LongBench v2 / 66ed910a821e116aacb2033b / Which following option is wrong, according to the topic "disaster " in the text?

Introduction 
 
As the purpose of this volume is to address the legal challenges posed to the protection of human 
rights by events loosely qualified as ‘disasters’, a preliminary question to be explored is the iden-
tification of the term’s legal contours under international law. However, as emphasised by the 
International Law Commission (ILC) Special Rapporteur Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, within the 
framework of activities related to the Draft Articles on the protection of persons in the event 
of disasters (ILC Draft Articles): 
1 ‘[t]here is no generally accepted legal definition of the term in 
international law’. 
2 Indeed, it would be challenging to pinpoint a single instrument of interna-
tional law capable of providing the authoritative and guiding legal parameter for this term. In 
this regard we are experiencing similar challenges to other areas of law in which standardised 
definitions are lacking and significant interpretative efforts are consequently required to navigate 
among different instruments towards the identification of common criteria. 
3 The relevance of 
this interpretative exercise should not be underestimated, as  
 
[s]uch a definition will help identify the situations in which protection may or shall be 
invoked, as well as the circumstances under which protection will no longer be neces-
sary. Describing the contours of ‘disaster’ will also help identify the persons in need of 
protection and thus ascertain who is entitled to protection. 
4 
 
Hence, with the aim of providing a pertinent terminological framework for this volume, in the 
subsequent paragraphs, we will explore the taxonomy 
5 of disasters and seek to better identify the 
legal contours and implications of this notion. 
 
A first brief reference will be made to the terminology issues addressed by disaster studies, in 
which specific emphasis is placed on the social and sociological dimensions of events that might 
represent a disaster, our aim being to verify to what extent such references could be translated 
into legal paradigms or capable of influencing them. Subsequently we will focus our attention 
on the international legal dimension of this term, conducting a critical assessment of the main 
approaches in this area as identifiable in relevant practice. In particular, the law-making tech-
niques adopted in treaties and soft-law documents could be grouped according to two diverging 
perspectives: (a) international instruments avoiding the terminology challenge, hence addressing 
 
2 
 
A TAXONOMY OF DISASTERS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Giulio Bartolini 


A taxonomy of disasters
11
relevant legal issues arising in the event of disaster without trying to define this term or, con-
versely, (b) documents illustrating the distinctive features events should possess in order to be 
qualified as a disaster. This second approach can be traced back to one of the earliest definitions 
of disaster in international law, namely that provided in the Convention establishing the Inter-
national Relief Union in 1927 (IRU Convention). In this latter context attention will be paid 
to current and recurring key issues in the terminology dilemma, thus permitting us to identify 
trends and converging elements. This analysis will also take advantage of the definitions of disas-
ter included in the most recent and relevant documents in this area, namely the abovementioned 
ILC Draft Articles and the Report of the open-ended intergovernmental expert working group 
on indicators and terminology relating to disaster risk reduction, elaborated to measure global 
progress in the implementation of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai 
Framework), as endorsed by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in February 2017 
(Report on DRR terminology). 
6 Finally, some concluding remarks will build upon this analysis 
in order to highlight the potential relevance of these terminology issues to the protection of 
individuals under human rights law. 
 
A brief foray into the terminological challenges 
pertaining to disaster studies 
 
Although our focus will be on the international law dimension of the term ‘disaster’, we should 
emphasise that the ‘definitional minefield’ 
7 related to the notion of disaster is a contentious 
issue in disaster studies too. As recently recognised, indeed, ‘the existing taxonomies of disaster 
matter . . . [as they] . . . might have far-reaching consequences for disaster policy’. 
8 Over the 
last few decades 
9 (and in advance compared to the terminology debate among international law 
scholars) 
10 a vast array of writings have been produced with the primary aim of revising the tra-
ditional narrative according to which such events were ‘an exteriority where God or Nature was 
to blame for the destruction caused by disasters’. 
11 The position that ‘there is no such thing as a 
natural disaster’ 
12 is a current leitmotiv of disaster studies scholars and might now be considered 
as the starting point for our terminological analysis in this area. 
 
This emphasis permits us to underline that it is ‘hard to identify catastrophic events which 
result purely from “natural” causes’, 
13 as 
‘the human contribution to disasters must be understood 
and recognized’. 
14 Based on such assumptions, disaster studies tend to emphasise that ‘[a] disaster 
event is the intersection of the physical and social environments’, 
15 and may conclude that ‘[i]t is 
also now well established that disaster risk and eventual disaster are social constructs based on the 
presence of potentially damaging physical events but seriously and dominantly conditioned by 
society’s perceptions, needs, demands, decisions and practices’. 
16 From this viewpoint, therefore, 
disasters appear to be the consequences of hazards or hazardous events 
17 whose final adverse 
effects on the inventory of elements present in the affected area are primarily determined by the 
combination of the abovementioned event(s) with human, environmental, social and structural 
vulnerabilities, as well as the capacity of affected communities to be resilient and cope with them. 
In brief, the consequences of a hazard ‘are at least as much a function of where and how we live 
as a function’ 
18 of the hazard itself. Such positions have also been expressed through various 
hypotheses of equations seeking to capture the distinguishing elements of disaster risk and hence 
predict the possibility of adverse effects caused by a hazard. For instance, according to some, 
Disaster Risk R
Capacity C
( ) =
( ) ×
( )
Vulnerability V
Hazard H
( )
 
19
 


Giulio Bartolini
12
 
or 
Disaster Risk R
( ) =
( )×
( ) ×
Hazard H
Exposure E
Vulnerability V
( )
( )
CopingCapacity C
 
20
 
 
Such nuanced elements focus in particular on the social and sociological implications of such 
events, as emphasised by scholars who have emblematically and succinctly qualified disasters as 
‘social events in social time’. 
21 However, the translation of such elements into legal terminology 
remains complex. First, it should be recognised that even within disaster studies the possibility of 
identifying a common terminology is far from being accepted, as recognised by leading treaties 
in this area. 
22 The never-ending nature of the process of refining this term has been captured 
by Kroll-Smith and Gunter, according to whom ‘the more we know about specific disasters, the 
more definitions of disaster are registered in the literature’. 
23 Second, even if it were accepted 
that the abovementioned ‘shift in focus has obvious implications for law in general and human 
rights in particular’, 
24 it must also be recognised that international law practice dealing with the 
terminology issue appears to have evolved primarily according to its own trend and regardless 
of the concomitant debate in disaster studies, as can be revealed through an assessment of such 
practice. 
 
As a result, even if current international legal terminology could be criticised as not being fully 
capable of fully reflecting the social implications of disasters and the need to address the causes 
underlying such events, it still represents the primary point of reference for the identification of 
a workable definition of disaster in this branch of law. For this same reason we will engage in the 
following paragraph in an empirical assessment of current definitions of disaster as provided by 
international law instruments, so as to grasp their main elements of reference. However, a plea 
could be made for a more osmotic approach among areas of research regarding disaster scenarios, 
as some elements of the current terminological reflections pertaining to disaster studies might also 
help to provide a broad theoretical picture and better address the same issue under a legal lens, 
for example regarding the thorny issue of separating natural or man-made disasters in relevant 
legal definitions. 
 
The defi
 nition of ‘disaster’ in international law practice 
 
As mentioned above, the terminology issue can also be addressed from the perspective of inter-
national law, according to solutions endorsed in treaties or soft-law documents. In this context 
the primary references for terminological analysis are provided by instruments pertaining to the 
emerging body of law qualified as international disaster law. 
25 Although its legal contours are 
still under debate, this term can be said to include rules and policies aiming to comprehensively 
address the legal and operational issues pertaining to the cycles of a disaster – commonly dis-
tinguished into the phases of mitigation, preparedness, relief and recovery – 
26 hence adopting a 
holistic approach towards the main legal, institutional and policy challenges raised by disasters in 
its temporal phases. 
27 
 
Of particular relevance to our analysis are instruments in which, thanks to their specific focus, 
the large majority of general legal definitions of disaster can be found, as we shall explore later. 
For the purpose of our analysis, within the ‘rather scattered and heterogeneous collection of 
instruments’ 
28 pertaining to this area of law, other instruments not addressing the terminology 
issue or having a limited scope of application and thus not contributing to the identification of 
common trends in this context are of little relevance. 


A taxonomy of disasters
13
 
In this latter regard, in fact, it could be underlined that the triggering mechanisms of several 
treaties and other documents have been tailored to their specific scope of application  
ratione 
materiae 
, and consequently a general definition of disaster is lacking in such instruments. These 
texts do not dwell on an abstract definition of the term but interpret it as a specific kind of 
event that warrants assistance activities in and of itself. Reference could be made, for instance, to 
the term ‘disease’ 
29 included in the WHO International Health Regulations, ‘oil pollution inci-
dent’ 
30 provided by the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Co-Operation, or ‘nuclear accident or radiological emergency’ in the 1986 Convention 
on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. 
31 Even if related 
events might eventually lead to a situation of disaster according to the potential general definition 
emerging in international law, the limited scope of application of these instruments has an impact 
on the possible use of their constitutive elements to identify criteria for the more comprehensive 
term of art. Similarly, reference could be made to treaties pertaining to different subject matters 
but including specific provisions whose application is triggered by the occurrence of a ‘disaster’. 
However, such documents do not provide autonomous definitions of the term, probably under 
the assumption that it is self-evident, or not wishing to embark on a lengthy law-making process 
in relation to definitions of less relevance for their purpose. An example of this latter trend may 
be provided by universal treaties regulating customs, such as Article 1(B) of Annex B.9 to the 
1990 Istanbul Convention, intended to facilitate the temporary admission of relief consignments 
‘to those affected by natural disasters and similar catastrophes’, or other treaty clauses making 
reference to ‘natural disasters’ 
32 or ‘disasters or natural calamities’ 
33 for their application, without 
however detailing such terms. 
 
Consequently, for the purposes of this contribution, specific attention will be paid to inter-
national instruments that expressly include a general definition of disasters, so as to verify recent 
evaluations according to which ‘[a] closer examination of the content of several conventions 
makes it possible to argue that the definitions of the term “disaster”, where provided in the 
treaties, are almost identical or at least do not differ in any significant manner’. 
34 In this regard, 
looking at the genealogy of the legal definition of disaster, the first example may be provided by 
one of the earliest instruments in this area, namely Article 2(1) IRU Convention. According to 
this provision, the purpose of the organisation was 
 
[i]n the event of any disaster due to  
force majeure 
, the exceptional gravity of which 
exceeds the limits of the powers and resources of the stricken people, to furnish to 
the suffering population first aid and to assemble for this purpose funds, resources and 
assistance of all kinds. 
35 
 
Hence this first general definition of disaster in international law does appear to focus on certain 
key elements in the debate. 
 
First, the ‘[ 
f 
] 
orce majeure 
’s more restrictive “Acts of God” emphasis’ 
36 provided by the IRU 
Convention apparently points to the unavoidable and unexpected character of disasters, a trend 
being reversed by the current mainstream in disaster studies. Second, for an event to be quali-
fied as a disaster for the IRU’s purposes it should be able to overwhelm the capacity of affected 
communities and States. This element is easily associated with the very  
raison d’être 
 of the IRU, 
intended ‘to co-ordinate as occasion offers the efforts made by relief organisations . . . and to 
induce all peoples to render mutual international assistance’. 
37 This emphasis on the involvement 
of international assistance in tackling a calamitous event may be particularly significant for the 
application of treaties devoted to this area of cooperation, although it can hardly be prescribed as a 
requirement for the definition of a disaster, as emphasised by subsequent practice. Finally, it could 


Giulio Bartolini
14
also be argued that the IRU substantially considered the notion to be self-explanatory, taking into 
account that the treaty provides only basic indications on the characteristics events should have in 
order to be qualified as a disaster. While this early definition suffers somewhat the lapse of time 
since its original drafting, it is nonetheless significant as already able to highlight the difficulties 
and certain trends in the elaboration of a legal qualification of disaster. 
 
Subsequent attempts at dealing with this definition in relevant international instruments have 
followed two diverging methodologies, namely: (a) avoidance of the terminology issue, thus 
addressing relevant problems without providing a definition of the term, or (b) a descriptive 
approach, aiming to illustrate the distinctive features events should present in order to be qualified 
as a disaster. 
 
The first trend can be considered a minority one. Only in a few instances do treaties specifi-
cally addressing the disaster cycle provide no legal qualification of this term in the text. In this 
regard mention could be made of the 1991 Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster 
Assistance 
38 and certain bilateral treaties developed in the 1970s and 1980s. 
39 It is not unusual 
in law-making processes to omit a detailed definition of key terms, with the implicit aim of 
maintaining some flexibility and preventing States from relying on a literal interpretation of the 
proposed criteria to escape from the application of relevant treaties. Examples are provided by the 
notions of ‘armed conflict’ in international humanitarian law or ‘outstanding universal value’ 
40 
in the 1972 World Heritage Convention. However, in the area of disaster law such a trend may 
be due to an opposing rationale. In particular, the fact that the application of such treaties of 
assistance depends primarily on the concrete willingness of States involved to act in a spirit of 
cooperation and solidarity has reduced the need to set stringent requirements regarding the 
exact definition of the treaty’s  
ratione materiae 
 scope of application. This element is particularly 
emphasised by the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance where, although 
a reference to disaster situations is made in the Preamble, its Article 1 devoted to ‘[a]pplicability’ 
simply states that ‘[t]his Convention shall apply whenever a state party furnishes assistance in 
response to a request from another state party, except as they otherwise agree’. 
 
While this radical approach has not been replicated in many contexts, significant room for 
flexibility has also been provided in treaties that do provide a definition of disaster. In some cases, 
for instance, even if the relevant document includes criteria to qualify certain events as a disaster, 
the definition includes clauses intended to potentially enlarge its scope of application according 
to the interests of parties involved. Reference could be made, for instance, to the 1997 Agreement 
between Argentina and Chile on cooperation in case of disasters, whose Article 1, apart from 
describing the characteristics events should have to be qualified as a disaster, also provides that 
‘“[d]isaster” shall mean any event so described by the Party requiring assistance’. 
41 
 
However, as mentioned above, the large majority of international instruments addressing dis-
asters usually include a definition of this term through certain descriptive elements and general 
criteria. As a result, ‘even if “disaster” is not a term of art and, as such, lacks one single accepted 
definition’, 
42 especially since the 1970s and 1980s an increasing body of practice has built up 
in this regard. Such practice comprises certain common elements and qualifiers, permitting the 
delineation of current converging trends in this area in light of recurring  
topos and cross-fertilisations. 
Hence, before looking at the recurring issues in practice over the last decades, it may be helpful to 
draw attention to the definitions of disaster included in the most recent and relevant documents 
in this area, namely the ILC Draft Articles and the Report on DRR terminology, which already 
emphasise current elements in the debate and highlight the shift that practice in this area has 
undergone since the early definition was provided in the 1927 IRU Convention. 
 
According to Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles, ‘“disaster” means a calamitous event 
or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass 


A taxonomy of disasters
15
displacement, or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the 
functioning of society’. 
43 Similarly, for the Report on DRR terminology, which has led the UN 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to update its definition, 
44 a disaster is 
 
[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due 
to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, 
leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental 
losses and impacts.  
 
These texts capture current trends and key converging elements in relation to terminology but 
nonetheless present some differences, for instance the emphasis in the Report on DRR terminol-
ogy on elements such as pre-existing vulnerabilities and exposures, thus addressing aspects present 
in disaster studies but not international law practice. Such definitions obviously do not come out 
of the blue but are expressions of the significant practice developed over the last decades, permit-
ting identification of the main and recurring complexities related to the terminology issue, as will 
be explored subsequently. In particular, the current definitions of disaster pivot on two main axes, 
upon which we can place the most frequently recurring features emphasised by practice, namely: 
the origin of disasters and the effects of such calamitous events. A series of sub-questions could 
also be formulated in relation to these features. 
 
Origin of disasters 
 
First, practice tends to categorise disasters according to their origins and causal elements, thus 
replicating in the normative arena the basic dilemma faced by disaster studies. As underlined 
above, disaster studies consider it almost impossible to make clear distinctions regarding the nature 
of disasters, namely to focus only on natural disasters as compared to those of man-made origin. 
In fact, disasters often result from a complex web of factors in which no single sufficient cause 
can be identified, especially once natural phenomena merge with human agency in the birth and 
expansion of calamitous events. 
 
Despite this basic assumption, in some limited cases treaties have expressly restricted their 
scope of application to natural disasters, as mainly exemplified by Article 1.3 of the 2011 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural 
Disasters (SAARC Agreement). 
45 Conversely, the very large majority of relevant instruments 
does not include a qualifier in this regard 
46 (probably on the assumption that an explicit ref-
erence to causation may be unnecessary) or clearly affirm, through similar expressions, 
47 that 
a disaster might be caused by exposure to ‘the operation of the forces of nature or to human 
intervention’. 
48 This approach is also confirmed by the Commentary to Draft Article 3(A) 
of the 2016 ILC Draft Articles, which emphasises that ‘[n]o limitation is included concerning 
the origin of the event, that is whether it is natural or human-made, in recognition of the 
fact that disasters often arise from complex sets of causes that may include both wholly nat-
ural elements and contributions from human activities’, 
49 according to the position already 
endorsed by the Special Rapporteur. 
50 In a similar manner this approach can be inferred from 
the reference to ‘hazardous events’ included in the definition of disaster of the Report on DRR 
Terminology, as it makes explicit reference to this additional term of art. In fact, according 
to the Report, ‘[h]azards may be natural, anthropogenic or socio-natural in origin. Natural 
hazards are predominantly associated with natural processes and phenomena. Anthropogenic 
hazards, or human-induced hazards, are induced entirely or predominantly by human activities 
and choices’. 
51 


Giulio Bartolini
16
 
The first element of this qualification also calls for the analysis of certain related issues. In 
particular, ‘disasters of human-made origin’ may apply to several scenarios, as exemplified by 
scholars seeking to include within this term ‘financial,’ ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’ events (including 
armed conflicts). 
52 However, from our perspective, such a very broad interpretation risks com-
pletely undermining a potentially autonomous notion of disaster in international law and does 
not appear to be supported by international practice. 
 
In particular, several instruments specify that armed conflict does not fit within the legal defi-
nition of disaster. 
53 This approach has been expressly endorsed by treaties 
54 and other relevant 
documents in this area. An early example is already included in the UN 1984 Draft Conven-
tion on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance 
55 and subsequently reiterated by the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in their Guidelines for 
the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery 
Assistance (IDRL Guidelines). 
56 Even the ILC has confirmed that ‘[a] situation of armed conflict 
cannot be qualified  
per se 
 as a disaster’. 
57 Said approach is also shared by the Report on DRR 
terminology, which maintains, in relation to anthropogenic hazards, that ‘[t]his term does not 
include the occurrence or risk of armed conflicts and other situations of social instability or ten-
sion which are subject to international humanitarian law and national legislation’. 
58 Such express 
limitations are especially relevant in identifying the contours of an autonomous definition of 
disaster, as armed conflicts could otherwise easily fulfill any proposed criteria due to their signif-
icant impact and negative consequences. The reasons behind this latter approach can clearly be 
justified by the desire to make a clear distinction from a branch of international law, namely the 
law of armed conflicts, that is already extensively regulated at the universal level according to its 
own rationale. Moreover, it reflects the recognition of ‘important differences between the context 
of conflict and peacetime disaster’, 
59 according to a solution also endorsed by disaster studies. 
60 
 
In a similar vein, with the aim of avoiding definitions which are too broad, the Commentary 
to Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles maintains that the term ‘disaster’ does not include 
‘other serious events, such as political and economic crises, which may also undermine the func-
tioning of society, but which are outside the scope of the draft articles’. 
61 Nonetheless, it could 
also be pointed out that, in certain circumstances, the relatively flexible approach adopted in some 
definitions has ultimately implied that mechanisms originally envisaged to deal with common 
scenarios related to disaster situations have effectively been used to address other public emer-
gencies. In this regard the primary example is provided by the activation of the European Union 
(EU) Civil Protection Mechanism to deal with the recent migrant crisis and the phenomenon of 
internally displaced persons present in non-EU States in relation to scenarios of armed conflict. 
Such extensive use of the Mechanism has however met with criticism in the doctrine focusing 
on the ad hoc nature of this solution, which has responded mainly to internal EU policies rather 
than to the scope of the Civil Protection Mechanism itself. 
62 
 
Effects of disasters 
 
Second, definitions of disasters usually include references to the effects calamitous events should 
have in order to be qualified as such. In particular, reference is made to events capable of affecting 
three broad categories usually expressly specified in current practice, namely: people, 
63 property 
64 
and the environment. 
65 In a very limited number of instruments express reference is also made to 
‘cultural heritage’ 
66 as a distinctive element potentially suffering from the effects of disasters, with 
the clear intention of emphasising the relevance of cultural assets, their intangible relationship to 
human beings and the need to preserve them for future generations from the effects of disasters. 
67 
Hence events may well trigger a series of consequences, recently included through several broad 


A taxonomy of disasters
17
examples in the ILC definition, such as loss of life, human suffering and distress, mass displace-
ment, or material or environmental damage. This text has systematised similar terminology used 
in international practice, where reference is made, for instance, to prejudices to the ‘health’ 
68 of 
humans and ‘animals’, 
69 ‘material damage’, 
70 ‘economic losses’, 
71 ‘human . . . losses’, 
72 ‘environ-
mental losses’, 
73 ‘social . . . damage’, 
74 etc. 
 
Such emphasis on different kinds of effects seeks to comprehensively underline the many 
significant impacts disasters might have on affected communities, not being limited to direct prej-
udices against human life but covering the entire ‘disaster impact’. 
75 For instance, the emphasis 
on environmental damage – an element that has more recently been routinely included in the 
definitions of disaster – should be welcomed as a recognition, also in this area, that ‘the environ-
ment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health 
of human beings, including generations unborn’ according to the position maintained by the 
International Court of Justice. 
76 
 
In order to avoid over-restrictive definitions, it should be emphasised that relevant provisions 
consider such criteria as being alternative ones. Therefore it is not necessary to ascertain the 
occurrence of all the abovementioned effects together, as the existence of one of them is suffi-
cient to fulfill the criterion. Similarly, it can also be emphasised that a transboundary nature of 
disasters is not considered necessary in this practice. Therefore even if the events in question are 
of a solely domestic nature they can still be relevant for the definition of a disaster, as reiterated 
by the Commentary to Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles. 
77 
 
As emphasised above, for a hazard to result in a disaster implies its capacity to impact people, 
property or the environment. However, in order to avoid classifying any sort of event as a disaster, 
international practice routinely employs certain qualifications so that only significant matters 
are contemplated: for instance, effects of hazards must be ‘severe’, 
78 ‘widespread’, 
79 ‘significant’ 
80 
or ‘serious’. 
81 Such elements clearly aim to differentiate between the common difficulties that 
communities may experience and a proper international legal definition of disaster. In fact, 
even if this term should be vested with some flexibility due to its mutable nature, the risk of its 
over-application or indefinite character is quite evident, as emphasised by some very outdated 
and isolated practice in this area seeking to deal with not only technological and natural disasters 
but also ‘les accidents de la vie quotidienne et de la circulation routière’. 
82 
 
However, it remains complex to effectively establish a threshold for such qualifications and 
effects of disasters. The difficulties are illustrated, for instance, by Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC 
Draft Articles, whose reference to events capable of ‘seriously disrupting the functioning of 
society’ has expressly been used to cover ‘only extreme events’ 
83 and to fix ‘a high threshold’, 
84 
in order to ensure that the occurrence of severe detrimental effects alone, as exemplified in the 
first part of this same definition, 
85 could not be considered sufficient to fulfill this term. This 
latter reasoning is expressly included in the Commentary, where it is specified that ‘the nature of 
the event is further qualified by the requirement that any, or all, of the four possible outcomes, 
as applicable, result in the serious disruption of the functioning of society. In other words, an 
event that resulted in, for example, large-scale material damage, but did not seriously disrupt the 
functioning of society, would not, accordingly, satisfy the threshold requirement’. 
86 However, the 
Commentary fails to spell out which criteria should be used to ascertain the disruption of a soci-
ety. Accordingly, some scholars have suggested that this additional element should be deleted in 
order to avoid establishing too high a threshold, 
87 or have underlined that the societal disruption 
element would not be fit for some types of disasters, such as environmental ones. 
88 
 
Furthermore, it could be pointed out that the sole reference to ‘society’ in this definition 
could potentially be misleading. Even if this term is also present in other instruments, such as the 
Tampere Convention on the Provision of T
elecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation 


Giulio Bartolini
18
and Relief Operations (Tampere Convention) or the IDRL Guidelines, 
89 other trends are also 
identifiable. In particular, other treaties include an additional reference to the term ‘community’ 
along with ‘society’, 
90 or make reference to more geographically defined notions such as disasters 
impacting local communities 
91 or having a ‘spatially limited’ character, 
92 for example occurring in 
‘a definite area’. 
93 Similarly, several treaties use the terms 
‘disaster’ or 
‘accidents’ 
94 in an interchange-
able manner, with the implicit consequence of also addressing events with a more limited impact. 
 
Presumably, this latter practice seeks to avoid the potential interpretative difficulties related to 
the term ‘society’, a notion not qualified in international instruments and one that might imply 
the assessment of the detrimental effects of hazards on a very large scale. The Report on DRR 
terminology, however, adopts a different solution: here the definition of disaster specifies 
‘[a] serious 
disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale’ and the related  
Annotations 
emphasise that this criteria is satisfied when the events ‘test or exceed the capacity of a commu-
nity or society to cope using its own resources, and therefore may require assistance from external 
sources, which could include neighbouring jurisdictions, or those at the national or international 
levels’. 
95 In this latter case, therefore, the disruption of a community or society is primarily linked 
to the presence of events of any scale that overwhelm the response capacity of the entities affected. 
This concept appears in several treaties, presumably with the aim of underlining the shortcomings 
among the descriptive criteria otherwise used for the identification of a disaster. 
96 
 
It is clear that increased harmonisation should be favored in future international practice in 
order to clarify this element, which is largely motivated by different perspectives behind the 
two instruments: the definition provided by Draft Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles has 
been accompanied by the usual caveat, according to which Draft Article 3 on the ‘use of terms’ 
has been provided ‘[f]or the purposes of the present draft articles’. As the purpose of the Draft 
Articles is primarily to regulate cooperation at the international level between the affected State 
and external assisting actors, usually driven by large-scale disasters, it does not appear unusual 
that the ILC moved toward a definition intended to identify international provisions with a high 
threshold in relation to events. Conversely, the Sendai Framework appears to adopt a very com-
prehensive approach, being intended to ‘apply to the risk of small-scale and large-scale, frequent 
and infrequent, sudden and slow-onset disasters caused by natural or man-made hazards’. 
97 From 
our perspective, and in the light of relevant practice, a broader definition should be favored in 
the identification of ‘disaster’ as a legal term of art, at least making reference to community along 
with society, in order to ensure that the interpretative challenges related to the societal disruption 
element do not result in an excessively limitative notion. 
 
The abovementioned detrimental effects can be recorded and evaluated according to different 
time scales, and in this regard reference is usually made to notions such as sudden-onset (such as 
volcanic eruptions) or slow-onset emergencies (such as drought). Recognition of the different 
temporal context of disasters has progressively been encapsulated in legal definitions addressing 
this term. For instance, a very limited number of international treaties expressly limit their field 
of application to sudden-onset disasters, as was the case in the original version of the 1991 Treaty 
establishing the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency, which specified situations 
involving ‘[a] sudden event’. 
98 However, this limitation has been deleted from the new 1998 
treaty regulating this entity 
99 and the majority of international instruments do not include this 
qualification. Conversely, certain relevant instruments now expressly include slow-onset disasters 
in their scope of application, such as the Tampere Convention 
100 and the IDRL Guidelines. 
101 
 
This position has recently been shared by the ILC in its Commentary to Draft Article 3(a), 
according to which 
‘the draft articles apply equally to sudden-onset events (such as an earthquake 
or tsunami) and to slow-onset events (such as drought or sea-level rise), as well as frequent small-
scale events (floods or landslides)’, 
102 hence expanding the definition to a series of events ‘that, 


A taxonomy of disasters
19
on their own, might not meet the necessary threshold, but that, taken together would constitute 
a calamitous event for the purposes of the draft articles’. 
103 In a similar vein the  
Annotations 
 to 
the definition of disaster in the Report on DRR terminology make reference to both categories 
of disasters. While a slow-onset disaster is ‘one that emerges gradually over time. Slow-onset 
disasters could be associated with, e.g. drought, desertification, sea-level rise, epidemic disease’, a 
sudden-onset disaster is ‘one triggered by a hazardous event that emerges quickly or unexpect-
edly. Sudden-onset disasters could be associated with, e.g. earthquake, volcanic eruption, flash 
flood, chemical explosion, critical infrastructure failure, transport accident’. 
104 
 
Finally, it should also be emphasised that various definitions do not limit this notion to the 
effective occurrence of negative consequences. Indeed, several international instruments empha-
sise that this definition could be satisfied, in legal terms, even before the occurrence of the disaster 
scenarios hypothesised, mainly in order to permit the timely activation of relevant assistance trea-
ties and reduce the negative consequences foreseen. In several treaties 
105 a disaster is considered 
as such in the presence of an event which ‘threatens’ 
106 or ‘may cause’ 
107 the abovementioned 
detrimental effects, a position shared by Article 1(C) of the 2000 Framework Convention on 
Civil Protection Assistance, which requires only the threat of loss in order to identify a dis-
aster, 
108 by Decision 1313/2013/EU, 
109 and by other treaties. 
110 It appears clear, especially in 
relation to treaties on assistance, that the prompt activation of cooperation among States and 
other assisting actors may help to reduce potential detrimental effects. Similarly, the relevance of 
protection issues linked with human rights standards can hardly be limited to actual victims of 
disasters without paying attention to potential ones. However, this element has not been expressly 
included in the definition or the Commentary to Draft Article 3(a), 
111 in line with the original 
proposal of the ILC Special Rapporteur. 
112 
 
Conclusions 
 
This taxonomy of the definitions of disaster provided by international law instruments allows us 
to identify several elements that converge toward the identification of this term of art, relating in 
particular to the origins of disasters, the effects such events might have and relevant limitations. As 
a result, even if certain criteria have yet to be properly addressed by practice, the legal boundaries 
of this notion are increasingly well defined. 
 
As mentioned above, the protection of human rights in disaster scenarios obviously represents 
one of the key legal paradigms to be taken into account. Indeed, the same terminology issue may 
be of some relevance in this context, as will be explored in the following chapters. 
 
First, the definition of the term ‘disaster’, according to international law practice, helps to 
clarify which events and related legal issues fall outside the parameters of this notion. A particular 
mention could be made of armed conflicts, which  
per se 
 do not represent a disaster, according to 
relevant documents such as the ILC Draft Articles and the Report on DRR T
erminology, as well 
as other practice. Also for the purpose of the present volume, armed conflicts have been excluded 
from any specific analysis, unless relevant international humanitarian law provisions might pro-
vide insights to help solve certain challenges, for example in the case of disasters occurring in 
complex emergencies, namely within a State already affected by an armed conflict. 
113 
 
Second, defining the term ‘disaster’ can permit the identification of specific exigencies related 
to the protection and respect of human rights which arise in such particular scenarios. As 
rightly underlined by Kälin, ‘[h]uman rights are never more important for people than in times 
of particular need and vulnerability, and they therefore have an important role to play in times 
of disasters’. 
114 The provision of this latter definition with clear contents could therefore help 
States, international organisations and non-state actors to better clarify the specific content of 


Giulio Bartolini
20
obligations inherent in general human rights guarantees as applied in disaster contexts. This 
perspective is endorsed by the ILC Special Rapporteur Valencia-Ospina, according to whom 
‘[s]uch a definition will help identify the situations in which protection may or shall be invoked’ 
115 
and clarify who needs protection in such specific circumstances. In particular, the context-based 
character of some challenges to the application of human rights obligations in the case of dis-
asters implies that clarification of this definition might contribute to the better identification 
of situations where additional or specifically tailored measures could be requested as compared 
to common scenarios, as explored by the authors of this volume. 
116 Even the integration of 
the rights-based approach into the disaster management perspective, as championed by some 
actors, 
117 can obviously benefit from the identification of situations in which suggested actions 
and legal and operative paradigms should be considered relevant. 
 
Furthermore, this link between the terminology issue and substantive human rights provi-
sions could also be explored in relation to certain specific elements. For instance, while we have 
seen that the origin of a disaster, i.e. human-made or natural, is no longer appropriate for ter-
minology purposes, as both typologies are commonly covered by relevant instruments, it could 
easily be shown that this distinction still has an impact in terms of the substantive human rights 
obligations States are expected to fulfill. Examples could be provided, for instance, in relation 
to different standards that States are requested to comply with, under a due diligence paradigm, 
in relation to the prevention of natural or anthropic disasters. 
118 Conversely, on the basis of the 
abovementioned terminological analysis, criticisms could be made regarding the restricted scope 
of application of instruments specifically intended to address challenges to the protection of 
human rights solely in case of natural disasters, such as the Operational Guidelines on Human 
Rights and Natural Disasters drawn up by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 
119 As discussed 
above, especially on the basis of analysis carried out within the framework of disaster studies and 
confirmed by relevant practice, such a distinction is hardly tenable, as similar challenges to human 
rights protection might also be expected to occur in the event of human-made disasters. Finally, 
terminology issues might also impact limitations and derogations to human rights treaties. In fact, 
especially in relation to events capable of fulfilling the high threshold criteria provided by Draft 
Article 3(a) of the ILC Draft Articles, States may be able to consider such disasters as situations 
representing public emergencies and hence demand extraordinary measures, as shall be explored 
subsequently. 
120 
 
As a result, the possibility of qualifying an event as a disaster might have the added value of 
underlining the specific and multifaceted peculiarities that such situations can imply and there-
fore properly guarantee positive and negative human rights obligations. Even if human rights 
law is naturally not dependent, from the point of view of its relevance, upon the existence of a 
disaster, identifying the proper content of the latter term could nonetheless help to better frame 
the guarantees protecting fundamental values within this specific context. 
 
Selected bibliography 
 
G. Bartolini, ‘Il progetto di articoli della Commissione del diritto internazionale sulla “Protection of Persons 
in the Event of Disasters”’,  
100 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2017) 677 ff. 
 
A. de Guttry, ‘Surveying the Law’ in de Guttry, Gestri and Venturini (eds),  
International Disaster Response Law 
(Springer, 2012), 3 ff. 
 
IFRC,  
Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study (IFRC, 2007). 
 
R.W
. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds),  
What Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions 
 (International 
Research Committee on Disasters, 2005). 
 
J.-M. Thouvenin, ‘La définition de la catastrophe par la CDI: vers une catastrophe juridique?’ in P
. Sanjuán 
and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds),  
International Law and Disasters (Ibanez, 2011) 41 ff. 


A taxonomy of disasters
21
 
Notes 
 1 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-Eighth Session, UN Doc. A/71/10 (2016) 
(ILC Report 2016) (2 May–10 June and 4 July–12 August 2016) 12. 
  
2 ILC, Preliminary Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Mr. Eduardo Valencia-
Ospina, UN Doc. A/CN.4/598 (5 May 2008) 152, para 46. 
 3 For similar problems see for instance: M. Di Filippo, ‘The Definition(s) of T
errorism in International 
Law’ in B. Saul (ed),  
Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism 
 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 
105; A. Gilles,  
La definition de l’investissement international 
 (Larcier, 2012); C. Dugard, ‘The Problem of the 
Definition of T
errorism in International Law’ in P
. Eden and T. O’Donnel (eds),  
September 11, 2001: A 
Turning Point in International and Domestic Law? 
 (Transnational Publishers, 2005) 187; V
. Grammatikas, 
‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law: A Problem Still Looking for a Solution’ 52  
Revue 
Hellénique de droit International (1999) 321. 
 4 ILC, Second Report on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters by Mr. Eduardo Valencia- 
Ospina, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/615 (7 May 2009) 193 (ILC Second Report) para 31. 
 5 Regarding this term and its use in classification exercises in international law see, of course, M. Milanovic 
and V
. Hadzi-Vidanovic, ‘A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict’ in N.D. White and C. Henderson (eds), 
 
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law: Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum 
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 256. 
 6 UNGA, Report of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Indicators and T
ermi-
nology Relating to Disaster Risk Reduction, UN Doc. A/71/644 (1 December 2016) (Report on DRR 
terminology); for the relevant UNGA Resolution see UNGA, Res 71/276, UN Doc. A/RES/71/276 
(13 February 2017) where, at its para 2, this body ‘[ 
e 
] 
ndorses 
 the recommendations contained in sections 
IV and V of the report’, namely the recommendations on global indicators and terminology proposed 
by the working group. 
 7 D. Alexander, ‘An Interpretation of Disaster in T
erms of Changes in Culture, Society and International 
Relations’ in R.W
. Perry and E.L. Quarantelli (eds),  
What Is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions 
(International Research Committee on Disasters, 2005) 25, 27. 
 8 L.G. Sun, ‘Climate Change and the Narrative of Disaster’ in J. Peel and D. Fisher (eds),  
The Role of 
International Environmental Law in Disaster Risk Reduction (Brill, 2016) 27, 47–48. 
 9 See, for instance, A. Wijkman and L. Timberlake,  
Natural Disasters: Acts of God or Acts of Man? 
 (Earthscan, 
1984). 
 
10 See, however, the early evaluation made by P
. Macalister-Smith,  
International Guidelines on Humanitarian 
Assistance 
 (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1991) 21 who 
maintains that previous attempts to define this term in international law resulted in short-lived and 
inadequate results. 
 
11 K.C. Lauta, ‘Human Rights and “Natural” Disasters’ in S.C. Breau and K. Samuel (eds),  
Research Hand-
book on Disasters and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 93. 
 
12 C. Hartman and G.D. Squires (eds),  
There Is No Such Thing as a Natural Disaster: Race, Class, and Hurricane 
Katrina (Routledge, 2006). 
 
13 D. Cubie,  
The International Legal Protection of Persons in Humanitarian Crises Exploring the Acquis Humani-
taire (Hart, 2017) 245. 
 
14 Sun (n. 8) 30. 
 
15 B.L. Brown, ‘Disasters Myth or Reality: Developing a Criminology of Disasters’ in M. Deflem (ed), 
 
Disasters, Hazards and Law (Emerald, 2012) 3, 5. 
 
16 A. Oliver-Smith, I. Alcántara-Ayala, I. Burton and A. Lavell, ‘The Social Construction of Disaster Risk: 
Seeking Root Causes’ 22  
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction (2017) 469. 
 
17 According to the Report on DRR terminology, 18, a hazard is ‘[a] process, phenomenon or human 
activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic 
disruption or environmental degradation’. As for hazardous events, see ibid 20. 
 
18 Sun (n. 8) 31. 
 
19 USAID, ‘Introduction to Disaster Risk Reduction’ (2011) 15, available at www.preventionweb.net/
files/26081_kp1concepdisasterrisk1.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. 
 
20 B. Field et al. (eds),  
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: 
Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 69. 
 
21 
 R.W
. Perry, 
‘Disasters, Definitions and Theory Construction’ in Perry and Quarantelli (eds) (n. 7) 311, 313. 
 
22 E.L. Quarantelli (ed),  
What Is a Disaster? (Routledge, 1998); Perry and Quarantelli (eds) (n. 7). 


Giulio Bartolini
22
 
23 S. Kroll-Smith and V
.J. Gunter, ‘Legislators, Interpreters and Disasters: The Importance of How as Well 
as What Is a Disaster’ in Quarantelli (ed) (n. 22) 160–176. 
 
24 Lauta (n. 11) 94. More extensively K.C. Lauta,  
Disaster Law (Routledge, 2014) 76 ff. 
 
25 There is a growing body of literature on this topic, for instance: A. de Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturini 
(eds),  
International Disaster Response Law 
 (Springer, 2012); D. Caron, M.J. Kelly and A. T
elesetsky (eds), 
 
The International Law of Disaster Relief 
 (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Breau and Samuel (eds) (n. 11). 
 
26 Such terms are usually used by practitioners and researchers to identify the cyclical processes and patterns 
that disaster events follow. However, there is no agreement on the exact content of the different components. 
According to M. Nthakomwa, ‘Cycles of a Disaster’ in K.B. Penuel and M. Statler,  
Encyclopedia of Disaster 
Relief 
 (Sage, 2011) 96–98: the mitigation phase pertains to activities intended to minimise or prevent the 
occurrence of non-imminent disaster; preparedness concerns actions carried out to minimise the impact of 
impeding disasters, usually on the basis of procedures developed during the mitigation phase; response deals 
with the actions immediately following a disaster; and recovery starts once the emergency is under control. 
Conversely, according to D.A. Farber, J. Chen, R. Verchick and L. Sun,  
Disaster Law and Policy 
 (2nd edn, 
Aspen, 2009) 3, the disaster cycle consists of mitigation, emergency response, compensation and rebuilding, 
with the latter completing the circle by including (or failing to include) mitigation measures. 
 
27 The need to comprehensively address legal issues pertaining to the disaster cycle has also been underlined 
by the ILC, according to which  
 
the scope of the draft articles  
ratione temporis 
 is primarily focused on the immediate post- 
disaster 
response and early recovery phase, including the post-disaster reconstruction phase. Nonetheless 
. . . the pre-disaster phase falls within the scope of the draft articles, and is the subject of draft 
article 9, which deals with disaster risk reduction and disaster prevention and mitigation activities. 
 
 
See ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 19, para 4. 
 
28 D. Fisher, ‘Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and Armed Conflict: 
A Comparative Analysis’ 866  
IRRC (2007) 347, 353. 
 
29 According to art 1 of the WHO Health Regulations ‘“disease” means an illness or medical condition, 
irrespective of origin or source, that presents or could present significant harm to humans’. 
 
30 
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (adopted 30 Novem-
ber 1990, entered into force 13 May 1995) 1891 UNTS 78, art 2.2,  
 
‘Oil pollution incident’ means an occurrence or series of occurrences having the same origin, 
which results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses or may pose a threat to the marine 
environment, or to the coastline or related interests of one or more States, and which requires 
emergency action or other immediate response. 
 
31 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (adopted 26 Sep-
tember 1986, entered into force 26 February 1987) 1457 UNTS 134. 
 
32 See, along similar lines, the Annex to the Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic 
(adopted 9 April 1965, entered into force 5 March 1967) 591 UNTS 265, arts 5.11 and 5.12 according 
to which public authorities must facilitate the arrival and departure of vessels engaged in natural disaster 
relief work and to the greatest extent possible facilitate the entry and clearance of persons and cargo 
arriving in such vessels. 
 
33 See Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (adopted 16 November 
1972, entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 152, art 21, according to which the World 
Heritage Committee is requested to provide priority consideration for international assistance to be 
arranged for the benefit of cultural heritage in such cases. 
 
34 A. de Guttry, ‘Surveying the Law’ in de Guttry, Gestri and Venturini (eds) (n. 25) 6. 
 
35 Convention Establishing an International Relief Union (IRU) (adopted 12 July 1927, entered into force 
27 December 1932) 135 League of Nations Treaty Series 247 ff. As for the IRU see P
. Macalister-Smith, 
‘The International Relief Union: Reflections on Establishing an International Relief Union of July 12, 
1927’ 54  
Legal History Review 
 (1986) 368–372; J. Hutchinson, 
‘Disasters and the International Order – II: 
The International Relief Union’ 23  
International History Review (2001) 253. 
 
36 K.N. Bookmiller, ‘Closing “the Yawning Gap”? International Disaster Response Law at Fifteen’ in Breau 
and Samuel (eds) (n. 11) 50. 
 
37 See art 2.2. 
 
38 Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance (adopted 7 June 1991, entered into force 
16 October 1996) A-54 OAS. 


A taxonomy of disasters
23
 
39 See, in this regard: Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents 
(Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, adopted 2 March 1978, entered into force 1 December 
1981) 1320 UNTS 123; Convention on Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Acci-
dents (Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland, adopted 28 November 1984, entered into force 
1 December 1988) 1554 UNTS 155; Convention between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Kingdom of Belgium on Mutual Assistance in Combating Disasters and Accidents (adopted 14 Novem-
ber 1984, entered into force 1 November 1988) 1526 UNTS 42; Agreement on Cooperation on Disaster 
Preparedness and Prevention, and Mutual Assistance in the Event of Disasters (Argentina and Spain, 
adopted 3 June 1988, entered into force 1 September 1992) 1689 UNTS 23. 
 
40 C. Forrest,  
International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge, 2010) 232–233. 
 
41 Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile on Cooperation in Case of 
Disasters (adopted 8 August 1997) art 1. 
 
42 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 193 para 31. 
 
43 ILC Report 21, where the relevant Commentary is also present. 
 
44 For the past version of the notion of disaster see UNISDR,  
Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction 
 (Geneva, 
2009) 9: ‘[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread 
human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources’, available at www.unisdr.org/files/7817_UNISDR
TerminologyEnglish.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. 
 
45 SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters (adopted 11 November 2011) art 1.3, 
makes reference to ‘a natural hazard event’. 
 
46 See, for instance, ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (adopted 
26 July 2005, entered into force 24 December 2009) art 1.3 (ASEAN Agreement). 
 
47 Regarding this approach see, for instance: Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic 
of Albania on Mutual Assistance in the Case of Disasters or Serious Accidents (adopted 27 January 
2010, entered into force 1 July 2011) 2771 UNTS 307 art 2; Agreement establishing the Caribbean 
Disaster Emergency Management Agency (adopted 1 July 2008, provisional application 4 July 2008) 
art 1 (CDEMA Agreement); IFRC, Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of Interna-
tional Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance (IFRC, 2007) art 2.1 (IDRL Guidelines); Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus 
on Cooperation in the Field of Prevention and Elimination of Consequences of Catastrophes, Natural 
Disasters and Serious Accidents (adopted 16 December 2003, entered into force 27 July 2004) 2339 
UNTS 203, art 1.3; Institute of International Law, Sixteenth Commission: Humanitarian Assistance. 
Resolution (Bruges session, 2 September 2003) art I (Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance); Agree-
ment on the Establishment of the Civil-Military Emergency Planning Council for Southeastern Europe 
(adopted 3 April 2001) art II; Tampere Convention on the Provision of T
elecommunication Resources 
for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations (adopted 18 June 1998, entered into force 8 January 2005) 
2296 UNTS 5, art 1.6 (Tampere Convention). 
 
48 See CDEMA Agreement, art 1, according to which “‘disaster’ means the exposure of the human habitat 
to the operation of the forces of nature or to human intervention resulting in widespread destruction of 
lives or property, but excludes events occasioned by war or military confrontation’. 
 
49 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 4. 
 
50 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 194, para 37. 
 
51 Report on DRR T
erminology 18. 
 
52 S.C. Breau and K.L.H. Samuel, ‘Introduction’ in S.C. Breau and K.L.H. Samuel (eds), Research Hand-
book on Disasters and International Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 3. 
 
53 However, see the Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance art I, intended to extend the scope of applica-
tion of this document to calamitous events whether of natural origin, man-made disasters or caused by 
armed conflicts or violence. 
 
54 See: CDEMA Agreement, art 1 according to which a disaster ‘excludes events occasioned by war or 
military confrontation’; Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement 
de la Malaisie sur la coopération dans le domaine de la prévention et de la gestion des catastrophes, et de 
la sécurité civile (adopted 25 May 1998) art 1.a, which qualifies as a disaster ‘un événement autre que la 
guerre’, available at www.ifrc.org/Docs/idrl/I392FR.pdf, accessed on 7 July 2017. 
 
55 UNGA, Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance, UN Doc. A/39/267/
Add.2-E/1984/96/Add.2 (1984) art 1.b, where the definition excluded ‘an ongoing situation of armed 
conflict’. 


Giulio Bartolini
24
 
56 IDRL Guidelines art 2.1, according to which the definition is aimed at ‘excluding armed conflict’. 
 
57 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 24, para 10. 
 
58 Report on DRR T
erminology 18. 
 
59 IFRC,  
Law and Legal Issues in International Disaster Response: A Desk Study (IFRC, 2007) 24. 
 
60 This approach has also been criticised in the area of disaster studies. For instance Sun (n. 8) 47, maintains 
 
 
[b]lurring the traditional lines between natural and technological disasters by recognizing that they 
exist along a continuum of human contribution might also open the door to grouping natural dis-
asters, not just with technological disasters like toxic releases and industrial accidents, but with the 
intentional man-made crises such as terrorism and war. This blurring of the boundaries between 
disasters, terrorism, and war might prove problematic for a number of reasons. 
 
61 
 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 22, para 2. 
 
62 F
. Casolari, ‘La dimensione esterna dell’azione dell’Unione europea nella risposta a disastri naturali ed 
antropici: quale coerenza?’ in M. Gestri (ed),  
Disastri, protezione civile e diritto (Giuffrè, 2016) 98–99. 
 
63 With similar references made to situations affecting ‘people’, ‘life’, etc. see for example: Decision No. 
1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Civil Protection Mech-
anism (Decision No. 1313/2013/EU) art 4.1; CDEMA Agreement, art. 1; Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; 
Framework Convention on Civil Defence Assistance (Framework Convention) (adopted 22 May 2000, 
entered into force 23 September 2001) 2172 UNTS 213, art 1.c.; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. 
 
64 See for instance: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and 
the Republic of Albania, art 2; CDEMA Agreement, art 1; IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1; Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; 
Tampere Convention, art 1.6. 
 
65 Ibid. 
 
66 See in particular: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; Council Decision of 24 June 2014 2014/415/
UE on the arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause, OJ L 192/53 
(2014) art 3; Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural 
and Man-Made Disasters (adopted 15 April 1998, entered into force 11 March 2003) art 2 (BSEC 
Agreement). 
 
67 
 Concerning the relevance of these elements in the definition of cultural heritage see A.A. Yusuf, ‘Article 1. 
Definition of Cultural Heritage’ in F
. Francioni (ed),  
The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 23, 27. See, similarly, Forrest (n. 40) 25–26. 
 
68 See for instance: IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. 
 
69 Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. 
 
70 See, for similar expressions making reference to economic or material losses: ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3. 
 
71 See: SAARC Agreement, art 1.3; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of 
Albania, art 2; ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3. 
 
72 See, for instance, SAARC Agreement, art 1.3. 
 
73 Regarding losses to the environment see, for instance: Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1; SAARC 
Agreement, art 3; IDRL Guidelines, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic 
of Albania, art 2; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government 
of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3; Framework Convention, art 1.c; Tampere Convention, art 1.6; BSEC 
Agreement, art 2. 
 
74 BSEC Agreement, art 2. 
 
75 Regarding this term see the Report on DRR terminology, 13, where ‘[t]he term includes economic, 
human and environmental impacts, and may include death, injuries, disease and other negative effects 
on human physical, mental and social well-being’. 
 
76  
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep. (I) 257, 241, para 29. 
 
77 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 19, para 5. 
 
78 Decision No. 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1. 
 
79 See: SAARC Agreement, art 1.3; CDEMA Agreement, art 1; ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3; IDRL Guide-
lines, art 2.1; Tampere Convention, art 1.6. 
 
80 
 BSEC Agreement, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. 
 
81 Agreement between Argentina and Chile, art 1. 


A taxonomy of disasters
25
  
82 See Accord de coopération entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le gouvernement du 
Royaume de Maroc en matière de protection et de sécurité civiles (adopted 21 April 1981, entered into 
force 21 April 1981) 1264 UNTS 453, art 1. 
 83 
 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 22, para 4. 
 84 
 Ibid 24, para 10. 
  
85 Such effects are ‘widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, mass displacement, or large-
scale material or environmental damage’. 
 86 
 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 5. 
 87 
 J.-M. Thouvenin, ‘La définition de la catastrophe par la CDI: vers une catastrophe juridique?’ in P
. 
Sanjuán and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds),  
International Law and Disasters (Ibanez, 2011) 41, 46–49. 
 88 
 T. Stephens, ‘Disasters, International Environmental Law and the Antrophocene’ in Breau and Samuel 
(eds) (n. 11) 155, who criticises the ILC definition as, under international environmental law, calami-
ties can involve damage to the environment per se and need not involve societal disruption (i.e. ‘pure 
environmental harm’). 
 89 
 IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1. 
 90 
 See: ASEAN Agreement, art 1.3, making reference to ‘[a] serious disruption of the functioning of a 
community or a society’; SAARC Agreement, art 1.3. 
 91 
 See art 1(a) of the 1998 Accord entre le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de 
la Malaisie making reference to events which have a negative impact on the activities of 
‘collectivités locales’. 
 92 
 Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. 
 93 
 See BSEC Agreement, art 2. 
 94 
 As for this term see, for instance: Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of 
Albania, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia on Mutual 
Assistance in the Event of Disasters or Serious Accidents (adopted 17 September 2004, entered into 
force 1 August 2006) 2486 UNTS 277, art 2; Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3. 
 95 
 Report on DRR T
erminology 13. 
 96 
 See, for instance, SAARC Agreement, art 1.3, which makes reference to a situation ‘which exceeds 
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources’. For similar criteria: 
Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Albania, art 2. 
 97 
 Sendai Framework, para 15. 
 98 
 CDEMA Agreement, art 1.d. 
 99 
 Ibid art 1. 
 
100 
 Tampere Convention, art 1.6 makes reference to events ‘developing suddenly or as the result of com-
plex, long-term processes’. 
 
101 See IDRL Guidelines, art 2.1. 
 
102 ILC Report 2016 (n. 1) 23, para 4. 
 
103 
 Ibid. 
 
104 Report on DRR T
erminology 13. 
 
105 
 Regarding this approach see, for instance, Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of Belarus, art 1.3. 
 
106 
 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia and the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine on the Co-Operation in the Field of Prevention of Disasters and Elimination of Their Con-
sequences (adopted 27 April 2006, entered into force 8 August 2008) 2619 UNTS 95. 
 
107 
 Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Russian 
Federation on Co-Operation in the Field of Prevention and Response to Natural and Man-Made 
Disasters (adopted 21 February 2000, entered into force 19 June 2002) art 1. 
 
108 
 Framework Convention, art 1(c), according to which a disaster is ‘an exceptional situation in which 
life, property or the environment may be at risk’. 
 
109 Decision 1313/2013/EU, art 4.1. 
 
110 
 See: Tampere Convention, art 1.6; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of 
Albania, art 2; Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia, art 2; BSEC 
Agreement, art 2; Agreement between Argentina and Chile, art 1.1. 
 
111 For a criticism see Thouvenin (n. 87) 49–50. 
 
112 
 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 195, para 47, where ‘the Special Rapporteur underscores that some actual loss 
is required, as opposed to the mere threat of harm’. 
 
113 See Williams and Simm’s chapter in this volume. 


Giulio Bartolini
26
 
114 W
. Kälin, 
‘The Human Rights Dimension of Natural or Human-Made Disasters’ 55  
GYIL (2012) 119, 147. 
 
115 ILC Second Report (n. 4) 193, para 31. 
 
116 See the chapters by Hesselman, McDermott, Rolnik, Casolari, Adinolfi, Riccardi, Giacca, Polymenop-
oulou, Nifosi, Guadagno and Sironi in this volume. 
 
117 See Creta’s chapter in this volume. 
 
118 See Sossai’s chapter in this volume. 
 
119 IASC,  
Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights 
Protection in Situations of Natural Disasters (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, 2008). 
 
120 See Sommario’s chapter in this volume.