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LongBench v2 / 66f3d738821e116aacb2f446 / The IEA’s 2024 World Energy Investment report highlights a significant imbalance…
Problem
Answer published by the source. Consult the official source to check your work against its answer.
choice A
Establish a global concessional lending framework that allows DFIs to pool resources, co-finance projects, and provide long-term, low-interest loans denominated in hard currencies (e.g., USD, EUR) specifically for renewable energy infrastructure in EMDEs.
choice B
Create an international “Green Sovereign Guarantee Fund” backed by multilateral development banks (MDBs), which would issue guarantees for clean energy projects in EMDEs to lower the cost of capital, while tying eligibility for these guarantees to fiscal discipline and climate adaptation measures.
choice C
Implement a tiered carbon tax system in advanced economies where revenues are funneled into a new Climate Investment Trust, which issues grants and low-interest loans to EMDEs for energy efficiency, renewable energy projects, and grid modernization, but also requires matched private capital from institutional investors.
choice D
Encourage the widespread adoption of local-currency debt instruments (e.g., green bonds) within EMDEs by creating regulatory frameworks that incentivize institutional investors to provide liquidity for local markets, while using concessional finance to hedge currency risk and offer yield-enhancing products for early-stage projects.
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PAGE | 1
Abstract
Abstract
This year’s edition of the World Energy Investment provides a full
update on the investment picture in 2023 and an initial reading of the
emerging picture for 2024.
The report provides a global benchmark for tracking capital flows in
the energy sector and examines how investors are assessing risks
and opportunities across all areas of fuel and electricity supply,
critical minerals, efficiency, research and development and energy
finance.
The report highlights several key aspects of the current investment
landscape, including persistent cost and interest rates pressures, the
new industrial strategies being adopted by major economies to boost
clean energy manufacturing, and the policies that support incentives
for clean energy spending, notably from the increasingly important
viewpoints of energy security and affordability.
This year’s edition provides an expanded analysis on the sources of
investment and sources of finance in the energy sector, including new
insights on the role of development finance institutions in energy
investments across emerging and developing economies. It will also
look at how investment trends in clean energy compare with those in
fossil fuels, as well as the geographic distribution of these
investments.
The report also includes a new regional section covering 10 major
economies and regions. It also assesses additional efforts needed to
meet the COP28 goals to transition away from fossil fuels, triple
renewable capacity and double the rate of improvements in energy
efficiency by 2030.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 2
Table of contents
Table of contents
Overview and key findings .............................................................................
3
Tracking COP28 Progress .......................................................................
17
Finance.........................................................................................................
24
Overview
...................................................................................................
25
Trends for financial market actors
............................................................
34
Trends for financial instruments ...............................................................
45
Implications
...............................................................................................
54
Power ...........................................................................................................
56
Overview
...................................................................................................
57
Generation
................................................................................................
62
Final investment decisions (FIDs) ............................................................
70
Grids and storage
.....................................................................................
77
Implications
...............................................................................................
82
Fuel supply
...................................................................................................
85
Overview
...................................................................................................
86
Upstream oil and gas................................................................................
90
LNG and refining ....................................................................................
100
Methane
..................................................................................................
105
Coal ........................................................................................................
108
Bioenergy ...............................................................................................
111
Hydrogen ................................................................................................
114
CCUS .....................................................................................................
117
Critical minerals
......................................................................................
120
Implications
.............................................................................................
124
Energy end use and efficiency
...................................................................
128
Overview / Investment ........................................................................... 129
Buildings ................................................................................................ 134
Transport................................................................................................ 143
Industry .................................................................................................. 149
Implications
............................................................................................ 152
R&D and technology innovation
.................................................................155
Overview
................................................................................................ 156
Spending on energy R&D
...................................................................... 158
VC funding of early-stage energy technology companies ..................... 164
Implications
............................................................................................ 175
Regional deep dive
.....................................................................................178
United States ......................................................................................... 180
Latin America and the Caribbean .......................................................... 183
European Union
..................................................................................... 186
Africa
...................................................................................................... 189
Middle East ............................................................................................ 192
China
...................................................................................................... 195
India ....................................................................................................... 198
Japan and Korea .................................................................................... 201
Southeast Asia
....................................................................................... 204
Eurasia
................................................................................................... 207
Annex .........................................................................................................210
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 3
Overview and key findings
Overview and key findings
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 4
Overview and key findings
The world now invests almost twice as much in clean energy as it does in fossil fuels…
Global investment in clean energy and fossil fuels, 2015-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Other clean power = fossil fuel power with CCUS, hydrogen, ammonia, and large-scale heat pumps. Low-emissions fuels = modern bioenergy, low-emissions
H2 based fuels, and CCUS associated with fossil fuels and also includes direct air capture. 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
400
800
1 200
1 600
2 000
Fossil fuels
Renewable power
Grids and storage
Energy efficiency and end-use
Nuclear & other clean power
Low-emissions fuels
Billion USD (2023, MER)
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 5
Overview and key findings
…but there are major imbalances in investment, and Emerging Market and Developing
Economies (EMDE) outside China account for only around 15% of global clean energy spending
Annual energy investment by selected country and region, 2019 and 2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. US = United States. EU = European Union.
200
400
600
800
1 000
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
2019
2024e
Fossil fuels
Renewable power
Grids and storage
Energy efficiency and end-use
Nuclear & other clean power
Low-emissions fuels
Billion USD (2023, MER)
China
US
EU
India
Southeast
Asia
Latin
America
Africa
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 6
Overview and key findings
Investment in solar PV now surpasses all other generation technologies combined
Global annual investment in solar PV and other generation technologies, 2021-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. Other = electricity generation from all other technologies including coal, oil, natural gas, wind, hydro and nuclear.
100
200
300
400
500
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Solar PV
Other
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 7
Overview and key findings
The integration of renewables and upgrades to existing infrastructure have sparked a recovery
in spending on grids and storage
Investment in grids and storage by region 2017-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
100
200
300
400
500
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
United States
China
Europe
India
Latin America
Southeast Asia
Africa
Rest of the World
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 8
Overview and key findings
Rising investments in clean energy push overall energy investment above USD 3 trillion for the
first time
Global energy investment is set to exceed USD 3 trillion for the first
time in 2024, with USD 2 trillion going to clean energy technologies
and infrastructure. Investment in clean energy has accelerated since
2020, and spending on renewable power, grids and storage is now
higher than total spending on oil, gas, and coal.
As the era of cheap borrowing comes to an end, certain kinds of
investment are being held back by higher financing costs. However,
the impact on project economics has been partially offset by easing
supply chain pressures and falling prices. Solar panel costs have
decreased by 30% over the last two years, and prices for minerals
and metals crucial for energy transitions have also sharply dropped,
especially the metals required for batteries.
The annual World Energy Investment report has consistently warned
of energy investment flow imbalances, particularly insufficient clean
energy investments in EMDE outside China. There are tentative
signs of a pick-up in these investments: in our assessment, clean
energy investments are set to approach USD 320 billion in 2024, up
by more 50% since 2020. This is similar to the growth seen in
advanced economies (+50%), although trailing China (+75%). The
gains primarily come from higher investments in renewable power,
now representing half of all power sector investments in these
economies. Progress in India, Brazil, parts of Southeast Asia and
Africa reflects new policy initiatives, well-managed public tenders,
and improved grid infrastructure. Africa’s clean energy investments
in 2024, at over USD 40 billion, are nearly double those in 2020.
Yet much more needs to be done. In most cases, this growth comes
from a very low base and many of the least-developed economies
are being left behind (several face acute problems servicing high
levels of debt). In 2024, the share of global clean energy investment
in EMDE outside China is expected to remain around 15% of the total.
Both in terms of volume and share, this is far below the amounts that
are required to ensure full access to modern energy and to meet
rising energy demand in a sustainable way.
Power sector investment in solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is
projected to exceed USD 500 billion in 2024, surpassing all other
generation sources combined. Though growth may moderate slightly
in 2024 due to falling PV module prices, solar remains central to the
power sector’s transformation. In 2023, each dollar invested in wind
and solar PV yielded 2.5 times more energy output than a dollar spent
on the same technologies a decade prior.
In 2015, the ratio of clean power to unabated fossil fuel power
investments was roughly 2:1. In 2024, this ratio is set to reach 10:1.
The rise in solar and wind deployment has driven wholesale prices
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 9
Overview and key findings
down in some countries, occasionally below zero, particularly during
peak periods of wind and solar generation. This lowers the potential
for spot market earnings for producers and highlights the need for
complementary investments in flexibility and storage capacity.
Investments in nuclear power are expected to pick up in 2024, with
its share (9%) in clean power investments rising after two consecutive
years of decline. Total investment in nuclear is projected to reach
USD 80 billion in 2024, nearly double the 2018 level, which was the
lowest point in a decade.
Grids have become a bottleneck for energy transitions, but
investment is rising. After stagnating around USD 300 billion per year
since 2015, spending is expected to hit USD 400 billion in 2024,
driven by new policies and funding in Europe, the United States,
China, and parts of Latin America. Advanced economies and China
account for 80% of global grid spending. Investment in Latin America
has almost doubled since 2021, notably in Colombia, Chile, and
Brazil, where spending doubled in 2023 alone. However, investment
remains worryingly low elsewhere.
Investments in battery storage are ramping up and are set to exceed
USD 50 billion in 2024. But spending is highly concentrated. In 2023,
for every dollar invested in battery storage in advanced economies
and China, only one cent was invested in other EMDE.
Investment in energy efficiency and electrification in buildings and
industry has been quite resilient, despite the economic headwinds.
But most of the dynamism in the end-use sectors is coming from
transport, where investment is set to reach new highs in 2024 (+8%
compared to 2023), driven by strong electric vehicle (EV) sales.
The rise in clean energy spending is underpinned by emissions
reduction goals, technological gains, energy security imperatives
(particularly in the European Union), and an additional strategic
element: major economies are deploying new industrial strategies to
spur clean energy manufacturing and establish stronger market
positions. Such policies can bring local benefits, although gaining a
cost-competitive foothold in sectors with ample global capacity like
solar PV can be challenging. Policy makers need to balance the costs
and benefits of these programmes so that they increase the resilience
of clean energy supply chains while maintaining gains from trade.
In the United States, investment in clean energy increases to an
estimated more than USD 300 billion in 2024, 1.6 times the 2020
level and well ahead of the amount invested in fossil fuels. The
European Union spends USD 370 billion on clean energy today,
while China is set to spend almost USD 680 billion in 2024, supported
by its large domestic market and rapid growth in the so-called “new
three” industries: solar cells, lithium battery production and EV
manufacturing.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 10
Overview and key findings
Overall upstream oil and gas investment in 2024 is set to return to 2017 levels, but companies
in the Middle East and Asia now account for a much larger share of the total
Change in upstream oil and gas investment by company type, 2017-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. NOC = national oil companies. Majors include bp, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ENI, ExxonMobil, Shell and TotalEnergies.
Sources: IEA calculations based on S&P, Bloomberg LP, Rystad and annual reports. Includes reported capital expenditure and 2024 guidance for 73 companies
accounting for about 70% of global production.
- 40
- 20
0
20
40
Middle East NOCs
Asian NOCs
Independents
Majors
Other NOCs
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 11
Overview and key findings
Newly approved LNG projects, led by the United States and Qatar, bring a new wave of
investment that could boost global LNG export capacity by 50%
Investment and cumulative capacity in LNG liquefaction, 2015-2028
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Newly approved LNG projects in the United States and Qatar are expected to boost capacity by 50% between 2015 and 2026. Bcm = billion cubic metres.
200
400
600
800
1000
10
20
30
40
50
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
bcm per year
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Middle East
Russia
Africa
North America
Australia
Others
Cumulative capacity (right axis)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 12
Overview and key findings
Investment in fuel supply remains largely dominated by fossil fuels, although interest in low-
emissions fuels is growing fast from a low base
Upstream oil and gas investment is expected to increase by 7% in
2024 to reach USD 570 billion, following a 9% rise in 2023. This is
being led by Middle East and Asian NOCs, which have increased
their investments in oil and gas by over 50% since 2017, and which
account for almost the entire rise in spending for 2023-2024.
Lower cost inflation means that the headline rise in spending results
in an even larger rise in activity, by approximately 25% compared with
2022. Existing fields account for around 40% total oil and gas
upstream investment, while another 33% goes to new fields and
exploration. The remainder goes to tight oil and shale gas.
Most of the huge influx of cashflows to the oil and gas industry in
2022-2023 was either returned to shareholders, used to buy back
shares or to pay down debt; these uses exceeded capital expenditure
again in 2023. A surge in profits has also spurred a wave of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A), especially among US shale companies,
which represented 75% of M&A activity in 2023. Clean energy
spending by oil and gas companies grew to around USD 30 billion in
2023 (of which just USD 1.5 billion was by NOCs), but this represents
less than 4% of global capital investment on clean energy.
A significant wave of new investment is expected in LNG in the
coming years as new liquefaction plants are built, primarily in the
United States and Qatar. The concentration of projects looking to
start operation in the second half of this decade could increase
competition and raise costs for the limited number of specialised
contractors in this area. For the moment, the prospect of ample gas
supplies has not triggered a major reaction further down the value
chain. The amount of new gas-fired power capacity being approved
and coming online remains stable at around 50-60 GW per year.
Investment in coal has been rising steadily in recent years, and more
than 50 GW of unabated coal-fired power generation was approved
in 2023, the most since 2015, and almost all of this was in China.
Investment in low-emissions fuels is only 1.4% of the amount spent
on fossil fuels (compared to about 0.5% a decade ago). There are
some fast-growing areas. Investments in hydrogen electrolysers
have risen to around USD 3 billion per year, although they remain
constrained by uncertainty about demand and a lack of reliable off-
takers. Investments in sustainable aviation fuels have reached
USD 1 billion, while USD 800 million is going to direct air capture
projects (a 140% increase from 2023). Some 20 commercial-scale
carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) projects in seven
countries reached final investment decision (FID) in 2023; according
to company announcements, another 110 capture facilities, transport
and storage projects could do the same in 2024.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 13
Overview and key findings
Energy investment decisions are primarily driven and financed by the private sector, but
governments have essential direct and indirect roles in shaping capital flows
Sources of finance and investment in the energy sector, average 2018-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sources of investment refers to the entities investing in assets, regardless of the provider or origin of the funds. It includes state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
corporates, and households. Sources of finance refers to the entities supplying the funds; this includes government funds (both equity in SOEs and subsidies),
Development Finance Institutions (DFI) and commercial finance provided by corporates and households, as well as private debt.
48%
15%
37%
Corporates
Households
Governments and SOEs
Commercial
Public
DFI
Sources of investment
74%
25%
1%
Sources of finance
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 14
Overview and key findings
Households are emerging as important actors for consumer-facing clean energy investments,
highlighting the importance of affordability and access to capital
Change in energy investment volume by region and fuel category, 2016 versus 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: EMDE includes China.
- 200
0
200
400
600
800
Advanced economies
EMDE
World
(fossil fuels)
World
(clean energy)
Governments
Households
Corporates
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 15
Overview and key findings
Market sentiment around sustainable finance is down from the high point in 2021, with lower
levels of sustainable debt issuances and inflows into sustainable funds
Sustainable debt issuances and sustainable fund launches, 2020-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: SSA = Sovereign, Supranational and Agency.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Morningstar.
300
600
900
1 200
1 500
1 800
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Corporates
Financials
SSA
Other
Sustainable debt issuances
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
2020
2021
2022
2023
Number of funds
Europe
United States
Rest of World
Sustainable fund launches
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 16
Overview and key findings
Energy transitions are reshaping how energy investment decisions are made, and by whom
This year’s World Energy Investment report contains new analysis on
sources of investments and sources of finance, making a clear
distinction
between
those
making
investment
decisions
(governments, often via state-owned enterprises (SOEs), private
firms and households) and the institutions providing the capital (the
public sector, commercial lenders, and development finance
institutions) to finance these investments.
Overall, most investments in the energy sector are made by
corporates, with firms accounting for the largest share of investments
in both the fossil fuel and clean energy sectors. However, there are
significant country-by-country variations: half of all energy
investments in EMDE are made by governments or SOEs, compared
with just 15% in advanced economies. Investments by state-owned
enterprises come mainly from national oil companies, notably in the
Middle East and Asia where they have risen substantially in recent
years, and among some state-owned utilities. The financial
sustainability, investment strategies and the ability for SOEs to attract
private capital therefore become a central issue for secure and
affordable transitions.
The share of total energy investments made or decided by private
households (if not necessarily financed by them directly) has doubled
from 9% in 2015 to 18% today, thanks to the combined growth in
rooftop solar installations, investments in buildings efficiency and
electric vehicle purchases. For the moment, these investments are
mainly made by wealthier households – and well-designed policies
are essential to making clean energy technologies more accessible
to all. A comparison shows that households have contributed to more
than 40% of the increase in investment in clean energy spending
since 2016 – by far the largest share. It was particularly pronounced
in advanced economies, where, because of strong policy support,
households accounted for nearly 60% of the growth in energy
investments.
Three quarters of global energy investments today are funded from
private and commercial sources, and around 25% from public
finance, and just 1% from national and international development
finance institutions (DFIs).
Other financing options for energy transition have faced challenges
and are focused on advanced economies. In 2023, sustainable debt
issuances exceeded USD 1 trillion for the third consecutive year, but
were still 25% below their 2021 peak, as rising coupon rates
dampened issuers’ borrowing appetite. Market sentiment for
sustainable finance is wavering, with flows to ESG funds decreasing
in 2023, due to potential higher returns elsewhere and credibility
concerns. Transition finance is emerging to mobilise capital for high-
emitting sectors, but greater harmonisation and credible standards
are required for these instruments to reach scale.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 17
Overview and key findings
Tracking COP28 Progress
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 18
Overview and key findings
A secure and affordable transitioning away from fossil fuels requires a major rebalancing of
investments
Investment change in 2023-2024, and additional average annual change in investment in the NZE Scenario, 2023-2030
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: CCUS = carbon capture, utilisation, and storage. Low-emissions generation includes modern bioenergy, low-emissions hydrogen, hydrogen-based fuels and
CCUS associated with fossil fuels. NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.
- 50
- 25
0
25
50
75
100
Transport Buildings
Industry
Clean
power
Grids
Battery
storage
Unabated
power
Bioenergy,
H₂ and
CCUS
Coal
Natural
gas
Oil
Investment change, 2023-24
Additional average annual change in the NZE to 2030
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Fuels
Power
End-use and
energy efficiency
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 19
Overview and key findings
A doubling of investments to triple renewables capacity and a tripling of spending to double
efficiency: a steep hill needs climbing to keep 1.5 °C within reach
Investments in renewable power, grids, and battery storage, as well as end-use sectors, today versus 2030 in the NZE Scenario
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Investments in end-use sectors include energy efficiency, electrification, and renewables for end use. NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
2022
2023
2030 NZE
Renewable power
Grids
Battery storage
Investments in renewables, grids and battery storage
Billion USD (2023, MER)
2022
2023
2030 NZE
Buildings
Transport
Industry
Investments in end-use sectors
x 3
x 2
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 20
Overview and key findings
Meeting COP28 goals requires a doubling of clean energy investment by 2030 worldwide, and a
quadrupling in EMDE outside China
Investments in clean power, clean fuels, and end use, 2024e and 2030 in the NZE Scenario
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario. End use includes energy efficiency and electrification.
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1 400
1 600
1 800
China
United States
Rest of the world
European Union
Japan and Korea
India
Latin America
Africa
Middle East
Southeast Asia
2024e
2030 Clean power (NZE)
2030 End-use (NZE)
2030 Clean fuels (NZE)
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 21
Overview and key findings
Mobilising additional, affordable financing is the key to a safer and more sustainable future
Breakdown of DFI financing by instrument, currency, technology, and region, average 2019-2022
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: DFI = Development Finance Institutions, excluding China-based DFIs. Eq. = Equity. The volume of DFI financing in the OECD Creditor Reporting System
(CRS) database is typically reported in donor currency.
Source: IEA analysis based on total reported disbursements from the OECD CRS database.
Debt
Eq. Grant
USD, EUR
Other donor currencies
Clean Energy
Fossil Fuels
Africa
Southeast
Asia
Other Asia
Latam
ME & Eurasia
25
50
75
100
Instrument
Currency
Technology
Region
%
24
Billion USD (2023, MER)
18
12
6
0
0
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 22
Overview and key findings
Much greater efforts are needed to get on track to meet energy & climate goals, including those
agreed at COP28
Today’s investment trends are not aligned with the levels necessary
for the world to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C
above pre-industrial levels and to achieve the interim goals agreed at
COP28. The current momentum behind renewable power is
impressive, and if the current spending trend continues, it would
cover approximately two-thirds of the total investment needed to triple
renewable capacity by 2030. But an extra USD 500 billion per year is
required in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE
Scenario) to fill the gap completely (including spending for grids and
battery storage). This equates to a doubling of current annual
spending on renewable power generation, grids, and storage in 2030,
in order to triple renewable capacity.
The goal of doubling the pace of energy efficiency improvement
requires an even greater additional effort. While investment in the
electrification of transport is relatively strong and brings important
efficiency gains, investment in other efficiency measures – notably
building retrofits – is well below where it needs to be: efficiency
investments in buildings fell in 2023 and are expected to decline
further in 2024. A tripling in the current annual rate of spending on
efficiency and electrification – to about USD 1.9 trillion in 2030 – is
needed to double the rate of energy efficiency improvements.
Anticipated oil and gas investment in 2024 is broadly in line with the
level of investment required in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario,
a scenario which sees oil and natural gas demand levelling off before
2030. However, global spare oil production capacity is already close
to 6 million barrels per day (excluding Iran and Russia) and there is
a shift expected in the coming years towards a buyers’ market for
LNG. Against this backdrop, the risk of over-investment would be
strong if the world moves swiftly to meet the net zero pledges and
climate goals in the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) and the NZE
Scenario.
The NZE Scenario sees a major rebalancing of investments in fuel
supply, away from fossil fuels and towards low-emissions fuels, such
as bioenergy and low-emissions hydrogen, as well as CCUS.
Achieving net zero emissions globally by 2050 would mean annual
investment in oil, gas, and coal falls by more than half, from just over
USD 1 trillion in 2024 to below USD 450 billion per year in 2030,
while spending on low-emissions fuels increases tenfold, to about
USD 200 billion in 2030 from just under USD 20 billion today.
The required increase in clean energy investments in the NZE
Scenario is particularly steep in many emerging and developing
economies. The cost of capital remains one of the largest barriers to
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 23
Overview and key findings
investment in clean energy projects and infrastructure in many
EMDE, with financing costs at least twice as high as in advanced
economies as well as China. Macroeconomic and country-specific
factors are the major contributors to the high cost of capital for clean
energy projects, but so, too, are risks specific to the energy sector.
Alongside actions by national policy makers, enhanced support from
DFIs can play a major role in lowering financing costs and bringing in
much larger volumes of private capital.
Targeted concessional support is particularly important for the least-
developed countries that will otherwise struggle to access adequate
capital. Our analysis shows cumulative financing for energy projects
by DFIs was USD 470 billion between 2013 and 2021, with China-
based DFIs accounting for slightly over half of the total. There was a
significant reduction in financing for fossil fuel projects over this
period, largely because of reduced Chinese support. However, this
was not accompanied by a surge in support for clean energy projects.
DFI support was provided almost exclusively (more than 90%) as
debt (not all concessional) with only about 3% reported as equity
financing and about 6% as grants. This debt was provided in hard
currency or in the currency of donors, with almost no local-currency
financing being reported.
The lack of local-currency lending pushes up borrowing costs and in
many cases is the primary reason behind the much higher cost of
capital in EMDE compared to advanced economies. High hedging
costs often make this financing unaffordable to many of the least-
developed countries and raises questions of debt sustainability. More
attention is needed from DFIs to focus interventions on project de-
risking that can mobilise much higher multiples of private capital.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 24
Finance
Finance
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 25
Finance
Overview
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
The cost of capital has increased across most of the world, with emerging and developing
economies outside China facing much higher financing costs
Indicators of local-currency, economy-wide cost of debt and USD-based equity ranges for utility-scale solar PV in selected regions
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Data on government bond yields includes information until end-2023. EIRR = expected equity internal rate of return. The shaded bars do not reflect an
increase, but rather the range of EIRR for 2023. For emerging market and developing economies (EMDE, which excludes China), this range is wider because risk
perceptions for solar PV projects vary significantly by country.
Source: IEA analysis based on Refinitiv (2023) and IEA (2023), Cost of Capital Observatory.
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
2020
2021
2022
2023
India
South Africa
Brazil
Mexico
United States
Eurozone
China
10-year government bond yield
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
Risk-free
United States
Europe
EMDE
Equity IRR expecations, solar utility-scale PV, USD denominated
2020
2023
EIRR range
2023
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
Rising finance costs shape today’s energy investment climate
Meeting the targets for sustainable development, climate and energy
security will require a substantial increase in capital investment in
energy. As these investments scale up globally, it is increasingly
important to understand the prevailing trends affecting capital-
allocation decisions across various finance providers, which is why
this year’s World Energy Investment report begins with a chapter on
finance.
This chapter provides an overview of current financing trends. It
makes a distinction between the notions of investment – understood
as a capital expenditure used to build or acquire an asset – and
finance, which encompasses the origin of the funds supporting an
investment, as well as the form it takes and who is providing it. Within
the energy finance ecosystem, we explore the different roles played
by capital providers – the ones who make the investment decisions
(e.g. governments, households and the private sector), also known
as “sources of investment” – and finance providers. This second
group includes development finance institutions as well as other
public and private sources capital – which we refer to as “sources of
finance.” We also look at emerging themes such as transition finance
and consider how the development of transition plans by financial
institutions and corporations can support access to capital for hard-
to-abate sectors. The role of carbon markets and carbon pricing is
also discussed.
The year 2023 was marked by a spike in interest rates across many
countries – including advanced economies where relatively low
inflation and low interest rates had prevailed for more than a decade
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. While the 2020-2022
pandemic drove interest rates sharply lower across much of the
world, inflation pressures mounted in 2022, changing this trajectory.
Compounding this trend, the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian
Federation (“Russia” hereafter) in early 2022 – as well as other
geopolitical conflicts across the world – increased political risks,
driving up the cost of capital. Interest rates on long-term, local-
currency government bonds – a benchmark indicator for the cost of
capital in a country – rose considerably in many countries, with the
notable exception of the People’s Republic of China (“China”
hereafter). Yields on ten-year United States Treasury bonds, for
example, increased by about three percentage points between 2020
and 2023, with even larger differences in the US overnight interbank
lending rate (the short-term rate). A similar trend was seen in bonds
issued by European governments. Sharp increases in US interest
rates have a significant knock-on effect for capital investments
worldwide – including in emerging market and developing economies
(EMDE) – because the assets held by most large international
investors, asset managers and financiers are valued in US dollars
(USD) and most major projects, regardless of geography, are also
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
priced in USD. On top of this, local-currency financing has also
become more expensive in many EMDE, including Brazil, Mexico,
India and South Africa.
In addition to raising borrowing costs, higher interest rates also affect
the cost of equity, which is estimated as the sum of the risk-free rate
(e.g. the return on a bond issued by a low-risk country like the United
States) and the equity risk premium (the additional return that
compensates investors for taking on the higher risk of equity). The
expected equity internal rate of return (EIRR) of utility-scale solar
photovoltaic (PV) projects in the United States, for example, has
soared in recent years, reaching between 8% and 9% in 2023. But
these USD rates of return are still about half of what foreign investors
require to finance a similar project in some EMDE. Although the
variations in both EIRR and the cost of capital vary widely among
EMDE, developing and emerging economies face higher costs of
capital in general due to the greater risks – real or perceived – of
investing in a particular jurisdiction and/or industrial sector. This
remains a significant barrier to increased levels of investment in
these regions.
A higher cost of capital – the weighted average of the costs
associated with raising funds for investments – makes it much more
difficult to generate attractive risk-adjusted returns. This is especially
true for relatively capital-intensive clean energy technologies that
require a large upfront investment, that are generally more
dependent on debt financing (compared to the oil and gas industry)
and where operating expenses tend to represent a relatively small
share of total project costs. Although ambitious government policies,
technological advancements and declining cost trends (all key factors
in determining energy project costs) have helped offset some of the
rise in capital costs, the general rise in interest rates and a stronger
USD are not good news for investment anywhere.
The picture in China is somewhat different. China did not suffer
inflation pressures in the wake of the pandemic, but it has been
battling relatively low economic growth and weakness in the property
sector, with knock-on effects for local banks. This is why, unlike most
of the world, China has kept benchmark lending rates low.
Elsewhere, there are signs that benchmark interest rates may not
remain high for long. There is ample debate on when and how fast
they may come down, though most experts agree that the
exceptional period of near-zero interest rates is probably over. The
US Federal Reserve (Fed) has indicated that it plans to cut its short-
term benchmark by 75 basis points in 2024, although this expected
rate-cutting cycle has been delayed repeatedly because US inflation
remains stuck above the Fed’s 2% target. These movements are
beyond the remit of energy policy makers, but will be important for
determining the pace of the energy transition over the next years.
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
Finance from commercial sources supports roughly 73% of energy investments overall,
although public finance plays a larger role in China and some other EMDE countries …
Changes in finance providers over time and by category
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: “Commercial finance” includes equity investments made by private enterprises and households, alongside debt from financial institutions. It also includes some
finance from state-owned banks, sovereign wealth funds and pension funds, although this includes a degree of state-directed lending, especially in emerging
economies with strong industrial policies. “Public finance” includes public equity stakes in private corporations and state-owned enterprises, state subsidies and tax
incentives and finance from export credit agencies as well as central banks. “DFI” refers to Development Finance Institutions that have a development mandate.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from S&P Capital IQ, IJGlobal, Rystad, World Bank, OECD, CRS, China Aid data.
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Public
DFI
Commercial
Sources of finance, 2015-2023
25%
50%
75%
100%
Clean energy
Fossil fuels
Advanced
economies
China
EMDE
Sources of finance by category, Average 2018-2023
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
… meanwhile the entities making the investments have evolved, with households gradually
taking on a larger share through spending on efficiency, electric vehicles and rooftop solar
Changes in sources of investment over time and by category
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: “Government” refers to stated-owned companies and state-owned assets (in the case of buildings for example). “Corporates” refer to private and publicly listed
companies.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from S&P Capital IQ, IJGlobal, Rystad, World Bank, OECD.
-
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Governments
Households
Corporates
Sources of investments, 2015-2023
25%
50%
75%
100%
Clean energy
Fossil fuels
Advanced
economies
China
EMDE
Sources of investments by category, Average 2018-2023
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Finance
Debt financing is more prominently used in power, grids and developed markets, while larger
equity stakes are seen in emerging and end-use technologies, fossil fuel supply and EMDE
Capital structure by energy assets and regions
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on data from S&P Capital IQ, IJGlobal, Rystad, World Bank, OECD.
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Clean fuels
Industry
Fossil fuel supply
Buildings
Transport
Clean power
Grid and storage
Fossil power
Debt share by energy assets, 2018-2023
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
India
Eurasia
Middle East and Africa
China and developed Asia
Other developing Asia
North America
Central and South America
Europe
Debt share by region, 2018-2023
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Finance
Clean energy is reshaping the role played by the private sector, including households, while
government funding still plays a large role in China and in supporting fossil fuels in EMDE
Since 2016, there has been a significant change in the types of
energy assets being financed, but less of a change in where capital
has come from. Between 2016 and 2023, clean energy’s share of
total energy investment increased from around 50% to 63%.
Throughout this period, private sources of finance made up the bulk
of spending, accounting for 73% in 2023. While this share remains
roughly the same by 2030 in the NZE Scenario, in absolute terms it
represents an increase of USD 1.5 trillion in private sector spending.
The role of public financing – i.e. state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
equity stakes in public assets such as government buildings and
public vehicle fleets, as well as various subsidies and tax incentives
– has decreased slightly. Public finance plays a larger role in EMDE,
accounting for 32% of spending between 2016 and 2023, compared
with 14% in advanced economies. Debt sustainability has become a
growing concern across EMDE – three quarters of all developing
economies have debt-to-GDP ratios of at least 75% – so mobilising
a greater share of private finance in these markets will be essential.
Government investment in global energy assets has remained
broadly stable at around 37% of assets for the 2015-2023 period. The
government plays a particularly prominent role in fossil fuel asset
ownership, meaning they are most involved in the energy sector in
regions with high fossil fuel production such as the Middle East,
Russia and the Caspian states. As these economies respond to the
energy transition, many SOEs will remain responsible for electricity
networks and utility-scale power generation, while policy makers are
increasingly positioning their SOEs to be key players in the energy
transition. Still, the role of SOEs in global energy financing is
expected to decrease over time as end-use sectors gradually take on
a larger share of total investment.
In China, government ownership accounts for 60% of all energy
assets and is particularly evident in fossil fuels, where nearly all of
assets are government owned. China has taken steps to support
large SOEs and state-owned banks to increase clean energy finance,
including through the development of sustainable finance regulations
and incentives, so state ownership is expected to remain prominent
even as clean energy becomes a larger part of the energy mix.
As energy transitions have gained momentum in recent years, we
have seen a rise in investments made by households. Their share of
new spending has doubled from 9% in 2015 to 18% in 2023. This is
due to growth in rooftop solar, energy efficiency in buildings and the
purchase of electric vehicles. With households taking on a higher
share of energy investment, affordability and cost-of-living concerns
may act as potential brakes on investment in the coming year. Unlike
corporations or governments, consumer finance operates under
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
different constraints – use-of-proceeds, application processes,
interest rates and fees, etc. – requiring unique policies and financing
instruments. The financial institutions supporting consumers with
financing also have a different profile compared to financial
institutions lending to utility-scale projects. This fundamental shift in
the system emphasises the need for tailored approaches to support
households in their transition towards sustainable energy practices.
Capital structure – i.e. the combination of debt and equity used to
finance energy assets – has remained fairly stable over the last 8
years at around 46% debt. This varies significantly between energy
assets and regions. Fossil fuels have the lowest share of debt at
around 40%. The last two years saw large repayments by oil and gas
companies; prior to that, a period of low commodity prices ate into
fossil fuel companies’ profitability, limiting their use of retained
earnings to pay back debt. For clean power, the share of debt is
closer to 50% – down from 60% in the late 2010s – driven by the
need for high upfront capital investment. This change is partly due to
better growth opportunities for the sector and lower equipment costs,
but also to the contractual repayment of debt used for the upfront
capital of previously installed clean power. Meanwhile, the share of
debt financing in the end-use sectors – with higher household
participation – is 45%, close to the average for all energy assets.
Reducing the uncertainty on debt financing availability is crucial for
the energy transition. Under the NZE Scenario, around 45% of
investments in clean energy relies on debt – particularly in grid
investment, where debt accounts for more than 50% of capital
spending. This trend will feed into the concerns about countries’
capacity to sustain high levels of borrowing, particularly in EMDE.
Whether debt is provided on a corporate or project finance basis also
matters. Grids are typically financed on a corporate basis while solar
PV and wind are increasingly on a project finance basis. This ends
up being particularly important in EMDE, where lending on a
corporate basis to utilities is challenging without tackling the
fundamental financial health of the utility.
Meanwhile, equity financing plays a key role in funding clean energy
technologies with high upfront risks – such as geothermal or hydro –
or less mature technologies like battery storage, carbon capture, and
low-carbon hydrogen. As these technologies mature, the risks should
fall, allowing more debt to be used. Long construction timelines, such
as for grid and nuclear, also increase the technology risks.
Equally, in less mature markets, even established technologies can
count on a larger share of equity to take on the risks in development
and construction phase. As newer technologies and markets
establish a track record, there is potential for the share of debt to
increase as governments implement supportive policies to bolster
business models with stable cash flows. This can be particularly
important in some EMDE, where a limited supply of equity (e.g. in
Africa) acts as a brake on the development of bankable projects. This
is where Development Finance Institutions (DFI) could step in to
provide funds without increasing the debt burden in EMDE countries.
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Finance
Trends for financial market actors
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Finance
Financial institutions continued to announce net zero targets or emission disclosure plans, but
reduced inflows to sustainable funds in 2023 reflected wavering market sentiment
Trends in sustainable finance investing
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: NZBA = Net-Zero Banking Alliance; NZAM = Net-Zero Asset Managers Initiative; NZAOA = Net-Zero Asset Owner Alliance. ‘’Targets” tracks the institutions
that have either adopted net-zero targets or met most minimum conditions for targets. ‘’Emissions Disclosure” tracks the institutions that have committed to Scope 3
emissions disclosure, or that track or disclose a portion of portfolio emissions. The institutions covered are those tracked by the Climate Policy Initiative.
Source: Climate Policy Initiative (2023), Morningstar (2023).
100
200
300
400
500
Targets
Emissions
Disclosure
Targets
Emissions
Disclosure
Targets
Emissions
Disclosure
NZAM
NZBA
NZAOA
Net zero targets and Scope 3 emissions disclosure
Number of institutions
2022
2020
2018
- 1
0
1
2
3
4
- 10
0
10
20
30
40
Q1 2023
Q2 2023
Q3 2023
Q4 2023
Trillion USD (2023, MER)
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Europe
North America
Rest of world
Total net assets
(right axis)
Sustainable funds flows
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Finance
Sustainable funds rebounded in early 2024, while interest is growing for financial industry
engagement to focus on credible transition plans as opposed to emissions disclosure
Sustainable finance regulations have recently provided a tailwind for
clean energy investments, but 2023 was a challenging year for
sustainable investment practices. For the first time, sustainable funds
saw a net outflow in the fourth quarter, notably including in Europe –
home to 84% of sustainable funds by value. Outflows have become
common in the United States, occurring for the last five quarters as
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues become
increasingly politicised. Meanwhile, in Europe, sustainable funds
consistently attracted larger proportional inflows than conventional
funds, but the two have gradually converged in 2023 and as the
market tightened, actively managed sustainable funds saw outflows
for the first time. This is likely due to a combination of factors, with
many fund managers increasing their allocations to government
bonds, and concern growing over the classification of sustainable
funds. Despite these concerns, the value of sustainable funds
globally increased by 8% in 2023, driven by a rally in growth stocks
(those that focus on long-term potential).
The pushback against ESG in the United States had an impact
beyond sustainable funds. In February, two of the largest US-based
asset managers – JPMorgan Chase and State Street – withdrew from
Climate Action 100+ (CA100+), an investor-led initiative designed to
encourage decarbonisation by large emitters. Blackrock also scaled
back its involvement in the initiative, transferring participation from
their US business to the smaller, international arm. CA100+ has also
seen withdrawals from Europe, including Swiss Re in March 2024,
with most firms arguing that they can achieve similar goals through
independent engagement with emitters. Analysis of proxy voting
patterns in 2024 indicates that support for climate-related resolutions
remains strong, but most of these are focused on emissions
disclosure. The departures from CA100+ came at a time when the
initiative aimed to increase their focus on enactment of climate
transition plans, as well as the continued push for improved
disclosure.
There has been a growing emphasis on moving beyond disclosures
to implementing transition plans, particularly among asset owners,
who play a key role in the financing chain due to their ability to
influence both corporate strategy and the approach of asset
managers. In December 2023, the UN-Convened Net Zero Asset
Owners Alliance (NZAOA) released guidance on how to strengthen
engagement on transition planning, alongside development of
credible plans for their own activities. Several months later, the
NZAOA also published guidelines for asset managers on how to
support their asset owner clients through strengthened climate
stewardship.
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
The banking sector is also wrestling with how to adhere to tighter climate disclosure
regulations without slowing real economic growth by restricting to key sectors
Banks play a particularly important role in the financing of energy
projects because of their large pools of capital (primarily for debt
financing) and because they provide funding at both the project and
corporate level as well as to households, who play an increasing role
in energy supply under the NZE Scenario. Banks can support energy
transitions through the design of sustainable loan products and
engagement with the companies they finance. Similarly, banks can
create tailored consumer loan offerings to incentivise clean energy
spending at the household level with products like green mortgages.
There is significant diversity within the banking sector, and the role of
banks in the energy transition is likely to vary by their size and by
region. The UN-convened Net Zero Banking Alliance (NZBA) plays a
leadership role, working across the sector to promote approaches to
decarbonise lending, develop transition finance tools and facilitate
the managed phase-out of fossil fuels. Currently, more than 140
banks are NZBA members, and around 40% of global banking assets
are held by banks with net-zero commitments. Despite this, data from
Bloomberg indicate that the ratio of clean energy funding (including
debt and equity underwriting) compared to fossil fuels has slightly
worsened: For every 1 USD loaned to the fossil fuel sector in 2021,
75 cents went to clean energy companies. By 2022, the ratio had
fallen to 73 cents (latest available data).
Sustainable finance regulations for the banking sector are primarily
focused on improving disclosure. For example, in November 2023,
the Basel Committee published a draft climate disclosure framework
for consultation aimed at improving the tracking of banks’ progress
on climate-related activities. However, several banks have expressed
concerns about the metrics used to measure these activities.
Currently, the main metric used is financed emissions (i.e. banks’
Scope 3 emissions) but these emissions are not widely reported by
companies and are hard to estimate accurately. Furthermore, there
is still debate over whether financed emissions are the best proxy for
climate risk, with banks arguing for the use of multiple metrics,
including a calculation related to transition finance.
Tighter regulations increase the risk that businesses in hard-to-abate
sectors can no longer access financing from banks in markets with
stricter climate regulations. This forces those businesses to raise
capital in markets with more lax environments, where banks are also
less likely to engage with companies over transition plans. This
practice – financial carbon leakage – could delay change in the real
economy. Avoiding this outcome means increasing the number of
banks committed to net zero, while also ensuring that sustainable
finance regulation considers transition financing.
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
Box 1.1. Growing domestic private financial sector involvement in clean energy in EMDE
Currency risk is often cited as one of the primary drivers of high
financing costs for energy projects, while also contributing to the
growing debt problem in EMDE countries. Given the scale of
investment needs, funding from advanced economies will remain
important. Solutions such as hedging products allow hard
currency funders to lend in local currencies, but these can add
complexity and cost to financing arrangements. Domestic
financial institutions, which lend in local currency and are less
subject to external shocks, also therefore play a key role.
There is currently significant variation in the role of domestic
capital in energy financing based on the depth of local markets.
Domestic financing dominates in some of the larger EMDE, such
as India and Brazil, or regions with well-developed financial
sectors such as ASEAN. In these markets, various approaches
allow local capital providers to invest in energy projects at an
affordable rate, including tools like sustainable debt issuance, as
in ASEAN, or mechanisms where the government absorbs some
costs of commercial lenders, as in India.
In EMDE where the financial sector is less deep (e.g. sub-
Saharan Africa) institutional investors such as pension funds
often primarily invest in government securities, with limited
familiarity with other investment classes such as infrastructure.
New mechanisms are emerging to tap into this capital source. For
example, in Nigeria, InfraCredit – a local currency guarantee provider
– has helped 19 local pension funds enter the energy sector, mobilising
USD 206 million over the last five years. This group of investors is most
likely to invest in operational assets, including via refinancing structures
that help free up development capital for greenfield assets.
Financial depth indicator, selected countries and regions
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on World Bank data on domestic credit to the private
sector and the market capitalisation of listed domestic companies.
50
100
150
200
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Brazil
ASEAN
India
China
Japan
US
Global average
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Finance
Development finance institutions primarily provide debt financing, and are making progress in
mobilising private capital for renewable power projects
Development finance provided to different regions by financial instrument, 2013-2021
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Based on reported total disbursements. ODA = Official Development Assistance – concessional funds that meet the ODA grant equivalent threshold with
economic development and welfare as the main objective; OOF = Other Official Flows that do not meet ODA criteria, excluding export credits. All equity financing is
counted as ODA. “China-based DFIs” refer to China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, which do not report to the OECD Development
Assistance Committee; hence its financing should be understood as ODA or OOF-like.
Source: IEA calculations based on OECD CRS and AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 3.0.
25
50
75
Russia
Europe
Caspian and
Middle East
Latin America
Southeast Asia
Other Asia
Africa
25
50
75
Europe
Caspian and
Middle East
Latin America
Southeast
Asia
Other Asia
Africa
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Debt: ODA
Debt: OOF
Equity
Grant
China-based DFIs
World (excluding China)
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Finance
Development finance institutions have reduced their support for fossil fuel activities, notably
from China, but this has not been accompanied by a surge in financing for clean energy
DFI financing by technology
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Based on yearly commitments. Oil, gas and coal include fuel supply and power generation. All Chinese financing covered in this analysis refers to overseas
flows. Analysis of domestic investment trends is covered in more detail in Chapter 7, Regional Deep Dive.
Source: IEA calculations based on OECD CRS and AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset, Version 3.0.
10
20
30
40
50
60
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Energy Efficiency: Buildings
Energy Efficiency: Transport
Energy Efficiency: Industry
Transmission & Distribution
Hydro
Wind
Solar PV
Coal
Gas
Oil
World (excluding China), 2013 - 2022
10
20
30
40
50
60
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021
China-based DFIs, 2013 - 2021
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
DFIs play a crucial and unique role due to their ability to take on higher-risk projects, but they
are facing pressure to ramp up financing and to scale up private sector mobilisation
Development finance institutions (DFIs) are uniquely positioned to
catalyse investment flows towards sustainable and resilient energy
infrastructure, particularly in EMDE. Along with direct financing, DFIs
can provide policy support, capacity building, and concessional
capital focused on de-risking projects to mobilise private capital into
otherwise high-risk markets or technologies.
From 2013 to 2021, cumulative DFI financing reached approximately
USD 468 billion globally, with China-based DFIs and other DFIs
accounting for 56% and 44%, respectively. While energy financing
from China’s DFIs has fallen from its peak in 2016 – averaging around
USD 27 billion in annual disbursements – other DFIs have been fairly
constant in their financing, averaging USD 21 billion annually. DFI
financing was disbursed across regions, with Africa being the largest
recipient, followed by Asia Pacific and Latin America. Russia has also
consistently received global energy financing through China’s DFIs.
In terms of financial instruments, DFIs primarily provide debt,
followed by significantly smaller amounts of grant and equity
financing. Less than half of the total debt financing is provided on
highly-concessional terms, or in the form of Official Development
Assistance (ODA), where at least 10-45% of the loan is a grant-
equivalent. The rest is provided under less-concessional terms, and
mostly from China. It is also notable that nearly 80% of global DFI
financing is reported to be provided in USD and EUR and limited
amounts of local currency lending was available from DFIs excluding
China. This highlights the need to better construct development
finance instruments that are more preferential and are better suited
to the needs of EMDE borrowers.
With regard to technology, around 65% of DFI financing was directed
towards clean energy, with investments in energy efficiency in
transport and transmission and distribution grids accounting for more
than 40%. Notably, financing for fossil fuels continues, albeit from a
smaller group of providers. This includes Chinese DFIs which, in line
with their pledge in 2021, have stopped financing new coal projects
abroad, but do still provide funding to oil and gas projects.
Several signals point to increased participation by DFIs in energy
financing. According to the latest data, financing for energy-related
sectors from DFIs outside of China reached a record high of
USD 31 billion in disbursements in 2022, an increase of more than
50% from the previous year. A 2017 pledge by multilateral
development banks (MDBs) to Paris align their financial flows took
effect in 2023, culminating in a joint MDB assessment framework for
Paris alignment. China’s development finance in energy is also
showing signs of revitalisation, with major announcements being
made in the 3rd Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, such as the
World Energy Investment 2024
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Finance
pledge to inject nearly USD 48 billion each to China Development
Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China to finance “small yet
smart” projects, with an emphasis on green investments, as well as
a USD 11 billion replenishment of the Silk Road Fund, the main
investment platform for the Belt and Road Initiative. It is also notable
that China has increasingly expanded its financing through state-
owned commercial banks, such as the Bank of China and the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, especially through
syndicated loans alongside various multilateral institutions, including
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
While it is important for DFIs to continue to channel their own capital
into EMDE, including by acting as implementation partners for
development aid from their donor governments, it is crucial to ensure
that such resources also lead to effective mobilisation of the private
sector. From 2012 to 2022, an average of USD 12 billion was
mobilised for climate from the private sector annually – of which
nearly USD 8 billion went to energy, industry, construction and
transport. The Latin America and Caribbean region was the largest
recipient of mobilised private finance (34%), followed by Asia (29%)
and Africa (22%), demonstrating how middle-income countries are
more likely to be the destination for private sector financing. Under
the NZE Scenario, private finance increases across all EMDE regions
by 2030. So finding solutions that can utilise DFI capital to de-risk
private investments in lower-income countries will be essential to
meet investment goals.
Mobilised private finance for climate in energy-relevant sectors,
2020-2022 (average)
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Non-renewable generation includes carbon capture and storage. Debt
financing includes syndicated loans and credit lines. Equity financing includes
shares in collective investment vehicles and direct investment in companies
and special purpose vehicles. Industry classification in this figure differs from
the IEA’s definition.
Source: IEA calculations based on OECD CRS.
5
10
15
20
Non-
renewable
generation
Energy
distribution
Energy
policy
Transport &
Storage
Industry &
Construction
Renewable
generation
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Debt financing
Equity financing
Guarantees
Simple co-financing
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 43
Finance
Requests for financial support included in current NDCs from EMDE are well below the levels of
clean energy investment needed to meet their 2030 targets …
Investment in clean energy in APS and financial support requests for energy mitigation in conditional NDCs, 2020-2030
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: APS = Announced Pledges Scenario; NDCs = National Determined Contributions. The conditional components of NDCs are contingent upon a range of
possible conditions, such as receiving enhanced financial resources, technology transfer, technical co-operation and capacity building. Financial support requests
from the conditional NDCs consider those that explicitly put forward a request for the energy sector.
Source: IEA analysis of conditional NDCs as of December 2023.
300
600
900
South East Asia
Africa
Middle East
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Eurasia
Billion USD (2023, MER)
APS
Conditional
NDCs
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 44
Finance
… but the next round of NDCs, expected by 2025, allows EMDE to reflect on their investment
needs, providing greater clarity on where climate finance should be channelled
Increasing global co-operation on climate change can support clean
energy investment via climate finance flows to EMDE. Countries put
forward their short- to medium-term climate commitments in
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). The majority of NDCs
have a target covering the energy sector. Around 70% of current
NDCs contain a conditional component, the implementation of which
is contingent on a range of possible conditions. These include
financial, technical and capacity-building support. Some countries
specify the level of financial support they would need to receive to
implement their conditional NDC component; this can help increase
clarity, transparency and understanding of these commitments.
However, estimating the financial support needed for clean energy
investments reported in NDCs is difficult to analyse due to
fragmented and unstandardised data. Overall, the level reported falls
short of what countries need to invest to meet their own 2030 clean
energy targets. In the first United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) report in 2021 on the determination of
needs of EMDE (which will be updated in 2024) the Standing
Committee on Finance also concluded that there were significant
gaps in the requests for investment support across the nine types of
national reports to the UNFCCC. This discrepancy could be attributed
to several factors. For instance, some EMDE might not need
international financial support to implement their own proposed
mitigation measures (e.g. some high-income, high-emitting countries
do not have a conditional NDC component). Some NDCs may not
fully capture the necessary clean energy investments, potentially also
due to a lack of detailed planning. Another factor could be the limited
availability of data or a limited capacity to estimate clean energy
investment needs. African countries stand out for including estimates
of financial support requirements in their NDCs that are closely
aligned with the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario (APS).
The next round of NDCs, expected by early 2025, presents a crucial
opportunity for countries to act on the outcomes of the first Global
Stocktake (GST), a process that culminated at COP28 and evaluated
the collective progress towards the goals of the Paris Agreement. It
will also be an opportunity to enhance the clarity and transparency of
their assessment of clean energy investment needs to achieve the
2030 and 2035 NDC targets. In this light, Brazil’s presidencies of the
G20 and COP30 have made it a priority to support countries to
transform their next round of NDCs into investable plans. A clearer
assessment of financial support needed in NDCs would have also
been important input for the discussions of the New Collective
Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, which will replace the
USD 100 billion goal set in 2009. Current discussions around the
NCQG address its potential quantum, scope and structure, and will
culminate at COP29.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 45
Finance
Trends for financial instruments
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 46
Finance
Rising interest rates have contributed to a 14% decline in sustainable debt issuance since 2022,
with investors’ concerns triggering a drop in sustainability-linked debt financing …
Sustainable debt issuances by type, 2016-2024
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Bloomberg (2024).
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
400
800
1 200
1 600
2 000
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
1Q 2024
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Transition Bond
Sustainability-
linked debt
Sustainability bond
Green loan
Green bond
Energy and utilities
as share of
corporate
issuances
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 47
Finance
… but new issues of “green” debt – particularly green bonds – have held steady and thanks to
sovereign issuances, indications from early 2024 are positive
Sustainable debt issuances reached approximately USD 1.2 trillion in
2023, exceeding USD 1 trillion for a third consecutive year.
Nonetheless, this represents a 14% decline from 2022 levels, and a
23% drop from the peak in 2021. Over the last two years, rising
interest rates have been a constraining factor, with both the number
and size of issuances decreasing. During this period, debt issuance
from energy and utilities companies also fell from a high of more than
USD 280 billion in 2021 to USD 229 billion in 2023 – though it
remains above 2020 levels.
The biggest declines have been concentrated mainly in sustainability-
linked debt, which in 2023 registered a 50% drop from the previous
year, reaching only USD 284 billion. By sector, real estate showed
the biggest decrease, followed by utilities and automobiles
manufacturing. Some of this decline is likely due to investors’
concerns around the credibility of sustainability-linked debt as a tool
to drive rapid transitions, as well as industry-specific drivers, such as
the contraction of the US commercial real estate market. Meanwhile,
new issuance of green bonds – the most mature sustainable debt
instrument – reached a record USD 650 billion in 2023 and
accounted for more than half of total issuances. The steady increase
in green bond issuance mainly comes from sovereigns, notably
China, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany.
Sustainable debt issuance remains concentrated in advanced
economies, which account for over three-quarters, and China, which
accounts for a further 11%. However, there are signs of growth within
other EMDE, which saw their share of issuance rise to 14% in 2023
from 8% in 2020. This has been driven by broadening use cases, as
seen with two large bond issuances for green hydrogen in Saudi
Arabia, and the instruments, such as the sovereign sustainability-
linked bond from the Chilean government. The EUR and USD remain
the primary currencies for issuance, accounting for 38% and 28%,
respectively. While this helps to attract international investors, it
exposes issuers in EMDE to currency risks. With many EMDE
grappling with rising debt levels, the borrowing at lower interest rates
through sustainable debt instruments makes them an attractive tool,
particularly for financing large public infrastructure projects.
Initial indications from 2024 have given a generally positive outlook
for sustainable debt issuances for the year. Although there may be
some volatility due to political events, the fundamentals of the market,
particularly for green bonds, remain strong and growth is expected in
areas such as transition finance (see below). Additionally, the
European Green Bond Standard, which comes into force in 2024, is
expected to increase market confidence by strengthening disclosure
requirements.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 48
Finance
Transition finance tools are emerging as a promising means to drive more capital to high-
emitting sectors, but further efforts to harmonise standards for transition plans are necessary
Achieving the NZE Scenario requires a broad range of investments.
Some of these can easily be classified as clean energy, but many
others are less easy to define. Under the NZE Scenario, technologies
that could provide or enable zero emission energy or energy services
account for 47% of spending in 2030, and those that provide
emissions reductions but do not themselves deliver zero emissions
energy or energy services account for 7%. Both categories struggle
to attract financing earmarked for clean energy and are at risk of
being excluded by investors seeking to decarbonise their portfolios.
Transition finance is a framework that can support these activities.
Several organisations such as ICMA, CBI, GFANZ, OECD and others
have developed transition finance guidance, covering activities such
as retrofitting and substantiating assets, investment in alternatives to
fossil fuel use, and the role of engagement by financial institutions.
Despite these guidelines, there is still significant variation in transition
finance methodologies, with ICMA finding three overlapping
definitions ranging from economy-wide to only hard-to-abate sectors.
Transition-related bonds have been a preferred labelled tool for hard-
to-abate sectors. Oil refining and marketing, industrials and metals
and mining accounted for 34% of issuances in the last three years;
these sectors accounted for only 15% of green bonds over the same
period. Transition-related bonds issuances in 2023 accounted for just
USD 3.5 billion – less than 1% of all sustainable debt issuances and
are geographically concentrated in Japan, Italy and China.
Share of corporates issuances by industry 2021-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: “Other material” includes chemicals. “Others” includes consumer
discretionary, consumer services, technology, and other business sectors.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Bloomberg (2024).
2%
8%
1%
20%
6%
63%
Transition-related bonds
1%
14%
1%
11%
2%
4%
43%
24%
Airlines
Refining & marketing
Renewable
Other Energy
Industrials
Metals & mining
Other Material
Utilities
Others
Green bonds
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 49
Finance
Establishing viable, science-based transition plans is a vital first step
to expanding the use of transition debt instruments. Transition plans
are generally understood as aligning with the Paris Agreement, and
spelling out transition pathways, actions and interim targets. These
elements are fundamental for engagement between corporates and
investors, as well as tracking progress. Governments and regulators
have taken different approaches to establishing transition activities.
For example, Europe and Singapore are using taxonomies to define
transition activities, while Japan has created industry roadmaps.
Coverage can vary based on the regional methodologies, but both
taxonomies and roadmaps can support an increase in funding,
including from advanced economies where investors may be subject
to stricter rules covering sustainable finance.
Even with the provision of stronger transition plans and roadmaps,
some additional obstacles have been observed. For example, on the
issuer side, especially in EMDE, the data necessary to create
transition plans and track progress is not always available. External
support may therefore be necessary to help the development of this
type of financing and, at least initially, such instruments will only be
viable for larger companies with the resources to develop this data.
On the supply side, many EMDE have sovereign ratings that are
below investment grade, making it hard to attract investment from
capital markets via instruments such as bonds without de-risking
support from concessional finance providers. Particularly in EMDE
with fossil-fuel intensive energy mixes, this use of concessional
financing could have a significant real-world impact – especially if it
leads to a “crowding in” of private sector investors. A further challenge
is that many investors have net zero targets that rely on financed
emissions as one of their primary metrics. Even though transition
activities may be in line with a taxonomy or roadmap, they generally
have higher emissions than purely clean activities, which would risk
skewed investors’ efforts to reduce their financed emissions. Further
consideration is needed on appropriate indicators that can monitor
institutions’ proper progress and acceleration of funding for future
energy transition of real economy.
Transition-related bond issuances by country 2019-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Bloomberg (2024).
1
2
3
4
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
United
Kingdom
United Arab
Emirates
Japan
Italy
Hong Kong
France
China
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 50
Finance
Box 2.1 The development of Climate Transition Bonds (JCTBs) in Japan
In February 2024, Japan issued the world's first sovereign transition
bonds – Japan Climate Transition Bonds (JCTBs). Two offerings of
JPY 800 billion (USD 5 billion) each were issued, with tenors of 5
and 10 years. The issuances are certificated by the Climate Bonds
Initiative and based on Japan’s national transition strategy.
Japan’s Basic Policy for the Realization of Green Transformation,
published in February 2023, includes a detailed investment plan for
22 industrial sectors to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, as well as
a commitment to introduce carbon pricing. Under the investment
plan, the government envisages JPY 20 trillion (USD 130 billion) of
public capital to realise more than JPY 150 trillion (USD 1 trillion) in
investment through public and private financing by 2050. The plan
is accompanied by transition roadmaps for each sector, which were
developed by expert committees of public and private stakeholders.
These roadmaps allow investors to identify transition activities and
can also be used by companies for internal transition planning. The
investment plan also includes an emphasis on nascent
technologies, which will receive over half of the proceeds of JCTBs.
The JCTBs also include a novel approach to carbon pricing.
Normally, revenue from carbon pricing can only fund future energy
transition activity, i.e. after the carbon has been paid. This delays
in the impact of the carbon pricing but Japan’s approach was to
build the future pricing revenue into the issuance, by assuming this
is the capital government will use to make repayments on the bonds.
This allows for the government to immediately take advantage of
the assumed future revenue of carbon taxes.
Structure of Japan Climate Transition Bonds (JCTBs)
The JCTBs approach can potentially be repurposed for EMDE. With
the government playing the role of credit intermediary, this could
enhance corporates’ creditworthiness and eliminate the complexity
of financing for small-scale projects. Countries with sub-investment-
grade credit ratings, may need additional credit enhancements –
such as guarantees from DFIs – to help facilitate access to
international capital markets.
Implementation of Carbon Pricing in Japan
Paid Auction start from FY2033 for Power sector
Emission Trading System (“GX-ETS”)
From FY2028 for fossil fuel importers
Fossil fuel levy (“GX-Surcharge”)
JCTBs repaid by
Future Carbon
Pricing Revenue
JCTBs
JPY 20 trillion public capital will be offered to
realize more than JPY 150 trillion investment
through public and private financing by 2050
Corporates/
Industries
The carbon pricing will start at a low level, and it will be rising gradually to
incentivise investment in green transformations early as possible
Japanese
Government
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 51
Finance
Revenues from compliance carbon pricing hit record highs in 2023; in the voluntary markets, a
large surplus of unused older credits weighed on prices and demand amid quality concerns
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Data on carbon credits relates to the following voluntary carbon markets registries: American Carbon Registry, Climate Action Reserve, Gold Standard, Verra’s
Verified Carbon Standard, California Air Resources Board, Washington State Climate Commitment Act. The categories considered under energy-related carbon
credits are: renewable energy, industry, transport, energy efficiency, carbon capture and storage. ETS = Emissions Trading System.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from the World Bank, and Berkeley, 2024 .
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
20
40
60
80
100
120
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Carbon taxes
Other ETS
EU ETS
Global emission coverage
Compliance carbon pricing revenues and emission coverage
100
200
300
400
500
600
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
Million credits
Credits issued
Credits retired
Cumulative surplus
Issuance and retirement of energy-related carbon credits
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 52
Finance
Compliance carbon pricing instruments have seen further expansion and innovation in 2023,
while voluntary carbon markets faced quality concerns
Carbon pricing is a key instrument for mitigating emissions,
encouraging investment in low-carbon technologies and reducing
demand
for
emissions-intensive
activities.
Carbon
pricing
instruments include compliance carbon pricing instruments (CCPIs),
such as carbon taxes, emissions trading systems (ETS) or hybrids of
the two, as well as baseline and credit systems, which generate
carbon credits. These two types of carbon pricing instruments can
contribute in different ways to financing the clean energy transition,
depending on the specific local contexts.
As of May 2024, 75 CCPIs were in place worldwide. All CCPIs cover
the energy sector and 23% of global greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. Aggregate revenues from CCPIs hit a new record high in
2023 and, for the first time, revenues surpassed USD 100 billion – of
which roughly half was generated by Europe’s ETS. A few notable
energy-sector related developments in CCPIs also took place:
Canada introduced a regulatory framework for a federal cap-and-
trade system for the oil and gas sector – its largest source of GHG
emissions. Meanwhile, as part of a broader reform, the European
Union extended the coverage of its ETS by including its domestic
maritime sector, which represents 3% to 4% of total EU CO2
emissions. Indonesia introduced a new intensity-based ETS for the
power generation sector. Brazil passed a new draft law for cap-and-
trade. Moreover, in October 2023, the EU Carbon Border Adjustment
Mechanism (CBAM) also entered its transitional phase – introducing
reporting requirements only – in preparation for a definitive regime
that will start in 2026.
Voluntary carbon credit markets have come under particular scrutiny
in 2023, with some projects being accused of over-crediting, of
lacking additionality or of enabling human rights abuses. This,
alongside inconclusive negotiations at COP28 on Article 6 rules,
impacted the issuance of energy-related carbon credits in 2023.
Retirements of credits remained high in 2023, after reaching a peak
in 2022. However, a surplus of unsold legacy credits has been
accumulating in recent years, reaching around 480 million credits in
2023. This keeps the costs of most energy-related carbon credits
much lower than the real cost of mitigation. To address questions that
some have raised on the integrity of some legacy credits, CORSIA
has introduced cut-off dates for eligible credits. Recent initiatives
were also set up to improve the quality of carbon credit supply (such
as the Core Carbon Principles of the Integrity Council for Voluntary
Carbon Markets) as well as demand (such as the Claims Code of
Practice of the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative, the
Nordic Code of best practice for the voluntary use of carbon credits,
Finland’s guide to good practices for voluntary carbon markets).
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 53
Finance
Box 2.3 Innovative financing solutions for energy access
There are still 750 million people living without access to
electricity globally and more than 2 billion people without clean
cooking solutions. Achieving the Sustainable Development Goal
7 – universal energy access by 2030 – will require annual
spending of at least USD 42 billion beginning in 2024. This
represents a massive increase in spending, particularly in Africa,
where energy access projects have struggled to attract more than
USD 5 billion annually.
Energy access investments are particularly challenging given that
they are small scale, and the risks associated with the end user
are often high. Mounting debt at utilities has slowed grid
connections, challenges over demand stimulation have put
pressure on mini-grid business models, and non-payment risks
have impacted profitability for providers of home solar systems.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to keep clean cooking solutions affordable
for end users without the use of carbon credits, a market that has
faced credibility concerns.
Financial aggregation solutions have emerged as a way to raise
more private capital for access projects. In May 2023, Sun King,
an off-grid electricity provider, finalised a securitisation deal led
by Citi, the US-based bank. Worth USD 130 million and
denominated in Kenyan shillings, the transaction is based on the
future expected revenue of a million customers. Alongside DFIs, the
structure included participation from commercial banks in the region.
Similarly, in 2021, Winch Energy used a portfolio loan approach –
combining successful tenders for mini-grid development in Uganda
and Sierra Leone into one holding company – to raise USD 16 million
for projects that were otherwise too small to access financial markets.
Grants and concessional capital will still play a key role, particularly in
rural areas and fragile and conflict-prone states, but aggregation can
leverage private capital into some of the more commercial projects.
Annual energy access investment in Africa
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA, 2024.
10
20
30
2019
2024-30
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Electricity
Clean cooking
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 54
Finance
Implications
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 55
Finance
To meet investment needs under the NZE Scenario, further evolution of today’s financial
architecture is needed, including tailored solutions for transition activities and for EMDE
Ensuring the availability of affordable capital will be vital for driving
rapid energy transitions. It is critical not only for financing projects and
companies, but also for supporting the enabling environment and
facilitating necessary spending by households. Current market
conditions – particularly the rising interest rate environment – have
resulted in higher financing costs and highlight the need for
innovative risk-mitigation instruments and support mechanisms,
particularly for EMDE. Tightening market conditions have also
contributed to a setback in sustainable finance instruments as more
financial players voice concerns about regulations becoming overly
stringent, especially when it comes to financing high-emitting, hard-
to-abate sectors.
Clean energy projects should adopt a diversified financing strategy
that leverages the strengths and risk appetites of each source of
capital. While private sector investment is particularly dominant in
advanced economies, growing domestic private financial sector
financing in energy in EMDE is particularly important, as it reduces
currency risk and reliance on external sources. Attention is also due
for households, which have also become increasingly prominent as
providers of capital, as observed by the near doubling of their share
of energy asset ownership between 2015 and 2023. Given the
increases in the cost of living, maintaining affordability of services will
be vital over the course of 2024, which may require additional support
from public sources. DFIs can also play a role in ensuring affordability
and providing capital in higher risk markets and technologies.
Appropriate tools and systems need to be in place to direct finance
towards energy investment in EMDE as a catalyst for clean energy
transitions. This includes enhancing the credibility of carbon markets,
which have faced criticism related to over-crediting, lack of
additionality and enabling human rights abuses. Furthermore,
improving transition finance mechanisms, and strengthening
sustainable finance regulations, especially in the context of the
potential impact on financing high-emitting, hard-to-abate sectors,
can help ensure that financing supports the differing trajectories of
EMDEs compared to advanced economies.
On the EMDE side, providing an accurate assessment of financial
needs for clean energy investments around NDCs will be crucial. This
can be used as a basis for engagement in some of the global efforts
to accelerate financing for energy transitions, such as at the
upcoming G20 discussions, or via initiatives such as the ongoing
Bridgetown Initiative that aims to reform the global financial
architecture to better support EMDE.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 56
Power
Power
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 57
Power
Overview
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 58
Power
Power sector investment increased by 15% in 2023 to USD 1.3 trillion, with the growth rate
expected to slow in 2024 due to cost reductions for renewables and a decline in fossil fuels
Global annual investment in the power sector by category, 2011-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Investment throughout is measured as ongoing capital spending on new and existing power capacity. All numbers throughout are in 2023 USD. Fossil fuel
power includes unabated and abated power. EMDE = emerging market and developing economies. 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
250
500
750
1 000
1 250
1 500
2011-17
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Battery storage
Electricity grids
Nuclear
Fossil fuel power
Renewable power
EMDE outside China
(share, right axis)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 59
Power
Spending on renewables and batteries continues to reach new highs even as costs for solar PV
and batteries plummet, while unabated fossil fuel power maintains its downward trend
Global investment in the power sector grew by 15% in 2023, reaching
a record USD 1.3 trillion. Concerns over high interest rates and the
profitability of renewables firms were offset by lower prices for solar
PV modules, coupled with rapid renewables deployment in major
economies including China, the European Union and the United
States. Growth is set to continue in 2024 but at a more modest pace.
Global spending on renewables also hit a new record of
USD 735 billion, driven by solar PV and wind. China alone saw solar
PV spending jump to USD 220 billion – almost half of global solar
investment for the year – with capacity additions multiplying by a
factor of 2.5 compared to 2022 thanks to falling module prices and
pandemic recovery effects. As prices for solar modules and other key
clean energy technologies continue to fall, we are now expecting the
growth of spending for renewables to slow down – especially for
distributed solar PV – and reach USD 770 billion in 2024. This does
not reflect a slowdown in the renewable power capacity added, as
price decreases allow for more capacity to be added per USD spent.
Nonetheless, grid and curtailment concerns, permitting delays and
land availability remain constraining factors.
As renewables expanded in 2023, capital expenditures on fossil fuel
power decreased by 10%, to USD 90 billion, led by declines in coal-
fired power. For 2024, we are expecting a similar decrease to
USD 80 billion, again driven by coal (-30%) and to a smaller extent
by gas-fired power (-8%). Spending on fossil fuel power with carbon
capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) remained below USD 1 billion
and was concentrated in China.
While investment in nuclear power remained largely unchanged in
2023, expected growth of around 20% in 2024 promises renewed
momentum. However, most of this spending growth in the next few
years will be driven by lifetime extensions rather than investment in
new nuclear capacity. Investment in hydropower fell slightly and is
expected to be even lower in 2024.
Investment in electricity grids reached USD 375 billion, translating to
a 9% average growth rate globally. Notable success stories for grids
were in advanced economies as well as China and Latin America.
Investment by other emerging market and developing economies
(EMDE) still lagged the global average, and even declined in some
regions. Battery storage investment grew in line with our strong
expectations, reaching USD 40 billion.
Final investment decisions (FIDs) continue to demonstrate a mixed
picture. While FIDs for utility-scale renewables were at record highs,
those for unabated coal-fired power plants also increased to levels
not seen since 2015, with almost all of these made in China.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 60
Power
Investment in renewable power rose rapidly across the board, with promising momentum for
spending on grids, nuclear and battery storage in 2024
Annual investment in the power sector by geography and category, 2021-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: REP = renewable power. FFP = fossil fuel power. BESS = Battery Energy Storage System. Investment spending on BESS in other EMDE is so small
(USD 2 billion in 2024e) that it can almost not be detected on the chart. 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
100
200
300
400
REP
Grids
FFP Nuclear BESS
REP
Grids
FFP Nuclear BESS
REP
Grids
FFP Nuclear BESS
Billion USD (2023, MER)
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Advanced economies
China
Other EMDE
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 61
Power
EMDE are slowly attracting more investment, but not at the scale required, while in advanced
economies falling wholesale electricity prices create uncertainty for investors
While total power sector investment in EMDE outside China
increased to USD 270 billion in 2023 – a record – its growth rate of
12% still lagged the 16% average for advanced economies and
China. Renewable power spending rose by almost one-fifth and now
represents half of total power sector investment in other EMDE
regions. Investment in grids increased to USD 80 billion – the highest
level since 2018 – with further growth expected for 2024. Spending
on nuclear and batteries also increased, while investments in fossil
fuel power generation dipped slightly.
Strong renewable power investment in EMDE outside China was
driven by significant spending in India, Southeast Asia, Brazil and
Africa, thanks to policy reforms and the introduction of well-organised
public tenders, as well as grid improvements. The volume of
renewable energy capacity that was auctioned in India, for example,
topped 20 gigawatts (GW) in 2023 – more than double that of 2022 –
with a particular focus on solar PV and projects that combine
renewables with storage. Seeking to tackle its “state of disaster” in
the electricity sector, South Africa also concluded its first battery
procurement programme and is seeking to add an additional 5 GW
of renewables and 600 megawatts (MW) of battery storage.
Latin America notably increased its spending on grids in 2023. Brazil
led the way with a record USD 8 billion auction, while Colombia and
Panama revived interconnection plans. On the other hand,
investment in grids in Southeast Asia and Africa stalled.
Overall, however, power sector investment in EMDE outside China
still represented only around 20% of the global total, while advanced
economies and China were responsible for more than USD 1 trillion
in spending. We expect this trend to persist in 2024, which means
that overall spending is still not on track to meet current climate and
energy-access goals. One major reason for this is the high cost of
capital for clean energy projects in EMDE regions outside China,
which is often double or triple the cost in advanced economies.
While renewable companies in advanced economies saw improved
profitability in 2023, lower prices for natural gas and deeper market
penetration by low-cost renewables are starting to put pressure on
wholesale electricity prices – creating uncertainties for their revenue
streams. This, in turn, puts additional scrutiny on future investments
– one reason we expect growth in renewable power investment to
slow in 2024. In some European countries, for example, average
wholesale electricity prices have fallen to their lowest levels since
2021 – and have regularly dipped into negative territory. This
underscores the pressing need for greater investment in power grids,
interconnectors and storage infrastructure as the share of intermittent
renewables increases.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 62
Power
Generation
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 63
Power
Solar PV attracted a record USD 480 billion in spending in 2023 – more than all other generation
technologies combined – while investment in coal power has fallen by 40% since 2021
Global annual investment in power generation by selected technologies, 2021-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Gas-fired generation investment includes both large-scale plants and small-scale generating sets and engines. Hydropower includes pumped-hydro storage.
2024e = estimated values for 2024.
100
200
300
400
500
Solar PV
Wind
Hydro
Nuclear
Coal
power
Gas
power
Billion USD (2023, MER)
2021
2022
2023
2024e
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 64
Power
Price pressures in solar PV and wind equipment have eased, and capital costs edged lower in
2023, reaching record lows for solar PV and batteries
Manufacturers' average selling prices
IEA clean energy equipment price index
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: The clean energy equipment price index, developed by the IEA, tracks price movements in a global basket of solar PV modules, wind turbines, lithium-ion
batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) and utility-scale battery storage, weighted by shares of investment. Prices are in current USD, more details can be found here.
Source: IEA calculations based on companies’ financial reports, Bloomberg data and BNEF.
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
Q1
2017
Q4
2023
Million USD/MW
European wind turbine manufacturers
Chinese wind turbine manufacturers
Chinese solar panel manufacturers
50
100
150
200
250
Q1
2014
Q4
2023
Index (2019 Q4 = 100)
Global index
Highest quarter
since Q4 2018
Lowest quarter
recorded
Q4
2022
Q4
2023
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 65
Power
The profitability of renewable utilities improved as capital costs fell; solar manufacturing
margins narrowed due to overcapacity, while challenges in wind manufacturing began to ease
ROC and WACC of solar and wind manufacturers
ROC and WACC in oil & gas vs renewables companies
IEA. CC BY 4.
Note: ROC = return on capital. WACC = weighted average cost of capital. Calculation based on the top 25 publicly listed companies in each sector according to
production capacity, primarily concentrated in advanced economies and China. Renewable companies include utilities and manufacturers. WACC is based on
implied market valuation. 2024 Q1 values based on obtainable data from companies.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg data and S&P Capital IQ.
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Q1
2024
Oil & Gas WACC
Renewables WACC
Oil & Gas ROC
Renewables ROC
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Q1
2024
Wind WACC
Solar WACC
Wind ROC
Solar ROC
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 66
Power
Offshore wind developers face contract profitability issues as governments react to new market
conditions by adjusting energy purchase prices
Offshore wind auctions in the United Kingdom
Offshore wind contracts in the United States in 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: UK average strike and US average contract prices are expressed in 2023 USD.
Source: IEA calculations based on UK Department of Energy and Change and company reports.
30
60
90
120
150
2
4
6
8
10
2016
2017
2019
2022
2023
2024
GW
Awarded
Renegotiation
Not awarded
Cancelled
30
60
90
120
150
2
4
6
8
10
Awarded
Renegotiation
Cancelled
GW
Average strike price
(USD/MWh, right axis)
Average contract price
(USD/MWh, right axis)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 67
Power
Renewables developers see improving profitability, while solar PV onshoring plans and wind
manufacturers face challenges
Solar PV and wind projects continue to offer attractive investment
prospects, despite profitability challenges in the manufacturing
business. Renewable utility profitability is slowly returning to pre-
pandemic levels, with returns on invested capital (ROIC) increasing
by one-third in 2023 from a year earlier, thanks to falling solar and
wind costs. ROIC is also notably more stable compared to the
volatility of oil and gas companies in recent years. That said, the
average cost of capital for renewable power firms has increased
slightly in recent years, now hovering at around 7% of market value.
An exception to the trend of improving profitability was offshore wind.
2023 saw a range of contract cancellations due to previously agreed
low prices that were no longer viable given supply chain challenges,
cost increases and permitting delays. In the United States, for
example, 7 GW of planned capacity was cancelled while another 4
GW are subject to contract renegotiations at prices that are on
average around two times higher. There were multiple cancellations
in the United Kingdom as well, with the 2023 auction not attracting a
single offer, prompting an increase of the strike price by 165% for its
2024 auction. Nonetheless, successful contract renegotiations,
adjustments in auctions and regulatory support such as the European
Union’s wind power package are all positive signs that demonstrate
the need for regulators to remain responsive to changing market
conditions.
On the manufacturing side, 2023 was dominated by significant price
declines and concerns about overcapacity. As manufacturing
capacity continues to grow within the Chinese solar PV sector, listed
solar firms – dominated by Chinese entities – are starting to see their
profit margins shrink. Despite government support for domestic
manufacturing, cost pressures have led to some cancellations of
expansion plans – and in some cases, existing plant closures – in
Europe, the United States and India. That said, falling prices for solar
modules led to a 5% drop in the global average levelised cost of
electricity (LCOE) for solar PV last year.
Companies specialised in wind turbines – a sector dominated by
European manufacturers – struggled for roughly two years with
various supply chain, cost and technical issues. But by 2023,
profitability had largely recovered, reaching similar levels as solar PV
manufacturers. Wind turbines produced by Chinese companies
continue to be around one-third the price of European-made turbines
and have had some limited success in winning onshore wind auctions
in Europe and Asia. However, overseas expansion plans by Chinese
wind turbine producers face obstacles due to more complex logistics
and higher operation and maintenance costs.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 68
Power
Investment in clean technology manufacturing is surging, driving price decreases but also
creating overcapacity in solar PV and battery manufacturing
Clean technology manufacturing is surging: The sector
accounted for 4% of global GDP growth in 2023. Clean
technology manufacturing attracted almost USD 200 billion in
investment last year – a 70% jump from 2022 – with solar PV and
battery manufacturing plants leading the way. Investment in solar
PV manufacturing more than doubled to around USD 80 billion,
while
investment
in
battery
manufacturing
stood
at
USD 110 billion. Together, both accounted for more than 90% of
total spending on clean technology manufacturing in 2023.
China accounted for three-quarters of global clean technology
manufacturing investment, down from 85% in 2022, as
investment in the United States and Europe accelerated. This
geographic concentration is set to continue to 2030, with China,
the United States and the European Union together projected to
account for around 80% to 90% of manufacturing capacity for
solar PV, wind, battery, electrolyser and heat pumps.
This surge in clean technology manufacturing is, however,
creating significant overcapacities – especially for solar PV and
batteries. Existing capacity for solar modules and cells is already
sufficient to meet demand under the NZE Scenario in 2030.
As a result, prices for solar PV modules and batteries have fallen to
historic lows. However, these facilities are also seeing relatively low
utilisation rates and profit margins are being compressed.
Output from existing and announced manufacturing capacity
relative to NZE Scenario in 2030
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Increased utilisation refers to the gap between 2023 production levels and
existing capacity being utilised at 85%. A utilisation rate of 85% is used for both
existing and announced manufacturing capacity in 2030.
Source: IEA (2024), Advancing Clean Technology Manufacturing.
50%
100%
150%
Solar PV
Wind
Batteries
2023 output
Increased utilisation
Committed
Preliminary
Announced capacity:
Existing capacity:
2030 NZE deployment
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 69
Power
Volatile wholesale electricity prices create uncertainty for renewables companies over the
impact on revenues and future investment, underlining the need for storage and grid expansion
Wholesale electricity prices in Europe are declining, with some
reaching their lowest levels since 2021. Lower natural gas prices,
increased hydro and nuclear output, and reduced demand, are all
driving down wholesale prices. As renewable capacity grows, power
production from these sources is also reaching unprecedented levels,
occasionally resulting in negative prices and increased volatility. For
instance, Spain achieved record-high solar power production in the
first quarter of 2024 with prices averaging 43 USD/MWh – and
sometimes approaching zero. Germany and the Netherlands also
experienced brief periods of negative prices in March 2024. While
electricity prices in the United States have been below those in
Europe for a while (due to its domestic natural gas production), prices
have dipped to record lows in recent months.
The rise in affordable electricity benefits consumers and is a welcome
respite from the record highs during the energy crisis. At the same
time, it increases uncertainty for renewables companies as revenue
streams come under pressure and become more unpredictable –
leading to greater scrutiny of the future growth prospects for
renewables investments. Developers who choose not to co-locate
their wind and solar PV power parks alongside battery storage or
other sources of flexibility may see a drop in potential revenues during
peak generation – hampering profits and discouraging investment.
Enhanced coordination between renewables production, storage and
demand response is needed to manage the balance between price
levels and growing volatility. Further grid expansion is also urgently
needed to mitigate price swings in both directions. Increased
interconnection in Europe offers an opportunity to optimise electricity
flow, especially when prices differ between regions. During the
energy crisis, for example, Spain and Portugal experienced lower
power prices than the rest of Europe due to their ample electricity
production from solar PV and wind, while a lack of interconnection
constrained electricity flow to higher-price markets in central Europe.
Monthly wholesale electricity prices in selected regions
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA calculations based on EIA (2024), CEIC (2024), Ember (2024).
100
200
300
400
500
Jan-21
Jan-22
Jan-23
Jan-24
USA
China
Germany
France
USD/MWh
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 70
Power
Final investment decisions (FIDs)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 71
Power
More than 50 GW of unabated coal-fired power generation was approved in 2023, the most
since 2015, and almost all of this was in China, reflecting security priorities and strong demand
Coal-fired power generation capacity reaching FID by geography (left) and segment (right), 2016-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: FID = final investment decision. FIDs are an indication of the scale of future capacity to come online in the coming years. The IEA tracks projects that reach
financial close or begin construction to provide a forward-looking indicator of future capacity additions and spending activity.
Source: IEA calculations based on McCoy Power Reports (2024).
20
40
60
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
GW
China
India
Southeast Asia
Rest of world
20
40
60
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
High efficiency
Subcritical
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 72
Power
FIDs for unabated gas-fired power generation declined by 10% in 2023 to 60 GW, still above the
levels observed before the global energy crisis
Gas-fired power generation capacity reaching FID by geography (left) and segment (right), 2016-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: MENA = Middle East and North Africa. CCGT = combined-cycle gas turbine. OCGT = open-cycle gas turbine. Share of net importers of natural gas = share of
gas power that has reached FID in countries that are net importers of natural gas. FIDs are an indication of the scale of future capacity to come online in the coming
years. The IEA tracks projects that reach financial close or begin construction to provide a forward-looking indicator of future capacity additions and spending activity.
Source: IEA calculations based on McCoy Power Reports (2024).
20
40
60
80
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
GW
China
United States
MENA
Other Asia
Southeast Asia
Europe
Rest of world
20%
40%
60%
80%
20
40
60
80
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
OCGT
CCGT
Net importers of natural gas (share, right axis)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 73
Power
FIDs for unabated fossil fuel generation rose above their already elevated 2022 levels, reaching
more than 110 GW, driven by unabated coal-fired power
Despite a drop in the number of approvals for natural gas power
plants, FIDs for unabated fossil fuel generation rose to 110 GW in
2023, driven by a 30% year-on-year increase in coal-fired capacity.
Even as its contribution to natural gas FIDs declined significantly and
clean power expanded drastically, China is still the source of the vast
majority of this unabated fossil fuel-generated capacity, accounting
for 95% of the world’s coal-fired plants that reached financial close.
In fact, if China were excluded, global approvals of unabated fossil
fuel generation would have decreased by 3% last year.
The main drivers for this proposed capacity expansion are ongoing
security of supply concerns amid the underperformance of
hydropower in China, inflexible interprovincial electricity export
contracts and rising electricity demand, as well as pressure on
provincial governments to prioritise economic growth.
Against a backdrop of rapid expansion of renewables capacity in
China, these new unabated fossil fuel power plants face the prospect
of very low utilisation and reliance on capacity markets. It remains
unclear whether this new capacity will be used primarily for flexibility
purposes or for baseload generation, but the potential implications for
China’s emissions in the latter case are significant given the
government’s carbon intensity target.
In India, new coal FIDs doubled from a year earlier, to 2 GW in 2023
– their highest level since 2019 – as the country sought to meet
higher-than-expected electricity demand. In the rest of the world, only
two countries – Russia and the Philippines – approved meaningful
increases in new coal-fired capacity for development. It appears,
therefore, that most countries and financiers are following through
with their pledges to stop supporting new coal-fired power plants.
In contrast to coal, FIDs for gas-fired power generation fell by 10% in
2023 – reaching 60 GW – although they remained above the average
of recent years. China still approved the largest share of gas-fired
plants, but the number dropped significantly, leading to a lower share
of plants reaching financial close among net importers of natural gas.
Elsewhere, FIDs for new gas plants increased in the Caspian region
(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan) in particular, due to an
influx of cheap Russian gas, while Nigeria has started to invest in
gas-fired power stations using its domestic gas reserves.
Elsewhere, approvals of new gas FIDs in the United States, Europe
and Asia in 2023 were in line with recent years. At the same time,
new projects in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region fell
by 50%. Moreover, all new gas FIDs were for combined-cycle gas
turbine plants (CCGTs), which indicates that these new projects are
looking for operating at higher utilisation rates.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 74
Power
Despite the high levels of new coal FIDs, the pipeline of coal is still slowing; similarly, a good
year for new hydropower has not offset the low number of approvals in recent years
Annual average capacity additions and FIDs by capacity, 2016-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Annual average FIDs are an indication of the scale of future capacity to come online in the coming years and the time it takes for a new plant to go online can
vary: A new natural gas plant might take three years, for example, while a new nuclear plant can take seven years.
Source: IEA calculations based on McCoy Power Reports (2024), S&P Global (2024), and IAEA (2024).
20
40
60
80
Natural gas
Coal
Hydro
Nuclear
GW
Annual average capacity additions
Annual average FIDs
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 75
Power
FIDs for utility-scale renewables climbed to record levels with solar leading the way, but
offshore wind recovered strongly from its 2022 lows
FIDs for utility-scale renewable plants, 2016-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Excludes large hydropower. “Other” includes biomass, waste-to-energy, geothermal, small hydro and marine.
Source: IEA calculations based on Clean Energy Pipeline (2024).
100
200
300
400
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Solar
Onshore wind
Offshore wind
Other
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 76
Power
Continued growth in solar and a rebound in offshore wind lifted FIDs for utility-scale
renewables to an all-time high in 2023
FIDs for utility-scale renewable projects increased by 15% year-on-
year to almost USD 400 billion in 2023, an all-time high. FIDs for solar
plants represented more than half of the total at USD 220 billion – a
new record and 2.5 times the amount approved in 2020. Wind power
recovered somewhat from the previous year’s drop due to a strong
recovery in offshore FIDs, while fewer onshore wind projects were
approved. The total numbers of utility-scale deals continued to
increase significantly as the combined value of deals above
USD 1 billion more than doubled.
Thanks to the European Union’s “Fit-for-55” package, as well as
improvements to the region’s auctions and permitting, approvals of
utility-scale renewable projects there rose by 50%, led by Germany,
France and Poland. Similarly, the United States saw FIDs increase
by 20%, with a bumper fourth quarter after details of the Inflation
Reduction Act were disclosed. Elsewhere, notable jumps were also
observed in Saudi Arabia and the Philippines.
In a strong year for hydropower, FIDs for large-scale hydro plants
increased to 32 GW from 14 GW in 2022. This was the highest level
seen since 2017 – a promising sign for a technology that will play an
important role in providing future baseload and energy storage
services. China dominated approvals – which approved FIDs for
more than 23 GW – India, Indonesia, Laos, Viet Nam and Angola.
Pumped hydro – which can serve as energy storage – constituted
more than 70% of hydropower FIDs. (Almost all approvals in China
and Indonesia were for storage projects.)
In 2023, China and Egypt were the only countries starting the
construction of new nuclear power plants (6 GW combined). The fact
that nuclear continues to stagnate is cause for concern, even though
additional capital is being spent on modernising and extending the
lifetimes of existing plants, which is not captured by FIDs.
The strong growth in approvals of utility-scale renewables suggests
that the construction delays and supply chain constraints of past
years have been largely resolved. However, a range of issues is still
hampering the scaling up of renewable capacity: Advanced
economies face land acquisition, permitting and grid connection
delays, for example, while China is keen to keep renewables
curtailment rates at 10%. In EMDE outside China, FIDs are still
lagging behind – with the exception of India and Brazil – and will
require addressing in particular the high cost of capital for clean
energy projects. Doing so will mean establishing clear and stable
regulatory frameworks, reducing off-taker risk and deploying
concessional finance where necessary. For 2024, we are therefore
expecting overall growth to continue, but growth in FIDs for utility-
scale renewables will slow in USD terms as costs continue to fall.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 77
Power
Grids and storage
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 78
Power
Grid investment is starting to pick up and is expected to reach USD 400 billion in 2024, with
Europe, the United Sates, China and parts of Latin America leading the way
Investment in power grid infrastructure by geography 2016-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
Source: IEA analysis based on transmission and distribution companies’ financial statements, Global Transmission (2023).
100
200
300
400
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
North America
China
Europe
Asia Pacific
Latin America
Others
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 79
Power
Investment in battery storage continued its rapid growth to reach USD 40 billion in 2023, and
further growth is expected in 2024 as costs continue to decline
Battery storage investment by geography (left) and segment (right), 2017-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: OECD Pacific = Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. 2024e = estimated values for 2024. For this report, we improved our methodological approach to
battery storage investment. This involved a more accurate association of capacity to utility-scale, commercial and residential battery storage projects as well as their
corresponding capital costs.
Source: IEA calculations based on BNEF (2024), Wood Mackenzie (2024), China National Energy Agency (2024) and CNESA (2024).
15
30
45
60
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023 2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
United States
China
Europe
OECD Pacific
Other
Utility-scale
Behind-the-meter
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023 2024e
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 80
Power
Electrification efforts are accelerating in advanced economies and Latin America, yet progress
is urgently needed in EMDE outside China
There were positive changes in the grid landscape in 2023. In some
regions, efforts to deploy networks for electrification increased,
though the gains still fell short of what is needed. Advanced
economies and China continue to lead investment in power grids,
accounting for about 80% of global spending. China held its level of
investment at USD 80 billion, with the government-owned State Grid
Corporation maintaining its appetite for new grids and networks.
Investment in advanced economies grew at a rate of 11% in 2023,
led by the United States, which spent USD 100 billion – mostly on
enhancing grid reliability and upgrading old infrastructure. Spending
in the European Union rose strongly, reaching USD 60 billion,
bolstered by the European Commission’s Grid Action Plan which
targets more than USD 600 billion in spending on grids in the next six
years. Further investments in grid interconnection are very much
required in the European Union to facilitate the flow of renewable
power from southern to central European markets. Generally, in
advanced economies, a key challenge lies in sustaining investment
growth and ensuring its effective translation throughout the supply
chain. Power transformers in particular encounter obstacles due to
inflationary pressures and supply shortages.
Grid investment in EMDE outside China grew by an impressive 15%,
reaching almost USD 80 billion in 2023. However, this increase
masked very different patterns in the underlying regions. Investment
in India, for example, remained flat despite the introduction of tenders
for smart meters – of which only 10% of the government’s original
target number have been installed. Investment in Africa and
Southeast Asia also remained mostly unchanged. However, this lack
of new investment was partly offset by a doubling of spending in Latin
America as countries like Colombia, Chile, Panama and Brazil made
efforts to increase spending. Brazil made particular progress – more
than doubling its grid investments in 2023 and auctioning a record
10 500 km of grid (where China State Grid won the biggest lot).
Many EMDE are highly dependent on concessional financing and
public funding for grid investment, which represented 80% of total
investment in 2023. Most of Southeast Asia lacks robust regulatory
frameworks for private participation, for example. In Viet Nam there
is no public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure with a clear
revenue model. In Africa, more than half of investment comes from
public sources – and only every third utility can recover operational
and debt costs, even after including subsidies from governments.
One positive exception to this is South Africa, which plans to establish
an independent transmission project office to procure new
transmission capacity using a build-operate-transfer model. Grid
connectivity in Africa generally remains a challenge, however.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 81
Power
Sharply declining costs helped battery storage investment to double again in 2023
As we point out in our recent Battery Special Report, battery storage
is a critical component for the energy transition. In 2023, investments
in battery storage reached more than USD 40 billion, 90% of which
was concentrated in China, the United States and Europe. But for
every 1 USD invested in battery storage in advanced economies and
China, only one cent was invested in other EMDE countries. This lack
of investment in EMDE is mainly due the absence of clear regulatory
frameworks as well as high capital and financing costs.
Spending on battery storage in China increased by a factor of almost
2.5 in 2023 to USD 11 billion. This comes as provinces rolled out
capacity payment schemes that subsidise both discharging and
charging. In addition, many provinces require project developers to
include a minimum of 10% to 20% of energy storage capacity in every
new wind or solar project. After this record year of renewables and
battery deployment (as well as continued declines in capital costs)
we are expecting capital expenditure for battery storage in China to
continue growing strongly in 2024, albeit at a slightly slower pace.
In the United States, investment also rose to USD 11 billion and we
expect similar growth 2024. This is supported by the US Inflation
Reduction Act and liberalised power markets that allow for favourable
storage economics, as well as strong dynamism in the residential
battery market. Even stronger growth has been held back by
permitting issues and higher financing costs.
Europe saw battery storage investment more than double to
USD 15 billion in 2023, with behind-the-meter applications – for
example, battery storage combined with rooftop solar – performing
particularly well in Germany and Italy and strong growth in utility-
scale systems in the United Kingdom. Continued power price
volatility, supportive energy storage auctions, and tax exemptions are
expected to support a similar investment level in 2024 with
progressively greater focus on utility-scale systems.
The Asia-Pacific region (outside China) increased its battery storage
spending by 40% to almost USD 2.5 billion, led by Japan and
Australia. India did not meet its growth expectations due to project
construction delays. For select other markets, such as Chile, 2023
marked the take-off year for battery storage as it passed legislation
to incentivise energy storage and announced that it would be seeking
to procure 5.4 GWh in energy storage and non-variable renewables
capacity by 2028 while setting aside USD 2 billion.
Despite high expectations for future capacity growth, investment
spending will likely moderate over time as capital costs continue to
come down. After increasing in the previous year for the first time,
capital costs returned to their 2021 levels in 2023 due to falling prices
for critical minerals and expanding battery manufacturing capacity.
Capital costs also continued to be significantly lower in China than in
Europe or the United States.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 82
Power
Implications
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 83
Power
Tripling installed renewables capacity by 2030 will require annual investment in renewables and
grids to increase by 12% and 11%, respectively, while battery investment needs to rise by 25%
Gap in investment spending to triple installed renewables capacity by 2030
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario. The annual growth rates mentioned above would ensure that the cumulative required investment to triple installed
renewables capacity by 2030 for renewable power, grids and battery storage in 2024-2030 is met.
50
100
150
200
2023
2030
Battery storage
350
700
1 050
1 400
2023
2030
Billion USD (2023, MER)
STEPS
Gap
Renewable power
200
400
600
800
2023
2030
Grids
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 84
Power
While investment in renewables, batteries and (most recently) grids is accelerating, more effort
is required to achieve a tripling of renewables capacity – especially in EMDE
At the COP28 international climate conference in Dubai, countries
famously signalled the “beginning of the end” of the fossil fuel era. As
part of this pledge, they agreed to triple installed renewables capacity
by 2030. While global spending on renewable power hit a record
USD 735 billion in 2023, more efforts are required for the tripling goal.
Early signs of a potential slowdown in the growth of global spending
on renewables, and persistently insufficient levels of investment in
EMDE outside China, underline the need to double down if we are to
achieve our climate and energy access goals. Ensuring further
increases in renewables investment requires the following: clear and
stable regulatory frameworks; policy support; simpler and faster
permitting; grid expansion; energy storage and sources of flexibility;
payment guarantees and more concessional finance.
Under current policies and market conditions, renewables investment
over the next seven years could meet around two-thirds of the
spending necessary to triple installed renewables capacity by 2030.
This creates a gap of around USD 400 billion per year in required
spending on renewables between 2024 and 2030. While advanced
economies and China will need to increase their current annual
investments by an average of 6% to meet the cumulative required,
the spending gap is particularly pronounced in other EMDE regions,
where annual investment will need to increase by 30% per year.
Key enablers for the tripling of installed renewables capacity are grids
and battery storage. While spending on grids has been relatively flat
in recent years, there was significant growth in 2023 and investment
is projected to further accelerate. Despite this, in the IEA’s Stated
Policies Scenario (STEPS), grid investment would still face a
significant shortfall to the investment levels required for tripling
renewables capacity. Current global spending on grids needs to grow
by an average of 11% every year to meet the cumulative required
investment. Tackling tariff risks, establishing forward-looking
regulatory frameworks and financing models to mobilise private
capital are essential to facilitate this increase in investment levels.
Through its ability to smooth the load curve by storing electricity when
it is produced in abundance and discharging when additional
electricity is required by the system, battery storage is primed to
support the variability of renewables generation. Even though it
experienced explosive growth in the past two years, in the STEPS
battery storage investment could only meet around two-thirds of the
cumulative investment need. Closing the gap will require current
annual spending on battery storage to grow by 25% every year. In
our recent Special Report on Batteries, the IEA highlights the
importance of clear and stable regulatory environments, as well as
addressing off-taker risk, to attract battery investment at scale.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 85
Fuel supply
Fuel supply
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 86
Fuel supply
Overview
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 87
Fuel supply
Fossil fuel investment is set to continue its rise in 2024; commitments to low-emissions fuels
are growing rapidly but from a very low base
Investment in fuels and CCUS, 2015-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Low-emissions fuels = modern bioenergy, low-emissions hydrogen, hydrogen-based fuels and CCUS associated with fossil fuels. 2024e = estimated values
for 2024.
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Oil
Natural gas
Coal
Low-emissions fuels
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 88
Fuel supply
Fuel supply investment remains overwhelmingly focused on fossil fuels with a major new wave
of LNG approved for development
While power sector investment, discussed in the previous chapter,
has shifted substantially in support of energy transitions, the same
cannot yet be said for investment in fuel supply. Demand for fossil
fuels remains robust as the world emerges from a period of vast
turbulence caused first by the Covid-19 pandemic and then by
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But investors peering beyond the short
term confront a range of possible energy futures, each with very
different implications for fuel supply projects.
Upstream oil and gas spending is set to increase by around 7% in
2024 – reaching USD 570 billion – building on a larger increase seen
in 2023. This is led by national oil companies (NOCs) in the Middle
East and Asia.
The huge increase in revenues and profits during the price spikes of
2021-2022 has not translated into a similar-sized rise in new capital
expenditures. More has gone towards dividends, share buybacks
and net debt repayment than to new investments. Upstream
investment is focusing on projects that are considered viable even
under challenging assumptions about future price and regulatory
developments, typically through a combination of low costs and low
emissions intensities. Expenditure aimed at extracting value from
existing fields is an important element of many strategies, hitting
USD 200 billion in 2023 for the first time since 2019. Strong cash
positions and a hunt for advantaged resources also explain the
volume and types of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity.
Investment in LNG is set to rise with a major wave of new LNG export
project approvals promising to increase LNG supply capacity by
250 bcm (a 50% increase) between 2023 to 2030, with 75% of the
growth coming from the United States and Qatar. Unlike previous
LNG supply surges, now there are fewer committed end-use off-
takers for these additional volumes, implying a strong shift away from
the sellers’ market seen in recent years toward a buyers’ market in
the second half of the decade.
Investment in refineries remained broadly flat from 2022 to 2023 and
is expected to drop in 2024 as long lead time projects and uncertainty
about future demand stymie final investment decisions. Refinery
capacity growth, driven by projects in China, Nigeria, and the Middle
East, added 1.3 mb/d of net capacity in 2023. Future capacity will
mainly come from China, India, and the Middle East.
Investment in coal supply increased in 2023, particularly in China,
India, and Indonesia, with further growth expected in 2024. Coal
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 89
Fuel supply
investments will be heavily dependent on the demand outlook in
China, which may slow due to economic uncertainties and rapid
growth in renewables.
Existing policies, plans, and commitments – like the Global Methane
Pledge – could reduce methane emissions from fossil fuel operations
by 50% by 2030. Achieving these reductions will require more than
USD 80 billion in cumulative investments, led by fossil fuel
companies. The investment will be offset by the value of the
additional gas that will be brought to market. Financial support for
low- and middle-income countries will be essential to reach this level
of abatement, and even more so to achieve the 75% reduction in
emissions by 2030 that is needed to limit global warming to 1.5 °C.
Commitments to low-emissions fuels are rising rapidly, but from a
very low base. Overall clean energy investment by oil and gas
companies grew to around USD 30 billion in 2023, but this remains
less than 4% of overall capital spending. Around half of clean energy
investment by the oil and gas industry in 2023 involved M&A of clean
energy companies.
Low-emissions hydrogen is another nascent area for clean energy
investment. Spending is growing but uncertainties, such as the future
of demand and lack of reliable off-takers, constrain the development
of large-scale supply projects.
There has also been some progress with new CCUS projects.
Around 20 commercial-scale CCUS projects in seven countries
reached final investment decision (FID) in 2023 and according to
company announcements, more than 110 capture facilities and
transport and storage infrastructure projects could reach FID in 2024.
The size of the critical mineral market in 2023 was USD 325 billion,
shrinking due to commodity price declines, especially for battery
materials (lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel, and manganese).
Diversifying supply by activating additional investment in different
geographies, as well as stepping up demand-side measures such as
recycling, are crucial to ensure well-balanced and resilient markets
as energy transitions propel demand.
Anticipated oil and gas investment in 2024 is broadly in line with the
level of investment required in 2030 in the Stated Policies Scenario,
a scenario which sees oil and natural gas demand levelling off before
2030. However, global spare oil production capacity is already close
to 6 million barrels per day (excluding Iran and Russia) and there is
a shift expected in the coming years towards a buyers’ market for
LNG. Against this backdrop, the risk of over-investment would be
strong if the world moves swiftly to meet the net zero pledges and
climate goals in the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) and the
NZE Scenario.
Coal investment in 2024 is set to be far higher than the 2030 level
seen in any IEA scenario. By contrast, despite the positive
momentum in developing low-emissions fuel projects, investment in
these technologies remains far below the levels projected for 2030 in
both the APS and the NZE Scenario.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 90
Fuel supply
Upstream oil and gas
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 91
Fuel supply
Upstream oil and gas investment increased globally by 9% in 2023 and looks set for a 7% rise in
2024, with most increases coming from Middle East and Asian NOCs
Upstream capital investment by selected oil and gas companies, 2015-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. Majors = bp, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, ENI, ExxonMobil, Shell, TotalEnergies. NOCs = national oil companies.
Sources: IEA analysis based on S&P, Bloomberg and Rystad and annual reports. Includes a sample of companies that are responsible for about 70% of global
production.
50
100
150
200
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Middle East and Asia NOCs
Other NOCs
Independents
Majors
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 92
Fuel supply
Investment in exploration and development rose in recent years pushed by cost inflation while
still remaining 30% below the peak in 2015 because of cost efficiency improvements
Upstream capital expenditure by activity and field type
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
Source: IEA analysis based on Rystad (2024).
50
100
150
200
250
300
Exploration in conventional
oil and gas fields
New conventional
oil and gas fields
Existing conventional
oil and gas fields
US tight oil and shale gas
Billion USD (2023, MER)
2015
2020
2024e
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 93
Fuel supply
Upstream cost inflation cooled in 2023 and costs may fall marginally in 2024 which means
recent investment trends translate into larger increases in activity
Upstream investment in real terms and rebased to 2021 cost levels
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. Investment rebased to 2021 cost levels adjusts investment in real terms by the IEA’s Upstream Capital Cost Index.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg Terminal, FRED, IEA, IMF, and Rystad data.
200
400
600
800
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Investment in real terms
Investment rebased to cost levels in 2021
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 94
Fuel supply
Upstream investment is realigning globally, with national oil companies taking the lead
Based on a review of the spending plans of companies representing
about 70% of global production, we estimate that upstream oil and
gas investment in 2024 will increase to around USD 570 billion, up
7% from 2023 levels, building on the 9% increase seen in 2023.
The period since 2015 has seen a major reorientation in upstream
investment, with greater cost discipline across company types along
with a major shift in the approach to spending. Between 2017 and
2024, investment by Middle East and Asian NOCs increased by more
than 50% while investment by private companies fell by close to 20%.
NOCs are set to provide over 40% of global upstream spending in
2024, compared with less than 25% in 2015, and NOCs in the Middle
East and Asia have been responsible for nearly all the increase in
investment in 2023 and 2024. This includes investment by
PetroChina to explore for conventional resources and develop tight
liquids and gas basins, Saudi Aramco’s push to meet its expanded
gas production target (even as it cuts back on plans to expand oil
production capacity), and new sour gas field developments in the
United Arab Emirates.
Capital investment in existing conventional oil and gas has accounted
for around 40% of total upstream oil and gas investment over the last
decade. A further one-third of overall investment has been devoted
to new field development and exploration, and most of the rest has
flowed to US tight oil and shale gas production.
From 2021 to 2023, nearly USD 130 billion was spent on
conventional oil and gas exploration. More than half of this
investment took place in China, North America, Norway, and Russia
– but the largest discoveries were seen in Guyana (in the Stabroek
block) and Namibia. Exploration investment is set to increase by a
further 15% in 2024, mainly because of increases in China and North
America.
Investment in US tight oil and shale gas peaked in 2018-2019, at
around USD 130 billion per year, and has since fallen back amid
significant cost cutting. Activity is set to remain broadly flat in 2024
but investment will fall marginally, given cost reductions and M&A
consolidation that should yield efficiency benefits.
The IEA’s Upstream Capital Cost Index (UICI) increased by 6% in
2022 because of tight markets for services and labour as well as
increased raw material costs. However, the UICI in 2022 was still
nearly 15% below 2014 levels due to efforts by operators to downsize
and simplify project designs to maintain competitiveness. Inflation
cooled in 2023 and costs could even fall marginally in 2024. The
increases in upstream investment in 2023 and 2024 thus translate
into a near 20% increase in upstream activity since 2022, a rate of
increase not seen since 2010-2012.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 95
Fuel supply
Dividend payments and stock repurchases exceeded capital expenditure again in 2023
Capital expenditure, dividends, and buybacks by the 30 largest upstream oil and gas companies, 2015-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg (2024) for the largest 30 upstream companies by revenue.
25%
50%
75%
100%
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Capital expenditure
Dividends
Stock repurchase
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 96
Fuel supply
Robust mergers and acquisitions activity focused on consolidating United States tight oil and
shale gas assets
Upstream merger and acquisition deals by announcement year Announced and completed deals by geography, 2023-Q1 2024
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Upstream deals include completed deals up to 2020 and completed and pending deals from 2021 to Q1 2024.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg and other market and company data.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 97
Fuel supply
High recent profits have been used mainly to benefit stockholders and to fund extensive
mergers and acquisitions
Oil and gas exploration and production companies generated
USD 2.4 trillion in net income in 2023, down USD 1.5 billion from
2022, but still well above the lows seen between 2015 and 2017 and
again in 2020. Based on a review of the 30 largest upstream oil and
gas companies, buybacks rose to historic highs in 2023, accounting
for 20% of cash flow from operations and payouts from dividends rose
to around 30%. For a second consecutive year, less than 50% of cash
flow was allocated to capital expenditures.
Many large M&A deals were completed and announced in 2023.
Three quarters of these involved US shale companies, reflecting the
trend towards consolidation of operational footprints in specific basins
while also looking to increase overall production levels.
Some of the largest deals in 2023 included Chevron’s purchase of
PDC, with a total enterprise value of USD 7.6 billion and Occidental’s
announced acquisition of CrownRock for USD 12 billion. Significant
deals were also announced that are likely to be completed in 2024.
These include: ExxonMobil’s USD 60 billion purchase of Pioneer; a
USD 26 billion merger between Diamondback and Endeavour (the
combined company will control close to 1 million acres in the Permian
Basin); a USD 7.4 billion merger between Chesapeake and
Southwestern, which will create the largest US gas producer; and
SLB’s acquisition of ChampionX, which will enhance its services to
the Permian basin. Chevron also announced its intention to acquire
Hess – which has significant assets in the US oil and tight shale
sectors, notably the Bakken basin – for USD 60 billion, but the deal
remains subject to several legal challenges related to some of Hess’s
non-US assets.
M&A activity beyond North America highlights a trend for oil majors
and NOCs to focus portfolios on specific geographies. ENI purchased
Neptune Energy’s assets in Europe, Indonesia, and North Africa –
locations where ENI already has a presence – for USD 2.6 billion,
while Var Energi acquired Neptune Norge for USD 2.3 billion.
TotalEnergies strengthened existing positions in Malaysia with a
stake in SapuraOMV Upstream for USD 1 billion while Shell sold its
Masela blocks in Indonesia to Pertamina and Petronas for
USD 650 million. In 2024, a number of majors also announced a goal
to scale down, or exit entirely, activities in Nigeria, partly driven by
the need to comply with sustainability goals.
The acquisitions announced or completed in 2023 were funded either
through cash, stock, reserve-based lending, or other investment
vehicles, with financing coming from a variety of banks, private
equity, and institutional lenders.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 98
Fuel supply
Clean energy investment by oil and gas companies grew to USD 28 billion in 2023 which is less
than 4% of overall capital spending and less than 1% of net income
Oil and gas industry investment in clean energy Share of clean energy investment in total investment and net income
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Includes project finance and M&A. CCUS = Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage. “Other” = EV infrastructure, geothermal, tidal, minerals and M&A of
companies with a portfolio of clean technologies.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg, Clean Energy Pipeline and companies’ annual reports and presentations.
5
10
15
20
25
30
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Solar PV
Wind
CCUS
Bioenergy
Energy storage
Low-emissions hydrogen
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Share of total
capital expenditure
Share of net income
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 99
Fuel supply
Nearly half of clean energy investment by the oil and gas industry in 2023 involved M&A of
clean energy companies, with a particular focus on CCUS
In 2023, oil and gas companies invested USD 28 billion into clean
energy, a 30% increase from 2022 levels. This was well below the
65% jump seen from 2021 to 2022, reflecting in part the inflationary
environment and supply chain issues for some renewable projects in
the wake of the energy crisis, as well as some recalibration of
company strategies.
Mergers and acquisitions completed in 2023 comprised just under
half of total clean energy investment by the oil and gas industry. The
largest transactions included: ExxonMobil’s acquisition of Denbury’s
CCUS network for USD 4.9 billion, which raises ExxonMobil’s CCUS
capacity to over 100 Mt CO2 across its refining, chemicals, and
enhanced oil recovery businesses; TotalEnergies’ USD 1.6 billion
takeover of Eren Re, a renewable energy company, and Occidental’s
USD 1.1 billion purchase of CarbonEngineering, a direct air capture
(DAC) business. The ExxonMobil and Occidental deals together
comprised the bulk of the industry’s USD 6 billion worth of
investments in CCUS in 2023.
Investment in solar PV and wind projects comprised more than 40%
of total clean energy spending by the oil and gas industry in 2023.
This includes more than USD 2.7 billion in investment by Equinor,
USD 2.2 billion by TotalEnergies and USD 1.8 billion by Repsol
(these three companies accounted for around 45% of total
investment in renewables by the oil and gas industry). Despite
announced cancellations and divestments in offshore wind projects,
investment remained substantial in 2023. Equinor invested nearly
USD 1.6 billion in offshore wind in 2023. Two other recent projects
– by bp in Korea and TotalEnergies in the United States – each
involve around USD 2.5 billion worth of investment.
Capital expenditure in electrolysers reached a new high of almost
USD 1 billion in 2023. Despite increasing policy support, the
investment environment for low-emissions hydrogen remains fragile,
mainly because of uncertainty about demand and the price that
consumers will be willing to pay for low-emissions hydrogen. Other
areas of increasing interest include EV charging infrastructure,
enhanced geothermal systems and lithium extraction from brine.
Clean energy investment by NOCs rose to more than USD 1.5 billion
in 2023, representing around 5% of total clean energy spending by
the oil and gas industry. Petronas, Sinopec, and Saudi Aramco led
the NOC investments, which were mostly focused on solar PV and
low-emissions hydrogen. Overall, the share of clean energy in total
capital investment rose only marginally from 2022 levels.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 100
Fuel supply
LNG and refining
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 101
Fuel supply
The new wave of LNG export projects will add 50% to supply capacity by 2030, mostly from the
United States and Qatar
Sanctioned LNG capacity
Investment and cumulative capacity
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024 data is up until Q1 2024. Sanctioned means projects that have received a final investment decision (FID). Qatar’s North Field West expansion is included
in the figure for 2024, although it has not yet received formal FID.
200
400
600
800
1 000
10
20
30
40
50
2015
2017
2019
2021
2023
2025
2027
bcm per year
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Middle East
Russia
Africa
North America
Australia
Others
Cumulative capacity (right axis)
20
40
60
80
100
2015
2017
2019
2021
2023
bcm per year
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 102
Fuel supply
Additional LNG capacity will come online at an uncertain time for demand with fewer committed
off-takers for these additional volumes
Global LNG trade expanded by 2% (or 12 bcm) in 2023. This is the
lowest growth rate since 2014, barring the exceptional contraction in
2020. Growth was driven primarily by the United States on the supply
side, which accounted for 90% of incremental global LNG volumes.
The Asia-Pacific region led LNG demand growth, accounting for
virtually all incremental imports.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine tightened global LNG markets,
around 140 bcm per year of new capacity has been announced,
representing some USD 80 billion of cumulative investment. Despite
the cyclical nature of the oil and gas industry investment, total LNG
trade was one of the few parts of the oil and gas sector to see
consistent growth through the Covid-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine and multiple other geopolitical headwinds.
Around two-thirds of the new capacity announced since early 2022
has been in the United States. The federal decision made in early
2024 to pause approvals of new LNG projects does not affect the
existing ones but raises uncertainty for the 350 bcm worth of
developments that are seeking to raise financing and secure a final
investment decision.
In February 2024, Qatar announced that it would develop the North
Field West project, adding a further 20 bcm of new LNG capacity. The
total announced and under-construction projects would see Qatar’s
LNG export capacity nearly double to almost 200 bcm/year. With
low-cost reserves, established infrastructure and well-developed
relationships with contractors and buyers, Qatar can expand its
capacity without needing to attract project financing or secure long-
term offtake contracts. Qatar is also looking to invest in CCUS to
improve the environmental footprint of its LNG exports.
LNG markets look amply supplied in the second half of the decade,
with the potential to soften global markets and attract price-sensitive
buyers. Nearly 250 bcm will come online between 2024 and 2030,
with about one-third from Qatar and close to one-half from the United
States.
Unlike previous waves of LNG supply, there are fewer committed end
use off-takers for these additional volumes. Of the new capacity
coming online, 70 bcm is to be delivered to fixed destination
terminals. Another 100 bcm has been contracted to portfolio players
who sold the volume to end consumers using a mix of short, medium
and long-term contracts. The remaining 80 bcm of new capacity does
not yet have firm off-takers and would therefore currently be sold on
the spot market. If future demand for LNG does not materialise, or if
regional price benchmarks fall to low levels, the sellers of these
uncontracted volumes would be the most exposed.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 103
Fuel supply
Investment in refining held steady around USD 37 billion in 2023, but is set to fall in 2024
Investment in oil refineries (greenfield and upgrades) by region and net refining capacity additions
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Investment figures do not include maintenance capital expenditure. 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
- 1.0
- 0.5
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
- 20
- 10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
North America
Central and South
America
Africa
Europe/Eurasia
Other Asia Pacific
Southeast Asia
China and India
Middle East
Net capacity addition
(right axis)
Billion USD (2023, MER)
mb/d
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 104
Fuel supply
Around 0.8 mb/d of new refining capacity is set to come online in 2024, but uncertainties
around future demand growth weigh on new investment decisions
In 2023, investment in oil refineries (excluding maintenance
spending) was just under USD 37 billion, similar to 2022. China saw
the largest share of investment globally, followed by Africa, mainly
related to spending in Nigeria’s Dangote refinery. The industry
witnessed the addition of 1.3 mb/d of net capacity in 2023, and
refinery runs increased to 82.3 mb/d in 2023. Heightened activity in
China largely drives the 1.5 mb/d increase from 2022 levels.
A further 0.8 mb/d of new refinery capacity is set to be added in 2024,
but investment is expected to decline globally by 5%. China and India
will likely account for almost half of the expected spending. Between
2020 and 2022, an average of around 1.3 mb/d of capacity was shut
down annually, but the pace of capacity closures is slowing: an
estimated 300 kb/d is expected to be taken offline in both 2023 and
2024. Global refinery runs are expected to rise by 1 mb/d in 2024, a
slower pace compared to 2023, due to lower runs in Russia,
unplanned outages in Europe and decelerating growth in China.
The sanctions and embargoes on Russian oil trade flows had limited
effect on Russian oil export volumes, but their impact on export
revenue was notable. The redirection of trade routes maintained
Russian export volumes at 7.4 mb/d in 2023. However, this resulted
in a 25% reduction in oil export revenue to USD 14.6 billion in 2023.
Following record margins and profits in 2022, refining margins began
to trend downward in 2023 even though strong middle distillate
cracks have kept margins well above historical averages. Despite the
healthy margin environment, a new wave of investment in refining
capacity is unlikely. Building new refineries entails significant capital
commitment and long lead times (typically 5-10 years), and
uncertainties surrounding long-term demand prospects present
challenges for investment decisions. Unless the region experiences
strong anticipated demand growth or expected operating costs are
highly competitive, justifying investment decisions for large-scale
greenfield refineries will be challenging. Future investment is
therefore likely to be further concentrated in a few regions such as
China, India, and the Middle East.
Amid a multitude of challenges, an increasing number of refiners are
opting to rationalise capacity or shift to low-carbon feedstock
processing. Following recent decisions by Petroineos and Shell to
close capacity in 2025, bp recently announced a restructuring of
operations, with crude processing at the 257 kb/d Gelsenkirchen site
in Germany being reduced by around 80 kb/d in 2025.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 105
Fuel supply
Methane
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 106
Fuel supply
Existing policies, plans and pledges to cut methane emissions would reduce emissions by
around 50% by 2030 and will require more than USD 80 billion in capital investment
Capital investment to 2030 to cut methane emissions from fossil fuel operations in line with the NZE Scenario
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: GMP = Global Methane Pledge. OGDC = Oil and Gas Decarbonisation Charter. There is overlap between several of the plans and pledges shown: those with
more detail provided are given preference in the reductions shown. Other policies, plans and pledges include those of Algeria, Australia, China, Colombia, Côte
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Qatar, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Policies and plans
Pledges
Additional measures required
Billion USD (2023, MER)
China
United States
OGDC
GMP
Russia
Iran
Other
Other
EU
Other
Canada
Nigeria
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 107
Fuel supply
Investment in methane abatement is increasing, but a step change is needed in both spending
levels and emissions transparency
Methane emissions from the energy sector remained near a record
high in 2023. However, with several major policies and regulations
recently announced – and with 157 countries joining the Global
Methane Pledge – the world could soon reach a turning point in
efforts to reduce methane emissions. If all existing pledges on
methane were to be achieved in full and on time, methane emissions
from fossil fuels will decrease 50% by 2030. In many cases, however,
pledges still need detailed plans.
Methane abatement in the oil and gas industry is one of the lowest
cost options to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions anywhere
in the economy. Achieving current pledges and plans will require
around USD 80 billion of investment to 2030. Investment levels that
are needed to cut emissions by 75% by 2030 – the reduction
assumed in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE) Scenario –
would
require
an
additional
USD
90
billion.
The
total
(USD 170 billion) includes USD 135 billion in capital investment and
USD 35 billion in operating costs.
This total amount of spending required to 2030 is less than 5% of the
income the industry generated in 2023. Fossil fuel companies carry
primary responsibility for financing methane abatement at their
operations and currently there is very limited public reporting on the
amounts companies spend on reducing methane emissions.
Additional transparency is needed to track progress and the efforts
companies are making. Regulations and policies could also help.
Some spending on methane abatement will require special attention,
especially to reduce emissions in low- and middle-income countries
and for measures that do not generate meaningful return over their
lifetimes. Several efforts are underway to increase financing and
investment for methane abatement. These include international
emissions pricing schemes and regional emissions trading markets,
as well as direct public funding, emissions standards for market
access and price premiums for low-emissions fuels.
In terms of publicly announced funding for methane abatement, the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act in the
United States will provide USD 4.7 billion to plug old oil and gas wells
and USD 1 billion in financial and technical assistance to cut
methane emissions. The World Bank’s more than USD 255 million
Global Methane and Flaring Reduction Fund aims to help cut
emissions in developing economies. Additional programs are also
emerging: the Climate Bonds Initiative, for example, is developing
guidance to incentivise capital markets to finance methane emissions
abatement.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 108
Fuel supply
Coal
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 109
Fuel supply
Global coal investment is set to grow by 2% in 2024 to more than USD 160 billion, close to the
average level seen in the early 2010s, led by increases in India, Indonesia and Australia
Global investment in coal supply by region, 2010-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. EMDE = Emerging market and developing economies.
40
80
120
160
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Shipping
Advanced economies
Australia and New Zealand
Other advanced economies
EMDE
Indonesia
Russia
India
China
Other EMDE
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 110
Fuel supply
Coal investment teeters between strong short-term demand and longer-term uncertainty
In 2023, coal demand growth in several countries, most notably
China, India, and Southeast Asia, led to a 6% increase in investment
in coal supply. A further 2% global increase is likely in 2024.
Coal companies saw income surge in 2021 and 2022, which
increased their capacity and appetite for investment in new supply
and ushered in a heightened period of merger and acquisition activity.
China is by far the largest coal producer and consumer globally, and
it is also the main market for coal exports. Coal shortages in 2021,
combined with very high prices in 2022, increased the focus on
energy security and investment in domestic coal supply. Annual coal
investment increased by nearly 10% on average between 2018 and
2023. This resulted in increased production which, combined with a
high level of imports, led to a surge in coal stocks.
In 2024, the combination of high stocks, lower coal prices and an
expected slowdown in economic activity is likely to reduce Chinese
coal demand growth. We estimate that annual investment in coal
supply will increase by around 1% in 2024 to roughly USD 100 billion
(more than 60% of the global total). The use of coal in the power
sector in China is coming under pressure from competition with
renewables. Coal demand in aggregate is set to enter terminal
decline, limiting the need for any future increases in coal investment
in the country.
India is the world’s second-largest coal producer and consumer. The
government has announced plans to increase domestic production to
meet rising demand and investment has been growing steadily since
2021. Investment increased by 5% in 2023 and is set to expand by
nearly 10% in 2024 to around USD 15 billion. The Ministry of Coal is
relying on a series of measures to boost coal supply, including
commercial auctions with a revenue share mechanism, allowances
for the sale of additional coal production and rolling auctions.
Nonetheless, based on current trends, demand is set to rise faster
than supply, which means India could soon overtake China to
become the world’s largest coal importer.
Elsewhere, Australia and Indonesia are the two largest coal exporters
globally and investment in these two countries is set to expand by
around 5% in 2024 (following a 12% increase in 2023). Poland has
seen an increase in coal investment in recent years as the European
Union weaned itself from Russian imports. This increase is likely to
be short-lived given the European Union’s climate targets and the
increasing share of renewables in new capacity additions. The United
States and other advanced economies are likely to see a continued
downward trend in investment.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 111
Fuel supply
Bioenergy
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 112
Fuel supply
Investment in bioenergy grew in 2023 and with a further rise in 2024, activity encompasses both
liquid and, increasingly, gaseous fuels
Average annual investment in biogases and transport biofuels
Cumulative investment by region, 2010-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Biomethane investment includes the cost of producing biogas as an interim step before upgrading to biomethane. 2024e = estimated values for 2024
Source: IEA analysis based on S&P Global (2023).
5
10
15
2010-14 2015-21
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Biogasoline
Biodiesel
Bio jet kerosene
Biogas
Biomethane
5
10
15
20
25
United States
China
Brazil
Europe
Rest of World
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 113
Fuel supply
Supported by commercial prospects for sustainable aviation fuels, liquid biofuels could see a
wave of new investments in the coming years
Transport biofuel capacity additions in 2023 reached a decade-high
of 270 kb/d, a 6% increase from 2022 that translates into an 8%
increase in investment. The growth stems mainly from the expansion
of renewable diesel refining capacity in the United States, increases
in bio-ethanol capacity in Brazil and growth (from a low base) in bio-
jet kerosene in China, Brazil, and Europe.
A number of traditional biofuel projects have been announced in
recent years, including a doubling of capacity at OCI Global’s green
methanol facility in Texas (which will have a capacity of around
4 kb/d). However, most biofuels investment increases are set to
come from new capacity for so-called “drop-in fuels” (substitutes for
petroleum products that are not subject to any blending limits). For
example, in Spain, Cepsa and Bio-Oils have begun construction of a
USD 1.3 billion sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) and renewable diesel
plant, with a capacity around 10 kb/d. Brazil’s Acelen will invest
USD 2.4 billion in a 20 kb/d green diesel plant which will come online
in 2026. In China, American Honeywell, which teamed up in 2022
with Oriental Energy to build a 20 kb/d SAF plant, announced that its
refining technologies will also be used by Sichuan Jinshang
Environmental Protection Technology Co. in a new 6 kb/d SAF plant.
Major energy companies are also looking to invest in the expansion
of biofuels. For example, Repsol announced plans to diversify into
biofuels by retrofitting existing fossil diesel facilities and securing
feedstock supply through new partnerships. TotalEnergies and
Sinopec have formed an agreement to produce 5 kb/d of SAF in
China. Engie announced the acquisition of Ixora Energy for
USD 81 million and plans to spend about USD 3.2 billion to boost
biomethane production in Europe. Neste is acquiring the cooking oil
collection and aggregation business of Crimson Renewable.
Goldman Sachs established Verdalia Bioenergy, with the view to
invest USD 1.1 billion in the European biomethane sector.
The European Union, United States and India have adopted or
extended policies supporting bioenergy. In March 2023, the
European Union reached a provisional agreement that strengthens
the sustainability criteria for the use of biomass for energy in the
Renewable Energy Directive (RED III). A mandate to accelerate
bioethanol in India has already allocated about USD 113 million from
2019 to 2024 to six commercial projects. Other governments have
announced bioenergy support such as a USD 21 million grant from
the UK Department for Transport’s Advanced Fuels Fund for a new
waste-to-fuels project, and USD 6 million from Canada’s Clean Fuels
Fund to help Azure Sustainable Fuels develop the front-end
engineering and design for SAF production in Manitoba, with first
production planned for 2027.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 114
Fuel supply
Hydrogen
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 115
Fuel supply
Investment in hydrogen electrolysers is expected to jump by more than 140% in 2024
Investment in hydrogen electrolysers and other supply by region (left) and intended use (right)
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated value for 2024. Other intended uses include biofuels upgrading, grid injection, combined heat and power and domestic heating.
Source: IEA analysis based on the IEA Hydrogen Production Projects Database and recent announcements.
2
4
6
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
United States
China
Europe
Latin America
Other
2
4
6
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Industry or refining
Mobility
Electricity storage
H₂-based fuels or trade
Other
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 116
Fuel supply
Investment in electrolysers is driven by higher deployment but also by higher financing costs
Investment in electrolysers is set to increase by close to 140% in
2024 to USD 5 billion. This is mainly because of new capacity
additions as well as cost inflation in the sector and resulting increases
in equipment prices and financing costs. Most of the electrolyser
capacity coming online in the next few years aims to replace existing
uses of hydrogen (refining and the chemical industry). These
investments are generally perceived as lower risk than generating
new potential sources of demand (e.g. mobility and conversion into
low-emissions hydrogen-based fuels).
China is set to see a 140% increase in investment in electrolysers in
2024, accounting for 40% of global investment. A low-emissions
hydrogen and ammonia production plant costing USD 900 million is
expected to begin operations in 2024, producing around 32 kt of low-
emissions hydrogen annually. By 2026, more than 20 projects above
100 MW, with combined capacities around 6.9 GW, could be
operational in China.
Europe is expected to see a 120% increase in investment in 2024,
accounting for less than one-third of global investment in
electrolysers. Major projects include USD 270 million for a 100 MW
electrolyser project being developed by GALP in the port of Sines,
Portugal (capable of producing around 15 kt hydrogen per year) and
just over USD 7 billion (USD 4.5 billion of debt, USD 2.3 billion of
equity and USD 300 million of grants) for the construction of a low-
emissions steel plant in Sweden by H2 Green Steel. A number of
projects have suffered from cost inflation and overruns: the Bad
Lauchstädt Energy Park project in Germany, for example, which
includes hydrogen production, storage and transport, has seen costs
rise to USD 230 million when it received FID in 2023, an increase of
50% over initial estimates.
The United States, accounting for about 15% of global investment in
hydrogen today, is expected to see a 120% rise in 2024, incentivised
by programs such as the 10-year Clean Hydrogen Production Tax
Credit which provides up to USD 3 per kilogram of low-emissions
hydrogen. A number of large-scale projects are under development,
including a USD 550 million liquid hydrogen production plant in
Arizona under development by Fortescue that will be able to produce
11 kt of hydrogen per year from 2026.
Internationally, Fortescue is also set to spend USD 150 million on an
electrolyser in Australia, scheduled to be commissioned in two
phases, one in 2025 and the second in 2028. In Saudi Arabia, the
world’s largest low-emissions hydrogen plant is under development
by NEOM Green Hydrogen – a USD 8.4 billion project due to start
production in 2026. In Oman, ACME Group is poised to invest
USD 480 million in a low-emissions hydrogen project, due to come
online in 2025.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 117
Fuel supply
CCUS
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 118
Fuel supply
Successfully executing announced CO2 capture, utilisation and storage projects would boost
investment by a factor of 10 by 2025
CCUS investment pipeline by type (left) and region (right) based on announced projects
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Includes commercial capture facilities with a capacity of over 0.1 Mt CO2 per year. Projected spending represents the capital costs of projects with announced
capacities based on their planned FID and operational dates. Spending is estimated where project-level cost data are unavailable. “Other” includes Africa, South and
Central America and the Middle East.
Source: IEA analysis based on IEA CCUS projects database.
10
20
30
40
2015
2018
2021
2024e
2027e
2030e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Oil and gas supply
Biofuels
Power generation
Hydrogen production
Industry and refining
CO₂ infrastructure
Direct air capture
10
20
30
40
2015
2018
2021
2024e
2027e
2030e
North America
Europe
China
Other Asia Pacific
Middle East
Other
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 119
Fuel supply
New policy momentum is supporting investment in CCUS worldwide, from direct capture
projects to transport and permanent storage, but risks remain
Around 20 commercial-scale carbon capture, utilisation and storage
(CCUS) projects in seven countries reached FID in 2023. More than
110 capture facilities, as well as transport and storage projects, could
reach FID in 2024. If all projects are developed on time, there will be
a near-tenfold increase in CCUS investment by 2025 (to
USD 26 billion). Global CO2 capture capacity would increase to
430 Mt CO2/year by 2030, and global CO2 storage capacity would
reach 620 Mt CO2/year. However, it remains an open question
whether all of these projects will materialise.
Governments sought to significantly accelerate the deployment of
CCUS in 2023, including initiatives such as the Carbon Management
Challenge. Nearly USD 20 billion in public funding was allocated to
CCUS projects in 2023 including: USD 1.7 billion announced by the
United States as part of a Funding Opportunity for carbon capture
demonstration projects; USD 1.2 billion announced by Denmark
under its CCUS Fund; and more than USD 500 million to four CCUS
projects under the European Union's Connecting Europe Facility.
Risks include delays which may occur between the announcement,
the securing of proposal funding and project mobilisation.
Oil and gas companies continue to develop new CCUS projects. For
example, ADNOC took FID on a 1.5 Mt CO2/year project in
September 2023 to build one of the largest integrated CCUS projects
in the Middle East. Several CCUS M&A deals involving oil and gas
companies were also announced in 2023 and 2024.
Many direct air capture (DAC) projects are advancing, and
investment is set to rise to USD 660 million in 2024 (a 140% increase
from 2023). The 36 kt CO2/year Mammoth DAC plant in Iceland
started operation in May 2024, and the Stratos project in Texas –
which will cost USD 1.3 billion and be the world's largest DAC facility
with a capacity of 500 kt CO2/year – aims for a mid-2025 start.
Expansion plans have also been announced by 1PointFive and
Carbon Engineering (now Occidental), with a target operation year of
2035, although locations and the fate of the captured CO2 (storage or
use) have not yet been finalised.
Investment in CO2 transport and storage infrastructure is set to
increase to USD 1.4 billion in 2024 (a tenfold increase from 2023) as
new business models are developing to create CCUS hubs that more
efficiently transport and store gases. Three FIDs taken in 2023
include the Porthos project to carry gas to depleted petroleum
reservoirs
in
the
North
Sea
(USD 1.4 billion,
handling
2.5 Mt CO2/year). The extension of the Alberta Carbon Trunk Line by
Wolf Midstream Canada will allow 7 Mt CO2/year to be permanently
stored. A CO2 transport and storage hub in Louisiana by
CapturePoint Solutions is set to store more than 10 Mt CO2/year.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 120
Fuel supply
Critical minerals
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 121
Fuel supply
Prices for minerals and metals mostly fell across the board in 2023, with particularly sharp
drops in metals required for batteries
Change in selected commodity prices in 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: REE = rare earth elements. Dy-Tb = dysprosium and terbium. Nd-Pr = neodymium and praseodymium.
Source: IEA analysis based on Bloomberg and S&P Global.
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
Uranium
Iron ore
Copper
Aluminium
Lead
Zinc
Silver
Platinum
REE (Dy-Tb)
REE (Nd-Pr)
Manganese
Cobalt
Nickel
Graphite
Lithium
Bulk materials
Precious metals
Battery metals
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 122
Fuel supply
Investment in critical mineral mining grew by 10% in 2023, a smaller increase than in 2022 as
price declines weighed on the financial capacity of producers
Capital expenditure on non-ferrous metal production by major mining companies, 2015-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Co = cobalt. Cu = copper. Ni = nickel. For diversified majors, capex on the production of iron ore, gold, coal and other energy products was excluded. Nominal
values. The results for arcadium start from 2016.
Source: IEA analysis based on company annual reports and S&P Global.
10
20
30
40
50
60
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023 MER)
Arcadium
IGO
Tianqi Lithium
Pilbara Minerals
Mineral Resources
Ganfeng Lithium
SQM
Albemarle
Zijin Mining
Eramet
South 32
Zhejiang Huayou
CMOC Group
Norilsk Nickel
KGHM
First Quantum Minerals
Southern Copper
Codelco
Glencore
Teck Resources
Freeport-McMoRan
Vale
Anglo American
BHP
Rio Tinto
Lithium
specialists
Focused players
(Cu, Ni, Co)
Diversified
majors
30%
10%
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 123
Fuel supply
Recent critical mineral price declines challenge the diversity and reliability of future supply
Following a price surge that began in 2021, 2023 saw a significant
decline in prices for most critical minerals and metals. Prices for
battery minerals fell especially sharply, with lithium prices plunging
75%. Inventory overhang in the downstream sector (such as battery
cells and cathodes), weaker-than-expected demand growth and an
increase in overall supply all contributed to the decline. Uranium was
a notable exception and saw a sharp price increase in 2023 due to
renewed momentum for nuclear power and a lack of new supplies.
In early 2024, copper prices increased because mining outputs were
lower than expected with the closure of the Cobre Panama mine and
a reduction in production guidance by Anglo American, which shifted
the market balance to a slight deficit. Nonetheless, battery mineral
prices remain subdued, prompting some high-cost producers to
curtail output and place facilities on care and maintenance. Industry
revenue fell by 10% in 2023 and operating profit fell by 34%, which
had a major impact on capital investment plans.
Our assessment of 25 large mining companies suggests that
investment in critical minerals grew by 30% in 2022 and by 10% in
2023 (6% when adjusted for cost inflation). Exploration investment
grew by 15% in 2023, with Canada and Australia registering the
largest increases, followed closely by Africa. Lithium saw much larger
gains with a 50% increase in investment, and an 80% jump in
exploration spending.
Despite demand growth, the size of the market for critical minerals
contracted by 10% to USD 325 billion in 2023. This figure would have
been 20% higher if prices had remained at 2022 levels. While current
supplies of most materials appear sufficient, the risks of market
tightness and price volatility are constant as countries continue to
pursue their energy and climate goals. Escalating geopolitical
tensions, exemplified by trade restrictions on a number of elements
in 2023 – including gallium, germanium, graphite, and rare earths –
further compound these risks. Lower prices have contributed to cost
reductions for many clean energy technologies, but they risk slowing
efforts to diversify supply chains.
The geographic concentration of production has remained largely
unchanged in recent years. One exception is nickel, where supplies
have become more concentrated: between 2021 and 2023,
Indonesia's share of mined nickel production increased from 34% to
52% and its share of refined nickel increased from 23% to 37%.
The current investment landscape could lead to further supply
concentration for several critical minerals, especially in the
processing and refining segments. Efforts to enhance the diversity
and reliability of critical mineral supplies therefore remain vital.
Mobilising investment in diversified projects, boosting innovation and
recycling and promoting environmental and social considerations in
policy and investment decisions must therefore remain priorities.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 124
Fuel supply
Implications
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 125
Fuel supply
Oil and gas investment aligns with 2030 STEPS levels, but coal spending is twice as high as
clean fuel investment is rising from a very low base
Global investment in fuels and CCUS historically and in 2030 in the STEPS, APS and NZE Scenarios
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: STEPS = Stated Policies Scenario. APS = Announced Pledges Scenario. NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.
200
400
600
800
1000
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Coal
Billion USD (2023, MER)
30
60
90
120
150
2023
Bioenergy
2021
2022
2023
Low-
emissions
H₂ and
CCUS
2021
2022
2023
2024e
2030
NZE
APS
STEPS
Oil and
natural gas
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 126
Fuel supply
Risks of over-investment in traditional elements and under-investment in low-emissions
alternatives
With the anticipated rise in 2024, overall investment in oil and gas
supply is at the level projected in 2030 in STEPS, a scenario which
shows coal, oil and natural gas demand levelling off or declining
before 2030. The increase in 2024 investment is driven by national
oil companies in the Middle East and Asia, although this does not
necessarily coincide with expected growth in output. In the case of
oil, increased near-term production is concentrated in the United
States, Guyana, Canada, and Brazil.
Even though oil and gas investment is broadly aligned with the
direction of travel in energy markets, as represented by the STEPS,
this trajectory is associated with some significant commercial and
environmental risks. Global spare oil production capacity is already
close to 6 million barrels per day (excluding Iran and Russia) and
there is a shift expected in the coming years towards a buyers’ market
for LNG. Against this backdrop, the risk of over-investment would be
strong if the world moves swiftly to meet the net zero pledges and
climate goals in the Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) and the
NZE Scenario. Oil and gas investment in 2024 is set to be around
35% more than the level required in 2030 if governments achieved
their climate targets in full and on time (as in the APS), and more than
double the 2030 level needed if consumption falls in line with a 1.5 °C
target (the NZE Scenario). Differences in coal industry are even more
stark: investment in 2024 is more than double the 2030 level in the
STEPS, almost four times more than in the APS, and five times more
than in the NZE Scenario.
In the APS, the trajectory for oil and gas consumption is curbed by
rapid growth in renewables, efficiency, and other clean energy
sources. There is no need in this scenario for further oil and gas
exploration, as already-discovered fields are sufficient to cover
projected demand. Investment is needed in some new oil and gas
projects, in maintaining production at existing fields and in safely
decommissioning or repurposing existing operations. In the NZE
Scenario, rapidly falling demand means that there is no need for long
lead time conventional oil and gas projects. In both scenarios,
investment in cutting greenhouse gas emissions from operations –
most notably in reducing methane emissions – is essential.
The oil and gas industry generated very large profits in 2022 and
2023. The focus on companies has mainly been to return profits to
shareholders through share buybacks and dividends. The oil and gas
industry is well placed to scale up many crucial technologies for net
zero transitions, especially those with strong overlap with existing
strengths such as offshore wind, low-emissions hydrogen, bioenergy
and CCUS. To date, only a few companies have markedly increased
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 127
Fuel supply
their spending in these areas, and less than 4% of the industry’s total
capital investment was invested into clean energy in 2023.
Scaling up clean energy investment rapidly is essential to mitigate
future price risks while reducing emissions. Investment in hydrogen
and CCUS has been growing rapidly in recent years, but from a very
low base. Investment in bioenergy has risen modestly in recent
years, but remains far below the levels needed by 2030 in the
STEPS. To get on track with the APS and NZE Scenario, clarity over
policy frameworks and incentives will be essential across all clean
fuels and technologies to bring forward announced and new projects.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 128
Energy end use and efficiency
Energy end use and
efficiency
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 129
Energy end use and efficiency
Overview / Investment
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 130
Energy end use and efficiency
Supported by strong EV sales, investment on global energy efficiency and electrification
remained resilient in 2023, despite strong headwinds for the building and industry sectors
Global investment in energy efficiency, electrification and renewables for end uses by sector 2017-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: An energy efficiency investment is defined as the incremental spending on new energy-efficient equipment or the full cost of refurbishments that reduce energy
use. The intention is to capture spending that leads to reduced energy consumption.
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Buildings
Transport
Industry
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 131
Energy end use and efficiency
Indicators affecting investment in energy efficiency
Trends in sectoral indicators for three major economies that are relevant to key sectors for energy efficiency, 2018-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Industry-value added for the United States is based on 2023 Q3 updates. The EU construction indicator is useful floor area for which building permits are
issued (both residential and non-residential). The US construction indicator is new privately owned housing units authorised by building permits in permit-issuing
places. The China construction indicator is newly started residential construction by floor meters, total construction area of houses constructed by real estate
developers.
Source: IEA calculations based on Eurostat (2024); BEA (2024); NBS (2024).
25
50
75
100
125
150
2018
2023
Index (2018 =100)
European Union
GDP
Vehicle sales
Industrial value-added
Construction activity
2018
2023
United States
2018
2023
China
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 132
Energy end use and efficiency
End-use investments in 2023 show a mixed picture, with high inflation and interest rates
affecting governments’ ability to offer support
The year 2023 has been a challenging for investments in the energy
efficiency and electrification of energy end-use sectors (Buildings,
Transport, and Industry). Investment plateaued in 2023 at
USD 646 billion: The buildings sector experienced one of its sharpest
year-on-year declines (-5%), and industry investment fell by 8%, but
this was partially offset by a 6% increase for transport, thanks to rapid
growth in EV sales. The United States, Europe, and China account
for about 75% of global end-use investment.
This slowdown comes at a time when the case for the affordability of
both energy efficiency technologies and financing have been affected
by the macroeconomic environment. Inflation not only made energy
and technologies more expensive to buy, but high interest rates also
meant that obtaining financing at reasonable terms became more
difficult and more costly – especially as the housing market has been
slow to cool down and disposable income has shrunk.
High interest rates are also eroding governments’ fiscal room and
their ability to provide incentives for energy efficiency and
electrification measures. In recent months, several countries have
announced plans to reduce – or scrap in some cases – incentives
provided for EVs, heat pump purchases or building renovations.
Despite lower gas prices, the level of industrial activity has also been
slower to recover from the combined effects of the global energy and
economic crises.
The question for the investment outlook in 2024 and beyond, is
therefore whether spending can continue to be resilient in the face of
waning government support as well as growing pressures on
household budgets and company balance sheets.
In the transport sector, the recent drop in battery costs and the
ongoing price wars between EV manufacturers (aimed at seizing
market share) seem to provide hope for continued growth – albeit at
a slower pace than before. In some large EMDE, EV sales are poised
to take off, notably with the arrival of Chinese manufacturers in Latin
America and the development of an EV industry in India. The effect
of measures aimed at onshoring manufacturing capacity (e.g. the
Inflation Reduction Act in the United States and the Carbon Border
Adjustment Mechanism in Europe) should also increase spending on
EV production outside China.
The outlook for investment in the building sector is very uncertain. On
the one hand, the construction industry has been more resilient than
anticipated, especially in China, with a focus on completing projects.
But in advanced economies, uncertainty over the continued
availability of public incentive packages dampens optimism about
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 133
Energy end use and efficiency
prospects for the next few years. In EMDE, weak building codes and
poor enforcement continue to be a drag on investment.
Despite easing inflationary pressures and lower gas prices, the level
of investment in energy efficiency in industry in 2024 remains
dependant on the level of growth in industrial activity in Europe and
China, for which the outlook remains quite uncertain.
For 2024, we project that aggregate spending in end-use sectors will
be largely unchanged from the previous year. A continued, though
slower, decline in building investment should be mostly offset by a
recovery in the industrial sector and continued growth in transport.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 134
Energy end use and efficiency
Buildings
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 135
Energy end use and efficiency
Energy efficiency spending on buildings slowed in 2023 …
Investment spending on energy efficiency and electrification by region in the buildings sector, 2016-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Spending on electrification (e.g. heat pumps) is included in the total spending and represented as a share of total spending on the right axis.
2024e = estimated values for 2024.
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
United States
China
Europe
Rest of world
Share of electrification spending (right axis)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 136
Energy end use and efficiency
… while inflation, higher interest rates and a constrained fiscal space continue to challenge the
outlook for 2024
In 2023, energy efficiency investments in the building sector stood at
around USD 280 billion – a 7% drop from the 2022 peak – thanks to
higher interest rates and the winding down of several large European
government incentive programmes. This decline is projected to
extend into 2024 due to continued pressures around construction
financing costs and further phase-outs of government led support
initiatives. From 2019 to 2022, stimulus spending and large structural
government programmes in Europe, including public efficiency
investment schemes in Germany and Italy, had supported average
annual investment growth of 15%. But 2023 marked a turning point,
where borrowing and construction cost pressures around the world
slowed the delivery of finished buildings.
Several large economies saw a reduction in the construction of
buildings in 2023. Construction in Brazil fell by around 2% from a year
earlier, while China experienced a drop of 16%, significantly
impacting global growth in construction spending and delivery of
green buildings. Most of Europe has seen a drop in construction
values, which translates into fewer efficient buildings being
constructed. In 2023, the United Kingdom saw a 12% drop in housing
deliveries, while they fell by 6% in France. Germany issued 27%
fewer building permits in 2023 compared to the previous year.
Europe presented a mixed picture of energy efficient investment in
2023. Following a ruling in November 2023 by Germany’s highest
court that a EUR 6 billion climate budget was unconstitutional, the
KfW development bank and BAFA export credit agency began to
curtail support programmes such as the “Bundesförderung für
Effiziente Gebäude” (Federal Funding Scheme for Efficient
Buildings), which reducing funding by 34% in 2023. Together with
cutbacks to other incentive schemes, Germany’s investments in
energy efficient buildings dropped by 27% compared to 2022.
The United Kingdom saw an increase in energy efficiency investment
through the Energy Company Obligation, spending GPB 1.48 billion
in 2023, a more than threefold increase from 2022. The Public Sector
Decarbonisation Scheme reached around GBP 1.3 billion in 2023
with a focus on improving heating systems, and a further commitment
to invest GBP 1.17 billion from 2024 onward.
In Italy, incentives in the building sector have led to more than
EUR 80 billion of investments in 2023 – of which more than half, or
EUR 44.4 billion was linked to the country’s so-called Superbonus
programme for homeowners. Since taking effect in July 2020, the
Superbonus scheme – which reimbursed 110% of the cost of energy
saving renovations – has led to EUR 102.7 billion in efficiency
improvements. As of January 2024, however, the Superbonus is only
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Energy end use and efficiency
available for condominiums and the maximum tax credit has been cut
to 70% for 2024 and will drop to 65% in 2025. A slowdown in
investments is therefore anticipated. Italy’s association of private
construction contractors foresees that such changes will trigger a
27% drop in home renovation investments and a 4.7% decline in
spending on new construction in 2024. The first two months of 2024
saw investment growth slowing to % from 4.8% a year earlier.
The EU has further strengthened the Energy Efficiency Directive
(EED), setting a target of 4% improvement in energy efficiency per
year and an 11.7% annual reduction in energy consumption by 2030.
The EED is complemented by a strengthened Energy Performance
of Buildings Directive (EPBD), which aims to boost the energy
performance of buildings and requires new buildings to be solar-
ready. The EPBD aims to reduce the primary energy use of
residential buildings by 16% by 2030 and by 20% to 22% by 2035.
The United States has continued to support investment in improving
the energy efficiency of buildings through the Inflation Reduction Act
of 2022. The Department of Energy is investing around
USD 705 million on building energy efficiency and weatherization
through the State and Community Energy Program. Similarly, the
Rural Energy for America Program (REAP) will focus on investments
in rural communities through grants and guaranteed loans to rural
communities and small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) for
renewable energy and energy efficiency improvements.
In February 2023, the African Development Bank introduced the
Africa Super ESCO Acceleration Programme, which provides
USD 5 million to support the establishment of public Super Energy
Service Companies (Super ESCOs) in Rwanda, Senegal and South
Africa. Standards that further promote energy efficient buildings
across the African continent, such as the EDGE certification scheme
from the International Finance Corporation, are also growing.
Alongside improvements to the National Construction Code, Australia
recently launched several programmes to support building energy
efficiency. The government established the Household Energy
Upgrades Fund, which includes AUD 1 billion for the Clean Energy
Finance Corporation to partner with lenders to offer low-cost finance
for home energy upgrades, and AUD 300 million dedicated to social
housing. The Small Business Energy Incentive supports SMEs with
a 20% tax deduction for eligible upgrades, such as electric heating
and cooling systems and efficient appliances.
Despite these initiatives, we estimate that global investments will fall
by a further 3.5% in 2024 to USD 270 billion. Governments need to
recommit to the doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvement
through both a combination of direct support for homeowners and
businesses to invest in efficiency and to help structure markets to
incentivise private investment. For example, the explicit inclusion of
building efficiency in green taxonomies and directives, such as in
Europe and an emerging system in Canada, can start unlocking
private financing at greater scale.
World Energy Investment 2024
Energy end use and efficiency
2023 saw heat pump sales fall for the first time as household budgets came under pressure
Note: heat pumps that deliver heat directly to households and residential or commercial buildings for space heating and/or domestic hot water provision. It includes
natural source heat pumps, including reversible air conditioners used as primary heating equipment. It excludes reversible air conditioners used only for cooling, or
used as a complement to other heating equipment, such as a boiler.
Source: IEA (2024), Clean Energy Market Monitor.
PAGE | 138
IEA. CC BY 4.0
20
40
60
80
100
Rate of growth of heat pump sales in 2022 and 2023 (left) and global heat pump capacity by country (right)
120
2020
2021
2022
2023
GW
China
United States
Europe
Japan
Rest of the World
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Energy end use and efficiency
Sustained policy support is key to accelerate heat pump uptake
Throughout 2023, heat pump sales slowed, aligning with the broader
investment trajectory seen in the building sector. This trend was
particularly pronounced in Europe, where sales declined by 5% over
the year. The United States also witnessed a near 17% decline
during this period. These reversals in sales represent a departure
from previously optimistic trajectories, despite the pressing global
need for increased adoption of heat pumps to facilitate the transition
to net zero emissions by 2050.
That said, this outcome was not entirely unforeseen, as several
factors contributed to the reduced enthusiasm of consumers to invest
in heat pumps in 2023. High interest rates deterred potential buyers,
while the substantial upfront costs associated with heat pump
installation posed financial challenges. Additionally, declining natural
gas prices rendered electric heating options less economically
appealing, further dampening demand. Uncertainties, including
delays in the adoption of heat pump-related regulations in the
European Union and the prolonged timeline for rebate distribution for
heat pump installations in the US exacerbated the situation.
Nonetheless, there are still reasons to expect a brighter future for the
industry. In the United States – where the overall market for HVAC
equipment experienced a year-on-year decline – heat pumps still
accounted for 55% of heating system sales as of December 2023, far
outpacing a 20% drop in gas equipment sales. Meanwhile, nine US
states – which together represent nearly a quarter of residential
energy consumption – recently agreed to a collective target for new
heating and cooling equipment sales to reach at least 65% by 2030.
Additionally, there are tax credit schemes available through the
Inflation Reduction Act that incentivise heat pump installations,
further bolstering the outlook for the market. In Europe, while certain
countries experienced declines in sales, others saw notable
increases. Heat pump sales rose in Germany and the Netherlands
for the first three quarters of 2023 – thanks to the carry-over effect of
the previous year’s sales spike – but eventually fell back amid market
pressures and the weakening of government incentives. Such
fluctuations illustrate the importance of effective regulations
supporting the adoption of heat pumps and enhancing building
efficiency.
China emerged as the market where heat pump sales thrived the
most in 2023, with robust 12% growth from a year earlier. China
currently leads the world in new heat pump installations,
commanding more than a quarter of global sales. This trend has
been bolstered by ongoing government initiatives aimed at promoting
the adoption of clean energy equipment in various industries, such
as agriculture. China’s experience contrasts with Japan’s relatively
mature market, which saw a 10% decline in heat pump installations
in 2023.
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Energy end use and efficiency
Sustainable finance for green buildings is holding up as construction costs level out
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: Environmental Finance Data, EDGE, Bloomberg Terminal, European Central Bank, Federal Housing Administration, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac.
40
80
120
160
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
China
Europe
Japan and Korea
North America
MDBs and others
Rest of world
Sustainable debt issuance for green buildings
5
10
15
20
50
100
150
200
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024e
Index (2017=100)
EDGE square meters (right axis)
Insulation Industry Revenue
New Mortgages
Construction costs
Home mortgage rates
Selected financial indicators for green buildings and renovations
Millions of EDGE certified square meters
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Energy end use and efficiency
Financing indicators for green building investment paint mixed picture for the years to come
Despite the decrease in investment in energy efficiency and
electrification in the building sector, some financial indicators point to
a brighter future. As with other energy sectors, rising prices and
higher interest rates eroded the affordability of the entire construction
value chain, pressing the pause button on the wave of the green
buildings and renovation. But there are signs that construction costs
have begun to stabilise and interest rates are expected to ease
slightly over the next few quarters.
The number of sustainable bonds listing green building as a target for
their proceeds had already begun to decline in 2022. But in 2023, the
volume of issuances remained relatively stable, in contrast to the
declining trend in the rest of the market for green, social and
sustainability (GSS) bonds.
Historically, most green building bond sales have been driven by
either by sovereign issuers (e.g. France, Belgium, Hong Kong) or
public or quasi-public actors like Fannie Mae in the United States or
KfW in Germany. But recently there has been a trend among private
financial institutions and large utilities to issue debt to finance green
buildings – though it remains unclear whether the proceeds of these
bonds can be deployed fast enough to support the 2.5% annual deep
retrofit rate required in the NZE Scenario.
Meanwhile, since the beginning of the inflationary period in 2021, the
number and value of current long-term mortgages – typically good
proxies for measuring renovation activity – have been declining both
in the European Union and the United States. This is concerning,
since all the IEA’s scenarios assume a greater role for debt to fund
renovations. Today, most retrofits are financed through owners’
equity, which greatly limits their uptake.
Therefore, making sure the right consumer financing tools are in
place will be crucial. Today, many options exist to finance the
purchase of a vehicle or even a home, but few mechanisms provide
readily available options to finance green buildings or renovations.
Some governments and banks – mainly Australia, the United
Kingdom, and United States – are experimenting with green
mortgages, but uptake has so far been limited due to many factors,
including low customer demand and complicated application
processes, as well as a lack of lending capacity or willingness by
banks to offer these products. In France, for instance, a recent
initiative to provide zero-interest loans for small renovations was
largely snubbed by banks and consumers alike until the rules were
simplified and revamped in 2024. Financial institutions often point to
a lack of available data and the difficulty of finding the right balance
between the financial risk and return on smaller loans.
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Energy end use and efficiency
Banks have identified a need to better address financing for energy
efficiency and electrification of the building sector, however: Today,
37 of the world’s 100 largest commercial banks say they have
implemented internal green building policies, although they still
appear to struggle with communicating these policies across their
branch networks. In June 2023, the International Sustainability
Standards Board issued two new IFRS global sustainability
disclosure standards that will require increased and more granular
reporting from homebuilders and real estate companies on their
building energy profiles.
Innovative solutions exist to increase the amount of financing for
green buildings, and they have been tested in various countries. In
the United States, the Property Assessed Clean Energy Programs
have shown a way to decouple the split incentives for owners – who
must shoulder the cost of green investment but do not necessarily
benefit from the resulting savings – by linking renovation costs to the
value of the property itself. In Europe, some of the largest banks have
already begun to implement voluntary Mortgage Portfolio Standards
to incorporate climate targets into their lending practices.
About 80% of the world’s population are homeowners and unlocking
at least a portion of the trillions of dollars’ worth of equity embedded
in this housing pool could also be leveraged to help finance
renovations. While many borrowers may not qualify for new
mortgages – since homeowners tend to skew toward the top the age
pyramid – public guarantees for home-equity loans could help to de-
risk commercial financing for renovations.
Overall, these difficulties are compounded by a regulatory landscape
which can be perceived as a moving signpost. As public budgets
become tighter in many parts of the world, governments are tempted
to cancel or scale back incentive mechanisms for renovations or
green buildings, thereby reducing demand. One concrete example is
from makers of insulation materials, who invested heavily in
manufacturing capacity on the assumption that demand for
renovation materials would rapidly materialise at scale. But recent
hesitation by several European countries over whether to maintain
incentive programmes have put these investments at risk and in
2023, revenues from the insulation industry started to decline.
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Energy end use and efficiency
Transport
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Energy end use and efficiency
Sales of electric vehicles reached another milestone in 2023, driven by declining costs
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: EV includes battery electric and plug-in hybrid passenger vehicles. 2024e = estimated values for 2024.
Source: IEA (2024), Global EV Outlook; Marklines.
6%
12%
18%
24%
5
10
15
20
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023 2024e
Million units
China
Europe
North America
Japan and Korea
Rest of world
Share of total sales (right axis)
Global EV sales and market share
Weighted average price and battery cost per region
25
50
75
100
125
2018
2022
2018
2022
2018
2022
Index (2018 = 100)
China (vehicle)
China (battery)
Europe (vehicle)
Europe (battery)
United States (vehicle)
United States (battery)
Sports utility
vehicle
Medium car
Small car
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PAGE | 145
Energy end use and efficiency
Buoyed by lower battery costs, a price war in EVs and signs of life in the commercial markets,
investment in the electrification of road transport is reaching new highs
Investment in energy efficiency, electrification, and hydrogen in the road transport sector
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: 2024e = estimated values for 2024. Hydrogen spending for transport is low and not visible on the figure, the category is included for completeness.
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Electrification
Energy Efficiency
Hydrogen
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 146
Energy end use and efficiency
Nearly one in five new cars sold in 2023 was electric, although more than 90% of sales were in
China, Europe, and the United States
In 2023, approximately 14 million electric cars were sold worldwide,
constituting nearly one-fifth of total car sales. Sales of electric cars in
2023 were 35% higher than in 2022, a trajectory that – if maintained
– would still be compatible with the targets set in the NZE Scenario.
Electric cars accounted for 18% of all cars sold in 2023, up from a
14% share in 2022 and just 2% in 2018. These trends indicate that
growth in electric car markets remains robust as the technology
matures. Battery electric cars accounted for 70% of the electric car
stock in 2023. But sales continue to remain heavily concentrated in
the traditional key markets. In 2023, almost 95% of all global electric
car sales took place in China, Europe, and the United States. China
led the way at almost 60% of sales, Europe at nearly 25%, and the
United States at 10%. These regions also show significant adoption
rates, with electric cars representing more than one-third of new car
registrations in China, one quarter of registrations in Europe and 10%
in the US market. In other developed car markets like Japan and
India, EV sales remain limited.
China ended its national subsidies for EV purchases in 2022 after
more than a decade – yet its EV industry and the level of EV sales
remained resilient. While the growth rate for Chinese sales fell in
2023 to just over 35% it was from a high base, which speaks to the
dynamism of the country’s EV market.
Sales growth in the United States slowed somewhat but remained
robust (up 42% year-on-year). The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and
the revised qualifications for the Clean Vehicle Tax Credit, along with
price cuts, seem to have helped in sustaining sales in 2023, despite
initial worries that stricter domestic content requirements for EVs and
batteries might trigger bottlenecks or delays.
In Europe, new electric car registrations reached nearly 3.2 million in
2023, marking a substantial increase of almost 20% compared to
2022. European governments have historically offered some of the
world’s most generous incentives for the purchase of new electric
vehicles. However, these subsidies are beginning to wind down,
notably in France, where a EUR 7000 (~USD 9000) per vehicle
bonus is set to drop to EUR 4000 in 2024 (USD 5100). Germany has
also ended its EUR 4500 (USD 5800) subsidy for the purchase of a
new EV.
Sales increased significantly in EMDE regions, but still accounted for
a small share of the global EV market. In Latin America, electric car
sales reached almost 90 000 units in 2023. In Brazil, electric car
registrations nearly tripled year-on-year to more than 50 000 units,
supported by the entry of imported Chinese models, a trend we could
expect to see more of as Chinese carmakers prioritise EMDE
markets over the United States and Europe. EV registration in India
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 147
Energy end use and efficiency
increased by 70% year-on-year thanks to purchase incentives under
the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles (FAME-
II) scheme, supply-side incentives under the Production Linked
Incentive scheme, tax benefits and the Go Electric campaign.
In 2024, global EV sales growth is expected to slow to around 20%.
Contradicting forces are at play: A certain level of market maturity
might have been reached in China, while the reduction or cancellation
of some subsidies in China, Europe and India cloud the horizon for
future sales. On the other hand, several factors should continue to
support growth, including: recent price drops in many EV models;
renewed activity in the commercial fleet segment and new emissions
standards such as those proposed by the US Environmental
Protection Agency. More targeted policy incentives, such as a French
programme offering a EUR 100 per month EV lease to low-income
households, could also be of help. (The French scheme was
suspended in 2024 after more than 50 000 households signed up).
Despite drops in EV prices across the range of models, the largest
EV manufacturers have been able to maintain their profit margins by
delaying the pass-through of falling battery prices to their customers.
Lower battery costs, supported by record levels of investment in
manufacturing, should lead to further reductions in EV retail prices
and increased sales.
But as the market enters a new era of slightly slower growth, the car
industry – which has seen many new entrants in recent years – is
likely to experience lower market capitalisations, increased
consolidation, spending restraint and eroding margins amid price
competition and slowing sales. The cancellation of two long-awaited
IPOs of the battery and EV branches of Volkswagen and Renault
points to a degree of investor scepticism about whether EV sales will
be able to keep growing at the rates seen in recent years, especially
in Europe. The story seems to be different in EMDEs, where in India
for instance, companies like Exicom are starting to look to the capital
markets for funding expansion into EVs. Announcements of new
capital expenditures and additions of new battery manufacturing
capacity continue to point to positive prospects for the sector globally.
Global sales of electric buses reached about 50 000 units in 2023,
which represented 3% of total bus sales. Roughly 60% of those sales
took place in China, thanks to early policy support and development
of domestic production capacity. Battery electric buses reached a
43% share of new city bus sales in the European Union, and some
progress was also made in Latin America and Kenya. In EMDE
regions, mass transit public transportation investments have been
supported by concessional finance, notably in India where multilateral
development banks (MDBs) have worked with the government in its
efforts to deploy a fleet of 50 000 electric buses and the
corresponding charging infrastructure. In Dakar, Senegal, the all-
electric Bus Rapid Transit system started operation in late 2023 and
was co-financed by the World Bank, which provided USD 300 million.
This push from MDBs can both establish strong order pipelines for
electric buses and help develop local manufacturing capacity.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 148
Energy end use and efficiency
Capital expenditures by the major listed battery companies reached USD 10 billion for the first
time in Q4 2023, and production capacity grew by 60% from a year earlier
Global trends in the battery manufacturing industry, 2017-2025
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Listed battery companies include LG Energy Solution, BYD, Contemporary Amperex Technology, Samsung SDI, Gotion High-tech, Eve Energy and Farasis
Energy Gan Zhou. 2023 values are based on fully commissioned capacity. 2025 and 2030 capacity values are based on capacity that is either announced, under
construction or fully commissioned.
Source: IEA calculations based on Benchmark Mineral Intelligence and Bloomberg Terminal (2024).
3
6
9
12
2023
2025
2030
TWh
China
Europe
United States
Rest of world
Battery manufacturing capacity
3
6
9
12
100
200
300
400
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Arithmetic return (Q4 2016 = 100)
Quarterly returns
Capital expenditure (right axis)
Financial indicators for listed battery companies
World Energy Investment 2024
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Energy end use and efficiency
Industry
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 150
Energy end use and efficiency
Energy efficiency investments declined in 2023 due to China's property sector downturn and
the global slowdown, but remained stable relative to global industrial capital expenditures
Energy efficiency investment in the industrial sector, 2015-2022 (left) and EBIT margin of selected industries (right)
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: The industrial sector includes iron and steel, cement, aluminium, copper, and chemicals. EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes.
Source: IEA calculations based on S&P Capital IQ.
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
18%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Steel
Fertilizers
Aluminum
Cement
Other chemicals
EBIT / Revenue
3%
6%
9%
12%
15%
18%
10
20
30
40
50
60
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Billion USD (2023, MER)
North America
Europe
China
India
Other
Share of industry investments
World Energy Investment 2024
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Energy end use and efficiency
This slowdown has taken place despite stubbornly high commodity prices across the board
and rising margins, notably in the cement and fertiliser sectors
Investment in energy efficiency and electrification in the industrial
sector shrank in 2023, cancelling out the gains seen in 2021 and
2022. This was driven mainly by a fall in investment in China, the
largest materials producer in the world. The country is experiencing
challenges from a declining property sector and lower growth and
demand prospects. Depending on estimates, the property sector
accounts for between 14% and 30% of China’s GDP. Not only is the
property sector itself very large, but it also drives many related
industries such as steel and cement. The global economic slowdown
and historically high inflation worldwide discouraged investment in
other regions, which have remained flat.
Industrial energy efficiency investment was down by 30% between
2022 and 2023 in China, though it is expected to increase by 5% in
2024. Until 2021, roughly one-third of all energy efficiency and end-
use investment in industry took place in China – but this share is
expected to fall to 22% in 2024. As part of its 14th Five-Year Plan for
National Economic and Social Government, China has set long-term
objectives for 2025, emphasising the importance of low-emission and
“green” development among heavy-polluting manufacturers such as
steel companies. In practice, however, most subsidies to steel firms
have gone to support investment in expanding capacity and capital
equipment rather than targeting R&D expenses or investment in
efficiency gains.
Compared with global capital expenditures across all industrial
sectors (iron and steel, cement, aluminium, copper, and chemicals),
energy efficiency and other end-use investments have stalled,
representing 13% of total investment in 2023 compared to 14% in
2017. This suggests that even in a period of high energy costs such
as 2021-2022, investments in energy efficiency and end-use have not
been a priority.
The surge in commodity prices since 2021 has prompted industrial
sectors to focus on higher-margin products and consolidation among
smaller producers. Driven by the high price of natural gas – a key
component of most fertilisers – fertiliser makers have enjoyed record
profits in recent years. Nonetheless, this has not translated into
bigger investments in energy efficiency.
In 2024, industrial sectors are expected to face growing turbulence.
Global excess capacity is increasing, while demand shows signs of
slowing, especially amid the potential for a downturn in Chinese
demand if the real estate crisis drags on. Steel and cement
production are declining in many countries, notably in Europe, while
capacity is rising in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
World Energy Investment 2024
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Energy end use and efficiency
Implications
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 153
Energy end use and efficiency
Doubling annual energy intensity improvements by 2030 requires a tripling of investments
IEA. CC BY 4.0
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
2023
2030
NZE
Annual energy intensity improvement
Electrification and other end-use renewables
Buildings
Transport
Industry
Energy intensity improvements
x 2
500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
2021 2022 2023 2024e
2030
APS
2030
NZE
Investments in end-use sectors
x 3
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 154
Energy end use and efficiency
Energy efficiency is one of the key pillars to keeping 1.5 °C within reach, but the world is not
investing nearly enough
During COP28, governments agreed on a set of key climate pillars
for keeping the door open to net zero emissions by 2050 and holding
global warming below 1.5 °C. One of these pillars is to double the
rate at which the energy intensity of the global economy improves.
Today the annual rate of improvement stands at about 2%. The NZE
Scenario requires this rate to double by 2030. Decarbonizing the
power and fuel sectors is crucial, but the largest emissions come from
end uses and efficiency improvements are pivotal in curbing fossil
fuel demand. To achieve a doubling of energy intensity improvement,
annual investment needs to triple within a little more than five years.
By 2030, investment in buildings nearly triples in the NZE Scenario
(as the share of deep retrofits reaches 2.5% per year), the number of
heat pumps installed triples, and every new construction is net zero
carbon ready. Clean investment in transport quadruples as 70% of
new cars more than half of buses and trucks sold are electric, 17
million charging points become available and new internal
combustion engine vehicles are at least 20% more efficient. While
industry is one of the most difficult sectors to decarbonise, it is also
the one where funding yields the best results. Only 6% of the total
increased
investment
delivers
20%
of
the
total
intensity
improvements by 2030.
Annual trajectory of EV sales and retrofits in the NZE Scenario
The upcoming years are pivotal for aligning the energy system with
the NZE Scenario. Recent reductions in government support and
slower growth in EV sales, heat pumps, and construction highlight
the correlation between end-use efficiency investment and subsidies.
However, public spending faces challenges due to inflation and
higher interest rates. The key question will be whether the business
case for electrifying transport, renovating buildings, and improving
industrial efficiency becomes strong enough to attract significant
private sector investment
20
40
60
80
2015
2030
Million units
2024 growth rate
STEPS
NZE
Sales of electric vehicles
0
1
2
3
4
2015
2030
Billion square metres
Floorspace retrofitted
to Net Zero Carbon Ready
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 155
R&D and technology innovation
R&D and technology
innovation
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 156
R&D and Technology innovation
Overview
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 157
R&D and Technology innovation
Divergent trends for R&D funding and the scaling up of private capital, identified in last year’s
report, continued throughout 2023
The amount spent globally on clean energy R&D grew again in 2023,
extending post-pandemic gains. A 13% rise in US government
spending on energy R&D helped keep global public energy R&D
spending on a steady upward trend, reaching USD 50 billion. Energy-
related R&D spending in the corporate sector stood at
USD 160 billion. Although the pace of growth was slower than the two
previous years, the momentum of investment in clean energy
technologies was maintained, led by the automotive sector.
This growth trend is driven by three factors. On the public side,
government commitments to reduce emissions are being taken
seriously, and research funding is being strategically directed to
areas that still show a gap between future deployment needs and
technology readiness. Secondly, there is a fast-growing recognition
at the highest levels of government that clean energy technologies
can offer major opportunities for investment and growth and that
benefits will accrue to those offering the most competitive products.
Packages of government incentives aim to steer sectors towards low-
emissions options and these are spurring corporate R&D to maintain
firms’ competitive advantages. These factors are evident in China,
which further increased its share of energy R&D in 2023.
For smaller, innovative clean energy companies, however, 2023 was
a difficult year. The types of capital on which start-ups rely – such as
venture capital (VC) or venture loans – became significantly more
expensive amid rising inflation and higher interest rates. Not only did
higher interest rates make alternative investments relatively more
attractive, but inflation and weaker outlooks for consumer spending
lengthened the expected time that start-ups would need to reach
profitability. As a result, many investors either moved their money out
of VC funds, or the funds offered smaller amounts of equity or debt
to start-ups – enough to keep them afloat until visibility improved.
Based on data from the first quarter of 2024, we expect start-ups to
find it difficult to raise capital through at least the end of 2024.
When it comes to energy innovation investment, emerging market
and developing economies (EMDE) remain under-represented.
Considering the active role these countries need to play in energy
transitions, and the greater impact of higher interest rates on the cost
of capital for innovators in these countries, their limited investment
participation is a concern. In 2023, just 6% of public R&D spending
and 3% of corporate R&D came from EMDE (outside China). For
start-ups in some EMDE countries – where VC ecosystems are less
developed than in advanced economies – borrowing rates have been
reported to be as high as 25%. However, with an 85% increase in
fundraising by Indian start-ups, the overall EMDE share of energy
venture capital rose from 3% to 9% of the total in 2023.
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R&D and Technology innovation
Spending on energy R&D
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R&D and Technology innovation
Government spending on energy R&D continued to increase in 2023, rising 7% year-on-year.
China and the United States led the way
Government spending on energy R&D, 2015-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Includes spending on demonstration projects (i.e. RD&D) wherever reported by governments as defined in IEA documentation. Figures for 2023 are a
preliminary estimate based on data available by mid-May 2024. State-owned enterprise funds comprise a significant share of the Chinese total. China’s 2022
estimate is based on reported company spending where available. The IEA Secretariat has estimated US data from public sources.
Source: IEA Energy Technology RD&D Budgets: Overview.
10
20
30
40
50
60
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Rest of World
Japan, Korea,
Australia, New
Zealand
Europe
North America
China
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R&D and Technology innovation
Clean energy R&D dominates the global total, and announced government initiatives point to
continued future spending growth, but in 2023, R&D for unabated fossil fuels also increased
Globally, public spending on energy R&D rose by 7% in 2023, to
almost USD 50 billion according to our estimates. This continues a
trend that has buoyed innovation in recent years despite
macroeconomic uncertainty. However, whereas the growth in 2022
was mostly driven by spending by the Chinese government and its
major energy-related state-owned enterprises, in 2023 nearly half the
growth came from North America, especially the United States.
Collectively, budgets for US energy research at the national energy
laboratories, Department of Defense and public grants given to
energy R&D and demonstration projects rose by more than
USD 1.3 billion in 2023.
Despite slower growth in 2023, we estimate that China exceeded the
7% per year planned increase in energy R&D spending in its 14th
Five-Year Plan (2021-2025). This maintains China’s status as the
largest public spender on energy R&D. However, compared to
previous years, the share of growth in Chinese public energy R&D
related to fossil fuel technologies was higher. As a result, the global
share of public energy R&D devoted to clean energy topics dipped
significantly for the first time in our dataset, after stagnating in 2022.
New government initiatives in this area include Korea’s List of Critical
and Emerging Technologies and a Special Act to create the support
instruments for these technologies, which include rechargeable
batteries, advanced mobility, advanced nuclear, biotechnology,
aerospace and marine technology and hydrogen. Japan launched a
programme to provide USD 300 million per year to support
collaborative research on storage batteries, hydrogen and new
bioproduction technologies. Austria’s new Climate Neutral Industry
initiative includes USD 260 million of R&D funding. The United
Kingdom announced an USD 28 million fund for interdisciplinary,
use-inspired research on clean energy and climate change through
international partnerships.
Public energy R&D spending in EMDE rose in 2023 but, outside
China, its share remained at 6% of the global total and was
concentrated in a small number of G20 countries. Under Brazil’s 2024
G20 Presidency the Group has begun work to help EMDEs develop
effective long-term clean energy innovation systems so that they can
participate more fully in emerging clean energy technology value
chains. As an example of targeted action in 2023, Colombia
established a Committee of Ministers for Sustainable Productive
Development, which seeks to guide the government's support for
development and commercialisation of technologies for climate
neutrality, including lithium production.
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R&D and Technology innovation
Corporate energy R&D spending continued to ramp up, growing 7% to USD 160 billion, largely
driven by the automotive sector but with growth across all technology areas
Spending on energy R&D by listed companies (left) and R&D budgets as a share of revenues (right), by sector of activity, 2015-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Includes only publicly reported R&D expenditure by companies active in sectors that are dependent on energy technologies, including energy efficiency
technologies where possible, and based on the Bloomberg Industry Classification System. Automotive includes technologies for fuel economy, alternative fuels and
alternative drivetrains. To allocate R&D spending for companies active in multiple sectors, shares of revenue per sector are used in the absence of other information.
Values may include both capitalised and non-capitalised costs, including for product development. Automotive spending is higher compared to that in WEI-2023 due
to the inclusion of more component suppliers in the sample. Right-hand figure considers the top 20 companies earning more than half of their revenues in the sector.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Bloomberg (2024).
30
60
90
120
150
180
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Automotive
Electricity generation, supply and networks
Oil and gas
Renewables
Coal
Thermal power and combustion equipment
Batteries, hydrogen and energy storage
Nuclear
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
2017-19
2020-22
2023
R&D spending as a share of revenues
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R&D and Technology innovation
R&D remained high in corporate sectors that are under pressure to develop low-emissions
solutions, with notable growth for cement and trucks
R&D spending by globally listed companies in heavy and long-distance transport (left) and industry (middle, right) by activity, 2016-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Values for 2023 are estimates based on reported data at the time of writing. Classifications are based on the Bloomberg Industry Classification System. Trucks
include recreational vehicles, but not industrial vehicles. Year-on-year changes can result from new companies entering the dataset or companies ceasing
operations, as well as changes in R&D spending.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from Bloomberg (2024).
3
6
9
12
15
18
21
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Aviation
Trucks
Shipping
Rail
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2016
2018
2020
2022
Chemicals
Iron and steel
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
2016
2018
2020
2022
Cement
Pulp and paper
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R&D and Technology innovation
Globally, energy-related companies are investing more in R&D to stay competitive and much of
this is tied to rising revenue at Chinese firms or more competition among car companies
Since 2019, corporate spending on energy R&D has grown by an
average of 7% per year – more than three times faster than the global
GDP. This reflects the ability of large firms to continue to invest to
develop their competitive advantage in a rapidly evolving technology
landscape. In some cases it is also a product of counter-cyclical
government support that has been earmarked for low-emissions
technologies in these companies. Major automotive manufacturers
and their suppliers are an example of this situation and their receipt
of sizeable public loans for electrification R&D since 2020 was
explored in WEI-2023. Another factor boosting global growth is the
allocation of higher sums to energy R&D by Chinese firms. Not only
are the revenues of Chinese energy-related firms rising faster than
many of their international counterparts, but they also increasingly
need to innovate to stay competitive domestically and internationally.
Of the top twenty energy-related corporate R&D spenders in our
dataset, thirteen are automotive companies based in the United
States, Germany, Japan or the Netherlands. The three non-
automotive companies in the top ten are Chinese: PowerChina (a
state-owned power plant engineering firm), PetroChina (a state-
owned oil company) and State Grid Corporation (a state-owned
electricity network operator). The French energy equipment
manufacturer Schneider Electric also features among a “Top 20”
group dominated by vehicle makers and auto parts suppliers, but the
oil majors do not feature. Despite record revenues in 2022 and 2023,
the oil major with the highest R&D spending, Shell, is below
PetroChina, Sinopec and Saudi Aramco. In past years, the oil majors
have been higher up the list.
In the automotive sector, Volkswagen and Mercedes Benz increased
R&D spending by a combined USD 5.5 billion, or 19%. This
represents impressive growth at a time when sales of internal
combustion engine vehicles are in decline and electric car sales,
while growing, typically have thinner margins for the supply chain.
Two companies focusing on electric vehicles, BYD and Tesla, rank
thirteenth and fourteenth, respectively.
Outside the typical scope of the energy sector, corporate R&D has
been rising in so-called hard-to-decarbonise sectors such as long-
distance transport and heavy industry. This is a positive sign that
companies, especially in the areas of trucks and cement, are
embracing the challenge of rapidly changing their long-standing
technological practices. Yet for chemicals, the recent upward trend
stalled in 2023. There was no noticeable growth in annual R&D
spending by companies engaged in the aviation, rail and shipping
sectors.
World Energy Investment 2024
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R&D and Technology innovation
VC funding of early-stage energy
technology companies
World Energy Investment 2024
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R&D and Technology innovation
Equity investors in energy start-ups took a “wait-and-see” approach in 2023, delaying deals or
reducing deal sizes amid market uncertainty – growth-stage deals have not yet bounced back
VC investment in energy start-ups, by technology area, for early-stage and growth-stage deals, 2010-2024e
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Number of deals includes deals for which no value has been reported, meaning that the average deal value cannot be accurately derived from the chart.
Industry includes start-ups developing alternative pathways to materials. Mobility includes technologies specific to alternative powertrains, their infrastructure and
vehicles, but not generic shared mobility, logistics or autonomous vehicles. “Other” includes carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS), nuclear, critical minerals
and heat generation. Fossil fuels covers start-ups whose businesses aim to make fossil fuel production and use more efficient or less polluting.
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024) and Crunchbase (2024).
200
400
600
800
1 000
1 200
1
2
3
4
5
6
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022 2024e
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Renewables
Energy efficiency
Industry
Energy storage and batteries
Mobility
Hydrogen and fuel cells
Other power and grids
Fossil fuels
Other
Deal count (right axis)
Early stage
100
200
300
400
500
600
6
12
18
24
30
36
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024e
Growth stage
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R&D and Technology innovation
Energy has outperformed other VC segments since 2021, particularly for early-stage equity
funding for start-ups, which held up well in 2023 thanks to policy backing for clean energy
Growth in global VC investment by sector of start-ups, 2010-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Indexed values are in constant USD.
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024) and Crunchbase (2024).
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Index (2021 = 100)
Agriculture and food
Biotechnology
Medical
Digital
All
Energy
Early stage
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
Growth stage
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R&D and Technology innovation
Early-stage VC investment in energy start-ups fell in 2023 for the first time since 2014, largely
because of macroeconomic conditions, but is set to get back on track in 2024
From the perspective of financial flows, 2023 was a disappointing
year for venture capital (VC) investment in energy. Whereas 2022
achieved unprecedented levels of deals and funding, both early- and
growth-stage equity investment declined in 2023. Early-stage
funding, which supports entrepreneurs with technology testing and
design – and plays a critical role in honing good ideas and adapting
them to market opportunities – fell by 4%. Growth-stage funding,
which needs more capital but funds less risky innovation, slid 21%.
This outcome can largely be attributed to macroeconomic conditions
rather than a loss of confidence in clean energy technologies. With
higher interest rates, fund managers found VC investments less
attractive than other investment classes. For hardware developers,
this was coupled with a more challenging path to market as their input
costs rose and potential customers tightened their belts. These
trends were already apparent in 2022 and are still expected to
reverse
as
the
macroeconomic
environment
improves.
Encouragingly, there are also reasons for optimism about VC for
energy technology innovation. Energy VC investment did not fall as
far as other VC segments, such as digital, which saw funding drop by
more than 70% compared with 2021.
The number of specialist VC funds targeting clean energy and other
climate segments continues to grow. These funds are often backed
by investors that impose criteria – such as potential for deep
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions – on the use of the money,
and in some cases allow returns to accrue over longer timeframes.
This additional investor focus on energy technology innovators is one
reason behind the rise in the number of early-stage deals for energy
start-ups in 2023. The overall investment trend appears therefore to
stem from a reduction in the amount invested per deal and a possible
postponement of very large deals, especially growth equity deals.
Such an approach may be expressed as “wait-and-see” via the
provision of “bridge finance” – which suggests there could be an
upward correction if macroeconomic conditions improve.
Data from the first quarter of 2024 indicate that the investment
environment has improved somewhat and delayed early-stage deals
are getting done. We estimate that early-stage VC funding for energy
will return to growth in 2024, but the growth-stage capital shortage
will continue. This is despite some big deals already being completed.
Several start-ups have already raised USD 250 million or more in
2024, including Deep Green (waste heat), Electra Charging (vehicle
charging), Fervo Energy (geothermal), H2 Green Steel (hydrogen
and steel projects), Koloma (hydrogen), NexAmp (solar projects) and
Sunfire (electrolysis). These deals are similar in magnitude to the
biggest energy VC transactions in early 2023.
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R&D and Technology innovation
US-based start-ups attract the most energy-related VC, but there are variations among sectors
including European dominance in energy efficiency and Chinese leadership in batteries
Early- and growth-stage equity investment in energy start-ups by region and technology area, 2020-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024) and Crunchbase (2024).
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Energy efficiency
Energy storage and batteries
Fossil fuels
Hydrogen and fuel cells
Industry
Mobility
Other
Other power and grids
Renewables
China
India
Australia
Rest of the world
United Kingdom
Other Europe
Canada
United States
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R&D and Technology innovation
The number of US growth-stage energy VC deals relative to early-stage deals is still higher than
in Europe, but Europe’s ratio of growth-to-early-stage VC deal value was higher in 2023
Ratio of growth- to -early-stage VC deal counts and deal values for Europe and the United States, 2010-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024).
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2023
Growth stage total / early stage total
Europe
North America
Deal count
5
10
15
20
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2023
Deal value
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R&D and Technology innovation
VC software vs hardware
Share of early and growth-stage VC investment in energy start-ups, by type of start-up, 2008-2023
IEA. CC BY4.0
Note: 2024 represents Q1 only.
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024) and Crunchbase (2024)
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
Hardware
Digital
Project development
Early stage
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
Growth stage
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R&D and Technology innovation
In 2023, energy-related VC deals were more likely to be for early-stage companies and those
developing projects rather than hardware
In the three years to 2023, start-ups based in the United States raised
more than those in other regions. Most investors in these deals were
US-based. While China, Europe and India have consistently
represented growing shares of the total as investment has increased
in recent years, this is not evenly distributed between the different
funding stages or among technologies. The share of Chinese start-
ups is highest in energy storage and batteries, where it now stands
at 35%, while Indian start-ups have been most successful in the
mobility sector – including electric urban vehicles and charging
infrastructure – where they represent a 6% share.
European start-ups have significantly increased their share of global
energy efficiency VC funding. In absolute terms, the amount of
money raised in 2021-2023 was nearly three times more than in
2018-2020, reaching USD 1.5 billion in 2023. The share of growth
equity in this total has also increased, indicating greater success for
European energy efficiency start-ups as they scale up. However,
across energy sectors, there has been a decline in the number of
growth-stage deals – when a defined product or service is in
development – relative to the number of deals for early-stage start-
ups, when the business is still being defined. This trend has been
most visible in the North American data: Between 2016-2018, the
average growth-to-early stage VC deal ratio was more than one
growth-stage deal and USD 11 of growth equity for every early-stage
deal and USD 1 of early-stage equity. In the 2021-2023 period, this
ratio was 0.7 growth-stage deals and USD 7 of growth equity per
early-stage deal. In absolute terms, nearly three times as much
funding went to early-stage deals in 2023 compared to 2018, while
growth-stage deal value fell by 35%. For the first time in our dataset,
European energy start-ups in aggregate raised more growth equity
for every early-stage deal than their North American counterparts.
The relative attractiveness of the two regions for scaling up a new
energy technology, which has traditionally favoured US start-ups in
terms of the availability of growth equity, may be converging.
Much of the need for clean energy technology innovation relates to
the development of hardware solutions, and energy start-ups
developing hardware continued to attract most of the VC funding.
However, growth-stage funding for energy start-ups dropped further
in 2023 after a drop in 2022 and now stands at around 75% of total
funding. Based on data for the first quarter of 2024, this level is
dropping further: just 69% of growth-stage VC funding was for
hardware developers.
Hardware products can take many years of VC funding to be
developed to meet customers’ needs, but these start-ups can achieve
World Energy Investment 2024
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R&D and Technology innovation
high valuations and pay-offs for investors. By contrast, energy
software and project development companies can have a quicker
path to market but offer lower returns. The decline in 2022-2023 likely
reflects lower willingness among VC funds to make large, long-term
bets in the current macroeconomic environment. Thus, the share of
hardware developers in early- and growth-stage deals tends to shift
with changing risk perceptions. This indicates that governments could
preferentially offer counter-cyclical support to hardware developers
during periods when capital is temporarily more costly.
In a given technology area, the share of VC deals represented by
project developers can indicate technology and policy maturity. One
of the biggest deals in 2023 saw 14 different investors take
USD 1.6 billion equity in H2 Green Steel, a Swedish project
developer for hydrogen-based steel production. The same company
raised a further USD 300 million from three different investors in
January 2024. The ability of H2 Green Steel to attract these levels of
growth equity signals that its backers are increasingly comfortable
with the level of technology risk and market outlook for hydrogen
production and low-emissions steel.
In contrast, renewables project developers in 2023 attracted the
smallest proportion of renewables VC investments in more than a
decade (excluding 2020, an outlier year due to the global pandemic).
After 2011, when many VC investors made losses on solar
companies that did not successfully scale up, there was a shift toward
investment in solar project developers or companies that help
building owners to install proven technologies: Between 2014 and
2018, project developers attracted more than 60% of VC investment
in solar, peaking at 70% in 2018. This increase accompanied an
industry shakeout triggered by cheaper, Chinese-made crystalline
photovoltaic panels. This was partly a reaction to how risks and
innovation incentives evolve in a maturing sector. However, VC
investors and start-ups have once again shifted its focus: In 2023,
owners of new solar hardware technologies received 70% of solar VC
investment.
This recent shift back to hardware shows that, even in sectors like
solar, which many people consider to be a mature and stable
technology, government policies can have a significant impact on
innovation. While the trend may relate, in part, to consolidation in the
market for renewable energy project developers, another factor is
likely to be the renewed interest of many governments in hosting solar
manufacturing facilities. Knowing that government support is
available for setting up a production facility that can compete with
imports incentivises researchers to push forward the technology
frontier to compete for the domestic market. Start-ups developing
new approaches to solar photovoltaics – such as thin film, flexible
designs and products that integrate solar cells – raised more VC
money in 2023 than in the previous eight years combined.
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R&D and Technology innovation
Corporate VC investment in clean energy start-ups dropped by almost two-fifths in 2023, with
automotive companies reducing their investment activity more than other sectors
Corporate VC investment in energy start-ups, by sector of corporate investor, 2010-2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Includes early- and growth-stage deals. Includes only investment by private-sector investors. Where there are several investors, deal value is evenly split
among them. ICT = information and communications technology. Industry includes chemicals, cement, commodities, construction (excluding real estate), iron and
steel and other equipment suppliers. Power sector includes independent power producers as well as electricity and renewables equipment and services. “Other”
includes food, health, research and mining.
Source: IEA analysis based on Cleantech Group (2024) and Crunchbase (2024).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Billion USD (2023, MER)
Other
Energy storage and
batteries
Industry
Transport
ICT and electronics
Oil and gas
Power sector
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R&D and Technology innovation
Big corporations cut back equity investment in energy start-ups more sharply than other types
of VC investors, with the exception of industrial companies
In 2023, large companies spent USD 5.5 billion buying equity stakes
in smaller energy-related start-ups with potential strategic value for
the investing firm. This injection of corporate venture capital (CVC)
has risen dramatically in recent years, as a way for big corporations
to acquire knowledge, new technologies and business models quickly
and at low cost. The nimbleness of start-ups and the “optionality” for
investors can be particularly valuable under conditions of uncertainty,
competition and budget pressures. While CVC remains lower than
corporate R&D budgets (which usually target the development
products that fit well with existing business lines) it has notable
strategic value when disruption from mass-produced, modular and
quick-to-scale technologies is anticipated.
For start-ups, CVC complements other sources of funding and can
accelerate scaling up by providing access to corporate experience
and resources, especially for manufacturing, as well as access to
consumers around the world.
Apart from 2020, when the global pandemic triggered a market
contraction, 2023 was the first year since 2017 that energy-related
CVC declined. This follows a broader dip in energy-related VC activity
in 2023, but the drop in CVC was more pronounced than the overall
VC trend. As a result, CVC fell from 22% of total energy-related VC
in 2022 to 17% in 2023. The change was largest for early-stage VC,
for which CVC fell from 17% to 11% of the total. This raises important
questions about the availability of this strategic source of capital
during periods of macroeconomic uncertainty.
Two sectors that have underpinned much of the recent growth in
energy-related CVC – oil and gas and automotive – made cuts to their
investment activities. For some firms, this was accompanied by
messages about refocusing CVC on technologies closer to their core
business and integrating start-up activities with corporate strategy.
Saudi Aramco said in January 2024 that it would increase the capital
of its CVC fund and prioritise clean energy technology. Volvo
announced it would follow some other automotive companies, such
as BMW, in deepening its start-up incubation and collaboration
efforts, as a complement to CVC. In 2023, Porsche moved the
headquarters of its VC fund and restructured it for efficiency.
Increased investment by companies in industrial sectors helped to
offset some of the CVC decline. Some of these deals were large: The
Chinese aluminium firm Shandong Weiqiao Pioneering Group
invested USD 1 billion in the EV maker Rox Motor; the Chinese
chemicals company Yibin Tianyuan Group participated in a
USD 375 million round of funding for Libode New Material, a battery
cathode start-up; and ArcelorMittal took part in a USD 120 million
capital round for Boston Metal, a US iron electrolysis start-up.
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R&D and Technology innovation
Implications
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R&D and Technology innovation
Clean energy policies are fuelling innovation spending, but with high capital costs slowing
progress for some technologies, maintaining momentum may require targeted measures
Several conclusions can be drawn from the 2023 trends presented in
this chapter. First, governments are continuing to increase spending
on R&D and demonstration projects in keeping with their pledges to
cut emissions while maintaining economic growth. Second, policies
that push the private sector to adopt low-emissions technologies are
inducing more corporate R&D in the automotive and heavy industrial
sectors. Third, the cost of capital matters most for early-stage and
smaller companies, for whom the pool of available finance has
shrunk since 2022.
It is encouraging for the prospects of addressing climate change that
many governments are successfully expanding their budgets for
clean energy R&D, despite competing shorter-term priorities for
government funds. Grants for applied research and demonstration
projects are essential for shepherding the next generation of energy
technologies to market at lower cost. However, governments should
also be concerned by the apparent loss of momentum in equity
funding for clean energy start-ups, given the urgency of the
challenge. While recent years have demonstrated that higher
government ambitions and expectations for tackling climate change
translate quickly into the founding of more innovative energy
companies and a corresponding flow of VC capital, it has also
revealed the volatility of this funding in a changing interest rate
environment.
Compared with other segments, clean energy start-ups developing
new hardware ideas require more capital and are often more reliant
on large equity deals to pay for testing and manufacturing facilities.
When access to this type of finance tightens, high-potential
technologies
risk
being
abandoned
or
delayed.
However,
governments can use tools such as non-dilutive project debt, equity
or guarantees to accelerate the sector’s transition to cheaper forms
of capital for scale-up.
The VC data also shows some changes in the technology focus
areas for investors, as revealed by their selectiveness in a more
capital constrained environment. Funding for electric vehicle start-
ups, for example, has noticeably declined. Despite continued growth
in electric vehicle sales, these are capital-intensive firms and riskier
bets when the world’s largest car companies concentrate their
resources on this sector. In comparison, VC investment continues to
flow to newer areas with less dominant industrial players, including
critical minerals, battery components, direct air capture of CO2,
ammonia production and renewable heat. These areas benefit
strongly from the entry of new VC investors that have exclusive
mandates to support climate mitigation technologies, including
hardware for challenging areas like industrial heat.
World Energy Investment 2024
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R&D and Technology innovation
Regionally, China is estimated to be the biggest spender on energy
innovation. China drove the year-on-year growth in corporate R&D
and, along with the United States, led the growth in public energy
R&D. While the link between spending and innovation outcomes is
unpredictable and not always direct, it is clear that China’s increased
spending on energy R&D over the past decade has borne fruit.
China’s presence is growing in the global market segments for high
quality electric vehicles, batteries, heavy equipment for power plants
and solar PV manufacturing. Each of these areas incorporates a
higher share of Chinese domestic innovation than ten years ago.
The resulting competition within global markets for clean energy
technologies is positive for consumers and for accelerating energy
transitions. However, this good news is contingent on the free flow of
knowledge to stimulate further innovation, and access to markets to
encourage innovators to compete. Governments around the world
face a challenge to balance the goal of raising the global pace of
energy innovation with securing a return on their R&D investments in
terms of domestic economic prosperity. The policy toolbox for
addressing this challenge includes the prioritisation of technologies
that are a good fit with existing local industries, measures to support
effective innovation
ecosystems and innovation related to
maintaining the competitiveness of manufacturing processes and
high added value products.
Except for VC fundraising, especially in India, clean energy
innovation investment in EMDE did not noticeably grow in 2023 as a
share of the global total. There is much that governments, multilateral
institutions and philanthropists can do to support these countries to
contribute actively to clean energy technology development.
Domestic
expertise
and
private-sector
advocates
can
be
instrumental in helping EMDE countries to advance their energy
transitions and make technology choices that fit the local context. As
an example of how more attention to this issue has led to creative
solutions, in May 2023, the International Finance Corporation took a
USD 20 million equity stake in Boston Metal – a start-up developing
an early-stage technology for low-emissions steel production – which
is contingent on construction of the company’s first facility in Brazil.
.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 178
Regional deep dive
Regional deep dive
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 179
Regional deep dive
China, the European Union and the United States have taken the lead on clean energy
investment, accounting for almost 60% of the current global spending on clean energy
Shares of clean energy investment (left), GDP and population (right) by selected countries and regions
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: RoW = rest of the world. EU = European Union. APS = Announced Pledges Scenario. NZE = Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Clean energy
investment
GDP
Population
200
400
600
800
1000
2019
2023
2030
APS
2030
NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
EU
United States
Japan and Korea
China
Middle East
Southeast Asia
Latin America
India
Africa
Rest of World
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 180
Regional deep dive
United States
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 181
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign yields of bonds in local currency. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026 and 2020,
similar with other periods. For other definitions see the WEI Methodology Annex.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (Aaa is the highest rating), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
76,892
20,952
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
15%
4%
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Aaa
315 bps
By 2050
Sovereign debt
rating
NZE commitments
United States
World
Economic and
financial indicators
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
Energy investment
1.9%
1.8%
1,451
371
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
1.4 1.8
6.1
4.7
13.2
10.5
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
Population
GDP
15%
200
400
600
800
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 182
Regional deep dive
The United States, the second largest economy in the world, accounts for 15% of global clean
energy investment, and remains a major investor in oil and gas
The United States has taken important steps to scale up investments
in clean energy. These investments overtook the spending that went
to fossil fuels in 2020 – when oil and gas investments fell sharply –
and increased to USD 280 billion in 2023 from USD 200 billion in
2020. The country also invests a significant amount in oil and gas: for
every USD 1.4 spent on clean energy in 2023, US investors directed
1 USD to fossil fuels. (That is slightly below the global average of
USD 1.8.)
New legislative vehicles supporting clean energy investment in the
United States are the Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs
Act of 2021, which allocated around USD 550 billion for clean energy
and infrastructure, and the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022,
which provides an estimated USD 370 billion in funding to promote
energy security and combat climate change.
These incentives are prompting faster deployment and the
development of new clean energy manufacturing capacities. By the
end of 2023, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act allocated
nearly USD 75 billion to clean energy, including projects related to
grid improvement and expansion (USD 21.3 billion), clean energy
demonstrations
(USD 21.5 billion),
energy
efficiency
(USD 6.5 billion) and clean energy manufacturing and workforce
development (USD 8.6 billion). Meanwhile, tax credits from the IRA
make clean energy projects in the United States more competitive
and incentivise investment in vulnerable energy communities.
The increase in clean energy investment moves capital flows towards
alignment with the long-term goal, announced in 2021, to achieve
economy-wide net zero emissions by 2050. However, clean energy
investors have faced some headwinds, including high financing costs
due to higher benchmark interest rates (that reached over 5.0% since
the summer of 2023). Permitting issues and the finalisation of tax
credit guidance under the IRA have also meant delays in some cases.
The United States is the world’s largest oil and gas producer, and its
spending on fossil fuel supply – more than USD 200 billion – accounts
for around 19% of the global total. The United States is home to
around 40% of the wave of new LNG export capacity that is set to
come to market in the second half of the decade. US spending on
clean fuels is also on the rise, amid a surge of interest in opportunities
for low-emissions hydrogen and CCUS.
In the IEA’s Announced Pledges Scenario (APS), lower demand for
fossil fuels brings a significant reduction in upstream and midstream
spending, while investments in low-emissions power double and in
energy efficiency nearly triple by 2030.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 183
Regional deep dive
Latin America and the Caribbean
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 184
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Sovereign yields of bonds in local currency (range of Brazil and Mexico). bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years
between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods. Debt rating reflects the credit rating range for various countries in the region.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
C – A2
268 – 482 bps
48%
Sovereign debt
rating
Countries with NZE
commitments
Latin America
World
Economic and
financial indicators
7%
8%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
18,382
20,952
1.5% 1.8%
279
371
0.8 1.8
2.2
4.7
6.5
10.5
Population
GDP
4%
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
100
200
300
400
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 185
Regional deep dive
Latin America has been a leader in clean energy but needs to step up investment to stay ahead
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), a diverse region of more
than 30 countries, accounted for 7% of the world’s GDP in 2023,
while income per capita is slightly below the world average. LAC
countries have generally been prone to high inflation, high debt and
fiscal issues, although sovereign credit ratings vary from debt in
default (Venezuela) to upper-medium grade (Chile). LAC had a
period of slow growth the past decade, where the region’s GDP
expanded at about one-third of the average global pace. This partially
explains why energy investment has been relatively low.
Fossil fuels represent two-thirds of the energy mix, well below the
world average of 80%. The use of coal is quite low, but oil use –
mainly for transport but also for industry – is relatively high, despite a
share of biofuels in road transport that is twice the global average.
The use of renewable energy has been central to LAC, where
renewables represent a 60% share of the power mix (double the
world average). LAC has a legacy of strong use of hydropower for
electricity production, with many large dams built long ago. While its
growth prospects are limited, hydro remains important for flexibility.
There has been strong momentum for clean investments in parts of
the region, and spending in fossil fuels has also risen in recent years.
LAC’s overall ratio of clean energy to fossil fuels investment just
under half the 2023 global average.
Energy investment is set to reach USD 185 billion in 2024, a record
high. The power sector accounts for over 35%, while fossil fuels
supply represents almost 55% and end-use less than 10%.
Renewables and storage continue their strong growth, with solar
leading on deployment (including small-scale projects), investment in
storage accelerating in Chile (to reduce transmission bottlenecks)
and even offshore wind picking up in Brazil and Colombia. Many
countries are also developing long-term hydrogen strategies and
implementing pilot projects, especially in Brazil (where a 1.2GW plant
obtained environmental permits in late 2023) and Chile. Investment
in the end-use sectors is low: Less than a third of LAC countries have
minimum energy performance standards for industrial motors or
household appliances, for example, and few have implemented
mandatory building codes.
Almost half of the 33 LAC countries pledged to reach net zero
emissions by 2050, including Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Colombia.
Average annual clean energy investment over the 2026-2030 period
needs to increase four-fold compared to the preceding decade in
order to get on track for these goals, which would result in fossil fuel
consumption peaking this decade. Efforts to reduce the cost of capital
will be critical, and will require improving the economic proposition for
clean investments while also reducing macroeconomic risks.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 186
Regional deep dive
European Union
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 187
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign yields of bonds in local currency, for Eurozone. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026
and 2020, similar with other periods. Debt rating reflects the credit rating range for various countries in the region.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (Aaa is the highest rating, and only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development
Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Ba1 - Aaa
296 bps
By 2050
Sovereign debt
rating
NZE commitments
European Union
World
Economic and
financial indicators
15%
6%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
54,249
20,952
1.7%
1.8%
925
371
20%
10.9
1.8
35.0
4.7
48.2
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
100
200
300
400
500
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 188
Regional deep dive
Clean energy investment in the European Union has risen as governments respond to the
global energy crisis and the cut in Russian gas supplies
The European Union (EU) is one of the leading regions for clean
energy deployment and policy momentum has intensified in many
countries, and at EU level, due to the global energy crisis that
followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its subsequent cut in gas
deliveries. In large part because of its reliance on imported fuels, the
European Union stands out as one of the regions that has the highest
clean energy to fossil fuels investment ratios: it spends more than
USD 10 on clean energy for every USD 1 invested in fossil fuels.
In 2023, investment in renewables generation totalled almost
USD 110 billion, an increase of more than 6% from the previous year.
Although the cost of capital for renewables has seen a slight rise due
to supply chain and inflation pressures, renewable investments
remain very cost-competitive. Denmark and Germany remain at the
forefront of the wind power sector in Europe, despite ongoing
profitability challenges. Spain has led the surge in solar adoption and
has seen wholesale electricity prices fall to record lows during periods
of high solar output – bringing some benefits for consumers but also
a warning sign for some investor revenue streams and the prospects
for future investment.
A good balance of investment across generation, grids, storage and
demand-side flexibility is key. Investment in power grids rose by more
than 20% in 2023, nearly reaching USD 65 billion, a very positive
development that reflects the need for more grid interconnection,
especially to facilitate power flows to central European markets.
Meanwhile, there was also ongoing growth in oil and gas
investments, which reached over USD 30 billion in 2023. Investment
in liquified natural gas (LNG) reached nearly 7 billion, while Europe
added more than 50 bcm/year of extra LNG import capacity to switch
away from Russian gas, mainly via Floating Storage Regasification
Units (FSRUs). The Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Greece and
Germany have all acquired or leased FSRUs.
The European Union has set a target to reduce net greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 55% by 2030, relative to 1990 levels, and to
reach climate neutrality by mid-century. Alongside a range of policies
and targets focused on increased deployment of renewables and
energy efficiency, there is also a focus on the diversity and resilience
of clean energy supply chains, both for manufacturing and for critical
minerals. The European Commission adopted the Net Zero Industry
Act in June 2024, to bolster the manufacturing of clean technologies,
with the objective of meeting 40% of the EU’s deployment needs by
2030 and reducing today’s reliance on imports. Overall clean energy
investment trends are broadly aligned with the EU’s energy and
climate goals.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 189
Regional deep dive
Africa
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 190
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Africa includes North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. Sovereign yields of bonds in local currency show the change for South Africa. bps = basis points. 2016-
20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods. Debt ratings reflect the credit rating range for various
countries in the region.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Caa3 – A3
91 bps
30%
Sovereign debt
rating
Countries with NZE
commitments
Africa
World
Economic and
financial indicators
5%
18%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
5,904
20,952
1.2%
1.8%
72
371
2%
0.5
1.8
2.1
4.7
6.1
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 191
Regional deep dive
Burdened by significant debt repayments, financing for clean energy projects is scarce as the
need for concessional support becomes increasingly evident
Achieving Africa’s energy- and climate-related goals by 2030 will
require annual investments of over USD 200 billion through the end
of this decade. This will be vital to meet the growing energy needs of
a continent where the median age of the population is 20 years and
average GDP per capita is just over one-fourth of the global average.
Our
tracking
of
energy
spending
suggests
that
around
USD 110 billion is set to be invested in energy across Africa in 2024,
of which nearly USD 70 billion to fossil fuel supply and power, with
the remainder going to a range of clean energy technologies.
Spending trends vary widely across Africa, but neither the total
amount nor the proportion spent on clean energy are enough to put
the continent on track to reach its sustainable development goals. As
they stand, energy investments are equivalent to only 1.2% of the
region’s GDP and clean energy investments, while rising, account for
just 2% of the global total.
Debt repayments, which have increased sharply in recent years,
mean that many African governments have difficulty accessing the
funds required for capital-intensive clean energy projects. Moreover,
low sovereign debt ratings further limit access to outside investment
– in 2023, only two countries, Botswana and Mauritius, held
investment-grade ratings.
Of the clean energy investments that have recently been made, the
majority are in renewable power generation. While these projects are
vital to meet Africa’s rising electricity needs in a sustainable way, the
prospects for further growth will be limited as long as the grid itself is
not upgraded and expanded. With average line losses of 15%,
inefficient grids and insufficient interconnections are already creating
bottlenecks for new renewable energy projects in the region.
Energy access is among the top priorities in Africa, where 600 million
people live without electricity and roughly 1 billion people lack access
to clean cooking. Financing needs for energy access initiatives fall
well short of the annual USD 25 billion that is required to achieve the
2030 objectives of full access to modern energy. Progress in this area
will require concessional finance providers to mobilise grants for the
most vulnerable households and support the creation of bankable
projects. The provision of other de-risking capital will also be critical
to allow the private sector to take a more active role.
A high cost of capital is a major impediment to scaling up clean
energy investments in Africa. Reducing country-wide and project-
specific risks will require a major effort from national policymakers,
based on clear strategies and ambitious NDCs, alongside
significantly more international financial and technical support.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 192
Regional deep dive
Middle East
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 193
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Notes: Sovereign yields of bonds not available. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods.
Debt ratings reflect the credit rating range for various countries in the region.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Caa1 – Aa1
-
42%
Sovereign debt
rating
Countries with NZE
commitments
Middle East
World
Economic and
financial indicators
4%
3%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
24,222
20,952
2.3%
1.8%
556
371
1%
0.2
1.8
0.7
4.7
2.9
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
250
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 194
Regional deep dive
Clean energy investment in the Middle East is rising, but it remains dominated by the region’s
traditional role as a supplier of oil and gas
The Middle East is home to five of the world’s top oil producers: Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, and Kuwait.
Moreover, it plays a significant role as a producer of natural gas, with
three of the world’s top ten producers being Iran, Qatar, and the UAE.
For the moment, spending on fossil fuel supply predominates: for
every 1 USD invested in fossil fuels, only 20 cents are allocated to
clean energy investment, which represents approximately one-tenth
of the average global ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel investment.
There are wide disparities in per capita income and energy
consumption levels across the region. For example, countries like
Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait are situated at the higher end of
income and energy consumption, while Yemen and Syria are
positioned at the lower end. Sovereign credit ratings also vary
significantly. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE hold high
ratings, while Jordan, Oman, and Bahrain fall into the medium-grade
category. Conversely, Iraq and Lebanon have very low ratings.
Energy investment in the Middle East is expected to reach
approximately USD 175 billion in 2024, with clean energy accounting
for around 15% of the total investment. In the APS by 2030, clean
energy investment more than triples compared with 2024. As a result,
by the end of the decade, every 1 USD invested in fossil fuels in this
scenario would be matched by 70 cents going to clean energy.
Five of the twelve countries in the region have set net zero emission
targets. The UAE and Oman have set targets to achieve net zero
emissions by 2050, while Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait have
announced a target for 2060. Additionally, the UAE has committed to
reducing emissions by 19% by 2030 from 2019 levels, and it also
pledged USD 30 billion in catalytic capital to launch a climate-focused
investment initiative at COP28.
The region’s power sector holds a distinct opportunity for increasing
investment in clean energy technologies, notably for solar PV.
Harnessing these resources could substantially decrease reliance on
both oil and gas in the power sector. Saudi Arabia, for example, is
targeting 130 GW of renewable capacity by 2030, up from less than
5 GW today. Projects including the large Al Shuaibah solar plant in
Saudi Arabia and the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum solar park
in UAE are underway. Various countries have also announced blue
and green hydrogen investments, as well as intensifying investments
in critical minerals. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has established a
USD 182 million mineral exploration incentive program. Similarly, the
UAE is expanding its efforts to establish a presence in the sector,
including through a USD 1.9 billion mining partnership in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and securing new agreements in
copper-rich Zambia.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 195
Regional deep dive
China
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 196
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign bond yields in local currency. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026 and 2020, similar
with other periods.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (A1 is investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
A1
22 bps
By 2050
Sovereign debt
rating
NZE commitments
China
World
Economic and
financial indicators
19%
18%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
22,695 20,952
2.5%
1.8%
577
371
33%
3.2 1.8
13.6
4.7
20.7
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
200
400
600
800
1 000
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 197
Regional deep dive
China is a clean energy powerhouse, although energy security concerns continue to fuel
approvals of new coal-fired power plants
China accounted for 19% of global GDP in 2023 and its annual
economic growth rate of 5.2% narrowly exceeded the government’s
annual target. Despite initial signs that the recovery would be swift,
China’s economy continues to face some challenges, notably with a
troubled property market. Yields on Chinese sovereign bonds have
been declining steadily since 2021 and reached a record low in March
2024.The People’s Bank of China, as well as other state-owned
commercial banks, have continued to lower their interest rates, in
contrast to the upward trend in most other major economies.
Chinese investments in energy remained extremely strong,
accounting for one-third of clean energy investments worldwide and
an important share of China’s overall GDP growth. China has
announced dual carbon goals – to peak carbon emissions before
2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060 – and has shown
remarkable progress in adding renewable capacity. In 2023, China
commissioned as much solar PV as the entire world did in 2022 while
its wind additions also grew by 66% year-on-year. Over the past five
years, China also added 11 GW of nuclear power, by far the largest
of any country in the world.
The year 2023 saw robust growth for the so-called “new three” (xin-
sanyang) industries – solar cells, lithium batteries and electric
vehicles (EV) – which saw a 30% jump in exports in 2023 from a
year earlier, making them a major factor in Chinese trade. These
trends are expected to continue into 2024, with the largest portion of
China’s investments heading towards low-emission power.
Ample domestic manufacturing capacity and continued government
support for clean technologies provides a foundation for strong clean
energy investment within China. However, pressures are increasing
on China’s ability to export these technologies to other large
international markets, including Europe and the United States.
Another issue that requires close attention is China’s continued
investment in fossil fuels, especially coal with nearly all the new global
coal-fired capacity. In tandem with its growing renewable capacity,
coal still remains the most prominent fuel source in China’s energy
mix, with coal production reaching a record high in 2023. While China
aims to ensure that coal and coal-fired power will play a supporting
role in its energy system, these developments reflect a strong
emphasis on energy security in China's energy strategy.
Overall energy investment levels in China are comparable to the
amounts required to meet national energy and climate goals,
although full alignment with the targets implies a rebalancing away
from investments in fossil fuel supply, towards grids and the end-use
sectors.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 198
Regional deep dive
India
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 199
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign bond yields in local currency. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years between 2026 and 2020, similar
with other periods.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Baa3
117 bps
By 2070
Sovereign debt
rating
NZE commitments
India
World
Economic and
financial indicators
7%
18%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
8,787
20,952
0.8%
1.8%
72
371
4%
2.1 1.8
7.8
4.7
22.9
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
250
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 200
Regional deep dive
India’s clean energy investments have grown fast in the past three years in response to
ambitious clean energy targets
With a GDP growth rate of 7.8%, India was the world’s fastest
growing major economy in 2023. Its economy is now the world’s fifth
largest, and is on track to become the third largest by 2030 behind
the United States and China. However, per capita income is less than
half of the world average, and India’s development priorities remain
focused on poverty alleviation, job growth and infrastructure creation.
As a result of its GDP growth potential, urbanisation, growth in built
spaces, and the increased demand for electricity as well as materials
such as cement and steel, energy demand growth in India is on track
to outpace all other regions of the world by 2050. This could put
strains on its energy system, which for the moment relies heavily on
imported fossil fuels, especially crude oil and natural gas. In tandem
with this sharp rise in energy demand, carbon emissions in India
could increase significantly over this period due to a growth in fossil
fuel use for transport, power generation and industry.
To address these challenges, India has been pursuing a range of
decarbonisation and diversification strategies. Most notably, India
has a set a target for reaching net zero emissions by 2070. In recent
years, India has scaled up solar and wind power investments and
also announced measures to promote domestic clean energy supply
chains. In 2020, India announced the Production Linked Incentives
scheme to set up domestic manufacturing of solar modules, batteries
and other clean energy equipment. India also has a long-standing
energy efficiency programme in place, as well as a new hydrogen
policy that envisions domestic manufacturing of electrolysers and the
production of low-carbon hydrogen.
India made its debut in the sovereign green bond market in January
2023. Two tranches of bonds valued at USD 1 billion (INR 80 billion)
were marketed primarily to local investors. The issue of bonds –
whose proceeds were destined to support renewables, metro rail
lines, and low-carbon hydrogen production – was more than four
times oversubscribed.
Such initiatives have led to a surge in Indian clean energy investment
in recent years. Spending reached USD 68 billion in 2023, up by
nearly 40% from the 2016-2020 average. Almost half of this was
devoted to low-emissions power generation, which includes solar PV.
Fossil fuel investment grew by 6% over the same period to reach
USD 33 billion in 2023, in response to rising demand for fuel and
coal-fired power generation. Clean energy investment is on track to
double by 2030 under today’s policy settings, but would need to rise
by a further 20% to get fully on track for the country’s energy and
climate goals. Addressing risks that push up the cost of capital will be
critical in this endeavour.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 201
Regional deep dive
Japan and Korea
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 202
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Sovereign bond yields in local currency show the change for Korea. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years
between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (A and Aa are investment grade ratings), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Aa2 – A1
57 – 217 bps
By 2050
Sovereign debt
rating
NZE commitments
Japan and Korea
World
Economic and
financial indicators
5%
2%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
51,373
20,952
1.5%
1.8%
760
371
6%
9.8
1.8
27.2
4.7
61.7
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
250
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 203
Regional deep dive
Japan and Korea have made important steps to expand clean energy investments
Japan and Korea are two of the most developed economies in the
Asian region, accounting for 5% of global GDP, with a per capita GDP
of approximately 2.5 times the global average. Energy investment
represents 1.5% of GDP, and clean energy investment per dollar of
fossil fuel investment is 9.8 – over five times the global average. This
reflects recent growth in clean energy investment as well as the fact
that both Japan and Korea import almost all of their fossil fuels. From
2021 to 2023, average annual clean energy investment in Japan and
Korea increased by around 40% and 10%, respectively, compared
with the 2016-2020 average. Both countries have announced targets
to reach carbon neutrality in 2050 and in our Announced Pledges
Scenario (APS), the countries increase their clean energy investment
by a further 27% by the end of the decade to align with these goals.
This expands investment in low-emission power sources, as well as
in the decarbonisation of heavy industry and transport.
Both countries are pursuing policies to promote investments in
energy transitions. Japan has clarified investment policies and
industry-specific roadmaps for its energy transition under the Basic
Policy for the Realization of GX. Multiple plans (such as the Basic
Hydrogen Strategy and the CCS Long Term Roadmap) have been
developed to support innovation and increase investment in the
deployment of a range of decarbonisation technologies. Japan is
introducing carbon pricing and setting incentives for companies to
accelerate investments in decarbonisation by announcing plans to
increase carbon prices in the future.
Korea’s drive for energy security and its transition to clean energy
sources have spurred substantial investments in recent years. With
its first National Basic Plan for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth
announced in 2023 (in line with its pledge to achieve carbon neutrality
by 2050) Korea plans to significantly increase power generation from
renewable energy sources as well as nuclear power, develop core
green technologies and nurture new green industries through policy
and private financing support, alongside improvements to relevant
systems. Commitments to boost carbon neutrality policies are backed
by enhanced financial support, such as climate response funds to
mobilise private investment. Korea also aims to refine its emission
trading systems (ETS) and introduce emissions permit trading.
International export and co-operation are also seen as key pillars of
Korea’s plan to help finance the energy transition, targeting the
industrialisation of nuclear exports, as well as the EV, renewable
energy, hydrogen and CCUS industries. Additionally, Korea has
pledged to raise the amount of its development assistance devoted
to climate and global energy transitions to OECD average levels by
2025.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 204
Regional deep dive
Southeast Asia
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 205
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign bond yields in local currency reflect the range of change of Indonesia. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five
years between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods. Debt rating reflects the credit rating range for various countries in the region.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings, Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
Caa3 - Aaa
34 bps
80%
Sovereign debt
rating
Countries with NZE
commitments
Southeast Asia
World
Economic and
financial indicators
6%
9%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
2023
Energy investment
indicators
15,753
20,952
0.7%
1.8%
107
371
2%
0.8
1.8
4.7 4.7
9.0
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 206
Regional deep dive
Most countries in Southeast Asia now have ambitious long-term clean energy goals, but
investments are not yet on track
Southeast Asia accounts for 9% of the world's population, 6% of the
world’s GDP and 4% of world energy consumption. The region’s
population is expected to grow to nearly 800 million by 2050; together
with continued economic growth this will have strong implications for
energy demand. Investment will determine how this rising demand is
met, with implications for security, affordability and alignment with
sustainability goals. Eight out of 10 countries in the region have
announced target dates of carbon neutrality: Singapore, Malaysia
and four others in 2050; Indonesia in 2060; and Thailand in 2065.
For the moment, there are significant gaps between investment
trends and the region’s long-term goals. Southeast Asia’s spending
on clean energy represents only about 2% of the global total. Annual
average energy investment over the last three years was
USD 72 billion, but would need to increase to over USD 130 billion to
align with the APS by the end of the decade. There would also need
to be a shift in the allocation of investment towards cleaner
technologies: clean power would be the largest share of investment
– nearly 40%.
Some countries are signalling a shift in priorities. Viet Nam, for
instance, approved its 8th Power Development Plan in 2024, which
seeks to reshape its energy system, including extensive development
of renewable technologies as well as the use of low-emissions
hydrogen and ammonia and a reduction in reliance on unabated coal.
However, the implementation plan is not yet fully clear and over
10 GW of new coal-fired capacity remains in the pipeline.
Updated
expansion
plans
for
low-emissions
power
and
infrastructure, and changes in power purchasing agreements, are an
important signal to investors. However, uncertainties remain in many
countries over remuneration mechanisms for renewable output,
which continue to affect risk perceptions and the cost of capital.
International development finance and support is crucial to Southeast
Asia’s energy transitions. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships
(JETPs) launched in 2021 in Indonesia and Viet Nam provide a
framework to mobilise capital for investments in clean energy and
support the phasing out of coal-fired power generation. The release
of the Indonesia Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan in
November 2023 was an important milestone for the JETP and is
expected to mobilise USD 97 billion in power sector investments in
Indonesia. The Asia Zero Emission Community initiative by Japan
provides financial support of up to USD 8 billion to 2030 for energy
projects in participating countries: Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand
and Viet Nam. The ASEAN Taxonomy and ASEAN Transition
Finance Guidance provide a valuable framework for the financial
industry to improve credibility and transparency to capital providers.
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 207
Regional deep dive
Eurasia
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 208
Regional deep dive
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: Sovereign bond yields in local currency, reflecting the range of Russia. bps = basis points. 2016-20 investment reflects annual averages over the five years
between 2026 and 2020, similar with other periods.
Source: Moody’s credit ratings (only Aaa, Aa, A and Baa are considered investment grade), Refinitiv Eikon, World Development Indicators and IEA analysis.
2023
GDP per capita (USD)
Share of the world
Change in
government bond
yield (2023 vs 2020)
B3 – Baa2
539 bps
56%
Sovereign debt
rating
Countries with NZE
commitments
Eurasia
World
Economic and
financial indicators
4%
3%
Grids & storage
Low-emissions
electricity
Clean supply
Fossil fuel power
End-use
Fossil fuel supply
Energy investment
% of GDP
Investment per capita
(USD)
Clean energy investment as a
share of global
Ratio of clean energy to fossil fuel
investment
APS 2030
NZE 2030
NZE 2030
Energy investment
indicators
25,882
20,952
2.0%
1.8%
525
371
1%
0.2
1.8
0.5
4.7
2.9
10.5
Population
GDP
Energy investment
trends and amounts
required to align
with energy &
climate goals
50
100
150
200
2016-20
2021-23
2024e
2026-30 APS
2026-30 NZE
Billion USD (2023, MER)
World Energy Investment 2024
PAGE | 209
Regional deep dive
Eurasia navigates a complex energy landscape, characterised by heavy reliance on fossil fuels,
and an urgent need to ramp up investments in clean energy
Eurasia is a heterogeneous region in energy terms, containing major
fossil fuel producers and exporters, as well as countries like Georgia,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan that obtain around 85% of their electricity
from hydro sources. The overall share of natural gas in the energy
mix is one of the highest in the world, but gas infrastructure is ageing
and often poorly maintained.
The region has been hit hard by energy instability in recent years.
Ukraine’s energy infrastructure has been targeted by Russian forces
following the 2022 invasion. High prices have had widespread
impacts on energy-importing countries and traditional energy
relationships between countries have been shaken.
Levels of energy investment in Eurasia have stalled in recent years
at around USD 110 and USD 120 billion per year, with around 80%
of this going to fossil fuels. At around USD 20 billion, annual clean
energy spending in the region is far below its potential, the result of
significant obstacles that include pervasive fossil fuel subsidies and
policy frameworks that are generally weak and unclear.
The global energy crisis has prompted rising interest in the potential
for clean energy. Azerbaijan’s hosting of the COP29 summit in 2024
presents an opportunity to give new momentum to energy transitions
through efforts to scale up clean power and to reduce emissions from
fossil fuels. Five countries in the region have set net zero targets:
Armenia ,Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic aim to achieve net zero
emissions by 2050. Russia and Kazakhstan have set a target of 2060.
Except for Russia, all countries in the region have signed the Global
Methane Pledge.
Getting on track to achieve these commitments requires a steady
increase in energy investment. In the APS, energy investment is
projected to reach around USD 145 billion by 2030, with the share of
clean energy investment reaching more than one third.
The oil and gas investment picture is subject to a high degree of
uncertainty. Russia is looking to compensate for the loss of European
markets by seeking out new markets in China and South Asia. This
has largely succeeded for oil but putting in place new export
infrastructure for gas has proved to be much more difficult. Russia
has stepped up its bilateral agreements with Eurasian countries,
however, including plans for fossil fuel and nuclear plant projects. In
2023, Russia signed an agreement with Kyrgyzstan for the
construction of a new coal-fired plant (660 MW). As part of its push
to open up new markets, Russia has also been seeking oil and gas
supply and transit arrangements with Central Asia.
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 210
Annex
Annex
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 211
Annex
Acknowledgements
This report was prepared by the Energy Investment Unit in the Office
of the Chief Energy Economist (OCEE) Division of the Directorate of
Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks (STO). It was designed and
directed by Tim Gould, Chief Energy Economist, and Cecilia Tam,
Head of the Energy Investment Unit (acting). Tanguy de Bienassis
co-ordinated the report and led the section on end use and efficiency.
Emma Gordon led the section on energy finance; David Fischer and
Alana Rawlins Bilbao led the analysis of the power sector, along with
Lucila Arboleya, who also designed the regional section. Courtney
Turich and Jérôme Hilaire were the main authors of the section on
fuel supply; Simon Bennett led the chapter on R&D and technology
innovation. Ryszard Pospiech co-ordinated modelling and data
across sectors. Musa Erdogan contributed to the overview and data
visualisation. Eleni Tsoukala provided essential administrative
support.
Other main authors of the report were Paul Grimal (sources of
finance, industry), Jeanne-Marie Hays (bioenergy, ccus), Zoe Hemez
(regional section & grids), Heeweon Hyun (cross-cutting support),
Tae-Yoon Kim (refining & critical minerals), Haneul Kim (sources of
finance, buildings & China), Luca Lo Re (carbon markets), Siddharth
Singh (cross-cutting support), Alessia Stedile (sustainable finance),
Jemima Storey (cross-cutting support), Ryo Yamasaki (sustainable
finance), Peter Zeniewski (LNG).
The report benefited greatly from contributions from other experts
within the IEA: Yuya Akizuki (upstream), Oskaras Alsauskas
(transport), Carlos Alvarez (coal), Heymi Bahar (renewables), Jose
Miguel
Bermudez
Menendez
(hydrogen),
Charlene
Bisch
(modelling), Tomas Bredariol (methane, coal), Michael Drtil (grids),
Stavroula Evangelopoulou (hydrogen), Mathilde Fajardy (CCUS),
Carl Greenfield (CCUS), Ian Hamilton (buildings), Jean-Baptiste Le
Marois (transport, R&D and technology innovation), Suzy Leprince
(R&D and technology innovation), Laura Mari Martinez (renewables),
Jeremy Moorhouse (bioenergy), Aloys Nghiem (R&D and technology
innovation), Francesco Pavan (hydrogen), Apostolos Petropoulos
(transport), Amalia Pizarro (R&D and technology innovation), Max
Schoenfisch (batteries), Jules Sery (transport), Fabian Voswinkel
(buildings), Brent Wanner (power), David Wilkinson (power).
Valuable comments and feedback were provided by senior
management and other colleagues within the IEA, in particular Laura
Cozzi, Brian Motherway, Alessandro Blasi, Toril Bosoni, Christophe
McGlade, Nicholas Howarth, David Martin, Rebecca McKimm, Jacob
Messing, Vida Rozite, Thomas Spencer and Daniel Wetzel.
Thanks also to Curtis Brainard, Poeli Bojorquez, Astrid Dumond,
Jethro Mullen, and Therese Walsh of the Communications and Digital
Office. Nicola Clark edited the manuscript and Lorenzo Squillace
designed the cover.
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 212
Annex
This report could not have been achieved without the support and co-
operation provided by donors to the IEA Clean Energy Transitions
Programme (CETP) notably: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and the
European Commission, on behalf of the European Union. The
financial assistance of the European Union was provided as part of
its funding of the Clean Energy Transitions in Emerging Economies
(CETEE) program within the CETP.
Many experts from outside of the IEA provided input, commented on
the underlying analytical work, and reviewed the report. Their
comments and suggestions were of great value. They include:
Andrei Balazs
Brookfield
Antoni Ballabriga
BBVA
Harmeet Bawa
Hitachi Energy
Imene Ben Rejeb-Mzah
BNP Paribas
Guy Brindley
WindEurope
Barbara Buchner
Climate Policy Initiative
Anne-Sophie Castelnau
ING
Michael Chen
Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies
Deirdre Cooper
Ninety-One
Jakob Forman
Orsted
Masayuki Fujiki
MUFG Bank
Charlotte Gardes
International Monetary Fund
Pablo Gonzalez Gascon
Iberdrola
Francesca Gostinelli
ENEL
Adil Hanif
EBRD
David Hart
George Mason’s Schar School of
Policy and Government
James Henderson
Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies
Ronan Hodge
GFANZ
Sean Kidney
Climate Bonds Initiative
Francisco Laveron Simavilla
Iberdrola
Evan Li
HSBC
Juan Lopez Diaz
Iberdrola
Akos Losz
Columbia University
Peter Morris
Minerals Council of Australia
Arjun Murti
Veriten
Fatoumata Ngom
OECD
Nandita Parshad
EBRD
Stephanie Pfeiffer
IIGCC
Filippo Ricchetti
Eni
Simone Ruiz-Vergote
MSCI
Toshiyuki Shirai
Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, Japan
Ulrik Stridbaek
Orsted
Tae Tamura
Mizuho Financial Group
Akhilesh Tilotia
National Investment and
Infrastructure Fund
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 213
Annex
Tom Tindall
Brookfield
Betsy Winnike
Boston Counsulting Group
Kelvin Wong
DBS Bank
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 214
Annex
Abbreviations and acronyms
ADNOC
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
APS
Announced Pledges Scenario
CCGT
Combined-Cycle Gas Turbine
CCS
Carbon Capture and Storage
CCUS
Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage
CO2
Carbon Dioxide
CVC
Corporate Venture Capital
DAC
Direct Air Capture
EMDE
Emerging Markets and Developing Economies
ESG
Environmental, Social, and Governance
ETS
Emissions Trading Scheme
EUR
Euro
EV
Electric Vehicle
FID
Final Investment Decision
FSRU
Floating Storage Regasification Unit
GBP
British Pound Sterling
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GHG
Greenhouse Gas
ICE
International Combustion Engine
ICT
Information and Communications Technology
IRR
Internal Rate of Return
IT
Information Technology
JPY
Japanese Yen
km
Kilometre
LCOE
Levelized Cost of Electricity
LNG
Liquified Natural Gas
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
M&A
Mergers & Acquisition
MDB
Multilateral Development Banks
MENA
Middle East and North Africa
MI
Mission Innovation
NOC
National Oil Company
NZE
Net Zero By 2050 Scenario
OCGT
Open-Cycle Gas Turbine
OECD
Organisation For Economic Co-Operation and Development
OPEC
Organization of The Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACE
Property-Assessed Clean Energy
PV
Photovoltaic
R&D
Research and Development
RD&D
Research, Design, and Development
REE
Rare Earth Elements
ROIC
Return On Invested Capital
S&P
Standard & Poors
SAF
Sustainable Aviation Fuel
SES
Solid Energy Systems
SOE
State-Owned Entity
STEPS
Stated Policies Scenario
UICI
Upstream Investment Cost Index
USD
United States Dollar
VC
Venture Capital
WACC
Weighted Average Cost of Capital
WEI
World Energy Investment
World Energy Investment 2023
PAGE | 215
Annex
Units of measure
g
Gram
GW
Gigawatt
GWh
Gigawatt Hour
kg
Kilogram
mb/d
Million Barrels of Oil per Day
kb/d
Thousand Barrels of Oil per Day
MBtu
Million British Thermal Units
Mt
Million Tonnes
MW
Megawatt
MWh
Megawatt Hour
TWh
Terawatt Hourdifficulty
easy
domain
Single-Document QA
length
medium
question
The IEA’s 2024 World Energy Investment report highlights a significant imbalance in clean energy investments between advanced economies and EMDEs (excluding China), with the latter receiving only around 15% of global clean energy spending. In light of this, assume the following conditions: The cost of capital in EMDEs is on average twice as high as in advanced economies. Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have limited capacity to mobilize private capital at the scale required to meet COP28 goals. Governments in EMDEs face rising public debt levels, making large-scale public borrowing for clean energy investments politically and economically untenable. Given these constraints, which combination of policies would best optimize the mobilization of private capital, reduce systemic financial risks, and ensure alignment with the energy transition targets outlined in the IEA’s Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE Scenario)?
sub domain
Financial
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