calculate and report \nemissions in compliance with local legislation \ndeveloped to meet commitments under the \nParis Agreement (box IV.16). Adding services \nin such specific areas or for sector-specific \nprocedures can thus help strengthen the \nsustainable development impact of digital \nbusiness and investment facilitation efforts.\nDigital government solutions obviously also \nextend to trade, as observed earlier. The \nASYCUDA programme of UNCTAD has a \nlong track record of implementing online \nsingle windows for clearance of foreign \ntrade procedures (box IV.17). Similar effects \nof economies of scale and scope can be \nobserved in trade portals, which aim to \nincorporate as many relevant procedures \nas possible. However, compared with \nbusiness and investment facilitation portals, \ntrade portals are more difficult to envisage \nas a basis for wider digital government \nexpansion because of the narrower scope \nof services and institutions they involve.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n148\nBox IV.15\nMali: Expanding the scope of digital services for business:  \npharmaceutical approval processes\nIn November 2023, Mali launched a pioneering online pharmaceutical registry, developed in collaboration \nwith UNCTAD, the Ministry of Health of Mali and the country’s National Pharmaceutical Association. This \ninitiative was spurred by the urgent need for pandemic preparedness underscored by the COVID-19 crisis \nand aims to address major health challenges for the country’s predominantly young population.\nThe digital registry is designed to enhance the efficiency of the marketing authorization process and ensure \nthe safety and quality of medicines. It will improve transparency and traceability, optimize resource use, \nsupport the growth of the local pharmaceutical industry and combat counterfeiting. According to the United \nNations Office on Drugs and Crime (2023), up to half of the pharmaceuticals in Mali are counterfeit or \nimproperly distributed, emphasizing the need for this system.\nThe online registry will enable pharmaceutical importers, producers and distributors, along with the \nGovernment, to address supply chain delays and fraud more effectively. This improvement in transparency \nand accessibility is expected to streamline the distribution of medicines and vaccinations. Currently, the \napproval process for importing, distributing or producing medicines is hindered by bureaucratic delays, \noften taking up to 18 months owing to reliance on paper documentation and the requirement for a salaried \nrepresentative’s physical presence. The new system will reduce the approval time to three months.\nAt present, the system allows online registration of pharmaceutical stakeholders and helps medical authorities \nmonitor the entry, production and distribution of products. It also aids in the identification of obsolete and \nunauthorized items and provides data on the locations of products and the needs for them across various \nmedical facilities. Although still in its pilot phase, digitalization of this registry holds promise for replication \nand scaling in other developing countries, potentially transforming health care delivery and management.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://unctad.org/news/magic-malis-digital-pharmaceutical-registry.\nBox IV.14\nEl Salvador: Expanding the scope of digital services for business: \nsupporting MSME formalization\nIn 2018, UNCTAD and the Government of El Salvador launched a digital single window for MSMEs (miempresa.gob.\nsv), allowing them to register online with simplified procedures. An important objective was to reduce informality. \nEntrepreneurs can register simultaneously with the ministries of finance, labour and commerce, and the municipality. \nThis automates what were previously 12 separate registrations. The system also integrates an online accounting \ntool that supports the filing of annual accounts and can generate six-month tax and social security filings as well \nas 11 annual filings. The purpose of these supporting tools is to help businesses become formal and remain \nformal – which requires periodic filings.  \nMany MSMEs are subsistence enterprises or sole traders, in the informal sector. Registrations at the National \nCommission for Micro and Small Businesses increased significantly in 2020 and afterward, especially in the most \nfragile categories. This translated to a steep rise in the numbers of entrepreneurs (+74 per cent) and MSMEs (+63 \nper cent) registered for social security in 2021. More than half of these companies were women owned. Their access \nto enterprise loans and safety nets critically contributed to the resilience of the private sector in the pandemic.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://miempresa.gob.sv.\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n149\nBox IV.16\nColombia: Expanding the scope of digital services for business: \nreporting carbon emissions\nIn 2023, the Colombian Ministry of Environment, in collaboration with UNCTAD, initiated the development of \na digital platform that will allow businesses to report their carbon emissions annually and obtain necessary \ncertifications, supporting the country’s commitment to the Paris Agreement objectives.\nThe registry is set to launch in the latter half of 2024, after final adjustments to the prototype, which was \npresented at the World Investment Forum of UNCTAD in October 2023. It integrates a user-friendly emissions \ncalculator and complies with the standards of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ensuring \nthat it is both comprehensive and accessible for companies that are required to report their emissions. It is \ndesigned to prepare Colombia for upcoming global carbon pricing and tax measures, including the Carbon \nBorder Adjustment Mechanism of the European Union.\nThe platform will be expanded with online services for environmental impact assessment certificates, in an \naim to streamline the application and review process, which is often criticized for its inefficiency and lack \nof transparency. These assessments are crucial for many sectors in Colombia, in particular construction. \nIn addition, a digital registry for green business certificates is being considered. This system would enable \ncompanies to evaluate their environmental practices against regional standards and qualify for “green \nbusiness” status, which provides benefit from various incentives. These digital innovations not only position \nColombia as a leader in environmental digitalization but also serve as potential models for other countries \nwith similar environmental and climate legislation.\nSource: UNCTAD. See also https://unctad.org/news/un-digital-government-awards-celebrate-excellence-\nonline-public-services.\nBox IV.17\nASYCUDA: Online single windows for trade\nSince 2012, the ASYCUDA (Automated System for Customs Data) Programme of UNCTAD has partnered \nwith governments and international organizations to design, develop and implement an integrated platform for \ninternational trade. It allows all stakeholders to process clearance of trade procedures, including by submitting \npermit and licence applications online, while also improving information sharing between partner government \nagencies and traders – aligning with Recommendation 33 of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe \non single windows and trade facilitation. Electronic single windows for trade are one of the most effective measures \nto enhance trade facilitation in a country, underscored by their inclusion in the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement.\nBy digitally connecting partner government agencies, an ASYCUDA single window simplifies trade, reduces \nclearance times and trade costs, ensures transparent and uniform application of duties and taxes, maximizes \ngovernment revenue, helps combat corruption and ensures compliance with standards for public health and safety. \nASYCUDA-based electronic single windows are active or being implemented in 13 countries (Barbados, Burundi, \nthe Comoros, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Rwanda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Timor-\nLeste, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe).\nIn 2023 UNCTAD published Roadmap for Building a Trade Single Window, which shares experience, expertise \nand recommendations in a blueprint for designing and implementing tailored, single windows that comply with \nnational, regional and international requirements. It is being used as a source by the World Customs Organization \nas it updates its Single Window Compendium. \nSources: UNCTAD and UNCTAD (2023b). See also https://asycuda.org/en/# and https://unece.org/sites/default/\nfiles/2023-10/Rec33_ECE-TRADE-352-Rev1E.pdf.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n150\nF. Conclusions and policy \nimplications\nGovernance and institutional weaknesses have consistently \nfeatured in research and investor surveys as key challenges to \nthe attraction of investment in sustainable development. Digital \ngovernment contributes to good governance and stronger \ninstitutions. Online tools for business and investment facilitation \nhave proven to be a good starting point for the broader \nimplementation of digital government. Digital facilitation of \nbusiness and investment is thus a key step in developing broader \ndigital government services and, indirectly, a key pillar of the \npromotion of investment in sustainable development.\nInvestment facilitation is top of mind for \npolicymakers worldwide. Investment policy \nmeasures of national governments aimed at \nfacilitating the establishment and operations \nof foreign investors have rapidly increased \nin number since the launch of the UNCTAD \nAction Menu in 2016 – they now make \nup 40 per cent of measures favourable \nto investors. Recent agreements at the \nbilateral, regional and international levels \nmore often include provisions on facilitation, \nand the recently finalized IFD agreement \nmay provide further impetus for action by \nnational policymakers and treaty negotiators. \nAs discussed in this chapter, international \nagreements can be catalysts not only for \ninvestment facilitation but also for digital \ntools for that purpose. In its support \nto discussions on international policy \ninstruments, UNCTAD has consistently \nemphasized the need to focus the \nimplementation of investment facilitation \nin developing countries on measures with \nthe highest rate of return. While investment \nfacilitation provisions can cover many \nissues, including dispute prevention, focal \npoints and collaborative initiatives, the \nmost cost-effective and impactful ones \nrevolve around information provision, \ntransparency of rules and regulations, and \nstreamlining of administrative procedures \nthrough digital government tools. That is \nbecause they are important all the time \n(not just on an occasional or project basis), \nthey benefit all firms (large and small, \nforeign and local) and they can cover \nall necessary processes for business \nestablishment and operation (not just \nprocedures specific to foreign investment). \nDeveloping countries can be at an \nadvantage in establishing digital government \ntools for business and investment facilitation. \nThey have fewer legacy systems to integrate \nand can adopt the latest solutions. A smaller \nnumber of institutions and decision-makers \ncan also support faster implementation. \nThe evidence in this chapter confirms \nthat there is a leapfrogging opportunity; \nsome of the lowest-income countries have \ncreated online facilitation platforms that \ncan compete with the best. However, the \ndevelopment of most of these platforms has \nrequired technical assistance and support. \nImportantly, the IFD agreement and other \ninternational cooperation agreements on \ninvestment aim to accelerate support to \ndeveloping countries for the implementation \nof investment facilitation mechanisms. Such \nDigital \ninvestment \nfacilitation \nmeasures are \nvaluable all the \ntime, for all \nfirms, in all \nprocesses\n\n\nChapter IV\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n151\nsupport should focus in large part on the \ndevelopment of digital government solutions. \nGovernments should adopt a \ncomprehensive approach to digital \ninvestment facilitation, avoiding dedicated \nprocesses solely for investment \nauthorization. Investors are not helped by \nsmooth investment approval processes if \nsubsequent procedures to establish their \nbusiness operations remain inefficient. \nGovernments should progressively \nincorporate all or most procedures and \nservices required by both foreign and local \nbusinesses, such as business registration, \ntax and social security registration, licensing \nand other essential services. This approach \nenables Governments to harness the full \npotential of digitalization and to capture \neconomies of scale and scope from the \nimplementation of digital platforms. \nBut there is no reason to stop at \nthe core mandatory procedures for \nbusiness establishment. Countless other \nadministrative procedures affecting \nbusiness operations may be sector specific \nor motivated by policy concerns ranging \nfrom the environment, to health and safety, \nto labour and social issues. The digital \ngovernment tools that are central to effective \nand efficient implementation of business \nand investment facilitation initiatives can \nserve as a foundation for broader digital \ngovernment adoption, making them a \nsignificant step towards modernizing \ngovernance and administrative processes. \nAs noted in this chapter, digital investment \ntools strengthen governance, enhance \ntransparency and lead to more efficient \nadministration. Their application more \ngenerally across government can further \nimprove the attractiveness of countries \nto both foreign and local investors. The \nreturn on investment to governments from \nsetting up a digital platform for investment \nfacilitation is maximized when more \nprocedures are covered. Once a digital \nbusiness registry is established and firms \nhave a verifiable online identity, governments \ncan relatively easily extend online services \nto licences (sectoral, import-export), \npermits (construction, environmental), \ntaxes (registration, filing, payment), social \nsecurity (employer-employee registration, \nfiling and payment), land transactions, \nhealth and safety certifications, sector-\nspecific procedures such as pharmaceutical \napproval processes, and carbon \nregistries. In that way, digital business and \ninvestment facilitation becomes a stepping \nstone to wider digital government. \nThe digital government platform of UNCTAD \nincludes a suite of tools and technical \nassistance products aimed at supporting \ndeveloping countries in meeting their \ninvestment facilitation commitments. \nThey include information portals, online \nsingle windows and regional investment \nfacilitation monitors specifically tailored \nfor business and investment facilitation. \nAcknowledged by the Donor Committee \nfor Enterprise Development as exemplars \nof good practice, these tools have \ngarnered widespread attention, being \naccessed 6.2 million times in 2023.\nThe digital single windows developed by \nUNCTAD can also be extended to other \nareas of government. From a technical \npoint of view, their cloud-based approach \nmeans there is no need for systems \nintegration: new databases can be designed \nwithin the same system and application \nprogramming interfaces can connect to \nexisting registries. New online services can \nbe created, with civil servants progressively \ntraining their colleagues in other agencies \nto use the system or accessing training \nat the Digital Government Academy \nof UNCTAD and the United Nations \nInstitute for Training and Research. \nAt the request of various Governments, \nUNCTAD has already started developing \ndigital single windows that go beyond \nbusiness creation to support business \noperations, with a specific focus on \nthe Sustainable Development Goals. \nThis effort includes tools to facilitate the \nlicensing of the import, distribution and \nlocal production of pharmaceuticals (using \nDigital business \nand investment \nfacilitation tools \nare a stepping \nstone to \nwider digital \ngovernment\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\nInvestment facilitation and digital government\n152\nstandards of the World Health Organization), \nthe registration and calculation of \ncarbon emissions to assess nationally \ndetermined contributions and to certify \ncarbon credits and debits (following the \nmethodology of the Intergovernmental \nPanel on Climate Change), tax and social \nsecurity filings, and the digitalization of \nextended producer responsibility. \nThis focus on processes relevant for the \nSustainable Development Goals shows \nhow digital business and investment \nfacilitation can be deployed specifically \nto support sustainable development. \nCases discussed in this chapter provide \nample evidence of the impact of digital \nbusiness and investment facilitation on \nsustainable development and inclusiveness, \nin particular through rates of participation \nin the economy of women, youth and \nrural communities. Even in countries with \na significant digital divide, solutions have \nbeen found to ensure that population \ngroups with limited access to the Internet or \nlacking digital skills have reaped the benefits \nof digitalization, e.g. through terminals \nin business registries and municipalities \nand through dedicated support. \nBuilding on digital business facilitation \ntowards wider implementation of digital \ngovernment will have an even bigger \nimpact on sustainable development and on \ninvestment in the Sustainable Development \nGoals. There is strong evidence that \ngood governance, transparent rules and \nregulations, and efficient administrative \nprocedures have a positive impact \non FDI. Surveys of investors and IPAs \nconsistently show that governance and \ninstitutional weaknesses are at the heart \nof challenges in attracting investment for \nsustainable development. By supporting the \ndevelopment of wider digital government \napplications, technical assistance for \nbusiness and investment facilitation, \nincluding capacity-building initiatives \nbased on international investment policy \ninstruments, has the potential to tackle some \nof the root causes of the gap in investment \nfor the Sustainable Development Goals.\nUNCTAD has acted as a catalyst for \nprogress on investment facilitation at the \nnational and international levels. It has \nactively supported individual countries, \nregional groups and the international \ncommunity through policy advice, policy \nguidance and knowledge resources. An \nimportant focus of the organization is now \non implementation – through technical \nassistance  to Member States on digital \ninvestment facilitation. The digital tools \nfor business and investment facilitation \nincluded in the UNCTAD digital government \nplatform are operational in more than 60 \ncountries (and the same tools are used for \ntrade information portals). Looking ahead, \nUNCTAD will continue to support developing \ncountries and – in collaboration with other \ninternational organizations – look for \nopportunities to maximize the development \nbenefits of digital government solutions \nby widening their scope of application.\n* * *\nDigital business \nand investment \nfacilitation \ncan support \ninclusive and \nsustainable \ndevelopment\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\n153\nReferences\nAlfaro L, Kalemli-Ozcan S and Volosovych V (2008). Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to poor \ncountries? An empirical investigation. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 90(2):347–368.\nAnderson J and Gonzalez A (2013). Does Doing Business matter for foreign direct investment? \nDoing Business Case Study 47/80647. World Bank. \nASEAN Secretariat and UNCTAD (2022). ASEAN Investment Report 2022: Pandemic Recovery \nand Investment Facilitation. Jakarta. \nBioy H, Wang B, Pucci N, Carabia A and Areyada B (2024). SFDR Article 8 and Article 9 funds: Q4 \n2023 in review. Morningstar. Available at https://www.morningstar.com/en-uk/lp/sfdr-article8-\narticle9. \nClimate Bonds Initiative (2021). Green bond pricing in the primary market, January–June 2021. \nAvailable at https://www.climatebonds.net/files/reports/cbi_pricing_h1_2021_03b.pdf.\nHenry J and Furdak R (2022). ESG performance and flows. Available at https://www.man.com/\nmaninstitute/documents/download/db804-c5788-db188-fe571/Responsible_Investment_ESG_\nPerformance_and_Flows_-_From_a_Tale_of_Two_Cities_in_2023_to_%28hopefully%21%29_\nGreat_Expectations_in_2024_English_25-01-2024.pdf.\nHossain S and Rahman Z (2017). Does governance facilitate foreign direct investment in \ndeveloping countries? International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues. 7(1):164–177.\nHuck V (2023). Could Europe be ISSB’s best friend... in the US? Corporate Disclosures. Available \nat https://www.corporatedisclosures.org/content/top-stories/could-europe-be-issbs-best-\nfriend-in-the-us.html. \nInternational Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. Understanding International Standard on \nSustainability Assurance 5000. Available at https://www.iaasb.org/focus-areas/understanding-\ninternational-standard-sustainability-assurance-5000.\nInternational Economic Law Clinic (2024). Mapping transparency commitments in IIAs. NUS Centre \nfor International Law. Singapore.\nIMF (2024). World Economic Outlook, April 2024: Steady But Slow: Resilience Amid Divergence. \nInternational Monetary Fund. Washington, D.C.\nITU and UNDP (2023). SDG Digital Acceleration Agenda. International Telecommunication Union \nand United Nations Development Programme. Geneva.\nJayasuriya D (2011). Improvements in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings: Do they \ntranslate into greater foreign direct investment? Policy Research Working Paper Series 5787. \nWorld Bank.\nMáchová R, Volejníková J and Lněnička M (2018). Impact of e-government development on the \nlevel of corruption: Measuring the effects of related indices in time and dimensions. Review of \nEconomic Perspectives. 18(2):99–121.\nMalone L, Holland E and Houston C (2023). ESG battlegrounds: How the states are shaping \nthe regulatory landscape in the U.S. Corporate Governance. Available at https://corpgov.\nlaw.harvard.edu/2023/03/11/esg-battlegrounds-how-the-states-are-shaping-the-regulatory-\nlandscape-in-the-u-s/.\nOECD (2024). Recommendation of the Council on Digital Government Strategies. OECD/\nLEGAL/0438. Available at https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/Recommendation-\ndigital-government-strategies.pdf.\nOpertti F and Volpe Martincus C (2023). Investment promotion in the new international context: \nWhat is the next frontier and how to get there. Columbia FDI Perspectives No. 355. Columbia \nUniversity, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\n154\nReil S, Hamdani K, Barreiros L, Berger A, Contreras R, Kagan Y, Sauvant K, Steneri P and Zhao Q \n(2022). What foreign investors want: Findings from an investor survey of investment facilitation \nmeasures in Latin America and the Caribbean. International Trade Centre and German \nDevelopment Institute with the Inter-American Development Bank. Available at https://doi.\norg/10.2139/ssrn.4018005.\nAl-Sadiq A (2021). The role of e-government in promoting foreign direct investment inflows. \nInternational Monetary Fund Working Papers No. 16(141). \nUNCTAD (1998). World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants (United Nations \npublication. New York and Geneva). \nUNCTAD (2015). Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development. UNCTAD/DIAE/\nPCB/2015/5. Geneva.\nUNCTAD (2016). Global Action Menu for Investment Facilitation. Geneva.\nUNCTAD (2017). World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital Economy (United \nNations publication. Sales No. E.17.II.D.3. New York and Geneva). \nUNCTAD (2018). UNCTAD’s Reform Package for the International Investment Regime (United \nNations publication. New York and Geneva).\nUNCTAD (2019). World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones (United Nations \npublication. Sales No. E.19.II.D.12. Geneva).\nUNCTAD (2020a). International Investment Agreements Reform Accelerator. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/\nINF/2020/8. New York and Geneva. \nUNCTAD (2020b). Post-COVID-19: Investment promotion agencies and the “new normal”. The IPA \nObserver, Special Issue 9. July.\nUNCTAD (2021). Digital Economy Report 2021 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.21.II.D.18. \nGeneva).\nUNCTAD (2022). World Investment Report 2022: International Tax Reforms and Sustainable \nInvestment (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.22.II.D.20. Geneva).\nUNCTAD (2023a). Investment facilitation in international investment agreements: trends and policy \noptions. IIA Issues Note No. 3, September. \nUNCTAD (2023b). Roadmap for Building a Trade Single Window. Transport and Trade Facilitation \nSeries No. 21.\nUNCTAD (2023c). The digital transformation of investment promotion agencies. IPA Observer No. 12 \n(UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/INF/2022/9). Geneva.\nUNCTAD (2023d). The evolution of FDI screening mechanisms: Key trends and \nfeatures. Investment Policy Monitor No. 25. February. \nUNCTAD (2023e). Trends in the investment treaty regime and a reform toolbox for the energy \ntransition. IIA Issues Note No. 2.\nUNCTAD (2023f). World Investment Report 2023: Investing in Sustainable Energy for All (United \nNations publication. Sales no. E.23.II.D.17. Geneva and New York).\nUNCTAD (2024a). Business and investment facilitation: Stepping stones to digital government. Note \nby the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B/C.II/51). Geneva.\nUNCTAD (2024b). Outward FDI policies: Promotion and facilitation – regulation and \nscreening. Investment Policy Monitor No. 27. February.\nUNCTAD (2024c). Shaping the future of SME sustainability disclosure: A holistic approach. \nUNCTAD input paper for the Group of 20 Sustainable Finance Working Group. \nUNCTAD (2024d). Global Economic Fracturing and Shifting Investment Patterns. A Diagnostic of \n10 FDI Trends and Their Development Implications (UNCTAD/DIAE/2024/1). Geneva.\nUnited Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022). E-Government Survey 2022. \nThe Future of Digital Government (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.22.II.H.2. New York).\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\n155\nUNECE UN/CEFACT (2020). Recommendation and Guidelines on Establishing a Single \nWindow to Enhance the Efficient Exchange of Information between Trade and Government. \nRecommendation No. 33 (United Nations publication. Sales No. 05.II.E.9. New York and \nGeneva).\nUNODC (2023). World Drug Report 2023 (United Nations publication. Sales No. E.23.XI.7. New \nYork).\nUnited States Securities and Exchange Commission. Final rule: The enhancement and \nstandardization of climate-related disclosures for investors. Available at https://www.sec.gov/\nrules/2022/03/enhancement-and-standardization-climate-related-disclosures-investors.\nVolpe Martincus C, Marra de Artiñano I, Sztajerowska M and Carballo J (2021). Making the Invisible \nVisible: Investment Promotion and Multinational Production in Latin America and the Caribbean. \nInter-American Development Bank. Washington, D.C.\nWorld Bank (2016). World Development Report 2016: Digital Dividends. Washington, D.C.\nWorld Trade Organization (2023). Investment facilitation self-assessment guide. Restricted document \n(INF/IFD/RD/137).\n\n\n156\nFDI inflows\nFDI outflows\nRegion/economy\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nWorlda\n1 376 139\n1 729 239\n 984 578\n1 621 808\n1 355 749\n1 331 813\n1 010 629\n1 444 809\n 779 507\n1 881 922\n1 574 724\n1 550 584\nDeveloped economies\n 674 750\n1 024 750\n 337 595\n 731 843\n 426 198\n 464 397\n 633 813\n1 045 960\n 396 035\n1 376 095\n1 023 157\n1 059 323\nEurope\n 320 294\n 660 687\n 158 933\n 178 748\n-105 878\n 16 493\n 535 714\n 648 344\n-17 470\n 705 714\n 216 770\n 327 855\nEuropean Union\n 305 556\n 627 336\n 154 889\n 266 502\n-84 831\n 58 645\n 340 138\n 644 799\n 102 670\n 619 677\n 169 790\n 182 746\nAustria\n 5 390\n 4 905\n-9 983\n 17 092\n 9 326\n 4 466\n 5 612\n 12 486\n 7 284\n 25 243\n 7 523\n 9 594\nBelgium\n 27 137\n 11 861\n 3 133\n 9 905\n 11 551\n 23 019\n 43 581\n 6 111\n 5 420\n 30 095\n 20 311\n 12 072\nBulgaria\n 1 143\n 1 835\n 3 397\n 1 794\n 2 771\n 3 913\n  249\n  449\n  246\n  318\n  561\n  598\nCroatia\n 1 199\n  402\n  146\n 4 486\n 3 590\n 2 749\n  206\n-118\n  35\n  926\n-254\n 1 178\nCyprus\n-413\n 52 330\n-24 451\n 7 388\n 5 732\n 3 447\n-6 941\n 51 415\n-32 965\n 3 278\n-905\n-1 833\nCzechia\n 11 010\n 10 108\n 9 411\n 9 051\n 9 248\n 7 785\n 8 663\n 4 128\n 2 990\n 7 734\n 5 675\n 7 052\nDenmark\n-2 497\n 27 029\n 1 372\n 7 095\n 7 750\n 8 760\n-3 971\n 36 425\n 9 660\n 26 138\n 5 868\n 15 129\nEstonia\n 1 426\n 3 053\n 3 541\n  105\n 1 009\n 4 577\n-46\n 1 868\n  292\n-770\n  842\n 1 506\nFinland\n-2 172\n 13 456\n-1 579\n 13 290\n 5 795\n-1 676b\n 11 455\n 4 865\n 5 856\n 9 156\n 13 275\n 1 372b\nFrance\n 34 671\n 20 426\n 13 174\n 34 109\n 75 979\n 42 032\n 95 621\n 51 459\n 23 676\n 55 087\n 52 776\n 72 356\nGermany\n 72 022\n 52 684\n 69 954\n 51 218\n 27 411\n 36 698\n 97 117\n 151 078\n 38 700\n 147 604\n 145 528\n 101 254\nGreece\n 3 973\n 5 019\n 3 213\n 6 328\n 8 451\n 5 430\n  477\n  642\n  549\n 1 109\n 3 198\n 3 952\nHungary\n 6 460\n 4 143\n 6 842\n 8 041\n 9 320\n 6 016\n 3 364\n 3 155\n 4 436\n 4 141\n 4 123\n 3 299\nIreland\n-12 017\n 149 433\n 102 519\n-3 933\n-25 058\n-9 165\n 5 154\n 32 083\n-11 400\n 56 146\n 9 395\n-6 595\nItaly\n 37 682\n 22 720\n-18 576\n-2 952\n 32 177\n 18 219\n 31 542\n 24 362\n 2 929\n 26 415\n 16 543\n 13 014\nLatvia\n  960\n  926\n 1 004\n 3 303\n 1 404\n 1 212\n  207\n-104\n  255\n 2 324\n  115\n  582\nLithuania\n  972\n 1 441\n  416\n 2 860\n 2 214\n 1 868\n  699\n  382\n-46\n 1 323\n  367\n  758\nLuxembourg\n-83 336\n 163 718\n 9 839\n 25 123\n-359 331\n-62 808\n 21 857\n 176 767\n 148 012\n 52 174\n-294 199\n-23 679\nMalta\n 4 024\n 3 778\n 3 921\n 28 662\n 19 916\n 20 900c\n 7 401\n 6 960\n 7 235\n 24 676\n 24 625\n 20 860c\nNetherlands\n 102 134\n 15 940\n-81 651\n-70 238\n-80 438\n-168 450\n-44 152\n 31 023\n-173 903\n 92 375\n 38 227\n-142 185\nPoland\n 15 996\n 13 510\n 15 195\n 29 235\n 31 470\n 28 685\n  891\n 1 854\n  851\n 3 168\n 6 325\n 10 403\nPortugal\n 7 181\n 12 251\n 7 683\n 9 615\n 9 778\n 7 220\n 1 375\n 4 010\n 2 526\n 1 468\n 2 686\n 3 556\nRomania\n 6 219\n 5 791\n 3 432\n 10 574\n 10 572\n 7 130\n  379\n  363\n  53\n  141\n 1 297\n  40\nSlovakia\n 1 675\n 2 511\n-2 404\n 1 821\n 2 902\n  180\n  322\n  43\n  348\n  297\n  433\n  89\nSlovenia\n 1 384\n 1 463\n  220\n 1 846\n 2 039\n 1 103\n  281\n  610\n  519\n 1 356\n  683\n  540\nSpain\n 58 063\n 17 842\n 14 239\n 38 318\n 44 885\n 35 914\n 37 944\n 26 196\n 33 539\n 17 260\n 42 900\n 30 335\nSweden\n 5 269\n 8 761\n 20 880\n 22 364\n 44 706\n 29 418\n 20 852\n 16 286\n 25 576\n 30 494\n 61 873\n 47 498\nOther Europe\n 14 738\n 33 352\n 4 044\n-87 754\n-21 047\n-42 152\n 195 576\n 3 545\n-120 141\n 86 037\n 46 980\n 145 109\nAlbania\n 1 290\n 1 288\n 1 108\n 1 234\n 1 434\n 1 630\n  83\n  128\n  88\n  63\n  181\n  265\nBelarus\n 1 421\n 1 293\n 1 398\n 1 238\n 1 603\n 2 060\n  50\n  16\n  88\n-71\n  173\n  23\nBosnia and Herzegovina\n  581\n  458\n  480\n  683\n  775\n  946\n  2\n  35\n  73\n  46\n  50\n  48\nIceland\n-381\n-225\n-928\n  518\n  859\n  977\n  76\n  479\n-427\n  3\n-118\n-181\nRepublic of Moldova\n  313\n  523\n  150\n  404\n  591\n  428\n  38\n  43\n-2\n  33\n  50\n  12\nMontenegro\n  490\n  416\n  532\n  699\n  877\n  526\n  109\n  75\n-5\n  11\n  53\n  63\nNorth Macedonia\n  725\n  446\n  230\n  556\n  785\n  667\n  12\n  40\n  53\n  98\n  96\n  101\nNorway\n 1 044\n 17 023\n-7 990\n 3 825\n 9 644\n 7 960\n 11 181\n 14 436\n 9 930\n 12 842\n 13 085\n 8 153\nRussian Federation\n 13 228\n 32 076\n 10 410\n 38 639\n-15 205\n 8 364\n 35 820\n 22 024\n 6 778\n 64 072\n 11 510\n 29 110\nSerbia\n 4 091\n 4 270\n 3 469\n 4 590\n 4 598\n 4 870\n  363\n  294\n  112\n  264\n  41\n  308\nSwitzerland\n-100 954\n-84 436\n-49 570\n-76 785\n-43 248\n 13 507\n 64 955\n-46 659\n-41 041\n-76 161\n-74 020\n 104 954\nUkraine\n 4 732\n 6 017\n-36\n 7 320\n  557\n 4 247\n-127\n  842\n  22\n-198\n  344\n  42\nUnited Kingdom\n 87 837\n 53 918\n 44 397\n-71 174\n 14 912\n-89 247\n 82 961\n 11 717\n-95 877\n 84 918\n 95 352\n 2 007\nNorth America\n 240 896\n 280 474\n 118 890\n 449 818\n 378 527\n 361 271\n-99 358\n 112 548\n 268 132\n 383 404\n 449 398\n 493 899\nCanada\n 37 662\n 50 544\n 25 594\n 60 382\n 46 175\n 50 324\n 58 049\n 77 492\n 43 667\n 104 878\n 83 012\n 89 583\nUnited States\n 203 234\n 229 930\n 93 296\n 389 436\n 332 352\n 310 947\n-157 407\n 35 056\n 224 465\n 278 526\n 366 386\n 404 316\nOther developed economies\n 113 561\n 83 589\n 59 773\n 103 277\n 153 549\n 86 632\n 197 456\n 285 068\n 145 374\n 286 977\n 356 989\n 237 568\nAustralia\n 67 569\n 38 536\n 14 162\n 23 855\n 63 366\n 29 874\n 7 825\n 8 719\n 5 607\n 3 100\n 118 050\n 9 822\nIsrael\n 21 515\n 17 363\n 20 969\n 18 950\n 23 031\n 16 422\n 6 087\n 8 690\n 4 579\n 10 369\n 10 246\n 9 970\nJapan\n 9 963\n 13 755\n 11 768\n 34 294\n 34 194\n 21 433\n 144 982\n 232 627\n 99 708\n 208 985\n 162 126\n 184 022\nRepublic of Korea\n 12 183\n 9 634\n 8 765\n 22 060\n 25 045\n 15 178\n 38 220\n 35 239\n 34 832\n 66 001\n 65 799\n 34 541\nNew Zealand\n 2 236\n 4 296\n 3 997\n 4 117\n 7 903\n 3 568\n  377\n-169\n  658\n-1 451\n  746\n-808\nBermuda\n  95\n  5\n  112\n  2\n  10\n  156c\n-35\n-38\n-11\n-27\n  21\n  21c\nDeveloping economiesa\n 701 389\n 704 489\n 646 983\n 889 965\n 929 551\n 867 417\n 376 816\n 398 849\n 383 471\n 505 827\n 551 567\n 491 261\nAfrica\n 43 772\n 46 975\n 41 048\n 82 196\n 54 465\n 52 633\n 7 899\n 5 122\n 2 465\n 5 144\n 9 232\n  61\nNorth Africa\n 15 407\n 13 550\n 9 797\n 9 509\n 15 323\n 13 461\n 2 269\n 1 727\n  356\n  994\n 1 171\n 1 185\nAlgeria\n 1 475\n 1 382\n 1 140\n  870\n  255\n 1 216\n  854\n  31\n  15\n-52\n  85\n  84\nEgypt\n 8 141\n 9 010\n 5 852\n 5 122\n 11 400\n 9 841\n  324\n  405\n  327\n  367\n  342\n  390\nLibya \n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n  276\n  377\n-487\n-55c\n  50c\n-164c\nMorocco\n 3 559\n 1 720\n 1 419\n 2 266\n 2 260\n 1 095\n  782\n  893\n  458\n  644\n  641\n  836\nSouth Sudan\n  60\n-232\n  18c\n  68c\n  122c\n-6c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSudan\n 1 136\n  825\n  717\n  523\n  574\n  548c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nTunisia\n 1 036\n  845\n  652\n  660\n  714\n  768\n  34\n  22\n  43\n  35\n  53\n  40\nAnnex table 1\t\nFDI flows, by region and economy, 2018–2023\n(Millions of dollars)\n\n\n157\nAnnex table 1\t\nFDI flows, by region and economy, 2018–2023\n(Continued)\nFDI inflows\nFDI outflows\nRegion/economy\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nOther Africa\n 28 366\n 33 425\n 31 251\n 72 687\n 39 142\n 39 171\n 5 629\n 3 395\n 2 109\n 4 150\n 8 061\n-1 124\nWest Africa\n 8 126\n 11 976\n 10 023\n 13 626\n 13 065\n 12 962\n 1 105\n 1 269\n 2 116\n 2 469\n 3 249\n  755\nBenin\n  194\n  218\n  174\n  346\n  376\n  434\n  10\n  27\n  22\n  43\n  47\n  49\nBurkina Faso\n  268\n  163\n-102\n-80\n  670\n  85\n  68\n  16\n-7\n-43\n  24\n  5\nCabo Verde\n  103\n  123\n  68\n  91\n  93\n  118\n-9\n-16\n-4\n  1\n-3\n-7\nCôte d’Ivoire\n  620\n  936\n  713\n 1 377\n 1 599\n 1 753\n  145\n  120\n  1\n  285\n  168\n  215\nGambia\n  52\n  71\n  190\n  249\n  236\n  208\n0.5\n-2\n-3\n-3\n  2\n-1c\nGhana\n 2 989\n 3 880\n 1 876\n 2 613\n 1 511\n 1 354\n  81\n  588\n  542\n  199\n  38\n  56\nGuinea\n  353\n  43\n  174\n  201\n  650\n  893c\n-0.3\n  1\n  2\n-3\n0.1c\n0.1c\nGuinea-Bissau\n  21\n  72\n  21\n  19\n  33\n  24\n-0.4\n0.4\n0.3\n  1\n  1\n0.3\nLiberia\n  129\n  87\n  738\n  536\n  960\n  745c\n  84c\n  102c\n  80c\n  91c\n  91c\n  87c\nMali\n  467\n  721\n  537\n  640\n  716\n  698\n0.3\n  1\n  1\n  56\n  44\n  23\nMauritania\n  773\n  887\n  931\n 1 064\n 1 419\n  873c\n..\n..\n  6c\n  5c\n  3c\n0.1c\nNiger\n  466\n  717\n  361\n  595\n  966\n  966\n  39\n  32\n  15\n  39\n  9\n  40\nNigeria\n  775\n 2 305\n 2 385\n 3 313\n  895\n 1 873\n  566\n  285\n 1 473\n 1 818\n 2 811\n  256\nSenegal\n  848\n 1 065\n 1 846\n 2 588\n 2 929\n 2 641\n  53\n  71\n  99\n  52\n  70\n  91\nSierra Leone\n  250\n  342\n  173\n  212\n  186\n  263c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nTogo\n-183\n  346\n-59\n-136\n-173\n  34\n  70\n  43\n-112\n-71\n-54\n-60\nCentral Africa\n 8 822\n 9 254\n 8 917\n 6 607\n 7 083\n 5 875\n  79\n  422\n  279\n  498\n  490\n  151\nBurundi\n  7\n  30\n  21\n  22\n  25\n  29c\n..\n  1\n  1\n  1\n  2\n  2c\nCameroon\n  765\n 1 025\n  675\n  964\n  926\n  799c\n  108\n  126\n  84\n  55\n  27\n-109c\nCentral African \nRepublic\n  18c\n  26c\n  2c\n  5c\n  24c\n  39c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nChad\n  461c\n  567c\n  558c\n  705c\n  614c\n  913c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nCongo\n 4 315c\n 3 366c\n 4 016c\n  532c\n  532c\n  626b\n  14c\n  23c\n  27c\n  25c\n  25c\n  26c\nDemocratic Republic \nof the Congo\n 1 617\n 1 488\n 1 647\n 1 870\n 1 846\n 1 635c\n  209\n  134\n  149\n  192\n  436\n  235c\nEquatorial Guinea\n-144\n  821\n-9\n  562\n 1 388\n  142c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nGabon\n 1 379c\n 1 553c\n 1 717c\n 1 529c\n 1 105c\n 1 151c\n-63c\n-34c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nRwanda\n  382\n  354\n  260\n  399\n  496\n  523\n  18\n  5\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSao Tome and Principe\n  23\n  24\n  32\n  19\n  127\n  18\n  2\n  1\n  1\n-0.04\n0.2\n-4\nEast Africa\n 7 918\n 7 681\n 7 439\n 10 082\n 11 543\n 11 226\n  248\n  174\n 1 508\n 2 082\n 1 709\n  721\nComoros\n  6\n  4\n  4\n  4\n  4\n  5c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nDjibouti\n  170\n  175\n  158\n  168\n  191\n  137\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nEritrea\n  61c\n-61c\n-30c\n-31c\n-32c\n  2c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nEthiopia\n 3 360\n 2 549\n 2 381\n 4 260\n 3 670\n 3 263\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nKenya\n 1 139\n 1 098\n 1 510\n 1 406\n 1 597\n 1 504c\n  11\n  11\n 1 297\n 1 840\n 1 502\n  588c\nMadagascar\n  353\n  474\n  358\n  358\n  468\n  415c\n  118\n  102\n  119\n  114\n  142\n  119c\nMauritius\n  461\n  444\n  225\n  253\n  580\n  760\n  98\n  58\n  16\n  86\n  37\n  16\nSeychelles\n-66\n  30\n  165\n  225\n  212\n  238\n  20\n  4\n  75\n  42\n  28\n-2\nSomalia\n  408\n  447\n  534\n  601\n  636\n  677\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nUganda\n 1 055\n 1 303\n 1 191\n 1 648\n 2 953\n 2 886\n0.3\n0.3\n0.3\n0.3\n0.4\n0.4\nUnited Republic of \nTanzania\n  972\n 1 217\n  944\n 1 190\n 1 265\n 1 339c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSouthern Africa\n 3 499\n 4 514\n 4 871\n 42 373\n 7 450\n 9 109\n 4 196\n 1 529\n-1 793\n-899\n 2 614\n-2 751\nAngola\n-6 456\n-4 098\n-1 866\n-4 355\n-6 599\n-2 086\n  6\n-2 349\n  91\n-1 057\n  41\n  33\nBotswana\n  286\n  94\n  32\n-319\n  708\n  198c\n  82\n-20\n-68\n-33\n  10\n-38c\nEswatini\n  36\n  130\n  36\n  117\n  15\n  29\n-11\n  22\n-13\n  60\n-17\n-22\nLesotho\n  41\n  35\n  28\n-12\n-8\n-26\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nMalawi\n  77\n  55\n  252\n  129\n  243\n  208c\n-102\n  23\n-154\n  28\n  37\n  32c\nMozambique\n 2 703\n 2 212\n 3 035\n 5 102\n 2 458\n 2 509\n-25\n-31\n  153\n  194\n  564\n  174\nNamibia\n  209\n-179\n-146\n  851\n 1 072\n 2 345\n  98\n  9\n  52\n  18\n  12\n-310\nSouth Africa\n 5 450b\n 5 125b\n 3 062b\n 40 215b\n 9 231b\n 5 233b\n 4 076b\n 3 147b\n-1 951b\n  139b\n 2 162b\n-2 811b\nZambia\n  408\n  860\n  245\n  394\n-65\n  108\n  45\n  696\n  64\n-280\n-253\n  160\nZimbabwe\n  745\n  280\n  194\n  250\n  395\n  588\n  27\n  32\n  33\n  32\n  58\n  31\nAsia\n 501 858\n 497 788\n 513 069\n 666 542\n 677 829\n 621 144\n 359 770\n 346 416\n 382 427\n 457 597\n 470 637\n 440 419\nEast and South-East Asia\n 400 933\n 397 183\n 404 822\n 542 477\n 538 249\n 512 531\n 300 620\n 292 723\n 335 063\n 380 875\n 369 413\n 367 047\nEast Asia\n 254 455\n 232 335\n 285 512\n 334 030\n 315 115\n 286 214\n 243 603\n 203 040\n 267 099\n 289 912\n 286 073\n 278 533\nChina\n 138 306\n 141 225\n 149 342\n 180 957\n 189 132\n 163 253\n 143 037\n 136 908\n 153 710\n 178 819\n 163 120\n 147 850\nDemocratic People’s \nRepublic of Korea\n  2c\n  30c\n  6c\n  18c\n  10c\n  13c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nMongolia\n 2 174\n 2 443\n 1 719\n 2 173\n 2 504\n 2 248\n  37\n  127\n  26\n  113\n  76\n  76\nHong Kong, China\n 104 246\n 73 714\n 134 710\n 140 186\n 109 685\n 112 676\n 82 201\n 53 202\n 100 715\n 96 428\n 106 226\n 104 286\nMacao, China\n 2 613\n 6 683\n-6 319\n 5 280\n 3 625\n 2 324c\n  270\n 1 041\n 1 148\n 3 211\n 1 062\n 1 607c\nTaiwan Province of \nChina\n 7 114b\n 8 240b\n 6 053b\n 5 416b\n 10 158b\n 5 700b\n 18 058b\n 11 763b\n 11 500b\n 11 341b\n 15 589b\n 24 714b\nSouth-East Asia\n 146 479\n 164 848\n 119 310\n 208 447\n 223 134\n 226 317\n 57 017\n 89 683\n 67 964\n 90 962\n 83 339\n 88 514\nBrunei Darussalam\n  517\n  375\n  577\n  205\n-292\n-51\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n\n\n158\nAnnex table 1\t\nFDI flows, by region and economy, 2018–2023\n(Continued)\nFDI inflows\nFDI outflows\nRegion/economy\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nCambodia\n 3 213\n 3 663\n 3 625\n 3 483\n 3 579\n 3 959\n  124\n  102\n  127\n  92\n  151\n  151\nIndonesia\n 20 563\n 23 883\n 18 591\n 21 131\n 25 390\n 21 628\n 8 053\n 3 352\n 4 448\n 3 845\n 7 323\n 7 070\nLao People’s \nDemocratic Republic\n 1 358\n  756\n  968\n 1 072\n  636\n 1 668c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n0.01\n..\nMalaysia\n 7 618\n 7 813\n 3 160\n 12 173\n 16 940\n 8 653\n 5 114\n 6 231\n 2 419\n 4 676\n 13 322\n 7 643\nMyanmar\n 2 892\n 2 509\n 1 907\n 2 067\n 1 239\n 1 520\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPhilippines\n 9 949b\n 8 671b\n 6 822b\n 11 983b\n 5 939d\n 6 210d\n 4 116b\n 3 351b\n 3 562b\n 2 251b\n  308d\n 1 251d\nSingapore\n 73 115\n 97 533\n 74 857\n 126 674\n 141 118\n 159 670\n 23 926b\n 67 776b\n 39 793b\n 61 368b\n 52 230b\n 62 997b\nThailand\n 11 705\n 3 765\n-6 284\n 14 417\n 11 082\n 4 548\n 15 085\n 8 410\n 17 260\n 18 398\n 7 365\n 10 369\nTimor-Leste\n  48\n-239\n-713\n-419\n-395\n  13\n..\n-3c\n-26c\n-26c\n-34c\n-17c\nViet Nam\n 15 500\n 16 120\n 15 800b\n 15 660b\n 17 900b\n 18 500b\n  598\n  465\n  380b\n  358b\n 2 674b\n-950b\nSouth Asia\n 52 262\n 59 090\n 71 050\n 52 683\n 57 519\n 35 974\n 11 630\n 13 275\n 11 206\n 17 716\n 15 942\n 13 524\nAfghanistan\n  119b\n  23b\n  13b\n  21b\n..\n..\n  39b\n  26b\n  37b\n  31b\n..\n..\nBangladesh\n 3 613\n 2 874\n 2 564\n 2 896\n 3 480\n 3 004\n  23\n  28\n  12\n  92\n  53\n  30\nBhutan\n  6\n  3\n  1\n  1\n  15\n  18\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nIndia\n 42 156\n 50 558\n 64 072\n 44 763\n 49 380\n 28 163\n 11 447\n 13 144\n 11 109\n 17 253\n 14 618\n 13 341\nIran (Islamic Republic of)\n 2 373\n 1 508\n 1 342\n 1 425\n 1 500c\n 1 422c\n  75\n  85c\n  78c\n  82c\n  100c\n  87c\nMaldives\n  576b\n  961b\n  441b\n  643b\n  732b\n  762b\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nNepal\n  67\n  185\n  126\n  196\n  65\n  74\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPakistan\n 1 737\n 2 234\n 2 057\n 2 147\n 1 462\n 1 818\n-21\n-85\n-45\n  242\n 1 157\n  32\nSri Lanka\n 1 614b\n  743b\n  434b\n  592b\n  884b\n  712b\n  68b\n  77b\n  15b\n  17b\n  15b\n  34b\nWest Asia\n 42 030\n 33 293\n 30 659\n 64 156\n 71 857\n 65 220\n 48 431\n 42 944\n 38 280\n 57 503\n 87 255\n 58 883\nArmenia\n  267\n  100\n  59\n  366\n  998\n  443\n  7\n-133\n-27\n  25\n  50\n  54\nAzerbaijan\n 1 403\n 1 504\n  507\n-1 708\n-4 474\n  253\n 1 761\n 2 432\n  825\n  77\n  172\n 1 875\nBahrain\n 1 654\n 1 548\n 1 021\n 1 779\n 2 760\n 6 840\n  111\n-197\n-205\n  64\n 1 948\n 1 113\nGeorgia\n 1 352\n 1 354\n  595\n 1 253\n 2 098\n 1 595\n  340\n  282\n  23\n  322\n  332\n  53\nIraq\n-4 885\n-3 508\n-2 859\n-2 637\n-2 088\n-5 273c\n  188\n  194\n  147\n  135\n  238\n  279c\nJordan\n  955\n  730\n  760\n  622\n 1 251\n  843\n-8\n  43\n  26\n  16\n-16\n  64\nKuwait\n  204\n  351\n  240\n  567\n  758\n 2 113\n 3 715\n-2 696\n 7 932\n 4 666\n 24 613\n 11 189\nLebanon\n 2 658\n 1 905\n 1 607\n  600\n  527\n  655\n  631\n  345\n  29\n-1 339\n  66\n  73\nOman\n 5 602\n 1 938\n 1 914\n 8 793\n 5 480\n 4 745c\n  130\n-588\n-840\n 1 178\n  944\n  165c\nQatar\n-2 186\n-2 813\n-2 434\n-1 093\n  76\n-474\n 3 523\n 4 450\n 2 730\n  160\n 2 384\n-191\nSaudi Arabia\n 12 141b\n 3 079b\n 1 621b\n 23 112b\n 28 055b\n 12 319b\n 19 252\n 14 553\n 5 411\n 24 674\n 26 962\n 16 071\nSyrian Arab Republic\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nTürkiye\n 12 511\n 9 469\n 7 663\n 11 481\n 13 447\n 10 439\n 3 666\n 2 973\n 3 233\n 5 037\n 4 716\n 5 774\nUnited Arab Emirates\n 10 385\n 17 875\n 19 884\n 20 667\n 22 737\n 30 688\n 15 079\n 21 226\n 18 937\n 22 546\n 24 833\n 22 328\nYemen\n-282c\n-371c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n  4c\n  3c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nState of Palestine\n  252\n  132\n  80\n  353\n  233\n  35c\n  31\n  56\n  59\n-58\n  13\n  36c\nCentral Asia\n 6 633\n 8 223\n 6 539\n 7 226\n 10 205\n 7 420\n-911\n-2 526\n-2 122\n 1 504\n-1 974\n  966\nKazakhstan\n 3 898\n 3 284\n 3 670\n 3 353\n 6 541\n 3 223\n-1 095\n-2 620\n-2 206\n 1 452\n-1 535\n  913\nKyrgyzstan\n  144\n  404\n-402\n  226\n  55\n  490\n  100\n  67\n  2\n  2\n-455\n  2\nTajikistan\n  360b\n  364b\n  107b\n  84b\n  174b\n  141b\n  82b\n  23b\n  70b\n  48b\n  12b\n  40b\nTurkmenistan\n 1 607c\n 1 854c\n 1 436c\n 1 287c\n  936c\n 1 378c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nUzbekistan\n  625b\n 2 316b\n 1 728b\n 2 275b\n 2 498b\n 2 187b\n  2b\n  3b\n  11b\n  3b\n  4b\n  12b\nLatin America and the \nCaribbeana\n 154 458\n 158 201\n 91 844\n 139 948\n 195 859\n 193 179\n 9 584\n 48 449\n-504\n 41 313\n 69 131\n 50 077\nSouth America\n 106 680\n 110 224\n 55 592\n 94 677\n 145 965\n 142 769\n  232\n 36 372\n-2 703\n 41 362\n 52 109\n 40 789\nArgentina\n 11 717\n 6 649\n 4 884\n 6 903\n 15 408\n 22 911\n 1 726\n 1 523\n 1 177\n 1 537\n 2 076\n 2 403\nBolivia (Plurinational \nState of)\n  302\n-217\n-1 129\n  584\n  6\n  294\n-84\n  48\n-111\n  91\n-81\n  257\nBrazil\n 59 824\n 65 386\n 28 322\n 50 651\n 73 352\n 65 897\n-16 336\n 19 031\n-13 415\n 20 450\n 32 100\n 29 920\nChile\n 13 031\n 14 403\n 11 292\n 12 627\n 16 882\n 21 027\n 6 934\n 11 169\n 6 242\n 12 024\n 11 852\n 5 567\nColombia\n 11 299b\n 13 989b\n 7 459b\n 9 561b\n 17 183b\n 17 446b\n 5 126b\n 3 153b\n 1 733b\n 3 181b\n 3 383b\n 1 211b\nEcuador\n 1 389\n  979\n 1 095\n  648\n  879\n  372\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nGuyana\n 1 231\n 1 695\n 2 086\n 4 468\n 4 393\n 7 198\n..\n  17\n  14\n  15\n  5\n  7\nParaguay\n  175\n  334\n  149\n  185\n  725\n  241\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPeru\n 6 761\n 6 362\n-825\n 6 272\n 12 026\n 3 331\n  98\n 1 087\n  392\n 1 098\n  237\n  889\nSuriname\n  119\n-8\n0.3\n-124\n  3\n-65\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nUruguay\n-11\n 2 018\n  756\n 1 937\n 3 456\n 3 429\n  718\n  627\n-263\n  430\n  500\n-812\nVenezuela (Bolivarian \nRepublic of)\n  844\n-1 367\n 1 504\n  964\n 1 651\n  688c\n 2 051\n-159\n 1 488\n 2 319\n 2 089\n 1 434c\nCentral America\n 45 062\n 44 032\n 32 346\n 42 638\n 46 350\n 46 662\n 9 065\n 11 709\n 2 193\n-1 025\n 15 626\n 7 926\nBelize\n  118\n  94\n  76\n  125\n  141\n  50\n  1\n  2\n  4\n  2\n  1\n  2\nCosta Rica\n 2 487\n 2 812\n 1 763\n 3 231\n 3 164\n 3 921\n  53\n  117\n  118\n  85\n  104\n  88\nEl Salvador\n  826\n  636\n  24\n  386\n  171\n  760\n-0.04\n0.4\n  22\n  12\n  29\n  29\nGuatemala\n  981\n  976\n  935\n 3 462\n 1 442\n 1 552\n  201\n  180\n  149\n  476\n  723\n  665\nHonduras\n  961\n  498\n  419\n  739\n  920\n 1 076\n  66\n  3\n  46\n  226\n  183\n  208\n\n\n159\nAnnex table 1\t\nFDI flows, by region and economy, 2018–2023\n(Concluded)\nFDI inflows\nFDI outflows\nRegion/economy\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\n2018\n2019\n2020\n2021\n2022\n2023\nMexico\n 34 101\n 34 617\n 28 211\n 31 829\n 36 312\n 36 058\n 8 489\n 10 755\n 1 720\n-2 125\n 14 532\n 6 429\nNicaragua\n  838\n  503\n  747\n 1 220\n 1 294\n 1 230\n  75\n  59\n  40\n  15\n  19\n  31\nPanama\n 4 751\n 3 895\n  172\n 1 646\n 2 906\n 2 015\n  180\n  592\n  94\n  285\n  34\n  474\nCaribbeana\n 2 715\n 3 945\n 3 906\n 2 634\n 3 544\n 3 748\n  287\n  368\n  6\n  977\n 1 397\n 1 363\nAntigua and Barbuda\n  193b\n  118b\n  62b\n  296b\n  326b\n  327b\n-2b\n-15b\n  1b\n-36b\n  14b\n  15b\nBarbados\n  242\n  215\n  262\n  239c\n  200c\n  225\n  9\n  28\n  8\n  18c\n  15c\n  8c\nDominica\n  97b\n  76b\n  5b\n  28b\n  12b\n  14b\n0.1b\n0.1b\n-0.4b\n  2b\n-1b\n-1b\nDominican Republic\n 2 535\n 3 021\n 2 560\n 3 197\n 4 099\n 4 390\n  209\n-192\n-99\n  153\n-49\n  360\nGrenada\n  226b\n  263b\n  160b\n  189b\n  172b\n  181b\n  36b\n  49b\n-45b\n-19b\n  19b\n  21b\nHaiti\n  105\n  75\n  25\n  51\n  39\n  32c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nJamaica\n  775\n  665\n  265\n  321\n  319\n  431c\n  13\n  446\n  7\n  56\n  60\n-6c\nSaint Kitts and Nevis\n  46b\n  44b\n-0.5b\n  25b\n  47b\n  36b\n  56b\n  23b\n  8b\n-3b\n-3b\n-3b\nSaint Lucia\n  58b\n  94b\n  97b\n  141b\n  78b\n  186b\n-19b\n  64b\n-35b\n-34b\n-29b\n  3b\nSaint Vincent and the \nGrenadines\n  28b\n  58b\n  57b\n  169b\n  68b\n  79b\n  15b\n  10b\n  3b\n-1b\n-3b\n-3b\nTrinidad and Tobago\n-700\n  184\n 1 056\n-935\n-913\n-1 105c\n  65\n  114\n  98\n  768\n 1 385\n 1 008c\nAnguilla\n  216b\n  163b\n  69b\n  87b\n  102b\n  147b\n  43b\n  14b\n  2b\n-74b\n  3b\n  5b\nAruba\n  110\n-136\n  137\n  143\n  261\n-178c\n  5\n-1\n  1\n  4\n  97\n  91c\nBahamas (the)\n  947\n  611\n  897\n 1 052\n 1 255\n 1 459\n  117\n  148\n  157\n  66\n  226\n  419\nBritish Virgin Islands\n 34 390c\n 39 103c\n 39 620c\n 39 361c\n 38 119c\n 39 889c\n 41 587c\n 44 154c\n 42 280c\n 43 217c\n 42 809c\n 44 158c\nCayman Islands\n 20 681c\n 28 165c\n 23 621c\n 25 893c\n 24 590c\n 28 134c\n 8 261c\n 31 630c\n 10 835c\n 21 232c\n 17 990c\n 20 422c\nCuraçao\n..\n  203\n  156\n  146\n  164\n  155c\n..\n-11\n  7\n  3\n  11\n  10c\nMontserrat\n  3b\n  1b\n  3b\n  2b\n  5b\n  7b\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSint Maarten\n-48\n  74\n  22\n  27\n  17\n  37c\n  4\n  1\n  1\n  6\n  2\n  2c\nOceania\n 1 301\n 1 525\n 1 021\n 1 279\n 1 398\n  461\n-437\n-1 138\n-917\n 1 772\n 2 568\n  703\nCook Islands (the)\n  12b\n  9b\n  5b\n-2b\n  4b\n  6c\n0.3b\n0.3b\n0.3b\n0.3b\n0.3b\n0.3c\nFiji\n  471\n  321\n  241\n  407\n  104\n  91\n-4\n-36\n  14\n  32\n  16\n  29\nKiribati\n-1\n-1\n  3\n  1\n  3\n  2c\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1\n0.1c\nMarshall Islands (the)\n  10\n  4\n  3\n0.5\n  3\n  2\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPalau\n  51\n  45\n  43\n  31\n  72\n  48c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPapua New Guinea\n  306b\n  335b\n  112b\n-11b\n  458b\n-425c\n-578b\n-1 211b\n-990b\n 1 691b\n 2 484b\n  596c\nSamoa\n  17\n-4\n  4\n  9\n  5\n-3\n0.04\n  4\n  2\n  1\n-0.1\n..\nSolomon Islands\n  25\n  33\n  9\n  28\n  44\n  25c\n  9\n  4\n  3\n  5\n  2\n  8c\nTonga\n  23\n-6\n  4\n  4\n  7\n  24c\n  1\n  1\n  1\n-0.1\n0.4\n0.3c\nTuvalu\n0.3c\n0.3c\n0.1c\n0.2c\n0.2c\n0.2c\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nVanuatu\n  37\n  53\n  41\n  43\n  11\n  9c\n  1\n  1\n  1\n0.2\n  1\n  4c\nFrench Polynesia\n  6\n  13\n-16\n-26\n-9c\n-6c\n  38\n  21\n-3\n  13\n  6c\n  15c\nNew Caledonia\n  345\n  723\n  572\n  794\n  696c\n  687c\n  96\n  76\n  55\n  30\n  57c\n  51c\nMemorandum\nLeast developed countries \n(LDCs)e\n 21 656\n 22 494\n 23 996\n 28 694\n 26 668\n 31 299\n  793\n-966\n  681\n-393\n 1 377\n 1 160\nLandlocked developing \ncountries (LLDCs)f\n 21 681\n 21 975\n 15 344\n 19 899\n 23 599\n 24 255\n 1 062\n  742\n-1 408\n 2 049\n-1 750\n 3 488\nSmall island developing States \n(SIDS)g\n 6 228\n 7 143\n 5 990\n 6 061\n 7 263\n 8 337\n  619\n  696\n  186\n 1 111\n 1 684\n 1 849\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\na Excluding the financial centres in the Caribbean and special-purpose entities in reported countries.\nb Asset/liability basis.\nc Estimates.\nd Directional basis calculated from asset/liability basis.\ne Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the \nComoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic \nRepublic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, the Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, \nSierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.\nf Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, \nthe Central African Republic, Chad, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, \nNepal, the Niger, North Macedonia, Paraguay, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and \nZimbabwe.\ng Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Bahamas, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, \nGrenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, \nSaint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Príncipe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and \nVanuatu.\n\n\n160\nAnnex table 2\t\nFDI stock, by region and economy, 2000, 2010, 2022 and 2023\n(Millions of dollars)\nFDI inward stock\nFDI outward stock\nRegion/economy\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\nWorlda\n7 377 201\n19 842 937\n44 375 102\n49 130 846\n7 408 709\n20 440 527\n40 569 644\n44 380 560\nDeveloped economies\n5 860 038\n13 778 925\n29 591 913\n33 434 653\n6 740 421\n17 537 053\n31 177 995\n34 404 485\nEurope\n2 491 244\n8 371 974\n16 110 676\n17 266 928\n3 193 644\n10 218 616\n17 537 359\n18 572 060\nEuropean Union\n1 882 785\n5 902 599\n11 672 194\n12 453 733\n1 967 112\n6 952 372\n13 530 528\n14 499 617\nAustria\n 31 165\n 160 615\n 206 490\n 226 276\n 24 821\n 181 638\n 253 986\n 273 210\nBelgium\n..\n 473 358\n 531 007\n 577 961\n..\n 431 613\n 685 498\n 770 505\nBulgaria\n 2 704\n 44 970\n 57 475\n 61 945\n  67\n 2 583\n 3 590\n 4 317\nCroatia\n 2 785\n 32 925\n 38 365\n 42 909\n  952\n 4 969\n 8 045\n 8 143\nCyprus\n 2 846\n 260 132\n 63 537\n 90 804\n  557\n 242 556\n 28 078\n 48 338\nCzechia\n 21 644\n 128 504\n 206 338\n 216 595\n  738\n 14 923\n 60 806\n 69 222\nDenmark\n 73 574\n 96 136\n 116 291\n 125 051c\n 73 100\n 163 133\n 221 838\n 236 967c\nEstonia\n 2 645\n 15 551\n 34 289\n 40 490\n  259\n 5 545\n 12 289\n 14 204\nFinland\n 24 273\n 86 698\n 82 980\n 149 649b\n 52 109\n 137 663\n 139 076\n 210 121b\nFrance\n 184 215\n 630 710\n 947 200\n1 012 705\n 365 871\n1 172 994\n1 544 549\n1 635 680\nGermany\n 470 938\n 955 881\n1 091 561\n1 128 259c\n 483 946\n1 364 565\n2 077 987\n2 179 240c\nGreece\n 14 113\n 35 026\n 50 578\n 61 593\n 6 094\n 42 623\n 16 698\n 21 324\nHungary\n 22 870\n 91 015\n 107 551\n 118 983\n 1 280\n 23 612\n 40 043\n 46 097\nIreland\n 127 089\n 285 575\n1 369 156\n1 410 084\n 27 925\n 340 114\n1 200 117\n1 336 414\nItaly\n 122 533\n 328 058\n 458 915\n 493 530\n 169 957\n 491 208\n 558 626\n 584 031\nLatvia\n 1 691\n 10 869\n 24 067\n 26 595\n  19\n  931\n 5 730\n 6 304\nLithuania\n 2 334\n 15 455\n 27 686\n 31 564\n  29\n 2 647\n 6 757\n 9 736\nLuxembourg\n..\n 172 257\n1 155 656\n1 183 734\n..\n 187 027\n1 594 807\n1 679 068\nMalta\n 2 263\n 129 770\n 491 467\n 725 715\n  193\n 60 596\n 477 251\n 695 859\nNetherlands\n 243 733\n 588 077\n2 775 591\n2 678 218\n 305 461\n 968 105\n3 395 399\n3 386 269\nPoland\n 33 477\n 187 602\n 268 019\n 335 540\n  268\n 16 407\n 29 658\n 38 212\nPortugal\n 34 224\n 90 900\n 177 165\n 195 340\n 19 417\n 52 497\n 62 900\n 69 041\nRomania\n 6 953\n 68 699\n 115 133\n 125 555\n  136\n 2 327\n 4 718\n 4 902\nSlovakia\n 6 970\n 50 328\n 57 372\n 60 532\n  555\n 3 457\n 5 428\n 5 062\nSlovenia\n 2 389\n 10 667\n 21 545\n 23 702\n  772\n 8 147\n 9 161\n 9 983\nSpain\n 156 348\n 628 341\n 812 740\n 897 268\n 129 194\n 653 236\n 567 881\n 630 189\nSweden\n 93 791\n 324 478\n 384 021\n 413 135\n 123 618\n 377 258\n 519 611\n 527 177\nOther Europe\n 608 459\n2 469 375\n4 438 482\n4 813 195\n1 226 532\n3 266 244\n4 006 832\n4 072 444\nAlbania\n  247\n 3 255\n 11 104\n 13 985\n..\n  154\n  995\n 1 389\nBelarus\n 1 306\n 9 904\n 15 440\n 15 822\n  24\n  205\n 1 496\n 1 470\nBosnia and Herzegovina\n  450\n 6 709\n 9 515\n 10 667\n..\n  211\n  736\n  814\nIceland\n  497\n 11 784\n 9 070\n 9 384\n  663\n 11 466\n 4 797\n 5 023\nRepublic of Moldova\n  449\n 2 897\n 4 933\n 5 531\n  23\n  90\n  425\n  448\nMontenegro\n..\n 4 231\n 5 494\n 6 066\n..\n..\n  190\n  271\nNorth Macedonia\n  540\n 4 351\n 7 480\n 8 421\n  16\n  100\n  166\n  210\nNorway\n 30 265\n 167 932\n 148 338\n 157 160\n 34 026\n 179 568\n 209 589\n 202 275\nRussian Federation\n 29 738\n 464 228\n 359 982\n 278 812\n 19 211\n 336 355\n 299 131\n 258 240\nSerbia\n..\n 22 299\n 53 499\n 60 459\n..\n 1 960\n 4 511\n 4 999\nSwitzerland\n 101 635\n 648 092\n1 038 034\n1 136 788\n 232 202\n1 043 199\n1 316 327\n1 472 959\nUkraine\n 3 875\n 52 872\n 50 987\n 54 261\n  170\n 6 548\n -867\n -885\nUnited Kingdom\n 439 458\n1 068 187\n2 718 892\n3 048 932\n 940 197\n1 686 260\n2 168 530\n2 124 191\nNorth America\n3 108 255\n4 406 182\n11 879 938\n14 482 837\n3 136 637\n5 808 053\n10 270 591\n12 180 818\nCanada\n 325 020\n 983 889\n1 495 991\n1 665 774\n 442 623\n 998 466\n2 287 758\n2 746 892\nUnited States\n2 783 235\n3 422 293\n10 383 947\n12 817 063\n2 694 014\n4 809 587\n7 982 833\n9 433 926\nOther developed economies\n 260 539\n1 000 769\n1 601 299\n1 684 888\n 410 140\n1 510 383\n3 370 045\n3 651 606\nAustralia\n 121 686\n 527 728\n 776 764\n 807 427\n 92 508\n 449 740\n 655 344\n 710 639\nIsrael\n 20 426\n 60 086\n 229 880\n 244 472\n 9 091\n 67 893\n 99 842\n 108 680\nJapan\n 50 323\n 214 880\n 225 367\n 246 801c\n 278 445\n 831 076\n1 948 555\n2 132 578c\nKorea, Republic of\n 43 738\n 135 500\n 272 328\n 284 146\n 21 497\n 144 032\n 647 568\n 682 023\nNew Zealand\n 24 101\n 59 738\n 94 319\n 99 128\n 8 491\n 16 717\n 18 608\n 17 536\nBermuda\n  265c\n 2 837\n 2 642c\n 2 915c\n  108c\n  925\n  129c\n  151c\nDeveloping economiesa\n1 517 163\n6 064 012\n14 783 189\n15 696 192\n 668 288\n2 903 474\n9 391 648\n9 976 074\nAfrica\n 153 062\n 620 046\n1 045 624\n1 036 252\n 39 815\n 137 363\n 296 153\n 248 821\nNorth Africa\n 45 590\n 201 109\n 336 039\n 354 974\n 3 199\n 25 770\n 40 219\n 42 324\nAlgeria\n 3 379c\n 19 545\n 35 643\n 36 860\n  205c\n 1 505\n 2 810\n 2 894\nEgypt\n 19 955\n 73 095\n 148 888\n 158 689\n  655\n 5 448\n 9 190\n 9 580\nLibya \n  471c\n 16 334\n 18 462c\n 18 462c\n 1 903c\n 16 615\n 20 450c\n 20 286c\nMorocco\n 8 842c\n 45 082\n 63 278\n 69 297\n  402c\n 1 914\n 7 066\n 8 076\nSudan\n 1 398\n 15 690\n 30 301c\n 30 849c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nTunisia\n 11 545\n 31 364\n 39 467\n 40 817c\n  33\n  287\n  703\n 1 488c\nOther Africa\n 107 472\n 418 937\n 709 585\n 681 279\n 36 616\n 111 594\n 255 934\n 206 496\nWest Africa\n 33 010\n 106 590\n 210 529\n 210 814\n 6 381\n 18 090\n 31 165\n 31 268\n\n\n161\nAnnex table 2\t\nFDI stock, by region and economy, 2000, 2010, 2022 and 2023\n(Continued)\nFDI inward stock\nFDI outward stock\nRegion/economy\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\nBenin\n  213\n  604\n 3 154\n 3 711\n  11\n  21\n  376\n  440\nBurkina Faso\n  28\n  354\n 2 998\n 3 193\n0.4\n  8\n  377\n  396\nCabo Verde\n  192c\n 1 367\n 2 346\n 2 572\n..\n  2\n  94\n  106\nCôte d’Ivoire\n 2 483\n 6 978\n 13 691\n 15 974\n  9\n  94\n 1 404\n 1 674\nGambia\n  216\n  323\n 1 176c\n 1 384c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nGhana\n 1 554c\n 10 080\n 46 006\n 47 360\n..\n  83\n 1 830\n 1 886c\nGuinea\n  263c\n  486\n 5 252c\n 6 145c\n  12c\n  144\n  97c\n  97c\nGuinea-Bissau\n  38\n  63\n  326\n  362\n..\n  5\n  11\n  12\nLiberia\n 3 247c\n 10 206\n 10 889c\n 11 633c\n 2 188\n 4 714\n 5 010c\n 5 097c\nMali\n  132\n 1 964\n 6 742\n 7 697\n  1\n  18\n  317\n  352\nMauritania\n  146c\n 2 372c\n 5 825c\n 6 702c\n  4c\n  28c\n  3c\n  3c\nNiger\n  45\n 2 251\n 8 628\n 9 926\n  1\n  9\n  391\n  446\nNigeria\n 23 786\n 66 797\n 86 239\n 73 375\n 4 144\n 12 576\n 18 297\n 17 663\nSenegal\n  295\n 1 699\n 13 184\n 16 358\n  22\n  263\n  991\n 1 120\nSierra Leone\n  284c\n  482\n 2 688c\n 2 951c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nTogo\n  87\n  565\n 1 385\n 1 469\n -10\n  126\n 1 966\n 1 975\nCentral Africa\n 5 053\n 39 227\n 120 236\n 126 047\n 1 651\n 2 217\n 4 733\n 4 884\nBurundi\n  47c\n  13\n  255c\n  283c\n  2c\n  2\n  8c\n  9c\nCameroon\n  917c\n 3 099c\n 6 484\n 7 283c\n 1 252c\n  971c\n  734\n  625c\nCentral African Republic\n  104\n  511\n  715c\n  754c\n  43\n..\n..\n..\nChad\n  576c\n 3 594c\n 8 372c\n 9 285c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nCongo\n 1 893c\n 9 261c\n 34 026c\n 34 653c\n  40c\n  34c\n  157c\n  183c\nDemocratic Republic of the Congo\n  617\n 9 368\n 30 995\n 32 629c\n  34\n  229\n 3 677\n 3 913c\nEquatorial Guinea\n 1 060c\n 9 413c\n 19 069c\n 19 211c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nGabon\n -227c\n 3 287c\n 16 591c\n 17 742c\n  280c\n  946c\n  79c\n  79c\nRwanda\n  55\n  422\n 3 237\n 3 697\n..\n  13\n  74\n  74\nSao Tome and Principe\n  11c\n  260c\n  493\n  511c\n..\n  21c\n  5c\n  1c\nEast Africa\n 7 202\n 37 754\n 99 466\n 110 318\n  387\n 1 474\n 3 261\n 3 993\nComoros\n  21c\n  60c\n  145c\n  150c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nDjibouti\n  40\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\n..\nEritrea\n  337c\n  666c\n 1 029c\n 1 031c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nEthiopia\n  941c\n 4 206\n 35 281\n 38 544c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nKenya\n  932c\n 4 967\n 9 692\n 11 196c\n  115c\n  62\n 2 668\n 3 256c\nMadagascar\n  141\n 4 383\n 4 120\n 4 535c\n  9c\n  193\n  838\n  957c\nMauritius\n  683\n 4 658\n 5 894c\n 6 418c\n  132\n  864\n  743c\n  773c\nSeychelles\n  515\n 2 960\n 3 117\n 3 354\n  130\n  290\n-1 162\n-1 167\nSomalia\n  4c\n  566\n 4 923\n 5 600\n..\n..\n..\n..\nUganda\n  807\n 5 575\n 16 631\n 19 517\n..\n  66\n  174\n  175\nUnited Republic of Tanzania\n 2 781\n 9 712\n 18 634c\n 19 973c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSouthern Africa\n 62 208\n 235 365\n 279 354\n 234 100\n 28 198\n 89 813\n 216 775\n 166 352\nAngola\n 7 977\n 32 458\n 14 262\n 12 177\n -8\n 1 870\n 5 259\n 5 292\nBotswana\n 1 827\n 3 351\n 5 194\n 5 410c\n  517\n 1 007\n 1 039\n  916c\nEswatini\n  536\n  927\n  966\n  896\n  87\n  91\n  162\n  133\nLesotho\n  330\n  929\n  958\n  851\n..\n..\n..\n..\nMalawi\n  358\n  963\n 1 484\n 1 692c\n -5\n  45\n  243\n  276c\nMozambique\n 1 249\n 4 331\n 54 597\n 57 281\n  1\n  3\n  7\n  7\nNamibia\n 1 276\n 3 595\n 7 747\n 9 136\n  45\n  722\n 1 034\n  697\nSouth Africa\n 43 451\n 179 565b\n 172 210b\n 124 025b\n 27 328\n 83 249b\n 207 954b\n 157 764b\nZambia\n 3 966c\n 7 433\n 15 384\n 15 492c\n..\n 2 531\n  311\n  471c\nZimbabwe\n 1 238\n 1 815\n 6 553\n 7 141\n  234\n  297\n  766\n  796\nAsia\n1 023 690\n3 878 998\n11 052 894\n11 674 477\n 575 247\n2 348 138\n8 269 297\n8 793 808\nEast and South-East Asia\n 908 302\n2 888 852\n9 210 207\n9 845 585\n 557 764\n2 059 331\n7 365 627\n7 823 232\nEast Asia\n 650 700\n1 738 193\n5 704 180\n5 976 425\n 473 708\n1 455 117\n5 239 530\n5 503 294\nChina\n 193 348c\n 586 882c\n3 496 380\n3 659 633c\n 27 768c\n 317 211\n2 754 810\n2 939 100c\nDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea\n  77c\n  236c\n  949c\n  963c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nMongolia\n  182\n 8 445\n 28 521\n 30 697\n..\n 2 616\n  907\n 1 024\nMacao, China\n 2 801c\n 13 603\n 45 737\n 47 955c\n..\n  550\n 13 278\n 14 856c\nHong Kong, China\n 435 417\n1 067 520\n2 008 153\n2 107 038\n 379 285\n 943 938\n1 975 466\n2 028 532\nTaiwan Province of China\n 18 875\n 61 508b\n 124 440b\n 130 140c\n 66 655\n 190 803b\n 495 068b\n 519 782c\nSouth-East Asia\n 257 603\n1 150 659\n3 506 027\n3 869 160\n 84 056\n 604 214\n2 126 097\n2 319 939\nBrunei Darussalam\n 3 868c\n 4 140\n 6 798\n 6 753\n..\n..\n..\n..\nCambodia\n 1 580\n 9 026\n 44 537\n 48 420\n  193\n  331\n 1 321\n 1 473\nIndonesia\n 25 060\n 160 735\n 264 034\n 285 690c\n 6 940\n 6 672\n 104 886\n 111 954c\nLao People’s Democratic Republic\n  588c\n 1 888c\n 12 736c\n 14 404c\n  26c\n  68c\n  95c\n  95c\nMalaysia\n 52 747\n 101 620\n 199 206\n 201 736\n 15 878\n 96 964\n 137 655\n 144 361\nMyanmar\n 3 752c\n 14 507\n 38 427\n 39 948\n..\n..\n..\n..\n\n\n162\nFDI inward stock\nFDI outward stock\nRegion/economy\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\nPhilippines\n 13 762c\n 25 896b\n 109 622d\n 118 985d\n 1 032c\n 6 710b\n 63 560d\n 68 272d\nSingapore\n 110 570\n 633 354b\n2 326 998b\n2 632 364b\n 56 755\n 466 723b\n1 638 614b\n1 792 289b\nThailand\n 30 944\n 142 334\n 292 205\n 290 870\n 3 232\n 24 418\n 165 398\n 187 893\nTimor-Leste\n..\n  155\n  993\n 1 018\n..\n  94\n  24\n  7\nViet Nam\n 14 730c\n 57 004c\n 210 471c\n 228 971c\n..\n 2 234c\n 14 545c\n 13 595c\nSouth Asia\n 30 743\n 269 143\n 643 371\n 675 576\n 2 761\n 100 441\n 231 859\n 245 241\nAfghanistan\n  17c\n  963\n 1 613c\n 1 613c\n..\n  16\n  165c\n  165c\nBangladesh\n 2 162\n 6 072\n 20 755\n 20 549\n  68\n  98\n  400\n  385\nBhutan\n  4c\n  204\n  419c\n  438c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nIndia\n 16 339\n 205 580\n 510 703\n 536 930\n 1 733\n 96 901\n 222 628\n 235 956\nIran (Islamic Republic of)\n 2 597c\n 28 953\n 61 636c\n 63 058c\n  411c\n 1 713c\n 4 239c\n 4 325c\nMaldives\n  128c\n 1 114c\n 6 718c\n 7 479c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nNepal\n  72c\n  239\n 2 187\n 2 067\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPakistan\n 6 919\n 19 828\n 25 292\n 28 610\n  489\n 1 362\n 2 894\n 2 850\nSri Lanka\n 2 505\n 6 190\n 14 047\n 14 831\n  60\n  351\n 1 534\n 1 560\nWest Asia\n 72 352\n 619 425\n 982 875\n 931 257\n 14 672\n 172 001\n 654 509\n 707 394\nArmenia\n  513\n 4 405\n 7 124\n 7 499\n..\n  150\n  571\n  618\nAzerbaijan\n 1 791\n 14 253\n 32 503\n 32 745\n  1\n 5 790\n 26 981\n 28 717\nBahrain\n 5 906\n 15 154\n 36 245\n 43 084\n 1 752\n 7 883\n 20 955\n 22 068\nGeorgia\n  762\n 8 518\n 22 329\n 24 354\n  118\n  848\n 3 249\n 3 529\nIraq\n -48\n 7 965\n..\n..\n..\n  632\n 3 389\n 3 598c\nJordan\n 3 135\n 21 899\n 38 496\n 39 534\n  44\n  473\n  681\n  745\nKuwait\n  608\n 11 884\n 15 091\n 16 648\n 1 428\n 28 189\n 45 818\n 50 246\nLebanon\n 14 233\n 44 285\n 70 604\n 71 260\n  352\n 6 831\n 14 729\n 14 802\nOman\n 2 577c\n 14 987\n 51 324c\n 56 069c\n..\n 2 796\n 6 057c\n 6 222c\nQatar\n 1 912\n 30 549\n 27 610\n 27 136c\n  74\n 12 995\n 50 054\n 49 862c\nSaudi Arabia\n 17 577b\n 176 378b\n 268 947b\n 215 524b\n 5 285c\n 26 528\n 187 068\n 203 768\nSyrian Arab Republic\n 1 244\n 9 939c\n 10 743c\n 10 743c\n..\n  5\n  5c\n  5c\nTürkiye\n 18 812\n 188 308\n 202 503\n 156 537\n 3 668\n 22 509\n 54 082\n 60 041\nUnited Arab Emirates\n 1 069c\n 63 869\n 194 300\n 224 987\n 1 938c\n 55 560\n 239 880\n 262 208\nYemen\n  843c\n 4 858c\n 1 942c\n 1 942c\n  13c\n  571c\n  672c\n  672c\nState of Palestine\n 1 418c\n 2 176\n 3 116\n 3 195c\n..\n  241\n  318\n  292c\nCentral Asia\n 12 293\n 101 577\n 216 441\n 222 059\n  49\n 16 365\n 17 303\n 17 941\nKazakhstan\n 10 078\n 82 648\n 154 419\n 157 198\n  16\n 16 212\n 16 792\n 17 381\nKyrgyzstan\n  432\n 1 698\n 3 506\n 3 810\n  33\n  2\n  26\n  27\nTajikistan\n  136\n 1 226\n 3 329\n 3 333\n..\n..\n  283\n  323\nTurkmenistan\n  949c\n 13 442c\n 41 537c\n 42 915c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nUzbekistan\n  698c\n 2 564\n 13 649\n 14 804\n..\n  152\n  202\n  210\nLatin America and the Caribbeana\n 338 557\n1 550 274\n2 653 078\n2 953 403\n 53 170\n 417 359\n 820 142\n 928 378\nSouth America\n 186 425\n1 085 464\n1 727 712\n1 898 677\n 43 634\n 288 295\n 604 267\n 677 146\nArgentina\n 67 601\n 85 591\n 116 698\n 128 855\n 21 141\n 30 328\n 45 781\n 48 299\nBolivia (Plurinational State of)\n 5 188\n 6 890\n 9 839\n 9 633\n  29\n  8\n  854\n 1 167\nBrazil\n..\n 640 330\n 878 144\n 997 570\n..\n 149 333\n 299 369\n 365 813\nChile\n 45 753\n 160 904\n 250 062\n 267 132\n 11 154\n 61 126\n 134 744\n 137 182\nColombia\n 11 157\n 82 991b\n 234 231b\n 254 329b\n 2 989\n 23 717b\n 73 295b\n 73 295b\nEcuador\n 6 337\n 11 858\n 22 292\n 22 664\n..\n..\n..\n..\nGuyana\n  756\n 1 784\n 17 074\n 10 279\n  1\n  2\n  78\n  47\nParaguay\n 1 003\n 3 555\n 7 666\n 8 906\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPeru\n 11 062\n 42 976\n 129 221\n 132 546\n  505\n 4 265\n 10 124\n 10 885\nSuriname\n..\n..\n 1 936\n 1 853\n..\n..\n  202\n  213\nUruguay\n 2 088\n 12 479\n 34 653\n 38 326\n  138\n  345\n 6 898\n 6 091\nVenezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)\n 35 480\n 36 107\n 25 897\n 26 585c\n 7 676\n 19 171\n 30 735\n 32 169c\nCentral America\n 139 768\n 417 113\n 843 099\n 968 310\n 8 534\n 126 025\n 208 553\n 242 658\nBelize\n  294\n 1 454\n 2 679\n 2 812\n  42\n  49\n  76\n  78\nCosta Rica\n 2 809\n 15 936\n 52 474\n 55 165c\n  22\n 1 135\n 3 758\n 3 769c\nEl Salvador\n 1 973\n 7 284\n 10 100\n 10 841\n  104\n  1\n 1 689\n 1 720\nGuatemala\n 3 420\n 4 554\n 22 409\n 24 080\n  93\n  452\n 2 936\n 3 618\nHonduras\n 1 392\n 6 951\n 18 557\n 19 633\n..\n  867\n 2 877\n 3 132\nMexico\n 121 691\n 355 512\n 662 718\n 778 371\n 8 273\n 119 967\n 190 122\n 222 742\nNicaragua\n 1 414\n 4 681\n 12 500\n 13 730\n..\n  181\n  818\n  849\nPanama\n 6 775\n 20 742\n 61 662\n 63 676\n..\n 3 374\n 6 277\n 6 751\nCaribbeana\n 12 365\n 47 697\n 82 267\n 86 417\n 1 002\n 3 039\n 7 322\n 8 574\nAntigua and Barbuda\n..\n..\n 2 090b\n 2 390b\n..\n..\n  91b\n  99b\nBarbados\n  308\n 4 970\n 8 544c\n 8 769c\n  41\n 4 058\n 3 858c\n 3 866c\nDominica\n..\n..\n  517b\n  537b\n..\n..\n  3b\n  2b\nAnnex table 2\t\nFDI stock, by region and economy, 2000, 2010, 2022 and 2023\n(Continued)\n\n\n163\nAnnex table 2\t\nFDI stock, by region and economy, 2000, 2010, 2022 and 2023\n(Concluded)\nSource: UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).\na Excluding the financial centres in the Caribbean and special-purpose entities in reporting countries.\nb Asset/liability basis.\nc Estimates. \nd Directional basis calculated from asset/liability basis.\ne Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the \nComoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic \nRepublic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, the Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, \nSierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.\nf Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, \nthe Central African Republic, Chad, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mongolia, \nNepal, the Niger, North Macedonia, Paraguay, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and \nZimbabwe.\ng Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Fiji, \nGrenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, \nSaint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Príncipe, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and \nVanuatu.\nFDI inward stock\nFDI outward stock\nRegion/economy\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\n2000\n2010\n2022\n2023\nDominican Republic\n 1 673\n 18 793\n 51 982\n 56 372\n..\n  743\n  917\n 1 277\nGrenada\n..\n..\n 1 990b\n 2 153b\n..\n..\n  99b\n  112b\nHaiti\n  95\n  625\n 2 031\n 2 063c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nJamaica\n 3 317\n 10 855\n 18 332\n 18 763c\n  709\n  176\n 1 136\n 1 131c\nSaint Kitts and Nevis\n..\n..\n 1 676b\n 1 709b\n..\n..\n  102b\n  100b\nSaint Lucia\n..\n..\n 1 865b\n 2 004b\n..\n..\n  638b\n  635b\nSaint Vincent and the Grenadines\n..\n..\n 1 601b\n 1 683b\n..\n..\n  93b\n  91b\nTrinidad and Tobago\n 7 280c\n 17 424\n 9 922\n 9 218c\n  293c\n 2 119\n 5 269\n 6 167c\nAnguilla\n..\n..\n 1 382b\n 1 528b\n..\n..\n  94b\n  96b\nAruba\n 1 161\n 4 567\n 4 686\n 4 508c\n  675\n  682\n  760\n  852c\nBahamas (the)\n 3 865c\n 13 160\n 28 512\n 29 904\n  547c\n 2 538\n 7 572\n 7 991\nBritish Virgin Islands\n 30 289c\n 265 783c\n1 028 356c\n1 068 246c\n 69 041c\n 376 866c\n 128 306c\n 172 465c\nCayman Islands\n 27 316c\n 161 916c\n 572 927c\n 601 061c\n 21 643c\n 89 316c\n 362 435c\n 382 857c\nCuraçao\n..\n  527\n 1 081c\n 1 236c\n..\n  32\n 1 002c\n 1 012c\nMontserrat\n..\n..\n  42b\n  49b\n..\n..\n..\n..\nSint Maarten\n..\n  256\n  190c\n  224c\n..\n  10\n  107c\n  111c\nOceania\n 1 854\n 14 694\n 31 593\n 32 060\n  56\n  614\n 6 055\n 5 067\nCook Islands (the)\n..\n..\n  181c\n  187c\n..\n..\n  14c\n  14c\nFiji\n  356\n 2 963\n 5 755\n 5 855\n  39\n  47\n  125\n  163\nKiribati\n..\n  5\n  11\n  13c\n..\n  2\n  1\n  1c\nMarshall Islands (the)\n  20\n  120\n  170\n  164\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPalau\n  173\n  232\n  858\n  905c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nPapua New Guinea\n  935\n 3 748\n 4 878c\n 4 454c\n  1c\n -5c\n 4 168c\n 3 078c\nSamoa\n  77\n  220\n  318\n  315\n..\n  14\n  51\n  51\nSolomon Islands\n  106c\n  552\n  652\n  681c\n..\n  27\n  77\n  77c\nTonga\n  19c\n  220c\n  108c\n  132c\n  14c\n  58c\n  50c\n  50c\nTuvalu\n..\n  5\n  9c\n  9c\n..\n..\n..\n..\nVanuatu\n  61c\n  454\n  636\n  647c\n..\n  23\n  29\n  28c\nFrench Polynesia\n  146c\n  442c\n 1 110c\n 1 104c\n..\n  144c\n  354c\n  368c\nNew Caledonia\n -41c\n 5 726c\n 16 908c\n 17 595c\n  2c\n  304c\n 1 187c\n 1 237c\nMemorandum\nLeast developed countries (LDCs)d\n 35 969\n 161 402\n 429 955\n 459 109\n 2 604\n 11 515\n 22 890\n 23 988\nLandlocked developing countries (LLDCs)f\n 33 630\n 183 972\n 444 859\n 468 390\n 1 025\n 29 288\n 53 514\n 56 413\nSmall island developing States (SIDS)g\n 18 806\n 80 554\n 155 252\n 163 726\n 1 906\n 11 076\n 19 815\n 21 560\n\n\nWorld Investment Report 2024\n164\nWIR past issues\nWIR 2023:  Investing in Sustainable Energy for All\nWIR 2022:  International Tax Reforms and Sustainable Investment\nWIR 2021:  Investing in Sustainable Recovery\nWIR 2020:  International Production Beyond the Pandemic\nWIR 2019:  Special Economic Zones\nWIR 2018:  Investment and New Industrial Policies\nWIR 2017:  Investment and the Digital Economy\nWIR 2016:  Investor Nationality: Policy Challenges\nWIR 2015:  Reforming International Investment Governance\nWIR 2014:  Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan\nWIR 2013:  Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development\nWIR 2012:  Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies\nWIR 2011:  Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development\nWIR 2010:  Investing in a Low-Carbon Economy\nWIR 2009:  Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development\nWIR 2008:  Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge\nWIR 2007:  Transnational Corporations, Extractive Industries and Development\nWIR 2006:  FDI from Developing and Transition Economies: Implications for Development\nWIR 2005:  Transnational Corporations and the Internationalization of R&D\nWIR 2004:  The Shift Towards Services\nWIR 2003:  FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives\nWIR 2002:  Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness\nWIR 2001:  Promoting Linkages\nWIR 2000:  Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development\nWIR 1999:  Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development\nWIR 1998:  Trends and Determinants\nWIR 1997:  Transnational Corporations, Market Structure and Competition Policy\nWIR 1996:  Investment, Trade and International Policy Arrangements\nWIR 1995:  Transnational Corporations and Competitiveness\nWIR 1994:  Transnational Corporations, Employment and the Workplace\nWIR 1993:  Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production\nWIR 1992:  Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth\nWIR 1991:  The Triad in Foreign Direct Investment","difficulty":"hard","domain":"Single-Document QA","length":"medium","question":"Considering the complex interplay of foreign direct investment (FDI) trends, geopolitical factors, and sustainable development goals (SDGs) as highlighted in the 2024 World Investment Report, which of the following scenarios presents the most intricate challenge to achieving the SDGs in developing economies?","sub_domain":"Financial"}

Source: https://huggingface.co/datasets/zai-org/LongBench-v2

initial import

Posting: /agents

GET /api/v1/write?intent=publish&task_id=748ab071-9838-52e7-8d1b-c5d66134b850&body={url_encoded_text}&agent_name={optional_name}&nonce={optional_random_id}