LongBench v2 / 66f8c9febb02136c067c4511 / Which of the following can we infer according to the diffierences and…

Military and Security Developments Involving the  
People’s Republic of China 
 
 
A Report to Congress 
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 
 
 
 
 
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 
106-65, as amended, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both 
classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s 
Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of 
military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and 
probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military 
organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. 
The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security 
matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China 
military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and 
cooperation in the future.” 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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C O N T E N T S  
 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................ I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... III 
CHAPTER ONE:  UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY ............................................................ 1 
CHAPTER TWO:  CHINA’S FORCES, CAPABILITIES,  AND POWER PROJECTION ........................ 45 
CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY ........ 103 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE ................................................. 133 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES & TECHNOLOGY  FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION ....................... 147 
CHAPTER SIX: U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
.......................................... 155 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY ........................................................ 158 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS OF INFORMATION AND INFORMATION DOMINANCE ................. 160 
SPECIAL TOPIC: THE PLA’S EXPANDED MILITARY DIPLOMACY ............................................. 163 
APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA ..................................................................... 165 
APPENDIX II: DEFENSE CONTACTS  AND EXCHANGES ......................................................... 168 
APPENDIX III: SELECTED PLA BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2021 .............. 169 
APPENDIX IV: ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 170 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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I 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
 
The 2022 National Security Strategy identifies the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the 
only competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international 
order. The Department of Defense (DoD) annual report on military and security developments 
involving the PRC charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military 
strategy and offers Congress insight on the tenets of Beijing’s ambitions and intentions. The 
PRC’s strategy entails a determined effort to amass and harness all elements of its national 
power to place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
As expressed in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the PRC presents the most consequential 
and systemic challenge to U.S. national security and the free and open international system.  
In this decisive decade, it is important to understand the contours of the People’s Liberation 
Army’s (PLA) way of war, survey its current activities and capabilities, and assess its future 
military modernization goals. In 2021, the PRC increasingly turned to the PLA as an 
instrument of statecraft as it adopted more coercive and aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Having purportedly achieved its 2020 modernization goal, the PLA now sets its sights 
to 2027 with a goal to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, 
informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this 2027 
objective could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification. 
In addition to the development of the PLA’s conventional capabilities, the PRC has continued 
to accelerate the modernization, diversification, and expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC 
has stated its ambition to strengthen its “strategic deterrent,” while being reluctant to discuss 
the PLA’s developing nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities, negatively impacting 
global strategic stability—an area of increasing global concern.   
As the PRC seeks to achieve “national rejuvenation” by its centenary in 2049, this report 
highlights Beijing’s ambition to reform the prevailing international rules-based system. This 
objective requires an external environment supportive of the PRC’s strategic goals defined 
under the concept of a “community of common destiny,” led by Xi Jinping’s initiatives such 
as the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative.  


 
II 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
This report illustrates how the CCP increasingly turns to the PLA in support of its global 
ambitions, and the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC’s 
increasingly capable military.   
Report Scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until 
the end of 2021.  
 
 


 
III 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY  
China’s National Strategy  
 The PRC’s national strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military 
modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the 
international order in support of Beijing’s system of governance and national interests.   
The PRC increasingly views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government 
effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC has characterized its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC 
leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and an increasingly 
confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition 
between the PRC and the United States.   
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and 
harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC 
in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
 The PRC’s 20th National Congress of the CCP holds important military and security 
implications for the PLA’s 2027 centenary objectives. The 20th Party Congress report 
focused on intensifying and accelerating the PLA’s modernization goals over the next 
five years, including strengthening its “system of strategic deterrence.” Xi Jinping 
retained his chairmanship of the seven-person Central Military Commission (CMC) 
and selected members that offer political continuity, technical expertise on military 
modernization and space issues, and Taiwan-focused operational experience. 
Foreign Policy 
 The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that 
supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Beijing’s 
revisionist ambition for the international order derives from the objectives of its 
national strategy and the CCP’s political and governing systems. 


 
IV 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
 In 2021, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and 
partner influence, such as highlighting the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
criticizing U.S.-backed security partnerships including the Quad (Australia, India, 
Japan, and the United States) and Australia-United Kingdom-United States 
partnership (AUKUS). 
 The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind the PRC’s 
foreign policy efforts in 2021, as Beijing sought to deflect blame for its initial response 
to the pandemic and continued its use of foreign medical assistance, including vaccine 
donations, to bolster its bilateral ties and advance its responsible great power narrative.   
Economic Policy 
 The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of 
China’s broader national development aspirations. The CCP’s economic, political, 
social, and security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support 
Beijing’s strategy of national rejuvenation. 
 Beijing’s “dual circulation (双循环)” policy aims to forge domestic resilience by 
reducing China’s reliance on foreign supply chains that have proven to be economic 
chokepoints. In addition, the policy aims to boost domestic production and 
consumption to fuel growth and decrease the economy’s reliance on exports moving 
forward. 
 China’s economic development supports its military modernization by providing the 
means for larger defense budgets.  Additionally, the PRC’s growing national industrial 
and technological base, as well as deliberate Party-led initiatives such as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025, offers systemic military benefits to the 
PRC. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
 The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand 
global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
 In 2021, the PRC significantly increased engagement with African, Latin American, 
and Middle Eastern countries and began prioritizing public health, digital 
infrastructure, and green energy opportunities. 
 Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards 
expanding its overseas security footprint to protect those interests.  


 
V 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy 
 The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF; 军民融合) development strategy to 
“fuse” its security and development strategies to build an integrated National Strategic 
System and Capabilities in support of the PRC’s national rejuvenation goals. 
 Beijing’s MCF development strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire 
advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and to deepen reform of the 
national defense science and technology industries, and serves a broader purpose to 
strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.   
 The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing 
China’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base; (2) 
integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and 
civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and 
knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and 
leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service 
and logistics capabilities for military purposes; and (6) expanding and deepening 
China’s national defense mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its 
society and economy for use in competition and war.  
Defense Policy and Military Strategy 
 In 2021, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding 
its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater 
global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of 
“active defense (积极防御).” 
 PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” 
military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the 
PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”    
 In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of 
the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more 
credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification.      
 In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW; 多域精确战).”MDPW is intended to leverage a 
C4ISR network, which the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems that 
incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key 


 
VI 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across 
domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. 
China’s Forces, Capabilities, and Power Projection 
 The PLA seeks to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all 
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and 
maritime, as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and 
cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability 
to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a euphemism likely for the 
United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and project power globally.    
 In 2021, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, 
fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its 
competency to conduct joint operations. 
 People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA has approximately 975,000 
active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary ground fighting force in the 
PLA. In 2021, the PLAA emphasized realistic training scenarios and standardization 
of training methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and throughout extensive joint 
amphibious training that utilized both People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and 
civilian roll-on-roll-off (RORO) vessels. PLAA and Russian Army units participated 
in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, a large-scale joint exercise to expand cooperation 
between the two militaries, which was conducted on PRC soil for the first time. 
 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is numerically the largest navy 
in the world with an overall battle force of approximately 340 ships and submarines, 
including approximately 125 major surface combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is 
largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2021, the 
PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight JIANGDAO 
class corvettes to the China Coast Guard (CCG). The PLAN commissioned its fourth 
RENHAI class cruiser in late 2021 and resumed series construction of the JIANGKAI 
II class frigate. The PLAN commissioned two YUSHEN class amphibious assault 
ships, one each in April 2021 and April 2022. The PLAN launched a third hull in the 
YUSHEN class in January 2021, which is currently undergoing sea trials prior to 
commissioning.  
 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF 
and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the region and the 
third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total aircraft (not including trainer variants 


 
VII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)) of which approximately 2,250 are combat aircraft 
(including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and 
attack aircraft). The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces and continues 
to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of 
UAVs. In October 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-
capable air-to-air refuelable bomber, signaling the airborne leg of its nuclear triad. 
 People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF organizes, mans, 
trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile 
forces, associated support forces, and missile bases. The PLARF is advancing its long-
term modernization plans to enhance its strategic deterrence capabilities. In 2021, the 
PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This 
was more than the rest of the world combined, excluding ballistic missile employment 
in conflict zones. In 2021, the PRC continued building three solid-fueled 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo fields, which will cumulatively contain 
at least 300 new ICBM silos. 
 Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization 
established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. 
The SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with 
an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.  
‒ The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled 
information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information 
gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components in conducting 
modern “informatized warfare.”    
‒ The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, 
satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic 
space exploration.   
 Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF provides integrated joint logistics 
support for the PLA.  The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic 
and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and on integrating civilian 
products and services. The JLSF also had an active role in coordinating with civilian 
entities to provide logistic support in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
 


 
VIII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Joint Capabilities in Development 
 The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to 
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific 
region.  
 The PLA is also developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into 
the Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases, globally.  
 Although the PLA has undertaken important structural reforms to promote joint 
operations, its capability to carry out joint operations in support of counter-
intervention or joint campaigns outside the First Island Chain remains in its infancy.  
Capabilities for Counter-intervention and Power Projection 
 The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having 
a presence in China’s immediate periphery and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-
Pacific region. The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are, to date, 
the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PLA is increasingly able to 
project power into the Philippine Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities 
to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.  
‒ Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA doctrinal writings state 
that precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war.  PLA writings 
state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of 
“war control” to prevent escalation.   
‒ Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant 
IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nautical miles (mm) (556 
kilometers (km)) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar 
network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems. 
The PRC has also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the South 
China Sea, further extending the range of its IADS. It also employs point defenses, 
primarily to defend strategic targets against adversary long-range cruise missiles 
and airborne strike platforms.  
‒ Hypersonic Weapons. China’s deployment of the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle 
(HGV)-armed Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) will continue to 
transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly 
intended to replace some older Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) units, 
according to PRC media, and is designed to strike foreign military bases and fleets 
in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.   
 


 
IX 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Advancing Toward an Informatized Military  
 The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO 
in military exercises. 
 The PRC presents a significant, persistent threat of cyber-enabled espionage and 
attack on an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems.  
 The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future 
conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 
Space and Counterspace Capabilities 
 The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and 
related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting 
space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor 
objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.    
 The PLA views space operations as a means to deter and counter third-party 
intervention during a regional military conflict. Moreover, PRC defense academics 
suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites 
could be among the target of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”    
Nuclear Capabilities 
 Over the next decade, the PRC aims to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear 
forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts exceed previous modernization attempts in both scale and complexity. 
 The PRC is investing in and expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based 
nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this 
major expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC is also supporting this expansion by 
increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder 
reactors and reprocessing facilities.  
 In 2021, Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion. The Department of 
Defense estimates that the PRC’s operational nuclear warheads stockpile has 
surpassed 400.      
 The PLA plans to "basically complete modernization" of its national defense and 
armed forces by 2035. If China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will 
likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by its 2035 timeline.   


 
X 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Chemical and Biological Research 
 The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, 
develop, and produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale.   
 China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological 
warfare (CBW) agents, and its robust armaments industry and numerous conventional 
weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted 
to deliver CBW agents.   
 The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which 
raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.  
Such PRC biological activities include studies at PRC military medical institutions on 
potent toxins with dual-use applications. 
 The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the 
Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are 
organized based on the Beijing’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater 
Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the 
theater. 
Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 
 The PRC intensified diplomatic, economic, political, and military pressure against 
Taiwan in 2021. 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and 
around the Taiwan Strait, to include increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and conducting island seizure exercises.    
 Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC 
has never renounced the use of military force. The circumstances under which the PRC 
has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have 
evolved over time. 
 The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, 
with varying degrees of feasibility and associated risks. These options may range from 


 
XI 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and 
occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan.  
THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an external environment conducive to China’s 
national rejuvenation.   
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside the 
PRC’s borders and immediate periphery to secure Beijing’s growing overseas interests 
and advance its foreign policy goals.  
The PLA’s Evolving Missions & Tasks 
 The PLAN’s evolving focus from “near seas defense” to “far seas protection” reflects 
the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach.  
 The PLAAF’s missions and tasks have similarly evolved towards conducting 
operations beyond China and its immediate periphery and supporting the PRC’s 
interests by becoming a “strategic” air force.  
 The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an 
effective way to support and safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s 
global interests, and gain valuable operational experience.   
PRC Influence Operations 
 The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace as a 
critical enabler and means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict.  
 The PRC conducts influence operations that target media organizations, business, 
academic, cultural institutions, and policy communities of the United States, other 
countries, and international organizations to shape public discourse and achieve 
outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
 PRC influence operations are coordinated at the high level and executed by a range of 
actors, such as the PLA Political Work Department, United Front Work Department 
(UFWD), International Liaison Department, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and 
the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF).    
 The CCP seeks to condition international institutions and public opinion to accept the 
PRC’s narrative surrounding its priorities such as Beijing’s “one China principle” on 
Taiwan unification, the Belt and Road Initiative, political control over Hong Kong, 
and territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.   


 
XII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
PLA Overseas Basing and Access 
 The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.  
 A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the 
PRC’s global military objectives evolve.  
 Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground 
forces projection.  
 The PRC has likely considered Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, 
Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan, among other places, as locations for PLA military 
logistics facilities.   
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
 The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial 
sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet 
the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.  
 The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, 
including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as 
espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The 
PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-industrial sector to improve weapon 
system research, development, acquisition, testing, evaluation, and production. 
 In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8 percent, 
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its 
position as the second-largest military spender in the world. As the PRC’s published 
military budget omits several major categories of expenditures, its actual military-
related spending is likely significantly higher than what it states in its official budget. 
Developments in the PRC Defense Industry 
 Most of China’s missile systems, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are 
comparable in quality to systems of other international top-tier producers. China 
conducted a test of a new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous 
progress in hypersonic weapon development.  


 
XIII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
 China’s decades-long efforts to improve domestic aircraft engine production are 
starting to produce results with the J-10 and J-20 fighters switching to domestically 
produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s first domestically produced 
high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing on the Y-20 heavy 
transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end of 2022. 
 As the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, the PRC is increasing its 
shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and 
auxiliary and amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, 
publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019. 
Espionage Activities Supporting China’s Military Modernization 
 The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent threat of cyber-enabled espionage and 
attack to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, 
acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.    
 Sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment that the PRC have attempted to 
acquire include radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave 
integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval and marine technologies, 
syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military communication jamming 
equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
 The PRC seeks to create destructive effects to shape decision-making and disrupt 
military operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC believes 
these capabilities are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries that 
depend on information technologies.   
‒ The PLA and China’s Talent Recruitment Programs. The CCP operates more 
than 200 talent-recruitment programs that are overseen by central bodies, 
including the Central Coordination Group on Talent Work and the Overseas High-
level Talent Recruitment Work Group. Although the PRC government administers 
China’s talent recruitment programs, the PLA uses China’s network of recruitment 
programs, such as the Thousand Talents Plan, to recruit overseas talent for military 
purposes.  
U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
 DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 emphasized responsibly 
managing competition and establishing commonsense guardrails to ensure 
competition does not veer into conflict.  


 
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 2021 defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritized open channels of 
communication and the advancement of DoD priorities on managing crisis 
communications and strategic risk management. 
  
 


 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY 
 
 
Understanding the tenets of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) national strategy is 
essential to understanding the drivers of China’s security and military strategy. This in turn 
offers insights on the current and future course of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) 
reform and modernization in terms of its strength, technological advances, organization, and 
operational concepts—all of which could offer PRC leaders expanded military options to 
support its national goals.   
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s national strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military 
modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the 
international order in support of Beijing’s system of governance and national interests.   
The PRC increasingly views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government 
effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC has characterized its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC 
leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and an increasingly 
confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition 
between PRC and the United States.   
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and 
harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC 
in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
The PRC’s strategy aims to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This 
objective, which General Secretary Xi Jinping (also referred to as Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission or President of the PRC, given the context of his responsibilities) calls 
“the Chinese Dream,” a national aspiration to elevate the PRC to a position of strength, 
prosperity, and leadership on the world stage.  
PRC leaders characterize their strategy to achieve political, social, and economic modernity—
as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—as a grand national endeavor that is 


 
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sweeping in scope and far-reaching in how it will transform the PRC and, in turn, the world.   
The Party defines national rejuvenation as a state in which the PRC is “prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.” Beijing’s strategy entails 
deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external 
elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position.” CCP leaders 
frequently refer to building the PRC’s “comprehensive” national power in this manner. The 
PRC’s strategy entails a long-term planning process to attain national rejuvenation that sets 
objectives, priorities, and milestones across virtually every aspect of governance and policy 
including economics, political affairs, the rule of law, public order, national security, 
diplomacy, and defense as well as social affairs, education, science and technology, culture, 
the environment, and other matters.  
The PRC pursues its efforts to generate greater national power from the basis of defending 
and advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Consequently, Beijing’s 
national ambitions and statecraft rest on the foundation of the CCP-dominated political 
ideology of enhancing the path, theory, system, and culture of “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics.” The objective of this Party-led strategy is perhaps best stated in what the 
Party calls its “basic line,” a single sentence in the CCP’s constitution that serves as the 
mission of the Party and as the cornerstone for its policymaking. Last amended at the 19th 
Party Congress in 2017, it states:   
“The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of 
socialism is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and 
pioneering effort, making economic development the central task, upholding 
the Four Cardinal Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening 
up, so as to see China becomes a great modern socialist country that is 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and 
beautiful.”    
The 19th Party Congress also adopted “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era” into the CCP’s constitution. Unanimously agreed by Party 
delegates, “Xi Jinping Thought” was hailed as a “guide to action for the entire Party and all 
the Chinese people to strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” designating 
General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core of the Party with outsized influence driving party 
objectives to come. 
External Conditions. Among the external elements of the PRC’s national strategy are its 
deliberate efforts to create a “favorable” international environment that is conducive to the 
PRC’s rise and national rejuvenation, according to State Councilor Yang Jiechi, a member of 
the Politburo and a leading Party official on foreign policy. During the 6th Plenary session of 
the 19th Central Committee, the CCP reported its perceived success in managing its foreign 
affairs and national security challenges having “broken new ground” in diplomatic endeavors 
amidst “profound global changes and turned crises into opportunities amid complex situations 
on the international stage.” With regard to national security, the CCP reported to have 


 
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“enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, 
and natural risks, challenges, and trials.” However, in 2021 and into 2022, PRC leadership 
contended with the on-going effects of the COVID-19 pandemic that brought challenges for 
the PRC’s diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence abroad. PRC leadership also took 
diplomatic measures to manage increased global concern regarding PRC rhetorical and 
diplomatic alignment with Russia before, following, and during the invasion of Ukraine, as 
well as concern for the PRC’s growing assertive and coercive economic and military actions.  
PRC leaders continue to believe that global trends, especially perceived U.S. decline, are 
generally conducive to their long-term interests.   
As PRC leadership view a divided China as a weak China, they argue that “full 
reunification”—including the resolution of the “Taiwan question” and completing Hong 
Kong’s and Macau’s integration by the end of 2049—is one of the fundamental conditions of 
national rejuvenation. Beijing views as an imperative that China field a “world-class” military 
that can “fight and win” and “resolutely safeguard” the country’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests.  In support of this goal, on December 26th, 2020 the National People's 
Congress (NPC) passed revisions to the PRC’s National Defense Law, which broadened the 
legal justification for PLA mobilization to include defense of China’s “development 
interests.” The codification of this language in PRC law is intended to add legitimacy to the 
use of military force to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests.   
China’s leaders claim national rejuvenation requires the PRC to “take an active part in leading 
the reform of the global governance system” as many rules and norms were established, in 
Beijing’s view, during a time of PRC weakness and without the PRC’s consultation and input. 
The Party views aspects of the prevailing international rules-based system as constraining the 
PRC’s strategic ambitions and incompatible with its sovereignty, security, political 
preferences, and development interests. To the PRC’s leaders, revisions are necessary to 
accommodate the PRC’s development and should reflect the CCP’s preferred transformation 
in the distribution of power to forge an external environment more favorable to the PRC’s 
political governance system and national interests.  
Key Objectives & Milestones. For decades, the PRC’s leaders have framed their pursuit of 
modernity and power as advancing China along a specific trajectory, with the PRC’s 
centenary in 2049 serving as the target for achieving national rejuvenation and becoming a 
“great modern socialist country.” From Beijing’s perspective, the PRC is a developing nation 
that must transition into a “fully developed and highly advanced” socialist society, and this 
trajectory involves the Party leadership shepherding the PRC through different stages of 
gradual but systematic modernization and development. The Party demarcates the stages of 
the PRC’s strategy with milestones accompanied by objectives and priorities determined by 
the Party’s long-term planning processes.  
Reflecting on the PRC’s progress at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi 
Jinping declared that China had assumed “…a leading position in terms of economic and 


 
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technological strength, defense capabilities, and comprehensive national strength” and 
therefore “crossed the threshold into a new era.” Xi’s declaration that the PRC had entered a 
“New Era” was not a change in strategic objectives, but an important signal of confidence that 
the PRC’s progress was sufficient to tackle the next set of challenges in its development. For 
the PRC’s strategy in the “New Era,” Xi laid out a broad plan to achieve national rejuvenation 
with a timeline linked to two symbolically important centenary milestones reached in 2021 
(the CCP’s centenary) and 2049 (the PRC’s centenary). To bridge the lengthy gap between 
the two anniversaries, Xi added interim national objectives for 2035 and laid out a broad two-
stage modernization plan to reach 2049. Further demonstrating the Party’s confidence in the 
PRC’s progress, Xi’s objectives for 2035 moved up certain mid-century targets set by the 
Party going back to 1987.   
At his centenary speech marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP on July 1st 2021, Xi 
declared that China had “realized the first centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects.” Beyond 2021, the PRC will use the “moderately prosperous society” 
as the basis for Xi’s “two-stage” plan to achieve national rejuvenation by the PRC’s centenary 
in 2049. In the first stage from 2021 to 2035, the Party aims for the PRC to "basically” meet 
its initial thresholds for becoming a “great modern socialist country.” In this stage, the PRC 
will likely continue to prioritize economic development as “the central task,” but rather than 
rapid economic growth, it will seek to address its uneven economic development and 
inequalities that Beijing recognized as the new “principal contradiction” in PRC society in the 
“New Era.” By 2035, the PRC will also seek to increase its economic and technological 
strength to become a “global leader in innovation” and aim to “basically” complete its military 
modernization. The PRC will also seek to significantly strengthen its cultural “soft power” 
and improve its domestic rule of law and governance systems.  
In the second stage from 2035 to 2049, the PRC aims to complete its development and attain 
national rejuvenation, realizing an international status that Xi describes as a “global leader in 
terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence." A renewed PRC will 
have attained—among the Party’s many goals—its objectives to field a “world-class” military 
and assume a leading position within an international order revised in line with Beijing’s 
overall foreign policy goal to establish what it refers to as a “community of common destiny 
(人类命运共同体),” or the PRC’s preferred official English translation, “community with a 
shared future for mankind.”  


 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Military and Security Implications of the 
 20th National Congress of the CCP 
General Secretary Xi Jinping presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16 to 22, 2022. Party 
Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications for 
the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th Party 
Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s 
modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified 
ways.” In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set 
objectives to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic 
deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and 
space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligence 
combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the network 
information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
for the third time, Xi Jinping selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical 
expertise on military modernization and space issues, and Taiwan-focused operational 
experience to lead the PLA toward achieving its centenary goals. 
The 20th Party Congress also offers new insight on the CCP’s changing perception of the 
PRC’s external security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reiterate 
previous reports’ statements that the PRC was operating within a “strategic window of 
opportunity for development,” and did not state unequivocally “peace and development 
remain the keynote of the times.” Rather, the PRC is facing “drastic changes in the 
international landscape” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and be 
prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”  
 
Historic Continuity. Understanding the origins of the PRC’s national rejuvenation is crucial 
to understanding how the PRC will likely shape and pursue this strategic objective. PRC 
leaders have consistently framed their efforts as seeking to “restore” China to a preeminent 
place in the world after enduring what the Party characterizes as China’s “century of 
humiliation” beginning in the 19th century as the Qing Dynasty began to disintegrate and 
lasting until the founding of the PRC in 1949. While the Party’s exact articulation of this goal 
as “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” first emerged in the late 1980s, the Party has 
championed the cause of rebuilding China since the 1920s. General Secretary Xi Jinping 
frequently points to the CCP’s steadfastness to the cause of national rejuvenation and 
describes it as the Party’s “original aspiration.”  
The Party’s narrative of national rejuvenation speaks to the deep impressions left on the PRC’s 
political landscape over an era defined by the disintegration of China’s polity, repeated 
violations of China’s sovereignty by foreign powers, and the prolonged absence of physical 
and economic security for many Chinese people. For a culture with a history stretching back 
thousands of years—much of it spent as one of the most powerful and advanced civilizations 
in the world—nationalist appeals to restore China’s greatness are deeply rooted. The threads 


 
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of national renewal can be traced to China’s reformers and nationalist revolutionary leaders 
in the late Qing Dynasty and emerged as a common nationalist theme in the fractured politics 
of China’s Republican Era. This resonance is crucial to why the CCP portrays the PRC’s 
rejuvenation as a nationalist project that the Party “shoulders” for the country. 
The PRC’s Strategy & the CCP. The Party’s leaders frame “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics” and the CCP as indispensable to the PRC overcoming its historical 
circumstances and attaining national rejuvenation. As General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in 
a speech to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, “Which ideological system a country 
implements depends on one crucial issue: can this ideology resolve the historical problems 
facing the country?” From the Party’s perspective, its leadership and systems are uniquely 
able to restore the PRC’s strength, prosperity, and prestige—underscored with the implicit 
warning that any deviation from socialism’s path would result in “chaos” and China falling 
behind on its “historic mission.” As Xi stated, “…only socialism can save China—and only 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can develop China.”    
CCP leaders flatly reject the notion that the Party has abandoned its socialist ideology in recent 
decades with the introduction of market features into the PRC’s economy or drifted towards 
a non-ideological form of governance. The Party asserts that the PRC remains on the path of 
“socialist modernization” but it seeks to advance the country gradually as a lesson painfully 
learned from the Mao-era catastrophes that aimed for rapid progress. Accordingly, the Party 
claims that to perform its decisive role in guiding the PRC’s development into a “great modern 
socialist country,” it must ensure that the country advances in line with “the Four Cardinal 
Principles (四项基本原则).” First stated by Deng Xiaoping and later written into the CCP 
Constitution, these principles mandate the Party “to keep to the path of socialism, to uphold 
the people’s democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership of the CCP, and to uphold 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” The Four Cardinal Principles are the basis 
for political and governance reforms pursued by the Party and the outer boundaries of its 
efforts to “reform” and “open up” the country.   
As General Secretary Xi Jinping told Party cadres in 2014, “promoting the modernization of 
the national governance system and capacity is definitely not Westernization or capitalism.”  
In addition to cultivating ideological discipline and fighting corruption within the Party, Xi 
has sought to advance the PRC’s strategy by strengthening the Party’s primacy across China’s 
governance systems and making the Party more effective at managing China’s political, 
economic and social problems. Xi’s emphasis on building the CCP’s institutional capacity 
and promoting internal unity—which he views as the means for the Party to perform its 
strategic role—has become a prominent feature of his tenure.  
Competition Between Systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the 
international system and an increasingly confrontational United States are the root causes of 
intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States. The PRC’s leadership 
has long viewed China as embroiled in a major international strategic competition with other 


 
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states. Throughout the post-Mao reform era and particularly after the end of the Cold War, 
the Party’s leaders recognized their socialist system was—and would remain over the long-
term—an underlying source of tension with the West. Given the Party’s ambitions to “restore” 
the PRC’s place in the world and their assessment of the PRC’s relative weakness via-a-vis 
rival states, CCP leaders recognized the PRC’s growing strength could threaten to flare 
tensions with others without careful management. Deng Xiaoping’s reputed approach to this 
dilemma, as attributed by other Party leaders, was for China to “hide our capacities and bide 
our time, be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” While PRC’s 
leaders have consistently pursued national rejuvenation as their goal, they have demonstrated 
a degree of strategic adaptability to seize opportunities and manage threats to their overall 
strategic objectives.  
Over time, the PRC has characterized China’s view of strategic competition in terms of a 
rivalry among powerful nation states, most importantly the United States, as well as a clash 
of opposing ideological systems. The PRC’s leaders have indicated they view competition as 
entailing aspects of cooperation and conflict, and that the Party would need to be adaptable, 
flexible, and above all, patient. The PRC’s leaders have also offered a view of competition 
based on relative levels of economic, technological, and military power. Speaking to the CCP 
Central Committee in 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping remarked that the Party needed to 
“appreciate” that “developed Western nations” would continue to possess “real, long-term 
advantages” over China in the economic, technological, and military domains. Xi argued that 
China would need to “prepare for a long period of cooperation and of conflict between these 
two social systems in each of these domains.” Lastly, Xi alluded to the core elements of 
“national rejuvenation” as the PRC’s approach to this competition. Xi stated, “Most 
importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually 
broadening our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a 
socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will 
win the initiative and have the dominant position.”  
In the past two years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has presented his thoughts on the PRC’s 
strategic environment on numerous occasions. In 2020, CCP leaders, including Xi himself, 
convened several meetings on “growing risks” and, in the communique following the 5th 
Plenum in October 2020, stressed that the PRC is on the brink of “changes unseen in a 
century,” but also that China would benefit from a “profound adjustment in the international 
balance of power.” In his CCP 100th anniversary speech, Xi asserted that as the world 
experienced “once-in-a-century changes,” China had to adopt “a holistic approach to national 
security that balances development and security imperatives” and implement “the national 
rejuvenation.” In his 2022 New Year’s speech, Xi stated that China needed to “remain mindful 
of potential risks” while maintaining “strategic focus and determination.” 
Since just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, PRC leaders have consistently 
characterized China’s security environment as undergoing intense changes and viewed the 
international order as shifting toward a multipolar system more commensurate with the PRC’s 


 
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development. The Party views a shift toward a multipolar system as consistent with its 
perception of global power trends. This shift is vital for the PRC to advance its strategy, 
perceiving U.S. power as a constraint that impedes many of the PRC’s goals. The PRC’s 
leaders have eagerly embraced narratives of the West’s relative decline and the inevitability 
of China’s rise as largely consistent with their strategy and evidence of China's progress. 
The Party views core aspects of the current international system as incompatible with its 
vision for a revised order premised on its “community of common destiny.” The PRC’s 
leaders view U.S. security alliances and partnerships, especially those in the Indo-Pacific, as 
destabilizing and irreconcilable with the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development 
interests. Regionally, the PRC’s  2019 defense white paper claims that “Asia-Pacific” 
countries are “increasingly aware that they are members” of the PRC’s “community with a 
shared future for mankind” and that managing disputes through dialogue is its “preferred 
policy option.”  
Beijing has also expressed concerns over growing global instability and a mounting sense of 
insecurity that it views as instigated by the United States. The PRC’s 2019 defense white 
paper criticized the United States as the “principal instigator” of global instability and driver 
of “international strategic competition.” China’s leadership views U.S. policy toward the PRC 
as a critical factor affecting the PRC’s national objectives and increasingly views the United 
States as more willing to confront Beijing where U.S. and PRC interests are inimical.  
Given the enduring suspicion among some in Beijing that the United States seeks to contain 
China, CCP leaders hold that the accrual of the PRC’s comprehensive national power will set 
the conditions for the PRC’s ability to confront or dissuade the United States and prevent 
containment. As China’s leaders seek to translate the PRC’s growing economic and military 
means into influence to advance their international aspirations, they must also carefully 
balance the PRC’s expanding interests across their priorities and resources. For example, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), originally called One Belt, One Road (OBOR), 
expands the PRC’s overseas development and security interests; Beijing has signaled this will 
drive the PRC toward expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests. 
China’s leaders also seem to have recognized that BRI and other initiatives have sparked 
concerns about the PRC’s intentions, leading it to use less inflammatory and more tailored 
rhetoric without altering the programs’ fundamental goals. Similar tensions can be found in 
the PRC’s efforts to advance General Secretary Xi Jinping’s foreign policy goals such as 
building a “community of common destiny;” pressing revisions to the international order; and 
establishing diplomatic relationships in accordance with what the PRC calls “strategic 
partnerships.” The PRC seeks to secure and advance its overseas interests without entirely 
compromising the relationships and stability crucial to its continued development. This 
tension underscores the increasingly complex decisions and risks China’s leaders must weigh 
in implementing their strategy. 
 


 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
The PRC’s National Security Concept & Management 
In recent years, the PRC has articulated its view of national security as a broad concept that 
spans the confluence of internal and external threats to the PRC’s interests. Party leaders 
have identified national security as encompassing traditional and non-traditional domestic 
and foreign threats; the intersection of external influences on internal stability; and economic, 
cultural, societal, and environmental threats. Additionally, Beijing has taken steps to define a 
concept for national security; improve the CCP’s ability to develop and coordinate national 
security policy across party, military, and state organs; and raise domestic awareness of 
national security concerns. These efforts seek to address longstanding concerns of China’s 
leadership that the country’s legacy system of stove-piped party-state organizations was ill 
equipped to meet the growing national security challenges that the PRC faces.  
National Security Concept: The CCP’s “Overall National Security Concept” (总体国家
安全观), first proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2014, provides the 
framework for the PRC’s national security system, the mission of the Central National 
Security Commission (CNSC), and the basis of the PRC’s national security strategy. 
According to the Party, the premise of the concept is that “The people's security is the 
purpose of national security, political security is the root of national security, and 
priority in national interests is the norm of national security.” China’s leaders consider 
people’s security, political security, and national interests as mutually reinforcing 
aspects of national security. Party outlets describe people’s security as the purpose 
because national security fundamentally must serve the PRC people and the PRC 
nation. Similarly, the Party’s view of political security as the foundation of national 
security is described in terms of the maintenance and “ruling status” of the Party and 
the system of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This reflects the Party’s 
certainty that its leadership and systems are indispensable to the PRC’s national 
rejuvenation. Party leaders assess the supremacy of national interests as the criterion 
or standard by which the Party expects its stewardship of the PRC’s national security 
will be judged: its ability to “resolutely safeguard” the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. The PRC’s concept also views development and security as 
mutually supporting aspects of national security in which “Security guarantees 
development, and development is the goal of security.” 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC): To improve coordination on national 
security matters, the CCP created the CNSC in 2013. The CNSC advises the Politburo, 
oversees the coordination of national security issues across the government, and 
manages crises. Embracing the Party’s expansive concept of national security, the 
CNSC’s purview covers internal and external national security matters. The CNSC’s 
mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and powerful 
leadership has led the CNSC to become an important party-state organ—promulgating 
regulations in 2021 on the “National Security Work of the CCP” and outlining who, 
what, and how the CCP will lead national security in the PRC.  


 
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Membership. The PRC’s top three leaders lead the CNSC: Xi who serves as the CNSC 
Chairman; Li Keqiang (Premier of the State Council); and probably Li Zhanshu 
(Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). CNSC 
membership may include Politburo members, senior government leaders, and senior 
PLA leaders (including the two Vice Chairman of the CMC). The CNSC General Office 
is responsible for the commission’s daily work and is run by senior CCP officials 
serving in dual-hatted roles in other positions. The current Director of the CNSC 
General Office is likely Ding Xuexiang, a longtime political aide to Xi. Ding also serves 
as the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and is a member of the 
Politburo. Since May 2018, Chen Wenqing has served as Deputy Director of the CNSC 
General Office. Chen is also the Minister of State Security.  
National Security Strategy. By 2015, the CCP adopted the PRC’s first national security 
strategy outline following the CNSC’s establishment. Official media noted the strategy 
intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s 
guidance. Over the years, the PRC’s leaders and media have indicated various 
national security sub-strategies that cover a variety of issues including political 
security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security, 
societal security, technology security, network security, nuclear safety, ecological 
security, resource security, and biosecurity.  
National Security Law. With the establishment of the CNSC and the Party’s adoption 
of the national security strategy, in 2015 the NPC passed the National Security Law. 
This law encapsulated the Party’s overall national security concept and swept a broad 
range of issues beneath a new legal framework of “national security,” while 
strengthening the formal role of central authorities. In recent years, the NPC has also 
passed a series of laws intended to address more specific national security concerns 
including counterespionage (2014), counterterrorism (2015), cybersecurity (2016), 
foreign non-governmental organizations in China (2016), intelligence (2017), and 
cryptography (2019). While these laws address more specific national security 
concerns, they remain sweeping in scope and authorities.  
In an effort to raise public awareness of the Party’s national security concepts and 
emphasize national security as a civic responsibility, the 2015 National Security Law 
designated April 15 of each year as National Security Education Day. Indicating the 
reach and depth the Party desires its national security concepts to penetrate into the 
party-state, the 2015 National Security Law also made provincial, autonomous 
regions and municipalities responsible for national security work within their 
administrative areas. This has led to the creation of national security committees in 
the Party’s provincial-level organizations, each headed by the province’s party chief.  
 


 
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FOREIGN POLICY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that 
supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Beijing’s 
revisionist ambition for the international order derives from the objectives of its 
national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems. 
 In 2021, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and 
partner influence such as highlighting the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
criticizing U.S.-backed security partnerships including the Quad (Australia, India, 
Japan, and the United States) and Australia-UK-United States partnership (AUKUS).  
 The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind the PRC’s 
foreign policy efforts in 2021, as Beijing sought to deflect blame for its initial response 
to pandemic, and continued its use of foreign medical assistance, including vaccine 
donations, to bolster its bilateral ties and advance its responsible great power narrative.   
The PRC’s diplomatic activities continued to seek a more prominent role for Beijing in 
international affairs. China has embraced a new diplomatic framework that it terms “Major 
Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” which is guided by the foreign policy 
direction determined by the CCP Central Committee and was set forth in General Secretary 
Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Party Congress. This framework seeks to advance the PRC’s 
strategy of national rejuvenation by achieving the CCP’s two centenary goals, improving the 
coordination of China’s major domestic and international policies, reforming aspects of the 
international order, adhering to the CCP Central Committee’s direction, and defending the 
PRC’s major interests. 
The CCP’s theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” underpins the conduct of the 
PRC’s foreign affairs. Since General Secretary Xi Jinping assumed power at the 18th Party 
Congress in 2012, the CCP Central Committee has placed greater emphasis on the PRC’s 
foreign policy advancing “the cause of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Yang Jiechi, 
a top Party official for the PRC’s foreign policy, has claimed that adherence to Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics is “showing extremely bright prospects” and “reached a new 
historical starting point.” Importantly, the CCP’s theory shapes the particular contexts and 
caveats that the PRC applies to its diplomatic concepts and principles.  
According to Party officials, the overall goal of the PRC’s foreign policy is to build a 
“community of common destiny” that seeks to shift the international system towards an 
architecture based on the CCP’s principles for how nations should interact. This goal is 
essential to how the PRC’s foreign policy supports its broader strategy to achieve national 
rejuvenation.  From Beijing’s perspective, establishing this “community” is necessary to set 
the external security and economic conditions for the PRCs national rejuvenation by 


 
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“safeguarding world peace” and “promoting common development” according to the Party’s 
principles. The PRC recognizes it cannot achieve its goals in isolation and seeks “all 
countries” to adopt its diplomatic framework in order to “build a community with a shared 
future for mankind” and “actively control the new direction of China and the world.” Lastly, 
PRC officials acknowledge that aspects of the international order are inconsistent with its 
objectives. The PRC’s diplomatic framework seeks to remedy this by promoting changes in 
a more “just and reasonable direction.” 
The PRC’s ambition to shape the international order derives from the objectives of its national 
strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems. The PRC does not frame its efforts 
as simply opportunistic challenges to the status quo or a significant deviation from the past.    
Rather, Beijing is acting upon its longstanding desire to redesign the architecture of the 
international order to support the PRC’s national rejuvenation, efforts that are married with 
growing resources and opportunities to do so. The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise 
aspects of the international order on the Party’s terms and in accordance with ideas and 
principles it views as essential to forging an external environment supportive of the PRC’s 
national rejuvenation and strategic goals. 
As part of its effort to establish a “community of common destiny,” the PRC likely seeks to 
present itself as a provider of “global public goods.” According to PRC documents and 
speeches, this includes efforts to address a broad range of global challenges centered on 
international security, economics, global development, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Xi 
Jinping presents the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, BRI, and 
the PRC’s COVID-19 vaccine distribution to the international community as an impetus to 
improve collective global security challenges.   
The PRC’s foreign policy framework includes efforts to promote and accelerate the 
transformation in the distribution of power, revise the principles of interstate relations, and 
reform global governance structures. Within the context of “Major Power Diplomacy with 
Chinese Characteristics,” PRC officials have described how the PRC differentiates its goals 
and relations according to the power relationships among four categories of actors: major 
powers, peripheral nations, developing nations, and international organizations. Among the 
major powers, Beijing contends that a new framework for relations is necessary to construct 
a “stable and balanced development” between the powers—in essence a multipolar system.  
Yang Jiechi contends that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, major power relations are 
undergoing a “first round of interactive adjustment.” With geographically peripheral nations, 
the PRC seeks to strengthen its relationships to create a more favorable environment along its 
maritime and land borders in accordance with Beijing’s view of justice and interests. For 
developing countries, the PRC emphasizes solidarity and cooperation, as well as “actively” 
carrying out multilateral diplomatic work, to include continued “high-quality development” 
under its Belt and Road Initiative. PRC leaders consider developing countries the 
“unshakeable foundation of China’s foreign policy.” Its priorities in developing countries – 


 
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such as those in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East – include cooperating in existing 
multilateral organizations, creating export markets for PRC technology products, positioning 
the PRC as a provider of “global public goods,” and securing support for the PRC’s attempts 
to reshape the international system.  
Another tenet of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” is Beijing’s 
ambition to construct “new types” of “omnidirectional” relations and bilateral partnerships 
among states. The PRC desires for its concepts of mutual respect, cooperation and mutual 
benefit to provide the basis for these “new types” of relations. Yang Jiechi describes China’s 
“new type” relationships as strategic partnerships that follow a new path of “major power 
relations.” Although distinct from alliance relationships, the PRC’s notion of strategic 
partnerships is indicative of a relationship that meets Beijing’s criteria and is worthy of a 
higher level of bilateral cooperation. To improve its diplomatic support further, the PRC also 
seeks to create what it calls a “comprehensive global partnership network” of its strategic 
partners to form a global “circle of friends.” Despite its encompassing rhetoric, the PRC uses 
nomenclature to implicitly rank its level of “partnership.” For example, the PRC ranks 
Pakistan as its only “all-weather strategic partner,” Russia as its only “comprehensive 
strategic partner with coordination relations,” and other countries such as Brazil and various 
states in South and Southeast Asia holding “all-round strategic partnership relations.”  
The PRC also promotes reforms to the “global governance system” as part of its diplomatic 
framework in order to reflect the “profound evolution” of the international order. According 
to Yang Jiechi, “The global governance system is at an important stage of profound evolution, 
and global governance has increasingly become the frontier and key issue of China’s foreign 
work.” To “seize opportunities” for reform, the PRC actively participates in the construction 
of a new global governance system based upon the Party’s principles. This may be achieved 
through the creation of new multinational organizations and forums to uphold the authority 
of the CCP and the PRC’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. Yang 
also asserted that all nations are considering the state of international affairs following the 
pandemic, and that as a result, “changes in the international order are accelerating.” For 
example, the PRC promotes BRI as an “important practical platform for the concept of the 
community of common destiny.” BRI also serves to strengthen Beijing’s strategic 
partnerships, enlarge its network of strategic partners, and advance reforms to the international 
order to support the PRC’s strategy.   
PRC leaders also continued to push diplomatic efforts to strengthen the PRC’s economic 
connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, particularly as the PRC’s economy recovered 
from the worst effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In September 2021, the PRC sought to 
join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
despite the huge gaps in the PRC’s ability to comply with the requirements of the trade pact. 
Beijing’s application to CPTPP occurred just a week prior to Taipei’s also applying to join 
the trade bloc, suggesting the PRC may have applied to isolate Taiwan’s economic connection 


 
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and limit CPTPP members’ autonomy to establish regional economic norms without Beijing’s 
input or participation. 
In addition, the PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2021 to erode 
U.S. influence globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad 
(Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States), which Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The PRC also 
seeks an alternative to the U.S. system of alliances centered on a broader, multilateral 
“common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” security. The CCP is frustrated by 
what it perceives to be an exaggerated threat picture of China caused by the United States. In 
addition, Beijing routinely asserts the United States is the sole party responsible for escalating 
U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the 
international environment to protect its interests. For example, PRC Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi claimed at the December 2021 symposium on China’s 2021 foreign policy that “…multiple 
challenges suffered by China-U.S. relations lies in the strategic misjudgment made by the 
U.S. side on China and bilateral relations.” PRC officials and state media outlets also 
repeatedly condemned the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and cited the withdrawal as 
evidence that the U.S. is an unreliable partner and declining power. In addition, PRC officials 
have inaccurately framed AUKUS as an act of nuclear proliferation and a threat to regional 
stability with an intent to stoke regional concerns about the trilateral security partnership and 
press countries to limit engagement with U.S.-backed alliances.   
COVID Diplomacy. The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind 
the PRC’s foreign policy efforts throughout 2021. Beginning in 2020 and throughout 2021, 
Beijing seized the opportunity to use COVID-19 as a propaganda tool against the West, sought 
to deflect culpability for the global pandemic, and attempted to capitalize on its domestic 
success in containing the virus and providing foreign health assistance. PRC officials also 
continue to assert the superiority of the PRC’s political model in enabling its success against 
the virus, despite the notable performance of Asian democracies, particularly Taiwan. In 2021, 
PRC officials maintained its Zero-COVID strategy, which seeks to eliminate the virus through 
closed borders and stringent domestic controls. These controls include strict travel 
restrictions, mass mandatory testing regimes, and extensive quarantine requirements. PRC 
state media and PRC officials also engaged in an effort to push disinformation on the origins 
of COVID-19, denigrate democratic countries’ responses to COVID, and at times displayed 
a hardened political response to criticism. 
Beijing also sought to establish a reputation as a key supporter of nations around the world 
fighting the pandemic. Throughout 2021, the PRC conducted an extensive vaccine diplomacy 
effort, providing through donations or sales, PRC-origin vaccines for strategic political 
purposes. Beijing primarily targeted countries in Asia and the Global South, viewing the 
provision of COVID-19 vaccines as an opportunity to bolster China’s bilateral ties, advance 
its responsible great power narrative, and undercut support for Taiwan. The PRC also 


 
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continued to provide COVID-19 aid, such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
medical teams, to countries around the world, in some cases using military transport assets 
and personnel. However, the lack of sufficient data and transparency raised questions 
concerning the effectiveness of the PRC’s vaccines amidst reports of low protection rates, 
later confirmed by the Director of the PRC Center for Disease Control in April 2021. In 
addition, spread of new COVID-19 variants such as Omicron raised international concerns 
about the efficacy and durability of PRC-origin COVID-19 vaccines. 
In 2021, the PRC’s COVID-19 related aid and vaccines were criticized for including political 
conditions. Aid recipients and outside observers noted that Beijing often linked provision of 
assistance and promises of vaccine doses to specific PRC policy objectives, such as exclusion 
of Taiwan from the World Health Assembly and other international organizations, 
participation in BRI, opening markets to PRC technology companies, and severing diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan. For example, the PRC successfully used vaccine provision to convince 
the Brazilian government to reverse its ban on Huawei participation in its 5G networks.       
Though unsuccessful, in the case of Paraguay’s need for vaccines, the PRC sought to extract 
concessions regarding Paraguay’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for aid in 
early 2021.    
Assertive Diplomacy. In 2021, Xi Jinping continued to urge efforts for the PRC to develop a 
“voice in international discourse that matches China’s comprehensive national strength and 
international status.” In the PRC’s view, strengthening the country’s international 
communication was “imperative” to creating a “favorable external environment for China’s 
reform, development, and stability.” PRC diplomats, and non-official PRC actors, continued 
to use a more aggressive, confrontational approach to pursuing PRC aims and responding to 
criticism, often referred to as “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy—a term coined by Western 
observers. PRC diplomats frequently engaged in more assertive diplomacy with foreign 
audiences through traditional mediums and social media platforms—many of which are 
banned in the PRC. Although Xi Jinping said that China needs to improve its efforts to create 
a positive image of the PRC, PRC officials have maintained their hostile diplomatic 
messaging often in a performative style, which receives praise from domestic PRC audiences. 
For example, at the March 2021 U.S.-PRC Meeting in Anchorage, Yang Jiechi and PRC 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi exclusively blamed the United States for causing the downward 
trajectory in U.S.-Sino relations, with Yang Jiechi asserting that “the United States is not 
qualified to speak to China from a position of strength.” In June 2021, the PRC Ambassador 
to France defended the PRC’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, claiming that international 
criticism of Beijing’s approach reflects the “arrogance of the west” and proclaimed that he 
was honored to be described as a “Wolf Warrior.” PRC diplomats and state media outlets 
have echoed this defense, suggesting that PRC officials view hostile and assertive diplomacy 
as an effective tool to advance and defend China’s interests. 


 
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Military Diplomacy. The PRC’s willingness to engage in military diplomacy with other 
countries can vary considerably based on its perception of a country’s adherence to Beijing’s 
diplomatic framework. For example, the PRC’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of 
coordination” with Russia entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. Sino-
Russian military cooperation occurs in practical forms through exchanges of training, 
equipment, technology, high-level visits, and other coordination mechanisms. For other 
strategic partnership countries, the PRC seeks to leverage those relationships to reinforce the 
PRC’s systemic preferences and maintain stability in Beijing’s favor. For countries with 
whom the PRC has not established strategic partnerships, such as the United States, the PRC 
shapes its military cooperation along more minimalist principles of conflict avoidance that 
emphasize “non-conflict” and “mutual respect.” From Beijing’s perspective, these curtailed 
relationships at least serve its foreign policy objective by ensuring stable relations with major 
powers.   
While the COVID-19 pandemic continued to constrain PRC’s military diplomacy in 2021, 
the PLA increased its external high-level military visits compared to 2020 and maintained 
close contact with the military leadership of neighboring countries. The PLA also relied on 
high-level virtual bilateral meetings and multilateral engagements to supplement cancelled 
engagements and maintain contacts with foreign militaries. The PRC has set up defense and 
security consultations as well as working meeting mechanisms with 17 neighboring countries 
to keep exchange channels open. 
China’s Territorial Disputes in Context 
The PRC’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely since 1949. Some disputes led 
to war, as in border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. China’s contested 
border with the Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In recent 
cases involving land border disputes, China has sometimes been willing to compromise with 
and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled 11 land-based 
territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. However, within the last decade China has 
employed a more coercive approach to deal with several disputes over maritime features, 
ownership of potentially rich offshore oil and gas deposits, and border areas. 
Tensions with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) sparked a standoff between 
Chinese and Indian forces in mid-May 2020, which persisted into the winter. The standoff 
escalated on June 15th 2020 after a skirmish ensued in the Galwan Valley between Indian 
Army and PLA forces that ended with 20 Indian soldiers and four PRC soldiers dead, 
according to press. In 2021, the PRC continued to amass forces and build military 
infrastructure along the LAC. 
The PRC and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea. The East China Sea contains natural gas and 
oil, though hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant 


 
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line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended 
continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. The PRC continues to 
assert sovereignty over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands and reiterate the importance 
of abiding by the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states both sides will 
acknowledge divergent positions over the East China Sea dispute but will prevent escalation 
through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. Japan remains concerned 
with the persistent deployment of PRC coast guard ships and fishing vessels in disputed East 
China Sea waters and contests the PRC’s claim of sovereignty.  
 
 
The South China Sea (SCS) plays an important role in security considerations across East 
Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS 
shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and other land features 
within its ambiguous self-proclaimed “nine-dash line”—claims disputed in whole or part by 
Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in 
the Spratly Islands, makes the same territorial assertions as the PRC. To further assert its 
sovereignty, in April 2021, China created two new administrative districts to cover the 
Paracels and Spratlys, and named 80 geographical features it claims in the region. The PRC 
continued to employ the PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to 
patrol the region throughout 2021. In response to China’s continued assertive actions, 


 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam publicly rejected Beijing’s nine-dash line 
claims and invoked international law in support of their maritime sovereign rights. 
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its claimed exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, 
the PLA has begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the 
First Island Chain in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity 
highlights China’s double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. 
Examples include sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military exercises such 
as the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii in 2014 and 2018, TALISMAN 
SABER off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021.     
PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the South China Sea and they frequently operate 
in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Malaysia.  
ECONOMIC POLICY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of 
China’s broader national development aspirations. The CCP’s economic, political, 
social, and security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support 
Beijing’s strategy of national rejuvenation. 
 Beijing’s “dual circulation (双循环)” policy aims to forge domestic resilience by 
reducing China’s reliance on foreign supply chains that have proven to be economic 
chokepoints. In addition, the policy aims to boost domestic production and 
consumption to fuel growth, and decrease the economy’s reliance on exports moving 
forward. 
 China’s economic development supports its military modernization not only by 
providing the means for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led 
initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025, as well 
from systemic benefits of the PRC’s growing national industrial and technological 
base. 
 China’s tools of economic statecraft include inducements such as infrastructure 
investments under BRI; industrial and technology policies that seek foreign 
technology transfers in exchange for market access; protectionist policies and legal 
barriers for foreign firms to compete in China’s domestic market; selective observance 
of trade commitments; and economic coercion against other states. 


 
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The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with, and part of, China’s 
broader national development aspirations and work in coordination with China’s economic 
policies and systems. PRC’s leaders directly link the pace and scale of the PLA’s 
modernization with the country’s overall development. PRC’s economic, political, social, and 
military development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support its strategy of national 
rejuvenation. The Party gives priority to China’s economic development as the “central task” 
and frames its economic system as the means of advancing the nation’s overall political and 
social modernity. In particular, China’s economic targets abroad focuses intensely on 
advancing what the Party calls the country’s “productive forces” (e.g., industry, technology, 
infrastructure, and human capital) which it views as the means to achieve the country’s 
political and social modernity—including building a “world-class” military. The party-state’s 
relentless efforts to grow China’s national industrial and technological base has significant 
implications for China’s military modernization, as well as for China’s global economic 
partners.  
CCP leaders have cast China’s partial adoption of market features—which were implemented 
as part of its “reform and opening up” that began in the late 1970s, and subsequently led to an 
economic transformation—as evidence that their strategy to modernize China has been 
succeeding rather than viewing the market feature adoption as a repudiation of the Party’s 
fundamental economic ideals. Party leaders since Deng Xiaoping have consistently 
rationalized China’s market-oriented economic reforms as a necessary regression from 
socialism needed to account properly for China’s historical circumstances, which left it 
significantly underdeveloped. According to the Party, contemporary China remains at the 
beginning stage or the “primary stage of socialism” with a long process of socialist 
modernization ahead.  
Basic Economic System. The Party conceives of China’s economy as constituting the “basic 
economic system” in which public ownership is dominant and state, collective, and private 
forms of ownership develop side-by-side. The basic economic system comprises China’s 
public ownership economy and the multi-ownership economy.  
Economic Development Goals. Despite slowing economic growth just prior to and during 
the COVID-19 outbreak, China will continue to pursue the economic policy objectives 
determined by the CCP Central Committee and set forth in the 14th Five-Year Plan. According 
to Xi’s report at the 19th Party Congress, China’s economic goals are: (1) furthering supply-
side structural reform; (2) making China a country of innovators; (3) pursuing a rural 
vitalization strategy; (4) implementing the coordinated regional development strategy; (4) 
accelerating efforts to improve the socialist market economy; and (5) making new ground in 
pursuing opening up on all fronts. The CCP sets more specific development goals in its Five-
Year Plans (FYPs). The PRC is currently executing the 14th FYP that will cover 2021-2025. 
The priorities and goals in the FYPs not only apply to the government and the public 


 
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ownership economy, but also serve as implicit guidance from the Party to the multi-ownership 
economy.  
Economic Conditions. Even before COVID-19, China’s economic growth had slowed 
because of demographic challenges, declining returns from state-led infrastructure 
investment, and slowing urbanization. Since 2016, and increasingly in the past year, the PRC 
leadership’s decision to increase oversight and tighten regulation on the financial and tech 
sector, as well as the PRC’s efforts to curb risky lending practices in housing and property 
markets have added additional strain on its economy. China’s efforts in early 2020 to contain 
the COVID-19 outbreak with government lockdowns and strict control measures exacerbated 
this slowdown in China’s economy. In March 2021, China announced an annual growth target 
of 6 percent, but China achieved 8.1 percent growth for 2021. In the first half of 2021 China’s 
exports surged, fueling growth, but as the economic landscape tightened exports were weaker 
in the second half of the year, portending substantially slower growth in to 2022.  
Economic Policies & Practices. The PRC’s introduction of market economy features within 
the “basic economic system” without a full transition to free and open markets has resulted in 
laws, regulations, and policies that generally disadvantage foreign firms vis-à-vis their 
Chinese counterparts in terms of tradable goods, services sectors, market access, and foreign 
direct investment. Examples of China’s economic policies and trade practices include its 
support to domestic industries at the expense of foreign counterparts, commercial joint 
venture requirements, technology transfer requirements, subsidies to lower the cost of inputs, 
sustaining excess capacity in multiple industries, sector-specific limits on foreign direct 
investment, discriminatory cybersecurity and data transfer rules, insufficient intellectual 
property rights enforcement, inadequate transparency, and lack of market access—
particularly in the information and communications technology (ICT), agriculture, and service 
sectors. Market access remains difficult for foreign firms because China restricts inbound 
investment, resulting in persistent underperformance in other countries’ services exports, 
particularly in the banking, insurance, Internet-related, professional, and retail services 
sectors. 
In March 2018, an investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 determined that the acts, policies, and practices of the 
PRC government related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation were 
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, resulting in harm to the 
U.S. economy of at least $50 billion per year. Additionally, the USTR’s annual Special 301 
Report, which identifies trading partners that do not adequately or effectively protect and 
enforce intellectual property rights and the findings of its Review of Notorious Markets for 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, has repeatedly identified China as a country that has serious 
intellectual property rights deficiencies. These reports, for example, have repeatedly identified 
China as the world’s leading source of counterfeit and pirated goods. Since 2006, USTR has 
placed China on its Priority Watch List, placement on which indicates particular problems 


 
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with respect to intellectual property protection, enforcement, or market access for U.S. 
persons relying on intellectual property. The USTR’s 2020 Special 301 Report states: 
“China’s placement on the Priority Watch List reflects U.S. concerns with China’s system of 
pressuring and coercing technology transfer, and the continued need for fundamental 
structural changes to strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement, including 
to trade secret theft, obstacles to protecting trademarks, online piracy and counterfeiting, the 
high-volume manufacturing and export of counterfeit goods, and impediments to 
pharmaceutical innovation.” 
A large portion of China’s economic output results from government and policy-directed 
investments rather than market-based forces. China pursues state-directed investment 
overseas and encourages mergers and acquisitions. Along with heavy investments in 
infrastructure and commodities to support its strategic firms, increase economic engagement, 
and improve economic security, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational 
for future innovations with both commercial and military applications. 
The PRC seeks and obtains foreign technology through the following means: foreign direct 
investment, overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign 
research and development (R&D) centers, joint ventures, research and academic partnerships, 
talent recruitment, industrial, and cyberspace-enabled espionage and theft.   
Recent legal proceedings highlight numerous cases of China’s efforts to obtain technology 
and knowledge through theft of trade secrets and economic espionage. In November 2021, a 
jury in U.S. Federal court convicted a PRC intelligence officer of attempting to steal industry-
leading aviation trade secrets. Court documents show that the PRC officer attempted to steal 
technology related to GE Aviation’s exclusive composite aircraft engine fan to benefit the 
PRC state. In November of 2020, a rheumatology professor pleaded guilty to using $4.1 
million in NIH grants to develop China’s expertise in rheumatology and immunology. In 
November 2019, a U.S. Federal grand jury indicted a PRC national who had worked as an 
imaging scientist for Monsanto and its subsidiary, The Climate Corporation, on charges 
related to economic espionage and stealing trade secrets for China. Federal officials stopped 
him from boarding a flight on a one-way trip to China in 2017 with a proprietary algorithm, 
according to the U.S. Department of Justice.  
The PRC’s recent economic policies have promoted innovation focused on strengthening 
domestic industry, while placing additional restrictions on foreign firms. Recognizing that 
some of its initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” and BRI have sparked concerns about 
China’s intentions, China’s leaders have adopted less inflammatory rhetoric when promoting 
these initiatives without altering their fundamental strategic goals. 
Made in China 2025: First announced by the PRC in May 2015, the “Made in China 
2025” plan seeks to increase China’s domestic innovation by setting higher targets 
for domestic manufacturing in strategic industries such as robotics, power 


 
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equipment, and next-generation information technology by 2020 and 2025. This 
plan seeks to strengthen China’s domestic enterprises through awarding subsidies 
and other incentives while increasing pressure on foreign firms to transfer 
technology to have market access in China. “Made in China 2025” came under 
criticism from advanced countries for unfairly favoring China’s domestic enterprises 
at the expense of foreign participants in China’s markets. Increasingly aware and 
sensitive to these concerns, by June 2018, China began avoiding references to “Made 
in China 2025” in major policy papers. The PRC government ordered its media 
outlets to downplay use of the term in June 2018. Key events that PRC leaders use 
to set strategic directives have also avoided references to “Made in China,” including 
the 2019 Central Economic Work Conference and the NPC. Despite the adjustments 
in its narrative, China has largely continued implementing the policies behind “Made 
in China 2025.” 
Dual Circulation: In 2020, Xi Jinping articulated the economic policy of dual 
circulation, which aims for a largely self-sufficient China that could innovate, 
manufacture, and consume within its own economy, while still drawing on the 
international economy through exports, critical supply chains, and limited imports 
of capital. Dual circulation seeks to enable the internal markets and external markets 
to reinforce each other, with a focus on establishing the domestic market as the 
primary driver of economic growth. 
Legal Framework. The PRC in recent years has implemented new laws that seek to place 
further restrictions on foreign firms while creating or strengthening the legal framework for 
the Party’s national security concepts and in some cases furthering its Military-Civil Fusion 
(MCF) Development Strategy (discussed in the next section): 
National Defense Law: Adopted in March 1997, the law provides legal justification 
to mobilize the military and civilian resources in defense of a broad range of national 
interests.  
National Security Law: Adopted in July 2015, the law limits foreign access to the 
information and communications technology (ICT) market in China on national 
security grounds. 
Counterterrorism Law: Adopted in December 2015, among its provisions, the law 
requires telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide 
information, decryption, and other technical support to public and state security 
organizations “conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.” 
National Defense Transportation Law: Coming into effect in 2016, the National 
Defense Transportation Law advances the PRC military-civil fusion development 


 
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strategy by laying the groundwork for the PLA Navy to mobilize civilian maritime 
transportation resources and facilities to support power projection missions. 
Cyber Security Law: The law, which went into effect in June 2017, promotes 
development of indigenous technologies and restricts sales of foreign ICT in China. 
The law also requires that foreign companies submit ICT for government-
administered national security reviews, store data in China, and seek government 
approval before transferring data outside of China. 
Intelligence Law: Passed in June 2017, the law allows authorities to monitor and 
investigate foreign and domestic individuals and organizations to protect national 
security. Specifically, it allows authorities to use or seize vehicles, communication 
devices, and buildings to support intelligence collection efforts. 
Cryptography Law: Adopted in October 2019 and coming into effect in 2020, this 
law requires entities working on cryptography to have management systems in place 
to ensure sufficient security for their encryption. Although the law encourages 
development of commercial encryption technology, its use cannot harm national 
security or the public good. It provides for the State Cryptography Administration 
and its local agencies to have complete access to cryptography systems and the data 
protected by those systems. 
Foreign Investment Law: In March 2019, the PRC’s NPC passed a new Foreign 
Investment law with the stated objective of improving the business environment for 
foreign investors and leveling the playing field between foreign businesses and 
Chinese private firms and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The law passed in just 
three months, which reflects an unusually fast turnaround in China where the same 
level of legislation usually takes years. PRC officials have indicated that swift 
passage of the law was to facilitate U.S.-China trade talks, and the law appears to 
respond to a number of issues raised by the U.S. Trade Representative’s Section 301 
report related to unfair Chinese trade practices related to intellectual property, 
technology transfer, and innovation. Despite the law’s stated objective, its wording 
is vague and the most substantial provisions are not new. 
Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law: Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the 13th National People’s Congress on June 10th, 2021, the law was enacted to 
“safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and to protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.” According 
to PRC media sources, the law is intended to “counter, fight, and oppose” unilateral 
sanctions on the PRC imposed by foreign countries. The law was likely adopted in 
response to sanctions on PRC officials in connection with serious human rights 
abuse in Xinjiang.  


 
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Data Security Law: This law went into effect on September 1st, 2021 and subjects 
almost all data-related activities to government oversight, as PRC officials grew 
concerned about the transfer of potentially sensitive data overseas. Companies in the 
PRC have become more reluctant to share data, as authorities are ambiguous as to 
what is considered sensitive information, increasing difficulties for international 
firms trying to do business in the PRC. In early November, local providers of ship 
tracking data stopped sharing details of ship locations, citing the data security law. 
Personal Information Protection Law: Effective on November 1st, 2021 and enacted 
by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the law is purposed 
to protect the rights and interests on personal information, regulate personal 
information processing activities, and promote reasonable use of personal 
information. PRC media sources note that activities such as “collection, 
application, processing, and trading of personal information will be strictly 
monitored” with infringements punishable according to the law. The law 
exemplifies a more complete system of regulation that will work in tandem with 
the PRC’s existing Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.  
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
Key Takeaways  
 The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand 
global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
 In 2021, the PRC significantly increased engagement with African, Latin American, 
and Middle Eastern countries and began prioritizing public health, digital 
infrastructure, and green energy opportunities. 
 Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards 
expanding its overseas security footprint to protect those interests.  
First announced in 2013, the PRC’s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic 
policy advanced by President Xi Jinping, which rebranded and further expanded China’s 
global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking 
to expand global transportation and trade links to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI 
by financing, constructing, and developing transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, 
hydropower projects, digital connectivity, satellite navigation ground stations, and technology 
and industrial parks worldwide. For example, Huawei has implemented “Safe Cities” 
programs across many African countries prompting concerns of surveillance and digital 
authoritarianism from the PRC. As of 2021, at least 146 countries had signed BRI cooperation 
documents, up from 138 in 2020 and 125 in 2019. BRI related spending is difficult to estimate 


 
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because there is no comprehensive list of projects, and difficulties delineating between official 
lending and lending from PRC state-owned banks; however, publicly available data indicates 
that the PRC’s 2021 BRI financing and investment commitments were similar to those of 
2020 and around 50 percent lower than the pre-pandemic numbers of 2019.  
In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial 
integrity, energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability 
and diminish threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern 
periphery. Similarly, through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in 
Pakistan, it seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic 
choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it 
builds through BRI to pursue additional economic cooperation with participating countries. 
2021 saw two key shifts in how Beijing implements BRI: The PRC significantly increased 
engagement with African and Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iraq, and began 
prioritizing public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy opportunities through its 
“Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)” (HSR), “Digital Silk Road (数字丝绸之路)” (DSR), 
“Space Information Corridor ( 空间信息走廊) ” (SIC), and “Green Silk Road (绿色丝绸之
路)” (GSR). Improving each of these “roads” offers Beijing benefits beyond economic 
integration.  
• 
HSR is Beijing’s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing 
medical assistance through BRI transportation networks, which the PRC leveraged in 
2020 and 2021 to provide COVID-19 vaccines, personal protective equipment, and 
other pandemic support to partner countries. In the future, it may help the PRC expand 
the international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role 
as a global public health leader, and identify the need for – and justify – new BRI 
projects.  
• 
DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing delivers PRC technology to partner countries, 
which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it seeks to set 
global standards for next-generation technology. The PRC hopes the DSR will 
increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and 
establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free 
trade zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech 
leaders by providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production 
opportunities for PRC tech firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, 
including next-generation cellular networks—such as fifth-generation (5G) 
networks—fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and data centers. The initiative also 
includes developing advanced technologies including satellite navigation systems, 
artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and export.  


 
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• 
Noted in the 2021 PRC State Council report on China’s Space Program, the PRC 
continued to press ahead with the construction of the SIC—the space-based 
component of BRI. The SIC advances the PRC’s national interests with aims to (1) 
internationalize the Beidou navigation system; (2) advance the construction of satellite 
telemetry, tracking, and command ground stations with potential dual-use 
applications; (3) provide space launch, satellite, and data services to BRI  signatories; 
and (4) integrate PRC satellites with BRI infrastructure projects. The integration could 
make operation of these infrastructure projects dependent on PRC satellites and 
associated space services.  
• 
GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects – an 
initiative that aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 
2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  
Since BRI’s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international 
concerns over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with 
suspicion of Beijing’s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. 
China has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived 
threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most 
participating countries. However, 2021 brought additional challenges such as a weak appetite 
for investment precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Kenya, for example, was unable to secure PRC financing to finish a super-fast rail 
link from its port of Mombasa to Uganda, a flagship BRI project in Africa. Meanwhile, 
Australia canceled its 2018 and 2019 agreements to deepen cooperation on infrastructure, 
innovation, and trade development through BRI on the grounds that they were contrary to 
Australia’s national interests. 
As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expand under BRI, the CCP has 
signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect those interests, 
which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned 
or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and 
instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2021, 
for example, 10 PRC nationals were killed and 26 others injured when a suicide bomber 
targeted a workers’ bus on its way to a BRI infrastructure development project in Pakistan. 
China has therefore sought to extend its ability to project military power to safeguard its 
overseas interests, including BRI, by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism 
cooperation and supporting host-nation security forces through military aid, including military 
equipment donations. 
 


 
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MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF; 军民融合) Development Strategy 
to “fuse” its security and development strategies to build an integrated National 
Strategic System and Capabilities in support of the PRC’s national rejuvenation goals. 
 Beijing’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use 
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science 
and technology industries, and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s 
instruments of national power.   
 The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing 
China’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base; (2) 
integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and 
civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and 
knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and 
leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service 
and logistics capabilities for military purposes; and (6) expanding and deepening 
China’s national defense mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its 
society and economy for use in competition and war.  
The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy as a nationwide 
endeavor that seeks to meld its economic and social development strategies with its security 
strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of China’s 
national rejuvenation goals. The Party’s leaders view MCF as a critical element of their 
strategy for the PRC to become a “great modern socialist country” which includes becoming 
a world leader in science and technology (S&T) and developing a “world-class” military.  
Although the PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-
use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense S&T 
industries, its broader purpose is to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power 
by melding aspects of its economic, military, and social governance. MCF strives to establish 
an infrastructure that connects the military and civilian sectors in a way that serves as a 
catalyst for innovation and economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in 
advancing dual-use technologies, especially those suited for “intelligentized” warfare, and 
facilitates effective industrial mobilization during wartime.  
Development & Significance. The Party has explored the concept of leveraging or 
integrating the combined contributions of the military and civilian sectors since the PRC’s 
founding. The current MCF concept initially took root in the early 2000s as the Party sought 
methods to enhance the PRC’s overall development. This led Party leaders to call for 


 
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improving “military-civilian integration” that echoed the collaboration between the defense 
and civilian sectors that China observed in the United States and other developed countries. 
Implementation of these efforts stalled due to a lack of centralized government control and 
the organizational barriers that exist across the party-state. Coinciding with the 11th Five Year 
Plan (FYP) (2006-2010), the PRC began replacing “military-civilian integration” with 
“military-civilian fusion.” In 2007, Party officials publicly noted the change from 
“integration” to “fusion” was not merely cosmetic, but broadened the scope to include all 
available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry.  
Since that time, MCF’s ambitions have grown in scope and scale as the Party has come to 
view it as a means to bridge the PRC’s economic and social development with its security 
development in support of the PRC’s national strategy to renew China. As such, the Party has 
continued to elevate MCF’s importance. In 2015, the CCP Central Committee elevated the 
MCF Development Strategy to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between the 
PRC’s national development strategy and its national security strategy that seeks to build an 
“integrated national strategic system and capabilities,” all of which support the PRC’s goal of 
national rejuvenation. In 2020 during the 5th Plenum of the 19th CCP Central Committee, PRC 
leaders reiterated the high-level priority of MCF by calling for accelerated military 
modernization through integration of new technologies and operational concepts, increased 
science and technology research, improved MCF, and personnel reforms. 
Management & Implementation. The overall management and implementation of the MCF 
Development Strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the 
State Council (notably the National Development and Reform Commission), and the CMC. 
In addition to signifying its importance, the CCP Central Committee’s elevation of the MCF 
Development Strategy to a national-level strategy also intended to overcome obstacles to 
implementation across the party-state. 
This elevation also led to the establishment of the Central Commission for Military Civilian 
Fusion Development (CCMCFD) in 2017, chaired by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Premier 
Li Keqiang, several other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, two State 
Councilors, both CMC Vice Chairmen, 12 Ministry-level leaders, and others. The stated 
objective of the CCMCFD is to build the PRC’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” 
This commission works to improve the “top-level design” of MCF and overcome 
impediments to implementation. The elevation of the MCF Development Strategy and the 
creation of the CCMCFD signals the importance that Party leaders place on MCF and the 
scope and scale of the strategy’s ambitions.   
The PRC pursues MCF through six interrelated efforts. Each effort overlaps with the others 
and has both domestic and international components. The Party seeks to implement the MCF 
Development Strategy across every level of the PRC from the highest national-level organs 
down to provinces and township, and creates top-down financing and regulatory mechanisms 
that incentivize civilian and military stakeholders—such as local governments, academia, 


 
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research institutions, private investors, and military organizations—to combine efforts on 
dual-use technologies. The PRC refers to these six aspects as “systems,” which may also be 
understood as mutually supporting lines of effort or components.  The six systems in the MCF 
Development Strategy are:  
The Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System. This system focuses 
on fusing the PRC’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base.   
This includes expanding the private sector’s participation in the PRC’s defense industrial base 
and supply chains as well as improving the efficiency, capacity, and flexibility of defense and 
civilian industrial and manufacturing processes. This broader participation seeks to transfer 
mature technologies both ways across military and civilian sectors, with the goal to produce 
outsized benefits for both sectors. This also aims to increase the competitiveness within the 
PRC’s defense industrial base in which one or two defense SOEs dominate an entire sector.   
This MCF system also seeks to advance the PRC’s self-reliance in manufacturing key 
industrial technologies, equipment, and materials to reduce its dependence on imports, 
including those with dual-uses. The PRC’s MCF-influenced industrial and technology 
endeavors include Made in China 2025 that sets targets for the PRC to achieve greater self-
sufficiency in key industrial areas such as aerospace, communications, and transportation.  
The Military-Civil Coordinated Technology Innovation System. This MCF system seeks 
to maximize the full benefits and potential of the country’s S&T development.  Consistent 
with the CCP leadership’s view that high technology and innovation are critical to 
strengthening China’s comprehensive national power, this system develops and integrates 
advanced technologies across civilian and military entities, projects, and initiatives—with 
benefits flowing in both directions. This includes using cutting-edge civilian technology for 
military applications or to more broadly advance military S&T, as well as using military 
advancements to push civilian economic development. Although related to the Advanced 
Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System, this system largely focuses on fusing 
innovations and advances in basic and applied research. Specific efforts in this MCF system 
include strengthening and promoting civilian and military R&D in advanced dual-use 
technologies and cross-pollinating military and civilian basic research. Additional efforts 
include promoting the sharing of scientific resources, expanding the institutions involved in 
defense research, and fostering greater collaboration across defense and civilian research 
communities. This system also seeks to foster “new-type” research institutions with mixed 
funding sources and lean management structures that are more dynamic, efficient, and 
effective than the PRC’s wholly state-owned research bodies. Examples of MCF-influenced 
dual-use S&T endeavors include the PRC’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy and 
Artificial Intelligence National Project.   
The Fundamental Domain Resource Sharing System. This system includes building 
military requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure from the ground up as 
well as leveraging China’s civilian construction and logistics capacities and capabilities for 


 
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military purposes. This includes factoring military requirements and dual-use purposes into 
building civilian private and public transportation infrastructure such as airports, port 
facilities, railways, roads, and communications networks. This also extends to infrastructure 
projects in dual-use domains such as space and undersea, as well as mobile communications 
networks and topographical and meteorological systems. Another element seeks to set 
common military and civilian standards to make infrastructure easier to use in emergencies 
and wartime. This aspect of MCF has arguably the greatest reach into the PRC’s local 
governance systems as military requirements inform infrastructure construction at the 
province, county, and township levels. The influence of this aspect of MCF is visible in the 
PRC’s major land reclamations and military construction activities in the South China Sea, 
which brought together numerous government entities, the PLA, law enforcement, 
construction companies, and commercial entities. It may also have important implications for 
the PRC’s overseas infrastructure projects and investments under BRI as the PRC seeks to 
establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project 
and sustain military power. 
The Military Personnel (Talent) Cultivation System. This MCF system seeks to blend and 
cultivate military and civilian S&T expertise through education programs, personnel 
exchanges, and knowledge sharing. The purpose of this effort is to improve the utilization of 
experts able to participate in S&T projects irrespective of whether they are military or civilian 
(or even foreign) experts and allow expertise to flow more freely across sectors. This aspect 
of MCF also seeks to reform the PRC’s talent cultivation system, which encompasses 
hundreds of talent recruitment plans, in order to improve China’s human capital, build a highly 
skilled workforce, and recruit foreign experts to provide access to know-how, expertise, and 
foreign technology. It takes into account all levels of education from the Party’s nationwide 
“patriotic education” programs for children to the matriculation of post-doctorate researchers 
within China and at institutions abroad. Many of the PRC’s named talent programs are likely 
influenced by MCF planning, as are reforms in its military academies, national universities, 
and research institutes.    
The Socialized Support and Sustainment System for the PLA. This system entails two 
major efforts that seeks to shift the PLA away from its inefficient self-contained logistics and 
sustainment systems, and towards modern streamlined logistics and support services. First, it 
seeks to harness civilian public sector and private sector resources to improve the PLA’s basic 
services and support functions—ranging from food, housing, and healthcare services. The 
concept is to gain efficiencies in costs and personnel by outsourcing non-military services 
previously performed by the PLA while also improving the quality of life for military 
personnel.  Second, it seeks to further the construction of a modern military logistics system 
that is able to support and sustain the PLA in joint operations and for overseas operations. 
This system seeks to fuse the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force’s (JLSF’s) efforts to integrate 
the military’s joint logistics functions with the PRC’s advanced civilian logistics, 
infrastructure, and delivery service companies and networks. These arrangements seek to 


 
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provide the PLA with modern transportation and distribution, warehousing, information 
sharing, and other types of support in peacetime and wartime. This fusion also seeks to 
provide the PLA with a logistics system that is more efficient, higher capacity, higher quality, 
and global in reach.  
The National Defense Mobilization System. This MCF system binds the other systems as 
it seeks to mobilize the PRC’s military, economic, and social resources to defend or advance 
China’s sovereignty, security and development interests. The Party views China’s growing 
strength as only useful to the extent that the party-state can mobilize it. China views 
mobilization as the ability to use precisely the instrument, capability, or resource needed, 
when needed, for the duration needed. Within the PLA, the reforms in 2015-16 elevated 
defense mobilization to a department called the National Defense Mobilization Department 
(NDMD), which reports directly to the CMC. The NDMD plays an important role in this 
system by organizing and overseeing the PLA’s reserve forces, militia, and provincial military 
districts and below. This system also seeks to integrate the state emergency management 
system into the national defense mobilization system in order to achieve a coordinated 
military-civilian response during a crisis. Consistent with the Party’s view of international 
competition, many MCF mobilization initiatives not only seek to reform how the PRC 
mobilizes for war and responds to emergencies, but how the economy and society can be 
leveraged to support the PRC’s strategic needs for international competition. 
MCF Linkages. Each MCF system entails linkages between dozens of organizations and 
government entities, including: 
• 
Ministry-level organizations from the State Council: Examples include the National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Education, and key state entities 
such as the State Administration of Science and Technology in National Defense and 
others. 
• 
Lead military organs subordinate to the Central Military Commission: CMC Strategic 
Planning Office, Joint Political, Logistics, and Equipment Development Departments, 
as well as operational units and the regional military structure at the Military District 
and Sub-District levels; military universities and academies such as National Defense 
University, Academy of Military Science, National University of Defense 
Technology, and service institutions. 
• 
State-sponsored educational institutions, research centers, and key laboratories: 
Prominent examples include the “Seven Sons of National Defense” (Harbin Institute 
of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Northwestern 
Polytechnical Institute, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering 
University, Beihang University, and Nanjing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics), as well as certain PLA-affiliated laboratories of Tsinghua University, 


 
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Beijing University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University, North University of China, and 
others. 
• 
Defense industry: The ten major defense SOEs continue to fill their traditional roles 
providing weapons and equipment to the military services. Many defense SOEs 
consist of dozens of subsidiaries, sub-contractors, and subordinate research institutes.  
• 
Other SOEs and quasi-private companies: High profile examples include PRC high-
tech corporations and important SOEs like China Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO), China National Offshore Oil Company, and major construction companies 
that have roles in BRI projects as well as helping the PRC build out occupied terrain 
features in the South China Sea. 
• 
Private companies: MCF efforts also seek to increase the proportion of private 
companies that contribute to military projects and procurements. These enterprises 
include technology companies that specialize in unmanned systems, robotics, artificial 
intelligence, cybersecurity, and big data.  
• 
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: In practice, many MCF efforts involve partnerships 
between central, provincial, or city government entities with military district 
departments, PLA departments, academia, research entities, and companies. A 
majority of provincial and local governments have announced MCF industrial plans, 
and more than 35 national-level MCF industrial zones have been established across 
China. MCF-linked investments funds created by central and local governments and 
private investors total in the tens of billions of dollars.  
DEFENSE POLICY & MILITARY STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 In 2021, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding 
its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater 
global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of 
“active defense (积极防御).” 
 PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” 
military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the 
PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”   
 In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027: to accelerate the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of 
the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more 
credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification. 


 
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 In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW; 多域精确战).” MDPW is intended to leverage a 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) network, which the PLA calls the “network information 
system-of-systems that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to 
rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine 
joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. 
The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. CCP leaders view these interests as foundational to their national 
strategy. The modernization of the armed forces is an indispensable element of the Party’s 
national strategy to modernize the country. At the Fifth Plenum in October 2020, the CCP 
declared that the PRC’s ambitions for becoming a rich country are closely integrated with its 
ambitions to develop a powerful military. The PRC’s defense policy and military strategy 
primarily orients the PLA toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” 
interests in the region counter to the United States. At the same time, CCP leaders increasingly 
cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend Beijing’s expanding global interests 
and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of “Great Power Diplomacy 
with Chinese characteristics.”   
As reported in the 19th Party Congress, one of the conditions for the PLA’s military 
modernization is to enable the PRC to “effectively shape the PLA’s military posture, manage 
crises, and deter and win wars.” The PRC’s military strategy is based on “active defense,” a 
concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at 
the operational and tactical levels. To adapt the PRC’s armed forces to long-term trends in 
global military affairs and meet the country’s evolving national security needs, PRC’s leaders 
stress the imperative of meeting key military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035. 
These milestones seek to align the PLA’s transformation with the PRC’s overall national 
modernization so that by the end of 2049, the PRC will field a “world-class” military.  
Strategic Assessment. A key driver of the PRC’s defense policy is how the CCP leaders 
perceive the relative threats and opportunities facing the country’s comprehensive national 
development. During Chairman Xi’s CCP centenary speech, he called for the full 
implementation of the Party’s idea of strengthening the army in the new era. The last defense 
white paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era, published in 2019 reaffirmed that 
China’s armed forces are aligned with and contribute to the strategies of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), stating that ongoing military reforms “ensure absolute leadership of 
the CCP over the military.” According to the paper, Beijing views the international 
environment as undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.”  The CCP concludes that 
“international strategic competition is on the rise” and expresses deep concerns at what it sees 
as growing sources of instability in the near-term. Offering no introspection on Beijing’s own 
role in stirring geopolitical tensions through its economic practices, military activities and 


 
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modernization, excessive maritime territorial claims, assertive diplomacy, or efforts to revise 
aspects of global governance, the PRC describes the international system as being 
“…undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional 
conflicts and wars.” Similarly, the PRC contends that global military competition is 
intensifying, and that “major countries” are adjusting their security and military strategies, 
reorganizing their militaries, and are developing new types of combat forces to “seize the 
strategic commanding heights in military competition.”  
Defense Policy. The PRC’s stated defense policy is to “resolutely safeguard” its sovereignty, 
security, and development interests, according to its 2019 defense white paper—offering 
continuity with past statements by PRC senior leaders and other official documents. In 
practice, the PRC’s military power is increasingly a central feature of the CCP’s regional and 
global ambitions. The 2019 defense white paper also identifies the PRC’s national defense 
aims that support these interests, likely offered in order of importance:  
• 
to deter and resist aggression; 
• 
to safeguard national political security, the people’s security, and social stability; 
• 
to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”; 
• 
to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” 
and the creation of “East Turkistan”; 
• 
to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum, 
and cyberspace;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests; 
• 
and to support the sustainable development of the country.  
Key changes in defense policy for the “New Era” include efforts to improve coordination 
across the party-state to leverage all organs of national power in a unified approach to support 
the CCP’s ambitions of a global military capability. Unlike previous defense white papers, 
China’s National Defense in the New Era explicitly stressed the PRC’s armed forces’ 
alignment and support to the Party’s broader societal and foreign policy objectives. The paper 
specifically aligns the PRC’s armed forces with the national objectives set by General 
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. For example, the white paper states 
that the PRC’s armed forces must be ready to, “provide strong strategic support for the 
realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and to make new and greater 


 
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contributions to the building of a shared future for mankind.” Also notable is the growing 
explicit alignment between the PRC’s defense and foreign policies, particularly in the armed 
forces’ role in protecting the PRC’s overseas interests and furthering the CCP’s concept of 
“strategic partnerships” with other countries.  
Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针). The Chairman of the CMC issues military 
strategic guidelines to the PLA that provide the foundation of the PRC’s military strategy. 
The military strategic guidelines set the general principles and concepts for the use of force 
in support of the CCP’s strategic objectives, provide guidance on the threats and conditions 
the armed forces should be prepared to face, and set priorities for planning, modernization, 
force structure, and readiness. The CCP leadership issues new military strategic guidelines, 
or adjusts existing guidelines, whenever they perceive it necessary to shift the PLA’s priorities 
based on the Party’s perceptions of China’s security environment or changes in the character 
of warfare.  
Since 2019, trends indicate the PRC has reviewed and adjusted its military strategic 
guidelines. In early 2019, PRC state media indicated that Beijing held senior-level meetings 
to “establish the military strategy of the ‘New Era.’” The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
states that the PLA is implementing guidelines for the “New Era” that, “…actively adapt to 
the new landscape of strategic competition, the new demands of national security, and new 
developments in modern warfare…” PRC official media in the latter half of 2019 echoed these 
themes and described the guidelines as constituting a notable change. The PRC’s defense 
white paper may reflect changes in the guidelines given its emphasis on the intensification of 
global military competition, the increase in the pace of technological change, and the military 
modernization themes introduced by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress. 
Documents released following the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in October 
2020 hailed progress in the “comprehensive and in-depth” implementation of the “New Era 
military strategic guidelines.”   
These developments are notable because the CCP leadership has issued new military strategic 
guidelines or adjusted its guidelines only a few times since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, 
the CMC under Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare to win “local wars” under “high-
tech conditions” after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, the CMC 
under Hu Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local wars under informationized 
conditions.” In 2014, the CMC under Chairman Xi Jinping placed greater focus on conflicts 
in the maritime domain and fighting “informatized local wars.” 
Military Strategy—Active Defense. The PRC’s military strategy is based on what it 
describes as “active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in 
combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. Active defense is 
neither a purely defensive strategy nor limited to territorial defense. Active defense 
encompasses offensive and preemptive aspects. It can apply to the PRC acting externally to 


 
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defend its interests. Active defense is rooted on the principle of avoiding initiating armed 
conflict, but responding forcefully if challenged. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
reaffirmed active defense as the basis for its military strategy. Minister of National Defense 
General Wei Fenghe reiterated this principle of active defense in his speech at the Ninth 
Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, stating that the PRC “will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but will surely counterattack if attacked.” 
First adopted by the CCP in the 1930s, active defense has served as the basis for the PRC’s 
military strategy since its founding in 1949. Although the PRC has adjusted and tailored the 
specifics of active defense over time based on changes in strategic circumstances, its general 
principles have remained consistent. Contemporary PRC writings describe the tenets of active 
defense as: 
• 
Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. This describes the 
basic principle for the use of military force under active defense. The PRC’s 2019 
defense white paper describes this principle as, “We will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” Active defense may entail 
defensive counterattacks in response to an attack or preemptively striking an adversary 
that the PRC judges is preparing to attack. 
• 
Combine strategic defense with operational and tactical offense. This aspect offers 
two approaches to warfare influenced by Mao Zedong’s notion of using defense and 
offense in turns. First, active defense may involve offensive campaigns, operations, 
and tactical actions in support of the strategic defense. These may occur rapidly and 
along “external lines.” Second, it uses strategic defense to weaken the enemy and set 
the conditions to transition into strategic offense in order to secure victory.  
• 
Taking the operational initiative. This aspect emphasizes the effective use of 
offensives at the operational and tactical levels, avoiding enemy strengths, and 
concentrating on building asymmetric advantages against enemy weaknesses to 
“change what is inferior into what is superior.” 
• 
Strive for the best possibilities. This calls for thorough peacetime military preparations 
and planning based on fighting the most challenging threat under the most complicated 
circumstances “in order to get the best results.” This aspect stresses the importance of 
setting conditions in advance and suggests it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, 
than to fight unprepared.   
• 
The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. This tenet seeks to resolve 
the dilemma that using too little force may protract a war instead of stopping it, while 
the unconstrained use of force may worsen a war and make it harder to stop. Calling 
for the “effective restraint of warfare,” this tenet seeks to avoid war first through 
sufficient military preparations and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act 


 
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in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue the enemy’s forces without 
fighting.” If war is unavoidable, however, this aspect calls for restraining war by 
taking the “opening move” and “using war to stop war.” 
• 
Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. This integrates the concept of active 
defense with the concept of “people’s war.” People’s war comprises subordinate 
military strategies, “guerrilla war” and “protracted war” that Mao saw as a means to 
harness the capacity of China’s populace as a source of political legitimacy and 
mobilization to generate military power. Contemporary PRC writings link “people’s 
war” to national mobilization and participation in wartime as a whole-of-nation 
concept of warfare. 
Military Missions & Tasks. The CMC directs the PLA to be ready and able to perform 
specific missions and tasks to support the Party’s strategy and defend the PRC’s sovereignty, 
security, and development interests. The PLA’s missions and tasks in the “New Era” include: 
safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; maintaining 
combat readiness; conducting military training under real combat conditions; safeguarding 
China’s nuclear weapons and its interests in the space and cyberspace domains; countering 
terrorism and maintaining stability; protecting the PRC’s overseas interests; and participating 
in emergency response and disaster relief. 
Modernization Objectives & Targets. The PLA successfully achieved its 2020 
modernization goal to generally achieve mechanization, while continuing to “significantly 
enhance informatization and greatly improve its strategic capabilities.” Throughout 2021, the 
PLA continued to pursue ambitious modernization objectives, implement major 
organizational reforms, update its procurement, training, and recruitment systems, and 
improve its combat readiness in line with the goals and timelines announced by General 
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The PRC’s goals for modernizing its 
armed forces in the “New Era” are:  
• 
By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, 
and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, 
organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment;  
• 
By 2035: “To comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, 
organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with 
the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national 
defense and the military …”; and, 
• 
In 2049: “To fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”  
The new milestone for PLA modernization in 2027 aligns with the 100th anniversary of the 
PLA’s founding. While the new 2027 goal did not clearly shift forward any of the PLA’s 


 
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declared modernization for 2035 and 2049 objectives, it did likely shift the PLA’s 
development of certain capabilities within the categories of the integrated development of 
mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. If realized, this achievement could 
give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues 
Taiwan unification. Following the PLA generally achieving mechanization, its 2020 goal, a 
new interim target was likely believed to be necessary by PRC leadership as a means for the 
CCP to keep the PLA on track towards its longer-term 2035 and 2049 goals—paralleling the 
CCP’s broader approach towards military development occurring in three steps. In March 
2021, Xi Jinping stated that 2021, the first year of China’s 14th Five Year plan, would be the 
year in which the new “three steps (三步走)” of PLA modernization would begin. PLA 
writings note the “three-step” strategic arrangement connects “near-, medium-, and long-term 
goals by 2027, 2035, and 2049.    
The 5th Plenum communique holds that the 2027 goal means that the Chinese military should 
comprehensively push forward the modernization of military theories, military organizational 
form, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. PRC media, citing a military source, 
connected the PLA’s 2027 goals to developing the capabilities to counter the U.S. military in 
the Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on Beijing’s 
terms. The communique stressed the need to “spur on synchronous improvements in national 
defense and economic power,” (presumably under Military-Civil Fusion), a PLA spokesman 
added that “China's national defense strength does not match its economic growth, and is not 
compatible with China's international standing and its strategic security needs.”   
Although China’s leaders view building military strength as a strategic imperative, they also 
place important caveats on these objectives. For example, Chairman Xi’s direction to the PLA 
to “basically complete” modernization by 2035 should also occur “in step with the 
modernization of the country.” These qualifications serve several purposes that highlight the 
interlocking nature of the Party’s strategic planning. First, as the PRC’s interests continue to 
expand as it develops, the Party expects the PLA to keep pace with the country’s evolving 
interests and be ready and able to defend its progress. Second, linking the PLA’s 
transformation to the country’s transformation allows Party leaders to signal the scope and 
scale of the internal changes they expect the PLA to implement, particularly given its historic 
resistance to reforms that challenge its risk-adverse organizational culture or threaten vested 
bureaucratic interests. Finally, these qualifications provide flexibility to the Party’s leaders to 
modulate military resources and defense objectives based on the conditions of the country’s 
overall development. This offers PRC leaders the ability to adapt to changing economic or 
international conditions and ensure military investments support—rather than compromise—
the strategy.  
Military Ambitions. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-
class” military by the end of 2049. Within the context of China’s national strategy, however, 
it is likely that the PRC will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in 
some cases superior to—the U.S. military,  and that of any other great power that Beijing 


 
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views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Given the far-reaching 
ambitions the CCP has for a rejuvenated China, it is unlikely that the Party would aim for an 
end state in which the PRC would remain in a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis the 
United States or any other potential rival. For the PRC to aim lower or otherwise willingly 
accept a permanent condition of military inferiority would seem anathema to the fundamental 
purpose of becoming a “great modern socialist country.” However, this does not mean that 
the PRC will aim for the PLA to mirror the U.S. military in terms of capacity, capability, or 
readiness. The PRC will likely seek to develop its “world-class” military in a manner that it 
believes best suits the needs of its armed forces to defend and advance the country’s interests 
and how the PLA—guided by the Party—adapts to the changing character of warfare.    
Way of War. The PLA increasingly view warfare as a confrontation between opposing 
operational systems, rather than a war of annihilation between opposing mechanized military 
forces. Following this logic, PLA writings refer to systems destruction warfare (体系破击战
) as the next way of war, transforming from mechanized warfare to an informatized and 
intelligentized style warfare. Though not a new PLA approach, systems destruction warfare 
likely continues to be the principal theory guiding its way of war.  
In November 2020, the CMC announced that it had issued the “Chinese People's Liberation 
Army Joint Operations Outline (Trial).” The Outline establishes a system for the PLA’s joint 
operations and focuses on clarifying basic issues regarding the organization and 
implementation of joint operations, command rights and responsibilities, and the principles, 
requirements, and procedures for joint operations, combat support, national defense 
mobilization, and political work. According to PLA writings, the Outline describes how the 
future combat style of the PLA will be integrated joint operations under the unified command 
of a joint operations command system. PLA writers emphasized that winning future wars 
would require a high degree of joint integration of various combat forces and combat elements 
from across the PLA services and all domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and 
tactical levels. The PLA’s “operational regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA 
leaders and PLA-affiliated academics had pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is 
out of step with the 2015-era structural command and organizational reforms and an obstacle 
to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint PLA.   
After the Outline was issued, PLA writings noted that PLA joint operations remain limited to 
the strategic level and are insufficient for success in future wars because of the reliance on the 
command authority of senior leaders or the use of administrative means to ensure compliance.   
Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational 
concept,” called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW;多域精确战).” MDPW is 
intended to leverage a C4ISR network, which the PLA calls the “network information system-
of-systems that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, to rapidly identify 
key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across 


 
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domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. MDPW is meant to sit atop 
an “operational conceptual system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional 
subordinate operational concepts and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, 
evaluate, and improve these future-oriented operational concepts. The timing of MDPW’s 
appearance with China’s updated doctrine and military strategic guidelines suggests that 
MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely amplifying themes and guidance in both 
while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be able to do to win future wars. 
Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC 
leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important 
element in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Chairman Xi Jinping and 
senior military leaders have continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat 
readiness so it can “fight and win wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA 
conducting more training, but making its training more rigorous and realistic as well as 
addressing issues in the PLA’s training and education systems relating to conducting complex 
joint operations and adapting to other aspects of modern warfare. It probably has also led to a 
standardization of a combat readiness system across the PLA to enable the PRC to quickly 
transition to a wartime footing.  
Along with the CCP leadership’s focus on improving the PLA’s combat readiness, in recent 
years PLA media outlets have noted shortcomings in the military’s training and education 
systems that reportedly left some commanders—particularly at the operational level—
inadequately prepared for modern warfare. In recent years, PLA media outlets have identified 
the need for the military to address the “Five Incapables” problem: that some commanders 
cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational 
decisions; (4) deploy forces; and (5) manage unexpected situations. Although PLA writings 
do not specify how widespread the “Five Incapables” are, PLA media outlets have 
consistently raised them. One outside expert has noted this may indicate the PLA lacks 
confidence in its proficiency to execute its own operational concepts. Additionally, senior 
Party and PLA leaders are keenly aware that the military has not experienced combat in 
decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organizational structures. PLA 
leaders and state media frequently call on the force to remedy the “peacetime disease” that 
manifests in the form of what it characterizes as lax training attitudes and practices that are 
viewed as hindering combat readiness.  
The COVID-19 pandemic degraded PLA readiness during early 2020, but mitigation 
measures probably allowed it to return to near-normal states of readiness levels by mid-
summer. The PLA continued to conduct exercises throughout 2021. Chapter 2 discusses the 
PLA’s 2021 training and exercises in detail. 
Anticorruption Campaign. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a 
Party-wide effort that General Secretary Xi Jinping strengthened and accelerated shortly after 
taking office. The stated goal of these campaigns is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, 


 
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root out corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority. Military 
discipline inspectors led by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission have targeted 
individual power networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such 
as officers connected to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, 
and former Chief of Joint Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 2021, General Secretary Xi Jinping 
continued to stress strict Party governance for the 14th Five-Year Plan period stating 
corruption still exists as the biggest risk to the Party’s governance. Throughout 2021, the 
anticorruption campaign also targeted executives within the PRC’s defense industrial sector 
as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced investigations of the 
former Chairman and head of the Communist Party at China North Industries Group 
Corporation (Norinco Group) and the executive at China National Nuclear Corporation.    
Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a party-
army, does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the party. The 
CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), currently chaired by Xi Jinping, is the highest 
military decision-making body in the PRC.  As a party-army, the PLA is a political actor.  As 
a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political and governance systems.  
As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government system, the PLA’s 
missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to its national 
defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping has implemented multiple 
reforms reducing PLA autonomy and greatly strengthening Party control over the military. 
Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s 
absolute control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party.    
China’s Military Leadership 
The military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the 
CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as 
the General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at 
the Party Congresses every five years. In fall of 2022, five of the seven CMC members were 
expected to retire. During the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia remained as Vice 
Chairman, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice Chairman. Other CMC 
members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning members Admiral 
Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. The CMC in 2021 consisted of two vice chairs, the 
Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, 
and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission. 
Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, 
and President of the PRC. The first two positions are party positions, while the third is a state 
position. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and 
as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to his Party positions at the fall 2017 
19th Party Congress and was reappointed President in spring 2018 at the National People's 
Congress (NPC). For a third term, Xi was reappointed to his Party positions in 2022 at the 


 
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20th Party Congress and is expected to be reappointed President at the 2023 NPC. In 2016, Xi 
was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center 
(JOCC) and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming CMC 
Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father 
was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo 
member in the 1980s. Xi Jinping served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career 
and had regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. 
Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang was the first career air force officer to be appointed the 
PRC’s top uniformed official.  Xu is a public advocate for reform and guides the effort as a 
deputy secretary of the CMC’s reform leading group.  Xu previously served on the CMC as 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander, where he oversaw rapid force modernization and 
expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping 
early in his career, when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer 
to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since the Cultural Revolution 
period, and – at 54 years of age at the time – the youngest in PLA history. Xu served as a third 
term CMC member and retired following the Party Congress in 2022.   
Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia was China’s second-most senior officer and former 
head of the Equipment Development Department. Zhang gained rare experience as a combat 
commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the 
Shenyang Military Region, which shared a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one 
of the PLA’s “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi 
Jinping’s father at the close of China’s Civil War in 1949. Zhang was expected to retire due 
to previously followed age norms within the PLA, but remains on the CMC for a third term 
following the 20th Party Congress. 
Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe was appointed to the CMC at the 2017 
Party Congress, and as the Minister of National Defense at the NPC in March 2018. Wei is 
the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and 
foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of 
command and his primary policy influence is derived from membership on the CMC and State 
Council. Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top 
posts in the headquarters of the former PLA Second Artillery Corps, the PLA Rocket Force’s 
(PLARF’s) predecessor, before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff – the first officer from the Second Artillery to serve in that position. Wei most recently 
was the PLARF commander. Wei is serving a second term as a CMC member he will likely 
be replaced as the Minister of National Defense during the National People’s Congress in 
March 2023.  
Joint Staff Department Chief General Li Zuocheng oversaw PLA joint operations, a 
narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former GSD prior to reforms initiated in 
2015. Li is one of few remaining active duty PLA officers with combat experience and is 


 
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recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. He was also 
the first Army commander after the PLA Army (PLAA) became a separate service in 2015. 
Li previously commanded the Chengdu Military Region, which was responsible for the 
sensitive area of Tibet. Li Zuocheng retired from his CMC position following the 20th Party 
Congress.  
Political Work Department Director Admiral Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political 
work, including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who 
switched services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the 
PLA Navy (PLAN).  Miao may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army 
in Fujian Province, when his career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLAN 
political commissar during the Navy’s BRI cruise conducted in mid-2017. Miao Hua, at age 
65 in 2021, remained on the CMC in his current position. 
Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengmin oversees 
the highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party 
discipline. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third ranking member on the standing 
committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s appointments indicate 
the Party’s commitment to the anticorruption campaign in the military. Shortly after his 
appointment to the CMC, Zhang was promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank in the 
PLA. Zhang Shengmin, at age 64 in 2021, remained on the CMC following the 20th Party 
Congress.  
 
 
 
 


 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
CHINA’S FORCES, CAPABILITIES,  
AND POWER PROJECTION 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across 
all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, 
and maritime, as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and 
cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability 
to fight and win wars against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a euphemism likely for the 
United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and project power globally.    
 In 2021, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, 
fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its 
competency to conduct joint operations. 
With approximately 2.2 million active duty military service members and 660,000 
paramilitary personnel, China maintains one of the largest military forces in the world.  In 
2021, China’s defense budget increased by 6.8% to $261 billion. According to a PRC work 
report, the new defense budget aligned with PRC military goals associated with its 2027 and 
2035 military modernization program. PRC state media reported that the defense budget 
increase over the prior year focused on modernizing the PLA’s training with realistic 
simulation and the use of virtual reality, accelerating improvements in logistics capabilities, 
investing in defense science and technology, and enhancing the military’s strategic capacities.  
In effort to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily reduced 
active duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with roughly 
one million soldiers in 2021. The PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have 
grown in size since 2015, indicating their increasing importance.  By 2021, the PLAN Marine 
Corps expanded from two to six brigades and supplemented with aviation and Special Forces, 
becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. The PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based nuclear and 
conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s strategic 
space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological 


 
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warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) handles 
quartermaster, transportation, medical services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s 
joint capabilities during peace and war. 
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA)  
Key Takeaways:  
 The PLAA emphasized realistic training scenarios and standardization of training 
methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and throughout extensive joint 
amphibious training that utilized both PLAN and civilian roll-on roll-off (RORO) 
vessels. 
 The PLAA and Russian Army units participated in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, a 
large-scale joint exercise to expand cooperation between the two militaries, which was 
conducted on PRC soil for the first time. 
 The PLAA applied twice a year conscription after delays from COVID-19 in 2020, 
emphasizing the recruitment of college graduates and students with science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) backgrounds. 
The PLA Army (PLAA) has approximately 975,000 active-duty personnel in combat units 
and is the primary ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 PRC National Defense 
University’s Science of Military Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition 
from a regional defense force to a global combat force. In 2021, the PLAA continued to 
emphasize the modernization and standardization of their equipment through the fielding of 
new and upgraded combat systems. 2021 also highlighted standardization of training, 
improvements to power projection capabilities, and extensive combined-arms and joint 
trainings. 
Force Structure and Organization. In 2021, the PLAA continued to field a large number of 
new platforms and updated equipment. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 
and 2017 PLA reforms is complete, but significant additional equipment fielding is necessary 
to complete the transformation of the PLAA into a fully modern force.  
The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang military command, 
and the Tibet military command. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of 
multiple combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force. The 
brigades vary in size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into 
three types: light (high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled 
armored vehicles), and heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from 
approximately 4,000 (light) to 5,000 (heavy) personnel each. Each group army controls six 
additional brigades responsible for operational element functions: an artillery brigade, an air 
defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) 


 
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brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a sustainment brigade. Some 
variations exist with at least one group army per theater separating their engineering and 
chemical defense brigades into separate units. Although the PLAA has standardized its group 
armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and brigades that exist outside of the 
group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP considers sensitive including 
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Beijing. 
Capabilities and Modernization. Despite the PLAA's ambitions to become a highly 
modernized ground force they still widely employ a mix of modern and obsolete tanks and 
armored fighting vehicles. Throughout 2021, the PLAA continued to test and field new 
systems with a large emphasis on the development of situational awareness and manned 
unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the proliferation of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 
and fixed-wing uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Soldier enhancement capabilities have also 
taken the next step as units are beginning to use exoskeletons and hyperbaric oxygen therapy 
to mitigate stresses on the individual soldier. A ground force with these capabilities, supported 
by sufficient lift and sustainment capabilities, would likely be able to project at least limited 
ground power regionally. The PLAA also continued the fielding of light, highly mobile 
systems with emphasis on areas with difficult terrain. 
The PLAA is rapidly developing a limited capability to project ground power as an 
expeditionary force. In addition to protecting national sovereignty and security, the 2020 
National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy describes the PLAA as focused on 
improving precision, multi-functional, and sustained operations capabilities, command and 
control, and integrated systems to promote ambitions of building a global combat capable 
army. The PLAA’s primary power projection initiatives are mobile, modular combined arms 
formations, special operations forces, and PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units.  
After years of substantial reform, the combined-arms battalion of the combined arms brigade 
is the basic combat unit of the PLAA. PLAA officers tell PRC media that the formations 
comprise more than 10 different combat arms, are plug-and-play and adjustable based on the 
terrain and mission requirements. The PLAA enhanced power projection capabilities through 
increased mobility, ease of transport and logistics, and precision strike capabilities. This was 
accomplished through an effort to lighten PLAA with a focus on medium and light, high 
mobility platforms, and the fielding of new long-range multiple rocket launcher systems.  
The PLAA's 15 Special Operations Forces (SOF) brigades provide group army commanders 
with an organic unit capable of executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF brigade 
missions include raids, harassment operations, target seizure and control, special 
reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and rescue operations. Observed SOF training in 
2021 included aerial infiltration, small-unit tactics, and maritime operations. 
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units remained a focus of development in 2021. PLAA 
training events and reports in PRC media show that air-ground integration, multi-dimensional 


 
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assaults, and MUM-T are now a standard part of training. Training in 2021 also included 
numerous examples of helicopters executing nighttime flight operations and ultra-low altitude 
flying.  PLAA Aviation works directly with ground units to enhance its ability to support air 
assault operations and conduct air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint training in 
2021 included the army aviation helicopters conducting confrontational training against 
PLAAF surface-to-air missile brigades, and army aviation helicopters coordinating with PLA 
Navy landing ships. The two PLAA Air Assault brigades continued extensive training on 
helicopter insertion, air reconnaissance, and coordinating air strikes with other PLAA units 
and joint service partners. In 2021, PLAA Aviation Brigades began using the new Z-20 
medium-lift transport helicopters for various missions in western China. Ongoing 
development of PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units will lead to a highly-mobile, modular 
ground force unit capable of supporting expeditionary operations. Expeditionary operations 
where PLA seeks to improve proficiency include: the protecting of overseas PRC citizens and 
overseas PRC economic interests, UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), 
Counterterrorism Operations (CT), and the ability to secure strategic lines of communication 
(SLOCs) far from the PRC mainland. The PLAA envisions its Aviation and Air Assault units 
employing their three-dimensional maneuver, firepower, and assault capabilities to act as a 
main combat force, support a greater joint operation, or conduct non-war military operations 
outside China. Overseas military operations is comprised of surveillance implementation, 
seizure, electronic combat, and battlefield rescue, while overseas non-combat operations 
include disaster relief, emergency rescue, and anti-terrorism. 
Readiness. PLAA training in 2021 followed the trend from 2020, focusing on combined-arms 
and joint training. PLAA units conducted multiple iterations of STRIDE-2021 in various 
theaters with an emphasis on setting the standardization of training methods and conditions. 
PLAA units stressed realistic training, professionalization of opposing force (OPFOR) 
formations, and conducted numerous force-on-force “confrontation drills.”  
In addition to conventional ground force training, PLAA units conducted extensive specialty 
exercises in 2021. Units conducted coastal defense, multiple sea crossings and landings, and 
high-elevation 
plateau 
operations. 
Joint 
training 
included 
for 
the 
first 
time, 
ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, where PLAA units conducted a large-scale exercise with the 
Russian 
military 
in 
China. 
PLAA 
and 
Russian 
forces 
participating 
in 
ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021 underwent theoretical and systems training, weapon swaps, 
and a culminating exercise to further understanding and cooperation between the two 
militaries. The PLAA also continued extensive joint training using PLAN landing ships and 
civilian RORO vessels to expand amphibious capabilities.  
While continuing to focus on equipment modernization, the PLAA also turned to the 
development of their personnel. The PLAA changes in their recruitment strategy as the PLA 
implemented a twice a year conscription and increased its emphasis on the recruitment of 


 
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college students majoring in science and engineering. The PLAA also emphasized the use of 
simulations in exercises to carry out immersive training in lieu of actual combat training. Use 
of simulations gives users an emulation of a battlefield that provides a variety of training 
situations to allow for completion of instruction and mitigation of shortcomings in a low risk 
environment. 
 
 
 
 


 
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PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN) 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of 
approximately 340 ships and submarines, including approximately 125 major surface 
combatants.  As of 2021, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission 
ships and submarines. 
 In 2021, the PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight 
JIANGDAO class corvettes to the China Coast Guard.  
 The PLAN commissioned its fourth RENHAI class cruiser (CG) in late 2021 and 
resumed series construction of the JIANGKAI II class frigate. 
 The PLAN commissioned two YUSHEN class amphibious assault ships, one each in 
April 2021 and April 2022. The PLAN launched a third hull in the class in January 
2021, which is currently undergoing sea trials prior to commissioning. 
 In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision 
strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-
attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability. 
The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
as adjusting to changes in the strategic requirements of near seas protection and far seas 
protection, noting that it was “speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near 
seas to protection missions on the far seas.” The PLAN is an increasingly modern and flexible 
force that has focused on replacing its previous generations of platforms that had limited 
capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is largely 
composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-
submarine weapons and sensors. The PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint operations 
and joint integration within the PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing 
emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater 
distances from mainland China. 
The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as 
well as the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. The PLAN 
continues to implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. Similar to 
the other services, the PLA-wide reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting 
operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint Theater Commands, and focused 
the PLAN on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.  
Missions. The PLAN continues to develop into a force increasingly capable of global 
operations, gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia.  The PLAN’s latest 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
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surface and subsurface platforms enable combat operations beyond the reach of the PRC’s 
land-based defenses. In particular, China’s growing force of aircraft carriers extend air 
defense coverage of deployed task groups beyond the range of land based defenses and will 
enable operations at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-
based land-attack systems will also enhance the PRC’s ability to project power. Furthermore, 
the PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable logistical replenishment ships to support 
long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two new FUYU class fast combat 
support ships (AOEs) built specifically to support aircraft carrier operations. The PLAN’s 
expanding fleet of large modern amphibious warships will enable it to conduct a wide range 
of expeditionary operations wherever PRC interests are threatened or in support of PRC 
participation in internationally sanctioned operations. The expansion of naval operations 
beyond China’s immediate region will also facilitate its non-war military activities and further 
legitimize the PRC’s growing global military posture, including at its base in Djibouti.  
China continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first 
domestically built aircraft carrier, Shandong, was launched in 2017 and commissioned in 
December 2019—the beginning of what the PLA states will be a multi-carrier force. China’s 
next generation of carriers, including one that began construction in 2018, will have greater 
endurance and an electromagnetic catapult launch system making it capable of launching 
various types of specialized fixed-wing aircraft for missions such as early warning, electronic 
warfare (EW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This will increase the striking power of 
a potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate 
periphery. China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is expected commission in 2024. 
The PLAN’s newest amphibious ships, the YUSHEN class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) 
and YUZHAO class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD) are modern platforms capable of 
regional and global expeditionary missions in support of both wartime and non-war 
contingency operations either singly or as part of capable and flexible task groups composed 
of multiple amphibious ships and surface combatants. 
The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain is modest but growing 
as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced 
platforms. China’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended 
task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Notable 
deployments in 2021 included the following:  
• 
In April 2021 and December 2021, the PRC aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted 
deployments to the Philippine Sea and South China Sea accompanied by escort ships 
including the RENHAI class cruiser Nanchang during both deployments. According 
to the Japanese Self-Defense Force, the December deployment included night flight 
operations almost 200 miles southeast of Okinawa with the task group accompanied 
by a FUYU class AOE. 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
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• 
In May of 2021, a PLAN task group operated in the South China Sea, Java Sea, and 
Celebes Sea, and conducted an exercise with the Indonesian Navy.  
• 
In August and September 2021, a PLAN task group that included a RENHAI class 
cruiser and an AGI deployed to the North Pacific and operated inside the U.S. EEZ in 
Alaskan waters. 
• 
In October 2021, PLAN and Russian warships exercised in the Sea of Japan and then 
sailed into the Pacific Ocean through the Tsugaru Strait that separates the Japanese 
Islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. 
• 
The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2021, 
a 13-year effort that is the PRC’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Indo-
Pacific region.  
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of 
approximately 340 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going 
amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. In 2021, the 
PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight JIANGDAO class 
corvettes to the China Coast Guard. This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol 
combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle 
force is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030. Much of this growth 
will be in major surface combatants.  The PLAN’s force structure consists of three fleets with 
subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval bases. The 
PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the Eastern 
Theater Navy is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the Southern Theater Navy 
is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but 
its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new 
technologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 44 
diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS/SSP).  The PLAN will likely 
maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more 
capable units on a near one-to-one basis. 
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing 
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the 
PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which are capable of 
launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 
17 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 
039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines purchased from 
Russia in the 1990s. 
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG 
I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs 
(Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) (7,200KM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first 
credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.  
By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile 
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN). This new SHANG class variant will enhance the 
PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if 
equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and 
special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.  By 
prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants, acoustic surveillance ships, 
and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its 
ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training and systems 
integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability.   
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for 
surface combatants. At the close of 2021, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new 
batch of guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and a new batch of guided missile frigates (FFG). 
These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine 
capabilities, and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the 
PLA’s shore-based air defense systems. By the end of 2019, the PLAN had commissioned its 
30th JIANGKAI II class FFG, reportedly completing the production run. However, in 2021 
PRC media reported production had restarted with at least two hulls launched by the end of 
year and additional units are likely under construction. The PLAN augmented its littoral 
warfare capabilities, especially for operations in the East and South China Seas, with the high-
rate production of the JIANGDAO class FFLs (Type 056 and Type 056A). The PLAN 
commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The 
PLAN also transferred the early flight JIANGDAO variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China 
Coast Guard in 2021, probably due to the models’ lack of towed-array sonar.  The 056A FFLs 
are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are thus capable ASW ships.  
The PLAN has expanded its force of large surface combatants with two programs, the 
LUYANG III class DDG and the RENHAI class guided-missile cruise (CG). By late 2020, 
the PRC had launched 25 LUYANG III class DDGs—including 12 lengthened LUYANG III 
MOD DDGs with 19 of the new hulls commissioning by the end of 2021. Both the standard 
LUYANG III and the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell multipurpose vertical launch system 
(VLS) capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to air missiles, and anti-submarine 
missiles. In December 2021, China commissioned its fourth RENHAI class guided-missile 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
cruiser with the remaining four hulls likely commissioning during 2022. The RENHAI has 
112 VLS cells and can carry a large load out of weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and anti-submarine weapons along with likely LACMs and anti-
ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when those become operational.   
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare capabilities in its force development. 
The PLAN’s frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of 
the YJ-83/YJ-83J ASCM (97NM, 180KM), while newer surface combatants such as the 
LUYANG II class DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (215NM, 400KM). The LUYANG III 
class DDGs and the RENHAI class CGs will be fitted with a variant of China’s newest ASCM, 
the YJ-18A (290NM, 537KM).  A few modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the 
supersonic YJ-12A ASCM (250NM, 460KM). Eight of the PLAN’s 10 KILO class SSs are 
equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM, 220KM). The PRC’s SONG class 
SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-
launched YJ-18 and its variants, which constitute an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM. 
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) 
targeting capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is 
investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications 
systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting 
information to surface and subsurface launch platforms. 
As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of land-
attack capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next 
step. In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and 
destroyers and developmental SHANG class Type 093B SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit 
its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition 
of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide 
the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets 
at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region. 
Amphibious Warfare Ships. China’s investment in Landing Helicopter Assault ships 
(LHAs) signals its intent to continue to develop its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April 
2021, China commissioned the first of YUSHEN class LHA (Type 075) followed by the 
commissioning of the second hull in December 2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was 
launched in January 2021, marking an approximately 16-month timeframe to launch the three 
vessels, and will likely join the fleet in the first half of 2022. The YUSHEN class are highly 
capable large-deck amphibious ships that will provide the PLAN with an all-aspect 
expeditionary capability. The YUSHEN class can carry a large number of landing craft, 
forces, armored vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the PLAN has eight large YUZHAO 
class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type 071) in service. The YUZHAO class LPDs 
and YUSHEN class LHAs provide the PLA with greater capacity, endurance, and more 
flexibility for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships, which it has 


 
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reduced in number over the last decade with obsolete units being decommissioned. The 
YUSHEN and YUZHAO can each carry several YUYI class air-cushion medium landing 
craft and a variety of helicopters, as well as tanks, armored vehicles and PLAN marines for 
long-distance expeditionary deployments. 
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first domestically built 
aircraft carrier, Shandong, which launched in 2017 and completed multiple sea trials during 
2018-2019. Shandong was photographed at a base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater 
Navy in late 2020 and should now be considered to be operational. Shandong is a modified 
version of the Liaoning (Soviet KUZNETSOV class) design and likewise uses a ski-jump 
takeoff method for its aircraft. The PRC continued work on its second domestically built 
aircraft carrier in 2021, which will be larger and fitted with an electromagnetic catapult launch 
system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early-
warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations and thus extend the reach and effectiveness 
of its carrier based strike aircraft.  The PRC’s second domestically built carrier, the Fujian, is 
projected to be operational by 2024, with additional carriers to follow.  
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates and is developing several aircraft to operate from 
its carriers and combatants. In addition to the standard J-15 fighter that currently operates 
from PLAN carriers, there is a catapult-capable J-15 variant in development. The aircraft is 
currently testing from land-based steam and electromagnetic catapults. A third J-15 variant, 
the J-15D, is a two-seat aircraft equipped with wingtip electronic support measures/electronic 
intelligence gathering pods as well as several conformal antennas. The aircraft is intended to 
fill a dedicated electronic attack role. China is also developing a carrier capable variant of the 
fifth-generation J-31 fighter. Beyond fighter aircraft, China is refining the design of a carrier-
borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft known as the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft, 
which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D Hawkeye, has existed for many years, and a 
prototype of the KJ-600 is currently in flight testing. The PRC is also developing the Z-20F 
helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the RENHAI cruisers and LUYANG III MOD 
destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The Z-20F is similar to the U.S. Navy’s SH-60 
and will provide significant improvements in ASW capabilities over the smaller Z-9 and Ka-
28 helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-20F will also complement the larger Z-
18Fs that operate from the PLAN’s aircraft carriers. 
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the process of replacing its older variant H-6 bombers 
in 2019 with the H-6J, a naval variant of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new and 
larger advanced maritime strike bomber has six weapons pylons instead of four, advanced 
avionics, and upgraded engines, and the H-6J can employ the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM 
(250NM, 460KM). In 2020 PLAAF H-6Ks were also photographed carrying YJ-12s, 
significantly increasing the number of bombers available to the PLA for long-range maritime 
strike missions. 


 
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The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime 
patrol and airborne early warning aircraft including many of the same variants operated by 
the PLAAF. However, the PLAN has also fielded a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine 
warfare and maritime patrol. The new aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector 
boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-
search radar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, 
probably for electronic surveillance. A small electro-optical (EO)/ infrared turret is located 
just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is equipped with an internal weapons bay in front 
of the main landing gear. 
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and 
support ships, including intelligence collection ships (AGI), ocean surveillance ships 
(AGOS), fleet replenishment oilers (AOR), hospital ships, submarine salvage and rescue 
ships, and various other specialized units. Additionally, China’s first domestically built polar 
icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in 2019. The ship is operated by the Polar 
Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration. In May 2021, XUELONG 2 
completed the PRC’s 37th research mission to Antarctica and in the second half of 2021, the 
PRC’s 12th research mission to the Arctic. 
PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). The PLANMC is still in the process of completing 
expansion requirements set forth by the CMC under PLA reform in 2016. Serving as the 
PLAN land combat arm, the PLANMC continued to evolve throughout 2021 and is receiving 
equipment and training necessary to become the PLA’s preeminent expeditionary force, as 
directed by Xi Jinping. All six PLANMC maneuver brigades have achieved initial operating 
capability (IOC); three of the brigades are assessed to be fully mission capable.   Two other 
PLANMC brigades – the aviation brigade and the special operations brigade, are IOC and 
Full Operational Capability (FOC), respectively. The aviation brigade will likely not achieve 
FOC status until at least 2025 and likely beyond, based on the current pace the brigade is 
receiving new helicopters, fully trained flight crews, and support equipment. The FOC 
aviation brigade will most likely contain a mix of heavy-lift, medium-lift, attack, and multi-
purpose helicopters capable of operating on land and at sea to support all aspects of PLANMC 
operations. Such operations include, but are not limited to humanitarian aid/disaster relief, 
force protection, counterterrorism, amphibious assault, and combat operations ashore, either 
in support of large-scale PLA operations or as an expeditionary force overseas. 
On December 30th, 2021, Lieutenant General Kong Jun, previously the PLANMC 
commander, was identified as the Eastern Theater Command Army commander. The new 
PLANMC commander is Major General Zhu Chuansheng. Major General Zhu also came from 
the PLAA and has a background in amphibious operations as the deputy commander of the 
41st Group Army. It is likely that Major General Zhu will see the PLANMC through its reform 
and expansion, likely by 2027. The new commander will lead a PLANMC of over 30,000 
marines. This number could increase to closer to 40,000 by 2027, depending on whether 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
current estimates of the number of marines in each combat brigade and the overall size of the 
aviation brigade remain accurate. The top end of PLANMC personnel strength is not likely to 
go higher than 40,000 marines, of which less than one-third will be conscripts. The majority 
of PLANMC marines will likely be non-commissioned officers with at least the equivalent of 
a high school diploma; many marines will likely be college-educated.    
The PLANMC’s roles and missions principally include defending PLA bases in mainland 
China, the South China Sea and abroad, conducting amphibious operations to seize and defend 
small reef and island outposts, and conducting non-war military activities (NWMA). 
Although the PLANMC has traditionally focused on its task to assault and defend small 
islands in the South China Sea, more recently its focus has grown to include expeditionary 
operations beyond the First Island Chain. The PLANMC’s roles under NWMA support the 
PRC’s efforts to protect its overseas interests including resources, infrastructure, and citizens 
abroad. 
The PLANMC has increased the size of its force in Djibouti from approximately 250 marines 
in 2017 to 400 marines in 2022, including a new special forces contingent. The PLANMC 
also embarks a contingent of marines with the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-focused 
naval escort task force that supports China’s trade interests. Additionally, the PLANMC 
supports the PRC’s military diplomacy. For example, they have trained with Thai, Pakistani, 
Saudi, South African, and Djiboutian forces.     
The PLANMC has begun to train on the PLAN’s first amphibious helicopter assault ship 
(LHA), likely as part of the vessel’s initial qualifications for operational status. PLAN LHAs 
will be capable of delivering PLANMC ground and air forces, to include amphibious and non-
amphibious combat units – throughout East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific 
Ocean. Additionally, the PLANMC is almost certainly serving a force protection role on 
PLAN ships operating beyond the First Island Chain, capable of both repelling an assault from 
the sea and conducting visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations to protect both PRC 
and international shipping in the Indian Ocean, the Philippine Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.  
Despite the focus on expanding expeditionary missions, the PLANMC has not abandoned its 
amphibious mission. To the contrary, the PLANMC continues to conduct amphibious and 
expeditionary training in the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands, to include 
training events in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The most 
significant aspect of PLANMC amphibious training is the continued–and almost certainly 
expanding–use of civilian roll-on/roll off (RORO) vessels to transport PLANMC combat 
forces during training events. This activity is significant because it demonstrates that the 
PLANMC now has a role as a second-echelon force in the PLA, providing theater 
commanders the flexibility to use the PLANMC in multiple roles as part of an amphibious 
campaign, specifically in a Taiwan scenario. This flexibility decreases the requirement to 
build additional PLAN amphibious ships to successfully assault Taiwan. This operational 
flexibility also provides operational and logistics units within the PLANMC the training and 


 
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proficiency to move between military and civilian vessels not just in a Taiwan scenario, but 
in any maritime environment where civilian transport vessels are available to the PLANMC 
and PLAN amphibious ships are not. 
 


 
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PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN 
AVIATION 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
 The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to 
modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. 
 In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad 
after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air 
refuelable bomber. 
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute 
the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total 
aircraft (not including trainer variants or UASs) of which approximately 2,250 are combat 
aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and 
attack aircraft).  The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable 
of long-range airpower projection. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the 
PLAAF’s missions and tasks as transitioning from territorial air defense to “offensive and 
defensive operations.” In 2021, General Chang Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF 
commander and continued to enact PLAAF reforms to improve the force’s ability to 
accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. 
This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant U.S. military technical 
advantages vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain. 
The CMC’s intent is to transform the PLAAF into a more effective and capable force that is 
proficient at conducting joint operations. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air 
defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-
ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF has reorganized into five Theater Command 
Air Forces, established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate 
regiments into brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber 
divisions.  
Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to field greater numbers of fourth-
generation aircraft (now more than 800 of 1,800 total fighters, not including trainers) and 
probably will become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. For 
fifth-generation fighters, the PLAAF has operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth-generation 
stealth fighter, and PRC social media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 in October 
2021. The PLAAF is preparing upgrades for the J-20, which may include increasing the 
number of air-to-air missiles (AAMs) the fighter can carry in its low-observable 


 
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configuration, installing thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, and adding super cruise capability 
by installing higher-thrust indigenous WS-15 engines. Development continues on the smaller 
FC-31/J-31 for export or as a future naval fighter for the PLAN’s next class of aircraft carriers.    
Bombers. The PRC’s bomber force is currently composed of H-6 Badger variants, which are 
domestically produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber. Despite the 
relative age of its bomber force, the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the 
operational effectiveness of these aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded greater 
numbers of the H-6K, a modernized H-6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and features 
more-efficient turbofan engines for extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs, giving 
the PLA a long-range standoff precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second 
Island Chain from home airfields in mainland China. PLAN Aviation has traditionally fielded 
the H-6G to support maritime missions. More recently, PLAN Aviation has begun operating 
the H-6J, a maritime strike version of the H-6K with six weapons pylons for ASCMs. This 
aircraft carries six supersonic long-range YJ-12 ASCMs and can attack warships out to the 
Second Island Chain.  
During the PRC’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N, a 
derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-range strikes. The H-6N features a modified 
fuselage that allows it to carry externally an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may 
be nuclear capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was observed carrying an air-launched ballistic 
missile. The H-6N’s air-to-air refueling capability also provides it greater reach over other H-
6 variants that are not refuelable in air. In 2020, the PLAAF operationally fielded the H-6N 
bomber, providing a platform for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The 
H-6N-equipped unit very likely is developing tactics and procedures to conduct the PLAAF 
nuclear mission.  In addition, the PLAAF is seeking to extend its power projection capability 
with the development of a new H-20 stealth strategic bomber, with official PRC state media 
stating that this new stealth bomber will have a nuclear mission in addition to filling 
conventional roles. The PLAAF is also developing new medium- and long-range stealth 
bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program 
in 2016, however it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber. 
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9 communications 
jamming/electronic countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-11). This aircraft is designed 
to disrupt an adversary’s battlespace awareness at long ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to-
air refueling operations to extend the ranges of its fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with 
refueling probes using the H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a 
small number of larger IL-78 Midas. In addition, the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its 
Y-20 heavy-lift transport, which will enable the PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve 
the PLAAF’s ability to operate beyond the First Island Chain from bases in mainland China.  
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500—the PRC’s most advanced airborne early warning 
and control (AEW&C) aircraft—continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-2000 Mainring 


 
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and KJ-200 Moth variants. These aircraft amplify PLAAF’s ability to detect, track, and target 
threats in varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances. It also extends the 
range of the PLA’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. Furthermore, China has 
produced at least one KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which will improve the aircraft’s 
ability to provide persistent AEW&C coverage. 
The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large 
transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports 
will supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which 
to date, consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports 
are intended to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic 
reconnaissance operations as well as HA/DR missions. 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs). China continues their comprehensive UAS 
modernization efforts, highlighted by the routine appearance of ever more sophisticated UASs 
across theater and echelon levels. The last three years have seen several key milestones. These 
include the airshow display and operational appearance of the Xianglong jet powered UAS, 
as well as the unveiling of both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a redesigned version of the 
GJ-11 stealth uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The PLA also continues the maritime 
use of ISR UASs, featuring both the venerable BZK-005 and the newer TW-328/TB001. 
China is also expanding the applications of large UASs, demonstrating uses including disaster 
communications, anti-submarine roles, firefighting, and weather modification. Advanced 
small UASs are increasingly appearing in both military and civilian applications, with the 
PRC industry remaining a key exporter of UAS and components of all sizes. 
In addition to maturing their current capabilities, China is also signaling its efforts in next 
generation capabilities. Air and trade shows are displaying growing numbers of autonomous 
and teaming systems, including for combat applications. In these concepts, PRC developers 
are demonstrating an interest in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into both air-to-air 
and air-to-ground combat, with a substantial amount of development displaying efforts to 
produce swarming capability for operational applications. 
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-
range SAM systems in the world, composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) battalions and 
domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions.  To improve its 
strategic long-range air defenses, the PRC has acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM system from 
Russia. The PRC is also developing its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will likely 
have a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. China is also developing kinetic-kill 
vehicle technology to field a mid-course interceptor, which will form the upper layer of a 
multi-tiered missile defense. The PLA conducted a test of a land-based mid-course interceptor 
on February 4, 2021. 


 
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PLAAF Airborne Corps. The PLAAF Airborne Corps commands six airborne combined-
arms brigades, a SOF brigade, an operational support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, 
a training base, and a new training brigade. The six combined arms brigades consist of three 
airborne infantry, one air assault, one wheeled airborne mechanized (wheeled air droppable 
armored vehicles), and one tracked airborne mechanized (tracked air droppable armored 
vehicles). 
Each airborne combined-arms brigade typically commands four combined-arms battalions, 
an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support 
battalion, and a service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion. 
Airborne units conducted significant joint training events in 2021. The PLAAF Airborne 
Corps participated in the ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021 exercise held in western China, 
which included paradrops from Y-20 aircraft and joint training with Russian military forces. 
PLAAF Airborne Corps also trained in 2021 for core strategic missions such as long range 
insertion, and seizure and control of key locations. In October, the PLAAF Airborne Corps 
conducted joint training with the PLAN Marine Corps off southern Hainan Island, in an effort 
to further their ability to execute joint force projection. Additionally, the PLAAF Airborne 
Corps used simulation technology, including virtual reality parachute simulators to improve 
effectiveness of parachute training.    


 
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PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its strategic 
deterrence capabilities.      
 In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and 
training.  This was more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile 
employment in conflict zones. 
 The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs), which are capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear 
precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval 
targets. 
 The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will 
significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased 
nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. In 2021, the PRC 
continued building three solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will cumulatively 
contain at least 300 new ICBM silos. 
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-
based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. 
The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy 
to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 
2019 defense white paper, the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable 
capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-
range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build 
a strong and modernized rocket force. 
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s 
ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of 
the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces includes the CSS-6 (DF-
15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 
km); the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km); the land-attack and anti-ship variants 
of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km); 
the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM; the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 3,000 
km); the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km); 
and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally 
armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-
range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific 


 
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from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a 
maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the 
field. The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 
2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and 
nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in 
the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China.  In 
2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea.  
The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles and 
developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
systems. In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and 
training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in 
conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. 
While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear 
warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 
as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.  
The PLARF is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly 
improve its nuclear-capable missile forces with more survivable delivery systems, and will 
require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The PRC appears to be 
doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists 
of approximately 300 ICBMs, including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching 
unitary and multiple reentry vehicles.  China’s fixed ICBMs consist of the shorter range CSS-
3 (DF-4), as well as the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF-
5B), which is capable of carrying up to five MIRVs. PRC media indicates a follow-on DF-5C 
may be in development. The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 class and CSS-20 (DF-41) 
ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess of 
11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. PRC media reports 
suggest a DF-31B might also be in development. The DF-41 ICBM has been operationally 
deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades existed for the 
system. The PRC appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-
mobile and silo basing. The PRC is building multiple ICBM silo’s intended to support the 
land-based component of the PRC’s nuclear triad. Additionally, sources indicate a “long-
range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in development. Official PRC military writings indicates this 
range-class spans 5,000-8,000km, which means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. 
Additionally, on 27 July 2021, China conducted the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM 
with an HGV. The HGV flew around the world and impacted inside China. This demonstrated 
the greatest distance flown (~40,000 km) and longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any PRC 
land-attack weapons system to date. According to senior U.S. military officials, the HGV did 
not strike its target, but came close. 
 


 
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STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF)  
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization 
established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.  
 The SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with 
an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. 


 
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 The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent 
anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy 
systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space 
domain during a crisis or conflict.  
 The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted 
significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space 
applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific 
endeavors, and space exploration. SSF works with civilian organizations, such as 
universities and research organization, to integrate civilian support to military efforts.  
The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s 
strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. 
The SSF reports directly to the CMC and supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The 
PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper described the SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to 
achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of 
new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.” 
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems 
Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department 
responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, EW, 
cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a 
four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, 
and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the 
CMC, but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The 
SSF provides information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to 
all PLA services and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – 
typically comprised of personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment 
SSF cyberspace operations during peacetime and are organized into specialized units during 
wartime to support network defense operations. 
In 2021, General Ju Qiansheng was promoted to SSF commander. He previously served as 
commander of the Network Systems Department. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong was the commander 
of the Space Systems in 2021. He previously served as the chief of staff for the former General 
Armaments Department, Chairman of the China Satellite Launch and Tracking General, and 
commander of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch center. The leader of the Network Systems 
Department is unknown.  
The SSF participates in joint exercises and training throughout China, including possible 
national strategic joint exercises. For example, since its creation, the SSF has participated in 
joint far seas training exercises with the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force concentrated 
on advancing joint operations and informatized warfare capabilities. These exercises allow 


 
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the SSF to assess and improve its capabilities to support joint operations and better enable the 
PLA to project power into the East and South China seas. 
Network Systems Department. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for 
information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical 
reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological warfare. By placing these 
missions under the same organizational umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational 
coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform 
organizational structure. The integration of cyberspace and EW elements under one 
organization was a crucial step towards realizing the operational concept of integrated 
network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since the early 2000s. The 
Network Systems Department operates five theater–aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a 
number of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The Network Systems 
Department provides intelligence support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse 
suite of ground-based technical collection assets to provide a common operating picture to 
geographically dispersed operational units. 
The SSF and the “Three Warfares” Concept: The SSF Network Systems 
Department, performs missions and tasks associated with the PLA’s concept of “Three 
Warfares,” which comprises psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal 
warfare. This department is the only publicly known organization in the PLA that 
performs psychological warfare operations. See ‘Special Topic:  PRC Views of 
Information and Information Dominance’ for more on PLA views on information 
warfare, including psychological warfare.  
The SSF’s strategic space, cyberspace, and psychological warfare capabilities and missions 
are not bound by geographic constraints and can be used independently or to enable and 
support PLA global power projection operations. The SSF’s information support role involves 
centralizing technical intelligence collection and management, which provides strategic 
intelligence support to the theater commands, enables power projection, supports strategic 
defense in the space and nuclear domains, and enables joint operations. The PRC continues 
to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary's 
use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed-
energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite 
(ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to 
pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth 
orbit.   
 


 
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SSF Space Systems Department  
Space and Counterspace Trends. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly 
and Beijing has devoted significant economic and technological resources to growing all 
aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as 
profit-generating launches, human spaceflight, scientific endeavors, as well as lunar and 
Martian exploration missions. Space has been considered a distinct domain of warfare since 
at least 2015, and the PLA expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by 
enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead 
command, 
control, 
communications, 
computers, 
intelligence, 
surveillance, 
and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The PRC probably will continue to develop the capabilities 
for use against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.   
Space and Counterspace Organizations. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible 
for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support; space surveillance; 
space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare.  The 
Space System Department operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions 
are the launch, tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to China’s overhead C4ISR 
architecture. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in several locations 
worldwide. The SSD also operates Yuan Wang space support ships that track satellite and 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches.  
Cyberspace Activities Directed Against the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
PRC-based intrusions continued to target computer systems around the world, including 
those owned by the U.S. Government, throughout 2021. These and past intrusions focus 
on accessing networks and extracting information. The PRC uses its cyberspace 
capabilities to not only support intelligence collection against U.S. political, economic, 
academic, and military targets, but also to exfiltrate sensitive information from the defense 
industrial base to gain military advantage and possibly for cyberattack preparations. The 
targeted information can benefit the PRC’s defense high-technology industries, support the 
PRC’s military modernization, provide China’s leadership with insights into U.S. plans and 
intentions, and enable diplomatic negotiations. Additionally, targeted information could 
enable their cyberspace forces to build an operational picture of U.S. defense networks, 
military disposition, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited prior 
to or during a crisis. The access and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those 
necessary to conduct cyberspace operations in an attempt to deter, delay, disrupt, and 
degrade DoD operations prior to or during a conflict. In aggregate, these cyber-enabled 
campaigns threaten to erode U.S. military advantages and imperil the infrastructure and 
prosperity on which those advantages rely.   


 
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China’s space program comprises organizations in the military, political, defense-industrial, 
and commercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and 
continues to support both civilian and military interests. This includes strengthening and 
investing in its science and technology sector, growing international partnerships, and 
improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, SATCOM, satellite navigation, human 
spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although state-owned enterprises are China’s 
primary civilian and military space contractors, China is placing greater emphasis on 
decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.  
The SSD’s China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four launch sites, in 
addition to Yuan Wang space support ships, two major satellite control centers—Xian 
Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC—and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and 
control (TT&C) system for all Chinese satellites.    
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral 
organization with rotating leadership whose members include China, Bangladesh, Iran, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as 
associate members.  APSCO oversees a space surveillance project known as the Asia-Pacific 
Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS). As part of the project, 
China provided to Iran, Pakistan, and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to track objects in 
LEO and GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data collected is funneled 
through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical Observatory of China. 
APOSOS has near full coverage of LEO and GEO. The organization is planning to improve 
optical system capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.     
China utilizes locations worldwide to aid in TT&C of space missions both around the Earth 
as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are ground stations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ethiopia, France, Greenland, Kenya, Kiribati, Namibia, Norway (Svalbard), Pakistan, South 
Africa, and Spain. There are also four sites in Antarctica that can provide similar support as 
well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall, Kunlun, Taishan, and Zhongshan Stations.  
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages 
China’s space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also 
maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees China’s military 
acquisitions. SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting 
China’s space activities.  
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the 
public face of China’s civilian space efforts. China is increasingly using CNSA efforts to 
bolster relationships with countries around the world, providing opportunities to cooperate on 
space issues. China had more than a hundred cooperative space-related agreements with more 
than three dozen countries and four international organizations.    


 
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Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose, and China emphasizes 
“military-civil fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, 
policies, and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations 
like universities and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts 
since there is an already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human 
resources. China’s commercial space sector features partially state-owned enterprises such as 
Zhuhai Orbita, Expace, Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote sensing, launch, and 
communication services.      
International Cooperation. In 2021, China launched the China-France Oceanography 
Satellite, China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 04A, Ethiopian Remote-Sensing Satellite, 
and Student Small Satellites (SSS) for the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 
(APSCO).  Beijing also completed the in-orbit delivery of the Pakistan Remote-Sensing 
Satellite (PRSS-1), Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite (VRSS-2), Sudan Remote-Sensing 
Satellite (SRSS-1), and the Algerian Communications Satellite (Alcomsat-1). China has 
provided satellite carrying or launching services for countries including Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Laos, and Luxembourg. China has built satellite data 
receiving stations with countries including Bolivia, Indonesia, Namibia, Thailand and South 
Africa.  
Space and Counterspace Operations. The PLA views space superiority, as well as the 
ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own 
space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components of 
modern “informatized warfare.” China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled 
operations to the United States and its allies has shaped integral components of PLA military 
planning and campaigns. In addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight 
operations for deployed PLA forces. The PLA probably views counterspace operations as a 
means to deter and counter a U.S. intervention during a regional military conflict. Moreover, 
PRC defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early 
warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the 
enemy.” 
The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and 
capabilities of its space systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well 
as the BeiDou navigation satellite system. These capabilities allow the PLA to maintain 
situational awareness of potential flashpoints as well as monitor, track, and target adversary 
forces. Additionally, the PRC continues to develop direct ascent, co-orbital, electronic 
warfare, and directed energy capabilities that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and 
operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict. PLA writings indicate the purpose 
of these capabilities is to deter and counter the intervention of a third party during a military 
conflict.     


 
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JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (JLSF) 
Key Takeaway 
 The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level 
logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services.   
 The JLSF also had an active role coordinating with civilian entities to provide logistic 
support in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 


 
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The PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) provides integrated joint logistics support for 
the PLA. The JLSF is directly subordinate to the CMC and is central to China’s efforts to 
build a joint, efficient “combat-oriented modern logistics system,” which Beijing views as 
essential for modern warfare. The JLSF works to modernize PLA joint strategic- and 
campaign-level logistics by overseeing theater wide supply operations, establishing and 
coordinating support relationships among the PLA service logistics elements, conducting joint 
logistics exercises with the PLA services, and integrating civilian logistics resources into 
military operations. The JLSF conducts exercises of various size, scope, and complexity to 
improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint logistics operations.     
The JLSF is headquartered at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base. It operates five joint 
logistics support centers (JLSCs) aligned with each of the theater commands that are intended 
to streamline logistics support to the PLA. Under the JLSCs’ control are units that provide 
materiel support to the PLA and joint logistics brigades (JLSBs), who focus exclusively on 
providing mobile logistic support to combat operations.    
The JLSF provides the PLA with joint strategic- and campaign-level logistics, enabling the 
PLA to conduct large-scale operations. Force elements of the JLSF include weapons and 
ammunition, warehousing, medical services, transport, fuel, engineering and construction 
management, reserve equipment, and procurement support. During peacetime, the JLSF has 
authority over the JLSCs’ operations and activities; during wartime, theater commands 
possibly would assume control of their designated JLSC.  
The JLSF routinely integrates civilian logistics resources and equipment into military 
operations and exercises, a known PLA practice to leverage China’s civilian products, 
services and transportation, such as aircraft and buses, to improve resupply and move military 
personnel and equipment more rapidly. The JLSF continues to play a lead role working with 
the civilian sector to provide logistic support in response to the continuing COVID-19 
outbreak.  
PLA Training to Improve Readiness 
The CMC sought to improve PLA combat readiness, interoperability, and training through 
the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced these priorities through military training mobilization 
orders and senior leadership guidance. In 2021, PLA training focused on reconnaissance, 
rapid mobilization, disaster relief, medical response, and joint warfare in a realistic combat 
environment. PLA training increasingly integrated non-military government agencies and 
militias. There was growing emphasis on incorporating the militia and PLA Reserve Forces 
into PLA joint training and operations.    
Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained, and in some cases increased, the frequency, scale, and 
duration of joint exercises. The COVID-19 pandemic likely did not significantly impact the 
PLA’s ability to conduct joint exercises. The PLA successfully completed at least thirteen 


 
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bilateral and multinational exercises conducting naval drills, maritime patrols, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Although the PLA has improved some 
combat proficiencies, the force as a whole still struggles with jointness, command and control, 
and professional military education, especially among the mid-level officers.     
PLA RESERVES, PARAMILITARY & MILITIA 
Key Takeaway 
 Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the 
PRC’s paramilitary forces continues to grow in scale and sophistication, including the 
coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s 
Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).   
 
The PRC’s Internal Security Forces 
The PRC’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and the militia. The CCP relies on these forces to address challenges 
ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic problems, to 
terrorism and natural disasters. In 2021, the PRC deployed more than 100,000 PLA, PAP, 
and militia personnel for disaster relief following devastating floods in Henan Province.  
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads the PRC’s civilian national police, which 
serves as the front force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law 
enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including anti-
rioting and anti-terrorism. 
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and 
counterintelligence service. MSS operations include but are not limited to: protect the 
PRC’s national security; conduct counterintelligence; combating foreign espionage; and 
investigate organizations or individuals inside the PRC who carry out or direct, support, or 
aid other people perceived to threaten national security.  On April26th 2021, the PRC 
enacted a new counter espionage law permitting the MSS authority to identify companies 
and organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require these 
institutes to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration.  
People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed 
forces.  Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation 
to the PLA during conflict. As part of a security structures reorganization in 2018, the CMC 
centralized control of the PAP. The same reform also subordinated the CCG to the PAP. 


 
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People's Liberation Army Reserve Force. The PLA Reserve Force was founded in 1983 
and professionalized throughout the 1990s and 2000s. On July 1, 2020, the PRC amended 
laws, regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve Force under the command of the Central 
Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous arrangement split control of the Reserve 
Force between the PLA and local Party committees. Motivations for the change include 
improving combat capability, facilitating cooperation with active-duty units, and upholding 
the CCP’s absolute leadership over the military. Chinese sources often stated specifically that 
the reform would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA 
appears to have begun making a partial restructure towards using a PLAA reserve base system 
to continue to improve facilitation and support for active-duty units. 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA has 
formal and informal roles in the PRC’s internal security. As the principal armed wing of the 
CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s survival, and supports other internal 
security forces as necessary. The 2015 white paper, China’s Military Strategy, outlined 
eight PLA strategic tasks: safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territory; safeguard national 
unification; safeguard China’s interests in new domains, such as space and cyberspace; 
safeguard China’s overseas interests; maintain strategic deterrence; participate in 
international security cooperation; maintain China’s political security and social stability; 
and conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” 
missions. 
Militia. PRC’s militia is a force that can be mobilized for a variety of peace- and war-time 
missions and is distinct from the PLA’s Reserve Force. The militia is organized by townships, 
administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions, and the 
missions may vary widely. In wartime, militia units assist the PLA with its military operations, 
conduct independent security operations, and provide support and manpower replacement 
to the PLA. During peacetime, the militia assists in humanitarian aid and disaster relief, 
supports military training, and maintains internal security. PRC’s Military Service Law 
requires male citizens between 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for military service, 
excluding those already in active service, be enrolled into the militia. The militia is divided 
into two categories. The primary militia consists of former soldiers, personnel that have 
received military training, and personnel selected for military training that are under the 
age of 28, in good health, and politically reliable. The remainder of male citizens between 
18 and 35 years of age are considered ordinary militia. The primary militia may recruit 
female citizens when necessary and the age limits can be waived under special 
circumstance. Local maritime militia forces, referred to by many western analysts as the 
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, perform tasks including safeguarding maritime 
claims, protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance 
and reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG. 


 
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The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate to the 
Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve.  According to 
official Chinese media and journal articles, a small number of active duty cadre serve as a 
permanent backbone for the Reserve Force to enable the influx of reserve officers and soldiers 
when required. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA’s National 
Defense University states the building of the reserve force is an important part of national 
defense construction and is the basic and strategic project to consolidate national defense. The 
primary mission of the reserves is to reinforce active-duty forces for national defense, with a 
secondary mission to aid in national disasters or maintaining social order. The Reserve Force 
should be prepared to effectively respond to a variety of emergencies and military threats, 
safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and the core security of 
the country. 
Reserve officers are selected from veteran PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia 
officers, and other technical personnel. Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA 
veterans, trained grass-roots militias, and other local or military specialty personnel. Some 
reserve soldiers also failed to meet active duty entry requirements and conduct remedial 
training in the reserves until they are able to join the active duty force.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that significant issues remain in the mobilization of reserve 
forces, including which equipment should be used, what level of government pays for the 
mobilization, and resistance from enterprises at the sudden requisition of their employees. 
Chinese documents state that Reserve Force equipment is predominately antiquated; one 
report stated that more than 70% of air defense artillery and artillery equipment is at or beyond 
its maximum service life. Some of the equipment is no longer manufactured and repair 
requires cannibalization. 
The PLA Reserve Force also provides significant support to local areas after natural disasters.  
The PLA Reserve Force does not include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad other 
groups (e.g. the People’s Armed Police or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC)). 
People's Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a component of the PRC’s armed forces and an 
armed wing of the CCP with an estimated 660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National Defense 
University publication Science of Military Strategy, the primary responsibilities of the PAP 
include maintaining political, institutional and regime security, handling emergency rescue, 
counter-terrorism, air support, maritime rights protection, administrative law enforcement, 
and defense operations. The PAP is organized into three main parts: the Internal Security 
Corps, the Mobile Corps, and the China Coast Guard (CCG). The Internal Security Corps 
covers each of the PRC’s provinces, provincial-level cities, and autonomous regions. There 
is not yet a reported permanent presence of the PAP in the Special Administrative Regions 
(SARs) of Hong Kong or Macao, but since 2019, the PAP maintains a rotational deployment 
in Hong Kong. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad PAP units placed to reinforce the 


 
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Internal Security Corps and provide flexibility in responding to internal security issues.  
Mobile Corps units are concentrated in the west and south (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
and Qinghai) as well as the major cities of Beijing and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular focus 
of the PAP due to PRC perceived separatist activity, as well as its proximity to areas of unrest 
in Central Asia. The China Coast Guard is covered in depth in the next section of this report. 
Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership tasked the PAP with integrating themselves into the PLA’s 
joint operation system. The PAP’s main mission is internal security, but is increasingly 
focused on joint operations with the PLA and is developing capabilities for rapid response, 
mobility, and counterterrorism operations. The PAP also conducts training with foreign 
partners, including at least Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP 
forces have likely operated in Tajikistan, patrolling the tri-border region connecting 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC. 
In 2021, the PAP reportedly executed numerous emergency rescue and disaster response 
operations in response to heavy flooding and typhoons, as well as conducting counter-
terrorism and opposing force training and exercises. 
China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a 
wide range of maritime security missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; 
fisheries enforcement; combating smuggling, terrorism, and environmental crimes; as well as 
supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National 
People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect on 1 February 2021. The 
legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, and applies those duties 
to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with concern by other regional 
countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially as territorial 
disputes in the region continue.  
The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has made it the largest maritime law 
enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer vessels are larger and more capable than older 
vessels, allowing them to operate further off shore and remain on station longer. A 2019 
academic study published by the U.S. Naval War College estimates the CCG has over 140 
regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (of more than 1,000 tons displacement). Some of the 
vessels are former PLAN vessels, such as corvettes, transferred to the CCG and modified for 
CCG operations. The newer, larger vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-
capacity water cannons, interceptor boats, and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In 
addition, the same academic study indicates the CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol 
combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and an 
additional 450 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499 tons). 
 
 


 
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China’s Maritime Militia 
Background & Missions. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a subset 
of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization that 
is ultimately subordinate to the Central Military Commission through the National Defense 
Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around towns, villages, 
urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission.  
PAFMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the 
China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. China employs 
the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” 
at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China employs 
PAFMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing them in disputed 
areas throughout the South and East China Seas.  In this manner, the PAFMM plays a major 
role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, and these 
operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations 
short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.  
Operations. PAFMM units have been active for decades in maritime incidents and combat 
operations throughout China’s near seas and in these incidents PAFMM vessels are often used 
to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to 
outweigh and outlast rival claimants. In March of 2021, hundreds of Chinese militia vessels 
moored in Whitsun Reef, raising concerns the Chinese planned to seize another disputed 
feature in the Spratly Islands.  Other notable incidents include standoffs with the Malaysian 
drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 oil rig in waters disputed with 
Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Shoal (2012), and harassment of USNS 
Impeccable  and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014).  Historically the maritime militia also 
participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel 
Islands from South Vietnam, and the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 
1994.  
The PAFMM also protects and facilitates PRC fishing vessels operating in disputed waters.  
For example, from late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 PRC 
fishing vessels operated under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in 
Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the PRC ships 
in this fishing fleet were affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, including a 
maritime militia unit based out of Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most traditional 
maritime militia units operating in the South China Sea continue to originate from townships 
and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of increasingly prominent maritime 
militia units based out of provinces in the PRC. These mainland based maritime militia units 
routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern South China Sea, and their 


 
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operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the PRC government to 
improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.   
Capabilities. Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes 
various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate PAFMM vessels to perform 
“official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. 
PAFMM units employ marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the 
PLAN and the CCG. While retaining their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, 
often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can be activated on demand. Additionally, starting in 
2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has developed into a salaried 
full-time maritime militia force equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with 
mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming along with 
their own command center in the Paracel Islands. Lacking their normal fishing 
responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel, many of whom are former PLAN 
and CCG sailors, train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, often with light arms, and 
patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums. 
Additionally, since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 
235 large fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons.  
These vessels were built under central direction from the Chinese government to operate in 
disputed areas south of twelve degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly 
Waters,” including the Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built 
for prominent PAFMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces. For vessel 
owners not already affiliated with PAFMM units, joining the militia was a precondition for 
receiving government funding to build new Spratly backbone boats. As with the CCG and 
PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands enhance the PAFMM’s ability to 
sustain operations in the South China Sea. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to 
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
 The PLA is also developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into 
the Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases, globally.  
 Although the PLA has undertaken important structural reforms to promote joint 
operations, the capability of the PLA to carry out joint operations in support of 
counter-intervention or joint campaigns outside the First Island Chain remains in its 
infancy.  


 
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Joint Capabilities for Counter-intervention  
The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a 
presence in China’s immediate periphery and limit US access in the broader Asia-Pacific 
region. The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are, to date, the most robust 
within the First Island Chain, although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the 
Philippine Sea, and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific 
Ocean.  
PLA ground, naval, air and rocket forces are increasingly capable of projecting power at 
greater distances from China. However, joint service training is still in its infancy and the 
PLA has demonstrated limited joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC. Instead, overseas 
activities are mostly conducted by single services and do not involve combat.  
Beijing recognizes the importance of increasing military capabilities to achieve global 
security objectives and has encouraged the PLA to increase its operations beyond the Indo-
Pacific. As detailed in China’s 2015 and 2019 Defense White Papers, Beijing is primarily 
interested in developing these capabilities to protect Chinese maritime rights and commercial 
interests.  However, the majority of PLA modernization and recent exercises remains focused 
on fighting and winning a regional conflict. As Beijing’s economic interests expand in areas 
like Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East, we expect to see increased 
focus on expanding power projection operations globally. 
Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA doctrinal writings state that 
precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war.  The PLA further notes that 
small elite forces using advanced weapons or capabilities can attain military effects that 
previously required large armies and much higher levels of damage and cost.  Therefore, PLA 
writings state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war 
control” to prevent escalation. PLA documents further state that the range of vital political, 
economic, and military targets has grown as the advanced globalized economy develops, 
implying that growing PLA strike capabilities will attack an increasing array of targets, and 
thereby attaining international strategic effects by striking critical nodes of the global 
economy during a future conflict. The PRC’s military modernization efforts have rapidly 
transformed the PLA’s missile force. PLA writings frame logistics and power projection 
assets as potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, which aligns with the PLA’s expanding 
ability to conduct strikes against regional air bases, logistics and port facilities, 
communications, and other ground-based infrastructure.  
U.S. bases in Guam are in range of a growing number of the PLA’s ballistic and cruise 
missiles. In the future, LACMs will also likely be deployable on surface platforms like the 
RENHAI class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K bomber flights into the Philippine Sea 
demonstrate the PRC’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs. The DF-26 


 
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intermediate range ballistic missile is capable of reaching Guam, and is capable of conducting 
nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.   
China views its ability to acquire timely, high-fidelity information as critical to its ability to 
execute precision strikes. The PLA’s information support system for precision strikes depends 
heavily on Strategic Support Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target, and conduct 
battlefield damage assessments. China emphasizes the importance of space-based 
surveillance capabilities in supporting precision strikes. In 2021, the PRC continued to 
develop its constellation of military reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, 
tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces, while also investing in reconnaissance, 
surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity OTH targeting information for its strike platforms.   
 Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS 
architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive 
early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has 
also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the South China Sea, further 
extending the range of its IADS. It also employs point defenses, primarily to defend strategic 
targets against adversary long-range cruise missiles and airborne strike platforms.  
The PLA has increasing numbers of advanced long-range SAMs, including its indigenous 
CSA-9 (HQ-9) and its follow-on HQ-9B, Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU), and SA-20 (S-
300PMU1 / PMU2), all of which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft 
and low-flying cruise missiles. To improve its strategic air defenses, the PLA possesses 
Russian-built SA-21 (S-400) Triumf SAM systems as a follow-on to the SA-20. Compared to 
these other systems, the SA-21 systems possess a longer maximum range, improved missile 
seekers, and more sophisticated radars.   
The PRC manufactures a variety of long-range air surveillance radars, including models 
claiming to support ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other models asserting the ability to 
detect stealth aircraft. Marketing materials also emphasize these systems’ ability to counter 
long-range airborne strike and combat support aircraft. PLAAF AEW&C aircraft such as the 
KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend the PRC’s s radar coverage well past the range of its 
ground-based radars. 
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a 
limited capability against ballistic missiles. The PRC’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range 
SAM system likely has a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic 
missiles. The PLA has SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs and SA-21 (S-400) SAMs that may have 
some capability to engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting 
infrastructure. The PRC is working to develop BMD systems consisting of exo-atmospheric 
and endo-atmospheric kinetic-energy interceptors. China is pursuing a mid-course interceptor 
that may have capabilities against IRBMs and possibly ICBMs. The RENHAI cruiser has been 


 
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identified as a platform for mid-course intercept capabilities suggesting the PRC will have 
forward deployed missile defense in the near future.  Additionally, the HQ-19 interceptor has 
undergone tests to verify its capability against 3,000 km-class ballistic missiles. The PLA’s 
cruise missile defense capability is more robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses, with 
short-to-medium range SAMs, such as the HQ-22, augmenting the PLA’s long-range SAMs 
in this role. 
Hypersonic Weapons. China’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue 
to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly intended to 
replace some older SRBM units, according to PRC media, and is intended to strike foreign 
military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.   
Aviation Forces (PLAAF, PLAA Aviation, PLAN Aviation). PLA aviation forces are 
fielding advanced platforms capable of supporting future long-distance operations, as their 
mission sets evolve from defending Chinese territorial space to launching offensive operations 
at distances beyond the First Island Chain. While interoperability is a stated priority, joint 
exercises between the aviation’s forces are limited. Individually, the PLAAF, PLAN Aviation, 
and PLAA Aviation continue to improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive 
operations offshore, including strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, early warning 
and reconnaissance missions, and insertion. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated 
calls from its leadership to become a truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long 
distances to advance and defend the PRC’s global interests.   
• 
In 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service, supporting the continued PLAAF 
expansion of air refuelable fighters, bombers, and SMA aircraft like the KJ-500 
AEW&C aircraft. These new air refuelable aircraft will significantly expand China’s 
ability to conduct long-range offensive air operations.     
• 
China was developing a new generation of long-range bombers, likely named the H-
20, according to multiple reports and a 2016 public statement by then PLAAF 
Commander General Ma Xiaotian. The H-20, which may debut sometime in the next 
decade, will have a range of more than 10,000km, enabling the PLAAF to cover the 
Second Island Chain and into the western region of the Pacific. The H-20 bomber’s 
range could be extended to cover the globe with aerial refueling. It is also expected to 
employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry and feature a stealthy design. 
• 
The PLA Army aviation and air assault units are enabling highly-mobile, modular 
ground task force capable of expeditionary operations. In 2021, the PLAA added at 
least six heavy lift Z-8 transport helicopters and 12 medium lift Z-20 helicopters. 
According to PRC media, three Z-8 transport aircraft battalions could airdrop a combat 
battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is also expected to fill a variety of missions including 
special force insertion and shipborne ASW.    
• 
PRC’s outposts in the South China Sea extends the operating reach of PLA aviation 
forces.   


 
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ADVANCING TOWARD AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO 
in military exercises. 
 The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat 
to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems.  
 The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future 
conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI 
and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 
Chairman Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of 
dominating all networks and expanding the country’s security and development interests. PRC 
military writings describe informatized warfare as the use of information technology to create 
an operational system-of-systems, which would enable the PLA to acquire, transmit, process, 
and use information during a conflict to conduct joint military operations across the ground, 
maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. The PLA is 
accelerating the incorporation of command information systems, providing forces and 
commanders with enhanced situational awareness and decision support to more effectively 
carry out joint missions and tasks to win informatized local wars. The PLA continues to 
expand the scope and regularity of military training exercises that simulate informatized 
operations and likely views offensive and defensive cyberspace operations as a means to 
achieve information dominance early in a crisis or conflict.  
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Modernization 
(C4I). The PRC continues to prioritize C4I modernization as a response to trends in modern 
warfare that emphasize the importance of rapid information collection, processing, and 
sharing and accelerated decision making. The PLA is continuing modernization and reform 
efforts, both technologically and organizationally, to effectively command complex, joint 
operations across all warfare domains and potentially in multiple theaters.  
The PLA sees networked, technologically advanced C4I systems as essential to providing 
reliable, secure communications to fixed and mobile command posts, thereby enabling rapid, 
effective, multi-echelon decision making. These systems are designed to distribute real-time 
data—including intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather 
reports via redundant, resilient communications networks—to improve commanders’ 
situational awareness. PLA field commanders view near-real-time ISR and situational data as 
well as redundant and reliable communications as essential to streamlining decision making 
processes and shortening response timelines. China has expanded its communications and 


 
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intelligence gathering capabilities in key regions like the South China Sea, where it has rapidly 
constructed new facilities and antennas likely supporting satellite communications and 
technical collection between 2018 and 2021. The PRC is also fielding the Integrated 
Command Platform to units at multiple echelons across the force to enable lateral and cross-
service communications and intelligence sharing required for joint operations. Digital 
databases and command automation tools allow commanders to simultaneously issue orders 
to multiple units while on the move and enable units to quickly adapt to shifting conditions in 
the battlespace. 
As the PLA continues to focus on improving its ability to fight and win informatized wars, 
future information systems will likely implement emerging technologies such as automation, 
big data, the internet of things, artificial intelligence (AI), and cloud computing to improve 
process efficiencies. The PLA has already begun this process by embracing big data analytics 
that fuse a variety of data to improve automation and to create a comprehensive, real-time 
picture for warfighters. 
Electronic Warfare (EW). The PLA considers EW to be an integral component of modern 
warfare and seeks to achieve information dominance in a conflict through the coordinated use 
of cyberspace and electronic warfare to protect its own information networks and deny the 
enemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The PRC’s EW strategy emphasizes 
suppressing, degrading, disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment throughout the 
continuum of a conflict. The PLA will likely use electronic warfare early in a conflict as a 
signaling mechanism to warn and deter adversary offensive action. Potential EW targets 
include adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave, infrared and optical 
frequency ranges, as well as adversary computer and information systems. PLA EW units 
routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple 
communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems 
during force-on-force exercises. These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW 
weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to improve confidence in 
their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment. In addition, the 
PLA reportedly tests and validates advances in EW weapons’ R&D during these exercises. 
Cyberspace warfare. The development of cyberspace warfare capabilities is consistent with 
PLA writings, which identify information operations (IO)—comprising cyberspace, 
electronic, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving information superiority 
early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe. The PRC has publicly 
identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its intent to 
expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to 
military and critical infrastructure systems, and presents a growing influence threat. The PRC 
seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to physical 
disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 


 
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operations beginning in the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC can launch 
cyberspace attacks that, at a minimum, can cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical 
infrastructure within the United States, and the PRC believes these capabilities are even more 
effective against militarily superior adversaries that depend on information technologies. As 
a result, the PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch 
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the 
United States.  
Authoritative PLA sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and 
EW as strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and 
“sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict. PLA writings 
judge other countries have effectively used cyberspace warfare and other IO in recent conflicts 
and argue for attacks against C2 and logistics networks to affect an adversary’s ability to make 
decisions and take actions in the early stages of conflict. The PLA also considers cyberspace 
capabilities to be a critical component in its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture, 
alongside space and nuclear deterrence. PLA studies discuss using warning or demonstration 
strikes—strikes against select military, political, and economic targets with clear awing 
effects—as part of deterrence. Accordingly, the PLA probably seeks to use its cyber-
reconnaissance capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyberspace attack purposes; to 
constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, 
commercial activities, and civilian and defense critical infrastructure; and, to serve as a force-
multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.  
The PLA’s recent structural reforms may further change how the PLA organizes and 
commands IO, particularly as the SSF continues to develop its capabilities and further 
integrate into joint planning, exercises, and operations with other PLA forces. The SSF likely 
is generating synergies by combining national-level cyberspace reconnaissance, attack, and 
defense capabilities in its organization, alongside other strategic IO capabilities. 
Intelligentized Warfare. In October 2020, the CCP announced that modern warfare was 
evolving to include intelligentization and incorporated the concept into its 14th Five-Year 
Plan. Beijing anticipates that AI and other advanced technologies, such as cloud computing 
and big data analytics, will be key to success in future warfare. As a result, it is adjusting the 
PRC’s defense modernization plans to focus on integrating the development of 
“mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” suggesting the PLA will field some 
intelligentized capabilities as it completes mechanization and informatization over the next 
decade. 
PLA strategists have stated new technologies will increase the speed and tempo of future 
warfare, and that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality 
of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making 
advantage over potential adversaries. The PLA is researching various applications for AI 
including support for missile guidance, target detection and identification, and autonomous 


 
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systems. The PLA is exploring next-generation operational concepts for intelligentized 
warfare, such as attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, cross-domain mobile warfare, AI-
based space confrontation, and cognitive control operations. The PLA also considers 
unmanned systems to be critical intelligentized technologies, and is pursuing greater 
autonomy for unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles to enable manned and 
unmanned hybrid formations, swarm attacks, optimized logistic support, and disaggregated 
ISR, among other capabilities. 
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information 
sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and 
communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized 
warfare.”    
 The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, 
and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.   
 The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and 
related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting 
space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor 
objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.    
Space Strategy and Doctrine. The PRC officially advocates for the peaceful use of space 
and is pursuing agreements in the United Nations on the “non-weaponization” of space.  China 
continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms 
to better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations. China’s space 
strategy is expected to evolve over time, keeping pace with the application of new space 
technology. These changes probably will be reflected in published national space strategy 
documents, through space policy actions, and in programs enacted by political and military 
leadership. In September 2021, President Xi Jinping stated that “space is an important 
strategic asset for the country that must be well managed and utilized and, more importantly, 
protected,” and called for strengthened space traffic management and international 
cooperation on security issues to improve effectiveness in managing crises in space.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere 
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication 
capabilities, as a critical component to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” China’s first 
public mention of space and counterspace capabilities came as early as 1971, largely from 
academics reviewing foreign publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chinese science 


 
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and technology efforts on space began to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of the 
U.S. space-focused Strategic Defense Initiative to defend against the former Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons.  Subsequently, after observing the U.S. military’s performance during the 
1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an 
effort to modernize weapon systems, across all domains including space, and update its 
doctrine to focus on using and countering adversary information-enabled warfare.  
China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and 
its allies has shaped integral components of PLA military planning and campaigns. In 
addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed PRC 
forces, and the PLA sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a U.S. 
intervention during a regional military conflict. China has claimed that “destroying or 
capturing satellites and other sensors” would make it difficult for the U.S. and allied militaries 
to use precision-guided weapons. Moreover, PRC defense academics suggest that 
reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the 
targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”  
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature 
rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant economic and political resources to growing all 
aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as 
profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.  The PRC’s space 
enterprise includes the SSF and also encompasses other military, government, and civilian 
organizations, including state-owned enterprises, academic institutions, and commercial 
entities.  The PLA has historically managed the PRC’s space program and the SSF Space 
Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations. The PRC continues 
to strengthen its military space capabilities, despite its public stance against the weaponization 
of space. The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite 
navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. In 
2022, the PRC plans to have a permanent operating space station that will host its own and 
foreign payloads and astronauts. The PRC has built an expansive ground support 
infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including spacecraft 
and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.  Additionally, 
the PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct ascent, co-orbital, 
electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities—that can contest or deny an adversary’s 
access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.  
China has devoted considerable economic and technological resources to growing all aspects 
of its space program, improving military space applications, developing human spaceflight, 
and conducting lunar and Martian exploration missions. In the past 10 years, China has 
doubled its launches per year and the number of satellites in orbit. China has placed three 
space stations in orbit, two of which have since deorbited, and the third of which launched in 


 
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2021. Furthermore, China has launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side of the Moon; 
a lander and sample return mission to the Moon; and an orbiter, lander, and rover in one 
mission to Mars. The PRC has also launched multiple anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that are 
able to destroy satellites and developed mobile jammers to deny SATCOM and GPS.         
Beijing’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully capable space power. Its rapidly growing 
space program—second only to the United States in the number of operational satellites—is 
a source of national pride and part of Chairman Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” to establish a 
powerful and prosperous China. The space program, managed by the PLA, supports both 
civilian and military interests, including strengthening its science and technology sector, 
growing international relationships, and modernizing the military. China seeks to rapidly 
achieve these goals through advances in the research and development of space systems and 
space-related technology.       
China will continue to launch a range of satellites that substantially enhance its ISR 
capabilities; field advanced communications satellites able to transmit large amounts of data; 
increase Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities; and deploy new weather and 
oceanographic satellites. China has developed and will continue to develop weapons for use 
against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.     
The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, 
as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space 
within their field of view and enable counterspace actions. In concert with its marked 
improvements in satellite navigation, launch capabilities, and space object surveillance and 
identification, the PRC is developing electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers; 
offensive cyberspace capabilities; and directed-energy weapons. Moreover, the PRC has 
demonstrated sophisticated, potentially damaging on-orbit behavior with space-based 
technologies. The PRC has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile 
intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional 
ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit. The PRC 
is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and is probably testing dual-use 
technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.    
ISR Satellite Capabilities. China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to 
enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing 
and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR 
satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
as well as electronic and signals intelligence data. China also exports its satellite technology 
globally, including its domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.  
As of the end of 2021, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 260 systems—a quantity 
second only to the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit systems since 2018.   


 
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The PLA owns and operates about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which could 
support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially 
throughout the Indo-Pacific region. These satellites also allow the PLA to monitor potential 
regional flashpoints, including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean, and the South 
China Sea.     
Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, 
procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well 
as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.  These improvements increase 
China’s monitoring capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, 
expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings.  Space capabilities will enhance potential 
PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast. These capabilities are being 
augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio 
transmissions.  
Satellite Communications. China owns and operates more than 60 communications 
satellites, at least four of which are dedicated to military use.  China produces its military-
dedicated satellites domestically. Its civilian communications satellites incorporate off-the-
shelf commercially manufactured components.  China is fielding advanced communications 
satellites capable of transmitting large amounts of data.  Existing and future data relay 
satellites and other beyond-line-of-sight communications systems could convey critical 
targeting data to Chinese military operation centers.     
In addition, China is making progress on its ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront 
of the global SATCOM industry. China is continuing to test next-generation capabilities like 
its Quantum Experimentation at Space Scale (QUESS) space-based quantum-enabled 
communications satellite, which could supply the means to field highly secure 
communications systems.  In 2016, China launched the world's first quantum communications 
satellite (Micius) into low Earth orbit. Between 2017 and 2019, PRC scientists used Micius 
to send quantum keys to ground stations up to distances of 1,200 kilometers and as a trusted 
relay to transmit quantum keys between ground stations in China and Austria, facilitating 
intercontinental quantum-secured communications. In June 2020, a team of PRC scientists 
claimed to achieve quantum supremacy—the event that a quantum device performs a 
computational task that no existing or easily foreseeable classical device could perform—
using a photonic quantum computer (Jiuzhang), followed by a Chinese superconducting 
quantum computer (Zuchongzhi), which also achieved quantum supremacy in 2021. Testing 
satellite-based quantum entanglement represents a major milestone in building a practical, 
global, ultra-secure quantum network, but the widespread deployment and adoption of this 
technology still faces hurdles.    
China also intends to provide SATCOM support to users worldwide and plans to develop at 
least seven new SATCOM constellations in LEO. However, as these constellations are still in 
the early stages of development, their effectiveness remains uncertain.       


 
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Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capabilities. China’s satellite navigation system, 
known as BeiDou, is an independently constructed, developed, and exclusively China-
operated PNT service. China’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national security and 
economic and social development by adopting PRC PNT into precise agriculture, monitoring 
of vehicles and ships, and aiding with civilian-focused services across more than 100 countries 
in Africa, Asia, and Europe. BeiDou provides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT 
services to users domestically, in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as globally and consists of 
49 operational satellites. Initially deployed to facilitate regional PNT services, BeiDou 
achieved worldwide initial operating capability in 2018. In June 2020, China successfully 
launched the final satellite in the BeiDou satellite constellation, completing its global 
navigation system. China’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT services to enable 
force movements and precision guided munitions delivery.    
BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy standard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-
Pacific region is within 5 meters. In addition to providing PNT, the BeiDou constellation 
offers unique capabilities, including text messaging and user tracking through its Regional 
Short Message Communication service to enable mass communications among BeiDou users. 
The system also provides additional military C2 capabilities for the PLA.     
China intends to use its BeiDou constellation to offer additional services and incentives to 
countries taking part in its Belt and Road Initiative emphasizing building strong economic ties 
to other countries to align partner nations with China’s interests. As of May 2021, China is 
predicting BeiDou products and services will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and potentially 
export BeiDou products to more than 100 million users in 120 countries.  
Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration Efforts. Following uncrewed missions that 
began in 1999, China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight 
when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003. In 2011, China then 
launched its first space station, Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second space station, 
Tiangong-2. In 2020, China conducted its first orbital test of the New-Generation Manned 
Spaceship, which is expected to replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft. On 29 April 
2021, China launched the first element, Tianhe, of its new Tiangong space station.  Beijing 
launched the first supply vessel, Tianzhou, and has launched two PRC crews since then.    
China has also taken on a greater role in deep space exploration and space science and has 
made notable accomplishments during the past several years. China has demonstrated its 
interest in working with Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to conduct deep-space 
exploration. China is the third country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and was the first 
to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao 
relay satellite that China launched the year before to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon 
Lagrange point. In May 2021, China landed the Zhurong rover on Mars, the first PRC rover 
to operate on Mars. 


 
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Space Launch Capabilities. China is improving its space launch capabilities to ensure it has 
an independent, reliable means to access space and to compete in the international space 
launch market. China continues to improve manufacturing efficiencies and launch capabilities 
overall, supporting continued human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions—
including to the Moon and Mars. New modular space launch vehicles (SLVs) that allow China 
to tailor an SLV to the specific configuration required for each customer are beginning to go 
into operation, leading to increased launch vehicle reliability and overall cost savings for 
launch campaigns. China is also in the early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV 
similar to the U.S. Saturn V or the newer U.S. Space Launch System to support proposed 
crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.  
In addition to land-based launches, in 2020 China demonstrated the ability to launch a Long 
March-11 (LM-11) from a sea-based platform. This capability, if staged correctly, would 
allow China to launch nearer to the equator than its land-based launch sites, increase the 
rocket’s carrying capacity, and potentially lower launch costs.  
China has developed quick-response SLVs to increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 
satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could 
support Chinese military operations during a conflict or civilian response to disasters. 
Compared with medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite 
launch campaigns because they are transportable via road or rail and can be stored launch-
ready with solid fuel for longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. Because their size is limited, 
quick-response SLVs such as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 are only able to 
launch relatively small payloads of up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO. In June 2020, 
China announced its intention to upgrade the payload capacity of the LM-11 in the new LM-
11A, designed for land or sea launches, beginning in 2022.      
The expansion of non-state-owned PRC launch vehicle and satellite operation companies in 
China’s domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is successfully advancing military-
civil fusion efforts. Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these entities and obfuscates 
the end users of acquired foreign technology and expertise.  
Space Situational Awareness. China has a robust network of space surveillance sensors 
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network 
includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow China to support its 
missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early 
warning (BMEW), spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris 
monitoring.    
Electronic Warfare Counterspace Capabilities. The PLA considers EW capabilities to be 
critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or 
deceive enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates jamming and anti-jamming 
techniques in its exercises that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based 


 
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communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and 
precision-guided munitions employment. China probably is developing jammers dedicated to 
targeting SAR, including aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR 
satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any 
potential conflict involving the United States or its allies. In addition, China probably is 
developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequency bands, including military-
protected extremely high frequency communications.    
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). During the past two decades, PRC defense research has 
proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for 
reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite 
components. China has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to 
disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites that include a current limited capability to employ laser 
systems against satellite sensors. By the mid- to late-2020s, China may field higher power 
systems that extend the threat to the structures of non-optical satellites.       
ASAT Missile Threats. In 2007, China destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites more 
than 800 kilometers above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The effect of this destructive test 
generated more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which more than 2,700 remain 
in orbit and most will continue orbiting the Earth for decades. The PLA’s operational ground-
based ASAT missile system is intended to target LEO satellites. China’s military units have 
continued training with ASAT missiles.    
China plans to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO. 
In 2013, China launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius 
above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No new satellites were released from the object, 
and the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding 
rocket launches for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability could exist to use ASAT 
technology against satellites at great distances and not just LEO.    
Orbital Threats. China is developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as 
satellite inspection and repair. At least some of these capabilities could also function as a 
weapon. China has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space 
maintenance technologies and is conducting research on space debris cleanup; the most recent 
launch was the Shijian-21 launched into GEO in October 2021. In January 2022, Shijian-21 
moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a high graveyard orbit above GEO. The 
Shijian-17 is a Chinese satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm technology could 
be used in a future system for grappling other satellites.    
Since at least 2006, the government-affiliated academic community in China began 
investigating aerospace engineering aspects associated with space-based kinetic weapons—
generally a class of weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets from orbit. Space-based 
kinetic weapons research included methods of reentry, separation of payload, delivery 


 
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vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes. China conducted the first fractional orbital 
launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China on July 27th, 2021. This 
demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (~100+ 
minutes) of any PRC land attack weapons system to date.  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways  
 Over the next decade, the PRC aims to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear 
forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts exceed beyond previous attempts in both scale and complexity. 
 The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based 
nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this 
major expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC is also supporting this expansion by 
increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder 
reactors and reprocessing facilities.  
 In 2021, Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion; DoD estimates China’s 
operational nuclear warheads stockpile has surpassed 400.      
 The PLA plans to "basically complete modernization" of its national defense and 
armed forces by 2035. If China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will 
likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by its 2035 timeline.   
 The PRC is fielding the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile and silo-based ICBM with 
MIRV capability. The system is likely intended to carry no more than three warheads 
per missile and has improved range and accuracy over DF-31 class ICBMs.  The PRC 
is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) 
submarines (SSBNs), which are equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 SLBMs.  
 The PRC is rapidly establishing its silo-based solid-propellant missile fields likely 
consisting of over 300 silos in total, which are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-
41 class ICBMs. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force 
suggests that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force 
by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.    
Strategy. The PRC’s approach to using nuclear force is based on PLA “deterrence” of an 
enemy first strike and “counterstrike” when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an 
adversary’s military capability, population, and economy.  The PRC’s nuclear weapons policy 
prioritizes the maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with 
sufficient strength to conduct multiple rounds of counterstrike, deterring an adversary with 
the threat of unacceptable damage to its military capability, population, and economy. The 


 
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PLA probably selects its nuclear strike targets to achieve conflict de-escalation and return to 
a conventional conflict with a remaining force sufficient to deter its adversary. PLA planners 
would probably avoid a protracted series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary, 
and state that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. It is 
unclear whether the buildup of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal may influence or change the PRC’s 
nuclear strategy in the future; the PLA insists its nuclear policy remains clear and consistent. 
• 
The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a public declaratory “no first 
use” (NFU) policy. That policy states the PRC will never use nuclear weapons first at 
any time nor under any circumstances. In addition, the PRC unconditionally 
undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-
weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China’s nuclear 
strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear 
attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates 
the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear 
use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC 
survival.  
Readiness. Although the PRC almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a 
peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads—nuclear and 
conventional PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty.” These 
apparently include assigning a missile battalion to be ready to launch, and rotating to standby 
positions, on about a monthly basis for unspecified periods of time. The PRC will likely 
increase the number of units on “high alert duty” during times of increased tension. 
Authoritative PLA text books on strategy state “high alert duty” is valuable for the defender 
in a nuclear war and recommend the PLARF adopt a high alert posture conceptually 
comparable to the claimed high alert posture kept by portions of U.S. and Russian nuclear 
force. Such a posture is compatible with the PRC’s active defense concept, NFU policy, and 
post-strike response approach.   
Land-Based Platforms. The PRC’s land-based nuclear forces primarily consist of ICBMs 
with different basing modes complimented by several theater-range road-mobile MRBMs and 
IRBMs. The PRC has approximately 300 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-
5A) and Mod 3 (DF-5B) and possibly more recently a CSS-10 class missile (DF-31 class); 
the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10-class (DF-31 class) with new versions having improved 
survivability and lethality  and CSS-20 (DF-41); and the more limited range roll-out-to-launch 
CSS-3 (DF-4). The PRC is establishing additional nuclear units and increasing the number of 
launchers in mobile ICBM units from six to 12. This strategic arsenal is complemented by 
road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 Mod 2 and Mod 6 (DF-21) MRBMs and DF-26 IRBMs 
capable of ranging targets in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA is probably upgrading its 
existing unitary and MIRVed DF-5 liquid propellant ICBMs.   


 
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Sea-based Platforms. The PRC likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with 
its six operational JIN class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) 
or CSS-NX-20 (JL-3) SLBMs. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN is probably 
intended to field MIRVed SLBMs judging from past developmental trends.  The 096 SSBNs 
will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the 
PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets 
concurrently. The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas 
north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States. The 
fielding of newer, more capable, and longer ranged SLBMs such as the JL-3 gives the PLAN 
the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters allowing the PLAN to 
consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent.  The South 
China Sea and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for employing this 
concept.  
Air Platforms. The PLAAF has operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform 
for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N, compared to other H-6 
bombers, adds an air-to-air refueling probe, as well as its recessed fuselage modifications that 
would allow for external carriage of an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) assessed to be 
nuclear capable. China is probably also developing a strategic stealth bomber, according to 
PRC state media.  
Future Developments. Over the next decade, the PRC will expand and diversify its nuclear 
forces. The PRC probably intends to develop new nuclear warheads and delivery platforms 
that at least equal the effectiveness, reliability, and/or survivability of some of the warheads 
and delivery platforms currently under development by the United States and/or Russia. The 
PLA seeks a diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from lower-yield precision 
strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields. Developing robust nuclear strike options 
is likely intended to provide deterrence predominantly against a “strong enemy,” as well as 
ensure China can inflict unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming 
retaliatory capabilities, and thus denying an adversary victory if a war escalates to the nuclear 
domain.   
China is establishing new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities very likely 
to support its nuclear force expansion. Although these efforts are consistent with China’s goals 
to increase nuclear energy generation and to close its nuclear fuel cycle, Beijing likely also 
considers this dual-use infrastructure as crucial to supporting its military goals, judging from 
Chinese nuclear industry reporting and think tank publications. Despite China’s public 
support for a fissile material cutoff treaty, we judge that Beijing intends to use this 
infrastructure to produce nuclear warhead materials for its military in the near term.    
• 
Plutonium. China is constructing two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder nuclear 
reactors at Xiapu, each capable of producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear 
warheads annually from blankets (referring to uranium placed around the fuel core for 


 
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the purpose of breeding plutonium) surrounding the core, according to think tank 
estimates and informed by PRC state media and nuclear industry reporting. China 
originally planned to use Russian-sourced mixed-oxide (MOX is a blend of uranium 
and plutonium) fuel for these reactors but changed the order to highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) fuel through 2030, according to nuclear industry reporting.    By using 
HEU fuel, China has the potential to generate additional weapons-grade plutonium. In 
addition, China is constructing multiple new reprocessing plants that could extract this 
plutonium, according to a Western think tank. China has reduced transparency in its 
nuclear program as its capabilities are increasing. It ceased reporting its stockpile of 
separated plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2017 while still 
being capable of producing plutonium in reactors and separating it at its reprocessing 
plant at Jiuquan, judging from PRC state media and a Western think tank.   
• 
Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally 
associated with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and 
likely will continue to do so. China is also working to expand and diversify its 
capability to produce tritium by methods such as using tritium production targets in 
reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy water, according to Chinese nuclear 
industry reporting.     
Evolving Nuclear Posture. The PRC’s evolving posture is presently more consistent with 
what PLA writings describe as a “limited deterrent”—a posture that the PLA describes as the 
very wide space between a minimum and maximum deterrent.  The PRC claims to adhere to 
a minimum deterrent which it defines as “…keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum 
level required for maintaining its national security.” The PRC perceived national security 
requirements will grow as it transitions from a ‘large country’ to a ‘powerful country’ and its 
minimum number of military forces—to include nuclear—needed to defend those greater 
interests is also likely to grow.   
Stockpile Size. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile 
was in the low-200s and expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing probably 
accelerated its nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates this stockpile has now surpassed 400 
operational nuclear warheads. By 2030, DoD estimates that the PRC will have about 1,000 
operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging 
the continental United States (CONUS).    
Beijing has not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, and has 
declined to engage in substantive arms control discussions. We continue to assess the PRC is 
constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this force expansion, including increasing 
its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and 
reprocessing facilities. Though this is consistent with the PRC goal of closing the nuclear fuel 
cycle, the PRC likely intends to use some of this infrastructure to produce plutonium for its 
expanding nuclear weapons program. 


 
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The PRC’s long-term nuclear requirements—and the relationship between the PRC’s nuclear 
requirements and its national strategy and goal to field a “world-class” military by mid-
century—remain unclear from public sources. Hawkish PRC state media outlets have asserted 
that the PRC needs 1,000 warheads, while retired PLA officers have suggested that the PRC 
should possesses a ‘mutually assured destruction’ capability. The PLA plans to "basically 
complete modernization" of its national defense and armed forces by 2035. If China continues 
the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 
that time. While neither of those claims are official, anticipated changes to the capacity, 
capability, and readiness of the PRC’s nuclear forces in the coming years seem likely to 
outpace potential developments by the nuclear forces of any adversary that could plausibly 
threaten the PRC ability to retaliate against a first strike. A Western think tank publication 
indicated that the PRC could field more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by the end of the decade, 
judging from the amount of plutonium that could be produced from reactors under 
construction.  
In recent years, the PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-
round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding 
its adherence to the U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.  
Regardless of the ultimate number of nuclear weapons it makes, the PRC will probably 
continue to claim it is, like other nuclear powers, adhering to the minimum of nuclear weapons 
needed to protect its security interests.   
Hypersonics and Fractional Orbital Bombardment. The PRC is probably developing 
advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a fractional 
orbital bombardment (FOB) system in part due to long-term concerns about United States 
missile defense capabilities, as well as to attain qualitative parity with future worldwide 
missile capabilities. On July 27th, 2021, the PRC conducted a test of an ICBM-range 
hypersonic glide vehicle that travelled 40,000 kilometers. The test likely demonstrated the 
PRC’s technical ability to field a FOB system.   
Lower-yield Nuclear Weapons. The PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead 
capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot 
deliver. PRC strategists have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order 
to increase the deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined 
specific nuclear yield values. A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield 
weapon had been developed for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce 
collateral damage. By late 2018, PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States would 
use low-yield weapons against its Taiwan invasion fleet, with related commentary in official 
media calling for proportionate response capabilities. The DF-26 is the PRC’s first nuclear-
capable missile system that can conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most likely 
weapon system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near-term.   


 
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PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear 
weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in the warzone, for 
warning and deterrence. Additional PRC military writings as of 2017 noted that while 
strategic nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with 
high hit precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war. Such 
discussions provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, 
suggesting PRC nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear 
war is uncontrollable.  
Launch on Warning (LOW). The PLA is implementing a launch-on warning posture, called 
“early warning counterstrike” (预警反击), where warning of a missile strike leads to a 
counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple 
manned C2 organs are involved in this process, warned by space and ground based sensors, 
and that this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC 
probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, especially its new silo-based units, on a 
LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted exercises involving early warning 
of a nuclear strike and launch on warning responses.  
China’s considerations to attain a LOW posture date back to even the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the PRC considered using existing land-based ballistic missile early warning radar to support 
a LOW posture for its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs, but apparently this early warning system was 
unreliable. In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed 
to support a LOW posture. China has several ground-based large phase array radars—similar 
in appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars—that could support a missile early warning role. 
There has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well. In 2013, foreign 
media sources claimed to be in possession of PLA documents indicating expedited plans to 
field three geostationary satellites capable of detecting ballistic missile launches.  Then, in 
2015, the PRC’s Defense White Paper identified “improved strategic early warning” as 
specific nuclear force modernization goals with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) 
reported including requirements to place early warning satellites in space. As of 2022, the 
PRC likely has at least three early warning satellites in orbit. In 2019, Russia offered to assist 
China in developing a missile early warning system.   
Despite these developments, the PRC has called upon other states to abandon similar launch-
on-warning postures to enhance strategic stability while declining to engage in substantive 
dialogue on risk reduction. The PRC probably believes a LOW posture is consistent with its 
no first use policy, given that it involves a retaliatory strike that takes place after warning of 
an inbound first attack from an adversary. PRC military writings note that command and 
control systems—which would include early warning systems—can be a source of accidental 
nuclear war. China has refused to join the Hague Code of Conduct or participate in other 
confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.  However, 
the PRC does have a bilateral missile and carrier rocket launch notification agreement with 
Russia called the Russian-Chinese Inter-governmental Agreement signed in 2009, which was 


 
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extended for 10 years in 2021—though little additional information regarding the 
implementation of the notification agreement is known.  
New ICBM Silos. The PRC is building hundreds of new ICBM silos. The PRC established a 
silo-based solid-propellant missile project likely consisting of at least 300 silos across three 
fields, judging from the size of the first field. These silos are capable of fielding both DF-31 
and DF-41 class ICBMs. This project and the expansion of China’s DF-5 class silo force 
suggests that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by 
moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.  
• 
The PRC is also building more silos for DF-5 class ICBMs; increasing the number of 
brigades while simultaneously increasing the number of launchers per brigade – 
though there is currently no indication this project will approach the size or numbers 
of the solid propellant missile silos.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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Chemical and Biological Research 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, 
develop, and produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale.   
 China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological 
warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous 
conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably 
could be adapted to deliver CBW agents.   
 The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which 
raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins 
with dual-use applications. 
 The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research 
on pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use 
applications. 


 
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The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have 
sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed historical biological 
warfare (BW) program, which the United States assesses that the PRC possessed from the 
1950s to at least the late 1980s. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
in 1984 and regularly submits to confidence-building measures (CBM) under the BWC; 
however, the PRC’s CBM reporting has never acknowledged its past offensive program. As 
part of its historical BW program, the PRC had reported weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, 
and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, and tularemia.  
Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its 
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the 
PRC’s research of PBAs and toxins with potential dual-use applications. China has declared 
that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes; however, 
Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and 
munitions were used before China ratified the CWC in 1997. Beijing also has declared two 
historical chemical warfare production facilities and was probably capable of producing 
mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite.   
Scientists at a PRC military institute have expressed interest in military applications of 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs), including synthesis, characterization, and testing of 
PBAs with potential dual-use applications. In addition, available information on studies 
conducted at PRC military medical institutions indicates that researchers identify, test and 
characterize diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use applications.  
China’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. The PRC probably 
has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and 
China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems, including 
missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents. China also 
has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and 
to defend against a CBW attack.   
Entities and individuals in the PRC continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, 
components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile 
programs. Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their 
own production capabilities.   
 


 
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CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the 
Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are 
organized based on the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater 
Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the 
theater. 
The PRC continues to make steady improvements to joint operations in the five theater 
commands, which were established in early 2016. Each theater command receives direction 
from the CMC, has operational authority over assigned PLA forces within its theater,  and is 
responsible for all conventional combat and non-combat operations within its area of 
responsibility. Theater commands are responsible for developing theater-specific strategies 
aimed at preparing to fight and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans 
and military capabilities, responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability 
of territories. The strategic directions of the theater commands are based on PRC perceptions 
of peripheral threats:   
• 
Eastern Theater Command – Taiwan, East China Sea;  
• 
Southern Theater Command – South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, 
territorial and maritime disputes; 
• 
Western Theater Command – India, Central Asia, “counterterrorism” in Xinjiang and 
Tibet;  
• 
Northern Theater Command – Korean Peninsula, Russia border security;  
• 
Central Theater Command – Capital defense; surge support to other theaters. 
 
 


 
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EASTERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaways 
 The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.   
 The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of executing a Taiwan 
invasion.   
The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes 
operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies 
in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.  PLA units located within the Eastern 
Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval 
aviation division and two marine brigades; two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF 
bases, and one PLARF base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China 
Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related 
to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. During a contingency, the Eastern 
Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) 
units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield 
awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.     
In 2021, the Eastern Theater Command focused on training and exercises to improve joint 
operations and combat readiness with long-distance maneuvers and mobilization, aerial 
combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to augment transportation.    
2021 Eastern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Weidong [何卫东] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command,Commander of 
the Western Theater Command Army 
DOB: 5/1957 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Dongtai, Jiangsu Province [东台市江苏省] 
Education: Army Command College, National University of Defense Technology 
Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command 
DOB: 11/1957 
Age: 64 


 
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Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市] 
Education: N/A 
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command – Lieutenant General Wang Xiubin 
[王秀斌] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army 
DOB: 3/1964 
Age: 57 
Birthplace: Rudong County, Nantong, Jiangsu Province [江苏省南通市如东县] 
Education: N/A 


 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN 
STRAIT 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC intensified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 
2021. 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and 
around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air 
Defense Identification Zone and conducting island-seizure exercises.    
Throughout 2021, island-seizure exercises became more frequent and realistic. The PLA 
conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 
13 observed in 2020. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and featured night 
missions, training in adverse weather conditions, and simultaneous multi-domain operations. 
The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived 
as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any 
intervention by a third-party, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on 
Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai 
administration, and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, China has 
persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan 
contingency. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the 
Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense 
Identification Zone and numerous island seizure exercises.   
PLA Unsafe and Unprofessional Behavior 
Throughout 2021 and into 2022, PLA naval vessels and aircraft have exhibited a sharp 
increase in unsafe and unprofessional behavior in the Indo-Pacific region. Unsafe and 
unprofessional PLA behavior appear to target U.S. and U.S. allies and partner military 
aircrafts and naval vessels, risking a major incident or accident in the region.  
Unsafe behaviors include lasing, aerobatics, discharging objects, and activity that impinge 
upon the ability of nearby aircraft to maneuver safely. For instance, in 2022, a PLA J-16 
fighter maneuvered across the nose of an Australian P-8 operating in international airspace 
in the South China Sea and released a round of chaff that was ingested by the P-8 engine. 
The number of unsafe PLA intercepts against military aircraft operating lawfully in 
international airspace have increased steadily over the past five years.  
 


 
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EAST CHINA SEA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near 
the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.  
 In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their 
Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols. 
The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East 
China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of 
the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge 
divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, 
and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty 
of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to 
reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security 
Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine 
Japan’s administration of the islands.   
The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not 
only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness 
to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the 
contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge 
Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In 
one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 
100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to 
ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies 
with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels—including four equipped with 
deck guns—sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the 
East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach 
Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. 
Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express 
"extremely serious concerns" in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense 
ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of 
escalation. 
 
 
 


 
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SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast 
Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.   
The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the 
South China Sea (SCS).  This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is 
responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation 
against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to 
China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 
74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air 
Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible 
for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command 
as needed over all CCG and PAFMM vessels conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed 
“nine-dash line.”  
2021 Southern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Southern Theater Command – Yuan Yubai [袁誉柏]  
Rank: Admiral  
Current position: Commander of the Southern Theater Command  
Previous position: Commander of the PLA Navy Northern Theater Navy and Deputy 
Command of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 5/1956 
Age: 65 
Birthplace: Gongan County, Hubei Province [湖北省公安县] 
Education: Attended and received a master’s degree from the PLA Naval Submarine 
Academy from 1978-1981 
 
Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command – Wang Jianwu [王建武]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Political Commissar of the Souhern Theater Command  
Previous position: Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department 
DOB: 8/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Luoning, Henan Province [河南省洛宁] 
Education: N/A 
 
Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command – Liu Yayong [刘亚永] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command  


 
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Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 4/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Duchang, Jiangxi Province [江西省都昌]  
Education: N/A 
 
The Southern Theater Command is responsible for training, force disposition, and operations 
in the SCS.  In 2020 and 2021, Southern Theater Command units conducted multiple live-fire 
drills and amphibious training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS. The Southern 
Theater Command also plays a significant role in the PLA’s bilateral and multilateral 
exercises with countries in Southeast Asia, participating in a joint naval exercise with 
Pakistan, a counterterrorism exercise with Cambodia, and a U.S. co-led multilateral exercise 
in Thailand, in 2021.   
The PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons are subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
In August 2021, the PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons conducted an annual rotation of 
forces. Since 1997, the PLA has rotated forces by land, air, and sea from Shenzhen at night, 
nominally as part of the usual annual rotation. Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, China 
maintains a rotational deployment of PAP forces in Hong Kong. The PAP and PLA units 
continued to publicly highlight their anti-riot, counterterrorism, and disaster prevention 
training.     
All of the PLA’s 24 Su-35s purchased from Russia are assigned to the Southern Theater 
Command Air Force and have flown patrols in the SCS and the Western Pacific. The Southern 
Theater Command was also the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike 
bombers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first-domestically produced aircraft 
carrier, Shandong into service at Yulin Naval Base in the Southern Theater Command.  
Shortly after, the carrier returned to its shipyard in the Northern Theater to complete testing 
and flight certifications with J-15 fighter aircraft before returning to its homeport on Hainan 
Island sometime in 2020.  


 
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SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s Spratly outposts are capable of supporting military operations, include 
advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft; however, no 
large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there.  
 In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response 
to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-
dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island. 
Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea 
In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s 
claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were 
not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes 
verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line 
claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues 
to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary 
vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated 
to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.  
• 
The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to 
its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels 
to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu 
Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within 
the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine 
supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water 
cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on 
Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments. 
• 
In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in 
the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended 
to further solidify PRC claims in these areas—especially in terms of domestic law— 
and justify its actions in the region. 
• 
In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members 
completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a 
second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the 
agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC 
negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.   


 
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When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from 
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions 
against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely 
because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that 
limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s 
consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 
2022.     
    
 
 
South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations 
Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced 
anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most 
capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China 
Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands 


 
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outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the 
PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands 
during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.  
The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the 
Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve 
marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel 
stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and 
resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and 
paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge 
activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available 
to Beijing 
WESTERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism 
missions along China’s Central Asia borders.  
The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the 
PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western 
China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group 
Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three 
PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base.   
PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the 
Western Theater Command.    
Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous 
Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly 
among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against 
humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other 
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have 
arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other 
Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. 
PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, 
including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of 
Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by 
extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the 
region. 


 
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Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along 
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to 
multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the 
India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols 
in Galwan Valley—the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years—the 
Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA 
forces along the LAC.  Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military 
commander negotiations breaking down in October. Due to the sustained military 
development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely 
continue through 2022.   
2021 Western Theater Command Leadership 
 
Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong [张旭东] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command  
Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army 
DOB: 11/1962 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Qian'an, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市迁安市] 
Education: N/A 
 
Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou [吴社洲] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command 
Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
DOB: 1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Hanchuan County, Hubei Province [湖北省汉川县] 
Education: N/A 
 
Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing [戎
贵卿] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command 
Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region 
DOB: 5/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province [河南省尉氏县] 
Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint 
Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University 
 


 
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CHINA-INDIA BORDER 
Key Takeaways 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued 
infrastructure build up along the LAC.  
 Negotiation made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages 
on the border.   
Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and 
clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff 
triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded 
the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China 
nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure 
construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China 
of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has 
maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.  
• 
The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in 
the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley 
resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, 
according to PRC officials.  
• 
Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, 
emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from 
harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent 
border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. 
PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship 
with India. 
NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian 
border security. 
The Northern Theater Command includes the PRC’s provinces bordering Mongolia, Russia, 
North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern 
periphery and border security associated with North Korean, Russia, and Mongolia.  PLA 
units located within the Northern Theater Command include the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group 
Armies; the Northern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; 


 
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two operational PLAAF bases, one special mission aircraft division, and one flying academy; 
and one PLARF base.  
During a contingency, the Northern Theater Command likely exercises command over some 
Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from 
the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.   
The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to 
northern China, but it could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets during 
contingencies located beyond the Northern Theater. In 2021, Northern Theater Command 
forces conducted various joint and single service training activities including carrier 
navigation and flight training, and, likely, UAS training.  
 
2021 Northern Theater Command Leadership 
 
Command of the Northern Theater Command – General Li Qiaoming [李桥铭]  
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 4/1961 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Yanshi, Henan Province [河南省偃师市] 
Education: N/A 
 
Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command – General Fan Xiaojun [范骁骏]  
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command 
Previous position: Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Air 
Force 
DOB: 10/1956 
Age: 65 
Birthplace: Danyang, Jiangsu Province [江苏省丹阳市] 
Education: N/A 


 
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RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC's relations with North Korea remained officially friendly in 2021, but the 
land border remained closed and North Korea's continued isolation prevented high-
level diplomacy. 
 The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula. 
Throughout 2021, PRC sought to prevent bilateral relations with North Korea from stalling 
due to Pyongyang’s self-imposed COVID-19 isolation, which has prevented high-level 
diplomatic exchanges. The land border remained closed, but in late 2021, North Korea was 
reportedly making preparations to reopen it and resume trade with China and Russia. The 
PRC continues to import North Korean coal by sea, despite United Nations sanctions, and still 
fails to act against prohibited ship-to-ship transfers in their territorial waters. In October 2021, 
the PRC and Russia circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that would lift some 
sanctions on North Korea, but the Council did not act on the draft. 
The PRC’s objectives for the Korean Peninsula include stability, denuclearization, and the 
absence of U.S. forces near China’s border. The PRC’s focus on maintaining stability on the 
Korean Peninsula involves preventing North Korea’s collapse or military conflict. Toward 
these ends, the PRC continues to advocate for an approach towards North Korea that 
prioritizes dialogue, to include the resumption of U.S.-North Korea talks. Beijing urges 
Washington to acknowledge Pyongyang’s “legitimate concerns” and argues that Pyongyang 
has taken denuclearization measures that merit a commensurate U.S. response, such as 
sanctions relief.  
The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula including air, land, sea, and chemical defense training events. China’s leaders could 
order the Northern Theater Command to engage in a range of operations in the event of a 
crisis. These could include securing the China-North Korea border to control the flow of 
refugees, or a military intervention into North Korea to secure weapons of mass destruction 
or preserve a North Korean buffer state.  
CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaway 
 The Central Theater Command’s mission is the defense of Beijing while providing 
support to other theater commands.  


 
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The Central Theater Command’s primary responsibility is to defend the capital and CCP 
leadership while providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. It is centrally 
located, connecting the four remaining theater commands. Major military units under the 
Central Theater Command military include the PLAA’s 81st, 82nd, and 83rd Group Armies; 
the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division, 34th VIP Transport Division, 36th Bomber Division, 
15th Airborne Corps, the Shijiazhuang Flying Academy, the Wuhan and Datong PLAAF 
bases; and one PLARF base.   
2021 Central Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Central Theater Command – Yi Xiaoguang [乙晓光]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Commander of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department 
DOB: 6/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Shuyang County, Jiangsu Province [江苏省沭阳县] 
Education: Graduated from the Baoding Aviation School and received master’s degree 
from the PLA National Defense University 
 
Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command  – Zhu Shengling [朱生岭]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police 
DOB: 11/1957 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Dongtai, Jiangsu Province [东台市江苏省] 
Education: Master’s Degree in Military Science 
 
Chief of Staff of the Central Theater Command – Wang Changjiang [王长江] 
Rank: Vice Admiral 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 2/1959 
Age: 62 
Birthplace: Luanzhou, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市滦州是] 
Education: The PLA Air Force's Fourth Aviation Academy  
 
2021 Central Theater Command Activities 
On May 31 2021, 16 Ilyushin Il-76 and Y-20 aircraft originating from the Central Theater 
Command’s 13th Transport Division, and possibly the Western Theater Command’s 4th 
Transportation Division, were operating near the contested areas of Malaysian airspace.  


 
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On July 20 2021, the Central Theater Command deployed more than 6,000 soldiers and 
16,000 militiamen for disaster relief in the flood-stricken area of Henan province.  
On November 8 2021, members of the PLA Central Theater Command’s 82nd Group Army 
deployed to the disputed territory of Abyei, Sudan, to perform a yearlong international 
peacekeeping mission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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THE PRC’S STRATEGY & CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
TAIWAN STRAIT  
Key Takeaways 
 Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC 
has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC 
has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have 
evolved over time. 
 The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, 
from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and 
occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of 
feasibility and risks associated.   
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political 
and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal 
communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must 
accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders 
have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was 
reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in 
Taiwan.  
 
PRC efforts to conflate foreign one China policies  
with its “One China principle” 
Beijing’s “One China principle,” established in 1949, according to PRC government white 
papers, predicates diplomatic relations with the PRC on “recognizing” the “government of 
the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China” and “that 
Taiwan is part of China.”  
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, countries around the world have enacted 
respective and unique “One China” policies that govern their relations with the PRC and 
Taiwan. Some countries have endorsed Beijing’s “One China principle” in their national 
“One China” policies, while other countries have determined to “acknowledge,” 
“understand,” or “note” the PRC’s position within their respective, national “One China” 
policies. These unique “One China” policies, and their attendant joint communiques with 
the PRC, provide countries around the world with the legal basis upon which each country 
engages with the PRC and Taiwan.  
The United States’ one China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Under the three Joint Communiques, the U.S. 
acknowledged the PRC’s position and reaffirmed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of 


 
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the “Taiwan question.” The United States’ implementation of the 1982 Communique 
related to arms sales to Taiwan is guided by President Ronald Reagan’s August 17, 1982 
internal presidential memo, where he stated the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales 
to Taiwan is conditioned “absolutely” upon the continued commitment of the PRC to the 
peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC cross-Strait differences. The Six Assurances, delivered 
to Taiwan in 1982, outlined key principles for continued U.S. support for Taiwan.  
The PRC has sought to conflate the United States’ one China policy, as well as other foreign 
nations’ respective “One China” policies, with its own “One China principle.” This effort 
erroneously portrays broad international support for its claim over Taiwan, attempts to 
legitimize PRC coercion against Taiwan, and make assertions of “broken legal 
commitments” by countries who engage with Taiwan in ways that Beijing perceives as 
threatening to its unification objectives.   
 
In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around 
four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and 
China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon 
the island's sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan's future be decided in accordance with the will of 
its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of 
"the motherland" was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait − referring to 
Taiwan, which Xi described as "sacred" territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take "drastic measures" if Taiwan makes 
moves towards formal independence.  
The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that 
unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict 
outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to 
maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from 
making moves toward independence.  In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly 
reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan 
issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.”  
In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on 
pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, 
two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private 
property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, 
security, and development interests,” are ensured. However, the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan White 
Paper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office restated the PRC’s preference for peaceful 
reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, while maintaining a refusal 
to renounce the use of force to compel unification, if needed. 


 
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Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC 
leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s 
“one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure 
campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and 
deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near 
Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA 
to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to 
achieve their objectives.   
• 
The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider 
the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:  
‒ Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;  
‒ Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;  
‒ Internal unrest in Taiwan;  
‒ Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;  
‒ Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; 
‒ Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.  
• 
Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use 
“non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession 
from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if 
“possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-
specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic 
ambiguity. 
PLA Increasing Military Pressure on Taiwan Through 
2021, Rising in 2022   
Throughout 2021 and into 2022, the PRC has increasingly deployed military means to 
pressure Taiwan to yield to Beijing’s “reunification” objectives and punish Taiwan for 
perceived transgressions.  
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) markedly increased its air operations inside Taiwan’s self-
declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2021 compared to 2020, with PLAAF 
aircraft entering the Taiwan ADIZ on 240 days of 2021, according to data published by 
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Notably, the ratio of advanced PLAAF J-16 
fighters in these operations increased throughout 2021 and special mission aircraft 
operating inside the Taiwan ADIZ on a near daily basis.    


 
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Amphibious exercises—training events that would help prepare the PLA for an amphibious 
assault on Taiwan—also increased in 2021. Moreover, the PLA Navy (PLAN) conducted 
more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, exceeding the 13 observed 
in 2020. In one three-month period, the PLAN conducted more than 120 maritime training 
exercises. The PLA also tested new platforms that could potentially play a key role in an 
amphibious assault, such as the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), which it used 
in large numbers for the first time in 2021.    
The PLA has continued to erode the status quo across the Taiwan Strait into 2022. In 
reaction to the U.S. Speaker of the House’s Congressional Delegation in early August, the 
PLAAF flew more than 250 fighter aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 
August 2022, according to Taiwan MND data. Additionally, in August 2022, the PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF) fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones in waters around Taiwan, 
including at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, according the Japan Ministry of 
Defense – an unprecedented act. The PLA likely will continue to increase military pressure— 
in concert with diplomatic, information, and economic pressure—in an attempt to compel 
Taiwan towards unification.  
 
PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN 
The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA 
has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple 
domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force 
or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more 
comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to 
compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC 
would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign—
capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those 
that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th 
anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited 
war of short duration.  In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate 
cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to 
fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following 
military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying 
degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.  
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which 
the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s 
vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures 
of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to 
compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct 
weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air 
and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and 


 
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information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control 
the international narrative of the conflict.    
Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or 
lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with 
overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information 
operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan 
authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks 
against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and 
degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special 
operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or 
leadership targets.  
Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key 
government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and 
communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or 
undermine the public’s resolve to resist.   
Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious 
invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, 
envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, 
logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore 
defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, 
and seize key targets or the entire island.     
The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full-
scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan 
and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will 
augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 
2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching 
amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing 
them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port 
facilities. 
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military 
operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of 
supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.  An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain 
PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force 
attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an 
amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the 
Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.    


 
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The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.  
With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an 
invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba.    
A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within 
the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political 
resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of 
restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk 
because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful 
international opposition.  
 
THE PLA'S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT 
PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan 
independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault 
training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the 
Army.  Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive 
amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.   


 
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The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater 
Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units 
continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts 
in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach 
assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also 
claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious 
assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale 
amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion 
scenario.  
Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021—in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 
120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an 
amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship 
(Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces' operational capabilities and vessel 
maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that 
the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076. The 
new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would 
enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft 
carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 
05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs 
represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, 
and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform. 
PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine 
warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new 
multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war.  New 
attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-
generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island 
Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.  
The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of 
ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. 
There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and 
medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large 
number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need 
for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious 
capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities— 
such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap. The PLA may also 
have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the 
necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.   
PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of 
capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced 


 
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aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, 
providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A 
number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on 
key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development 
of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA 
operations.  Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its 
ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party 
intervention. 
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against 
high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade 
Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 
saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will 
likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.     
Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space 
and cyberspace domains in joint operations.  The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that 
its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its 
cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest 
that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan 
contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information 
dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, 
such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote 
the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications 
support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing 
strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.  
Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics 
support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, 
by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support 
mechanisms. 
TAIWAN’S ABILITY TO DETER FORCE 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the 
capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military. 
 To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and 
capabilities for asymmetric warfare. 


 
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Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and 
expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity 
with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, 
improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and 
noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects 
adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting 
its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified 
strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater 
reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. 
However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges. 
Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 
active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 
90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitioned to an 
all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to 
improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have 
been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and 
retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and 
readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. 
Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate 
in refresher training. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization within 
its national security structure to improve whole of society mobilization to support defense.   
Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and 
bolster its forces against PRC pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense 
spending to be the highest level since 1990. Taiwan announced a further 10 percent increase 
from the previous year, bringing the 2021 defense budget to NT453billion(15.4 billion), 
and representing more than 2% of Taiwan’s GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget 
continues to grow and is about 17 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of it 
focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the 
growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is 
working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. 
Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic 
warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and 
minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has 
also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, 
upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four 
minelaying ships to supplement its navy.  
Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability. From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified 


 
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approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 
fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile 
system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery 
rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and 
AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING 
GLOBAL PRESENCE 
 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s 
national rejuvenation.  
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside 
China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas 
interests and advance its foreign policy goals.  
The CCP continues its goal to create international conditions that are conducive to the PRC’s 
development and compatible with its aspirations for the PRC’s rejuvenation as a “great 
modern socialist country.” CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the 
PLA’s growing global presence, contribute to creating a “favorable” international 
environment for the PRC’s national rejuvenation. This evolving approach parallels the Party’s 
view that the initial decades of the 21st century represent a “period of strategic opportunity” 
to focus on building the PRC’s comprehensive national power.  
The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s 
borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance 
its foreign policy goals. The PRC is focusing efforts to develop security relationships with 
key countries along its periphery. In addition to promoting BRI, the PRC has begun to seek 
new cooperative security partnerships with foreign nations, including the expansion of the 
PLA’s global military attaché presence and access, expansion of strategic partnerships, and 
ensuring more reliable, cost-effective, and diverse sources of energy and other strategic 
resources.  
The PRC probably will continue to expand the PLA’s global military presence through 
humanitarian assistance, naval escorts and port calls, UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), 
arm sales, influence operations, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through 
these engagements, Beijing can strengthen and expand its diplomatic relationships to advance 
its foreign policy goals, to include shaping the international system to align with the PRC’s 
interests, gaining operational experience for the PLA, and attracting foreign interest in hosting 
PLA bases abroad.  


 
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CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active 
role in advancing its foreign policy goals.  
 As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s 
leaders have increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the 
capabilities to operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance 
and defend these interests. This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military 
coercion—and inducements—to advance its global security and development 
interests. 
 In 2021, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas, build closer ties to 
foreign militaries, and provide COVID-19 related aid. In late 2021, China and 
Cambodia attended a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of a military 
police shooting range. Around the same time, PRC medical experts from the PLA 
General Hospital provided online training to PRC doctors assigned to PRC 
peacekeeping forces overseas.  
The PLA’s Evolving Missions & Tasks. In 2004, one of the “new historic missions” given 
to the PLA by then-President Hu Jintao was to support China’s overseas interests and 
diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus—from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection” 
—reflects the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach. The PLAAF’s missions and tasks 
have similarly evolved towards conducting operations beyond China and its immediate 
periphery, and supporting the PRC’s interests by becoming a “strategic” air force. 
Additionally, the PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as 
an effective way to support and safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s global 
interests, and gain valuable operational experience.   
The PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA, and SSF have deployed abroad for counterpiracy, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping, training exercises, and space support 
operations. Within the PLA, the PLAN has the most experience operating abroad due to its 
far seas deployments and counterpiracy missions, the PLAAF likely has the most experience 
conducting rapid response HA/DR operations abroad,  and the PLAA has the most experience 
conducting peacekeeping operations. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command 
stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan 
Wang space support ships to track satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
launches.  
• 
Increasingly, the PLAN is operating outside of its home waters in places that include 
the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Latin 
America. The PLAN has also conducted submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, 


 
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demonstrating its increasing familiarity in that region and underscoring the PRC’s 
interest in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) beyond the South China 
Sea.  In 2015, three PLAN ships from a Gulf of Aden naval escort task force evacuated 
629 PRC citizens from Yemen to Djibouti and Oman.  
• 
Since 2002, the PLAAF has delivered aid after natural disasters throughout Southeast 
Asia and South Asia, assisted with evacuation from Libya in 2015. The PLAAF has 
delivered COVID-19 related aid to multiple countries including Myanmar, Vietnam, 
Pakistan, and Tunisia. 
Military Cooperation. As China’s regional and international interests grow increasingly 
complex, the PLA’s international engagements likely will continue to expand. Beijing often 
relies on senior military visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, and 
peacekeeping and military assistance to promote China’s foreign policy objectives. For 
example, through 2021, Beijing continued to conduct global “vaccine diplomacy” with 
Cambodia, Pakistan, Mongolia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, among other countries, 
which has allowed China to deepen bilateral relations and set itself up as a global leader. As 
part of this COVID assistance, China has also donated personal protective equipment to more 
than 50 countries throughout 2021 and has deployed its naval hospital ship nine times over 
the past ten years to provide medical services for more than 40 countries and regions.    
PRC has sought to gain security access through policing cooperation agreements and is likely 
to continue seeking these agreements. Following domestic unrest and riots in the Solomon 
Islands that threatened Chinese property and nationals in late 2021, Beijing offered to provide 
Honiara with policing assistance.   
While senior-level military visits and international exchanges remained limited throughout 
2021 due to the pandemic, China continued to promote selective military engagements, such 
as signing a revised memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Korea regarding the 
establishment and use of direct communication lines between their respective air forces and 
navies in March 2021. China may have used these engagements as an opportunity to observe 
foreign military command structures, unit formation, operational training, and shaping foreign 
approaches to shared security concerns. In 2021, China’s Minister of National Defense, 
General Wei Fenghe, led delegations to Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Singapore, and 
Tajikistan, where he also met with Russian Defense Minister General Sergey Shoygu. Wei 
undertook these visits to further promote bilateral relations and, in the case of the meeting 
with Shoygu, to demonstrate China’s solidarity and expanding relationship with Russia. 
The PRC continues to expand the PLA’s participation in bilateral and multilateral military 
exercises, normalizing the PLA’s presence overseas and establishing ties to foreign militaries. 
For example, in 2021, the PLA participated in seventeen bilateral or multilateral exercises, 
including hosting Russian forces for Interaction-2021, as well as Peace Mission 2021 along 
with forces from other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) militaries including 


 
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Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. China also hosted forces 
from Pakistan, Mongolia, and Thailand in Queshan County, Henan Province for Shared-
Destiny-2021, a multinational peacekeeping exercise. Additionally, China partnered with Iran 
and Russia for joint naval drills in February of 2022. For a list of selected PLA bilateral and 
multilateral exercises in 2021, see Appendix III.  
In recent years, the PRC has expanded its efforts on global peacekeeping and increased 
contributions to multilateral organizations, particularly in Africa. The PRC currently has more 
than 2,500 forces participating in peacekeeping missions worldwide, of which approximately 
1,800 are performing missions in several countries and regions. The PLA also deploys regular 
convoys in the Gulf of Aden, and has a number of forces stationed in Lebanon. China’s 
peacekeeping forces have provided a wide variety of services, including medical training and 
support, minesweeping efforts to include donating mine clearance equipment, and repair and 
construction of key infrastructure.     
Military Attaché Presence. China’s military attaché presence has grown around the world, 
which reflects its increasing global interests. Military attaches manage much of the PLA’s 
day-to-day military diplomacy efforts using PLA military attachés in over 110 offices 
worldwide. The attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, support Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives. They also perform a variety of duties tied 
to PLA military and security cooperation, including counterpart exchanges with host-nation 
and third-country personnel. Additionally, attachés may conduct clandestine and overt 
intelligence collection on their areas of assignment. Although the general function of an 
attaché office is the same worldwide, attaché offices probably prioritize different specific 
missions or diplomatic priorities based on China’s defense objectives across different 
countries.   
China’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to ten officers. Most 
offices consist of just a few accredited officers; however, offices in countries considered 
important to China’s strategic interests are often considerably larger, potentially including 
multiple assistant attachés, dedicated naval or air force attachés, and support staff. 
Counterterrorism. Beijing is implementing its global counterterrorism (CT) strategy through 
international outreach that spans across diplomatic and military domains to garner the 
assistance of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC 
citizens abroad. China routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur 
extremists, pursues formal extradition treaties with countries with large Chinese diaspora 
populations and seeks public endorsement of its CT efforts in multilateral forums. Beijing 
further leverages involvement in regional security forums, joint border patrols, and 
international exercises to press its neighbors into adopting China’s approach to CT operations.   
Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2021, China continued to conduct counterpiracy operations within 
the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters by deploying its 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th naval escort task 


 
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forces to the area since 2008. The 39th Task Force escorted 48 Chinese ships and foreign ships 
while voyaging over 90,000 nautical miles in over 165 days. At the conclusion of 
deployments, these task groups usually conducted port calls and bilateral engagements with 
host-country militaries and local Chinese communities, providing additional opportunities for 
PLA military diplomacy. However, it is unclear if this activity has resumed, likely due to 
continued concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic.     
Peacekeeping Operations. In 2022, the PRC continued to contribute the largest number of 
forces among the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The 
PRCs participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports the PRC’s objectives of 
highlighting its role as a global actor and obtaining operational experience for the PLA. The 
PRC could use its role in nine UN PKOs to collect intelligence on other UN units, and 
supporting these missions demonstrates the PLA’s ability to operate outside of China’s 
borders. The PRC provides PLA forces and other personnel to several UN PKOs, primarily 
across Africa and in Lebanon. For the PRC, contributing PLA forces to UN peacekeeping 
operations is one of several measures it employs to support its country’s engagement across 
the African continent to expand its foreign policy goals. Beijing continues to provide PLA 
personnel to UN operations in Mali, Moroccan Sahara, Sudan and South Sudan, Cyprus, and 
Lebanon. PRC personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations consist of forces, police, staff 
officers, and experts that include engineers, medical professionals, and logisticians. As of the 
end of 2021, the PRC was the ninth largest contributor of personnel to the UN PKOs with 
approximately 2,235 personnel among nine UN PKO missions in Africa and the Middle East. 
The PRC’s force contributions decreased from 2,548 personnel in October 2020 to 2,235 at 
the end of 2021. The PRC is the second largest financial contributor to UN PKOs and has 
funded 15 percent of the total $6.38 billion 2021-2022 UN PKO budget.  
Military Education Collaboration. Beijing considers establishing international professional 
military education (PME) to create transnational networks of alumni, establish the doctrinal 
foundation for globally integrated operations, and strengthen China’s defense and security 
ties. Over the past decade, China has increased its military exchange programs with a bias 
toward junior officers. Nearly half of the 70 military academies operating in China admit 
foreign students but only a few offer senior-level education. The College of Defense Studies 
of the PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU) is the highest level of training for 
foreign officers offered by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to training 
foreign senior military officials, PLA NDU conducts international exchanges and academic 
discussions on defense and security issues. The PLA NDU has accepted students from more 
than 100 partner nations and has pursued relationships with Latin American and African 
militaries.  
Although third countries have historically perceived Chinese PME as less prestigious than 
Russian or U.S. PME, Beijing’s growing economic clout and expanded global security 
presence has bolstered the international reputation of Chinese programs. For example, PLA 


 
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NDU offers students higher stipends and greater exposure to Chinese technological and 
scientific innovations (such as military applications of AI) than Russian schools. 
China also cultivates transnational alumni and shared doctrinal understanding through short-
term course offerings. Since 2002, the PLA NDU sought to increase exchanges with the 
international military community by sponsoring security seminars annually, which aim to 
foster cooperation, strengthen military exchanges, and attempt to impart a common approach 
to issues of interest to the community. The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from 
over 90 countries; it also maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 
countries in addition to over 140 countries’ militaries. 
Despite the PLA’s progress to enhance its PME programs, cultural and linguistic barriers limit 
the effectiveness of PRC PME. For example, foreign student and host nation student contacts 
and opportunities for interaction are limited owing to the separation between Chinese and 
foreign language courses. Additionally, PRC military schools rarely consider root causes of 
the security problems they teach their students despite a detailed dive into the problems 
themselves. Lastly, military ethics and human rights are off-limits for discussion within the 
PLA NDU curriculum; students are prohibited from criticizing Beijing’s record in these areas, 
whether they are Chinese or foreign.  
PRC Influence Operations. The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the 
modern battlespace as a critical enabler and means of achieving information dominance early 
in a conflict. Since the early 2000s, as part of the PRC’s overall influence operations, the PLA 
has been developing the “Three Warfares” concept, which calls for the coordinated use of 
public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Public opinion warfare 
creates and disseminates information to guide an adversary’s public opinion and gain support 
from domestic and foreign audiences. Psychological warfare uses propaganda, deception, and 
coercion to induce pressure and affect the behavior of the target audience. Legal warfare uses 
domestic and international laws to shape narratives that advance PRC interests and undermine 
those of an adversary. The PLA likely seeks to couple digital influence activities with the 
“Three Warfares” concept to demoralize adversaries and influence domestic and foreign 
audiences during conflict.  
From the CCP’s perspective, influence operations are undertaken by all nations, especially 
the United States, which Beijing believes uses digital narratives, to undermine the CCP’s 
governance system in the PRC. Thus in the CCP’s view, the PRC’s influence operations are 
a means to counter this perceived subversion and are considered a defensive measure to 
protect the party and the military. 
At the heart of the PRC’s influence operations is the CCP’s ability to maintain its stable and 
continued governance of China. Domestically, the CCP uses influence activities to protect the 
PLA’s image to the public and garner their support for the military. Internationally, Beijing 
aims to create an information environment favorable to its strategic objectives. The PRC 


 
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conducts influence operations that target media organizations, business, academic, cultural 
institutions, Chinese diaspora communities, and policy communities of the United States, 
other countries, and international organizations, to shape public discourse and achieve 
outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
PRC influence operations are coordinated at the high level and executed by a range of actors, 
such as the PLA Political Work Department, United Front Work Department (UFWD), 
International Liaison Department, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the PLA 
Strategic Support Force (SSF). The CCP likely seeks to condition international institutions 
and public opinion to accept the PRC’s narrative surrounding its priorities such as the 
“inevitable rise” of the PRC as a great power, Beijing’s “one China principle” on Taiwan 
unification, the Belt and Road Initiative, political control over Hong Kong, and territorial and 
maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.   
The PRC almost certainly will increase its influence over foreign governments using a 
combination of diplomatic, economic, and defense engagements tools. Beijing engages in 
such activities to promote its interests abroad while undermining U.S. influence. PRC 
influence operations take advantage of corruption where present and can include lobbying, 
bribing, or cultivating foreign politicians. PRC influence operations also aim to inject Chinese 
cultural narratives or values into foreign education systems, bridging academic or think tank 
researchers’ access to China, and flooding Chinese language media abroad, all of which can 
be accomplished via diplomacy or coercive means. A foundation of the PRC’s influence 
strategy includes appealing to overseas PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese of other countries as 
indirect proxy to assert the CCP’s objectives through soft power engagements. The PRC also 
uses threats, blackmail, and other forms of coercion to force members of Chinese diaspora 
communities to assist in carrying out Beijing’s priorities. As part of this strategy, the PRC 
often targets Uyghurs overseas with threats to imprison their family members in China. 
Furthermore, the UFWD collaborated with overseas Chinese communities in Latin America 
and Caribbean countries in order to shape positive views of China that would better facilitate 
economic ties. Additionally, the PRC’s hundreds of known “talent recruitment programs,” 
such as the Thousand Talents, target ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese scientists and experts 
around the world to support a systematic strategy of identifying and acquiring technologies 
critical to the PRC’s scientific and technical modernization. 
The PRC has also demonstrated its intent to use multilateral forums and organizations to 
expand its defense influence and security cooperation while establishing a leadership role in 
those organizations. The PRC promotes strategic messaging by portraying China as a 
responsible global actor through organizations such as the World Trade Organization, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (BRICS) mechanism. Additionally, the PRC augments this strategic communication 
with “forum diplomacy,” the creation of regional diplomatic bodies such as the Forum on 


 
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China-Africa Cooperation, the China-CELAC Forum, the China-Arab States Cooperation 
Forum, and the China-Central Central Eastern Cooperation Framework.      
The PRC uses overt and covert messaging vectors, such as the Internet, social media 
platforms, and military cyberspace capabilities during peacetime and wartime. The PLA’s 
goals for social media influence operations can fall into three broad categories: promote a 
narrative favorable to the PRC, undermine adversary resolve, and shape foreign governments’ 
policies in favor of Beijing’s interests. The PLA views social media through the prism of 
information dominance and during a crisis, the PRC could use digital influence operations to 
undermine enemy morale and confuse or deceive adversary decision makers.  Most Chinese 
media platforms, including traditional and digital newspaper, and television programs, are 
either state-owned or heavily influenced by Beijing to augment the CCP’s response to 
geopolitics and often take on a more aggressive messaging tone. 
The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected that the CCP understood cyberspace operations 
as the primary mean for psychological manipulation. As the PLA seeks to expand the reach 
of its influence operations around the world and seize information dominance on the 
battlefield, it is researching and developing the next evolution of psychological warfare called 
cognitive domain operation (CDO) (认知领域作战) that leverages subliminal messaging, 
deep fakes, overt propaganda, and public sentiment analysis. The PLA views CDO as a more 
aggressive form of psychological warfare that it could employ across a range of domains to 
influence an adversary’s cognitive functions.  
The CCP has consistently framed the United States and the broader Western community as a 
threat to its interests and security. This has enabled Beijing to continue expanding the target 
audience of its influence campaigns to discredit the United States, amplify the PRC’s great 
power narratives, and reorder the Indo-Pacific region to China’s advantage.    
China’s Energy Supplies. In 2021, China imported approximately 10.3 million barrels per 
day of crude oil, which met about 72 percent of its needs, according to an industry report. 
China continues to build its crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) capacity to 
safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ worth of 
imports—about 1.25 billion barrels—in storage. China’s EPR storage capacity is 
approximately 600 million barrels, according to industry data. China met about 45 percent of 
its natural gas demand with imports in 2021, and industry experts estimate that China’s natural 
gas imports will increase to about 50 percent by 2035.  In 2021, most of China’s oil and natural 
gas imports came from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia. China’s 
investments in transport networks for oil and gas could help diversify its supply and reduce 
dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. 
China relies on maritime routes that transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca for 
most of its hydrocarbon deliveries. Approximately 76 percent of China’s oil imports and 23 


 
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percent of its total natural gas imports transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca.  
Despite China’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, the sheer volume of oil and natural gas 
imported from Africa and the Middle East will make securing strategic maritime routes a 
priority for Beijing for at least the next 15 years. 
Crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate China’s interest in 
increasing overland fuel supply. In 2021, China imported about 600,000 barrels per day of 
Russian crude oil via the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which has a total designed 
capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day. China also imports crude oil from Middle Eastern—
primarily Saudi—and African suppliers via a crude oil pipeline across Burma. This 440,000-
barrels-per-day pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from 
Kyaukpyu, Burma, to Yunnan Province, China, and reduces shipping time by more than a 
third.  
In 2021, approximately 20 percent of China’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan 
via a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline can transport 55 
billion cubic meters per year; Turkmenistan and China are planning to expand it to 80 billion 
cubic meters per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion 
cubic meters per year, but only 4.1 billion cubic meters of gas was shipped in 2021. In early 
December 2020, the middle section of the China-Russia East natural gas pipeline—which is 
connected to the Power of Siberia pipeline—began operations, which will increase gas supply 
to 27 million cubic meters per day. The pipeline is projected to reach an annual capacity of 
38 billion cubic meters per year by 2025.  
China in the Polar Regions. China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic 
region since gaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013.  In May 2019, China hosted 
the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai where PRC Officials highlighted Beijing’s interest 
in expanding its partnership with countries along the Polar Silk Road.  In January 2018, China 
published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be 
a “near-Arctic State.” The strategy identifies Beijing’s interests as access to natural resources, 
sea lines of communication, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in 
Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as 
integral to implementation. During the 2019 Arctic Circle China Conference, PRC officials 
underlined the importance of China’s role in protecting the Arctic environment.  
China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates two icebreaking 
research vessels. The first is the Xue Long, which in 2017 became the first Chinese official 
vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage, and in September 2019, completed the 10th 
Arctic expedition, which focused on research on the Arctic environment. In 2018, Beijing 
launched its second icebreaking research vessel, the Xue Long 2. The Xue Long 2 can break 
ice up to 1.5 meters thick, compared to the Xue Long’s maximum of 1.2 meters. Furthermore, 
the Xue Long 2 is the first polar research vessel in the world that can break ice while moving 
forwards or backwards. In July 2021, the Xue Long 2 commenced the PRC’s 12th Arctic 


 
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expedition, during which researchers studied the ecosystem and new pollutants in Arctic 
waters. The Xue Long 2 explored the Gakkel Ridge in order to learn about the formation of 
rocks and magma and the geomorphic features. During the 12th Arctic Expedition, the PRC 
deployed an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) for the first time in the Arctic Ocean. In 
November 2020, the Xue Long 2 embarked on the PRC’s 37th Antarctic expedition, where 
researchers planned to carry out hydrological, meteorological and environmental studies, and 
monitor new pollutants such as microplastics and drifting garbage in the Antarctic Ocean. 
The PRC’s expanding Arctic engagement has created new opportunities for engagement 
between the PRC and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister referred to the PRC as Russia’s 
“priority partner” in the Arctic. In April 2019, China and Russia established the Sino-Russian 
Arctic Research Center. PRC and Russia plans to use this center to conduct a joint expedition 
to research optimal routes of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and climate change were probably 
limited due to a continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic.    
In mid-2021, during a virtual summit between PRC President Xi Jinping and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, the PRC and Russia agreed to deepen cooperation in the Arctic and 
strengthen collaboration on the use of the NSR. The PRC and Russia support further 
cooperation on commercial issues, energy development, and infrastructure projects such as 
the Yamal LNG project in north-central Siberia and LNG 2, a notional second natural gas 
plant which Russia and the PRC signed agreements for in 2018. In 2019, Russia and China 
also agreed to found a joint Arctic research center, furthering their academic cooperation 
alongside economic measures. As of late 2021, PRC banks agreed to provide 2.5 billion 
rubles, although the PRC continued to raise the issues of Yamal LNG dividend taxation. 
However, some limitations and potential bilateral friction points remain. In 2019 and in 2022, 
Russia proposed regulations governing the passage along the Northern Sea Route, which 
would have required foreign warships to give Moscow 45 days' notice of their intention to 
transit and to have a Russian pilot on board, and would have reserved Moscow the right to 
refuse passage. Additionally, Russian experts have noted private Russian objections to 
China’s “Polar Silk Road” concept, saying it undermines a Russian-led Northern Sea Route.   
The PRC is also increasing its presence in the Antarctic through scientific projects, 
commercial ventures, and infrastructure and capability investments, likely intended to 
strengthen its position for future claims to natural resources and maritime access. The PRC’s 
strategy for Antarctica includes the use of dual-use technologies, facilities, and scientific 
research, which are likely intended, at least in part, to improve PLA capabilities. Beijing’s 
2015 National Security Law identifies polar regions, along with deep sea and outer space, as 
areas for development and exploitation.  
China-Russia Relations. Throughout 2021, Russia and the PRC continued to broaden their 
strategic diplomatic, informational, military and economic cooperation, primarily aimed 
countering the United States. PRC leaders, including PRC President Xi Jinping, have 
reiterated on multiple occasions the strength and commitment toward sustaining Sino-Russian 


 
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relations. In August 2021, more than 13,000 Russian and Chinese military personnel 
reportedly conducted joint land and air operations within Chinese territory as part of Western 
Joint 2021. China and Russia probably used their participation in WESTERN JOINT/ZAPAD 
INTERACTION 2021 to signal the strength of Sino-Russian cooperation rather than to 
improve interoperability. Separately, both navies conducted joint operations in the Sea of 
Japan in October 2021 as part of Joint Sea 2021. The PRC and Russia likely perceive further 
cooperation between the two militaries, including joint defense technology development, 
exercises, and other military modernization initiatives, as advantageous to their respective 
interests. Ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 4, 2022, PRC President Xi 
Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement underscoring China 
and Russia’s commitment to “deepening strategic coordination of mutual support.” The PRC 
has maintained rhetorical and diplomatic alignment with Russia before, following, and during 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite on-going military cooperation, the PRC and Russia 
continue to stop short of characterizing its partnership as a formal alliance with mutual 
security guarantees. 
China-Iran Relations. Since at least 2018, China has pursued closer economic and military 
ties with Iran, with the two countries signing a memorandum of understanding on intelligence 
and security cooperation in 2018. In 2020, PRC and Iranian diplomats signed the China-Iran 
25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement, which paved the way for an 
expanded PRC presence in Iran’s banking, telecommunications, and infrastructure, and 
locked in discounted oil sales for China.  Additionally, China and Iran—along with Russia—
have conducted three joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean since 2019, most recently in 
February 2022, titled the Maritime Security Belt Combined Exercises. Despite these 
activities, however, the threat of sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions have probably 
limited China’s appetite for investing in Iran, particularly after secondary sanctions stemming 
from Huawei’s activities in Iran led to the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in 2018. 
PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.  
 A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the 
PRC’s global military objectives evolve.  
 Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering 
and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground 
forces projection.  


 
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 The PRC has likely considered Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, 
Angola, and Tajikistan among other places as locations for PLA military logistics 
facilities.   
The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to 
allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. Beijing may assess 
that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to commercial 
infrastructure abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities with prepositioned supplies co-
located with commercial infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, most closely aligns 
with the PRC’s overseas military logistics needs. Currently, the PRC uses commercial 
infrastructure to support all of its military operations abroad, including the PLA’s presence in 
other countries’ territories, such as at its base in Djibouti. Some of the PRC’s BRI projects 
could create potential military advantages, such as PLA access to selected foreign ports to 
pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant 
as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests.  
PRC official sources assert that military logistics facilities, to include its Djibouti base, will 
be used to provide international public goods like support to U.N. operations and HA/DR, and 
to secure China’s lines of communication, citizens, and assets abroad. Regardless, a global 
PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global 
military objectives evolve.  Host nations can perform an essential role in regulating the PRC’s 
military operations, as PRC officials very likely recognize that a stable long-term relationship 
with the host nation is critical to the success of their military logistics facilities. 
• 
PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of 
PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military 
logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.   
• 
In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLA Navy 
Marines are stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are 
currently largely dependent on nearby commercial ports due to the lack of experience 
utilizing its recently operational pier on its base. In late March 2022, a FUCHI II class 
(Type 903A) supply ship Luomahu docked at the 450-meter pier for resupply; the first 
such reported PLA Navy port call to the Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier 
is now operational. The pier likely is able to accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft 
carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA personnel at the facility have 
interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, and the PRC has sought 
to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base. 
 


 
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Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for 
additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The 
PLA’s approach likely includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many 
countries, but only some will advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status 
of forces or visiting forces agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations 
involved in planning and negotiating for military logistics facilities are the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support Department, and service 
headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of 
potential host nations to support a PLA presence. PRC interlocutors likely use all means 
available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host nations, 
while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.  
• 
The PRC has likely considered Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, 
Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan among other places as locations for PLA military 
logistics facilities. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Namibia, 
Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. The PLA is most interested in military access along 
the SLOCs from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.  
• 
The PRC’s military facility at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be the first PRC 
overseas base in the Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the “Joint Vietnamese Friendship” 
building, a facility built by the Vietnamese, was relocated off Ream Naval Base to 
avert conflicts with PRC military personnel.  As of early 2021, dredgers were spotted 
off Cambodia’s Ream naval base, where the PRC is funding construction work and 
deeper port facilities that would be necessary for the docking of larger military ships.   
In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help 
to modernize and expand Ream, but would not be the only country given access to the 
facility. If the PRC is able to leverage such assistance into a presence at Ream Naval 
Base, it suggests that the PRC’s overseas basing strategy has diversified to include 
military capacity-building efforts. Both the PRC and Cambodia have publicly denied 
having signed an agreement to provide the PLA exclusive access to Ream Naval Base.  
  
 


 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES & TECHNOLOGY  
FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
 
 
 
 Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial 
sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet 
the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.  
 The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, 
including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as 
espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The 
PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-industrial sector to improve weapon 
system research, development, acquisition, testing, evaluation, and production. 
 In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8 percent, 
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its 
position as the second-largest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published 
military budget omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-
related spending is higher than what it states in its official budget. 
China is continuing to reorganize its defense, science, and commercial industries to ensure 
PLA access to the resources, technologies, and expertise required to militarily surpass the 
United States and develop capabilities for complex future military contingencies. China’s 
efforts include developing and incorporating military-AI and other emerging disruptive 
technologies (EDT) to build an “intelligentized” force sufficiently equipped with high-tech 
weapons and advanced communications and information technologies to wage and win 
dynamic wars. While China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy supports acquisition of 
foreign materiel, technology, and expertise through overt and illicit means, China is also 
accelerating efforts to build domestic capacity in these areas and reduce its vulnerabilities to 
foreign supply chokepoints.     
Military Expenditures Trends  
In 2021, the PRC announced a 6.8 percent annual military budget increase to $209 billion, 
which is approximately 1.3 percent of gross domestic product. This year’s budget continues 
more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains the PRC’s position as 
the second-largest military spender in the world after the United States. The PRC’s defense 


 
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budget has nearly doubled during the past 10 years—data from 2012 through 2021 indicates 
China’s official military budget grew 7 percent annually. Of note, on March 9, 2022 a 
spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated at the fifth session of 
the 13th NPC that the PRC had allocated a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (228.3 billion 
USD) for 2022, up by 7.1 percent compared to the budget implementation in 2021. This 
increase would mark the defense budget's fastest growth rate since 2019. 
China: Official Defense Budget (2012–2021)  
 
 
 
China’s Estimated Military Expenditures. The PRC’s published military budget omits 
several major categories of expenditures, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. 
In 2021, China’s actual military-related spending could be significantly higher than its 
officially announced defense budget. Actual PRC military expenses are difficult to calculate, 
largely due to the PRC’s lack of transparency. 
China’s Estimated Defense Budget Growth. If China’s official defense budget increases 
annually by an average of 7 percent, growing as high as $270 billion by 2023, the PLA can 
dedicate more money for training, operations, and modernization, especially given the 
reduction of the PLA’s size by 300,000 people. Economic forecasters project that China’s 
economic growth will slow during the next 10 years, falling from about 6 percent in 2021 to 
around 4 percent in 2025, which could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming 
accurate economic projections and a steady defense burden, China will remain the second-
largest spender after the United States. 
 


 
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Regional Comparison of the PRC’s 2021   
Official Defense Budget 
 
2021 BillionPRC(officialdefensebudget)209 
India 
64.8Japan55 
Russia (national defense budget) 
56.7SouthKorea48 
Taiwan 
$15.4 
 
CHINA: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
Missile and Space Industry 
Most of China’s missile systems, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are 
comparable in quality to systems of other international top-tier producers. China’s Aviation 
Industry Corporation of China, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and China 
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation produce a wide range of missiles—ballistic, 
cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air—for domestic military use and for export. China 
conducted a test of a new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous progress 
in hypersonic weapon development. In 2020, China fielded its first missile with a hypersonic 
glide vehicle and advanced its scramjet engine development, which has applications in 
hypersonic cruise missiles. In 2021 and 2022, China conducted flight tests of a reusable 
suborbital vehicle believed to be part of a plan to build a hypersonic transport system that 
could take people and cargo anywhere on Earth in less than an hour. According to the China 
Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), this system will “feature winged aircraft 
that take off and land like ordinary aircraft, but cruise at five times the speed of sound at high 
altitude.”  
China’s space industry, managed by the PLA, is rapidly expanding its intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellite constellations. The 
successful landing of a rover on Mars and launch of the first and second modules of China’s 
first long-term space station in 2021 and 2022 demonstrated the industry’s continued progress. 


 
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China’s domestic space market is dominated by state-run enterprises; however, increased 
investment has created private space companies, which have achieved successful orbital 
satellite launch attempts during the past 2 years. During 2020, China launched its first 
satellites for a new space-based Internet-of-things project with container monitoring and 
maritime communications applications, and announced the completion of its global 
navigation satellite services. The PRC is also developing the Shenlong and Tengyun space 
planes. Following the 2020 launch of its first prototype spaceplane, in 2022, China launched 
its second prototype space plane, which stayed on orbit for an extended period of time. Beijing 
stated these prototypes tested reusable and in-orbit service technologies as part of advancing 
the peaceful use of space. 
Naval and Shipbuilding Industry 
China, the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, is increasing its shipbuilding 
capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and auxiliary and 
amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-
range system in 2019. China domestically produces naval gas turbine and diesel engines as 
well as almost all shipboard weapons and electronic systems for its shipbuilding sector, 
making the sector nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. In 2020, China 
Shipbuilding Corporation signed agreements with the two major aerospace enterprises to 
collaborate on joint projects supporting the PLA Navy. 
Armaments Industry 
China’s North Industries Corporation and China South Industries Group Corporation are 
improving in nearly every PLA ground system category: armored personnel carriers, assault 
vehicles, air defense artillery systems, artillery systems and pieces, and main and light battle 
tanks. Notably, China began testing unmanned Type 59 tanks in 2018 and displayed 
lightweight Type 15 tanks in October 2019. China can produce ground weapon systems at or 
near world-class standards; however, quality deficiencies persist with some exported 
equipment, which is inhibiting Beijing’s ability to expand China’s export markets.  
Aviation Industry 
China is advancing its domestic aviation industry through two major state-owned aircraft 
corporations, AVIC and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). AVIC 
designs and produces China’s military aircraft including the J-20 fifth-generation fighter, the 
Y-20 heavy transport, and the future H-20 flying wing stealth bomber. COMAC produces 
large passenger aircraft and aims to compete in the global commercial airliner market. 
COMAC is producing the ARJ21 regional jet, flight-testing the C919 airliner, and working 
with Russia to develop the CR929 wide-body airliner. China’s decades-long efforts to 
improve domestic aircraft engine production are starting to produce results with the J-10 and 
J-20 fighters switching to domestically produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s 


 
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first domestically produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing 
on the Y-20 heavy transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end 
of 2022. 
PRC’s Drive to Dominate Emerging Technologies 
China seeks to be an innovation superpower that is largely non-reliant on foreign technology 
and that serves as a global center for high-tech industries. The goal of attaining self-
sufficiency in key S&T sectors—a theme of Chinese state plans going back decades—was 
recently reiterated in the 14th Five-Year Plan. As part of this self-sufficiency drive, Beijing 
has mobilized its bureaucracies to rapidly develop the country’s capacity for domestic 
innovation. Published in 2006, the National Medium-and-Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), was a landmark policy that formalized 
China’s push for domestic innovation while also calling for the assimilation and “re-
innovation” of advanced foreign technologies. In 2015, with the Made In China 2025 plan, 
Beijing sharpened its emphasis on technological independence by establishing import 
substitution quotas across a range of core technologies. The plan also called for the reform of 
state-owned enterprises, the establishment of regional innovation centers, and the leveraging 
of private sector capabilities in order to leapfrog foreign technological competitors and create 
a superior innovation ecosystem. 
China is particularly focused on dominating a range of emerging, dual-use technologies that 
promise to be both disruptive and foundational for future economies; these technologies 
include AI, autonomous systems, smart city platforms, quantum technologies, biotechnology, 
and advanced materials and manufacturing. Beijing has a clear understanding of its S&T 
deficiencies, particularly China’s vulnerability and reliance on western companies for 
enabling technologies such as semiconductors, new materials, and in some cases basic 
research. In addition, Beijing aims to address the challenges present in growing its science 
and technology talent pool. As a result of these vulnerabilities, the PRC has focused their 
industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to reduce 
these dependencies, ensure their resilience, and to become a market leader in emerging 
technologies. China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies 
to domestic companies working on frontier technologies, and has developed a focused effort 
to improve their domestic education, attract overseas Chinese talent, and attract foreign talent. 
China designates AI as one of its priority S&T development areas and assesses that advances 
in AI and autonomy are central to intelligentized warfare, Beijing’s concept of future warfare.  
Beijing views the integration of military and civilian institutions as central for developing AI-
enabled military capabilities and has established military-civilian R&D centers and procured 
commercially-developed AI and robotic technologies to ensure PLA access to cutting-edge 
AI technologies. PRC researchers are world leaders in certain AI applications, such as facial 
recognition and natural language processing, and PRC companies are marketing domestically-
designed AI chips. While China remains reliant on certain foreign capabilities to produce AI 


 
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hardware, such as advanced semiconductor fabrication factories and electronic design 
automation software, PRC researchers are exploring new materials and design concepts for 
next-generation semiconductors. 
Last year, China designed and fabricated a quantum computer capable of outperforming a 
classical high-performance computer for a specific problem. China was also domestically 
developing specialized refrigerators needed for quantum computing research in an effort to 
end reliance on international components. In 2020 and 2021, Chinese scientists and engineers 
performed additional testing demonstrating the feasibility of quantum communications from 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) using their Shijian-20 satellite.  
China’s Arms Exports. China is the fifth-largest arms supplier in the world, and sells nearly 
every category of conventional military equipment including UASs, submarines, naval 
surface vessels, surface to air missile systems and fighter aircraft to customers like Saudi 
Arabia, Serbia, the UAE, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and Pakistan.      
Armed UASs. China has supplied strike-capable Caihong and Wing Loong UASs to 
at least Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Algeria, Serbia, Indonesia, and 
Kazakhstan.  
Precision-Strike Weapons. As of 2017, China had sold export variant ballistic 
missile systems, including the M20, BP-12, and Joint Attack Rocket and Missile 
System (JARM), as well as long-range satellite-guided rocket systems. Although 
China typically does not disclose the countries purchasing these types of arms, in 
2021, Burma displayed an SY-400 TEL and in 2017 Qatar displayed a JARM.  
Naval Combatants. China is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by 
Pakistan’s 2015 purchase of eight Yuan class submarines for more than $3 billion. 
Thailand also purchased one Yuan class submarine in 2017 and originally planned to 
purchase two more. As of late 2021, Thailand’s procurement of the first Yuan 
submarine was not fulfilled by China due to contractual delays, though it delivered 
two Ming class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 
and 2018, China sold two naval frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan. In 
September 2019, China made its first-ever sale of an LPD-class ship to Thailand. 
Combat Aircraft. The PRC is attempting to diversify its international arms exports 
to include more technologically advanced combat aircraft. For example, in 2022 the 
PRC has offered to sell its JF-17 aircraft to Argentina. 
China’s arms sales operate primarily through state-run export organizations such as AVIC 
and North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Arms transfers also are a component of the 
PRC’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of assistance to complement 
foreign policy initiatives undertaken as part of China’s BRI policy.  


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Many developing countries buy PRC weapons systems because they are less expensive than 
other comparable systems. Although some potential customers consider arms made by the 
PRC to be of lower quality and reliability, many of China’s systems are offered with 
enticements such as donations, and flexible payment options, which make them appealing 
options for buyers.  
Espionage Activities Supporting China’s Military Modernization. Multiple U.S. criminal 
indictments since 2015 involve PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens or permanent resident 
aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens. They include procuring and exporting controlled 
items to China, economic espionage, and sanctions-related criminal cases, according to a U.S. 
Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement. The PRC’s efforts to 
acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included radiation hardened 
integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, 
naval and marine technologies, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military 
communication jamming equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, 
and ASW. Cases from 2021 include:  
•
In July 2021, a PRC national was sentenced to 42 months in Federal prison for
conspiring to fraudulently export maritime raiding craft and engines to China. The
U.S. Military utilizes these vessels and multi-fuel engines because they can be
operated after being launched from a submerged submarine, or after being dropped
into the ocean by an aircraft.  No comparable engine is manufactured in China.
•
In April 2021, a PRC national residing in the United States pled guilty to conspiring
to export devices with military applications to the PRC government and military.  The
PRC national fulfilled instructions from the PLA to obtain dual-use technology used
for anti-satellite weapons and other advanced military capabilities. This included
remotely operated side scan sonar systems, hydrophones, robotic boats, unmanned
underwater vehicles, and unmanned surface vehicles.
PRC Cyber-Enabled Espionage Activities  
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to 
military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain 
access to information and advanced technologies. 
Detected PRC cyberspace operations have targeted telecommunications firms, managed 
service providers (MSPs), and software developers. Key U.S. targets include proprietary 
commercial and military technology companies and research institutions associated with 
defense, energy, and other sectors. 
The PRC seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to 
physical disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 


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operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC believes these capabilities 
are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries that depend on information 
technologies.   
The PLA and China’s Talent Recruitment Programs 
The CCP operates more than 200 talent-recruitment programs that are overseen by central 
bodies that oversee talent development, including the Central Coordination Group on Talent 
Work and the Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group. Although the PRC 
government administers its talent recruitment programs, the PLA uses China’s network of 
recruitment programs, such as the Thousand Talents Plan, to recruit overseas talent. The PLA 
also has used its premier science and technology university, the National University of 
Defense Technology (NUDT), to offer foreign talent guest professorships at NUDT. 
Additionally, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, which runs the PLA’s nuclear 
weapons program, plays an active role in recruitment of overseas experts. 


 
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CHAPTER SIX: U.S.-PRC DEFENSE 
CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 emphasized responsibly 
managing competition and establishing commonsense guardrails to ensure competition did 
not veer into conflict.  
 2021 defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritized open channels of 
communication and the advancement of DoD priorities on managing crisis 
communications and strategic risk. 
President Biden made clear to PRC President Xi Jinping that it is their responsibility, as leaders, 
to ensure that competition between the United States and the PRC does not veer into conflict. 
Following the President’s guidance, U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2021 
supported U.S. policy and strategy toward the PRC to responsibly manage competition.  
DoD contacts and exchanges with the PRC were conducted in accordance with the statutory 
limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. 
In 2021, U.S. defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC focused on three interconnected 
priorities: (1) challenging PRC’s destabilizing behaviors inconsistent with peace and stability in 
region; (2) promoting dialogue on strategic risk in nuclear, cyberspace, and space to avoid 
misunderstanding or miscalculation that could escalate into crisis; and (3) building the structures 
and habits necessary to manage crises. 
A complete list of U.S. defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 is provided in 
Appendix II. 
Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2021  
Despite consensus built between President Biden and PRC President Xi to maintain open channels 
of communication, the PLA exhibited an unwillingness to engage on substantive matters with 
appropriate interlocutors.    
High-Level Contacts and Exchanges. High-level contacts between the United States and PRC 
are an important means to exchange views on the international security environment, and 


 
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demonstrates the responsible management of competition between our nations. In 2021, the United 
States made several requests to the PLA for the use of the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) or Video 
Teleconference (VTC). The Secretary of Defense made clear his desire to engage with PLA 
leadership, as needed, to advance priorities across the defense relationship. The Secretary of 
Defense requested calls to discuss issues related to operational matters and foreign defense 
relations with PLA CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang and PLA CMC-member and Minister 
of National Defense General Wei Fenghe. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China 
also conducted one DTL call with the Deputy Director of the PLA’s Office International Military 
Cooperation (OIMC) on August 19, 2021.  
Recurring Exchanges. Recurring exchanges serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to 
advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management, and reduce of operational risk. The 
following is a list of recurring exchanges and their status in 2021: 
• 
In 2020, the PLA indefinitely postponed the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD), an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense-level policy dialogue. The APSD did not take place in 2021.  
• 
The Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) is an annual Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (DASD) level policy dialogue. On September 28-29, 2021, DASD for China 
Dr. Michael Chase conducted a secure video conference with PRC Major General Huang 
Xueping, Deputy Director of OIMC, to hold the 16th U.S.-PRC DPCT. The two sides held 
frank and in-depth discussion on a range of issues affecting the U.S.-PRC defense 
relationship.  
• 
In 2021, the PLA declined to hold the second Crisis Communications Working Group 
(CCWG), a working-level policy dialogue established to advance the crisis prevention and 
management mechanisms between DoD and the PLA. The U.S. first convened the CCWG 
in October 2020 by video teleconference to discuss with the PLA concepts of crisis 
communications, crisis prevention, and crisis management. The meeting provided an 
opportunity to build mutual understanding between the U.S. military and the PLA on 
principles to prevent and manage crisis and reduce risk to forces.   
• 
The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group is an operational 
safety dialogue between U.S. INDOPACOM and PLA naval and air forces. The MMCA 
Working Group and Flag Officer session was held virtually on December 14-16, 2021. 
During the 2021 MMCA meetings, both sides discussed sustaining maritime and aviation 
operational safety and professionalism; reviewed safety-related events; and discussed 
implementation and assessment of the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime 
Encounters Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The U.S. and PRC have met regularly 
since 1998 for MMCA dialogue to strengthen military maritime safety, improve 
operational safety in the air and sea, and reduce risk between the two militaries.  


 
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Functional and Academic Exchanges. Functional engagements focus on advancing channels for 
risk reduction, understanding, and communication to promote international rules and norms, and 
set assumptions and expectations for safe and professional behavior between our two militaries. 
Similarly, academic exchanges focus on building mutual understanding. COVID restrictions 
prevented the execution of U.S. and PRC military academic institution exchanges planned for 
2021.  
• 
The annual exchange between the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) and 
the PLA Archives held an event in February 2021, which had been rescheduled from 2020 
due to COVID restrictions. During the meeting, DPAA and the PLA Archives discussed 
16 cases. No additional DPAA-PLA Archives meetings were held in 2021.  
• 
The U.S. Army Pacific Command and the PLA did not hold the 2021 Disaster Management 
Exchange (DME).  
• 
On November 30, 2021 U.S. and PRC defense officials held a working level virtual 
meeting to discuss the Department of Defense’s 2021 annual report on “Military and 
Security Developments Involving the PRC,” consistent with the 2014 “MOU between the 
U.S. Department of Defense and the PRC Ministry of National Defense on Notification of 
Major Military Activities Confidence Building Measures Mechanism.”   
U.S-PRC Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2022 
In 2022, the U.S. has prioritized maintaining open channels of communication at senior-levels and 
holding following exchanges: Defense Policy Coordination Talks, Crisis Communications 
Working Group, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group and Plenary, and 
Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA)-PLA Archive exchange. In August 2022, the 
PRC canceled defense engagements with the United States. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS ON STRATEGIC 
STABILITY 
 
 
 
Understanding strategic stability. PRC strategists typically define strategic stability as including 
nuclear, conventional, and political-military aspects of state relations.  Beijing increasingly views, 
what it characterizes as, “ensuring mutual vulnerability” with its nuclear rivals as a linchpin to this 
concept.    
• 
China’s understanding and approach to strategic stability are influenced by the PRC’s 
history, Western research and scholarship, and modern developments in weapons 
technology, proliferation, and great power competition. PRC experts’ understanding of 
strategic stability originally draws from Mao Zedong−era strategies that downplayed the 
need for a vast nuclear arsenal. Current views have evolved, and frequently refer to 
strategic stability as a general state of balance between the PRC and its rivals in multiple 
domains, including military, economic, and political.   
• 
Modern PRC experts increasingly accept Western definitions and concepts around strategic 
stability, agreeing that strategic stability should be understood as involving crisis stability 
(the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first) and arms control stability (the 
absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force). PRC scholars also emphasize the 
importance of constraints against the use of nuclear weapons and strategic mutual 
confidence and communications, and tend to reject frameworks that seem to portray the 
United States and China as being in a “Cold War-style” arms race.    
• 
China is committed to maintaining nuclear deterrence with its nuclear rivals, and PRC 
nuclear experts view a secure second-strike capability as crucial to national security. 
Beijing’s understanding of nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient 
capability to inflict a degree of unbearable destruction against its rivals and thus deter 
attack. Maintaining this posture with a small number of weapons has often led to China’s 
leaders lacking confidence in their ability to assure retaliation, perceiving that they either 
lacked enough weapons or lacked a sufficiently survivable arsenal.  
PRC leadership reluctant to engage on strategic stability. It remains unclear how much PRC 
leadership and decision-makers accept the premise behind strategic stability, including the utility 
of crisis stability and communications. PRC officials have been reluctant to engage on nuclear, 
cyberspace, and space issues as it pertains to strategic risk reduction in official or unofficial 
dialogue, particularly in defense channels.  


 
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Challenges to China’s pursuit of strategic stability. China’s concerns about maintaining 
strategic stability with its major power rivals revolves around keeping pace with emerging 
technological developments while also managing neighbors viewed as having the potential ability 
to alter the regional nuclear balance and degrade the PRC’s deterrence capability.  
• 
PRC experts perceive risks to ensuring strategic stability with their neighbors and U.S. 
allies, which they describe as pursuing a strategy of ‘nuclear hedging.’ Experts both worry 
about the impacts of the U.S. nuclear umbrella on allied behavior, and raise concerns over 
those U.S. allies pursuing independent nuclear deterrents. 
• 
Beijing views significant risks to strategic stability from potential U.S. technological 
breakthroughs or new commitments to produce and deploy cutting-edge weapons systems 
at greater scale or near China’s periphery.   
‒ PRC leaders are concerned that the United States could achieve rapid advances in 
missile defense technology, despite the technical limitations and small stockpiles of 
present U.S. interceptor systems. PRC leaders are concerned that Washington could 
achieve a breakthrough development in system effectiveness or deployment scale that 
negates Beijing’s ballistic missile arsenal.  
‒ Beijing fears that advances in U.S. and allied hypersonic capabilities may credibly 
threaten China’s relatively small arsenal of land-based weapons. Additionally, some 
PRC experts are concerned that the proliferation of hypersonic technology may blur 
the line between nuclear and conventional escalation; for example, the use of nuclear-
armed air defense systems to counter hypersonic glide vehicles could lower the nuclear 
threshold and raise the possibility of escalation into a broader nuclear exchange. 
‒ Beijing’s perception of strategic stability is also challenged by other technological 
developments, including potential U.S. development of increasingly accurate long-
range missiles capable of conducting counterforce strikes with low-yield nuclear 
warheads. Advanced space surveillance assets, conventional prompt-strike weapons, 
and the possibility of cyberspace-attacks to undermine nuclear command and control 
also contribute to PRC’s concerns about maintaining mutual nuclear vulnerability.  
 
 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS OF INFORMATION 
AND INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
 
 
 
The concept of information put forth by PLA writers, in authoritative texts, defines information as 
identifiable, carriable, indestructible, shareable, timely, and movable content that, through 
acquisition, allows individuals to transform the world. PRC leaders have identified that collecting, 
controlling, and accessing of information is crucially important in both warfighting and modern 
society. As a result, the PLA has conceptualized warfighting concepts to seize control of the 
information domain during a conflict. The concept of information warfare is an expansive concept 
that includes individuals, enterprises, societies, and national communication networks that form 
integrated entities, and encompasses the electromagnetic spectrum, psychology and perception, 
and intelligence operations. The PLA would probably use a variety of military capabilities such as 
cyberspace, electronic, and conventional to destroy adversary information systems and propagate 
PRC foreign policy messaging or disinformation. China’s goal for information warfare is to gain 
information superiority, which is achieved by destroying the adversary’s ability to acquire, 
transmit, and process information while simultaneously protecting the PLA’s ability to do the 
same.  
The PLA probably believes that it can successfully deter and manage a conflict by either 
controlling or destroying an adversary’s access to information. Authoritative PRC military 
documents illustrate that the PLA is aware of the risk of escalation during a conflict. Similar to 
their Western counterparts, PLA strategists broadly define escalation as an increase in the intensity 
or scope of military activities to achieve explicit goals. Beijing views of conflict escalation suggest 
confidence in their ability to control conventional conflict, and willingness to conduct offensive 
operations to demonstrate Beijing’s resolve, seize the initiative, and exploit adversary weaknesses.   
• 
PLA strategy is also informed by the view that contemporary “informatized” warfare, 
enabled by modern C4ISR capabilities, provides leaders with sufficient battlefield 
awareness to calibrate military effects and elicit a desired adversary response. PLA 
strategists view warfare as a science, discounting the possibility of inadvertent escalation 
or the effects of the “fog of war.”      
• 
PLA writings indicate that the Chinese military leaders probably views achieving 
information dominance during a conflict as a requirement to deny the adversary the ability 
to control the conflict, weaken their will to fight, and compel them to cease hostilities. The 
PLA has noticed that U.S. information dominance during the Iraq war provided the U.S. 


 
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military with the ability to control the conflict, while the Iraqi military was unable to 
receive orders or conduct operations because their command systems had been destroyed. 
The PLA probably will seek to control the information domain across the spectrum of conflict. 
Prior to the start of hostilities, the PLA would conduct psychological warfare to erode the will to 
fight of both adversary military forces and the civilian population, positioning the PLA to seize 
control of the information environment. Additionally, the PLA could conduct kinetic strikes or 
cyberspace-attacks on adversary command and control (C2) systems in order to cut off an 
adversary’s information flow. PLA writings states that a key concept of seizing information 
dominance is to preempt the enemy by conducting operations to paralyze adversary information 
systems. As the conflict progresses, the PLA will continue to use cyberspace and kinetic attacks 
to suppress and jam enemy information systems. The PLA would probably continue to use 
information operations against an adversary’s military and civilian populations in order to continue 
to erode adversary support for the conflict.  
• 
The PLA has recognized that information operations are highly offensive in nature and that 
individuals are often highly sensitive to the first narrative around an event. The PLA 
observed both Russia and Ukraine attempting to be the first side to control the information 
environment during the beginning of the current crisis in Ukraine. The PLA has also 
noticed that information operations have the ability to shape the information domain before 
the start of the conflict and the effects can be felt long after the conflict has concluded. 
In 2019, the PLA began mentioning a new concept called “intelligentized warfare,” which seeks 
to incorporate AI and other advanced technologies into every level of warfare. A major focus of 
intelligentized warfare is in the cognitive domain, as PRC theorists have perceived that the 
development of information technology has reached its limits and that future wars will occur in 
this cognitive domain. The PLA has already stated that modern conflict has transitioned towards 
intelligentized warfare have highlighted the utility of learning from the current Russia-Ukraine 
crisis, a conflict which the PLA thinks has cognitive confrontation at its core. To prepare for these 
future confrontations in the cognitive domain, the PLA has been honing its concept of “Cognitive 
Domain Operations (认知领域作战)” (CDO) that seek to adapt previous PRC concepts such as 
public opinion and psychological warfare to the modern information environment through the aid 
of emerging technologies such as AI.  
• 
According to a PLA researcher, CDO actions integrate military, political, economic, public 
opinion, psychology, legal theory, and other means to achieve strategic national security 
goals that affect a target’s cognition, decision making, and behavior. The goal of CDO is 
to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance”, defined as the use of propaganda 
as a weapon to influence public opinion to effect change in a nation’s social system—likely 
to create an environment favorable to China and reduce civilian and military resistance to 
PLA actions. PLA researchers have stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may 


 
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yield greater strategic benefits than firepower destruction, force control, and siege, and that 
effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has concluded. 
The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party 
entry into a future conflict or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a society. 
Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring about 
psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles on CDO 
state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without 
fighting is the highest realm of warfare. The PLA recognizes the offensive utility of CDO, as 
researchers have noticed that individuals are highly sensitive to the first news of an event, even if 
that news is misinformation. By using CDO to conduct offensive actions, the PLA seeks to create 
an asymmetric advantage to not only suppress their opponents, but also to subtly shape the thinking 
habits of the opponent’s audience and guide their opponents to support PLA objectives. 
PLA researchers have stated that emerging technology such as artificial intelligence and big data 
are key to creating profound advancements in CDO. Since at least 2019, PLA researchers have 
called on the PLA to improve their big data, natural language processing, and deep learning 
capabilities in order to improve its ability to create deep fakes, disseminate propaganda, and 
analyze internet users’ sentiments. Another PLA researcher suggested that the PLA should use AI 
to run its bot network on social media, which would be able to create content, and coordinate the 
optimal time to post on social media. If the PLA is successful in incorporating these technologies 
into operations, it could increase obfuscation of activities, create more plausible content, and 
enable more accurate targeting of audiences. 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA’S EXPANDED MILITARY 
DIPLOMACY 
 
 
 
The expansion of China’s military diplomatic activities began in the early 1990s with a dramatic 
shift in Beijing’s view of the international security environment. In 2004, then-Chinese President 
Hu directed the PLA to undertake “new historic missions,” which included supporting China’s 
overseas interests and diplomacy. A major milestone occurred in 2008 when the PLA Navy began 
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden—an important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) 
for Chinese trade. Since 2015, President Xi has reemphasized expanding PLA global activities and 
developing a system to defend China’s growing overseas interests as part of broader PLA reform 
efforts. The PLA’s engagement strategy depends on China’s overall relationship with each country 
or international organization. 
In 2015, China developed a prioritization for military-to-military relations in line with how Beijing 
categorizes its diplomatic relations with other countries: major powers (Russia, the United States, 
and Western Europe) with whom Beijing seeks “stable and balanced development” in a multipolar 
system; peripheral nations in the Indo-Pacific region with whom China seeks stronger relationships 
to create a more favorable environment along its maritime and land borders; and developing 
nations (usually in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East), where China emphasizes 
solidarity and cooperation and participates in multilateral diplomatic efforts, including projects 
associated its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Beijing uses foreign defense relations to shape global perceptions, strengthen its overseas 
influence, collect information on foreign militaries, and facilitate global access for the PLA to 
support Beijing’s strategic objectives. These engagements also advance Beijing’s broader goal of 
countering foreign opposition to China’s global activities and establishing a multipolar global 
governance system in which China has a greater role and no single country is dominant.  
The PLA’s interest in bilateral defense engagement activities is influenced by Beijing’s broader 
diplomatic priorities. China tends to undertake greater levels of military cooperation with countries 
where it has established a strategic partnership—such as Russia, with whom its “comprehensive 
strategic partnership of coordination” entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. 
China seeks to leverage its relationship with other strategic partnership countries to reinforce its 
systemic preferences and maintain stability in Beijing’s favor. 
As China’s overseas interests grew during the past two decades, CCP leaders directed the PLA to 
think about operating beyond China’s borders and its periphery to advance Beijing’s objectives. 


 
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This emphasis probably represents Beijing's increased reliance on and trust in the PLA to tout itself 
as a contributor to global security. 
While not the sole focus of China’s foreign defense relations, these activities provide opportunities 
to negotiate overseas military facilities and military access, which China needs to protect PRC 
nationals abroad, SLOCs, and substantial commercial investments associated with BRI, while also 
helping to support its forces participating in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Since 2018, the PLA has emphasized the responsibilities and roles of military attachés, training 
and professional military education (PME) opportunities in China, and engagement in multilateral 
forums, as the most effective means to boost its reputation and support Beijing’s strategic 
objectives. The PLA participates in combined exercises when doing so is likely to support political 
objectives or yield insights into foreign tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) concerning 
counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. 
Beijing continues to focus its foreign defense relations and influence efforts in the Indo-Pacific 
region to expand trade and investment, secure China’s borders, and counter U.S. influence. Outside 
of the Indo-Pacific, China sees Africa as a region of particular opportunity because African 
governments are highly receptive to China’s engagement and assistance. In 2021, the PRC held 
the inaugural China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, which brought together virtually the PLA 
and military representatives from 19 African countries. The event focused on COVID-19’s impact 
on African regional security, military medicine exchanges, and the role of military cooperation in 
combating COVID. During 2021, the PRC provided forces to UN Peacekeeping missions in Mali, 
South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PLA likely uses peacekeeping missions 
in Africa to gain operational experience and signal political commitment on the continent.  During 
the last five years, China has expanded ties with its historical partners like Russia and Pakistan 
while increasing engagements with U.S. partners and allies, such as the Philippines, Djibouti, and 
Thailand. These bilateral defense engagements provide the PLA opportunities to acquire advanced 
weapon systems and technologies and give the PLA access to foreign military practices, 
operational doctrine, and training methods.  
China’s defense outreach provides interlocutors with alternatives to U.S.-provided support.  
China’s diplomatic engagements provides alternative sources of support and legitimacy to isolated 
regimes, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
which blunts the effectiveness of international sanctions, enables these regimes to circumvent U.S. 
efforts, and weakens commitments to U.S. objectives among U.S. partners like the United Arab 
Emirates and Tunisia.    
 
 


 
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APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces  
          
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Taiwan Strait Area 
Total 
Total Ground Force 
Personnel 
1,040,000  
416,000  
89,000 
Group Armies/Army Corps 
13  
5 
3 
Combined Arms Brigades 
81  
30 (6 Amphibious)  
NA 
Mechanized Infantry 
Brigades 
N/A 
3 
Motorized Infantry 
Brigades 
6 
Armor Brigades 
4 
Army Aviation/Air 
Assault Brigades  
17 
5  
4 
Artillery Brigades  
15 
5 
3 
Airborne Brigades 
7  
7 
0 
Marine Brigades  
8 
5 
2 
Tanks 
4,400 
. 
850 
Artillery Pieces 
9,800 
. 
1,200 
Note: For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theaters.  
 
 


 
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Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 
       
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Eastern and 
Southern Theater 
Navies 
Total 
Aircraft Carriers  
2 
1 
0 
Cruisers 
6 
2 
0 
Destroyers  
36 
24 
4 
Frigates  
45 
32 
22 
Corvettes  
50 
N/A 
0 
Tank /Medium Landing ships 
Amphibious Transport Dock 
57 
52 
31 
Attack Submarines  
56 
31 
2 
Nuclear Attack Submarines  
9 
2 
0 
Nuclear Powered Ballistic 
Missile Submarines  
6 
6 
0 
Coastal Patrol (Missile)  
84 
68 
44 
Coast Guard Ships 
224 
N / A 
23 
 
Note: The PLAN has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. 
In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action 
against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the 
sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets. In conflict, China may also 
employ CCG and PAFMM ships to support military operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 
 
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Eastern and 
Southern Theater 
Total 
Fighters  
1,900 (2,900*) 
700 (800*) 
300 (450*) 
Bombers/Attack  
450 
250 
0 
Transport  
450 
20 
30 
Special Mission Aircraft  
200 
150 
240 
 
Note: This chart displays estimated totals of military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN aviation. However, the 
PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario.  
 
*The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers. 
 
 
China’s Rocket Force  
 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM 
300 
300 
>5,500km 
IRBM 
250 
250+ 
3,000-5,500km 
MRBM 
250 
500+ 
1,000-3,000km 
SRBM 
200 
600+ 
300-1,000km 
GLCM 
100 
300+ 
>1,500km 
 
 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX II: DEFENSE CONTACTS  
AND EXCHANGES 
 
 
 
U.S.-China Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2021 
 
RECURRENT EXCHANGES 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
September 
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group 
December 
ACADEMIC EXCHANGES 
FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES 
DPAA-PLA Archives 
February 
CMPR Briefing-Per 2014 MOU 
November 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX III: SELECTED PLA BILATERAL 
AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2021 
 
 
Selected PLA Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises in 2021 
Exercise Name 
Type of Exercise 
Participants 
Peace 2021/ Aman 
2021 
Multinational joint naval exercise 
Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, United 
States and 41 additional nations  
Joint Naval Drill 
Joint Naval exercise 
Singapore 
Joint maritime 
Training Exercise 
Joint Naval exercise 
Indonesia 
Cobra Gold 2021 
Multinational humanitarian and 
disaster relief training  
Thailand, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
India, United States 
Zapad/ Interaction 
2021 
Joint military training  
Russia 
Shared Destiny 2021 
Multinational peacekeeping exercise 
Pakistan, Mongolia, Thailand 
Peace Mission 2021 
Multinational military training 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Pabbi Antiterror 2021 
Joint anti-terrorism exercise 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, 
India 
Coast Guard Joint 
Patrols 
Joint Coast Guard patrol 
Vietnam 
Joint Sea 2021 
Joint Naval exercise 
Russia 
Joint Aerial Strategic 
Patrol 
Joint aerial strategic patrol 
Russia 
Joint Naval Patrols 
Joint Naval patrol 
Vietnam 
Peace Rescue 2021 
Joint medical exercise 
Vietnam 
               
 
 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX IV: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
APSCO 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization  
AAM 
Air To Air Missiles  
AAV 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle  
ADIZ 
Air Defense Identification Zone 
AEW&C 
Airborne Early Warning & Control 
AGI 
Intelligence Collection Ships 
AGOS 
Ocean Surveillance Ships  
AI 
Artificial Intelligence 
ALBM 
Air-Launched Ballistic Missile 
AOE 
Fast Combat Support Ship 
AOR 
Fleet Replenishment Oilers  
APOSOS 
Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 
APSD 
Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue  
ASAT 
Anti-Satellite Weapon 
ASBM 
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
ASW 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
AUKUS 
Australia, The United Kingdom, And The U.S. 
AUV 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
AVIC 
Aviation Industry Corporation Of China 
BACC 
Beijing Aerospace Control Center 
BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense  
BMEW 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning  
BRI 
Belt And Road Initiative 
BRICS 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, And South Africa 
BWC 
Biological Weapons Convention  
C2 
Command And Control 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
CALT 
China Academy Of Launch Vehicle Technology 
CBM 
Confidence-Building Measures  
CBW 
Chemical And Biological Weapons  
CCDI 
Central Commission For Discipline Inspection 


 
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CCG 
Chinese Coast Guard 
CCMCFD 
Central Commission For Military Civilian Fusion Development 
CCP 
Chinese Communist Party 
CCWG 
Crisis Communications Working Group 
CDO 
Cognitive Domain Operations  
CELAC 
Community Of Latin American And Caribbean States 
CFO 
Chief Financial Officer 
CG 
Coast Guard 
CLTC 
China Launch And Tracking Control  
CMC 
Central Military Commission 
CMM 
Chinese Maritime Militia (See PAFMM) 
CMPR 
China Military Power Report 
CNSA 
China National Space Administration  
CNSC 
Central National Security Commission  
COMAC 
Commercial Aircraft Corporation Of China  
CONUS 
Continental United States 
COSCO 
China Ocean Shipping Company 
COVID 
Coronavirus 
CPTPP 
Comprehensive And Progressive Agreement For Trans-Pacific Partnership  
CWC 
Chemical Weapons Convention  
DASD 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense 
DDG 
Guided-Missile Destroyer 
DME 
Disaster Management Exchange 
DOB 
Date Of Birth 
DPAA 
Defense Pow/Mia Accounting Agency 
DPCT 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
DSR 
Digital Silk Road  
DTL 
Defense Telephone Link  
ECS 
East China Sea 
EDT 
Emerging Disruptive Technologies 
EEZ 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
EO 
Electro-Optical 
EPR 
Emergency Petroleum Reserve  
EW 
Electronic Warfare 
FFG 
Guided-Missile Frigate 
FFL 
Corvette 
FIC 
First Island Chain 
FOB 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment 
FOC 
Full Operational Capability 
FYP 
Five Year Plan 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product 


 
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GEO 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
GLCM 
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile 
GPS 
Global Positioning System 
GSD 
General Staff Department 
GSR 
Green Silk Road  
HEU 
Highly Enriched Uranium  
HGV 
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle 
HQ 
Headquarters 
HSR 
Health Silk Road  
IADS 
Integrated Air Defense System 
ICBM 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICT 
Information And Communications Technology 
INDOPACOM 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
IO 
Information Operations 
IOC 
Initial Operational Capability 
IRBM 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR 
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
JARM 
Joint Attack Rocket And Missile System 
JLSB 
Joint Logistics Brigades  
JLSC 
Joint Logistics Service Center 
JLSF 
Joint Logistics Support Force 
JOCC 
Joint Operations Command Center  
LAC 
Line Of Actual Control  
LACM 
Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LEO 
Low Earth Orbit 
LHA 
Amphibious Assault Ship  
LM 
Long March 
LNG 
Liquid Natural Gas 
LOW 
Launch-On-Warning 
LPD 
Amphibious Transport Docks  
LST 
Tank Landing Ships  
MCF 
Military-Civilian Fusion 
MDPW 
Multi-Domain Precision Warfare 
MIRV 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles 
MMCA 
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement  
MND 
Ministry Of National Defense 
MOU 
Memorandum Of Understanding 
MOX 
Mixed-Oxide  
MPS 
Ministry Of Public Security  
MRBM 
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MSP 
Managed Service Providers 


 
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MSS 
Ministry Of State Security 
MUM-T 
Manned Unmanned Teaming  
NDMD 
National Defense Mobilization Department  
NDU 
National Defense University  
NEO 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
NFU 
No First Use 
NIH 
National Institutes Of Health 
NORINCO 
North Industries Corporation 
NPC 
National People's Congress 
NSR 
Northern Sea Route  
NUDT 
National University Of Defense Technology 
NWMA 
Non-War Military Activities 
OBOR 
One Belt One Road 
OIMC 
Office For International Military Cooperation 
OPFOR 
Opposing Force 
OTH 
Over-The-Horizon 
PAFMM 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
PAP 
People's Armed Police 
PBA 
Pharmaceutical-Based Agents  
PKO 
Peacekeeping Operations 
PLA 
People's Liberation Army  
PLAA 
People's Liberation Army Army 
PLAAF 
People's Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN 
People's Liberation Army Navy 
PLA NDU 
People's Liberation Army National Defense University  
PLANMC 
People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps 
PLARF 
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force 
PME 
Professional Military Education 
PNT 
Positioning, Navigation, And Timing 
POW 
Prisoner Of War 
PPE 
Personal Protective Equipment 
PRC 
People's Republic Of China 
PRSS 
Pakistan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
RIMPAC 
Rim Of The Pacific Exercise 
RORO 
Roll-On/Roll-Off Cargo Ships 
SAM 
Surface-To-Air Missile 
SAR 
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SASTIND 
State Administration For Science, Technology, And Industry For National 
Defense 
SATCOM 
Satellite Communications 
SCO 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 


 
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SCS 
South China Sea 
SIC 
Second Island Chain 
SLAM-ER 
Standoff Land 
SLBM 
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
SLOC 
Sea Lines Of Communication 
SLV 
Space Launch Vehicle 
SMA 
Special Mission Aircraft 
SOE 
State-Owned Enterprise 
SOF 
Special Operations Forces 
SRBM 
Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
SRSS 
Sudan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
SS 
Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSBN 
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSD 
Space System Department 
SSF 
Strategic Support Force 
SSGN 
Guided-Missile Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSN 
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSP 
Air-Independent Powered Attack Submarines  
SSS 
Student Small Satellites  
STEM 
Science, Technology, Engineering, And Mathematics 
TRA 
Taiwan Relations Act 
TT&C 
Telemetry, Tracking, And Control  
TTP 
Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures 
UAE 
United Arab Emirates 
UAS 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems 
UAV 
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV 
Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UFWD 
United Front Work Department 
UN 
United Nations 
UNCLOS 
United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea 
USD 
U.S. Dollar 
USNS 
United States Naval Ship (Non-Commissioned) 
USTR 
United States Trade Representative 
VBSS 
Visit, Board, Search And Seizure  
VIP 
Very Important Person 
VLS 
Vertical Launch System 
VRSS 
Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite  
VTC 
Video Teleconference 
VTOL 
Vertical Take-Off And Landing 
XPCC 
Xinjiang Production And Construction Corps 
XSCC 
Xi'an Satellite Control Center  


 
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Military and Security Developments Involving the  
People’s Republic of China 
 
A Report to Congress 
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, as amended 
 
 
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, as 
amended, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and U form, on 
military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the 
current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army 
and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the 
military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The 
report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the 
period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the 
United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.” 
 
 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................. I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. II 
CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING  THE PRC’S STRATEGY ........................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER TWO: PLA FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION ................................................... 
47 
CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY ......................... 117 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE ................................................................... 149 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION...................................... 164 
CHAPTER SIX: DEFENSE CONTACTS  AND EXCHANGES IN 2022 ............................................................ 173 
 SPECIAL TOPICS 
................................................................................................................................. 177 
APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 
....................................................................................... 185 
APPENDIX II: SELECTED BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2022 ....................................... 187 
APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 188 


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I 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
 
PREFACE 
The 2022 National Security Strategy states that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only 
competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the 
international order.  As a result, the 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the 
“pacing challenge” for the Department of Defense. As the PRC seeks to achieve “national 
rejuvenation” by its centenary in 2049, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders view a modern, 
capable, and “world class” military as essential to overcoming what Beijing sees as an increasingly 
turbulent international environment.  
The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 
of China charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military strategy, and 
offers insight on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, 
as well as its future modernization goals. 
In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout 
the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, while accelerating its 
development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” 
against a “strong enemy,” counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and to project power globally. At the same time, the PRC largely denied, cancelled, and 
ignored recurring bilateral defense engagements, as well as DoD requests for military-to-military 
communication at multiple levels.  
This report illustrates the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC’s 
increasingly capable military.   
Report Scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the 
end of 2022.  


II 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY  
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
●The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by
2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand
the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support
of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as
deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents
obstacles to its national strategy.
●The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful
nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that
structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root
causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.
‒ 
In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have 
implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against 
us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”  
●The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness
the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading
position” in an enduring competition between systems.
●In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for
an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s
security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks,
challenges, and trials.”
FOREIGN POLICY  
●The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to


III 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the 
Party’s political and governing systems. 
●Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European
countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf
warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.
●In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous
year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI
extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.
●Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
II. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on
Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding
reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.
ECONOMIC POLICY  
●At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID policy. The decision to implement
China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests
against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local
governments.
●The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of
growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to
basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green
developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.
●The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of
China’s broader national development aspirations.
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) 
●The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global
transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic
integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.
●In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline.
However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and
Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy
opportunities.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding
its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.
MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
●
The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to
“fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and
Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.
●The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and
technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments
of national power.
●Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil
Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 
●In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its
sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for
itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防
御).
●PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by
the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great
modern socialist country.”
●In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party
Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi
to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.
●During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi
reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s
armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a
more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.
●In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR
network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key
vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to
launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not
significantly impact PLA combat readiness.
FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION  
●The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime
as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
●The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight
and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States),
counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project
power globally.
●People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment
and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world
class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military
response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The
PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the
policy are not clear.
●People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the
world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140
major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and
submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
‒ 
It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) 
and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.  In the near-term, 
the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land 
targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, 
notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability. 
‒ 
The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international 
law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the 
same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including 
the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
●People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation.  The PLAAF and
PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The
PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize with
the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the
PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly
revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.


VI 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term
modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.  The PRC is developing
new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require
increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
‒ 
The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental 
range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the 
PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United 
States, Hawaii, and Alaska. 
●Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established
to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications,
and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF’s Network Systems Department
(NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible
for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare,
technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s
Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天
部队), is responsible for military space operations.  The PRC continues to develop
counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites,
electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s
access to and operations in the space domain.
●
Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint
strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian
products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the
movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.
●Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s
SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level
special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to
conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it
difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
●The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade,
deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct
military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
●The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to
strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain
(FIC).


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION  
●The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a
presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold
at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
●Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in
all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are
not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.
●Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS
architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive
early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also
placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of
its IADS.
●Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will
continue to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system is possibly intended to replace some
older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western
Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.
ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
●The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military
exercises.
●The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict,
which it calls "intelligentized warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced
technologies at every level of warfare.
●The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
United States.
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
●The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication
capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”


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●The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and
meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.
●The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within
their field of view and enable counterspace actions.
 NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
●Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its
nuclear forces.  Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current
efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.
●The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms
while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion
of its nuclear forces.
●In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC
possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed
previous projections.
●DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by
2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its
force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that
year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military
by 2049.
●The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce
plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies
are intended for peaceful purposes.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into
these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to
increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW)
posture.
●The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead
with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current
JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC
littoral waters.


 
 
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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
● The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This 
includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
● The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a 
threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.  
● The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
● The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, 
Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on 
the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
● Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the 
PLA conventional forces within the theater. 
● In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring 
Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a 
dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS 
● The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its 
sovereignty.  
● Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence 
in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil 
and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”   
● During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS, 
including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in 
close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land 
features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on 
the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.  
 


 
 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT  
● In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The 
PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait 
included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-
declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan. 
● At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position 
that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force 
as an option. 
● The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its 
August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 
in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States. 
PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
● Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances 
of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past 
two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 
100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in 
an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the 
region.  
● Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft 
have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of 
closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other 
actions.  
● The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of 
the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential 
for loss of life. 
THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE  
● CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national 
rejuvenation.   
● The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders 
and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its 
foreign policy goals.  This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion—
and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests. 


 
 
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● In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN 
peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. 
The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to 
COVID-19.  
 PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
● The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA 
to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military 
logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives 
evolve. 
● Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces 
projection. 
● In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s 
Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA 
military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United 
Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.  
● The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, 
and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and 
ICBM launches. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE 
● The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine 
that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach 
to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.  
● Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense 
and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.   
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
● The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused 
with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for 
modern military capabilities. 
● The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including 
through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities 
to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 7.1 percent,
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position
as the second-largest military spender in the world.
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
●China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and
many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.
●China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities
that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.
●In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier,
featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to
deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
●The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to
military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain
access to information and advanced technologies.
●There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by
PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as
U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA
modernization.
DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022 
●In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and
DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely
continued in 2023.
●The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States,
combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk
of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.
●DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition
does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include
ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding
misperceptions.


 
 
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CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING  
THE PRC’S STRATEGY 
 
 
Understanding the tenets of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) national strategy is essential 
to understanding the drivers of China’s security and military strategy. This, in turn, offers insights 
on the current and future course of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) reform and 
modernization in terms of its strength, technological advances, organization, and operational 
concepts —all of which could offer PRC leaders expanded military options to support its national 
goals.  
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 
2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand 
the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support 
of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as 
deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents 
obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful 
nation states as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that 
structural changes in the international system and confrontational United States are the root 
causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.  
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness 
the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading 
position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
The PRC’s strategy aims to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This objective, 
which General Secretary Xi Jinping (also referred to as Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission or President of the PRC, depending on the context of his responsibilities) calls “the 
Chinese Dream,” is a national aspiration to elevate the PRC to a position of strength, prosperity, 
and leadership on the world stage.  
PRC leaders characterize their strategy to achieve political, social, and economic modernity—as 
defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party)—as a grand national endeavor that is 
sweeping in scope and far-reaching in how it will transform the PRC and, in turn, the world.  The 


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Party defines national rejuvenation as a state in which the PRC is “prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.” The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and 
determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national 
power that will place the PRC in a “leading position.” CCP leaders frequently refer to building the 
PRC’s “comprehensive” national power in this manner.  The PRC’s strategy entails a long-term 
planning process to attain national rejuvenation that sets objectives, priorities, and milestones 
across virtually every aspect of governance and policy area including economics, political affairs, 
the rule of law, public order, national security, diplomacy, and defense as well as social affairs, 
education, science and technology, culture, the environment, and other matters. CCP officials have 
discussed achieving the unification of PRC and Taiwan as an element of national rejuvenation.  
The PRC pursues its efforts to generate greater national power from the basis of defending and 
advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Consequently, the PRC’s national 
ambitions and statecraft rest on the foundation of the CCP-dominated political ideology of 
enhancing the path, theory, system, and culture of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” The 
objective of this Party-led strategy is perhaps best stated in what the Party calls its “basic line,” a 
single sentence in the CCP’s constitution that serves as the mission of the Party and as the 
cornerstone for its policymaking. Last amended at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, it states:   
“The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism 
is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and pioneering effort, 
making economic development the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal 
Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening up, so as to see China 
becomes a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.”   
The 20th Party Congress also incorporated new developments since 2017 in “Xi Jinping Thought 
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” after the term was adopted into the 
CCP’s constitution. Unanimously agreed upon by Party delegates to the 19th Party Congress, the 
inclusion of Xi Jinping’s namesake ideology into the CCP constitution was hailed as a “guide to 
action for the entire Party and all the Chinese people to strive for the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation.” 
External Conditions. Among the external elements of the PRC’s national strategy are its 
deliberate efforts to create a “favorable” international environment that is conducive to the PRC’s 
rise and national rejuvenation. In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded 
on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate and prioritized securing 
and safeguarding its overseas interests.  The Party stressed the need for strengthening the PRC’s 
capacity to secure its overseas interests, including improving its control over grain, energy and 
other resources, and key industrial and supply chains. The report also stressed the CCP’s need to 
prevent digital penetration, sabotage, subversion, and separatism activities from external actors. 
With regard to national security, the CCP reported it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all 
fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.” 
However, in 2021 and into 2022, PRC leadership contended with the ongoing effects of the 


 
 
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COVID-19 pandemic that brought challenges for the PRC’s diplomatic, cultural, and economic 
influence abroad. PRC leadership also took diplomatic measures to manage increased global 
concern about PRC rhetorical and diplomatic alignment with Russia before, immediately 
following, and during the war on Ukraine, as well as concern for the PRC’s growing assertive and 
coercive economic and military actions.  PRC leaders continue to believe that global trends, 
especially perceived U.S. decline, are generally conducive to their long-term interests.  
As PRC leadership views a divided China as a weak China, they argue that “full reunification”— 
including the resolution of the ‘Taiwan question’ by 2049 and solidifying the PRC’s “overall 
jurisdiction” over Hong Kong — is one of the fundamental conditions of national rejuvenation. 
Beijing views as an imperative that China field a “world-class” military by 2049 that can “fight 
and win” and “resolutely safeguard” the country’s sovereignty, security, and development 
interests. In support of this goal, on 26 December 2020 the National People's Congress passed 
revisions to the PRC’s National Defense Law, which broadened the legal justification for PLA 
mobilization to include defense of China’s “development interests.” The codification of this 
language in PRC law is intended to add legitimacy to the use of military force to safeguard the 
PRC’s overseas interests.  
China’s leaders claim national rejuvenation requires the PRC to “take an active part in leading the 
reform of the global governance system” as many rules and norms were established, in the PRC’s 
view, during a time of PRC weakness and without the PRC’s consultation and input. The Party 
views aspects of the prevailing international rules-based system as constraining the PRC’s strategic 
ambitions and incompatible with its sovereignty, security, political preferences, and development 
interests. To the PRC’s leaders, revisions are necessary to accommodate the PRC’s development 
and should reflect the CCP’s preferred transformation in the distribution of power to forge an 
external environment more favorable to the PRC’s political governance system and national 
interests.  
Key Objectives and Milestones. For decades, the PRC’s leaders have framed their pursuit of 
modernity and power as advancing China along a specific trajectory, with the PRC’s centenary in 
2049 serving as the target for achieving national rejuvenation and becoming a “great modern 
socialist country.” From the PRC’s perspective, the PRC is a developing nation that must transition 
into a “fully developed and highly advanced” socialist society, and this trajectory involves the 
Party leadership shepherding the PRC through different stages of gradual but systematic 
modernization and development. The Party demarcates the stages of the PRC’s strategy with 
milestones accompanied by objectives and priorities determined by the Party’s long-term planning 
processes.  
Reflecting on the PRC’s progress at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi declared that China had 
assumed “…a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense 
capabilities, and comprehensive national strength” and, therefore, “crossed the threshold into a 
new era.” Xi’s declaration that the PRC had entered a “New Era” was not a change in strategic 
objectives, but an important signal of confidence that the PRC’s progress was sufficient to tackle 


 
 
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the next set of challenges in its development. For the PRC’s strategy in the “New Era,” Xi laid out 
a broad plan to achieve national rejuvenation with a timeline linked to two symbolically important 
centenary milestones reached in 2021 (the CCP’s centenary) and 2049 (the PRC’s centenary). To 
bridge the lengthy gap between the two anniversaries, Xi added interim national objectives for 
2035 and laid out a broad two-stage modernization plan to reach 2049. Further demonstrating the 
Party’s confidence in the PRC’s progress, Xi’s objectives for 2035 moved up certain mid-century 
targets set by the Party going back to 1987.  
At his centenary speech marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP on July 1st, 2021, Xi declared 
that China had “realized the first centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects.” Beyond 2021, the PRC will use the “moderately prosperous society” as the basis for 
Xi’s “two-stage” plan to achieve national rejuvenation by the PRC’s centenary in 2049. In the first 
stage, from 2021 to 2035, the Party aims for the PRC to “basically” meet its initial thresholds for 
becoming a “great modern socialist country.” In this stage, the PRC will likely continue to 
prioritize economic development as “the central task,” but rather than rapid economic growth, it 
will seek to address its uneven economic development and inequalities that Beijing recognized as 
the new “principal contradiction” in PRC society in the “New Era.” By 2035, the PRC will also 
seek to increase its economic and technological strength to become a “global leader in innovation” 
and aim to “basically” complete its military modernization. The PRC will also seek to significantly 
strengthen its cultural “soft power” and improve its domestic rule of law and governance systems.  
In the second stage from 2035 to 2049, the PRC aims to complete its development and attain 
national rejuvenation, realizing an international status that Xi describes as a “global leader in terms 
of comprehensive national strength and international influence.” A renewed PRC will have 
attained—among the Party’s many goals—its objectives to field a “world-class” military and 
assume a leading position within an international order revised in line with the PRC’s overall 
foreign policy goal to establish what it refers to as a “community of common destiny (人类命运
共同体),” or the PRC’s preferred official English translation “community with a shared future for 
mankind.”  
Historic Continuity. Understanding the origins of the PRC’s national rejuvenation is crucial to 
understanding how the PRC will likely shape and pursue this strategic objective. PRC leaders have 
consistently framed their efforts as seeking to “restore” China to a preeminent place in the world 
after enduring what the Party characterizes as China’s “century of humiliation” beginning in the 
19th century as the Qing Dynasty began to disintegrate and lasting until the founding of the PRC 
in 1949. Although the Party’s exact articulation of this goal as “the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” first emerged in the late 1980s, the Party has championed the cause of rebuilding 
China since the 1920s. Xi frequently points to the CCP’s steadfastness to the cause of national 
rejuvenation and describes it as the Party’s “original aspiration.”   
The Party’s narrative of national rejuvenation speaks to the deep impressions left on the PRC’s 
political landscape over an era defined by the disintegration of China’s polity, repeated violations 
of China’s sovereignty by foreign powers, and the prolonged absence of physical and economic 


 
 
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security for many Chinese people.  For a culture with a history stretching back thousands of 
years—much of it spent as one of the most powerful and advanced civilizations in the world—
nationalist appeals to restore China’s greatness are deeply rooted.  The threads of national renewal 
can be traced to China’s reformers and nationalist revolutionary leaders in the late Qing Dynasty 
and emerged as a common nationalist theme in the fractured politics of China’s Republican Era.  
This resonance is crucial to understanding why the CCP portrays the PRC’s rejuvenation as a 
nationalist project that the Party “shoulders” for the country.   
The PRC’s Strategy and the CCP. The Party’s leaders frame “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics” and the CCP as indispensable to the PRC overcoming its historical circumstances 
and attaining national rejuvenation. Xi stated in a speech to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, 
“Which ideological system a country implements depends on one crucial issue: can this ideology 
resolve the historical problems facing the country?” From the Party’s perspective, its leadership 
and systems are uniquely able to restore the PRC’s strength, prosperity, and prestige—underscored 
with the implicit warning that any deviation from socialism’s path would result in “chaos” and 
China falling behind on its “historic mission.” As Xi stated, “…only socialism can save China—
and only Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can develop China.”   
CCP leaders flatly reject the notion that the Party has abandoned its socialist ideology in recent 
decades with the introduction of market features into the PRC’s economy or drifted towards a non-
ideological form of governance. The Party asserts that the PRC remains on the path of “socialist 
modernization” but it seeks to advance the country gradually as a lesson painfully learned from 
the Mao-era catastrophes that aimed for rapid progress. Accordingly, the Party claims that to 
perform its decisive role in guiding the PRC’s development into a “great modern socialist country,” 
it must ensure that the country advances in line with “the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原
则).” First stated by Deng Xiaoping and later written into the CCP Constitution, these principles 
mandate the Party “to keep to the path of socialism, to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, 
to uphold the leadership of the CCP, and to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”  
The Four Cardinal Principles are the basis for political and governance reforms pursued by the 
Party and the outer boundaries of its efforts to “reform” and “open up” the country.  
Xi told Party cadres in 2014, “promoting the modernization of the national governance system and 
capacity is definitely not Westernization or capitalism.”  In addition to cultivating ideological 
discipline and fighting corruption within the Party, Xi has sought to advance the PRC’s strategy 
by strengthening the Party’s primacy across China’s governance systems and making the Party 
more effective at managing China’s political, economic and social problems. Xi’s emphasis on 
building the CCP’s institutional capacity and promoting internal unity—which he views as the 
means for the Party to perform its strategic role—has become a prominent feature of his tenure.  
Competition Between Systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international 
system and an increasingly confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying 
strategic competition between China and the United States. The PRC’s leadership has long viewed 
China as embroiled in a major international strategic competition with other states. Throughout 


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the post-Mao reform era and particularly after the end of the Cold War, the Party’s leaders 
recognized their socialist system was—and would remain over the long-term—an underlying 
source of tension with the West. Given the Party’s ambitions to “restore” the PRC’s place in the 
world and their assessment of the PRC’s relative weakness via-a-vis rival states, CCP leaders 
recognized the PRC’s growing strength could threaten to aggravate tensions with others without 
careful management. Deng Xiaoping’s reputed approach to this dilemma, as attributed by other 
Party leaders, was for China to, “hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a 
low profile; and never claim leadership.”  Although the PRC’s leaders have consistently pursued 
national rejuvenation as their goal, they have demonstrated a degree of strategic adaptability to 
seize opportunities and manage threats to their overall strategic objectives.  
Over time, the PRC has characterized China’s view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, most importantly the United States, as well as a clash of opposing 
ideological systems. The PRC’s leaders have indicated they view competition as entailing aspects 
of cooperation and conflict and that the Party would need to be adaptable, flexible, and above all 
patient. The PRC’s leaders have also offered a view of competition based on relative levels of 
economic, technological, and military power. Speaking to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, Xi 
remarked that the Party needed to “appreciate” that “developed Western nations” would continue 
to possess “real, long-term advantages” over China in the economic, technological, and military 
domains. Xi argued that China would need to “prepare for a long period of cooperation and of 
conflict between these two social systems in each of these domains.” Xi also alluded to the core 
elements of “national rejuvenation” as the PRC’s approach to this competition. Xi stated, “Most 
importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually broadening 
our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a socialism that is 
superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and 
have the dominant position.”  
CCP Views of Geostrategic Shifts. In the past two years, General Secretary Xi has presented his 
thoughts on the PRC’s strategic environment on numerous occasions. In 2020, CCP leaders, 
including Xi himself, convened several meetings on “growing risks” and, in the communique 
following the 5th Plenum in October 2020, stressed that the PRC is on the brink of “changes unseen 
in a century,” but also that China would benefit from a “profound adjustment in the international 
balance of power.” In his CCP 100th anniversary speech, Xi asserted that, as the world experienced 
“once-in-a-century changes,” China had to adopt “a holistic approach to national security that 
balances development and security imperatives” and implement “the national rejuvenation.” In his 
2022 New Year’s speech, Xi stated that China needed to “remain mindful of potential risks” while 
maintaining “strategic focus and determination.” 
Since just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, PRC leaders have consistently characterized 
China’s security environment as undergoing intense changes and viewed the international order as 
shifting toward a multipolar system more commensurate with the PRC’s development. The Party 
views a shift toward a multipolar system as consistent with its perception of global power trends. 
This shift is vital for the PRC to advance its strategy, perceiving U.S. power as a constraint that 


 
 
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impedes many of the PRC’s goals. The PRC’s leaders have eagerly embraced narratives of the 
West’s relative decline and the inevitability of China’s rise as largely consistent with their strategy 
and evidence of China’s progress. 
The Party views core aspects of the current international system as incompatible with its vision for 
a revised order premised on its “community of common destiny.” The PRC’s leaders view U.S. 
security alliances and partnerships, especially those in the Indo-Pacific, as destabilizing and 
irreconcilable with the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. Regionally, the 
PRC’s 2019 defense white paper claims that “Asia-Pacific” countries are “increasingly aware that 
they are members” of the PRC’s “community with a shared future for mankind” and that managing 
disputes through dialogue is its “preferred policy option.”   
Beijing has also expressed concerns over growing global instability and a mounting sense of 
insecurity that it views as instigated by the United States. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
criticized the United States as the “principal instigator” of global instability and driver of 
“international strategic competition.” China’s leadership views U.S. policy toward the PRC as a 
critical factor affecting the PRC’s national objectives and increasingly views the United States as 
more willing to confront Beijing where U.S. and PRC interests are inimical.  
Given the enduring suspicion among some in Beijing that the United States seeks to contain China, 
CCP leaders hold that the accrual of the PRC’s comprehensive national power will set the 
conditions for the PRC’s ability to confront or dissuade the United States and prevent containment. 
As China’s leaders seek to translate the PRC’s growing economic and military means into 
influence to advance their international aspirations, they must also carefully balance the PRC’s 
expanding interests across their priorities and resources.  
 


 
 
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THE PRC’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT & MANAGEMENT 
In recent years, the PRC has articulated its view of national security as a broad concept 
that spans the confluence of internal and external threats to the PRC’s interests.  Party 
leaders have identified national security as encompassing traditional and non-traditional 
domestic and foreign threats; the intersection of external influences on internal stability; 
and economic, cultural, societal and environmental threats. Additionally, Beijing has 
taken steps to define a concept for national security; improve the CCP’s ability to develop 
and coordinate national security policy across party, military, and state organs; and raise 
domestic awareness of national security concerns. These efforts seek to address 
longstanding concerns of China’s leadership that the country’s legacy system of stove-
piped party-state organizations was ill equipped to meet the growing national security 
challenges that the PRC faces. 
National Security Concept. The CCP’s “Overall National Security Concept” (总体国家安全
观), first proposed by Xi in 2014, provides the framework for the PRC’s national security 
system, the mission of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC), and the basis 
of the PRC’s national security strategy. According to the Party, the premise of the concept 
is that “The people’s security is the purpose of national security, political security is the 
root of national security, and priority in national interests is the norm of national security.” 
China’s leaders consider people’s security, political security, and national interests as 
mutually reinforcing aspects of national security. Party outlets describe people’s security 
as the purpose because national security fundamentally must serve the PRC people and 
nation. Similarly, the Party’s view of political security as the foundation of national security 
is described in terms of the maintenance and “ruling status” of the Party and the system 
of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This reflects the Party’s certainty that its 
leadership and systems are indispensable to the PRC’s national rejuvenation. Party 
leaders assess the supremacy of national interests as the criterion or standard by which 
the Party expects its stewardship of the PRC’s national security will be judged: its ability 
to “resolutely safeguard” the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. The 
PRC’s concept also views development and security as mutually supporting aspects of 
national security in which “security guarantees development, and development is the goal 
of security.” 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC). To improve coordination on national 
security matters, the CCP created the CNSC (中央国家安全委员会) in 2013. The CNSC 
advises the Politburo; oversees the coordination of national security issues across the 
government; manages crises; fights terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism; and 
interacts with foreign counterparts. Embracing the Party’s expansive concept of national 
security, the CNSC’s purview covers both internal and external national security matters. 
The CNSC’s mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and 
powerful leadership has led the CNSC to become an important party-state organ, and 
exemplified by its promulgating regulations in 2021 on the “National Security Work of the 
CCP” and outlining who, what, and how the CCP will lead national security in the PRC. 
CNSC Membership. The PRC’s top three leaders lead the CNSC: Xi who serves as the 
CNSC Chairman; Li Qiang (Premier of the State Council); and probably Zhao Leji 
(Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). CNSC 
membership may include Politburo members, senior government leaders, and senior PLA 


 
 
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leaders (including the two Vice Chairmen of the CMC). The CNSC General Office is 
responsible for the commission’s daily work and is run by senior CCP officials serving in 
dual-hatted roles in other positions. As of March 2023, the Director of the CNSC General 
Office likely continued to be Ding Xuexiang, a longtime political aide to Xi. Ding also serves 
as the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and is a member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee. Last October, Chen Wenqing was elevated to Secretary of 
the Central Politics and Law Commission at the 20th Party Congress and is unlikely to stay 
on at the CNSC where he has served as Deputy Director of the CNSC General Office since 
2018. 
National Security Strategy. By 2015, the CCP had adopted the PRC’s first national security 
strategy outline following the CNSC’s establishment. Official media noted the strategy 
intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s guidance. 
Since 2015, the PRC’s leaders and media have indicated national security sub-strategies 
that cover a variety of issues including political security, homeland security, military 
security, economic security, cultural security, societal security, technology security, 
network security, nuclear safety, ecological security, resource security, and biosecurity.  
In November 2021, the Politburo deliberated and, soon thereafter, passed the PRC’s 
National Security Strategy (2021-2025) (国家安全战略). 
National Security Law. With the establishment of the CNSC and the Party’s adoption of 
the national security strategy, in 2015 the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the 
National Security Law (国家安全法). This law encapsulated the Party’s overall national 
security concept and swept a broad range of issues beneath a new legal framework of 
“national security,” while strengthening the formal role of central authorities. In recent 
years, the NPC has also passed a series of laws intended to address more specific 
national security concerns including counterespionage (2014, updated in 2022), 
counterterrorism (2015), cybersecurity (2016), foreign non-governmental organizations 
in China (2016), intelligence (2017), cryptography (2019), and the coast guard (2021). 
While these laws address more specific national security concerns, they remain sweeping 
in scope and authorities.  
In an effort to raise public awareness of the Party’s national security concepts and 
emphasize national security as a civic responsibility, the 2015 National Security Law 
designated April 15th of each year as National Security Education Day. Indicating the 
reach and depth the Party desires its national security concepts to penetrate into the 
party-state, the 2015 National Security Law also made provincial, autonomous regions 
and municipalities responsible for national security work within their administrative 
areas. This has led to the creation of national security committees in the Party’s 
provincial-level organizations, each headed by the province’s party chief.  
 
 
 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
FOREIGN POLICY  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to
reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the
Party’s political and governing systems.
●In 2022, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and partner
influence and sought to cultivate international support against intensifying U.S.-backed
security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS.
●Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
II. Beijing has increasingly sought to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while
avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would result from providing non-deniable
material offensive or “lethal” assistance to Russia.
●Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material
support to Russia to enable the PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material
transfers, create off-ramps to renege on agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid
Russia.
The PRC has increasingly sought to use its growing diplomatic clout to promote a more prominent, 
global leadership role for Beijing in international affairs. China continued to advance a new 
diplomatic framework that it terms “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” based 
on the foreign policy direction determined by the CCP Central Committee and reaffirmed at the 
20th Party Congress. This framework seeks to advance the PRC’s strategy of national rejuvenation 
by achieving the CCP’s two centenary goals, improving the coordination of China’s major 
domestic and international policies, reforming aspects of the international order, adhering to the 
CCP Central Committee’s direction, and defending the PRC’s major interests. At the same time, 
PRC leaders are increasingly aware that the PRC foreign security environment is becoming more 
unstable and dangerous, especially in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which 
could disrupt the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  
The CCP’s theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” underpins the conduct of the PRC’s 
foreign affairs. Since Xi assumed power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the CCP Central 
Committee has placed greater emphasis on the PRC’s foreign policy advancing “the cause of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”  Yang Jiechi, a former top Party official for the PRC’s 
foreign policy, has claimed that adherence to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is “showing 
extremely bright prospects” and “reached a new historical starting point.”  


 
 
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According to Party officials, the overall goal of the PRC’s foreign policy is to build a “community 
of common destiny” that seeks to shift the international system towards an architecture based on 
the CCP’s principles for how nations should interact. This goal is essential to how the PRC’s 
foreign policy supports its broader strategy to achieve national rejuvenation.   From the PRC’s 
perspective, establishing this “community” is necessary to set the external security and economic 
conditions for the PRC’s national rejuvenation by “safeguarding world peace” and “promoting 
common development” according to the Party’s principles.  The PRC recognizes it cannot achieve 
its goals in isolation and seeks “all countries” to adopt its diplomatic framework in order to “build 
a community with a shared future for mankind” and “actively control the new direction of China 
and the world.” Lastly, PRC officials acknowledge that aspects of the international order are 
inconsistent with its objectives. The PRC’s diplomatic framework seeks to remedy this by 
promoting changes in a more “just and reasonable direction.” 
The PRC’s ambition to shape the international order derives from the objectives of its national 
strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.  The PRC does not frame its efforts as 
simply opportunistic challenges to the status quo or a significant deviation from the past.  Rather, 
Beijing is acting upon its longstanding desire to redesign the architecture of the international order 
to support the PRC’s national rejuvenation, efforts that are married with growing resources and 
opportunities to do so.  The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise aspects of the international order 
on the Party’s terms and in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an 
external environment supportive of the PRC’s national rejuvenation and strategic goals. 
The PRC’s foreign policy framework includes efforts to promote and accelerate the transformation 
in the distribution of power, revise the principles of interstate relations, and reform global 
governance structures.  Within the context of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” PRC officials have described how the PRC differentiates its goals and relations 
according to the power relationships among four categories of actors: major powers, peripheral 
nations, developing nations, and international organizations. Among the major powers, Beijing 
contends that a new framework for relations is necessary to construct a “stable and balanced 
development” between the powers—in essence a multipolar system.  With peripheral nations, the 
PRC seeks to strengthen its relationships to create a more favorable environment along its maritime 
and land borders in accordance with the PRC’s view of justice and interests. For developing 
countries, the PRC emphasizes solidarity and cooperation as well as “actively” carrying out 
multilateral diplomatic work, to include continued “high-quality development” under its Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). This likely refers to the importance that the PRC places on attaining support 
from developing countries within international organizations. 
Another tenet of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” is the PRC’s ambition 
to construct “new types” of “omnidirectional” relations and bilateral partnerships among states.  
The PRC desires for its concepts of mutual respect, cooperation, and mutual benefit to provide the 
basis for these “new types” of relations. Politburo member Yang Jiechi describes China’s “new 
type” relationships as strategic partnerships that follow a new path of “major power relations.” 
Although distinct from alliance relationships, the PRC’s notion of strategic partnerships is 


 
 
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indicative of a relationship that meets the PRC’s criteria and is worthy of a higher level of bilateral 
cooperation.  To improve its diplomatic support further, the PRC also seeks to create what it calls 
a “comprehensive global partnership network” of its strategic partners to form a global “circle of 
friends.” Despite its encompassing rhetoric, the PRC uses nomenclature to implicitly rank its level 
of “partnership.”  For example, the PRC ranks Pakistan as its only “all-weather strategic partner,” 
Russia as its only “comprehensive strategic partner with coordination relations,” and other 
countries such as Brazil and various states in South and Southeast Asia holding “all-round strategic 
partnership relations.”  
The PRC also promotes reforms to the “global governance system” as part of its diplomatic 
framework in order to reflect the “profound evolution” of the international order. According to 
Yang Jiechi, “The global governance system is at an important stage of profound evolution, and 
global governance has increasingly become the frontier and key issue of China’s foreign work.” 
To “seize opportunities” for reform, the PRC actively participates in the construction of a new 
global governance system based upon the Party’s principles.  This may be achieved through the 
creation of new multinational organizations and forums to uphold the authority of the CCP and the 
PRC’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. For example, the PRC promotes 
BRI as an “important practical platform for the concept of the community of common destiny.” 
BRI also serves to strengthen the PRC’s strategic partnerships, enlarge its network of strategic 
partners, and advance reforms to the international order to support the PRC’s strategy.  
At the same time, PRC leaders probably increasingly seek to protect the PRC’s interests amid an 
external security environment that is becoming more unstable and dangerous.  At the 20th Party 
Congress in October 2022, Xi proclaimed that “the CCP Central Committee coordinated the 
overall strategic situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and major changes in the 
world unseen in a century.” He added that the “CCP led the entire party, the entire military, and 
the people of all ethnic groups across the country to effectively deal with the severe and complex 
international situation and the huge risks and challenges that came one after another.” Although 
Xi did not mention specific challenges, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, the PRC’s 
heightened threat perception of United States, and lingering economic and political consequences 
of the COVID-19 pandemic almost certainly inform the PRC’s current foreign policy aimed at 
maximizing the PRC’s ability to shape the international system and better protect PRC’s interests.  


 
 
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MILITARY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
 20TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CCP 
General Secretary Xi presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16th–22nd, 2022. Party 
Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications 
for the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th 
Party Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s 
modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified 
ways.”  
In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set objectives 
to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic 
deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and 
space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, 
intelligence combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the 
network information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the CMC for the third time, Xi 
selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical expertise on nuclear and 
space issues, and Taiwan-centric operational experience to lead the PLA toward achieving 
its centenary goals. 
The 20th Party Congress offered new insight on the CCP’s perception of the PRC’s external 
security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reference a “strategic 
window of opportunity for development,” but rather that the PRC is facing “drastic changes 
in the international landscape,” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and 
be prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”  
 
The PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2022 to erode U.S. influence 
globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS, which 
Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The CCP is increasingly frustrated by 
Washington’s perceived use of an exaggerated threat picture of China to cultivate an international 
coalition willing subvert the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  In response, PRC leaders and 
officials have increasingly sought to bolster the PRC’s relations with developing countries in 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; co-opt regional multilateral organizations such as 
ASEAN; and assert its status as the self-appointed de facto leader of the “Global South.”  Similarly, 
beginning late 2022, Beijing launched a diplomatic “charm offensive” targeting European 
countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of “wolf warrior” 
diplomacy and COVID-19 isolation. Through these engagements, Beijing aims to internationally 
isolate Washington and persuade countries that the United States is the sole party responsible for 
escalating U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the 
international environment to protect its interests.   PRC officials have also framed AUKUS as an 


 
 
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act of nuclear proliferation and threat to regional stability to stoke international concerns about the 
trilateral security partnership and press countries to limit engagement with U.S.-backed alliance.  
In recent years, global public opinion of the PRC has fallen, particularly after the PRC’s response 
to COVID and continued coercive foreign and domestic policies. Out of 24 countries across 
Europe, Asia, and the Americas surveyed by the Pew Research Center in spring 2023, 15 countries 
registered their most negative feelings towards the PRC in 2022 or 2023. Similarly, five of the 
eight middle-income countries polled saw the PRC in more negative light after the pandemic. In 
the 2022 Pew survey, only 18 percent of global respondents trusted Xi Jinping do the right thing 
regarding world affairs. These reports are only the most recent in a series of surveys showing an 
increasingly negative perception of the PRC across the U.S., Europe, and Asia.  
Russia’s War on Ukraine. The Russian war on Ukraine represented a major, unexpected 
challenge for Beijing as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of 
World War II. Despite multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions towards Kyiv, Beijing was caught 
completely off guard by the full scope and scale of Russia’s war on Ukraine. For example, on the 
first day of the invasion and as Russian and Ukraine air forces battled over Kyiv, the PRC 
Ambassador to Ukraine publicly announced that PRC was organizing an aerial evacuation of 
Chinese citizens. Although the PRC eventually shifted to an overland evacuation of its citizens 
once the reality of the conflict became apparent to PRC officials, the PRC’s initial reaction is 
indicative of the PRC’s continued struggles to anticipate geopolitical risks and protect its overseas 
interests. 
As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has continued, Beijing has increasingly sought to balance 
its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would 
result from providing undeniable offensive material or “lethal” assistance to Russia. PRC leaders 
and officials have parroted Russian narratives blaming the U.S. and NATO for causing the conflict. 
Beijing has also refrained from directly criticizing or condemning Russia for using military force 
to infringe on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s actions in Ukraine violating the PRC’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  Of note, Beijing has also become a willing buyer of Russian 
energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanctioned-battered economy and has ensured Russia’s continued 
diplomatic participation in multilateral organizations. At the same time, Beijing probably has taken 
a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material support to Russia to enable the 
PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material transfers, create off-ramps to renege on 
agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid Russia.  It remains to be seen whether/when 
Russia becomes more of a liability than an asset in the Chinese calculus. 
● To date, Chinese officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance to Russia. 
However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it probably will 
seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic 
costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese 
companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, 


 
 
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dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, 
spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. 
● China’s expansive and unregulated commercial drone market has allowed Russian defense 
forces to routinely acquire small drones and dual-use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
support their war in Ukraine. Between March 2022 and 2023, Chinese firms exported more 
than $12 million worth of drones and drone components to Russia. Chinese-origin drones have 
been employed by Russian forces for targeting, surveillance, and strike missions in Ukraine. 
In August 2023, Beijing announced it would implement its first controls on the civilian and 
dual-use drone market, as well as the sale of civilian-use counter-UAV systems, in response to 
international speculation over Chinese drones’ use in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine.  
PRC leaders and officials have sought to deflect international criticism over Sino-Russian relations 
and protect its international reputation by using high-level diplomatic engagements and messaging 
emphasizing the PRC’s “neutral” role in the conflict. These efforts include Chinese officials 
meeting with Ukrainian officials, announcing token humanitarian assistance, and calling for peace 
talks without developing a specific, detailed plan to resolve the conflict. Similarly, the PRC’s 
ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is also intended 
to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power. In November 2022, during German 
Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear 
wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a 
nuclear conflict in Eurasia. Xi’s repetition of the PRC’s stated stance on nuclear weapons as well 
as his unwillingness to specifically condemn Russian nuclear threats, suggest that Xi probably was 
focused on protecting China’s reputation rather than applying strong pressure to prevent Russia 
from using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.   
Global Initiatives. Adding to this standard framework for talking points on Russia’s war of 
aggression in Ukraine and other foreign policy issues, in April 2022, Xi announced the Global 
Security Initiative (GSI) at the Bo’ao Forum. Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global 
Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI 
language into multilateral forums and documents.  At the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October, 
Xi further promoted GSI and GDI, emphasizing that realizing the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” required equal prioritization of both security and development. As of the end of 
2022, however, Chinese officials had yet to clearly define how GSI would actually advance the 
vague security goals it espouses, such as safeguarding “comprehensive” security and protecting 
territorial integrity. International receptivity to GDI and GSI has been mixed so far; GDI’s links 
to BRI has made the initiative more attractive to developing countries, while GSI’s vagueness and 
implicit criticisms of the United States have made more countries hesitant to sign on to it. 
 


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PRC EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GSI ABROAD 
PRC state-run media outlets publish multiple articles daily aimed at promoting the GSI 
abroad, including in English, Spanish, French, Russian, and other languages. These 
reports frequently quote local voices as well as current and former PRC and non-PRC 
government officials expressing support for GSI. Additionally, PRC diplomats publish 
“signed articles,” promoting GSI in local newspapers all around the world. While some 
foreign-language PRC media reports and “signed articles” are tailored to local audiences, 
most reports emphasize four key themes: (1) GSI promotes world peace and shared 
prosperity; (2) the West’s security framework is based on a hegemonic, Cold-War mindset 
that leads to crises; (3) The “International Community” supports GSI, especially in Africa, 
the Middle East, Latin America, parts of Asia; and (4) GSI represents “true 
multilateralism.” Although these reports state that GSI “seeks concrete actions and 
tangible results” they do not articulate a framework, mechanisms, list of “signatories,” or 
other specifics about how and what GSI would do.   
Military Diplomacy. The PRC’s willingness to engage in military diplomacy with other countries 
varies considerably based on its perception of a country’s adherence to the PRC’s diplomatic 
framework.  For example, the PRC’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with 
Russia entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. Sino-Russian military cooperation 
occurs in practical forms through exchanges of training, equipment, technology, high-level visits, 
and other coordination mechanisms.  For other strategic partnership countries, the PRC seeks to 
leverage those relationships to reinforce the PRC’s systemic preferences and maintain stability in 
Beijing’s favor.  For countries with whom the PRC has not established strategic partnerships, such 
as the United States, the PRC shapes its military cooperation along more minimalist principles of 
conflict avoidance that emphasize “non-conflict” and “mutual respect.” From the PRC’s 
perspective, these curtailed relationships at least serve its foreign policy objective by ensuring 
stable relations with major powers.   
Although the COVID-19 pandemic continued to constrain PRC’s military diplomacy in 2022, the 
PLA increased its external, in-person high-level military visits compared to 2021 and maintained 
close contact with the military leadership of neighboring countries. The PLA also relied on high-
level virtual bilateral meetings and multilateral engagements to supplement cancelled engagements 
and maintain contacts with foreign militaries.  
PRC Policy Towards the Pacific Islands. Since 2015, the PRC probably has viewed economic, 
political, and policing engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) as an opportunity to 
expand the PRC’s regional influence, press countries to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing, 
deepen security cooperation, and advance the PRC’s responsible great power narrative. Of note, 
in late May and early June 2022, then PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to seven PICs, 
including Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and sought to promote the expansion of Sino-PICs 
relations. During his visits, Wang emphasized that the PRC would continue to pursue a “four-


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pronged adherence’ towards relations with the PICs that linked the PRC’s efforts to improve 
relations with PICS with foreign policy principals. 
Wang’s visit came on the heels of the April 2022 announcement that the PRC and the Solomon 
Islands had signed a security cooperation agreement. According to a draft copy of the China-
Solomon Islands Security Agreement, China would be permitted to send armed policy and military 
personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though Honiara denied this would lead 
to a PRC military base. Beijing probably seeks to use security agreements with the PICs to justify 
the expansion of PLA security activities in the region. 
PRC Relationship with Iranian Proxies. The PRC almost certainly does not have extensive 
relations with Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Iranian-
backed militia groups in Iraq. PRC officials, including the PRC’s Special Envoy to Syria, have 
publicly met with Hezbollah officials to discuss the Syrian civil war, but such engagements almost 
certainly are perfunctory and focused on advancing the PRC’s responsible great power narrative 
rather than the PRC seeking to expand ties with these groups.    PRC officials probably calculate 
that expanding relations with Iranian proxies, especially Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq, 
would alienate regional governments and disrupt the PRC’s regional objectives such as promoting 
the expansion of BRI projects in the Middle East.   
The PRC has also maintained diplomatic, economic, and some security ties with the Assad Regime 
Syria.Since 2016, the PRC’s special envoy to Syria has focused the PRC’s efforts on political 
support to the Assad regime, facilitating a political resolution to the civil war, humanitarian 
assistance, reconstruction, and counterterrorism.  In 2022, the PRC reached an agreement with 
Syria to join the BRI, demonstrating the PRC’s efforts to promoted economic relations with Syria.   
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN CONTEXT
The PRC’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely since 1949. Some disputes led to 
war, as in border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. China’s contested border with 
the Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In recent cases involving 
land border disputes, China has sometimes been willing to compromise with and even offer 
concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled 11 land-based territorial disputes with 
six of its neighbors. However, within the last decade China has employed a more coercive 
approach to deal with several disputes over maritime features, ownership of potentially rich 
offshore oil and gas deposits, and border areas. 
Tensions with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) sparked a standoff between Chinese 
and Indian forces in mid-May 2020, which persisted into the winter.  The standoff escalated on 15 
June 2020 after a skirmish ensued in the Galwan Valley between Indian Army and PLA forces that 
ended with 20 Indian soldiers and four PRC soldiers dead. In late 2022, Chinese and Indian forces 
engaged in an unarmed clash near Tawang along the Eastern Sector of the LAC separating Tibet 
and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This was the first such clash since the 2020 Galwan 


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skirmish, although local commanders quickly diffused the clash and the overall standoff did not 
substantively escalate. 
Select Chinese Territorial Claims 
The PRC and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea (ECS). The ECS contains natural gas and oil, 
although hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant line 
from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental 
shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. The PRC continues to assert sovereignty 
over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands and reiterate the importance of abiding by the four-
point consensus signed in 2014, which states both sides will acknowledge divergent positions over 
the ECS dispute but also prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management 
mechanisms. Japan remains concerned with the persistent deployment of PRC coast guard ships 
and fishing vessels in disputed ECS waters and contests the PRC’s claim of sovereignty. 
The South China Sea (SCS) plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia 
because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS shipping 
lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China 
claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and other land features within its 
ambiguous self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands, 
makes the same territorial assertions as the PRC. The PRC continued to employ the PLA Navy 
(PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to patrol the region throughout 2022.  In 
response to China’s continued assertive actions, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam 


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have publicly rejected the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and invoked international law in support 
of their maritime sovereign rights. 
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its claimed exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has 
begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the First Island Chain 
(FIC) in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity highlights China’s 
double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. Examples include 
sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii in 2014 and 2018, TALISMAN SABER off Australia in 2017, 
2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021.  PRC survey ships are also extremely 
active in the SCS and frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such 
as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.  
ECONOMIC POLICY  
Key Takeaways 
●At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID-19 policy. The decision to
implement China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-
wide protests against the PRC’s zero-COVID-19 policies, economic pressures, and fiscal
difficulties for local governments.
●The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of
growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted common prosperity, more equitable access to
basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green
developments as a few of China’s economic initiatives.
●The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of
China’s broader national development aspirations. China’s economic, political, social, and
security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support China’s strategy of national
rejuvenation.
●China’s tools of economic statecraft include inducements such as infrastructure investments
under BRI; industrial and technology policies such as Made in China 2025 that seek foreign
technology transfers in exchange for market access; protectionist policies and legal barriers for
foreign firms to compete in China’s domestic market; selective observance of trade
commitments; and economic coercion against other states.
The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of China’s broader 
national development aspirations and work in coordination with China’s economic policies and 
systems.  PRC’s leaders directly link the pace and scale of the PLA’s modernization with the 
country’s overall development. The PRC’s economic, political, social, and military development 


 
 
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efforts are mutually reinforcing and support its strategy of national rejuvenation. The Party gives 
priority to China’s economic development as the “central task” and frames its economic system as 
the means of advancing the nation’s overall political and social modernity. In particular, China’s 
economic targets abroad focus intensely on advancing what the Party calls the country’s 
“productive forces” (e.g., industry, technology, infrastructure, and human capital) which it views 
as the means to achieve the country’s political and social modernity—including building a “world-
class” military. The party-state’s relentless efforts to grow China’s national industrial and 
technological base has significant implications for China’s military modernization, as well as for 
China’s global economic partners.  
CCP leaders have cast China’s partial adoption of market features–which were implemented as 
part of its “reform and opening up” that began in the late 1970s, and subsequently led to an 
economic transformation–as evidence that their strategy to modernize China has been succeeding 
rather than viewing the market feature adoption as a repudiation of the Party’s fundamental 
economic ideals. Party leaders since Deng Xiaoping have consistently rationalized China’s 
market-oriented economic reforms as a necessary regression from socialism needed to account 
properly for China’s historical circumstances, which left it significantly underdeveloped. 
According to the Party, contemporary China remains at the beginning stage or the “primary stage 
of socialism” with a long process of socialist modernization ahead.  
Basic Economic System. The Party conceives of China’s economy as constituting the “basic 
economic system” in which public ownership is dominant and state, collective, and private forms 
of ownership develop side by side. The basic economic system comprises China’s public 
ownership economy and the multi-ownership economy.  
Economic Development Goals. Despite slowing economic growth just prior to and during the 
COVID-19 outbreak, China will continue to pursue the economic policy objectives determined by 
the CCP Central Committee and set forth in the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP). China’s economic 
goals are (1) furthering supply-side structural reform, (2) making China a country of innovators, 
(3) pursuing a rural vitalization strategy, (4) implementing the coordinated regional development 
strategy, (5) accelerating efforts to improve the socialist market economy, and (6) making new 
ground in pursuing “opening up on all fronts.” The PRC is currently executing the 14th FYP that 
will cover 2021-2025. The priorities and goals in the FYPs not only apply to the government and 
the public ownership economy, but also serve as implicit guidance from the Party to the multi-
ownership economy.  
 Economic Conditions. Prior to COVID-19, China’s economic growth had slowed because of 
demographic challenges, declining returns from state-led infrastructure investment, and slowing 
urbanization. China’s efforts in early 2020 to contain the COVID-19 outbreak with government 
lockdowns and strict control measures exacerbated this slowdown in China’s economy. In March 
2022, China announced an annual growth target of around 5.5 percent, but fell well short and only 
achieved 3 percent growth for 2022, the second lowest growth on record since 1976.  


 
 
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Multiple challenges affected China’s economy in 2022, including a COVID-19 resurgence in the 
fall, a weak property sector due to a correction in the housing market, high youth unemployment, 
and sluggish consumption recovery. China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID-19 policy at the end 
of 2022, a decision probably based on CCP leader’s recognition that the lock downs were failing 
to prevent infections and concerns about the fluffing economy and country-wide protests against 
the policy in early December. China is also facing adverse demographics, slowing external demand 
amid global inflationary pressures, and a debt problem. Although global supply chain relocation 
has been discussed for years, multinational corporations may be thinking more seriously about 
supply chain diversification after facing serious disruptions during China’s zero-COVID-19 
policy. 
China’s government is also concerned about economic risks associated with prolonged housing 
market corrections and may be more inclined to deliver funding support for developers and further 
easing measures on the demand side (e.g., lower down payments required and the removal of home 
purchase restrictions). China’s property market may have reached a trough in 2022 and could 
improve in 2023.  
Economic Policies and Practices. The 20th Party Congress unveiled a new economic leadership 
team to advance Xi’s goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts. Economic growth is 
a necessary condition for China to realize this goal, with more emphasis on quality and inclusive 
growth, as well as security requirements. The Party Congress vowed to grow China’s per capita 
GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country, which it defined as income of 
$20,000 per capita. This would imply average growth of approximately 3.5 percent during 2022 
to 2035. Xi’s new economic team has broad technocratic qualifications. Of note, Xi elevated Vice 
Premier Zhang Guoqing to be in charge of science, technology, and industry. Zhang has a doctorate 
in economics, which suggests a national security-oriented economic focus in Xi’s third term to 
supports his stated goal of national strength through increasing economic strength and scientific 
technological capabilities. 
The PRC’s introduction of market economy features within the “basic economic system” without 
a full transition to free and open markets has resulted in laws, regulations, and policies that 
generally disadvantage foreign firms vis- à-vis their Chinese counterparts in terms of tradable 
goods, services sectors, market access, and foreign direct investment. Examples of China’s 
economic policies and trade practices include its support to domestic industries at the expense of 
foreign counterparts, commercial joint venture requirements, technology transfer requirements, 
subsidies to lower the cost of inputs, sustaining excess capacity in multiple industries, sector-
specific limits on foreign direct investment, including partnership requirements and other barriers 
to investment, discriminatory cybersecurity and data transfer rules, insufficient intellectual 
property rights enforcement, inadequate transparency, and lack of market access—particularly in 
the information and communications technology (ICT), agriculture, and service sectors. Market 
access remains difficult for some foreign firms because China restricts certain inbound investment, 
resulting in persistent underperformance in other countries’ services exports, particularly in the 
banking, insurance, Internet-related, professional, and retail services sectors. 


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A large portion of China’s economic output results from government and policy-directed 
investments rather than market-based forces. China pursues state-directed investment overseas and 
encourages mergers and acquisitions. Along with heavy investments in infrastructure and 
commodities to support its strategic firms, increase economic engagement, and improve economic 
security, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational for future innovations with 
both commercial and military applications. 
The PRC seeks and obtains foreign technology through the following means: foreign direct 
investment, overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign research 
and development (R&D) centers, joint ventures, research and academic partnerships, talent 
recruitment, industrial, and cyberspace espionage and theft. Investors may be concerned about 
intensified pressure of technology restrictions on China, which has forced the Chinese government 
to double down on its efforts to promote innovation and self-sufficiency in key technologies.   
Recent legal proceedings highlight numerous cases of China’s efforts to obtain technology and 
knowledge through theft of trade secrets and economic espionage. In April 2022, a jury in United 
States federal court sentenced a PRC national to 29 months in prison for conspiring to commit 
economic espionage. The PRC national had worked as an imaging scientist for a Monsanto 
subsidiary and was found to have stolen proprietary algorithms, which he brought to the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences Institute of Soil Science. In November 2021, a federal jury convicted a PRC 
intelligence officer of attempting to steal industry-leading aviation trade secrets. Court documents 
show that the PRC officer attempted to steal technology related to GE Aviation’s exclusive 
composite aircraft engine fan to benefit the PRC state.  
The PRC’s recent economic policies have promoted innovation focused on strengthening domestic 
industry, while placing additional restrictions on foreign firms. Recognizing that some of its 
initiatives such as Military Civil Fusion (MCF), “Made in China 2025,” and BRI have sparked 
concerns about China’s intentions, PRC leaders have adopted lower profile rhetoric when 
promoting these initiatives without altering their fundamental strategic goals. 
●Made in China 2025: First announced by the PRC in May 2015, the “Made in China 2025”
plan seeks to increase China’s domestic innovation by setting higher targets for domestic
manufacturing in strategic industries such as robotics, power equipment, and next-generation
information technology by 2020 and 2025. This plan seeks to strengthen China’s domestic
enterprises through awarding subsidies and other incentives while increasing pressure on
foreign firms to transfer technology to have market access in China. “Made in China 2025”
came under criticism from advanced countries for unfairly favoring China’s domestic
enterprises at the expense of foreign participants in China’s markets. Increasingly aware and
sensitive to these concerns, by June 2018, China began avoiding references to “Made in China
2025” in major policy papers. The PRC government ordered its media outlets to downplay use
of the term in June 2018. Key events that PRC leaders use to set strategic directives have also
avoided references to “Made in China,” including the 2019 Central Economic Work


 
 
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Conference and the NPC. Despite the adjustments in its narrative, China has largely continued 
implementing the policies behind “Made in China 2025.” 
● Dual Circulation: In 2020, Xi articulated the economic policy of dual circulation, which aims 
for a largely self-sufficient China that could innovate, manufacture, and consume within its 
own economy, while still drawing on the international economy through exports, critical 
supply chains, and limited imports of capital. Dual circulation seeks to enable the internal 
markets and external markets to reinforce each other, with a focus on establishing the domestic 
market as the primary driver of economic growth. 
Legal Framework. In recent years, the PRC has implemented new laws placing further 
restrictions on foreign firms while creating or strengthening the legal framework for the Party’s 
national security concepts and, in some cases, furthering its MCF Development Strategy 
(discussed in the next section):  
● National Defense Law: Adopted in March 1997, the law provides legal justification to mobilize 
the military and civilian resources in defense of a broad range of national interests.  
● National Security Law: Adopted in July 2015, the law limits foreign access to provide a broad 
framework for safeguarding the PRC’s security interests. It calls for review and monitoring of 
foreign participation in the ICT market in China on national security grounds.  
● Counterterrorism Law: Adopted in December 2015, among its provisions, the law requires 
telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide information, 
decryption, and other technical support to public and state security organizations “conducting 
prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.”  
● National Defense Transportation Law: Coming into effect in 2016, the National Defense 
Transportation Law advances the PRC MCF development strategy by laying the groundwork 
for the PLA Navy to mobilize civilian maritime transportation resources and facilities to 
support power projection missions. 
● Cyber Security Law: The law, which went into effect in June 2017, promotes development of 
indigenous technologies and restricts sales of foreign ICT in China. The law also requires 
foreign companies to submit ICT for government-administered national security reviews, store 
data in China, and seek government approval before transferring data outside of China.  
● Intelligence Law: Adopted in June 2017, the law allows authorities to monitor and investigate 
foreign and domestic individuals and organizations to protect national security. Specifically, it 
allows authorities to use or seize vehicles, communication devices, and buildings to support 
intelligence collection efforts. 
● Cryptography Law: Adopted in October 2019 and coming into effect in 2020, this law requires 
entities working on cryptography to have management systems in place to ensure sufficient 


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security for their encryption. Although the law encourages development of commercial 
encryption technology, its use cannot harm national security or the public good. It provides for 
the State Cryptography Administration and its local agencies to have complete access to 
cryptography systems and the data protected by those systems. 
●
Foreign Investment Law: In March 2019, the PRC’s NPC adopted a new Foreign Investment
law with the stated objective of improving the business environment for foreign investors and
leveling the playing field between foreign businesses and Chinese private firms and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The law passed in just three months, which reflects an unusually
fast turnaround in China where the same level of legislation usually takes years. PRC officials
have indicated that swift passage of the law was to facilitate U.S.-China trade talks, and the
law appears to respond to a number of issues raised by the U.S. Trade Representative’s Section
301 report that highlighted unfair Chinese trade practices related to intellectual property,
technology transfer, and innovation. Despite the law’s stated objective, its wording is vague
and the most substantial provisions are not new.
●Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law: Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the
13th National People’s Congress on June 10th, 2021, the law was enacted to “safeguard national
sovereignty, security, and development interests, and to protect the legitimate rights and
interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.” According to PRC media sources, the law is
intended to “counter, fight, and oppose” unilateral sanctions on the PRC imposed by foreign
countries. The law was likely adopted in response to sanctions on PRC officials in connection
with serious human rights abuse in Xinjiang.
●Data Security Law: This law went into effect on September 1st  2021, and subjects almost all
data-related activities to government oversight, as PRC officials grew concerned about the
transfer of potentially sensitive data overseas. Companies in the PRC have become more
reluctant to share data, as authorities are ambiguous as to what is considered sensitive
information, increasing difficulties for international firms trying to do business in the PRC. In
early November 2021, local providers of ship tracking data stopped sharing details of ship
locations, citing the data security law.
●Personal Information Protection Law: Effective November 1st, 2021 and adopted by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the law is purposed to protect the
rights and interests on personal information, regulate personal information processing
activities, and promote reasonable use of personal information. PRC media sources note that
activities such as “collection, application, processing, and trading of personal information will
be strictly monitored” with infringements punishable according to the law.  The law
exemplifies a more complete system of regulation in tandem with the PRC’s existing
Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.
●Counter-espionage law: On April 26th, 2021, the PRC adopted a counter-espionage law
permitting the Ministry of State Security (MSS) authority to identify companies and
organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require these institutes


 
 
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to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration. In July 2023, the PRC adopted an 
amended counter-espionage with a broader scope. The amended law expanded the definition 
of espionage from covering state secrets and intelligence to any documents, data, materials, or 
items related to national security, without defining these terms.   
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) 
Key Takeaways  
● The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global 
transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic 
integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
● In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. 
However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and 
Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy 
opportunities. 
● Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding 
its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.  
First announced in 2013, the PRC’s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic policy 
advanced by Xi that rebranded and further expanded China’s global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to 
support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade 
links to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its 
periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI by financing, constructing, and developing 
transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, hydropower projects, digital connectivity, and 
technology and industrial parks worldwide. As of 2022, at least 147 countries had signed BRI 
cooperation documents, up from 146 in 2021, 138 in 2020, and 125 in 2019.  
In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial integrity, 
energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability and diminish 
threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern periphery. Similarly, 
through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it seeks to 
become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the 
Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it builds through BRI to pursue 
additional economic cooperation with participating countries. 
Since 2022, two distinct trends have developed relative to BRI. First, the share of PRC financial 
investment relative to construction increased to its highest levels, with investments almost 
doubling. Beijing experienced strong growth in their East Asian and the Middle Eastern 
investments but a decline in their Sub-Saharan Africa efforts. Conversely, spiraling construction 
costs over the past three years have resulted in $78 billion in bad loans which needed to be written 
off or renegotiated in 2022. Second, Beijing began to replace previous BRI rhetoric with language 


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highlighting cooperation and partnership, which likely is designed to make BRI more appealing to 
foreign partners. The official name of “Belt and Road Initiative” was removed from the English 
version of many of Xi’s speeches in 2022 and replaced with phrases such as “Belt and Road 
cooperation.” After launching the GDI in September 2021, Xi mentioned Belt and Road 
Cooperation eight times while referring to GDI more than 16 times.   
China has continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy 
opportunities through its “Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)” (HSR), “Digital Silk Road (数字丝
绸之路)” (DSR), and “Green Silk Road (绿色丝绸之路)” (GSR), respectively. Improving each of 
these “roads” offers Beijing benefits beyond economic integration.  
●HSR is the PRC’s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing medical
assistance through BRI transportation networks. In the future, it may help the PRC expand the
international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role as a global
public health leader, and identify the need for – and justify – new BRI projects.
●GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects; this initiative
aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents
Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.
●DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing seeks to facilitate transfer of PRC technology to
partner countries, which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it
seeks to set global standards for next-generation technology. Announced in 2015 as a digital
subset of BRI, the PRC’s Digital Silk Road initiative, seeks to build a PRC-centric digital
infrastructure, export industrial overcapacity, facilitate expansion of the PRC’s technology
corporations, and access large repositories of data. As of 2016, 16 countries had signed
memorandums of understanding with Beijing to participate in the DSR. The PRC hopes the
DSR will increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and
establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free trade
zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech leaders by
providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production opportunities for PRC tech
firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, including next-generation cellular
networks—such as fifth-generation (5G) networks—fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and
data centers. The initiative also includes developing advanced technologies including satellite
navigation systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and
export. International opponents of China’s DSR fear that Beijing will encourage recipient
countries to use this technology as a tool of repression modeled on China’s authoritarian-style
government. Likewise, host country political elites would probably risk their sovereignty by
becoming vulnerable to espionage and political blackmail.


 
 
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Since BRI’s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international concerns 
over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with suspicion of the 
PRC’s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. China has applied 
military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party-
state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries.  
As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expanded under BRI, the CCP has 
signaled that its overseas security footprint will increase accordingly to protect those interests, 
which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned or 
active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and 
instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk.  In 2022, for 
example, five PRC citizens were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where 
Chinese nationals were known to stay. 
China has therefore sought to extend its ability to safeguard its overseas interests, including BRI, 
by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and supporting host-
nation security forces through military aid, including military equipment donations. In an October 
2022 speech to the National Party Congress, Xi spoke of the need to become more adept at 
deploying the PLA to protect China’s national security interests. Xi also said, “We will better 
coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production 
factors between the military and civilian sectors.”  
The PRC has adopted new security legislation establishing a legal basis to violate people’s data 
privacy and includes the aforementioned National Intelligence and Cybersecurity Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China.  Under the auspices of national security, the PRC and its security 
services have the authority to compel any private Chinese company to turn over all data collected 
by their systems, if desired.  GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance 
projects – an initiative that aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 
2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.  
The PRC has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived 
threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most 
participating countries. As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expand under 
BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect 
those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s 
planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, 
and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk.  In 2022, 
for example, five PRC nationals were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul 
where Chinese nationals were known to stay. 
 


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MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC pursues its MCF (军民融合) Development Strategy to “fuse” its security and
development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities in support
of China’s national rejuvenation goals.
●The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and
technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all the PRC’s instruments of
national power.
●The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing China’s
defense industrial base to its civilian technology and industrial base, (2) integrating and
leveraging science and technology innovations across military and civilian sectors, (3)
cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and knowledge, (4) building
military requirements into civilian infrastructure and leveraging civilian construction for
military purposes, (5) leveraging civilian service and logistics capabilities for military
purposes, and (6) expanding and deepening China’s national defense mobilization system to
include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in competition and war.
●Since early 2022, the Party appears to have been deemphasizing the term MCF in public, in
favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”  Xi’s work report to the 20th
Party Congress in October 2022 omitted any mention of MCF, only calling for “consolidating
and enhancing integrated national security strategies and capabilities,” and then addressing
many of the components traditionally associated with MCF.
The PRC pursues its MCF strategy as a nationwide endeavor that seeks to meld its economic and 
social development strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic 
system and capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals. The Party’s leaders view 
MCF as a critical element of their strategy for the PRC to become a “great modern socialist 
country” which includes becoming a world leader in science and technology (S&T) and developing 
a “world-class” military.  
Although the PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use 
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense S&T industries, its 
broader purpose is to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power by melding aspects 
of its economic, military, and social governance. MCF strives to establish an infrastructure that 
connects the military and civilian sectors in a way that serves as a catalyst for innovation and 
economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in advancing dual-use technologies, 
especially those suited for “intelligentized” warfare, and facilitates effective industrial 
mobilization during wartime.  


 
 
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Development and Significance. The Party has explored the concept of leveraging or integrating 
the combined contributions of the military and civilian sectors since the PRC’s founding. The 
current MCF concept initially took root in the early 2000s as the Party sought methods to enhance 
the PRC’s overall development. This led Party leaders to call for improving “military-civilian 
integration” that echoed the collaboration between the defense and civilian sectors that China 
observed in the United States and other developed countries. Implementation of these efforts 
stalled due to a lack of centralized government control and the organizational barriers that exist 
across the party-state. Coinciding with the 11th FYP (2006-2010), the PRC began replacing 
“military-civilian integration” with “military-civilian fusion.” In 2007, Party officials publicly 
noted the change from “integration” to “fusion” was not merely cosmetic but broadened the scope 
to include all available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry. 
Since that time, MCF’s ambitions have grown in scope and scale as the Party has come to view it 
as a means to bridge the PRC’s economic and social development with its security development 
in support of the PRC’s national strategy to renew China. As such, the Party has continued to 
elevate MCF’s importance.  In 2015, the CCP Central Committee elevated the MCF Development 
Strategy to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between the PRC’s national development 
strategy and its national security strategy, later also adding building “integrated national strategic 
systems and capabilities” (一体化的国家战略体系和能力), both of which support the PRC’s 
goal of national rejuvenation.  
Since early 2022, the Party appears to have been deemphasizing the term MCF in public, in favor 
of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”  This term appears to have originated in 
June 2017 when Xi addressed the first meeting of the Central Committee’s Central Commission 
for Military-Civil Fusion Development and charged them with gradually building up “China’s 
integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.” Xi used “integrated national strategic 
systems and capabilities” in conjunction with “military-civilian fusion” in his 2017 speech to the 
19th Party Congress, suggesting that completion of major projects, achievements in defense 
research, and improved MCF would contribute to building the PRC’s overarching integrated 
national strategic systems and capabilities. In December 2017, three PLA National Defense 
University (NDU) scholars published a study expanding on that concept, asserting that MCF was 
part of a near-term goal to establish basic “deep development patterns.”  The NDU academics 
maintained that once that was accomplished, the PRC could move on to its ultimate goal of 
building “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.” Notably, the language in the study 
closely mirrored that of national policies, making it possible that the authors played a significant 
role in helping draft the strategy. Their interpretation of Xi’s speech was supported by numerous 
other writings that came out following the 19th Party Congress in 2017.  
Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 omitted any mention of MCF, only 
calling for “consolidating and enhancing integrated national security strategies and capabilities,” 
and then addressing many of the components traditionally associated with MCF. This same 
formulation was used in March 2023 by Xi and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia in their 
separate addresses to PLA and People’s Armed Police delegates to the 14th National People’s 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Congress. Provincial party officials responsible for MCF were already publicly using the phrase 
“integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” and avoiding the term MCF in the months 
leading up to the 20th Party Congress. It is not clear whether Party leadership believes that China 
has met all the conditions to move beyond MCF. However, an article published in the PLA Daily 
in December 2022 stated that the process of enhancing integrated national strategic systems and 
capabilities will “quicken the pace of national defense and armed forces building” and “greatly 
enhance the strategic confrontation capability of the national system.” 
Management and Implementation. The overall management and implementation of the MCF 
Development Strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the State 
Council (notably the National Development and Reform Commission), and the CMC. In addition 
to signifying its importance, the CCP Central Committee’s elevation of the MCF Development 
Strategy to a national-level strategy also was intended to overcome obstacles to implementation 
across the party-state. 
This elevation led to the establishment of the Central Commission for Military Civilian Fusion 
Development (中央军民融合发展委员会) (CCMCFD) in 2017, chaired by General Secretary Xi 
Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, several other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, two State 
Councilors, both CMC Vice Chairmen, 12 Ministry-level leaders, and others. The stated objective 
of the CCMCFD is to build the PRC’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” This 
commission works to improve the “top-level design” of MCF and overcome impediments to 
implementation. The elevation of the MCF Development Strategy and the creation of the 
CCMCFD signals the importance that Party leaders place on MCF and the scope and scale of the 
strategy’s ambitions.  
The PRC pursues MCF through six interrelated efforts. Each effort overlaps with the others and 
has both domestic and international components. The Party seeks to implement the MCF 
Development Strategy across every level of the PRC from the highest national-level organs down 
to provinces and townships and creates top-down financing and regulatory mechanisms that 
incentivize civilian and military stakeholders – such as local governments, academia, research 
institutions, private investors, and military organizations – to combine efforts on dual-use 
technologies. The PRC refers to these six aspects as “systems,” which may also be understood as 
mutually supporting lines of effort or components. The six systems in the MCF Development 
Strategy are as follows: 
The Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System. This system focuses on 
fusing the PRC’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base. This 
includes expanding the private sector’s participation in the PRC’s defense industrial base and 
supply chains as well as improving the efficiency, capacity, and flexibility of defense and civilian 
industrial and manufacturing processes. This broader participation seeks to transfer mature 
technologies both ways across military and civilian sectors, with the goal to produce outsized 
benefits for both. This also aims to increase the competitiveness within the PRC’s defense 
industrial base in which one or two defense SOEs dominate an entire sector. This MCF system 


 
 
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also seeks to advance the PRC’s self-reliance in manufacturing key industrial technologies, 
equipment, and materials to reduce its dependence on imports, including those with dual-uses. The 
PRC’s MCF-influenced industrial and technology endeavors include Made in China 2025, which 
sets targets for the PRC to achieve greater self-sufficiency in key industrial areas such as aerospace, 
communications, and transportation.  
The Military-Civil Coordinated Technology Innovation System. This MCF system seeks to 
maximize the full benefits and potential of the country’s S&T development. Consistent with the 
CCP leadership’s view that high technology and innovation are critical to strengthening China’s 
comprehensive national power, this system develops and integrates advanced technologies across 
civilian and military entities, projects, and initiatives—with benefits flowing in both directions. 
This includes using cutting-edge civilian technology for military applications or to more broadly 
advance military S&T as well as using military advancements to push civilian economic 
development. Although related to the Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial 
System, this system largely focuses on fusing innovations and advances in basic and applied 
research. Specific efforts in this MCF system include strengthening and promoting civilian and 
military R&D in advanced dual-use technologies and cross-pollinating military and civilian basic 
research. Additional efforts include promoting the sharing of scientific resources, expanding the 
institutions involved in defense research, and fostering greater collaboration across defense and 
civilian research communities. This system also seeks to foster “new-type” research institutions 
with mixed funding sources and lean management structures that are more dynamic, efficient, and 
effective than the PRC’s wholly state-owned research bodies. Examples of MCF-influenced dual-
use S&T endeavors include the PRC’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy and Artificial 
Intelligence National Project.   
The Fundamental Domain Resource Sharing System. This system includes building military 
requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure from the ground up as well as 
leveraging China’s civilian construction and logistics capacities and capabilities for military 
purposes. This includes factoring military requirements and dual-use purposes into building 
civilian private and public transportation infrastructure such as airports, port facilities, railways, 
roads, and communications networks. This also extends to infrastructure projects in dual-use 
domains such as space and undersea as well as mobile communications networks and 
topographical and meteorological systems. Another element seeks to set common military and 
civilian standards to make infrastructure easier to use in emergencies and wartime. This aspect of 
MCF has arguably the greatest reach into the PRC’s local governance systems as military 
requirements inform infrastructure construction at the province, county, and township levels. The 
influence of this aspect of MCF is visible in the PRC’s major land reclamations and military 
construction activities in the SCS, which brought together numerous government entities, the PLA, 
law enforcement, construction companies, and commercial entities. It may also have important 
implications for the PRC’s overseas infrastructure projects and investments under BRI as the PRC 
seeks to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to 
project and sustain military power. 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
The Military Personnel (Talent) Cultivation System. This MCF system seeks to blend and 
cultivate military and civilian S&T expertise through education programs, personnel exchanges, 
and knowledge sharing. The purpose of this effort is to improve the utilization of experts able to 
participate in S&T projects irrespective of whether they are military or civilian (or even foreign) 
experts and allow expertise to flow more freely across sectors. This aspect of MCF also seeks to 
reform the PRC’s talent cultivation system, which encompasses hundreds of talent recruitment 
plans, in order to improve China’s human capital, build a highly skilled workforce, and recruit 
foreign experts to provide access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology. It takes into 
account all levels of education from the Party’s nationwide “patriotic education” programs for 
children to the matriculation of post-doctorate researchers within China and at institutions abroad. 
Many of the PRC’s named talents programs are likely influenced by MCF planning, as are reforms 
in its military academies, national universities, and research institutes.  
The Socialized Support and Sustainment System for the PLA. This system entails two major 
efforts that seeks to shift the PLA away from its inefficient self-contained logistics and sustainment 
systems and towards modern streamlined logistics and support services. First, it seeks to harness 
civilian public sector and private sector resources to improve the PLA’s basic services and support 
functions—ranging from food, housing, and healthcare services. The concept is to gain efficiencies 
in costs and personnel by outsourcing non-military services previously performed by the PLA 
while also improving the quality of life for military personnel.  Second, it seeks to further the 
construction of a modern military logistics system that is able to support and sustain the PLA in 
joint operations and for overseas operations. This system seeks to fuse the PLA Joint Logistic 
Support Force’s (JLSF’s) efforts to integrate the military’s joint logistics functions with the PRC’s 
advanced civilian logistics, infrastructure, and delivery service companies and networks. These 
arrangements seek to provide the PLA with modern transportation and distribution, warehousing, 
information sharing, and other types of support in peacetime and wartime. This fusion also seeks 
to provide the PLA with a logistics system that is more efficient, higher capacity, higher quality, 
and global in reach.  
The National Defense Mobilization System. This MCF system binds the other systems as it 
seeks to mobilize the PRC’s military, economic, and social resources to defend or advance China’s 
sovereignty, security and development interests. The Party views China’s growing strength as only 
useful to the extent that the party-state can mobilize it. China characterizes mobilization as the 
ability to precisely use the instrument, capability, or resource needed, when needed, for the 
duration needed. Within the PLA, 2015-16 reforms elevated defense mobilization to a department 
called the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD), which reports directly to the 
CMC. The NDMD plays an important role in this system by organizing and overseeing the PLA’s
reserve forces, militia, and provincial military districts and below. This system also seeks to
integrate the state emergency management system into the national defense mobilization system
in order to achieve a coordinated military-civilian response during a crisis. Consistent with the
Party’s view of international competition, many MCF mobilization initiatives not only seek to
reform how the PRC mobilizes for war and responds to emergencies, but how the economy and
society can be leveraged to support the PRC’s strategic needs for international competition.


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
MCF Linkages. Each MCF system entails linkages between dozens of organizations and 
government entities, including: 
● Ministry-level organizations from the State Council: Examples include the National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Education, and key state entities such as the State 
Administration of Science and Technology in National Defense and others. 
● Lead military organs subordinate to the Central Military Commission: CMC Strategic 
Planning Office, Joint Political, Logistics, and Equipment Development Departments, as well 
as operational units and the regional military structure at the Military District and Sub-District 
levels; military universities and academies such as National Defense University, Academy of 
Military Science, National University of Defense Technology, and service institutions. 
● State-sponsored educational institutions, research centers, and key laboratories: Prominent 
examples include the “Seven Sons of National Defense” (Harbin Institute of Technology, 
Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Northwestern Polytechnical Institute, Beijing 
Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Beihang University, Nanjing 
University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), as well as certain PLA-affiliated laboratories of 
Tsinghua University, Beijing University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University, North University 
of China, and others. 
● Defense industry: The ten major defense SOEs continue to fill their traditional roles providing 
weapons and equipment to the military services. Many defense SOEs consist of dozens of 
subsidiaries, sub-contractors, and subordinate research institutes.  
● Other SOEs and quasi-private companies: High profile examples include PRC high-tech 
corporations and important SOEs like COSCO, China National Offshore Oil Company, and 
major construction companies that have roles in BRI projects as well as helping the PRC build 
out occupied terrain features in the SCS. 
● Private companies: MCF efforts also seek to increase the proportion of private companies that 
contribute to military projects and procurements. These enterprises include technology 
companies that specialize in unmanned systems, robotics, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, 
and big data.  
● Multi-stakeholder partnerships: In practice, many MCF efforts involve partnerships between 
central, provincial, or city government entities with military district departments, PLA 
departments, academia, research entities, and companies. A majority of provincial and local 
governments have announced MCF industrial plans, and more than 35 national-level MCF 
industrial zones have been established across China. MCF-linked investments funds created 
by central and local governments and private investors total in the tens of billions of dollars.  


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
●In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding its
sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for
itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense
(积极防御).”
●PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by
the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great
modern socialist country.”  In response to perceived personnel deficiencies within the PLA, Xi
approved and issued a new series of regulations in July 2022 on the management of PLA
soldiers seeking to improve recruiting, training, promotions, benefits, and demobilization
efforts for non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
●CCP leaders increasingly cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend the PRC’s
expanding global interests and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of
“Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”
●Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of China’s Communist Party at the Party
Congress in October 2022 and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC
probably will enable Xi to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during
his next 5-year term. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Xi detailed PLA goals of
enhancing party loyalty in the military, while simultaneously strengthening the military
through reform, science and technology, personnel training, mechanization, informatization,
and modernized military strategies.
●In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed
forces, which, if realized, could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool
for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts. During his October 2022 speech at the opening
ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi stated that China intends to complete the plan to
modernize the PLA by 2027.
●In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-Domain
Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network
that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what the PLA calls the
“network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S.
operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes
against those vulnerabilities. The PLA’s official newspaper continued to emphasize the
importance developing MDPW in 2022, citing “several informatized local wars” as evidence
for the need for MDPW capabilities.


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
● COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not 
significantly impact PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 
skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC and other deployments. While some 
non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the 
PLA’s mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within 
China’s military. 
The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. CCP leaders view these interests as foundational to their national strategy. 
The modernization of the armed forces is an indispensable element of the Party’s national strategy 
to modernize the country. At the Fifth Plenum in October 2020, the CCP declared the PRC’s 
ambitions for becoming a rich country are closely integrated with its ambitions to develop a 
powerful military. The PRC’s defense policy and military strategy primarily orients the PLA 
toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” interests in the region while 
countering to the United States. At the same time, CCP leaders increasingly cast the armed forces 
as a practical instrument to defend the PRC’s expanding global interests and to advance its foreign 
policy goals within the framework of “Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”  
Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 said that the People’s Liberation Army 
must move quicker with troop training and new strategies to reach its target of becoming a world-
class military. The PRC’s military strategy is based on “active defense,” a concept that adopts the 
principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical 
levels. To adapt the PRC’s armed forces to long-term trends in global military affairs and meet the 
country’s evolving national security needs, PRC leaders stress the imperative of meeting key 
military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035. These milestones seek to align the PLA’s 
transformation with the PRC’s overall national modernization so that by the end of 2049, the PRC 
will field a “world-class” military.  
Strategic Assessment. A key driver of the PRC’s defense policy is how the CCP leaders perceive 
the relative threats and opportunities facing the country’s comprehensive national development. 
During Chairman Xi’s CCP centenary speech, he called for the full implementation of the Party’s 
idea of strengthening the army in the new era. The last defense white paper, China’s National 
Defense in the New Era, published in 2019, reaffirmed that China’s armed forces are aligned with 
and contribute to the strategies of the CCP, stating that ongoing military reforms “ensure absolute 
leadership of the CCP over the military.”  According to the paper, Beijing views the international 
environment as undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.” The CCP concludes that 
“international strategic competition is on the rise” and expresses deep concerns at what it sees as 
growing sources of instability in the near-term. Beijing offers no introspection on its role in stirring 
geopolitical tensions through its economic practices, military activities and modernization, 
excessive maritime territorial claims, assertive diplomacy, or efforts to revise aspects of global 
governance. Rather, the PRC describes the international system as being “…undermined by 
growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars.” 
Similarly, the PRC contends that global military competition is intensifying and that “major 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
countries” are adjusting their security and military strategies, reorganizing their militaries, and are 
developing new types of combat forces to “seize the strategic commanding heights in military 
competition.”  
Defense Policy. The PRC’s stated defense policy is to “resolutely safeguard” its sovereignty, 
security, and development interests, according to its 2019 defense white paper, which provides 
continuity with past statements by PRC senior leaders and other official documents. Xi’s work 
report to the 20th Party Congress reiterated this policy, saying that fast modernization of the PLA’s 
organization, personnel, and military technology standards, under the absolute leadership of the 
party, would be key not only to defending China’s sovereignty but also its security and 
developmental interests. In practice, the PRC’s military power is increasingly a central feature of 
the CCP’s regional and global ambitions. The 2019 defense white paper also identifies the PRC’s 
national defense aims that support these interests, in likely order of importance:  
●to deter and resist aggression;
●to safeguard national political security, the people’s security, and social stability;
●to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence;”
●to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” and the
creation of “East Turkistan;”
●to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security;
●to safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;
●to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and
cyberspace;
●to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests; and
●to support the sustainable development of the country.
Key changes in defense policy for the “New Era” include efforts to improve coordination across 
the party-state to leverage all organs of national power in a unified approach to support the CCP’s 
ambitions of a global military capability. Unlike previous defense white papers, China’s National 
Defense in the New Era explicitly stressed the PRC’s armed forces’ alignment and support to the 
Party’s broader societal and foreign policy objectives. For example, the white paper states that the 
PRC’s armed forces must be ready to “provide strong strategic support for the realization of the 
Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and to make new and greater contributions to the building 
of a shared future for mankind.” Also notable is the explicit alignment between the PRC’s defense 
and foreign policies, particularly in the armed forces’ role in protecting the PRC’s overseas 
interests and furthering the CCP’s concept of “strategic partnerships” with other countries.  


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针). The Chairman of the CMC issues military 
strategic guidelines to the PLA that provide the foundation of the PRC’s military strategy. The 
military strategic guidelines set the general principles and concepts for the use of force in support 
of the CCP’s strategic objectives, provide guidance on the threats and conditions the armed forces 
should be prepared to face, and set priorities for planning, modernization, force structure, and 
readiness. The CCP leadership issues new military strategic guidelines, or adjusts existing 
guidelines, whenever they perceive it necessary to shift the PLA’s priorities based on the Party’s 
perceptions of China’s security environment or changes in the character of warfare. 
Since 2019, trends indicate the PRC has reviewed and adjusted its military strategic guidelines. In 
early 2019, PRC state media indicated that Beijing held senior-level meetings to “establish the 
military strategy of the ‘New Era.’” The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that the PLA is 
implementing guidelines for the “New Era” that, “…actively adapt to the new landscape of 
strategic competition, the new demands of national security, and new developments in modern 
warfare…” PRC official media in the latter half of 2019 echoed these themes and described the 
guidelines as constituting a notable change. The PRC’s defense white paper may reflect changes 
in the guidelines given its emphasis on the intensification of global military competition, the 
increase in the pace of technological change, and the military modernization themes introduced by 
General Secretary Xi at the 19th Party Congress. Documents released following the Fifth Plenum 
of the 19th Central Committee in October 2020 hailed progress in the “comprehensive and in-
depth” implementation of the “New Era military strategic guidelines.”  
These developments are notable because the CCP leadership has issued new military strategic 
guidelines or adjusted its guidelines only a few times since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the 
CMC under Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare to win “local wars” under “high-tech 
conditions” after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, the CMC under Hu 
Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local wars under informationized conditions.” In 
2014, the CMC placed greater focus on conflicts in the maritime domain and fighting 
“informatized local wars.” 
Military Strategy—Active Defense. The PRC’s military strategy is based on what it describes as 
“active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with 
offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. Active defense is neither a purely defensive 
strategy nor limited to territorial defense. Active defense encompasses offensive and preemptive 
aspects. It can apply to the PRC acting externally to defend its interests. Active defense is rooted 
on the principle of avoiding initiating armed conflict but responding forcefully if challenged. The 
PRC’s 2019 defense white paper reaffirmed active defense as the basis for its military strategy. 
Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe reiterated this principle of active defense in his 
speech at the Ninth Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, stating that the PRC “will not attack unless 
we are attacked, but will surely counterattack if attacked.” 
First adopted by the CCP in the 1930s, active defense has served as the basis for the PRC’s military 
strategy since its founding in 1949. Although the PRC has adjusted and tailored the specifics of 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
active defense over time based on changes in strategic circumstances, its general principles have 
remained consistent. Contemporary PRC writings describe the tenets of active defense as: 
● Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. This describes the basic 
principle for the use of military force under active defense. The PRC’s 2019 defense white 
paper describes this principle as, “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely 
counterattack if attacked.” Active defense may entail defensive counterattacks in response to 
an attack or preemptively striking an adversary that the PRC judges is preparing to attack. 
● Combine strategic defense with operational and tactical offense. This aspect offers two 
approaches to warfare influenced by Mao Zedong’s notion of using defense and offense in 
turns. First, active defense may involve offensive campaigns, operations, and tactical actions 
in support of the strategic defense. These may occur rapidly and along “external lines.” Second, 
it uses strategic defense to weaken the enemy and set the conditions to transition into strategic 
offense in order to secure victory. Strategic defense is not equivalent to deterrence but includes 
deterrence. Strategic defense also includes actions taken after deterrence has failed, such as 
conducting conventional strikes against an adversary. 
● Taking the operational initiative. This aspect emphasizes the effective use of offensives at the 
operational and tactical levels, avoiding enemy strengths, and concentrating on building 
asymmetric advantages against enemy weaknesses to “change what is inferior into what is 
superior.” 
● Strive for the best possibilities. This calls for thorough peacetime military preparations and 
planning based on fighting the most challenging threat under the most complicated 
circumstances “in order to get the best results.” This aspect stresses the importance of setting 
conditions in advance and suggests it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, than to fight 
unprepared.  
● The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. This tenet seeks to resolve the 
dilemma that using too little force may protract a war instead of stopping it while the 
unconstrained use of force may worsen a war and make it harder to stop. Calling for the 
“effective restraint of warfare,” this tenet seeks to avoid war first through sufficient military 
preparations and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political 
and diplomatic efforts to “subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting.” If war is unavoidable, 
however, this aspect calls for restraining war by taking the “opening move” and “using war to 
stop war.” 
● Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. This integrates the concept of active defense 
with the concept of “people’s war.” People’s war comprises subordinate military strategies, 
“guerrilla war” and “protracted war” that Mao saw as a means to harness the capacity of 
China’s populace as a source of political legitimacy and mobilization to generate military 
power. Contemporary PRC writings link “people’s war” to national mobilization and 
participation in wartime as a whole-of-nation concept of warfare. 


 
 
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Military Missions and Tasks. The CMC directs the PLA to be ready and able to perform specific 
missions and tasks to support the Party’s strategy and defend the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. The PLA’s missions and tasks in the “New Era” include safeguarding 
China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, maintaining combat readiness, 
conducting military training under real combat conditions, safeguarding China’s nuclear weapons 
and its interests in the space and cyberspace domains, countering terrorism and maintaining 
stability, protecting the PRC’s overseas interests, and participating in emergency response and 
disaster relief. 
Modernization Objectives and Targets. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Xi detailed 
PLA goals of enhancing party loyalty in the military, while simultaneously strengthening the 
military through reform, science and technology, personnel training, mechanization, 
informatization, and modernized military strategies. 
In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated 
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces, 
which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s 
Taiwan unification efforts.  The PLA’s 2027 modernization goal aligns with the 100th anniversary 
of the PLA’s founding. During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party 
Congress, Xi said that China intends to complete the plan to modernize the PLA by 2027. In a 
March 2021 speech, Xi detailed that the 2027 modernization goal is the first step in a broader 
modernization effort. PLA writings note the “three-step” modernization plan connects “near-, 
medium-, and long-term goals in 2027, 2035, and 2049” respectively.   
The PRC’s goals for modernizing its armed forces in the “New Era” are as follows:  
● By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and 
intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, 
organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.  
● By 2035: “To comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational 
structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of 
the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military…”  
● By 2049: “To fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”  
The 5th Plenum communique holds that the 2027 goal means that the Chinese military should 
comprehensively push forward the modernization of military theories, military organizational 
form, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. PRC media, citing a military source, 
connected the PLA’s 2027 goals to developing the capabilities to counter the U.S. military in the 
Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms. 
Although China’s leaders view building military strength as a strategic imperative, they also place 
important caveats on these objectives. For example, Chairman Xi’s direction to the PLA to 


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“basically complete” modernization by 2035 should also occur “in step with the modernization of 
the country.” These qualifications serve several purposes that highlight the interlocking nature of 
the Party’s strategic planning. First, as the PRC’s interests continue to expand, the Party expects 
the PLA to keep pace with the country’s evolving interests and be ready and able to defend its 
progress. Second, linking the PLA’s transformation to the country’s transformation allows Party 
leaders to signal the scope and scale of the internal changes they expect the PLA to implement, 
particularly given its historic resistance to reforms that challenge its risk-adverse organizational 
culture or threaten vested bureaucratic interests. Finally, these qualifications provide flexibility to 
the Party’s leaders to calibrate military resources and defense objectives based on the conditions 
of the country’s overall development. This offers PRC leaders the ability to adapt to changing 
economic or international conditions and ensure military investments support—rather than 
compromise—the strategy.
Military Ambitions. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-
class” military by the end of 2049. Within the context of China’s national strategy, however, it is 
likely that the PRC will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or, in some 
cases, superior to—the U.S. military, and that of any other great power that Beijing views as a 
threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Given the far-reaching ambitions the 
CCP has for a rejuvenated China, it is unlikely that the Party would aim for an end state in which 
the PRC would remain in a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States or any other 
potential rival. For the PRC to aim lower or otherwise willingly accept a permanent condition of 
military inferiority would seem anathema to the fundamental purpose of becoming a “great modern 
socialist country.” However, this does not mean that the PRC will aim for the PLA to mirror the 
U.S. military in terms of capacity, capability, or readiness. The PRC will likely seek to develop its 
“world-class” military in a manner that it believes best suits the needs of its armed forces to defend 
and advance the country’s interests and how the PLA—guided by the Party—adapts to the 
changing character of warfare.  
Way of War. The PLA increasingly views warfare as a confrontation between opposing 
operational systems, rather than a war of annihilation between opposing mechanized military 
forces. Following this logic, PLA writings refer to systems destruction warfare (体系破击战) as 
the next way of war, transforming from mechanized warfare to an informatized and intelligentized 
style warfare. Although not a new PLA approach, systems destruction warfare likely continues to 
be the principal theory guiding its way of war.  
In November 2020, the CMC announced that it had issued the “Chinese People's Liberation Army 
Joint Operations Outline (Trial).” The Outline establishes a system for the PLA’s joint operations 
and focuses on clarifying basic issues regarding the organization and implementation of joint 
operations, command rights and responsibilities, and the principles, requirements, and procedures 
for joint operations, combat support, national defense mobilization, and political work. According 
to PLA writings, the Outline describes how the future combat style of the PLA will be integrated 
joint operations under the unified command of a joint operations command system.  PLA writers 
emphasized that winning future wars would require a high degree of joint integration of various 


 
 
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combat forces and combat elements from across the PLA services and other arms and across all 
domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and tactical levels. PLA writings highlight the 
multi-domain component of integrated joint operations and the need to coordinate the development 
of “mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization integration.”  The PLA’s “operational 
regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA leaders and PLA-affiliated academics have 
pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is out of step with the 2015-era structural command 
and organizational reforms, and an obstacle to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint 
PLA.   
Since the CMC issued the Outline, the PLA has launched a force-wide effort to study and 
implement it, including through joint operations undertaken during exercises. The PLA is working 
to turn the Outline’s vision of joint operations into reality by breaking down institutional barriers 
and standardizing command systems in practice.  Along the way, the PLA seeks to identify 
shortcoming develop solutions and facilitate the adoption of modern operational concepts.   
Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” 
called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to 
leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what 
the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities 
in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision 
strikes against those vulnerabilities.  MDPW is meant to sit atop an “operational conceptual 
system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional subordinate operational concepts 
and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, evaluate, and improve these future-oriented 
operational concepts.  The timing of MDPW’s appearance vis-à-vis China’s updated doctrine and 
military strategic guidelines suggests that MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely 
amplifying themes and guidance in both while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be 
able to do to win future wars. 
Joint Firepower Strike. PLA writings have long emphasized the importance of joint firepower 
strikes as a component of large-scale operations. Joint firepower strikes include multiple services 
combining to utilize their firepower capabilities to create substantial effect and have been explicitly 
tied to a Taiwan invasion in PLA writings. During the August 2022 Congressional Delegation 
(CODEL) visit to Taiwan, the PLA Rocket Force fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones 
in waters around Taiwan; this included at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, which was 
unprecedented. The military drills afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint 
firepower strike operations.  
Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC’s 
leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important element 
in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Xi and senior military leaders have 
continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat readiness so it can “fight and win 
wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA conducting more training but making its 
training more rigorous and realistic as well as addressing issues in the PLA’s training and 


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education systems relating to conducting complex joint operations and adapting to other aspects 
of modern warfare. It probably has also led to a standardization of a combat readiness system 
across the PLA to enable the PRC to quickly transition to a wartime footing.
Along with the CCP leadership’s focus on improving the PLA’s combat readiness, in recent years 
PLA media outlets have noted shortcomings in the military’s training and education systems that 
reportedly left some commanders—particularly at the operational level—inadequately prepared 
for modern warfare. In response to perceived personnel deficiencies within the PLA, Xi approved 
and issued a new series of regulations in July 2022 regarding the management of PLA soldiers 
seeking to improve recruiting, training, promotions, benefits, and demobilization efforts for NCOs. 
In recent years, PLA media outlets have identified the need for the military to address the “Five 
Incapables” problem: that some commanders cannot (1) judge situations, (2) understand higher 
authorities’ intentions, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy forces, and (5) manage 
unexpected situations. Although PLA writings do not specify how widespread the “Five 
Incapables” are, PLA media outlets have consistently raised them. One outside expert has noted 
this may indicate the PLA lacks confidence in its proficiency to execute its own operational 
concepts. Additionally, senior Party and PLA leaders are keenly aware that the military has not 
experienced combat in decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organizational 
structures. PLA leaders and state media frequently call on the force to remedy the “peacetime 
disease” that manifests in the form of what it characterizes as lax training attitudes and practices 
that are viewed as hindering combat readiness.  
COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not 
significantly undermine PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 
skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC, and other deployments. Although some 
non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the PLA’s 
mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within China’s 
military. 
Anti-Corruption Campaign. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a 
Party-wide effort that General Secretary Xi strengthened and accelerated shortly after taking 
office. The stated goal of these campaigns is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, root out 
corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority. Military discipline 
inspectors led by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission have targeted individual power 
networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such as officers connected 
to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong and, former Chief of Joint 
Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 2022, General Secretary Xi delivered a speech to the CCP Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection in which he stated that although serious potential dangers 
of corruption within the Party and the military have been rooted out, the fight against corruption 
is still raging in the PRC.  In mid-2023, PRC media announced that PLA Rocket Force leadership 
was being replaced and the PLA launched an inquiry into corruption linked to the procurement of 
military equipment, indicating that the PLA’s anti-corruption campaign remains incomplete. 
Emblematic of Xi’s sustained focus on anti-corruption efforts in 2022, PRC authorities continued 


 
 
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frequent arrests of high-ranking officials and business elites for allegations of taking bribes and 
abusing power, especially in the financial sector. In November 2022 alone, PRC authorities 
arrested the Vice Governor of the People’s Bank of China and former CEO of a major PRC 
telecommunications firm as a result of investigations by CCP anti-corruption bodies.  
Effects of COVID-19 on PLA Modernization and Reform Goals. In 2022, the COVID-19 
pandemic likely had little effect on the PLA’s modernization and reform goals. At the 20th Party 
Congress in October, Xi continued to emphasize promoting the modernization of China’s national 
defense and armed forces. A few months later, in his annual new year's address, Xi highlighted 
military and strategic achievements from 2022 including the PLA’s 95th anniversary, the launching 
of the PLAN’s third aircraft carrier, and the completion of China's space station. In 2022, the PLA 
continued to play a role in COVID-19 response activity, such as mobilizing approximately 2,000 
medical personnel to Shanghai during an outbreak in April. The PRC’s recent Government Work 
Report referenced PLA activities through the last year, including COVID-19 response that boosted 
China’s national defense mobilization capability. 
Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a Party-army, 
does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the Party. The CCP CMC, 
currently chaired by Xi, is the highest military decision-making body in the PRC. As a Party-army, 
the PLA is a political actor. As a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political 
and governance systems. As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government 
system, the PLA’s missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to 
its national defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi has implemented multiple 
reforms which reduced PLA autonomy and greatly strengthened Party control over the military. 
Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s absolute 
control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party. 
CHINA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
As the military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC is technically also a department of the 
CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the 
General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at Party 
Congresses every five years. In the fall of 2022 at the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia 
ascended to the first Vice Chairman position, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice 
Chairman. Other CMC members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning 
members Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. In 2022, the CMC consisted of two 
vice chairs, the Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work 
Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission. 
Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, and 
President of the PRC. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 
2012 and as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to all of his positions for an 
unprecedented third term at 2022’s 20th Party Congress and the 2023 National People’s Congress. 


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In 2016, Xi was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command 
Center (JOCC) and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming 
CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father 
was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo 
member in the 1980s. Xi also served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career and had 
regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. 
Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia is China’s top uniformed official and former junior vice 
chairman. Zhang was first appointed to the CMC in 2012 as the head of the General Armaments 
Department – now the Equipment Development Department (EDD) – where he oversaw the PLA’s 
manned space program, as well as MCF and military modernization efforts. Zhang gained rare 
experience as a combat commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang 
formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea and 
Russia. Zhang is one of the PLA’s “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, 
served with Xi’s father at the close of Chinese Civil War in 1949. Zhang, at age 72 in 2022, was 
expected to retire due to previously followed age norms within the PLA. However, Zhang’s 
retention on the CMC for a third term probably reflects Xi’s desire to keep a close and experienced 
ally as his top military advisor. 
Vice Chairman General He Weidong is China’s second-most senior officer and a former 
commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater. His ascent to a vice chairman position absent prior 
CMC membership is unusual and probably a testament to his extensive operational experience 
focused on Taiwan. Before his selection as vice chairman, He served a brief stint in the CMC 
JOCC where he played a key role in planning live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait as part of the PLA 
response to the then-U.S. House Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taipei. He may have close 
ties to Xi due to their overlapping service in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  
Minister of National Defense General Li Shangfu was appointed to the CMC at the 20th Party 
Congress in October 2022, and as the Minister of National Defense at the NPC in March 2023. Li 
is the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and 
foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of command 
and his primary policy influence is derived from membership on the CMC and State Council, 
where he serves as a direct liaison for civil-military integration, defense mobilization, and 
budgeting. Li previously headed the EDD where he managed the PLA’s weapons development 
and acquisition efforts and China’s manned space program. In 2018, Li was sanctioned by the 
United States for his role as EDD director overseeing the purchase of Russian fighter jets and 
surface-to-air missile systems.  
Joint Staff Department Chief General Liu Zhenli oversees PLA joint operations, a narrowing 
of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated 
in 2015. Liu is one of few remaining active-duty PLA officers with combat experience and is 
recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. Like his 


 
 
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predecessor Li Zuocheng, Liu rose through the ranks of the PLA Army HQ, assuming command 
of the service in 2021. Beginning in 2015 as Army chief of staff, Liu guided the service through a 
major period of reform which saw the ground force downgraded to an equal standing with the 
other branches. Liu, at age 58 in 2022, is the youngest CMC member and is eligible to remain on 
the CMC for at least an additional term.  
Political Work Department Director Admiral Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political work, 
including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who switched 
services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the PLAN. Miao 
may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, when his 
career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLAN political commissar during the Navy’s 
BRIcruise conducted in mid-2017. Miao Hua, at age 66 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his 
current position following the 20th Party Congress. 
Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengmin oversees the 
highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party discipline, 
including corrupt practices. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third-ranking member on the 
standing committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s reappointment 
reflects the Party’s continued commitment to the anticorruption campaign within the military. 
Zhang, at age 65 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his current position following the 20th Party 
Congress. 
 
 
 


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China’s Military Leadership Organizational Chart 


 
 
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CHAPTER TWO: PLA FORCES, 
CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION  
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all 
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime 
as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to 
“fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United 
States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and 
project power globally.  
 In 2022, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding 
modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct 
joint operations. 
The PLA is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 
million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 
million. In efforts to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily 
reduced active-duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with 
roughly 1 million soldiers in 2022. The PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have grown in size 
since 2015, indicating their increasing importance. By 2022, the PLAN Marine Corps expanded 
from two to six combined arms brigades and was supplemented with aviation and special forces 
units, with the intent of becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. 
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based 
nuclear and conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s 
strategic space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological 
warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the JLSF handles quartermaster, transportation, medical 
services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s joint capabilities during peace and war. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PLA’S MODERNIZATION AND REFORM 
The PRC maintains its goal to achieve a fully modernized national defense and military force by 
2035 and for the PLA to become a world-class military by 2049. The force also progresses toward 
its 2027 benchmark of military modernization that aligns with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s 
founding on August 1, 1927. The 2027 benchmark, introduced during the 14th Five Year Plan 


 
 
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(2021-2025), represents the start of the new three-step development strategy that continues Xi’s 
approach of military reform to transform the PLA. The original three-step modernization strategy 
sought to achieve mechanization by 2020; modernization of military theory, organization, 
personnel, and equipment by 2035; and to become a world-class force by mid-century. With basic 
mechanization considered achieved in 2020, the 2027 goal is a short-term marker and represents a 
modification, not a compression in timeline, for China’s ambition to achieve complete military 
modernization of the PLA by 2035. The PLA centenary goal set by the CCP accelerates the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization and to field a 
combat-ready force with improved strategic capabilities to defend national sovereignty, security, 
and development interests by 2027. 
PLA modernization in training includes realistic simulation and use of virtual reality and 
enhancing the military’s strategic capacity. The PLA has a minimal reliance on imports and has 
the ability to independently manufacture and develop equipment comparable to the most advanced 
U.S. and Russian equipment, accelerating their ability to modernize. The CCP continues to 
prioritize modernizing PLA activities in near and distant battlefields by integrating system-vs-
system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations.  
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA) 
Key Takeaways  
● The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training 
in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world-class military. 
● The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the 
August 2022 U.S. CODEL visit to Taiwan.  
● The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice-a-year conscript intake. The long-term effects of 
the policy are not clear. 
The PLAA has approximately 970,000 active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary 
ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 National Defense University’s Science of Military 
Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition from a regional defense to a global 
combat force.  
Force Structure and Organization. The PLAA continues to replace legacy equipment with 
newer systems. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 and 2017 PLA reforms is 
complete, but many units are still in the process of upgrading equipment.  
The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the 
Tibet Military District. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of multiple 
combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force. The brigades vary in 
size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into three types: light 


 
 
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(high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled armored vehicles), and 
heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from approximately 4,500 to 5,000 
personnel. Each group army controls six additional brigades responsible for operational element 
functions: an artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a 
special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a 
sustainment brigade; however, some variations exist with at least one group army per theater 
separating their engineering and chemical defense brigades into separate units. Although the 
PLAA has standardized its group armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and 
brigades that exist outside of the group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP 
considers sensitive including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing. The PLAA also commands 
several border and coastal defense brigades under the Theater Army Commands and regiments 
under the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts. 
Capabilities and Modernization. To meet the stated ambitions to become a world-class military, 
the PLAA continues systems modernization and combined arms and joint training. However, they 
still employ a mix of modern and legacy military equipment. The PLAA continues focusing 
training on fighting as combined arms formations while adapting to the twice-a-year conscript 
induction change.  
The PLAA's 15 SOF brigades provide group army commanders with an organic unit capable of 
executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF brigade missions include raids, harassment 
operations, target seizure and control, special reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and rescue 
operations. The PLA continues to prioritize SOF for modernization with the fielding of the new 
QBZ-191 military service rifle and the CSK-series of vehicles. Observed SOF training in 2022 
included airborne parachuting, small unit tactics and maritime operations.  
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units remained a focus of development in 2022. PLAA training 
events and reports in PRC media show that support to amphibious operations, multi-dimensional 
assaults, developing close air support tactics, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) are now 
a standard part of training. Training in 2022 also included numerous examples of helicopters 
executing nighttime flight operations, over water maneuver, and ultra-low altitude flying. PLAA 
Aviation works directly with ground units to enhance its ability to support air assault operations 
and conduct air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint training in 2022 included army 
aviation helicopters continuing to train for operations with PLAN landing ships. 2022 saw the first 
observed evidence of PLAA helicopters being able to rearm and refuel onboard PLAN vessels 
along with continued progress towards maritime operations.  The two PLAA Air Assault brigades 
continued extensive training on helicopter insertion, area security, and aerial reconnaissance. The 
PLAA envisions its Aviation and Air Assault units employing their three-dimensional maneuver, 
firepower, and assault capabilities to act as a main combat force, support a greater joint operation, 
or conduct non-war military operations outside China.  
PLAA air defense units in 2022 concentrated on improving their tactical air defense against low 
and slow threats like Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) and loitering munitions to meet evolving 


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air defense requirements. Hybrid self-propelled air defense artillery systems (SPADA), gun air 
defense artillery, small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man-Portable Air Defense 
Systems (MANPADS) form the core of the PRC’s evolving solution to countering tactical UAS. 
One of the systems with high counter UAS potential being fielded to light combined arms brigades 
is armed with a six barreled 25mm rotary cannon, which possibly uses Programmable Timed Fuse 
Pre-Fragmented (PTFP) rounds, and also mounts four FN-16 MANPADS on its turret. 
During 2022, the PLAA continued to emphasize the fielding and application of modern EW 
capabilities that are designed to maximize a unit’s combat effectiveness by detecting and 
degrading/disrupting adversary command and control communications as well as complicating an 
adversary’s use of tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Similar to 
the combined arms brigade’s fielding of EW capabilities, the PLAA’s air defense forces have 
rapidly fielded new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that will complement traditional air 
defense and support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) mission. 
Readiness. In 2022, the PLAA continued to improve its methods and standards of training 
combined arms units. Training encompassed individual to collective soldier events integrating 
reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signal units. In addition to continued 
PLAA deployments to the LAC on the Indian border, the PLAA conducted multiple “around the 
clock” large-scale exercises in training areas throughout the country to include joint operations in 
response to the U.S. and Taiwan actions in 2022.The PLAA used its new PCH191 long-range 
rocket artillery system during live fire events along China’s east coast as a response to the U.S. 
CODEL in August 2022. The new long-range MRL is capable of striking Taiwan from mainland 
China. 
In an effort to help develop a more professional military, adjustments were made to the recruitment 
and promotion of PLAA enlisted personnel. The changes aimed to accelerate the integrated 
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. To expand the pool of 
educated and technically proficient personnel for conscription, the recruitment age for university 
graduates increased from 24 to 26. The "4+X" service policy was also implemented for the NCO 
Corps, creating flexibility for intermediate- and senior-level NCOs by helping avoid unwanted 
demobilization if an NCO fails to meet promotion criteria after their 4-year contract.  


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Major Ground Units   
 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN) 
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370
ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely
composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines.
●The PLAN commissioned its eighth RENHAI class cruiser in late 2022 and is continuing
construction of the RENHAI Guided Missile Cruiser (CG), the LUYANG III MOD Guided
Missile Destroyer (DDG), and the JIANGKAI II Guided Missile Frigate (FFG), as well as
beginning production on a new class of frigate, the JIANGKAI III.
●In 2022, the PLAN commissioned its third YUSHEN-class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA)
and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.
●In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
●In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against
land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles,
notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
●The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is
inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the
EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and
Malaysia.
The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 
ships and submarines, including over 140 major surface combatants.  The PLAN is largely 
composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. The PLAN commissioned its eighth 
RENHAI-class cruiser in late 2022 and continued construction of the RENHAI cruiser, LUYANG 
III MOD destroyer and the JIANGKAI II-class frigate as well as beginning production of the 
JIANGKAI III-class frigate.  The PLAN commissioned its second YUSHEN-class amphibious 
assault ship (TYPE 075 LHA) in December 2021 and the third in October 2022 with the first ship 
in the class achieving initial operating capability (IOC) in March 2022. Construction on a fourth 
YUSHEN-class LHA likely began in early 2023. In June 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft 
carrier, CV-18 Fujian.  
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has begun conducting the same types of 
military activities inside and outside the FIC in the EEZs of other countries, including the United 
States. This activity highlights the PRC’s double standard in the application of its interpretation 
of international law. Examples include sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military 


 
 
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exercises such as the RIMPAC exercise off Hawaii in 2014, 2018, and 2022, TALISMAN SABER 
off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021. Chinese 
intelligence collection ships also operated near sensitivity defense facilities off Australia’s west 
coast in May 2022 and near Japan in July 2022. PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the 
SCS and they frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.  
The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAN as adjusting to changes in the strategic 
requirements of near seas defense and far seas protection, noting that it was “speeding up the 
transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas...” 
Towards the PRC’s goal of building a “strong and modernized navy force,” the PLAN has replaced 
or updated its previous generations of platforms that had limited capabilities in favor of larger, 
modern multi-mission combatants. Today, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role 
platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. The 
PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint operations and joint integration with the other branches 
of the PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain 
and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater distances from mainland China. 
The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as well 
as the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. The PLAN continues to 
implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. The PLA-wide reforms 
removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the 
PLA’s joint theater commands, and focused it on organizing, manning, training, and equipping 
naval forces.  
Missions. The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, gradually extending its operational 
reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges, including 
a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden.  The PLAN’s latest surface and subsurface platforms 
enable combat operations beyond the reach of the PRC’s land-based defenses. In particular, the 
PRC’s growing force of aircraft carriers extend air defense coverage of deployed task groups 
beyond the range of land-based defenses, enabling operations farther from China’s shore. The 
PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-based land-attack systems will also enhance the PRC’s 
ability to project power. Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable 
logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two 
new FUYU-class fast combat support ships (AOEs) built specifically to support aircraft carrier 
and large-deck amphibious ship operations. The PLAN’s expanding fleet of large modern 
amphibious warships will enable it to conduct in a wide range of expeditionary operations 
wherever PRC interests are threatened or in support of PRC participation in internationally 
sanctioned operations. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will 
also facilitate its non-war military activities and further legitimize the PRC’s growing global 
military posture, including at its base in Djibouti. 


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The PRC is in the beginning stages of operating what the PLA calls its “multi-carrier force.”  The 
PRC continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first 
domestically-built aircraft carrier, CV-17 Shandong, was launched in 2017 and commissioned in 
December 2019. The PRC’s next generation of carriers, the new FUJIAN-class – the first of which 
it is currently outfitting – will have greater endurance and an electromagnetic catapult launch 
system making it capable of launching various types of specialized fixed-wing aircraft for 
missions such as airborne early warning and EW. This will increase the striking power of a 
potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate 
periphery. CV-18 Fujian launched in June 2022 and is expected to commission in 2024. 
The PLAN’s newest amphibious ships, the YUSHEN LHA and YUZHAO amphibious transport 
docks (LPD), are modern platforms capable of regional and global expeditionary missions in 
support of both wartime and non-war contingency operations either singly or as part of capable and 
flexible task groups composed of multiple amphibious ships and surface combatants. 
The PLAN continues to build multiple new, large auxiliary ships that can support force projection 
operations, including large logistic ships such as the FUYU fast combat support ship (AOE) and 
specialized platforms for intelligence collection ships (AGI) and ocean surveillance ships (AGOS). 
The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC is modest but growing as it gains more 
experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The 
PRC’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended task group 
deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Other recent extended 
range PLAN operations include the following: 
●In September 2022, a PLAN task group that included a RENHAI class cruiser operated with
four Russian combatants near the Aleutian Islands and was shadowed by U.S. Coast Guard
ships and aircraft.
●In December 2022 and January 2023, a PLAN task force including a LUYANG III DDG
operated in the South Pacific near French Polynesia.
●In December 2022, CV-16 Liaoning with escorts including two RENHAI-class cruisers
operated in the Philippine Sea near Japan’s Daito Islands in an area similar to where Liaoning
deployed to in December 2021.
●In February 2023, a PLAN task group, that included YUSHEN-class LHA-31, conducted
training in the SCS and Western Pacific. This was the first extended range deployment for the
newly commissioned LHA.
●The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2022, a 14-
year effort that is the PRC’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Indo-Pacific region.  In
January 2022, the 39th Naval Escort Task Force conducted a three-day escort of Chinese fishing
vessels in the Gulf of Aden. Overall, according to Chinese state media, the PLAN has expanded


 
 
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its original mission of escorting Chinese-flagged vessels and vessels from the World Food 
Program to escorting merchant ships from other countries as well.  
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 
platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine 
warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.  Notably, this figure does not include 
approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). 
The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. 
Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants. The PLAN’s force structure consists of 
three fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval 
bases. The PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the 
Eastern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the Southern Theater 
Navy is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its 
force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new 
technologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-
powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). The PLAN’s submarine force is 
expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement of older 
hulls due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity. 
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 
12 Russian-built KILO-class SS units, eight of which are capable of launching ASCMs. China’s 
shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN-class diesel-electric 
air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to 
produce a total of 25 or more YUAN-class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired 
the first two KILO-class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 
1990s. 
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear submarines – two SHANG I-class 
SSNs (TYPE 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (TYPE 093A), and six JIN-class SSBNs (TYPE 
094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
(3,900NM) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400NM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN-class 
SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN-class SSBN can 
carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding 
anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation TYPE 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with 
follow-on longer range SLBM. The TYPE 096 will likely begin construction in the near future. 
Based on the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and 
TYPE 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for 
the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.” 


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The PRC launched two SHANG III (TYPE 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines 
(SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational 
hulls by 2025.  This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare 
capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare capabilities through 
the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a 
robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.  
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface 
combatants. As of late 2022, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new batch of guided-
missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and a new batch of guided missile frigates, including 
a new 054 variant designated JIANGKAI III. These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s 
air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN expands its 
operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems. By the end of 2019, 
the PLAN had commissioned its 30th JIANGKAI II-class FFG, reportedly completing the 
production run. However, in 2021 PRC media reported production had restarted with at least three 
additional hulls commissioned by the end of 2022 with a total possible end production run of more 
than 40 hulls. The PLAN augmented its littoral warfare capabilities, especially for operations in 
the ECS and SCS, with the high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class Corvettes (FFLs) (TYPE 
056 and TYPE 056A). The PLAN commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, 
completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently transferred the early flight TYPE 056 
variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in 2021, probably due to the early models’ 
lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array 
sonar and are, thus, capable of contributing to ASW operations.  
The PLAN has expanded its force of large surface combatants with two programs, the LUYANG 
III DDG and the RENHAI CG. By the end of 2022, the PRC had commissioned 25 LUYANG III 
DDGs—including 12 lengthened LUYANG III MOD DDGs – with additional hulls under 
construction. Both the standard LUYANG III and the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell 
multipurpose vertical launch system (VLS) capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to air 
missiles, and anti-submarine missiles, and the MOD variants will be capable of carrying the new 
Z-20 anti-submarine helicopter by late 2022, eight RENHAI-class CG’s were in commission in
the PLAN with additional hulls under construction. The RENHAI has 112 VLS cells and can carry
a large load out of weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and
anti-submarine weapons along with likely LACMs and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when
those become operational. In early 2022, the PLAN released a video of RENHAI CG test launching
an anti-ship ballistic missile with a reported/estimated range of 540NM.  The new ship launched
anti-ship ballistic missile can possibly be launched by the LUYANG III and LUYANG III MOD
DDGs.
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare capabilities in its force development. The 
PLAN’s frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of the YJ-
83/YJ-83J ASCM (135NM), while newer surface combatants such as the LUYANG II-class 


 
 
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DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (270NM). The LUYANG III-class DDGs and the RENHAI-class 
CGs are fitted with a variant of the PRC’s newest ASCM, the YJ-18A (290NM). A few 
modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the supersonic YJ-12A ASCM (270NM), and 
the next-generation frigates may also receive this missile.  Eight of the PLAN’s 12 KILO-class 
SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM). The PRC’s SONG-class SS, 
YUAN-class SSP, and SHANG-class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-launched 
ASCM, the YJ-18 which constitutes an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM. It is possible the 
PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial shipping container for 
covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant ships.  
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting 
capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint 
reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting information to surface and 
subsurface launch platforms. 
As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of land-attack 
capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next step. In the 
coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and the 
developmental SHANG III SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit its older surface combatants and 
submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the 
PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range 
strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
Amphibious Warfare Ships. The PRC’s investment in LHA ships signals its intent to continue 
to develop its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April 2021, the PRC commissioned the first 
YUSHEN-class LHA (TYPE 075) followed by the commissioning of the second hull in December 
2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was commissioned in October 2022 while the first hull 
achieved IOC in March 2022, and there are indications of a probable fourth hull under construction 
in early 2023.The YUSHEN class are highly capable large-deck amphibious ships that will provide 
the PLAN with an all-aspect expeditionary capability including the ability to carry a large number 
of landing craft, troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the PLAN has eight large 
YUZHAO-class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (TYPE 071) in service. The YUZHAO-class 
LPDs and YUSHEN-class LHAs provide the PLA with greater capacity, endurance, and more 
flexibility for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships, which it has reduced in 
number over the last decade with obsolete units being decommissioned. The YUSHEN and 
YUZHAO can each carry several of the new YUYI class air-cushion medium landing craft and/or 
the conventional YUBU-class utility landing craft, and a variety of helicopters, tanks, armored 
vehicles and PLAN marines for long-distance expeditionary deployments. 
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first domestically built aircraft 
carrier, Shandong, which launched in 2017 and completed multiple sea trials during 2018-2019. 


 
 
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Shandong was photographed at a base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater Navy in late 2020 
and should now be considered to be operational. It is a modified version of the Liaoning (Soviet 
KUZNETSOV-class) design and likewise uses a ski-jump takeoff method for its aircraft. China 
launched its third domestically built aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian in June 2022 and continued 
outfitting work early 2023. CV-18 is larger than CV-16 and CV-17 and fitted with an 
electromagnetic catapult launch system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter 
aircraft, fixed-wing early-warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations and thus extend the 
reach and effectiveness of its carrier-based strike aircraft. CV-18 is expected to be operational by 
2024, with additional carriers to follow.  
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates and is developing several aircraft to operate from its 
carriers and combatants. In addition to the standard J-15 fighter that currently operates from PLAN 
carriers, there is a catapult-capable J-15 variant in development. The aircraft is currently testing 
from land-based steam and electromagnetic catapults. Two other J-15 variants are in development 
– the J-15S tandem-seat variant and the J-15D electronic warfare variant, which is equipped with 
wingtip electronic support measures/electronic intelligence gathering pods as well as several 
conformal antennas. The PRC is also developing a carrier capable variant of the fifth-generation 
J-31 fighter, known as the J-35, which conducted its first flight in 2021. Beyond fighter aircraft, 
the PRC is refining the design of a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, known as 
the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft, which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D Hawkeye, 
has existed for many years, and prototypes of the KJ-600 have been in flight testing since 2020. 
Beijing is also developing the Z-20F helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the RENHAI cruisers 
and LUYANG III MOD destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The Z-20F is similar to the 
U.S. Navy’s SH-60 and will provide significant improvements in ASW capabilities over the 
smaller Z-9 and Ka-28 helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-20F will also complement 
the larger Z-18Fs that operate from the PLAN’s aircraft carriers.  
Accompanying the manned fixed-wing and rotary aircraft will be UAVs. The PLAN have 
conducted sea trials on multiple surface combatants with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
UAVs ranging in wingspan between 3.5 and 4 meters. These UAVs can include the SD-40, CSC-
005, S-100 CAMCOPTER, and AV-500 UAV systems. These UAVs are used for ISR purposes. 
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the process of replacing its older variant H-6 bombers with 
the H-6J, a naval variant of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new and larger advanced 
maritime strike bomber has six weapons pylons instead of four, advanced avionics, upgraded 
engines, and can employ the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM (270NM). In 2020, PLAAF H-6Ks were 
also photographed carrying YJ-12s, significantly increasing the number of bombers available to 
the PLA for long-range maritime strike missions. 
The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime patrol, 
airborne early warning aircraft including many of the same variants operated by the PLAAF. 
However, the PLAN also operates a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine warfare and maritime 
patrol. This aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector boom, similar to that of the U.S. 


 
 
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Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-search radar mounted under the nose 
as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, probably for electronic surveillance. A small 
electro-optical (EO)/infrared turret is located just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is 
equipped with an internal weapons bay in front of the main landing gear. 
The PRC also operates a fixed-wing medium to large size UAVs from land bases. These UAVs 
specialize in ISR and include EO/infrared imaging, signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, and 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Many of these UAVs can be operated in satellite communications 
(SATCOM) mode, extending the datalink and operational ranges well past traditional line-of-sight 
(LOS) communications. Fixed-wing UAVs include the XIANGLONG high altitude, long 
endurance UAV; the BZK-005 medium altitude, long endurance UAV; and the ASN-209 medium 
altitude, medium endurance UAV. 
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and support 
ships, including AGIs, AGOs, fleet replenishment oilers, hospital ships, submarine salvage and 
rescue ships, and various other large auxiliaries for specialized missions. Additionally, the PRC’s 
first domestically built polar icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in 2019. The ship is 
operated by the Polar Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration. In October 2022, 
XUELONG 2 departed for the PRC’s 39th research mission to Antarctica and was followed one 
week later by XUELONG 1, marking the third occasion both research vessels have conducted a 
joint mission in Antarctica. 
Current Nuclear Sea-Based Capabilities. For the PLAN and CCP, the possession of SSBNs has 
long been seen as an important symbol in achieving great power status. The PRC has six 
operational TYPE 094 JIN-class SSBNs, and these submarines are conducting at sea deterrent 
patrols. The PLAN’s JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 sea launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs); JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20) representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based 
nuclear deterrent. With six operational SSBNs, the PLAN has the capacity to maintain a constant 
at sea deterrent presence. With a range of approximately 3,900NM, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 
would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean in order to threaten targets in the western half of 
the Continental United States (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii in order to threaten 
targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 
5,400NM which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from 
Chinese littoral waters. The PLAN’s next generation SSBN, the TYPE 096 is expected to enter 
service the late 2020s or early 2030s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first-
generation SSNs, the PRC will operate the TYPE 094 and TYPE 096 SSBNs concurrently. 
PLAN MARINE CORPS (PLANMC)  
The PLANMC maintains a presence at the PRC’s first overseas military base in Djibouti that 
extends The PRC’s military reach and strategic influence in Africa and the Middle East. In 2020, 
China highlighted a PLANMC SOF unit that had joined the previously assigned PLANMC unit in 
Djibouti. The PLANMC’s presence in Djibouti provides the PRC with the ability to support a 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
military response to contingencies affecting China’s investments and infrastructure in the region 
and the approximately 1 million PRC citizens in Africa and 500,000 in the Middle East, although 
we have not observed the PLANMC in Djibouti assist in evacuation efforts to date. The PLANMC 
also embarks a contingent of marines with the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-focused naval 
escort task force that supports the PRC’s trade interests. Additionally, the PLANMC supports the 
PRC’s military diplomacy. For example, the PLANMC at Djibouti have trained with Thai, 
Pakistani, Saudi, South African, and Djiboutian forces.  
The PLANMC’s roles and missions principally include defending PLA bases in mainland China, 
the SCS and abroad, conducting amphibious operations to seize and defend small reef and island 
outposts, and conducting non-war military activities (NWMA). Although the PLANMC has 
traditionally focused on its task to assault and defense of small islands in the SCS, more recently 
its focus has grown to include expeditionary operations beyond FIC. The PLANMC’s roles under 
NWMA support the PRC’s efforts to protect its overseas interests including resources, 
infrastructure, and citizens abroad. 
The PLANMC emphasized artillery training throughout 2022 which included training with the 
PCL-181 vehicle-mounted artillery pieces at various training ranges. The training also 
incorporated a reconnaissance variant of the Type-05, and it concluded with a multi-brigade 
culminating event in southern Guangdong. The inclusion of this artillery piece greatly increases 
the range of their artillery compared to what the PLANMC was previously fielding. Additionally, 
the PLANMC increased its overall aviation capability in 2022. The PLANMC’s Z-8C helicopter 
inventory increased to at least 28, bolstering their air assault capability. The PLANMC aviation 
brigade participated in three-dimensional amphibious assault training during the year which 
included air assault components, amphibious assault vehicles, and a combination of Landing Craft 
Air Cushion (LCAC) and assault boats. This training was conducted in conjunction with a 
commercial roll-on/roll-off vessel as the PLANMC continues to increase their integration with 
civilian vessels and expanding their sealift means.   


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Major Naval Units 
  
 
 
 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN 
AVIATION 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-
Pacific region.
●The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize
with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs.
●In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the
PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the 
largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 3,150 total aircraft 
(not including trainer variants or UASs) of which approximately 2,400 are combat aircraft 
(including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft).  
The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower 
projection. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAAF’s missions and tasks as 
transitioning from territorial air defense to “offensive and defensive operations.” In 2021, General 
Chang Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF commander and continued to enact PLAAF reforms 
to improve the force’s ability to accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF is rapidly catching 
up to Western air forces. This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant U.S. military 
technical advantages vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain. 
The CMC’s intent is to transform the PLAAF into a more effective and capable force that is 
proficient at conducting joint operations. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air 
defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-ranging 
reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF has reorganized into five Theater Command Air Forces, 
established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate regiments into 
brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.  
Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to field greater numbers of fourth-generation 
aircraft (now more than 1,300 of 1,900 total fighters, not including trainers) and probably will 
become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years.   For fifth-generation 
fighters, the PLAAF has operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, and 
PRC social media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 in October 2021. The PLAAF is 
preparing upgrades for the J-20, which may include increasing the number of air-to-air missiles 
(AAM) the fighter can carry in its low-observable configuration, installing thrust-vectoring engine 
nozzles, and adding super cruise capability by installing higher-thrust indigenous WS-15 engines. 
Development continues on the smaller FC-31/J-31 for export or as a future naval fighter for the 
PLAN’s next class of aircraft carriers. 


 
 
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Bombers. The PRC’s bomber force is currently composed of H-6 Badger variants, which are 
domestically produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber. Despite the relative 
age of its bomber force, the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the operational 
effectiveness of these aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded greater numbers of the H-6K, 
a modernized H-6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and features more-efficient turbofan 
engines for extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs, giving the PLA a long-range standoff 
precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second Island Chain from home airfields in 
mainland China. PLAN Aviation has traditionally fielded the H-6G to support maritime missions. 
More recently, PLAN Aviation has begun operating the H-6J, a maritime strike version of the H-
6K with six weapons pylons for ASCMs. This aircraft carries six supersonic long-range YJ-12 
ASCMs and can attack warships out to the Second Island Chain.  
During the PRC’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N, a 
derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-range strikes. The H-6N features a modified fuselage 
that allows it to carry externally an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may be nuclear 
capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was observed carrying an air-launched ballistic missile. The 
H-6N’s air-to-air refueling capability also provides it greater reach over other H-6 variants that are 
not refuelable in air. In 2020, the PLAAF operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a 
platform for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N-equipped unit very 
likely is developing tactics and procedures to conduct the PLAAF nuclear mission.  In addition, 
the PLAAF is seeking to extend its power projection capability with the development of a new H-
20 stealth strategic bomber, with official PRC state media stating that this new stealth bomber will 
have a nuclear mission in addition to filling conventional roles.   The PLAAF is also developing 
new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders 
publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this 
type of advanced bomber. 
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9 communications 
jamming/electronic countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-11). This aircraft is designed to 
disrupt an adversary’s battlespace awareness at long ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to-air 
refueling operations to extend the ranges of its fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with refueling 
probes using the H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a small number of 
larger IL-78 Midas. In addition, the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its Y-20 heavy-lift 
transport, which will enable the PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve the PLAAF’s ability 
to operate beyond the FIC from bases in mainland China.  
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500—the PRC’s most advanced airborne early warning and 
control (AEW&C) aircraft—continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-2000 Mainring and KJ-
200 Moth variants. These aircraft amplify PLAAF’s ability to detect, track, and target threats in 
varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances, It also extends the range of the 
PLA’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. Furthermore, the PRC has produced at least 
one KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which will improve the aircraft’s ability to provide 
persistent AEW&C coverage. 


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The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large 
transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports will 
supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which to date, 
consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports are intended 
to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic reconnaissance 
operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). The PRC continues its comprehensive UAS modernization 
efforts, highlighted by the routine appearance of increasingly sophisticated systems across theater 
and echelon levels. The last three years have seen several key milestones. These include the 
airshow display and operational appearance of the Xianglong jet-powered UAS, as well as the 
unveiling of both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a redesigned version of the GJ-11 stealth 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). The PLA also continues the maritime use of ISR UASs, 
featuring both the venerable BZK-005 and the newer TW-328/TB001. The PRC is also expanding 
the applications of large UASs by demonstrating uses including disaster communications, anti-
submarine roles, firefighting, and weather modification. Advanced small UASs are increasingly 
appearing in both military and civilian applications, with Chinese industry remaining a key 
exporter of UASs and components of all sizes. 
In addition to maturing their current capabilities, the PRC is also signaling its efforts in next 
generation capabilities. Air and trade shows are displaying growing numbers of autonomous and 
teaming systems, including for combat applications. In these concepts, Chinese developers are 
demonstrating an interest in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into both air-to-air and air-to-
ground combat, with a substantial amount of development displaying efforts to produce swarming 
capability for operational applications. 
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-range 
SAM systems in the world, composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) battalions and 
domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions. To improve its strategic 
long-range air defenses, in 2019 the PRC acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM system from Russia. 
The PRC is also developing its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will likely have a 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The PRC is also developing kinetic-kill vehicle 
technology to field a mid-course interceptor, which will form the upper layer of a multi-tiered 
missile defense. The PLA conducted a test of a land-based mid-course interceptor on February 4th, 
2021. 
PLAAF AIRBORNE CORPS 
The PLAAF Airborne Corps commands six airborne combined arms brigades, a SOF brigade, an 
operational support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, a training base, and a new training 
brigade. The six combined arms brigades consist of three airborne infantry, one air assault, one 
wheeled airborne mechanized (wheeled air droppable armored vehicles), and one tracked airborne 
mechanized (tracked air droppable armored vehicles). 


 
 
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Each airborne combined arms brigade typically commands four combined arms battalions, an 
artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support battalion, and 
a service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion. 
  
 
Major Aviation Units  
 
 
 


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PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic
deterrence” capabilities.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos and has loaded at least
some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into these silos.
●The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile
forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction
of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
●The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range
missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten
conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.
The PLARF organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and 
conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a 
critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter 
third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper, 
the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear 
deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, 
and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket 
force.” 
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s ground-
based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF 
and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces include the CSS-6 (DF-15) short-range 
ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km), the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km), the CSS-11 
(DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km), land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) 
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km), the hypersonic glide vehicle 
capable DF-17 MRBM, the DF-26 Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (3,000 km-
4,000km), the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km), 
and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally-armed 
CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range 
precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland 
China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle 
(MaRV) and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow 
its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting 
precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS 
from mainland China. In 2020, the PRC fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target 
in the SCS. The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles 
and developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary BMD systems. The DF-17 passed 
several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert 
described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the 
Western Pacific. The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed 
intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the 
PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and 
Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability. 
The PLARF is developing ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces 
with more survivable delivery systems. The PRC has doubled and continues to grow the number 
of launchers at most ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists of approximately 350 ICBMs, 
including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and multiple reentry vehicles. 
The PRC’s fixed ICBMs consist of the multiple CSS-4 (DF-5)-class missiles, one of which is 
capable of carrying up to five (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) MIRV’s and a 
silo-based CSS-10-class missile.  The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 (DF-31)-class and CSS-
20 (DF-41) ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess 
of 11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. The DF-41 ICBM 
has been operationally deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades 
existed for the system. Additionally, sources indicate a “long-range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in 
development. Official PRC military writings indicate this range-class spans 5,000-8,000 km, which 
means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. The PRC probably is developing advanced 
nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a fractional orbital 
bombardment (FOB) system.  
 
CHINA’S ROCKET FORCE 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM 
500 
350 
>5,500 km 
IRBM 
250 
500 
3,000-5,500 km 
MRBM 
300 
1,000 
1,000-3,000 km 
SRBM 
200 
1,000 
300-1,000 km 
GLCM 
150 
300 
>1,500 km 


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Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles 


 
 
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Fielded Conventional Strike 
 
 
 
 
 


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STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF) 
Key Takeaways 
●The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic
space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare
missions and capabilities.
●The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace
Force (CSF; 网络空间部队) is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission
set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and
psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred
to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations.
●The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can
contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or
conflict.
●The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant
resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil
applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.
SSF works with civilian organizations, such as universities and research organization, to
integrate civilian support to military efforts.
The SSF was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF reports directly to the CMC and 
supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the 
SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and 
accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and 
modernized strategic support force.” 
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the SSD, sometimes referred 
to as the ASF, is responsible for military space operations, and the NSD, sometimes referred to as 
the CSF, responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, 
EW, cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a 
four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, and 
Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the CMC, 
but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The SSF provides 
information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to all PLA services 
and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – typically comprised of 
personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, Ministry of Public Security, 
Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment SSF cyberspace operations during 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
peacetime and are organized into specialized units during wartime to support network defense 
operations. 
General Ju Qiansheng has served as SSF commander since 2021. He previously served as 
commander of the NSD. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong recently served as commander of the SSD, until 
leaving that position sometime in 2023, but a replacement has not been identified. The leader of 
the NSD is unknown.  
Network Systems Department. The SSF NSD, also referred to as the CSF, is responsible for 
information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
EW, and psychological warfare.  By placing the SSF NSD missions under the same organizational 
umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered 
information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform organizational structure. The incorporation of 
cyberspace and EW elements under one organization was a crucial step towards realizing the 
operational concept of integrated network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since 
the early 2000s. The NSD operates five theater–aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a number 
of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The NSD provides intelligence 
support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection 
assets to provide a common operating picture to geographically dispersed operational units. 
The SSF and the “Three Warfares” Concept: The SSF NSD, or CSF, performs 
missions and tasks associated with the PLA’s concept of “Three Warfares,” which 
comprises psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare.  This 
department is the only publicly known organization in the PLA that performs 
psychological warfare operations. See 2022 CMPR “Special Topic: PRC Views of 
Information and Information Dominance” for more on PLA views on information 
warfare, including psychological warfare. 
SSF SPACE SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT 
The SSD, sometimes referred to as the ASF, is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, 
including space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space 
telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare.   The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s 
command and control C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and capabilities of its space 
systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well as the BeiDou navigation 
satellite system.  
The SSD operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions are the launch, 
tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to the PRC’s overhead C4ISR architecture.  The 
SSD operates tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) stations in multiple locations worldwide 
to guide space missions around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space.   The SSD also 
operates Yuanwang space support ships that track satellite and ICBM launches.  


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China has five launch sites, including four land-based and one sea-based. The SSD’s China Launch 
and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four fixed launch sites in China, in addition to 
Yuanwang space support ships (SESS), two major satellite control centers—Xian Satellite Control 
Center (XSCC) and the Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC)—and the PLA TT&C system 
for all Chinese satellites. 
Other Space and Counterspace Organizations. The PRC’s space program comprises 
organizations in the military, civil, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA 
historically has managed the PRC’s space program and continues to support both civilian and 
military interests. This includes strengthening and investing in its science and technology sector, 
growing international partnerships, and improving the PRC’s capabilities in space-based ISR, 
SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although state-
owned enterprises are China’s primary space contractors, the PRC is placing greater emphasis on 
decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.  
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages the PRC’s 
space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also maintains a 
working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees the PRC’s military acquisitions. 
SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting the PRC’s space 
activities.  
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, conducts China’s 
civilian space efforts, including human spaceflight at the Chinese space station, lunar missions, 
and interplanetary missions. The PRC is increasingly using CNSA efforts to bolster relationships 
with countries around the world, particularly with the BRI Partners, providing opportunities to 
cooperate on space issues.  
Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose and the PRC emphasizes 
“military-civil fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, policies, 
and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations like universities 
and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts since there is an 
already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human resources. China also 
has a growing commercial space sector that supports government objectives, including remote 
sensing, launch, and communication services. 
International Cooperation. The PRC has extensive civil space cooperation agreements around 
the world and is an exporter of satellites and space technology. It has more than a hundred 
cooperative space-related agreements with more than three dozen countries and four international 
organizations. The PRC is inviting countries to participate on the Chinese space station or 
International Lunar Research Station, which is jointly led by China and Russia, and has sold 
satellite launching services and ground stations to countries around the world.   


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral 
organization with rotating leadership whose members include Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members. 
APSCO oversees a network of space surveillance telescopes and tasking information, and the 
observation data it collects is funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National 
Astronomical Observatory of China. The organization is planning to improve optical system 
capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.  
 
Major SSF Installations 
JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (JLSF) 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Key Takeaways 
●The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic
efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services.
●The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA
forces and equipment for training.
The PLA JLSF, established in 2016, provides integrated joint logistics support for the PLA. The 
JLSF commander is Lt. Gen. Wang Liyan. The JLSF is directly subordinate to the CMC and is 
central to China’s efforts to build a joint, efficient “combat-oriented modern logistics system,” 
which Beijing views as essential for modern warfare. The JLSF modernizes PLA strategic- and 
campaign-level logistics by overseeing theater wide supply operations, establishing and 
coordinating support relationships among PLA service logistics elements conducting joint logistics 
exercises with the PLA services, and integrating civilian logistics resources into military 
operations. The JLSF conducts exercises to improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint logistics 
operations.  
The JLSF is headquartered at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base.  It operates five joint logistics 
support centers (JLSCs) aligned with each of the theater commands that are intended to streamline 
logistics support to the PLA. Under the JLSCs’ control are units that provide materiel support to 
the PLA and joint logistics support brigades (JLSBs), who focus exclusively on providing mobile 
logistics support during combat operations.  
The JLSF provides the PLA with joint strategic- and campaign-level logistics, enabling the PLA 
to conduct large-scale operations. Elements of the JLSF who provide direct wartime support to the 
PLA fighting force are categorized as weapons and ammunition storage, warehousing, medical 
services, transport, fuel, engineering and construction management, reserve equipment, and 
procurement support. During peacetime, the JLSF has authority over the JLSCs’ operations and 
activities; during wartime, theater commands possibly would assume control of their designated 
JLSC. 
The JLSF integrates civilian resources and equipment into military operations and exercises, 
leveraging China’s civilian products, services and transportation, to improve resupply and move 
military personnel and equipment more rapidly. It does so primarily through the use of military 
representative offices (MROs) comprised of JLSF personnel who embed with civilian 
transportation companies (air, rail, road, and sea) to plan and manage military transportation. MRO 
personnel are vital to the JLSF’s military-civilian integration efforts because they understand the 
technical loading procedures for various modes of transportation, can draft load plans, and provide 
expertise to reduce load times at points of embarkation. JLSF theater dispatch centers are the 
headquarters of regional MROs, coordinate PLA mobilization, and are tasked with improving the 
efficiency of transferring materials and forces between transportation modes.  


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
PLA Training to Improve Readiness. The CMC sought to improve PLA combat readiness, 
interoperability, and training through the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced these priorities 
through military training mobilization orders and senior leadership guidance. In 2022, Xi 
emphasized the need for the PLA to adopt the latest technologies in its training and to focus on 
integrating training with combat operations The PLA conducted multiple large-scale joint 
exercises and incorporated advanced weapons and equipment, such as during the exercises around 
Taiwan in August.  
Throughout 2022, the PLA sustained the frequency, scale, and duration of joint exercises.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic likely did not significantly impact the PLA’s ability to conduct joint 
exercises. The PLA successfully completed at least eight bilateral and multinational exercises, 
conducting naval drills, maritime and aerial patrols, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
efforts. Although the PLA has improved some combat deficiencies, the force, as a whole, probably 
continues to work through challenges with joint operations, command and control, and tactical and 
small-unit leadership. 
The largest unplanned event of the year occurred in August 2022, when the PLA conducted live-
fire drills—including firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan—in response to the CODEL visit to 
Taipei in August 2022. During the visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that 27 PLA aircraft 
entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, including 22 that crossed the median of the 
Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s centerline crossings have continued since August as the PLA maintains 
a heightened readiness level. Such activity reflects ongoing PLA attempts to normalize median 
line crossings. 
INCREASING OPERABILITY WITH PLA RESERVES, PARAMILITARY 
& MILITIA  
Key Takeaways 
● Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s 
paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination 
between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM).    
● The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime organizations in maritime disputes, selectively 
using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation. 
 


 
 
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THE PRC’S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES 
The PRC’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and the militia.  The CCP relies on these forces to address 
challenges ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic 
problems, to terrorism and natural disasters.  In 2022, the PRC deployed thousands of 
PLA, PAP, and militia personnel for disaster relief in response to multiple events such as 
an airplane crash, earthquakes, fires, and floods.   
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads the PRC’s civilian national police, which 
serves as the front force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law 
enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including anti-
rioting and anti-terrorism. 
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and 
counterintelligence service. MSS operations include but are not limited to: protect the 
PRC’s national security; conduct counterintelligence; combating foreign espionage; and 
investigate organizations or individuals inside the PRC who carry out or direct, support, or 
aid other people perceived to threaten national security. On April 26th, 2021, the PRC 
enacted a new counter-espionage law permitting the MSS authority to identify companies 
and organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require 
these institutes to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration.  
People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed 
forces.  Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and 
augmentation to the PLA during conflict. As part of a security structures reorganization in 
2018, the CMC centralized control of the PAP. The same reform also subordinated the 
CCG to the PAP. 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA has 
formal and informal roles in the PRC’s internal security. As the principal armed wing of the 
CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s survival and supports other internal 
security forces as necessary. The 2020 National Defense Law recognizes this role in 
assigning the PLA the mission to “consolidate the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China and the socialist system” in addition to external defense tasks. 
Militia. The PRC’s militia is a force that can be mobilized for a variety of peace- and war-
time missions and is distinct from the PLA’s Reserve Force. The militia is organized by 
townships, administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions, 
and the missions may vary widely. In wartime, militia units assist the PLA with its military 
operations, conduct independent security operations, and provide support and manpower 
replacement to the PLA. During peacetime, the militia assists in humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief, supports military training, and maintains internal security. The PRC’s 
Military Service Law requires male citizens between 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for 
military service, excluding those already in active service, be enrolled into the militia. The 


 
 
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militia is divided into two categories. The primary militia consists of former soldiers, 
personnel that have received military training, and personnel selected for military training 
that are under the age of 28, in good health, and politically reliable. The remainder of male 
citizens between 18 and 35 years of age are considered ordinary militia. The primary 
militia may recruit female citizens when necessary and the age limits can be waived under 
special circumstance. Local maritime militia forces, referred to by many western analysts 
as the Chinese Maritime Militia, perform tasks including safeguarding maritime claims, 
protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance and 
reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG. 
 
People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force. The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force was 
founded in 1983 and professionalized throughout the 1990s and 2000s. On July 1st, 2020, the PRC 
amended laws, regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve Force under the command of the 
Central Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous arrangement split control of the 
Reserve Force between the PLA and local Party committees. Motivations for the change include 
improving combat capability, facilitating cooperation with active-duty units, and upholding the 
CCP’s absolute leadership over the military. Chinese sources often stated specifically that the 
reform would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA appears 
to have begun making a partial restructure towards using a PLAA reserve base system to continue 
to improve facilitation and support for active-duty units. 
The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate to the Army 
Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve. According to PLA 
documents, active-duty personnel are the backbone of the Reserve Force, but reserve-duty officers 
and soldiers are its foundation. 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy 
states the building of the reserve force is an important part of national defense construction and is 
the basic and strategic project to consolidate national defense. The primary mission of the reserves 
is to reinforce active-duty forces for national defense, with a secondary mission to aid in national 
disasters or maintaining social order. The Reserve Force should be prepared to effectively respond 
to a variety of emergencies and military threats, safeguard national sovereignty, security and 
development interests, and the core security of the country. 
Although originally founded to support the ground forces, reforms in recent years seek to reduce 
PLAA reserves and increase those for the PLAN, PLAAF, and the PLARF. However, PRC 
writings suggest that, as of 2018, the Reserve Force was still predominately ground force-centric, 
with less than 10 percent of reservists serving specialized technical functions in the PLAN, 
PLAAF, PLARF, or PLA SSF. 
Reserve officers are selected from veteran PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia officers, 
and other technical personnel. Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA veterans, trained 
grass-roots militias, and other local or military specialty personnel. Some reserve soldiers also 


 
 
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failed to meet active-duty entry requirements and conduct remedial training in the reserves until 
they are able to join the active-duty force.  
The PLA is working to improve reserve mobilization, which anecdotal evidence suggests is 
hindered by unclear processes. In March 2023, during the PRC’s annual “Two Sessions,” PLA 
deputies suggested that the PRC should study and prioritize wartime legislation, including the 
introduction of laws such as the mobilization of reserve forces. Chinese documents also suggest 
that Reserve Force equipment is old; one report in 2018 stated that more than 70 percent of air 
defense artillery and artillery equipment is at or beyond its maximum service life. Some of the 
equipment is no longer manufactured and repair requires cannibalization. 
The PLA Reserve Force does not include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad other groups 
(e.g., the People’s Armed Police or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)). 
PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE (PAP)  
The PAP is a component of the PRC’s armed forces and an armed wing of the CCP with an 
estimated 660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military 
Strategy, the primary responsibilities of the PAP include maintaining political, institutional and 
regime security, handling emergency rescue, counter-terrorism, air support, maritime rights 
protection, administrative law enforcement, and defense operations. The PAP is organized into 
three main parts: the Internal Security Corps, the Mobile Corps, and the CCG. The Internal 
Security Corps covers each of the PRC’s provinces, provincial-level cities, and “autonomous” 
regions. There is not yet a reported permanent presence of the PAP in the Special Administrative 
Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong or Macao. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad PAP units 
placed to reinforce the Internal Security Corps and provide flexibility in responding to internal 
security issues. Mobile Corps units are concentrated around non-Han ethnic regions in the West 
and South (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai) as well as the major cities of Beijing 
and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular focus of the PAP due to alleged separatist activity, as well 
as its proximity to areas of unrest in Central Asia.  
On July 1st, 2020, the standing committee of the PRC’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, 
approved a revision to the Law on the People’s Armed Police Force which officially recognized 
the CMC singular command of the PAP, identified the PAP as an important part of the armed 
forces that fall under the leadership of the CCP, as well as affirming its primary mission set of 
handling security emergencies, maintaining stability, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and 
executing maritime law enforcement and rescue. This legal amendment codified and deepened the 
substantial reforms of 2018, when command of the PAP was centralized under the Central Party 
Committee and the CMC after decades of dual-leadership under the CMC and State Council (a 
PRC government body); the China Coast Guard was subordinated to the PAP; and myriad auxiliary 
duties (e.g., protecting gold mines, firefighting, etc.) were removed from the PAP’s purview to 
focus its mission on PRC domestic and international security. Chinese media noted that the 2020 


 
 
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PAP reforms included an article that permitted the PAP to conduct certain operations, including 
counter-terrorism training, outside of the PRC. 
Xi and the CCP leadership tasked the PAP with integrating themselves into the PLA’s joint 
operation system. The PAP is increasingly focused on internal security and joint operations with 
the PLA and is developing capabilities for rapid response, mobility, and counterterrorism 
operations. The PAP also conducts training with foreign partners, including at least Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP forces have likely operated in Tajikistan, 
patrolling the tri-border region connecting Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC. 
In 2022, PAP forces performed rescue operations in Xining following major flooding in August 
and in Sichuan after a September 5th earthquake and acquired new helicopters to support in 
counter-terrorism and disaster relief tasks. An emphasis was also placed on PAP SOF training 
throughout the year, including a maritime tactical joint exercise in June with PLANMC. 
Additionally, a PAP officer was named as the commander of the PLA Garrison in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, showing a PRC focus of maintaining social stability based on the 
new commander’s counter-terrorism experience in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.  
CHINA COAST GUARD (CCG)  
The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a wide range of maritime security 
missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; combating smuggling, terrorism, and 
environmental crimes; as well as supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing 
Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect 
on 1 February 2021. The legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, 
and applies those duties to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with concern 
by other regional countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially 
as territorial disputes in the region continue.  
Since the law, CCG activity has continued to prompt regional concern. In March 2022, the 
Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest against the PRC after a CCG vessel reportedly engaged in 
“close distance maneuvering” near a Filipino vessel in the disputed Scarborough Shoal. In 
December 2022, Japan reported that CCG vessels stayed in its territorial waters for over 72 hours, 
the longest continuous intrusion since 2012. 
The CCG’s continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest maritime law enforcement 
fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable than older vessels, allowing 
them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. While exact numbers are 
unavailable, open-source reporting and commercial imagery counts indicate the CCG has over 150 
regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels include over 
20 corvettes transferred from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. , The newer, 
larger CCG vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, multiple 
interceptor boats and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters., Revised estimates indicate the CCG 


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operates more than 50 regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for 
limited offshore operations, and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499 tons). 
CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA 
China’s Maritime Militia (CMM) is a subset of the PRC’s national militia, an armed reserve force 
of civilians available for mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to the CMC through the 
National Defense Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around 
towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission.  
CMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China 
Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. These operations 
traditionally take place within the FIC along China’s coast and near disputed features in the SCS 
such as the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reed, and Luconia Shoal. However, the presence 
of possible CMM vessels mixed in with Chinese fishing vessels near Indonesia’s Natuna Island 
outside of the “nine-dashed line” on Chinese maps indicated a possible ambition to expand CMM 
operations within the region. The PRC employs the CMM in gray zone operations, or “low-
intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response 
by the other parties involved. The PRC employs CMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty 
claims, often amassing them in disputed areas throughout the SCS and ECS. In this manner, the 
CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting 
and these operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational 
operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.  
CMM units have been active for decades in incidents and combat operations throughout China’s 
near seas and in these incidents CMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the 
forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. 
From September 2021 to September 2022, maritime militia vessels were a constant presence near 
Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines EEZ. Other notable examples include 
standoffs with the Malaysia drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 drill 
rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Reef (2012), and 
harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014).   Historically, the 
maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 
seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly 
Islands in 1994. 
The CMM also protects and facilitates Chinese fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. From 
late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 Chinese fishing vessels operated 
under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in Indonesian claimed waters northeast 
of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the Chinese ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated 
with known traditional maritime militia units, including a maritime militia unit based out of Beihai 
City in Guangxi province.  While most traditional maritime militia units operating in the SCS 


 
 
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continue to originate from townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of 
increasingly prominent maritime militia units based out of provinces in mainland China. These 
mainland based maritime militia units routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern 
SCS, and their operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the Chinese 
government to improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.  
CMM AND LAND RECLAMATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Since at least 2014, CMM vessels have engaged in covert small scale reclamation activity 
and likely caused physical changes observed at multiple unoccupied features in the 
Spratly Islands, including Lankiam Cay, Eldad Reef, Sandy Cay, and Whitsun Reef. Beijing 
likely is attempting to covertly alter these features so that it can portray them as naturally 
formed high tide elevations capable of supporting PRC maritime claims out to the farthest 
extent of the nine-nash line. In contrast to the PRC large-scale reclamation program, 
which was overt and where the original status of occupied features is well documented, 
the less well-known historical record about many of the unoccupied features makes them 
more susceptible to PRC efforts to shape international opinion regarding the status of the 
features. 
 
Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes various local and 
provincial commercial organizations to operate CMM vessels to perform “official” missions on an 
ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. CMM units employ marine 
industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While retaining 
their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can 
be activated on demand.  
Since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 235 large steel-hulled 
fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons.  These vessels 
were built under central direction from the PRC government to operate in disputed areas south of 
12 degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly Waters,” including the Spratly 
Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built for prominent CMM units in 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces.  For vessel owners not already affiliated with CMM 
units, joining the militia was a precondition for receiving government funding to build new Spratly 
backbone boats.  As with the CCG and PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
enhance the CMM’s ability to sustain operations in the SCS. 
Starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has been developed into 
a salaried full-time maritime militia force with its own command center and equipped with at least 
84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel 
hulls for ramming. Freed from their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia 
personnel – many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors – train for peacetime and wartime 


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contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features 
even during fishing moratoriums. 
The Tanmen Maritime Militia is another prominent CMM unit. Homeported in Tanmen township 
on Hainan Island, the formation was described by Xi as a “model maritime militia unit” during a 
visit to Tanmen harbor in 2013. During the visit, Xi encouraged Tanmen to support “island and 
reef development” in the SCS. Between 1989 and 1995, the Tanmen Maritime Militia, under the 
authority of the PLAN Southern Theater Navy (then the South Sea Fleet), was involved in the 
occupation and reclamation of PRC outposts in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef.  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Key Takeaways 
●Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat
experience.
●China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of
China’s SOF activities.
●Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP
units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
●The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and
international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and
the Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious).
In late 2015, the PRC’s SOF were impacted by a series of reforms that aimed to “reorganize troops 
and rebuild new-type combat forces. New types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct 
special operations, all-dimensional offense and defense, amphibious operations, far seas 
protection, and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, combined, 
multi-functional, and flexible.” In 2016, additional changes to Chinese law were made authorizing 
the PRC’s SOF to conduct operations outside of China’s borders. 
Mission. The PRC’s SOF are tasked to conduct three primary missions; direct action, special 
reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. The goal of the PRC’s SOF operations are to prepare the 
battlefield for their conventional force counterparts by attacking critical areas, degrading enemy 
operational systems and capabilities, and delaying or disrupting enemy operational activities. In 
conventional warfare, the PRC’s SOF missions include, but are not limited to, disrupting rear 
echelon formations and activities, destroying or securing key targets, decapitation, and targeting 
for fire support.  The PRC’s SOF can also conduct humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) 
missions, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and personal security assignments. While 
PLA SOF can conduct counterterrorism missions, PAP SOF are specifically tasked with this 


 
 
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mission.  The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and 
international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and the 
Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious). 
● PLA Army SOF. PLAA SOF train to clear obstacles, operate behind enemy lines, land 
navigation, reconnaissance, targeting, blocking maneuvers, and first aid. PLAA SOF units 
from the Eastern Theater Command train for maritime missions by swimming, maneuvering 
small rubber boats, marksmanship from moving boats, and scuba diving. In a 2016 exercise, 
forces from a Southern Theater Command Army SOF Brigade (BDE) conducted an air assault 
mission off the coast then traveled 5 km to the shoreline. 
● In September 2020, attack and transport helicopters from the 73rd Army Group (GA) conducted 
air assault training with elements from a 73rd GA SOF BDE. 
● That same month, elements from a Southern Theater Command SOF BDE deployed to a new 
training area and conducted a command post exercise and force-on-force exercise. 
● PLA Navy Marine Corps SOF. PLANMC SOF are trained to conduct ground-based special 
operations, as well as coastal and maritime missions, including maritime counterterrorism, 
HADR, NEO and visit, board, search and seizure operations. They train for more than a year 
learning airborne, rappelling, reconnaissance, secure communication, navigation, driving, 
search and seizure, demolition, and hand-to-hand combat skills. They also practice deploying 
rubber boats and fast-roping from helicopters into the water. In December 2020, PLANMC 
SOF participated in a combined arms island seizure exercise with mechanized infantry units 
where the SOF used mine-clearing line charges to destroy obstacles with sniper teams in 
overwatch. 
● PLA Air Force Airborne Corps SOF. The PLAAF Airborne Corps, created in 2011, train to 
conduct high-altitude, high-opening and high-altitude, low-opening airborne missions for 
critical target seizure, combat search and rescue, and fire support coordination during 
extraction. 
● PLA Rocket Force Reconnaissance Regiment. The PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment 
which is based in Qinghai, can conduct air, land, and sea missions including counter-ISR, 
strategic asset protection, special reconnaissance, and target acquisition. 
● People’s Armed Police SOF. The PAP has three main SOF units assigned to the two mobile 
contingents and the Xinjiang Military District. The Mountain Eagle Commando Unit created 
in 2019 and based in Xinjiang is trained to conduct counterterrorism missions within the 
province. The other two PAP SOF units, the Snow Leopards Commando Unit and the Falcon 
Commando Unit, are large rapid reaction forces with mixed capabilities that can be deployed 
in major contingencies on a national level. These units are also trained to conduct 
counterterrorism missions along with hostage rescue, and include assault, reconnaissance, 
explosive ordnance disposal, and sniper teams. The Snow Leopards have strict selection 


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standards with a 40-50 percent of recruits failing the initial screening. The Snow Leopards’ 
annual “Devil Week” training simulates counterterrorism missions in multiple combat 
environments including desert, jungle, urban terrain, air, and sea. 
Personnel. The PRC’s SOF currently has between 20,000 and 30,000 personnel. The PRC’s SOF 
units are comprised of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers but are also assigned 
new conscripts and officers that recently graduated from basic training or military academy, 
including the Special Operations Academy in Guangzhou. SOF conscripts are selected from 
volunteers suggesting they are among the most qualified that commit to a two-year term of service. 
After their two-year commitment, the conscripts are offered to continue service as 
noncommissioned officers. 
Structure and Organization. Beginning in January 2016, the PLA underwent several reforms 
that impacted the PLA SOF. The seven military regions were reorganized into five theater 
commands (TC) and five of the 18 GA were deactivated. The PLA SOF were also reorganized 
assigning a SOF BDE to each GA along with a SOF BDE for the Xinjiang and Tibet Military 
Districts. These and later reforms also impacted the PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment, the 
PLAAF Airborne Corps SOF BDE, and the PAP SOF units. Some of these SOF units are relatively 
new and were created using conventional forces to expand the PLA’s SOF capability. All PLA 
SOF units are supported by the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps for tactical insertion, 
extraction, and resupply. 
Each PLA SOF BDE has between 2,000 and 3,000 personnel while a regiment has between 1,000 
and 2,000 personnel. While PLA SOF units have discrete missions based on branch and location, 
their internal structure resembles the PLA Army brigade-battalion-company-team construct with 
a main, reserve, and rear command structure. 
There are three SOF units within the PAP which have a total of six detachments. Three 
detachments are assigned to the 1st Mobile Contingent based in Beijing, two detachments are 
assigned to the 2nd Mobile Contingent based in Guangzhou, and one detachment falls under the 
Xinjiang Internal Contingent. 
There is no national-level special operations command responsible for all SOF activities.  PLA 
SOF also does not have organic or dedicated infrastructure or support and therefore must rely on 
conventional forces to support their missions whereas the PAP does have an internal logistic 
support system to support its SOF missions. 


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MAJOR PAP AND PLA SOF UNITS  
HIGHER 
HEADQUARTERS 
UNIT 
UNIT NAME 
Central Military 
Commission 
People’s Armed Police 
Snow Leopards Commando 
Unit 
Falcon Commando Unit 
Mountain Eagle Commando 
Unit 
Northern Theater 
Command 
78th Group Army SOF BDE 
Tigers of the Northeast 
79th Group Army SOF BDE 
Lions 
80th Group Army SOF BDE 
Falcons 
Eastern Theater 
Command 
71st Group Army SOF BDE 
Sharks 
72nd Group Army SOF BDE 
Thunderbolts 
73rd Group Army SOF BDE 
Dragons of the East Sea 
Southern Theater 
Command 
74th Group Army SOF BDE 
Unknown 
75th Group Army SOF BDE 
Sword of the South 
PLA Navy Marine Corps SOF BDE 
Sea Dragons 
Western Theater 
Command 
76th Group Army SOF BDE 
Sirius 
77th Group Army SOF BDE 
Cheetahs 
Xinjiang Military District SOF BDE 
Snowy Owls 
Sharp Blade of the Kunlun 
Tibet Military District SOF BDE 
Snow Leopards of the Plateau 
Central Theater 
Command 
PLA Rocket Force Reconnaissance 
Regiment 
Sharp Blade 
PLA Air Force Airborne Corps SOF 
BDE 
Thunder Gods 
81st Group Army SOF BDE 
Sacred Sword of the East 
82nd Group Army SOF BDE 
Whistling Arrows 
83rd Group Army SOF BDE 
Ferocious Tigers of the Central 
Plain 
Internal Training and Exercises. The PRC’s SOF focus on individual and squad-level training; 
however, they have participated in larger combined arms and joint exercises. SOF training entails 
physical fitness training, close quarters combat, individual and team survival, camouflage, 
weapons proficiency, land navigation, and communication. All PRC SOF units are airborne and 
air assault capable. 
The recent reforms under Xi gave theater commanders authority over a wider range of forces 
including PLA SOF and also emphasized joint training. However, these reforms did not create 
joint task forces which might encourage increased coordination between the services. The 
restructuring to theater commands has not resulted in increased integration of PLA SOF into joint 
training. There is scant evidence of PRC’s SOF units from different services training together or 


 
 
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with conventional forces, the exception being PLAAF aircraft for PLAA SOF airborne training. 
There is also no evidence that PAP SOF units have participated in joint exercises with any PLA 
forces. Theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate 
PAP SOF into PLA training exercises. 
External Training and Exercises. In 2002, the PLA began participating in multinational training 
exercises and since then, PRC’s SOF personnel and units, to include PAP SOF, have taken part in 
several foreign events, primarily focused on counterterrorism.  Some of these events were held 
with units from Belarus, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Jordan.  Individual PLA SOF personnel and small units have participated in training 
in Israel, Turkey, Estonia, Colombia, and Venezuela In August 2021, PLA SOF participated in 
joint training exercise “Zapad” with their Russian counterparts to help maintain security and 
stability in the Transbaikal region. Supported by Y-20 transport aircraft, PLA SOF focused their 
training on large-scale airborne exercises including heavy equipment insertion. Of note, the PAP’s 
Snow Leopards have won the International Warrior Competition held at Jordan’s King Abdullah 
II Special Operations Training Centre in Amman several times. 
Equipment and Sustainment. The PRC’s SOF units are equipped with the most modern 
domestically-produced weapons and equipment.    These include advanced communication and 
electronics, unmanned aerial systems ranging from micro-UAVs to the medium-altitude long 
endurance platforms, night vision devices, targeting devices, parachutes, and light vehicles, boats, 
and aircraft.  PLA SOF units tasked with conducting clandestine maritime missions are also 
equipped with diver navigation aids, radios, undersea sensors, diver propulsion systems, 
underwater personnel delivery systems, and handheld direction-finding sonars for low-visibility 
underwater environments.  
PLA SOF do not have an internal support system to conduct missions and relies on the theater 
command to meet their logistical needs whereas the PAP has an internal logistic system separate 
from the PLA to meet their sustainment needs during operations.   
Operational Capabilities. Most PLA ground SOF units appear to be elite light infantry units that 
can be inserted behind enemy lines but are limited by their conventional force counterpart’s ability 
to support their mission. PLA SOF brigades emphasize a “centralized command style”—common 
in conventional units—as opposed to a more flexible “task-oriented command style” via radio and 
satellite communications. PLA Army SOF brigades also include liaison officers from pertinent 
PLA Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and aviation units in their command post to facilitate SOF 
missions in support of theater command operations. PLA SOF brigades also face the same C2 
issues that conventional PLA brigades encounter. One example from 2019 showed that voice 
communications were difficult to maintain using single-function and limited bandwidth radios and 
satellite communications terminals. This limited communication between the brigade and below 
conventional forces as well as the supporting SOF battalion and below forces. 
Many U.S. SOF activities do not fall within the purview of China’s SOF missions. PLA SOF do 
not conduct military information support operations (also known as psychological operations). 


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These operations are conducted by elements within the PLA Political Department System. 
However, PLA SOF units may assist in larger information support operations, but would not be in 
command. PLA SOF also do not have units equivalent to U.S. Army Civil Affairs units. 
Humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) is a mission conducted by all PLA, PAP, and militia 
units in conjunction with local civilian authorities. The PRC’s SOF may provide support in the 
form of communications and reconnaissance in remote areas, but would not be the lead agency for 
HADR missions. 
Both the PLAA and PLAAF lack aviation assets to conduct long-range insertions of PLA SOF to 
conduct strategic-level direct action or reconnaissance, but they can conduct air insertions of SOF 
in support of theater operations. Helicopters are used to transport SOF for airborne and air assault 
missions. All PLA airborne-qualified SOF train in fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Yun-5 biplane, 
which can also be used for SOF missions. However, the PLA’s shortage of long-range, heavy 
transport aircraft means PLA Air Force units receive priority to use these aircraft for airborne 
training. 
Employment. Since 2008, approximately 70 PLANMC SOF personnel have deployed to the Gulf 
of Aden aboard PLAN vessels as part of the PRC’s counterpiracy operations.   In 2015, PLA SOF 
conducted search and rescue, medical evacuation, and force protection operations in Nepal 
following an earthquake. Also in 2015, PLANMC SOF helped evacuate foreign nationals due to 
the war in Yemen and in 2017, PLANMC SOF recaptured a hijacked freighter from Somali pirates 
in the Gulf of Aden. In 2020, PLA SOF from the Tibet Military Region deployed to the border 
with India following clashes between Chinese and Indian forces along the LAC. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade,
deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region.
●The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the
Indo-Pacific region and globally.
●The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to
strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.


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UNDERGROUND FACILITIES  
The PLA maintains a robust and technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) 
program to conceal and protect all aspects of its military forces, including C2, weapons 
of mass destruction, logistics, and modernized missile, ground, air, and naval forces. The 
PRC has thousands of UGFs and constructs more each year. These UGFs are central to 
The PRC’s counter-intervention and power projection efforts, enabling the PLA to protect 
valuable assets from the effects of missile strikes and to conceal military operations from 
adversaries. The PRC’s emphasis on strategic deterrence has also contributed to the 
construction of UGFs for the country’s nuclear forces, which aims to survive an initial 
nuclear first-strike by an adversary. 
The PRC began to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid- to late-1980s. 
This modernization effort took on renewed urgency following the PRC’s observation of 
U.S. and Coalition air operations during the 1991 Gulf War and their use in OPERATION 
ALLIED FORCE. These military campaigns convinced China it needs to build more 
survivable, deeply buried facilities to protect military assets from the effects of 
penetrating conventional munition and nuclear strikes. Since the 2015-2016 military 
reforms, the PRC has expanded their UGF program to support survivable and redundant 
nodes for its wartime contingency planning. These nodes aim to enable continuous C2, 
communications, sustainment, and counterstrike capabilities across all PLA services and 
domains, as well as its joint forces. The PRC will likely continue to develop and expand its 
UGF program to support its expanding forces and military modernization. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION  
The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a presence 
in the PRC’s immediate periphery and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The 
PLA’s A2/AD—otherwise known as “counterintervention”—capabilities are, to date, the most 
robust within the FIC, although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the Philippine 
Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.  
Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in all 
warfare domains is critical in modern war. The PLA further notes that small elite forces using 
advanced weapons or capabilities can attain military effects that previously required large armies 
and much higher levels of damage and cost.  Therefore, PLA writings state that precision weapons 
are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation. PLA 
documents further state that the range of vital political, economic, and military targets has grown 
as the advanced globalized economy develops, implying that growing PLA strike capabilities will 
attack an increasing array of targets, and, thereby, attain international strategic effects by striking 
critical nodes of the global economy during a future conflict. 


 
 
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The PRC’s military modernization efforts have rapidly transformed the PLA’s missile force. The 
force is increasingly capable of conducting strikes against regional air bases, logistics and port 
facilities, communications, and other ground-based infrastructure—targets that PLA writings 
discuss as adversary vulnerabilities. The PLA is capable of reaching U.S. bases in Guam with 
ballistic and cruise missiles. In the future, PLA LACMs will also likely be deployable on surface 
platforms like the RENHAI-class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K bomber flights into the Philippine 
Sea demonstrate the PRC’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs. The DF-26 
intermediate range ballistic missile is a capable of ranging Guam and is capable of conducting 
nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.  
The PRC views its ability to acquire timely, high-fidelity information as critical to its ability to 
execute precision strikes. The PLA’s information support system for precision strikes depends 
heavily on Strategic Support Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target, and conduct battlefield 
damage assessments. The PRC emphasizes the importance of space-based surveillance capabilities 
in supporting precision strikes and, in 2022, continued to develop its constellation of military 
reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied 
forces. The PRC is also investing in reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and 
communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity 
OTH targeting information for its strike platforms.   
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture 
over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning 
radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also placed radars and 
air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of its IADS. It also 
employs point defenses, primarily to defend strategic targets against adversary long-range cruise 
missiles and airborne strike platforms. 
The PLA has increasing numbers of advanced long-range SAMs, including its indigenous CSA-9 
(HQ-9) and its follow-on HQ-9B, Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU), and SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2), 
all of which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise 
missiles. To improve its strategic air defenses, the PLA possesses Russian-built SA-21 (S-400) 
Triumf SAM systems as a follow-on to the SA-20. Compared to these other systems, the SA-21 
systems possess a longer maximum range, improved missile seekers, and more sophisticated 
radars.  
The PRC manufactures a variety of long-range air surveillance radars, including models claiming 
to support BMD and other models asserting the ability to detect stealth aircraft.  Marketing 
materials also emphasize these systems’ ability to counter long-range airborne strike and combat 
support aircraft. PLAAF AEW&C aircraft such as the KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend the 
PRC’s radar coverage well past the range of its ground-based radars. 
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a limited 
capability against ballistic missiles.  The PRC’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM system 
likely has a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles.  The PLA 


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has SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs and SA-21 (S-400) SAMs that may have some capability to 
engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting infrastructure. The PRC is 
working to develop BMD systems consisting of exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric kinetic-
energy interceptors. The PRC is pursuing a mid-course interceptor that may have capabilities 
against IRBMs and possibly ICBMs.The Type-055 Destroyer has been identified as a platform for 
mid-course intercept capabilities, suggesting the PRC will have forward deployed missile defense 
in the near future. Additionally, the HQ-19 interceptor has undergone tests to verify its capability 
against 3,000 km-class ballistic missiles.  The PLA’s cruise missile defense capability is more 
robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses, with short-to-medium range SAMs, such as the 
HQ-22, augmenting the PLA’s long-range SAMs in this role. 
Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue 
to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly intended to replace 
some older SRBM units, according to PRC media, and is intended to strike foreign military bases 
and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR POWER PROJECTION  
 Key Takeaways 
●The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve China’s regional and global
security objectives beyond its immediate periphery.
●The PLA has emphasized primarily power projection capabilities in the maritime domain,
while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remains limited.
●Improvements of PLA air and naval systems are enabling PLA forces to operate further from
China for longer periods.
PLA ground, naval, air and rocket forces are increasingly capable of projecting power at greater 
distances from China. However, joint service training is still in its infancy and the PLA has 
demonstrated limited joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC.  Instead, overseas activities are 
mostly conducted by single services and do not involve combat. In early 2022, the Southern 
Theater Command Navy conducted a joint distant sea training, where personnel from the Navy, 
Air Force, and Rocket Force served in the joint operations command system.  
Beijing recognizes the importance of increasing military capabilities to achieve global security 
objectives and has encouraged the PLA to increase its operations beyond the Indo-Pacific. China’s 
2015 and 2019 defense white papers claim that Beijing is primarily interested in developing these 
capabilities to protect PRC maritime rights and commercial interests. However, the majority of 
PLA modernization and recent exercises remains focused on winning a regional conflict. As the 
PRC’s economic interests expand in areas like Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, we expect 
to see increased focus on expanding power projection operations globally.  


 
 
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PLAN Operational Experience. The PLAN’s experience in extended range operations is 
primarily derived from naval task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the 
Gulf of Aden, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, or intelligence collection missions. 
However, the PLA does also deploy surface task groups into areas of the western and southern 
Pacific to gain incremental far seas experience.  
● The PLAN has operated in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, deploying 3-4 vessels on average and 
700 personnel for 4-month deployments. As of January 2023, the PLA has deployed 131 
vessels and more than 32,000 personnel across 42 escort missions. 
● In early 2022, the PLAN conducted distant sea joint training in the eastern Indian and western 
Pacific oceans. The task group included two destroyers, an amphibious landing dock, and a 
replenishment ship.  
● In January and February 2022, the PLAN and PLAAF delivered disaster relief supplies to the 
Pacific Island nation Tonga.  
● In March 2022, a PLA naval supply ship conducted resupply at the PLA’s Support Base in 
Djibouti, marking the first time a PLA vessel naval ships berthed at the location. 
● In August 2022, a PLA AGI conducted an intelligence collection mission during the U.S. 
Navy’s international exercise RIMPAC.  
● In September 2022, the PLA conducted a four-day maritime training exercise with guided 
missile destroyers in the South Pacific, near French Polynesia.  
● In November 2022, the Peace Ark hospital ship conducted its first visit since 2018 to Indonesia.  
PLAN PLATFORMS  
New ships enable the PLAN to gradually extend its operational reach beyond East Asia. In 2022, 
the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults, 
capable of launching various fixed-wing aircraft. When commissioned, the carrier will be capable 
of launching various specialized fixed-wing aircraft for early warning, electronic warfare, or anti-
submarine warfare missions, increasing the strike power potential of the PLAN.   
The RENHAI and LUYANG III are the PRC’s premier carrier escort for blue-water operations.  
The RENHAI CG, with 13,000 tons displacement and long-range ASCMs and SAMs, will likely 
be equipped with a planned naval variant of the Z-20 helicopter.  The PLAN is engaged in series 
production of the RENHAI CG with at least eight units in service. The PLAN currently operates 
eight YUCHAO-class amphibious assault ships (LPD) and commissioned its first of three 
YUSHEN-class helicopter assault ships (LHD) in April 2021.  The PLAN’s expanding fleet of 
large modern amphibious warships will enable it to conduct a wide range of expeditionary 
operations to protect the PRC’s interests or in support of international assistance operations.   


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The PLAN is also expanding its logistical capabilities to support long-distance operations. The 
PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable logistical replenishment ships to support long-
duration deployments.  
The PLANMC continues to make strides towards becoming a multidimensional expeditionary 
force capable of conducting operations beyond the FIC to protect the PRC’s growing overseas 
interests. The PLANMC maintains a presence at the PRC’s first overseas military support facility 
in Djibouti, which the PRC refers to as its “PLA support base in Djibouti” (吉布提保障基地), that 
extends The PRC’s military reach and strategic influence in Africa and the Middle East. The 
PLANMC’s presence in Djibouti seeks to enable a military response to contingencies affecting the 
PRC’s investments and infrastructure in the region. 
Aviation Forces (PLAAF, PLAA Aviation, PLAN Aviation). PLA aviation forces are fielding 
advanced platforms capable of supporting future long-distance operations, as their mission sets 
evolve from defending Chinese territorial space to launching offensive operations at distances 
beyond the FIC. While interoperability is a stated priority, joint exercises between the aviation’s 
forces are limited. Individually, the PLAAF, PLAN Aviation, and PLAA Aviation continue to 
improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive operations offshore, including strike, 
air and missile defense, strategic mobility, early warning and reconnaissance missions, and 
insertion. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated calls from its leadership to become a 
truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long distances to advance and defend the PRC’s 
global interests.   
●The PLA’s indigenously developed Y-20A heavy-lift transport has performed numerous
overseas missions, including an April 2022 arms delivery to Serbia. Y-20A aircraft have
delivered humanitarian aid throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the South
Pacific. In 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service, supporting the continued PLAAF
expansion of air refuelable fighters, bombers, and SMA aircraft. These new air refuelable
aircraft will significantly expand the PRC’s ability to conduct long-range offensive air
operations. In addition to aerial refueling, it is expected that there will likely be further Y-20
variants, such as a possible AWAC variant.
●The PRC is developing a new generation of long-range bombers, likely named the H-20,
according to publicly released computer-generated design plans and promotional videos and a
2016 public statement by then PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian. The H-20, which
may debut sometime in the next decade, will have a range of more than 10,000 km, enabling
the PLAAF to cover the Second Island Chain and into the western region of the Pacific. The
H-20 bomber’s range could be extended to cover the globe with aerial refueling. It is also
expected to employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry and feature a stealthy design.
●The PLA Army aviation and air assault units are enabling highly-mobile, modular ground task
force capable of expeditionary operations. According to PRC media, three Z-8 transport


 
 
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aircraft battalions could airdrop a combat battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is also expected to fill 
a variety of missions including special force insertion and shipborne ASW.  
● PRC’s outposts in the SCS extend the operating reach of PLA aviation forces.   
PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF’s strategic cyberspace, technical reconnaissance, 
and psychological warfare capabilities and missions are not bound by geographic constraints and 
can be used independently or to enable and support PLA global power projection operations. The 
SSF’s information support role involves centralizing technical intelligence collection and 
management, which provides strategic intelligence support to the theater commands, enables 
power projection, and aids joint operations.  
The Network Systems Department’s (NSD), also referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF), 
missions across the cyber and information domains and the electromagnetic spectrum probably 
provide key capabilities to support PLA power projection globally, including improving China’s 
access to the cyber domain in peacetime and contesting it in wartime.   
● The PLA integrates offensive and defensive cyber operations into its joint military exercises, 
allowing its cyber personnel to gain operational experience while testing new capabilities.  
● In August 2022, the PLA SESS Yuanwang-5 docked at Hambantota Port, in Sri Lanka. These 
ships are equipped with advanced electronic equipment, sensors, and antenna that can assists 
in tracking satellite, rocket, and ICBM launches.  
The PRC continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent 
an adversary's use of space during a crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed-
energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite 
(ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites. The PRC probably intends to pursue 
additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.  
ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
Key Takeaways 
● The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military 
exercises.  
● The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an 
adversary's military and critical infrastructure systems.   
● The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, 
which it calls "intelligentized warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced 
technologies at every level of warfare.    


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●The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
United States.
Xi has called for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of dominating all networks 
and expanding the country's security and development interests.   PRC military writings describe 
informatized warfare as the use of information technology to create an operational system-of-
systems, which would enable the PLA to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during a 
conflict to conduct integrated joint military operations across the ground, maritime, air, space, 
cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum domains.   The PLA is accelerating the incorporation 
of command information systems, providing forces and commanders with enhanced situational 
awareness and decision support to more effectively carry out joint missions and tasks to win 
informatized local wars.   The PLA continues to expand the scope and regularity of military 
training exercises that simulate informatized operations and likely views offensive and defensive 
cyberspace operations as a means to achieve information dominance early in a crisis or conflict.    
C4I MODERNIZATION  
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Modernization (C4I). 
The PRC continues to prioritize C4I modernization as a response to trends in modern warfare that 
emphasize the importance of rapid information collection, processing, and sharing and accelerated 
decision making. The PLA is continuing modernization and reform efforts, both technologically 
and organizationally, to effectively command complex, joint operations across all warfare domains 
and potentially in multiple theaters.  
The PLA sees networked, technologically advanced C4I systems as essential to providing reliable, 
secure communications to fixed and mobile command posts, thereby enabling rapid, effective, 
multi-echelon decision making. These systems are designed to distribute real-time data – including 
intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather reports via redundant, 
resilient communications networks – to improve commanders’ situational awareness.   PLA field 
commanders view near-real-time ISR and situational data as well as redundant and reliable 
communications as essential to streamlining decision making processes and shortening response 
timelines. Beijing recognizes advantages of near-space ISR capabilities and will probably seek to 
leverage near-space platforms to augment space-based satellite capabilities or provide redundancy 
during times of crisis. The PRC is also fielding the Integrated Command Platform to units at 
multiple echelons across the force to enable lateral and cross-service communications and 
intelligence sharing required for joint operations.  
As the PLA continues to focus on improving its ability to fight and win informatized wars, future 
information systems will likely implement emerging technologies such as automatization, big data, 
the internet of things, AI, and cloud computing to improve process efficiencies. The PLA has 
already begun this process by embracing big data analytics that fuse a variety of data to improve 
automation and to create a comprehensive, real-time picture for warfighters. The PRC’s 


 
 
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increasingly limited access to advanced technologies from the West may impede the PLA’s 
progress toward fully achieving an “intelligentized” military. However, the PRC is pursuing 
domestic production of critical technologies to reduce reliance on foreign sources.   
Electronic Warfare. The PLA considers EW to be an integral component of modern warfare and 
seeks to achieve information dominance in a conflict through the coordinated use of cyberspace 
and electronic warfare to protect its own information networks and deny the enemy the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The PRC’s EW strategy emphasizes suppressing, degrading, 
disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment throughout the continuum of a conflict. The 
PLA will likely use electronic warfare prior to a conflict as a signaling mechanism to warn and 
deter adversary offensive action. Potential EW targets include adversary systems operating in 
radio, radar, microwave, infrared and optical frequency ranges, as well as adversary computer and 
information systems. PLA EW units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming 
operations against multiple communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System 
(GPS) satellite systems during force-on-force exercises.  These exercises test operational units’ 
understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to 
improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic 
environment. In addition, the PLA reportedly tests and validates advances in EW weapons’ R&D 
during these exercises. 
Cyberspace Warfare. The development of cyberspace warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA 
writings, which identify IO – comprising cyberspace, electronic, space, and psychological warfare 
– as integral to achieving information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter 
a stronger foe. The PRC has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security 
and declared its intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
The PRC poses a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military 
and critical infrastructure systems and presents a growing influence threat. The PRC seeks to create 
disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to physical disruptions of 
critical infrastructure—to shape decision making and disrupt military operations beginning in the 
initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC can launch cyberspace attacks that, at a minimum, 
can cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical infrastructure within the United States, and 
the PRC believes these capabilities are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries 
that depend on information technologies. As a result, the PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack 
capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas 
pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.  
Authoritative PLA sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and EW as 
strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and “sabotage the 
enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict. PLA writings judge other countries 
have effectively used cyberspace warfare and other IO in recent conflicts and argue for attacks 
against C2 and logistics networks to affect an adversary’s ability to make decisions and take 
actions in the early stages of conflict. The PLA also considers cyberspace capabilities to be a 


 
 
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critical component in its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture, alongside space and 
nuclear deterrence. PLA studies discuss using warning or demonstration strikes—strikes against 
select military, political, and economic targets with clear awing effects—as part of deterrence. 
Accordingly, the PLA probably seeks to use its cyber-reconnaissance capabilities to collect data 
for intelligence and cyberspace attack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting 
network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense 
critical infrastructure; and, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during 
armed conflict.  
In addition, PLA publications emphasize the importance of cyber defense to defend the PRC’s 
critical infrastructure and military system-of-systems against adversary reconnaissance and 
attacks. The PLA likely views cyber defense as including preventative measures as well as 
offensive actions to deter or disrupt adversary cyberspace activity.  
The PLA may further change how it organizes and commands IO, particularly as the SSF continues 
to develop its capabilities and further integrate into joint planning, exercises, and operations with 
other PLA forces. The SSF likely is generating synergies by combining national-level cyberspace 
reconnaissance, attack, and defense capabilities in its organization, alongside other strategic IO 
capabilities, and integrating into theater command planning and operations. 
 
CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
China-based intrusions continued to target computer systems around the world, including 
those owned by the U.S. Government, throughout 2022. These and past intrusions exploit 
known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. government networks to steal intellectual 
property and develop access into sensitive networks. The PRC uses its cyberspace 
capabilities, not only to support intelligence collection against U.S. academic, economic, 
military, and political targets, but also to exfiltrate sensitive information from the critical 
defense infrastructure and research institutes to gain economic and military advantage 
and possibly for cyberattack preparations. The targeted information can benefit the PRC’s 
defense high-technology industries, support the PRC’s military modernization, provide the 
PRC’s leadership with insights into U.S. plans and intentions, and enable diplomatic 
negotiations. Moreover, targeted information could enable their cyberspace forces to 
build an operational picture of U.S. defense networks, military disposition, logistics, and 
related military capabilities that could be exploited prior to or during a crisis. The access 
and skillset required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct 
cyberspace operations in an attempt to deter, delay, disrupt, and degrade DoD operations 
prior to or during a conflict. Taken together, these cyber-enabled campaigns either directly 
or indirectly impact the United States’ ability to project, or defend against, military action. 


 
 
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Intelligentized Warfare. In recent years, the PLA has increasingly emphasized intelligentization 
as a leading element of its modernization plans. The PRC is in the middle of its 14th Five-Year 
Plan, covering years 2021-2025, in which it outlined the development of intelligentized weapons 
as important to keep pace with modern warfare. Beijing is applying its research into AI 
technologies, such as machine learning and human-machine teaming, to military processes, such 
as decision-making to ultimately gain a cognitive advantage in future warfare.  
PLA strategists have stated new technologies would enhance the PLA’s capability to process and 
utilize information at scale and machine speed, allowing decision-makers to plan, operate, and 
support cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting in the battlefield.  The PLA is 
researching various applications for AI including support for missile guidance, target detection 
and identification, and autonomous systems. The PLA is exploring next-generation operational 
concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, cross-domain 
mobile warfare, AI-based space confrontation, and cognitive control operations.  The PLA also 
considers unmanned systems to be critical intelligentized technology, and is pursuing greater 
autonomy for unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles to enable manned and unmanned 
teaming, swarm attacks, optimized logistic support, and distributed ISR, among other capabilities. 
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways 
● The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere 
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication 
capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” 
● The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite 
communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and 
robotic space exploration.  
● The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as 
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within 
their field of view and enable counterspace actions.  
Space Strategy and Doctrine. The PRC officially advocates for the peaceful use of space and is 
pursuing agreements in the United Nations on the “non-weaponization” of space. The PRC 
continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms to 
better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations. The PRC’s space strategy 
is expected to evolve over time, keeping pace with the application of new space technology. These 
changes probably will be reflected in published national space strategy documents, through space 
policy actions, and in programs enacted by political and military leadership. In September 2021, 
Xi stated that “space is an important strategic asset for the country that must be well managed and 


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utilized and, more importantly, protected,” and called for strengthened space traffic management 
and international cooperation on security issues to improve effectiveness in managing crises in 
space.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and 
to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, 
as a critical component to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”    The PRC’s first public 
mention of space and counterspace capabilities came as early as 1971, largely from academics 
reviewing foreign publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chinese science and technology 
efforts on space began to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of the U.S. space-focused 
Strategic Defense Initiative to defend against the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, after observing the U.S. military’s performance during the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and the second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an effort to modernize weapon 
systems, across all domains including space, and update its doctrine to focus on using and 
countering adversary information-enabled warfare.  
The PRC’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and its 
allies has shaped integral components of PLA military planning and campaigns. In addition, space 
is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed Chinese forces, and the PLA 
sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a U.S. intervention during a regional 
military conflict.  The PRC has claimed that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors” 
would make it difficult for the U.S. and allied militaries to use precision-guided weapons. 
Moreover, Chinese defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, 
and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen 
the enemy.”  
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly 
and Beijing has devoted significant economic and political resources to growing all aspects of its 
space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating 
launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. The PRC’s space enterprise includes the 
SSF and also encompasses other military, government, and civilian organizations, including state-
owned enterprises, academic institutions, and commercial entities. The PLA has historically 
managed the PRC’s space program and the SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for 
nearly all PLA space operations. The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities 
despite its public stance against the weaponization of space. The PLA continues to invest in 
improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and 
meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.  The PRC has built an 
expansive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions 
including spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.
Additionally, the PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct ascent, co-
orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities—that can contest or deny an 
adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.  


 
 
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The PRC has devoted considerable economic and technological resources to growing all aspects 
of its space program, improving military space applications, developing human spaceflight, and 
conducting lunar and Martian exploration missions. In 2022, the PRC conducted over 60 
successful space launches, which is a three-fold increase compared to five years ago. One of these 
launches was a technology testing mission of a reusable spaceplane, which was in orbit from 
August 2022 until May 2023. These 2022 launches carried over 180 satellites into orbit, which is 
a five-fold increase in satellites deployed compared to five years ago.  Last year, the PRC 
completed construction of the three-module Chinese space station.  Furthermore, the PRC has 
launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side of the Moon; a lander and sample return mission 
to the Moon; and an orbiter, lander, and rover in one mission to Mars. The PRC has launched 
multiple ASAT missiles that are able to destroy satellites and developed mobile jammers to deny 
SATCOM and GPS.        
The PRC’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully capable space power. Its rapidly growing space 
program—second only to the United States in the number of operational satellites—is a source of 
national pride and part of Xi’s “China Dream” to establish a powerful and prosperous China. The 
space program, managed by the PLA, supports both civilian and military interests, including 
strengthening its science and technology sector, growing international relationships, and 
modernizing the military. The PRC seeks to rapidly achieve these goals through advances in the 
research and development of space systems and space-related technology.         
The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as 
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their 
field of view and enable counterspace actions.  In concert with its marked improvements in satellite 
navigation, launch capabilities, and space object surveillance and identification, the PRC is 
developing electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers; offensive cyberspace 
capabilities; and directed-energy weapons. Moreover, the PRC has demonstrated sophisticated, 
potentially damaging on-orbit behavior with space-based technologies. The PRC has an 
operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit 
satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying 
satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.    The PRC is employing more sophisticated satellite 
operations and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to 
counterspace missions.   
ISR Satellite Capabilities. The PRC employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to 
enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing and 
mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites 
are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as 
electronic and signals intelligence data. The PRC also exports its satellite technology globally, 
including its domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.  


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As of March 2022, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 290 systems—a quantity second 
only to the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit systems since 2018.   The PLA 
owns and operates about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which could support monitoring, 
tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region. These satellites also allow the PLA to monitor potential regional flashpoints, including the 
Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean, and the SCS.   In early 2023, the United States 
announced sanctions against Chinese companies Spacety and China HEAD Aerospace for 
providing imagery of Ukraine to Russian private military company Wagner during the conflict.  
Recent improvements to the PRC’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, 
procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as 
space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.     These improvements increase China’s 
monitoring capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike 
groups, and deployed air wings.     Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations 
farther from the Chinese coast. These capabilities are being augmented with electronic 
reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio transmissions.  
Satellite Communications. The PRC owns and operates more than 60 communications satellites, 
at least four of which are dedicated to military use. The PRC produces its military-dedicated 
satellites domestically. Its civilian communications satellites incorporate off -the-shelf 
commercially manufactured components. The PRC is fielding advanced communications satellites 
capable of transmitting large amounts of data. Existing and future data relay satellites and other 
beyond-line-of-sight communications systems could convey critical targeting data to Chinese 
military operation centers.   
In addition, China is making progress on its ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront of the 
global SATCOM industry.   China is continuing to test next-generation capabilities like its 
Quantum 
Experimentation 
at 
Space 
Scale 
(QUESS) 
space-based 
quantum-enabled 
communications satellite, which could supply the means to field highly secure communications 
systems.  In 2016, the PRC launched the world's first quantum communications satellite (Micius) 
into low Earth orbit, and in July 2022, the PRC launched an additional experimental quantum 
satellite Testing satellite-based quantum entanglement represents a major milestone in building a 
practical, global, ultrasecure quantum network, but the widespread deployment and adoption of 
this technology still faces hurdles.  
The PRC also intends to provide SATCOM support to users worldwide and plans to develop at 
least seven new SATCOM constellations in low earth orbit (LEO), most notably one from state-
owned enterprise China SatNet. These constellations are still in the early stages of development 
and may begin to launch in the next year.      
Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capabilities. The PRC’s satellite navigation system, 
known as BeiDou, is an independently constructed, developed, and exclusively China-operated 
PNT service. It reached initial operating capability in 2018 and was finalized with its last launch 
in 2020.    The PRC’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national security and economic and 


 
 
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social development by adopting Chinese PNT into precise agriculture, monitoring of vehicles and 
ships, and aiding with civilian-focused services across more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Europe. BeiDou provides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT services to users 
domestically, in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as globally and consists of 49 operational 
satellites. The PRC’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT services to enable force 
movements and precision guided munitions delivery.   
BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy standard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-Pacific 
region is within 5 meters. In addition to providing PNT, the BeiDou constellation offers unique 
capabilities, including text messaging and user tracking through its Regional Short Message 
Communication service to enable mass communications among BeiDou users. The system also 
provides additional military C2 capabilities for the PLA.    
The PRC intends to use its BeiDou constellation to offer additional services and incentives to 
countries taking part in its BRI emphasizing building strong economic ties to other countries to 
align partner nations with the PRC’s interests.  In 2021, China predicted Beidou products and 
services will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and potentially export BeiDou products to more than 
100 million users in 120 countries.  
Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration Efforts. Following uncrewed missions that began 
in 1999, China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight when it 
successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003.  In 2011, China then launched its 
first space station, Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second space station, Tiangong-2.   In 
2020, China conducted its first orbital test of the New-Generation Manned Spaceship, which is 
expected to replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft.  In 2022, China successfully 
launched the Mengtian Chinese Space Station laboratory module into orbit, completing the three-
module Chinese space station. 
China has also taken on a greater role in deep space exploration and space science and has made 
notable accomplishments during the past several years. The PRC has demonstrated its interest in 
working with Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to conduct deep-space exploration.  
China was the third country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and was the first to land a rover 
on the lunar far side in 2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao relay satellite that 
China launched the year before to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon Lagrange point.  In May 
2021, the PRC landed the Zhurong rover on Mars, the first Chinese rover to operate on Mars. This 
rover has provided China with valuable scientific data of the Martian surface and underground. 
Space Launch Capabilities. The PRC is improving its space launch capabilities to ensure it has 
an independent, reliable means to access space and to compete in the international space launch 
market. The PRC continues to improve manufacturing efficiencies and launch capabilities overall, 
supporting continued human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions—including to the 
Moon and Mars. New modular SLVs that allow the PRC to tailor an SLV to the specific 
configuration required for each customer are beginning to go into operation, leading to increased 
launch vehicle reliability and overall cost savings for launch campaigns. The PRC is also in the 


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early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn V or the newer U.S. 
Space Launch System to support proposed crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.  
In addition to land-based launches, in 2019, the PRC demonstrated the ability to launch a Long 
March-11 (LM-11) SLV from a sea-based platform. Since 2021, the PRC has been expanding its 
sea launch infrastructure near Haiyang to expand the frequency of sea launch missions. This 
capability, if staged correctly, would allow the PRC to launch nearer to the equator than its land-
based launch sites, increase the rocket’s carrying capacity, and potentially lower launch costs.  
The PRC has developed quick-response SLVs to increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 
satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could support 
PRC military operations during a conflict or civilian response to disasters. Compared with 
medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite launch campaigns 
because they are transportable via road or rail and can be stored launch-ready with solid fuel for 
longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. Because their size is limited, quick-response SLVs such 
as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 are only able to launch relatively small payloads of 
up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO.  
The expansion of non-state-owned PRC launch vehicle and satellite operation companies in 
China’s domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is successfully advancing military-civil 
fusion efforts. Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these entities and obfuscates the end 
users of acquired foreign technology and expertise.  
Space Situational Awareness. The PRC has a robust network of space surveillance sensors 
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network 
includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow the PRC to support its missions 
including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning (BMEW), 
spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring.  
Electronic Warfare Counterspace Capabilities. The PLA considers EW capabilities to be 
critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive 
enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates in its exercises jamming and anti-jamming 
techniques that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based communications, radar 
systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and precision-guided munitions 
employment. The PRC probably is developing jammers dedicated to targeting SAR, including 
aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR satellites very likely protects 
terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any potential conflict involving the United 
States or its allies.   In addition, China probably is developing jammers to target SATCOM over a 
range of frequency bands, including military-protected extremely high frequency communications. 
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). During the past two decades, PRC defense research has 
proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for 
reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite components. 
The PRC has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or 


 
 
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damage satellites that include a current limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite 
sensors. By the mid- to late-2020s, the PRC may field higher power systems that extend the threat 
to the structures of non-optical satellites.      
ASAT Missile Threats. In 2007, the PRC destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites more 
than 800 kilometers above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The effect of this destructive test 
generated more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which more than 2,700 remain in 
orbit and most will continue orbiting the Earth for decades.   The PLA’s operational ground-based 
ASAT missile system is intended to target LEO satellites. The PRC’s military units have continued 
training with ASAT missiles.   
The PRC plans to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO. 
In 2013, the PRC launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius 
above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No new satellites were released from the object, and 
the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket 
launches for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability could exist to use ASAT technology 
against satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO).   
Orbital Threats. The PRC is developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as 
satellite inspection and repair. At least some of these capabilities could also function as a weapon. 
The PRC has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space maintenance 
technologies and is conducting research on space debris cleanup. The Shijian-17 was the PRC’s 
first satellite with a robotic arm, technology that could be used in a future system for grappling 
adversary satellites. In October 2021, the PRC launched another satellite with a robotic arm, the 
Shijian-21, into GEO, and, in January 2022, it moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a 
high graveyard orbit above GEO.       
Since at least 2006, the PRC has investigated aerospace engineering aspects associated with space-
based kinetic weapons—generally a class of weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets from 
orbit. Space-based kinetic weapons research included methods of reentry, separation of payload, 
delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes.      In July 2021, the PRC conducted 
the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China. This 
demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (~100+ 
minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapons system to date.  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways  
● Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its 
nuclear forces.  Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity. 


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●The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms
while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion
of its nuclear forces.
●In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile
had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023.
●DoD estimates that the PRC will have have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030,
much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force
to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year,
which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by
2049.
●The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce
plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies
are intended for peaceful purposes.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into
these silos. These silo fields are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-41 class ICBMs. This
project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to increase the
peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.
●The PRC is updating its capability to deliver multi-megaton warheads by fielding the new DF-
5C silo based, liquid-fueled ICBM.The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its
current JIN-class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from
PRC littoral waters, and continues to produce additional JIN-class SSBNs.


 
 
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China: ICBM Silo Externally Completed - Hami Silo Fields 
 
Strategy. The PRC’s approach to using nuclear force is based on PLA “deterrence” of an enemy 
first strike and “counterstrike” when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an adversary’s 
military capability, population, and economy.  The PRC’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the 
maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with sufficient strength to 
conduct multiple rounds of counterstrike, deterring an adversary with the threat of unacceptable 
damage to its military capability, population, and economy. The PLA probably selects its nuclear 
strike targets to achieve conflict de-escalation and return to a conventional conflict with a 
remaining force sufficient to deter its adversary. PLA planners would probably avoid a protracted 
series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary, and state that the scale and intensity of 
retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. The buildup of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal may 
change the PRC’s nuclear strategy in the future, while the PLA insists its nuclear policy remains 
clear and consistent.  
● The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a declaratory “no first use” (NFU) 
policy, stating it will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any circumstances. This 
includes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-
weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China’s nuclear strategy 


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probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack 
threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic 
effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to restore 
deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival.  
The PRC’s commingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces during peacetime 
and ambiguities in its NFU conditions could complicate deterrence and escalation management 
during a conflict. If a comingled PRC missile launch is not readily identifiable as a conventional 
missile or nuclear missile, it may not be clear what the PRC launched until it detonates. 
Furthermore, potential adversary attacks against China’s conventional missile force-associated C2 
centers could inadvertently degrade China’s nuclear C2 and generate nuclear use-or-lose the 
pressure to use weapons before they are targeted.  Once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of 
mobile missile systems to hide sites could further complicate the task of distinguishing between 
nuclear and conventional forces and, thus, increase the potential for inadvertent attacks on the 
nuclear forces. PRC leadership calculus for responding to conventional attacks on nuclear forces 
remains a key unknown. 
Readiness. The PLA Rocket Force uses a set of operational procedures to keep part of its force at 
heightened readiness during peacetime, according to PLA documents and media reporting.
PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty” which includes assigning 
a missile battalion to be ready to rapidly launch. Further, a new generation of silo-based ICBMs 
are beginning to enter the force and they will probably be operating under China’s developing 
“Early Warning Counterstrike” (预警反击) posture (the PLA term for launch on warning), 
enabling a rapid responsive nuclear strike. This readiness posture allows the Rocket Force to 
maintain a portion of its units on a heightened state of readiness while leaving the other portion in 
peacetime status with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.  
The PLA also probably has an orderly, pre-planned series of “combat readiness level” steps that 
govern the increases in the readiness of its forces from peacetime to wartime combat operations. 
This process probably allows the PLA to transition most, perhaps all, of its nuclear missile force 
from its current peacetime status to full combat readiness in order to respond to possible 
contingencies.   
Land-Based Platforms. The PRC’s land-based nuclear force primarily consists of ICBMs with 
different basing modes complimented by theater-range road-mobile systems. The PRC has 
approximately 350 ICBMs in its arsenal, all of which can reach CONUS.  


 
 
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Silo-Based Systems. The PRC’s silo-based ICBMs consist of multiple CSS-4 (DF-5 class) liquid-
fueled ICBMs and more recently a CSS-10 (DF-31class) solid-propelled ICBM, which China 
probably began to load at its new silo fields. The PRC is updating its capability to deliver multi-
megaton warheads by fielding the new DF-5C silobased, liquid-fueled ICBM.  The PRC is 
building more silos for DF-5 class ICBMs; increasing the number of brigades while simultaneously 
increasing the number of launchers per brigade – though there is no indication this project will 
approach the size or numbers of the solid propellant missile silos. The PLA probably is also 
developing an upgrade to its existing MIRVed DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBMs. 
China: Military garrisons constructed at newly build ICBM Silo Fields – Guazhou ICBM Silo 
Field Missile Garrison 
 
Road-Mobile Systems. China’s road-mobile ICBMs consist of the solid-fueled CSS-10 (DF-31 
class) and CSS-20 (DF-41) ICBMs. The CSS-20 has improved range and accuracy over legacy 
solid-fueled ICBMS and is armed with no more than three warheads per missile. The PRC is 
establishing additional nuclear units and increasing the number of launchers in mobile ICBM units.  
This strategic arsenal is complemented by road-mobile and DF-26 IRBMs capable of ranging 
targets in the Indo-Pacific region.  


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Sea-Based Platforms. The PRC probably fielded the extended-range CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM on 
China’s JIN-class SSBN, giving the PRC the ability to target the continental United States from 
littoral waters and allowing the PLAN to consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability 
of its sea-based deterrent.  The SCS and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for 
employing this concept.  The PRC also continued to construct additional JIN class SSBNs. It is 
unclear whether continued JIN-class SSBN production is the result of delays in the development 
of the PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN or is an effort to accelerate its sea-based nuclear 
capability as Xi has directed. The Type 096 SSBN is probably intended to field MIRVed SLBMs 
and will likely begin construction in the early 2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the 
PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently. 
The PRC probably continued to conduct near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six 
operational JIN-class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) or CSS-N-
20 (JL-3) SLBMs.
China: PLA Navy Constructs Additional Submarine Piers – Yalong Naval Base 
Air Platforms. The PLAAF has operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform for 
the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N, compared to other H-6 bombers, 
adds an air-to-air refueling probe, as well as its recessed fuselage modifications that would allow 
for external carriage of a nuclear-capable ALBM. The ALBM carried by the H-6N appears to be 
armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle, indicating the ALBM, along with the DF-26 IRBM, is 


 
 
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likely capable of conducting nuclear precision strikes against targets in the Indo-Pacific theater. 
The PRC is probably also developing a strategic stealth bomber, according to PRC state media.  
Future Developments. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to pursue selective 
qualitative parity with an increasing scope of U.S. and Russian capabilities. The PLA seeks a 
diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to 
ICBMs with multi-megaton yields. Developing robust nuclear strike options is likely intended to 
provide deterrence predominantly against a “strong enemy,” as well as ensure China can inflict 
unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming retaliatory capabilities, and thus 
denying an adversary victory if a war escalates to the nuclear domain.  
The PRC is establishing new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities very likely 
to support its nuclear force expansion. Although these efforts are consistent with the PRC’s goals 
to increase nuclear energy generation and to close its nuclear fuel cycle, Beijing likely also 
considers this dual-use infrastructure as crucial to supporting its military goals, judging from 
Chinese nuclear industry reporting and think tank publications. Despite the PRC’s public support 
for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), it is likely that Beijing intends to use this 
infrastructure to produce nuclear warhead materials for its military in the near term. For example, 
the PRC’s efforts to impede progress at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) run contrary to its 
stated commitments of a FMCT.  
● Plutonium Production. The PRC is constructing, with Russian assistance including in the 
form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) supply, two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder 
nuclear reactors at Xiapu, each capable of producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear 
warheads annually from blankets (referring to uranium placed around the fuel core for the 
purpose of breeding plutonium) surrounding the core, according to think tank estimates and 
informed by Chinese state media and nuclear industry reporting. The PRC originally planned 
to use Russian-sourced mixed-oxide (MOX is a blend of uranium and plutonium) fuel for these 
reactors but changed the order to highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel through 2030, according 
to nuclear industry reporting. By using HEU fuel, China has the potential to generate additional 
weapons-grade plutonium. Chinese officials claim the CFR-600 reactors are intended to help 
the PRC achieve its civilian nuclear power and carbon neutrality objectives, but the PRC has 
described the CFR-600s as a “national defense investment project” subject to military nuclear 
facility regulations. By December 2022, Russia delivered the first three batches of HEU 
nuclear fuel assemblies, to China for the first core loading and the first refueling of the CFR-
600. In early 2023, think-tank reporting indicates the quantity of HEU transferred from Russia 
to China for its CFR-600 reactors is more than the entire amount of HEU removed worldwide 
under U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices in the last three decades. 
In March 2023, the PRC and Russia signed an agreement that includes commitments for 
continued cooperation on fast reactor and reprocessing technology development, extending 
this relationship for “the decades ahead.”  


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●Plutonium Extraction. China could extract the WGPu at its 50 ton/year reprocessing plant at
Jiuquan (Plant 404) or at one of the two 200 ton/year reprocessing plants under construction at
the CNNC Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jinta, Gansu Province, the first of
which is expected to be operational by 2025. China has reduced transparency in its nuclear
program as its capabilities are increasing and has not reported its stockpile of separated
plutonium to the IAEA since 2017, according to a Western think tank. China has, thus far,
refused international calls to apply IAEA safeguards, under a Voluntary Offer Agreement on
its civilian reactors.
●Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally associated
with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and likely will continue
to do so. China is also working to expand and diversify its capability to produce tritium by
methods such as using tritium production targets in reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy
water, according to Chinese nuclear industry reporting.
Nuclear Testing. In recent years, the PRC expanded its nuclear warhead research, development, 
testing, and production capacity to support the size and pace of its nuclear stockpile expansion. 
The PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-round and lack of 
transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the 
U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in 
their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.  
EVOLVING NUCLEAR POSTURE  
Though it is often thought that the PRC maintains a “minimum deterrent,” the PRC’s evolving 
nuclear posture is more consistent with its own definition of “limited deterrent.”  Rocket Force 
documents describe these terms as follows: 
●“Minimum Deterrence” is achieving nuclear deterrence with only a small quantity of nuclear
weapons to strike enemy urban targets.
●“Maximum Deterrence” is seeking overwhelming disarming strikes to minimize one’s own
losses and maintain strategic freedom of action; employing overwhelming qualitative and
quantitative superiority, a multi-function offensive system capable of hitting hard targets and
a comprehensive defense system.
●“Limited Deterrence” is the wide space between minimum and maximum deterrence.
The PRC perceived national security requirements will grow as it transitions from a “large 
country” to a “powerful country” and its minimum number of military forces – to include nuclear 
–needed to defend those greater interests is also likely to grow.  In 2022, the PRC rejected requests
by the United States to discuss strategic stability or strategic risk reduction, and other impacts of
the PRC’s rapid nuclear build up.


 
 
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Stockpile Size. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in 
the low-200s and expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear 
expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads 
as of May 2023. By 2030, DoD estimates that the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear 
warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the CONUS.  Beijing has 
not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, has resisted calls in 
multilateral fora for increased transparency, and has declined to engage in substantive arms control 
discussions. We continue to assess the PRC is constructing the infrastructure necessary to support 
this force expansion, including increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by 
constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities. Though this is consistent with the 
PRC goal of closing the nuclear fuel cycle, the PRC likely intends to use some of this infrastructure 
to produce plutonium for its expanding nuclear weapons program. 
The PRC’s long-term nuclear requirements—and the relationship between the PRC’s nuclear 
requirements and its national strategy and goal to field a “world-class” military by mid-century—
remain unclear from public sources. Hawkish PRC state media outlets have asserted that the PRC 
needs 1,000 warheads, while retired PLA officers have suggested that the PRC should possesses a 
“mutually assured destruction” capability. While neither of those claims are official, China’s 
arming of hundreds of silos over the next decade, continued rapid growth in its road-mobile force 
and air and sea legs indicates that beyond 2030, China will probably have over 1,000 operational 
nuclear warheads, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels, and will continue 
growing its force to 2035 in line with previous estimates. These changes to the numbers, capability, 
and readiness of the PRC’s nuclear forces in the coming years are likely to outpace potential 
developments by the nuclear forces of any competitor.  
Regardless of the ultimate number of nuclear weapons it makes, the PRC will probably continue 
to claim it is, like other nuclear powers, adhering to the minimum of nuclear weapons needed to 
protect its security interests.  
Hypersonics and Fractional Orbital Bombardment. The PRC probably is developing advanced 
nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a FOB system in part due 
to long-term concerns about United States missile defense capabilities as well as to attain 
qualitative parity with future worldwide missile capabilities.  On July 27th, 2021, the PRC 
conducted a test of an ICBM-range hypersonic glide vehicle that travelled 40,000 kilometers. The 
test likely demonstrated the PRC’s technical ability to field a FOB system. The PRC does not 
appear to have tested a FOB system in 2022. 
Lower-Yield Nuclear Weapons. The PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead 
capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver. 
PRC strategists have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order to increase the 
deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined specific nuclear yield 
values. A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield weapon had been developed 
for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce collateral damage. By late 2018, 


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PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States would use low-yield weapons against its 
Taiwan invasion fleet, with related commentary in official media calling for proportionate 
response capabilities. The DF-26 is the PRC’s first nuclear-capable missile system that can 
conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most likely weapon system to field a lower-yield 
warhead in the near-term.  
PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear 
weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in the warzone, for 
warning and deterrence. Additional PRC military writings as of 2017 noted that while strategic 
nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with high hit 
precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war. Such discussions 
provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, suggesting PRC 
nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear war is uncontrollable.  
Launch on Warning (LOW). The PLA is implementing a LOW posture, called “early warning 
counterstrike” (预警反击), where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an 
enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple manned C2 organs are involved in 
this process, warned by space and ground based sensors, and that this posture is broadly similar to 
the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, 
especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted 
exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and LOW responses. 
The PRC’s considerations to attain a LOW posture date back to even the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the PRC considered using existing land-based ballistic missile early warning radar to support a 
LOW posture for its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs, but apparently this early warning system was 
unreliable. In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed to 
support a LOW posture. The PRC has several ground-based large phase array radars – similar in 
appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars – that could support a missile early warning role. There 
has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well. In 2013, foreign media sources 
claimed to be in possession of PLA documents indicating expedited plans to field three 
geostationary satellites capable of detecting ballistic missile launches. Then, in 2015, the PRC’s 
defense white paper identified “improved strategic early warning” as specific nuclear force 
modernization goals with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) reported including 
requirements to place early warning satellites in space. As of 2022, the PRC likely has at least 
three early warning satellites in orbit.  In 2019, President Putin of Russia stated that Russia is aiding 
the PRC in developing a ballistic missile early warning system.  
Despite these developments, the PRC has called upon other states to abandon similar launch-on-
warning postures to enhance strategic stability while declining to engage in substantive dialogue 
on risk reduction. The PRC seems to believe a LOW posture is consistent with its no first use 
policy, given that it involves a retaliatory strike that takes place after warning of an inbound first 
attack from an adversary. At the same time, PRC military writings note that command and control 
systems – which would include early warning systems – can be a source of accidental nuclear war. 


 
 
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The PRC has refused to join the Hague Code of Conduct or participate in other confidence-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. However, the PRC does have a 
bilateral missile and carrier rocket launch notification agreement with Russia called the Russian-
Chinese inter-governmental agreement signed in 2009, which was extended for 10 years in 2021— 
though little additional information regarding the implementation of the notification agreement is 
known.  
 
 
China: Solid Propellant ICBM Silo Fields and Associated Training Site Locations 
 
 


 
 
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China: Yumen Silo Field Launch Sites 
 
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. 
● The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a 
threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations. 
● The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This 
includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
● The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 


 
 
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The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have 
sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed historical biological 
warfare (BW) program, which the United States assesses that the PRC possessed from the 1950s 
to at least the late 1980s. The PRC acceded to the BWC in 1984 and regularly submits to 
confidence-building measures (CBM) under the BWC; however, the PRC’s CBM reporting has 
never acknowledged its past offensive program. As part of its historical BW program, the PRC 
had reported weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, 
plague, and tularemia. 
Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its 
obligations under the CWC due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of PBAs and toxins with 
potential dual-use applications. The PRC has declared that it once operated a small chemical 
weapons program for offensive purposes; however, Beijing has consistently maintained that the 
program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the CWC 
in 1997. Beijing also has declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that were 
probably capable of producing mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite. 
Scientists at a PRC military institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, 
including synthesis, characterization, and testing of PBAs with potential dual-use applications. In 
addition, available information on studies conducted at PRC military medical institutions indicates 
that researchers identify, test, and characterize diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. The PRC probably has the 
technical expertise to weaponize CBW agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and 
numerous conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could 
be adapted to deliver CBW agents. China also has the technical expertise, military units, and 
equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack. 
Entities and individuals in the PRC continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, 
components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. 
Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production 
capabilities. 


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CHINA: HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOON DEVELOPMENT 
Military and commercial entities in the PRC have been researching and developing high-
altitude systems—including high altitude balloons—since at least the mid-2000s. PRC-
based research institutions and companies have developed and tested high-altitude 
balloons as early as 2015, including payloads to support imaging, data relay, and 
communications capabilities. While some of this research may support civilian 
applications such as weather monitoring, many of these high-altitude systems are very 
likely intended to support PLA requirements. Chinese military publications have 
demonstrated interest in integrating “near-space” platforms as another layer in the PLA’s 
broader reconnaissance “system-of-systems,” and have highlighted the use of high-
altitude systems to support various tracking and targeting missions.  The high-altitude 
balloon shot down on February 4th, 2023, was developed as part of this broader military-
linked aerial surveillance program. 
CHINA: JANUARY 28TH TO FEBRUARY 4TH, 2023 
 HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOON INTRUSION 
On January 28th, 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense detected a high-altitude balloon 
(HAB) approaching U.S. airspace off the west coast of Alaska. According to a timeline 
reconstruction published in the New York Times that made use of commercial imagery, 
the balloon launched from Hainan Island in China on approximately January 15th. It 
traveled across the Pacific over the course of 13 days, before passing over Alaska’s 
Aleutian Islands and then over the Alaskan mainland. The United States and Canada 
tracked the balloon as it crossed into Canadian airspace, where prevailing high-altitude 
winds blew it south, and it re-entered U.S. airspace over Idaho on January 31st. The 
Department of Defense tracked and monitored the balloon as it made its way across the 
United States and confirmed via handheld imagery from the pilot of a U-2 high-altitude 
surveillance aircraft that the balloon was indeed equipped with intelligence collection 
capabilities. 
As stated by CDR NORAD & USNORTHCOM, the United States took precautions to 
minimize the amount and sensitivity of any intelligence the balloon could collect as it 
transited the United States. President Biden later confirmed and on June 29, DoD 
spokesmen reiterated that the balloon did not collect. On February 4th, U.S. fighters shot 
down the balloon off the coast of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, where U.S. Coast Guard, 
Navy, and agents of the FBI conducted salvage and recovery operations. 
For its part, China initially expressed “regret” that its airship entered North American 
airspace, but claimed that it was a purely civilian airship used for meteorological research, 
and that prevailing winds had blown off course. In slightly over a week, China’s tone 
changed, accusing the U.S. of flying surveillance balloons over China 10 times during 
2022 (which the National Security Council denied), and claiming that the U.S. and NATO 
were attempting to “smear and accuse China,” likely reflecting a decision by China’s top 
leadership to respond by manufacturing a counter-narrative. 


 
 
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CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE 
AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, 
Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on 
the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the 
PLA conventional forces within the theater. 
 In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring 
Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a 
dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed air defense identification 
zone (ADIZ).  
The PRC continues to make steady improvements to joint operations in the five theater commands, 
which were established in early 2016. Each theater command receives direction from the CMC, 
has operational authority over assigned PLA forces within its theater,  and is responsible for all 
conventional combat and non-combat operations within its area of responsibility.  Theater 
commands are responsible for developing theater-specific strategies aimed at preparing to fight 
and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans and military capabilities, 
responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of its claimed territories.  The 
strategic directions of the theater commands are based on Chinese perceptions of peripheral threats:   
● Eastern Theater Command – Taiwan, ECS;  
● Southern Theater Command – SCS; Southeast Asia border security; territorial and maritime 
disputes; 
● Western Theater Command – India, Central Asia, “counterterrorism” in Xinjiang and Tibet;  
● Northern Theater Command – Korean Peninsula, Russia border security;  
● Central Theater Command – Capital defense; surge support to other theaters. 
 


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EASTERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the ECS.
●The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of a Taiwan Invasion.
●The Eastern Theater Command was responsible for executing the PLA’s large-scale joint
exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan in August 2022.
The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the ECS and likely executes operational 
control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around 
the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.   
During 2022, the Eastern Theater Command maintained focus on a series of training and exercises 
to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of 
long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified 
civilian ferries to help augment transportation.  
For Taiwan-related issues, see section on DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION 
IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (Pg. 136).  
2022 EASTERN THEATER COMMAND LEADERSHIP 
Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General Lin Xiangyang [林向阳]  
Previous Position: Commander of the Central Theater Command 
DOB: October 1964 
Age: 58 
Birthplace: Dengjun Village, Haikou Town, Fuqing, Fuzhou, Fujian Province [福建省福州市
福清市海口镇登俊村] 
Education: Nanchang Army Academy; Studied abroad in Russia; Attended a class at PRC NDU 
for Young- and Middle-aged Cadres [中青班] 
Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平]  
Previous Position; Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command; 
Deputy Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command  
DOB: November 1957 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市] 
Education: Unknown 
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater 
Command – Lieutenant General Hong Jiangqiang [洪江强]  
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army, Northern Theater Command Army 


 
 
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DOB: 1965 
Age: 57 
Birthplace: Meishi Village, Gangwei Town, Longhai, Zhangzhou, Fujian Province [福建省漳
州市龙海市港尾镇梅市村] 
Education: Unknown 
 
PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies; 
the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two Air 
Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base.  During a contingency, the 
Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some SSF units in theater and 
receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate 
joint operations within the theater.   The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all CCG 
and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with 
Japan over the Senkaku Islands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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PLA Force Laydown in Eastern Theater Command 


 
 
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EAST CHINA SEA (ECS) 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-
administered Senkaku Islands. 
● The PRC attempts to legitimize its claims in the ECS through the continuous presence of PRC 
fishing and Maritime Militia vessels, escorted by CCG cutters and with PLA Navy warships 
nearby as overwatch. 
● In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast 
Guard vessels, which created a legal justification for more aggressive patrols. Throughout 2021 
and 2022, the PRC expanded its annual unilateral summer fishing ban in Beijing-claimed 
waters north of the 12th parallel to include the ECS by an additional month to incrementally 
enforce its de facto maritime sovereignty claims. 
The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which 
Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the 2014 four-point consensus, 
which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but prevent 
escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States 
does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s 
administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of 
Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any 
unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.  
The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku Islands, not 
only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to 
potential contingencies. In 2022, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous 
zone territorial seas around the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control 
over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. For the third year in a 
row, CCG ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days, including 
over 300 days in the contiguous zones around the Islands in 2022.  In December 2022, the CCG 
conducted the longest entrance to date into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters, with four ships 
remaining in the waters for nearly 73 hours. The previous record for territorial waters entrance 
duration was 64 hours, set in July 2022. The increased PRC assertiveness around the Senkaku 
Islands caused Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to express “grave concern” in November 
to President Xi during the first meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders since December 
2019. The two leaders agreed to reestablish a maritime and aerial hotline between the two 
countries’ militaries to resume security dialogue, which the two defense ministers later used for 
the first time in May 2023.  
 


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SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the SCS, Southeast Asia border security,
and territorial and maritime disputes.
●The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation
operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and CMM ships
conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”
●In 2022, Southern Theater Command units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious
training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS.
The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the SCS.  
This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the 
SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the 
security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions in the SCS.  The 
Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation 
operations in the SCS by regularly tracking and reacting to U.S. ships operating within the China-
claimed “nine-dash line.” 
The Southern Theater Command is responsible for training, force disposition, and operations in 
the SCS.  The Southern Theater Command also plays a significant role in the PLA’s bilateral and 
multilateral exercises with countries in Southeast Asia, such as participating in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief exercise with Thailand in 2022. 
The PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons are subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. In 
August 2022, the PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons conducted an annual rotation of forces. 
Since 1997, the PLA has rotated forces by land, air, and sea from Shenzhen at night, nominally as 
part of the usual annual rotation.  Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, China maintains a 
rotational deployment of PAP forces in Hong Kong. The PAP and PLA units continued to publicly 
highlight their anti-riot, counterterrorism, and disaster prevention training. 
All of the PLA’s 24 Su-35s purchased from Russia are assigned to the Southern Theater Command 
Air Force and have flown patrols in the SCS and into the Western Pacific. The Southern Theater 
Command was also the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike bombers. In 
December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first-domestically produced aircraft carrier, Shandong 
into service at Yulin Naval Base in the Southern Theater Command.  In April, the Shandong 
conducted its first training exercise in the Philippine Sea with J-15 aircraft entering Taiwan’s air 
defense identification zone for the first time, demonstrating the PLA’s increased capabilities 
further from China’s borders. 


 
 
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2022 Southern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– Wang Xiubin [王秀斌] 
Previous position: Chief of Staff, Eastern Theater Command; Deputy Commander, Eastern 
Theater Command 
DOB: March 1964 
Age: 58 
Birthplace: Rudong County, Nantong, Jiangsu Province [江苏省南通市如东县掘港镇港南村] 
Education: National Defense University’s Joint Command and Staff College 
[联合指挥与参谋学院]; Postgraduate class at Zhejiang University; Taught at Nanjing Artillery 
Academy 
 
Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command – Wang Jianwu [王建武]  
Rank: General 
Previous position: Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department 
DOB: August 1958 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Luoning, Henan Province [河南省洛宁] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command – Liu Yayong [刘亚永] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: April 1958 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Duchang, Jiangxi Province [江西省都昌]  
Education: Unknown 
 
PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, 
the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA 
Rocket Force bases.   
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Southern Theater Command 
 
SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS) 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC’s outposts on the Spratly Islands are capable of supporting military operations, 
including advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft.  However, no 
large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed at airfields on the outposts.  


 
 
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● In 2022, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships in response to 
Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “Nine-DashLine,” the 
Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island, and the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second 
Thomas Shoal. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS 
In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest, ruled that the PRC’s claims 
to “historic rights” in the SCS, depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with 
UNCLOS. Since December 2019, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have 
explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the 
PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the 
tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA 
naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims. The PRC does so in ways 
calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict. In 2022, the PRC continued to 
impose a yearly, unilateral three-month fishing ban that includes the waters inside the EEZ of the 
Philippines and Vietnam to incrementally enforce its de facto maritime claims. 
● The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its 
sovereignty. Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain 
a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in 
response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed 
“nine-dash line.”  Separately, the CCG and People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) 
used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and 
issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions. 
● In November 2022, a CCG vessel forcibly seized apparent PRC rocket debris that had fallen 
near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island from the Philippines by cutting the tow line of a 
Philippine Navy vessel as it was towing debris back to shore. PRC insisted the debris was 
returned to them after a “friendly negotiation,” despite the Philippines producing video 
evidence of the incident and issues diplomatic notes of protest.  
● In March 2022, the Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest after a CCG ship maneuvered 
within 21 meters of a Filipino vessel near Scarborough Shoal. This was the fourth time in under 
a year that the CCG had maneuvered dangerously close to Philippine vessels.   
● In December 2022, the Philippines expressed serious concern over reports that the PRC had 
reclaimed several unoccupied land features in the SCS, notably at four features in the Spratly 
Islands. The Philippines noted that new construction contravenes the Declaration of Conduct 
on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award, while 
Beijing denied any actions and emphasized dialogue between the two nations.  


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Outposts in the Spratly Islands  
SCS OUTPOSTS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
Since early 2018, the PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced 
anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, representing the most 
capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed SCS areas to date. 
In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the 
Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region. From early 2018 through 
2022, the PRC regularly used its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard 
operations in the SCS.  The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it 
occupies in the Spratlys. China has also added military infrastructure, including 72 aircraft 
hangars, docks, satellite communication equipment, antenna array, radars, and hardened shelters 
for missile platforms. 


 
 
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The PRC has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, 
and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the 
outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a 
more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the 
PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the 
range of response options available to Beijing.  
WESTERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
● The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along 
China’s Central Asia borders.  
● The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where 
the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur 
populations in Xinjiang. 
● Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 
along the PRC border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers. 
The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC 
and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as “terrorist 
threats” in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th 
and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; 
three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.   
Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous 
Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among 
Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred 
during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority 
groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million 
ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed 
to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps 
under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” information from the 
international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of 
Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by 
extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region. 
Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC 


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regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction 
on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared 
border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, 
the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command 
implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. 
Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17th 
round of talks. The Western Theater Command’s deployments along the LAC will likely continue 
through 2023.   
2022 Western Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– General Wang Haijiang [汪海江] 
Previous position: Commander, Xinjiang Military District 
DOB: July 1963 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province  
Education: Unknown 
Political Commissar– General Li Fengbiao [李凤彪] 
Previous position: Commander, Strategic Support Force  
DOB: October 1959 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province  
Education: Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master’s degree in strategic studies from 
National Defense University  
Chief of Staff– Major General Li Zhonglin [李中林] 
Previous position: Commander, 71st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army 
DOB: Unknown 
Age: Unknown 
Birthplace: Unknown 
Education: Unknown  


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command 
 
CHINA-INDIA BORDER  
Key Takeaways 
● In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up 
along the LAC. 
● Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing 
perceived advantages on the border. 


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Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs 
wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the 
buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of 
the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on 
those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it 
perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive 
incursions into India’s territory.  On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and 
resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was 
the deadliest clash between the two since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Following the 2020 clash, the 
PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the 
LAC. 
●In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These
improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three
sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over
Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.
●In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and
Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western
sector of the LAC. China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern
sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the
LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed
forces remain in place along the LAC.
●On July 17th, China and India held the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on
the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to
withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through
military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining
border issues.   Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January
made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.
●On September 8th, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings
area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16th
round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.
●On October 14th, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25th Meeting of
Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the
recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border
tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The
24th WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from
the western sector of the LAC.
●On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the
LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India.  Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms


 
 
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along the border—instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons—however both Chinese and 
Indian forces sustained injuries.  Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 
2020 Galwan Valley incident. 
● On 20 December, China and India held the 17th round of Corps Commander-level talks at the 
Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in China. This round of talks was not announced—unlike 
previous talks—and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern 
sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India.  No agreements were made during 
this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic 
channels. 
NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
● The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border 
security. 
● In September 2022, the Northern Theater Command sent a 2,000 member contingent of army, 
navy, and air force units to participate in the Russia-hosted multi-national military exercise 
Vostok-2022. 
The Northern Theater Command includes the PRC’s provinces bordering Mongolia, Russia, North 
Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern periphery and 
border security associated with North Korean, Russia, and Mongolia.  PLA units located within 
the Northern Theater Command include the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies; the Northern 
Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two operational PLAAF 
bases, one special mission aircraft division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base.  
During a contingency, the Northern Theater Command likely exercises command over some SSF 
units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield 
awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater. The North Sea Fleet is responsible 
primarily for protecting the sea approaches to northern China but could provide mission-critical 
assets to support other fleets during contingencies located beyond the Northern Theater. In 2022, 
Northern Theater Command forces conducted various joint and single service training activities 
including carrier navigation and flight training, and likely conducted UAS training.  
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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2022 Northern Theater Command Leadership 
 
Commander– General Wang Qiang [王强]  
Previous position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Air Force; Deputy 
Commander of the Western Theater Command 
DOB: ~1963 
Age: ~59 
Birthplace: Probable Rong County, Zigong, SichuanProvince [ 四川省自贡市荣] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Political Commissar– Admiral Liu Qingsong [刘青松]  
Previous position: Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command Navy; Deputy 
Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: ~November 1963 
Age: ~58 
Birthplace: Zhangqiu District, Jinan, Shandong Province [山东省济南市章丘区] 
Education: Unknown 
Chief of Staff– Vice Admiral Jiang Guoping 
Rank: Admiral 
Previous position: Assistant to the Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC 
DOB: ~October 1962 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Rushan, Weihai, Shandong Province  
Education: Dalian Naval Ship Academy  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Northern Theater Command  
 
 
 


 
 
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CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaway 
● The Central Theater Command’s mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to 
other theater commands.  
The Central Theater Command’s primary responsibility is to defend the capital and CCP leadership 
while providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. It is centrally located, 
connecting the four remaining theater commands. Major military units under the Central Theater 
Command military include the PLAA’s 81st, 82nd, and 83rd Group Armies; and the PLAAF’s 13th 
Transport Division, 34th VIP Transport Division, 36th Bomber Division, 15th Airborne Corps, and 
the Shijiazhuang Flying Academy.  Other assets in the Central Theater Command include PLA 
Rocket Force and the Wuhan and Datong Bases.   
2022 Central Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– General Wu Ya'nan [吴亚男] 
Previous position: Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC  
DOB: August 1962 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province [河北省石家庄市] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Political Commissar– General Xu Deqing [徐德清] 
Previous position: Political Commissar, Western Theater Command Army; Deputy Political 
Commissar, Western Theater Command  
DOB: July 1963 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Chongzhou, Chengdu, Sichuan Province [四川省成都市崇州市] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Chief of Staff– Vice Admiral Wang Changjiang [王长江] 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: February 1959 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Luanzhou, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市滦州市] 
Education: The PLA Air Force's Fourth Aviation Academy  
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Central Theater Command 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN 
STRAIT  
Key Takeaways 
● In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. 
● Throughout 2022, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the 
Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into 
Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan. 
Throughout 2022, the PRC conducted large-scale joint military exercises focused on training to 
deter further U.S. and allied operations along China’s periphery. Many of these exercises focused 
on combat realism and have featured night missions, training in extreme weather, and simultaneous 
multi-domain operations.  
The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as 
necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party 
intervention, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf.   As 
part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration and signal its 
displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, the PRC has persistently conducted military 
operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency.    Throughout 2022, the 
PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile 
overflights of Taiwan, significantly increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared air defense 
identification zone, and conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.  
● According to Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) data, the PLA sent a total of 1,737 
aircraft in Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2022. This is a 79 percent increase from 972 incursions in 2021.  
● Throughout 2022, the PLA also diversified the type of aircraft it sent into Taiwan’s ADIZ. 
Since September 2022, when the Taiwan MND began releasing information on UAV 
operations in the ADIZ, UAVs have made up around 10 percent of aircraft tracked. 
At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position 
that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as 
an option.  Additionally, the CCP amended its constitution to reaffirm that it will resolutely oppose 
and deter Taiwan independence. The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicted 
it would consider the use of force has evolved over time. These circumstances have included the 
following:  
● Formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence 
● Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence 


 
 
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● Internal unrest in Taiwan 
● Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons 
● Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unification 
● Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.   
 
 
PlA Aircraft Entering Taiwan ADIZ 
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan increased in 2022, as the PRC intensified political and 
military pressure aimed at Taiwan. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan 
in August 2022, Beijing released a new Taiwan white paper, which was the third paper issued by 
Beijing since 1993. The content of the white paper appears consistent with familiar talking points 
from Beijing, albeit with a more pointed tone. It highlights that unification is foundational to the 
PRC’s “national rejuvenation,” Beijing’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one 
country, two systems” framework, and a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel 
reunification, if needed.  Unlike the previous Taiwan white paper (released in 2000), this iteration 
explicitly calls out Taiwan’s ruling  Democratic People’s Party for “having adopted a separatist 
stance,” and features heavier criticism on “external interference” by singling out the United States.  
The paper further asserts that all U.S. “interference” in Taiwan is guided by a strategy to use 
Taiwan as a “pawn” in an effort to contain China.   
The PRC continues to suspend formal communications with Taiwan, which began in 2016, and 
remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept the PRC’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart such 
engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to the PRC’s “One 
China principle,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” 
in Taiwan.  


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CONSISTENT U.S. DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN 
In response to U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan, Beijing routinely accuses the United 
States of not abiding by its One China principle. U.S. defense engagements with Taiwan, as 
one element of the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, remain consistent with our one China 
policy – as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, 
and the Six Assurances. U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan has evolved over time in 
response to the PRC’s capacity and willingness to use military coercion against Taiwan. This 
evolution does not contradict publicly-stated U.S. policy, and it is in fact required by U.S. 
policy.  
The 1979 TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In 1982, President Reagan clarified in an 
internal memo—which the United States made public in 2019—that the quantity and quality 
of U.S. defense assistance provided to Taiwan be “conditioned entirely on the threat posed 
by the PRC.” President Reagan further emphasized that this linkage is intended as a 
“permanent imperative” of foreign policy.  
The United States opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo by either side; 
does not support Taiwan independence; and expects cross-Strait differences to be resolved 
by peaceful means. United States defense engagement with Taiwan’s will continue to 
bolster these positions and be conditioned entirely on the evolving threat posed by the PRC 
and the interests of the people of Taiwan, as enumerated in U.S. policy. 
PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
The PLA’s coercive and risky air and maritime activity, particularly in the East and South China 
Seas, continued throughout 2022 and into 2023.  The PLA’s coercive and risky activities includes 
unsafe, unprofessional, and other behaviors that seek to impinge upon the ability of the United 
States and other nations to safely conduct operations where international law allows. The goal of 
the PLA’s behavior is to pressure the United States and other nations to reduce or cease lawful 
operations near areas Beijing claims territorial sovereignty.  
Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft 
have included lasing (i.e., the use of military-grade lasers against a target), reckless maneuvers 
(i.e., maritime bow crossings and barrel rolls and acrobatics in close proximity to aircraft), close 
approaches in the air or at sea, high rates of closure (i.e., rapid approaches), discharging objects 
(i.e., chaff or flares) in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.  
The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the 
road; increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of 
life. 


 
 
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Over the last 18 months, the PLA appears to have been engaged in a centralized, concerted 
campaign to perform these risky behaviors in order to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational 
activity, and that of U.S. Allies and partners. Prior to the fall of 2021, the PLA routinely intercepted 
foreign air and maritime assets operating in the Indo-Pacific, but these earlier interactions rarely 
involved PLA employment of coercive and risky behavior. Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 
2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air 
intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past two years than in the previous 
decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and 
risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United 
States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region.  The PRC’s messaging 
regarding its forces’ operational behavior, such as claiming it is “justified to take forceful 
countermeasures” against activities that Beijing labels “provocative,” suggests centralized 
coordination, not the behavior of a few isolated PLA officers. 
Some examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky behavior include the following:  
● In February 2022, a Chinese naval ship directed a laser at an Australian P-8A Poseidon aircraft 
operating in Australia’s exclusive economic zone, endangering the health of Australian airmen. 
● While flying a mission between April and May 2022, the Canadian CP-140 patrol aircraft were 
the subject of harassment by PLAAF fighter jets, which on several occasions, attempted to 
divert Canadian CP-140s. The PLAAF aircraft did this by conducting close approaches which 
forced the Canadian patrol craft to alter its flight path to avoid collision. 
● During a routine May 2022 maritime surveillance flight by an Australian P-8A in the South 
China Sea, a Chinese J-16 conducted a dangerous intercept maneuver which posed a safety 
threat to the P-8A and its aircrew. The Australian government issued a press release on this 
event. 
● In June 2022, a Chinese J-16 cut across the nose of another Australian P-8A Poseidon that was 
operating in international airspace over the South China Sea.  The Chinese jet released a round 
of chaff, which was ingested into the Australian aircraft’s engine.  
● In December 2022, a PLA J-11 fighter came within 20 feet of the nose of a U.S. military aircraft 
operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea.    
● In February 2023, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement concerning 
an incident with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, operating under PLA overwatch, engaged in 
dangerous maneuvers against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel operating within Manila’s own 
EEZ, including by deploying a military-grade laser that temporarily blinded Filipino crew 
members.  
● In May 2023, the DoD released cockpit video of a PLA J-16 “thumping” a U.S. RC-135 aircraft 
by forcing the U.S. RC-135 to fly directly behind it in its wake turbulence.  
● Less than one week later, in June, the DoD released video of the PLA’s unprofessional reaction 
to the USS CHUNG HOON during a U.S.-Canada bilateral Taiwan Strait Transit. 
 


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PLA RESPONSE TO HIGH-PROFILE VISIT TO TAIWAN BY FOREIGN 
FIGURES 
Throughout 2022, the PRC continued to respond to high-level foreign visits to Taiwan with 
low-level military drills near Taiwan, typically including Taiwan Strait centerline crossings, 
increased PLA Navy activity around Taiwan, and public statements condemning the visits. 
In stark contrast, the PLA responded in early August 2022 to the CODEL vist to Taiwan 
with significantly larger-scale military activities that included several unprecedented 
actions. The Eastern Theater Command conducted snap military drills that included PLA 
aviation flying more than 250 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and 13 PLA 
Navy vessels operating around Taiwan. The PLARF fired multiple ballistic missiles into 
impacts zones in waters around Taiwan, including the first-seen instance of at least four 
missiles overflying Taiwan. These military drills also afforded the PLA an opportunity to 
train simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations. 
PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN  
Although Beijing reaffirms that “peaceful reunification” is its preferred course of action, the PRC 
continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of 
options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could 
increasingly signal its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA 
could also conduct a range of cyberspace, blockade, and kinetic campaigns designed to force 
Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the 
PRC’s terms. In any case, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan 
contingency campaign. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a 
limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate 
cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight 
to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer Xi the following military 
options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of 
feasibilities associated risk. The PRC’s perception of domestic and international receptivity to 
military action, the expected impact on its economy of resulting sanctions, political trends in 
Taiwan, and its level of confidence in the PLA’s capability to conduct a successful invasion of 
Taiwan will determine which military option the PRC chooses during crises. The PLA practiced 
elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise 
aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-
wen’s transit of the United States. 
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the 
PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital 
imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation.  Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of 


 
 
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Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel 
Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or 
months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely would complement its air and 
maritime blockades with concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s 
authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.  
Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal 
military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and 
clandestine economic and political activities supported by IO to shape perceptions or undercut the 
effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer 
network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure 
to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. 
Similarly, PLA SOF could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or 
leadership targets.  
Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key 
government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and 
communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize its leadership, or undermine 
the public’s resolve to resist.   
Amphibious Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an 
amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, 
envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, 
air, and naval support.  The objectives are to break through or circumvent Taiwan’s shore defenses, 
establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key 
targets or the entire island.  
The PLA continues to test new options to force unification. In October 2022, seven Chinese 
civilian car ferries, under CMM, participated in amphibious landing drills on Chinese beaches in 
the Taiwan Strait. In August 2022, in response to the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan, 
the PLA conducted joint exercises focusing on establishing air, maritime, and information 
superiority. The exercise consisted of joint air and maritime activities to the north, southwest, and 
southeast of Taiwan, focused on establishing air dominance, according to Eastern media reporting.  
A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military 
operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment 
of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.  It would likely strain the PRC’s armed forces and 
invite a strong international response. These factors, combined with inevitable force attrition, the 
complexity of urban warfare, and potential for an insurgency, make an amphibious invasion of 
Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi and the CCP, even assuming a successful 
landing and breakout past Taiwan beachhead defenses.    
Small Island Seizure. The PLA also is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short 
of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, 


 
 
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the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the SCS, such as Pratas or 
Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is 
also within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, 
political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure 
of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political 
risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful 
international opposition.  
CIVILIAN ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RORO) SHIPS AND THEIR 
POTENTIAL USE IN A TAIWAN INVASION 
The lack of significant PLA amphibious ship buildup does not independently reflect a PLA 
deficiency toward building a military option to take Taiwan by force, but rather, is consistent with 
the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.  
In 2015, China’s official media reported that all future builds of five categories of civilian vessels 
had to be built to “national defense requirements” including container ships, RORO ferries, 
multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers, and break bulk ships.  
In 2019, images emerged on Chinese state television that at least one of its RORO ferries had been 
modified with a ramp to allow amphibious vehicles to disembark at sea suggesting these ferries 
could be used to deliver first echelon forces without requiring prior seizure of a pier. By 
demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an amphibious invasion, the PLA is 
eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial lines 
between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military 
objectives. 
In a similar state media disclosure, images emerged in 2021 showing that China had modified a 
flat deck container vessel to function as a landing platform helicopter (LPH) or as an expeditionary 
transfer dock (ESD); such modification could serve as a mid-way refueling point for helicopters 
returning from delivering air assault forces to Taiwan or enable PLA helicopters to transport 
forward stocks of logistics ashore.  
Although China has not officially revealed the size of its civilian fleet or how it plans to use it 
during an invasion, 2019 information indicated the PLA have at least 63 civilian ROROs suitable 
for military operations.   
Subsequent information from one Chinese province indicates as many as 64 civilian ROROs would 
be made available to the PLA in wartime and that these platforms would be equipped with weapons 
as part of the mobilization process.  
Some public estimates suggest that China’s use of its dual-capable civilian fleet could provide it 
greater displacement tonnage than the sum of all of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships. 


 
 
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In 2022, the PLA significantly stepped up RORO training to supportChina’s military activities by 
more than doubling the number of ROROs used to support similar activity in the prior year. 
Although most of these events consisted of troop movements within or between theaters, several 
marked a continued maturation towards using ROROs and other civilian shipping to support PLA 
amphibious force employment against Taiwan. However, these events have not demonstrated the 
realism or requisitite tactical proficiency to engage in wartime operations. This includes the 
absence of opposed landing operations in unfavorable weather conditions and sea states. It also 
includes a lack of RORO training to operate in convoys, conduct rapid disembarkation, and the 
offload of PLA forces at sea while underway. 
● Floating Causeway Improvement. During three events between May and July 2022, two 
Chinese civilian ROROs participated in docking evolutions with a new floating causeway 
system intended to allow ROROs to disembark forces onto a beach without seizing a port or 
being modified to discharge amphibious vehicles at sea.  The causeway observed in 2022 
featured several improvements over the one used in 2021 to include having six uniform self-
propelled sections extendable to an additional 200 meters.  The causeway system seems to rely 
on a semi-submersible barge to stabilize the causeway, which may limit its utility for a cross 
strait invasion. However, PLA naval writings stress the importance of floating causeways, 
especially those with wave attenuation capabilities, as one solution to dealing with Taiwan 
ports that might be inaccessible for off-loading operations in wartime. 
● Large-Volume Lift Exercise. From mid-July to mid-August, the PLA conducted large 
amphibious lift exercises along China’s Northern and Southern coast, using 12 civilian ships 
including eight large RORO ferries.  The lift capacity, number of vessels stops, and the number 
of participating ground vehicles suggest this training could have simulated the movement of 
up to a full group army for the first time. The PLA also conducted a five-day loading/unloading 
exercise in September 2022 using six ROROs and three cargo ships to simulate the movement 
of a heavy combined arms brigade in a Taiwan invasion. 
● Denial and Deception Training. In August 2022, a PLAA air defense brigade exercise 
attempted to obscure observation of its loading onto a RORO in the Bohai Gulf. A PLA video 
showed the brigade entering a dock-side building where it hid for an undetermined period of 
time before loading onto a RORO using a tarp that extended from the building to the ship, 
likely intended to limit observation of their loading activity.   
● Austere Port Operations. In mid-August 2022, a single RORO supported the transport of 
roughly 40 vehicles from a portion of Dongshan Port that had little cargo handling 
infrastructure, no pier-side RORO ramp, and no tugboat support. This training suggests the 
PLA seeks the capability to operate from any intact pier, even ones without offloading 
infrastructure. 


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●RORO Participation in PLAN Amphibious Forces. From August 31st to September 2nd,
2022, the PLA conducted its most complex use of civilian shipping for amphibious assault
operation at Dacheng Bay and Honghai Bay in southern China. The exercise featured 10
civilian ships – including RORO ferries and RORO vehicle carriers – operating alongside
PLAN amphibious ships, including at least one Type-071 LPD. The operations at Dacheng
Bay made use of the new six-segment floating causeway, supported by a San Hong Gong
submersible floating barge, which docked with at least one RORO ferry. ROROs in both
exercise area off-loaded forces at sea, suggesting stern ramp modifications allowing for at-sea
disembarkation are becoming more commonplace within the RORO fleet. One combined-arms
amphibious brigade and one combined-armed amphibious battalion were believed to have been
delivered as part of this exercise.
PRC Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait 
THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT  
PLAA. The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the 
Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike 
capabilities.  Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely 
indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army.  Major PLAA contributions 
to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault 
operations.   


 
 
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The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command 
(nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious 
assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events 
refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated 
sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively 
used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious 
brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly 
aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario. 
PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing 
an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting 
diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since 
August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and 
fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority 
within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan 
conflict. 
The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-
going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number 
of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has 
not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe 
the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has 
sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational 
capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may 
also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the 
necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.  
PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary 
in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting 
operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to 
conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a 
strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on 
China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved 
ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, 
expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party 
intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher 
levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and 
were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure 
on Taiwan. 
PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including 
Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, 
neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is 


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increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an 
increasing number of deployed missiles.  
Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and 
cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible 
for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions 
of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be 
responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against 
Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a 
strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence 
collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands 
involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 
2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan. 
Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics 
support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by 
conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. 
The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate 
far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities. 
TAIWAN’S ABILITY TO DETER THE MAINLAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap
compared to Taiwan’s military.
●Geopolitical events in 2022 accelerated Taiwan’s development of new concepts and
capabilities for asymmetric warfare to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities.
Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to generate international support and 
expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with 
the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving 
joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and 
noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments 
to the military’s strategy for defending the island by placing emphasis on protecting its littorals 
and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses 
enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air 
Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.  
In 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the PRC’s forceful response to then-U.S. Speaker of the 
House’s CODEL to Taiwan in August increased the urgency with which Taiwan is pursuing 
defense reforms. The PRC’s response to the then-U.S. House Speaker’s visit accelerated the PRC’s 


 
 
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ongoing military and gray zone activity toward Taiwan. The PRC’s actions likely intended to 
establish a new status quo and to place greater operational demands on Taiwan’s military. 
Taiwan’s planned improvements only partially address its defense challenges, and a majority of 
Taiwan citizens believe that the then-Speaker’s visit and the PLA response were detrimental to 
Taiwan’s security. 
Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 
active-duty billets. As of 2021, the MND had accomplished its goal to fill 90 percent of the active 
duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitions to an all-volunteer force, the cost 
savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, 
housing, and incentive pay. However, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full 
increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. 
Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness obstacles.  
Reservists, conscripts, and civil defense volunteers support the volunteer active duty forces. 
Taiwan’s number of reserve personnel ranges from one to two million, while there are fewer than 
half a million conscripts. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization to 
improve the mobilization of reserves and civilians to support military operations.  In 2022, Taiwan 
implemented this legislation by establishing the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which 
coordinates a whole-of-society approach to support military operations and disaster prevention and 
response. In December 2022, Taiwan announced that it would extend the duration of mandatory 
military conscription service from four months to one year and double conscripts’ monthly salary 
starting in 2024. 
Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget to support defense acquisitions and strengthen its 
forces against Chinese pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to 
be the highest level since 1990. In October 2022, Taiwan proposed total defense spending of about 
$19 billion for 2023, a 13.9 percent increase from 2022, which will represent about 2.4 percent of 
Taiwan’s GDP. In January 2022, Taiwan approved an $8 billion multi-year supplemental defense 
budget to strengthen Taiwan’s air and sea combat capabilities. Over half of Taiwan’s supplemental 
defense spending will fund missile corvettes and anti-ship weapons, such as the Hsiung Feng 
missile system.  Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow to around $230 
billion in 2022, about 12 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of China’s defense 
budget focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.  
Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has 
stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric 
warfare. Specific areas of emphasis in Taiwan’s strategy include offensive and defensive 
information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid 
mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan 
has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, 
domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters and producing the remaining 
three of a previously planned four transport docks.  


 
 
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The United States maintains a one-China policy that is based on the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint 
Communiqués, and the Six Assurances; opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo; 
and continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace 
acceptable to both sides. Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, 
and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Since 2009 Taiwan has received about $30 billion in 
arms sales from the United States. Taiwan currently has arms sales agreements to acquire Stinger 
missiles, Javelins, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, Harpoon missiles, and F-16 fighter 
jets.   
PRC EFFORTS TO CONFLATE FOREIGN ONE CHINA POLICIES WITH 
ITS “ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE” 
The PRC’s “One China principle,” established in 1949, according to PRC government 
white papers, predicates diplomatic relations with the PRC on “recognizing” the 
“government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of 
China” and “that Taiwan is part of China.”  
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, countries around the world have enacted 
respective and unique “One China” policies that govern their relations with the PRC and 
Taiwan. Some countries have endorsed the PRC’s “One China principle” in their national 
“One China” policies, while other countries have determined to “acknowledge,” 
“understand,” or “note” the PRC’s position within their respective, national “One China” 
policies. These unique “One China” policies, and their attendant joint communiques with 
the PRC, provide countries around the world with the legal basis upon which each country 
engages with the PRC and Taiwan.  
The U.S. one China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Under the three Joint Communiques, the U.S. 
acknowledged the PRC’s position and reaffirmed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of 
the “Taiwan question.” U.S. implementation interpretation of the 1982 Communique 
related to arms sales to Taiwan is guided by President Ronald Reagan’s August 17th, 
1982 internal presidential memo (known as the Six Assurances), where he stated the 
U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned “absolutely” upon the 
continued commitment of the PRC to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC cross-Strait 
differences. The Six Assurances, delivered to Taiwan in 1982, outlined key principles for 
continued U.S. support for Taiwan.  
The PRC has sought to conflate the United States, as well as other foreign nations’ 
respective “One China” policies, with its own “One China principle.” This effort erroneously 
portrays broad international support for its claim over Taiwan, attempts to legitimize PRC 
coercion against Taiwan, and make assertions of “broken legal commitments” by 
countries who engage with Taiwan in ways that Beijing perceives as threatening to its 
unification objectives.   


 
 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING 
GLOBAL PRESENCE  
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national 
rejuvenation.   
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s 
borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance 
its foreign policy goals.  
The CCP continues its goal to create international conditions that are conducive to the PRC’s 
development and compatible with its aspirations for the PRC’s rejuvenation as a “great modern 
socialist country.” CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the PLA’s 
growing global presence, contribute to creating a “favorable” international environment for the 
PRC’s national rejuvenation. Of note, the PRC’s perception of its international security 
environment is evolving in ways that Beijing views as “increasingly complex.” The PRC’s view 
of its increasingly complex security environment likely also factors into the PLA’s growing global 
ambitions.  
The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders 
and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign 
policy goals. The PRC is focusing on efforts to develop security relationships with key countries 
along its periphery. In addition to promoting BRI, the PRC is seeking new cooperative security 
partnerships with foreign nations, including the expansion of the PLA’s global military attaché 
presence and access, expansion of strategic partnerships, and ensuring more reliable, cost-
effective, and diverse sources of energy and other strategic resources.  
The PRC probably will continue to expand the PLA’s global military presence through 
humanitarian assistance, naval escorts and port calls, peacekeeping operations (PKO), arm sales, 
influence operations, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through these engagements, 
Beijing can strengthen and expand its diplomatic relationships to advance its foreign policy goals, 
to include shaping the international system to align with the PRC’s interests, gaining operational 
experience for the PLA, and attracting foreign interest in hosting PLA bases and dual-use 
installations abroad.  


 
 
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CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active role in 
advancing its foreign policy goals.  
● As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s leaders have 
increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the capabilities to operate 
beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests. 
This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion — and inducements — 
to advance its global security and development interests. 
● In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas and build closer ties to foreign 
militaries. In 2022, Beijing maintained an active peacekeeping force of more than 2,000 
personnel stationed abroad, conducted regular anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and 
waters off Somalia, continued construction of a PLA facility at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, 
participated in bi- and multilateral military exercises, and restarted in-person military 
diplomacy suspended by COVID-19.  
THE PLA’S EVOLVING MISSIONS AND TASKS 
In 2004, one of the “new historic missions” given to the PLA by then-President Hu Jintao was to 
support China’s overseas interests and diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus—from “offshore 
defense” to “open seas protection”—reflects the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach. The 
PLAAF’s missions and tasks have similarly evolved towards conducting operations beyond China 
and its immediate periphery and supporting the PRC’s interests by becoming a “strategic” air force. 
Additionally, the PLA has embraced its concept of NWMA as an effective way to support and 
safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s global interests, and gain valuable 
operational experience.  
The PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA, and SSF have deployed abroad for counterpiracy, HA/DR, 
peacekeeping, training exercises, and space support operations. Within the PLA, the PLAN has 
the most experience operating abroad due to its far seas deployments and counterpiracy missions,  
the PLAAF likely has the most experience conducting rapid response HA/DR operations abroad,  
and the PLAA has the most experience conducting peacekeeping operations. The SSF operates 
tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The SSF 
also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches. 
● Increasingly, the PLAN is operating outside of its home waters to places including the Middle 
East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. The PLAN has 
also conducted submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing 
familiarity in that region and underscoring the PRC’s interest in protecting SLOCs beyond the 


 
 
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SCS.  In 2015, three PLAN ships from a Gulf of Aden naval escort task force (NETF) 
evacuated 629 PRC citizens from Yemen to Djibouti and Oman.  
● Since 2002, the PLAAF has delivered aid after natural disasters throughout Southeast Asia and 
South Asia and assisted with evacuations from Libya and Yemen. In January 2022, the PLAAF 
flew relief supplies to Tonga ten days after a volcanic eruption devastated the island nation, 
offering the PLA to normalize its presence in the region.  
PLA OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE  
Counterterrorism. Beijing is implementing its global counterterrorism strategy through 
international outreach that spans across diplomatic and military domains to garner the assistance 
of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against Chinese citizens and 
economic projects abroad. The PRC routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur 
extremists, coordinates with host nations to pursue terrorist threats, and seeks public endorsement 
of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. Beijing further leverages involvement in 
regional security forums, joint border patrols, and international exercises to press its neighbors into 
adopting the PRC’s approach to counterterrorism operations. 
Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2008, the PLAN joined anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, its first 
missions outside the Western Pacific. Since then, China has dispatched more than 40 NETFs to 
the region to escort Chinese and foreign ships. This naval activity demonstrates the PLAN’s 
increasing familiarity with the area, hones its ability to operate in far seas, and allows the PLAN 
to advance military diplomacy efforts by conducting port calls in Africa. In 2022, in addition to 
deploying its 42nd NETF to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN convened a China-Africa symposium to 
discuss cooperating on anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.   
Peacekeeping Operations. China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN 
Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over 31 years and 
pledged an 8,000-strong PKO standby force to the UN’s Peacekeeping Capability Readiness 
System. Beijing frames these efforts as advancing cooperative global governance, peaceful 
development, and the principles of the UN Charter, which are key components of its responsible 
global power narrative. However, the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have also become a 
testing ground for China's "far seas operations" as Beijing seeks to extend its reach in tandem with 
the growth and expansion of its interests. The PRC could use its role in the UN PKOs to collect 
intelligence on other UN units, and supporting these missions demonstrates the PLA’s ability to 
operate outside of China’s borders.    
● In 2022, the PRC provided about 2,200 personnel to eight UN PKO missions in Africa and the 
Middle East: Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, South Sudan, 
Sudan, and Western Sahara. These personnel consist of groups-infantry, engineering, medical 
service, and maintenance specialists. The PRC troop contributions have slightly decreased 
from 2,548 personnel in 2021 to 2,200 in 2022.  


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MILITARY ATTACHÉ PRESENCE 
The PRC’s military attaché presence continues to grow globally, reflecting the PRC’s 
increasing interests in military modernization and partnerships. Military Attaché offices 
manage the day-to-day overseas military diplomacy efforts in over 110 offices worldwide. 
The attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, and support Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives. They also perform a variety of PLA 
military and security cooperation duties, including counterpart exchanges with host-
nation and third-country personnel.  Additionally, the attachés conduct clandestine and 
overt intelligence collection on respective areas of responsibility. Although the general 
function of an attaché office is the same worldwide, individual attaché offices probably 
prioritize specific missions or diplomatic priorities based on location, close bilateral 
relations, or other factors.  
The PRC’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to 1-officers. 
Most offices are made of two to three officers, although officers in countries considered 
important to China’s strategic interests often employ more attachés. These offices 
potentially include multiple assistant attaches, service attaches such as naval or air force, 
and additional support staff. 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
As the PRC’s regional and international interests grow increasingly complex, the PLA’s 
international engagements likely will continue to expand. Beijing often relies on senior military 
visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, peacekeeping, and military assistance to 
promote the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  
Senior-level military visits and international exchanges remained limited in 2022 due to continuing 
COVID-19 restrictions in China. Many engagements were still conducted via remote video, such 
as the 2nd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum Ministerial and a minister-level meeting with 
Latin American and Caribbean nations.  In 2022, former PRC Defense Minister Wei Fenghe 
resumed attending some multilateral security meetings in person, including the revived Shangri-
La Dialogue in Singapore and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in Cambodia. Wei 
also traveled to traditional partner nations such as Russia and Iran, and met with his Australian 
counterpart for the first time in two years.   Wei likely undertook these visits to influence foreign 
approaches to shared security concerns, demonstrate solidarity with long-standing partners, and 
improve bilateral and multilateral defense relations. 
The PLA continued to participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises in 2022, though 
fewer than in past years, likely in part due to lingering concerns over COVID-19. The PLA carried 
out what appears to be a standard annual list of military exercises with the Russian military: the 


 
 
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Joint Sea naval exercise and a joint naval patrol; two strategic aerial patrols; and PLA participation 
in Russia’s capstone military exercise, VOSTOK 2022. The PRC and Russia also conducted a 
trilateral naval exercise with Iran, the third such exercise since 2019. Other bilateral exercises the 
PLA conducted last year included the fifth FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand, the 
PEACE TRAIN humanitarian rescue exercise with Laos, and the SEA GUARDIANS naval 
exercise with Pakistan. The PRC’s lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in late 2022 will likely 
facilitate the reinvigoration of PLA defense activities abroad as well as the hosting of senior level 
bilateral and multilateral engagements in China. 
Military Education Collaboration. Beijing considers establishing international professional 
military education (PME) as a way to create transnational networks of alumni, foster a common 
understanding of military operational doctrine, and strengthen the PRC’s defense and security ties. 
Over the past decade, the PRC has increased its military exchange programs with a bias toward 
junior officers. Nearly half of the 70 military academies operated in China admit foreign students 
but only a few offers senior-level education. The College of Defense Studies of the PLA National 
Defense University (PLA NDU) provides the highest level of training for foreign officers offered 
by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to training foreign senior military officials, 
PLA NDU conducts international exchanges and academic discussions on defense and security 
issues.   The PLA NDU has accepted students from more than 100 partner nations and has pursued 
relationships with Latin American and African militaries.  
Although third countries have historically perceived Chinese PME as less prestigious than Russian 
or U.S. PME, the PRC’s growing economic clout and expanded global security presence has 
bolstered the international reputation of Chinese programs. For example, PLA NDU offers 
students higher stipends and greater exposure to Chinese technological and scientific innovations 
(such as military applications of AI) than Russian schools. 
The PRC also cultivates transnational alumni and shared doctrinal understanding through short-
term course offerings. Since 2002, the PLA NDU sought to increase exchanges with the 
international military community by sponsoring annual security seminars which aim to foster 
cooperation, strengthen military exchanges, and attempt to impart a common approach to issues 
of interest to the community. The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from over 90 
countries and maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 countries in 
addition to over 140 countries’ militaries. 
Despite the PRC’s progress to enhance its PME programs, cultural and linguistic barriers limit the 
effectiveness of Chinese PME. For example, foreign student and host nation student contacts and 
opportunities for interaction are limited due to the separation between Chinese and foreign 
language courses. Additionally, despite detailed dives on specific issues, PRC military schools 
rarely teach students about the root causes of security problems. Military ethics and human rights 
are off-limits for discussion within the PLA NDU curriculum and students are prohibited from 
criticizing the PRC’s record in these areas.  


 
 
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In November 2022, the PLA hosted the third International Army Forum on Military Education via 
video link from Nanjing. Participants from 21 military academies in 10 countries including 
Pakistan, Greece, Egypt, and Argentina discussed training and career paths for junior army 
officers. According to an official PLA news site, the annual forum seeks to foster dialogue and 
cooperation between Chinese military academies and other nations.  
PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
 Key Takeaways 
● The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA 
to project and sustain military power at greater distances. 
● A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s 
global military objectives evolve. 
● Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces 
projection. 
● In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s 
Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA 
military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United 
Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.  
The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. Beijing may assess that a 
mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to commercial infrastructure 
abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities with prepositioned supplies co-located with commercial 
infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, most closely aligns with the PRC’s overseas 
military logistics needs. Some of the PRC’s BRI projects could create potential military 
advantages, such as PLA access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics 
support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, 
and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests. 
● Official PRC sources assert that military logistics facilities, to include its Djibouti base, will 
be used to provide international public goods like HA/DR, and secure China’s lines of 
communication, citizens, and assets abroad. Regardless, a global PLA military logistics 
network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. 
Host nations can perform an essential role in regulating the PRC’s military operations, as PRC 
officials very likely recognize that a stable long-term relationship with the host nation is critical 
to the success of their military logistics facilities. 


 
 
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● PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of PLA forces 
and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable 
intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.  
● In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLANMC are 
stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are currently limited in 
their ability to conduct expeditionary operations due to a lack of helicopters at the facility. 
Notably, we have no evidence that the PRC has used its base to assist in evacuation of Chinese 
citizens.  
● In late March 2022, a Type 903A “Fuchi” class supply ship, Luomahu (AOE-964), docked at 
the 450-meter pier for resupply; this was the first such reported PLA Navy port call to the 
Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier is now operational. The pier likely is able to 
accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA 
personnel at the facility have interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, 
and the PRC has sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base. 
Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional military 
logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The PLA’s approach likely 
includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many countries, but only some will 
advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status of forces or visiting forces 
agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations involved in planning and negotiating 
for military logistics facilities are CMC Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support 
Department, and service headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by 
the willingness of potential host nations to support a PLA presence. Host nations are likely 
concerned about risks to sovereignty, regional and international perceptions, and relations with the 
United States when considering hosting a Chinese military facility. PRC interlocutors likely use 
all means available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host 
nations, while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.  
In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help to modernize 
and expand Ream but would not be the only country given access to the facility. The following 
June, China and Cambodia hosted a ground opening ceremony for the Chinese-built upgrades of 
the Ream base.  
The PRC has likely also considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab 
Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The PRC has 
probably already made overtures to Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. According to a 
draft copy of the China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement, the PRC will be permitted to send 
armed police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though the 
Solomon Island government denied this would lead to a PRC military base. The PLA is most 


 
 
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interested in military access along the SLOCs from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the 
Pacific Islands.  
China seeks to strengthen its security ties through small-scale, in-country efforts to support 
domestic security. As of 2022, the PRC provides occasional personnel support at public events for 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.  In Africa, the PRC maintains an embedded PLA training 
cadre for local military forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a military training 
school in Tanzania. The PRC probably pursues such efforts in regions it assesses can help foster 
favorable environments for its security goals, but these efforts do not signal definite interest in 
overseas basing. 
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
Key Takeaways  
● The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected the CCP’s understandings of cyber operations 
as the primary means for psychological manipulation. 
● The PLA concept of Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO) combines psychological warfare 
with cyber operations to shape adversary behavior and decision making.  
● The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party 
entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a 
society.   
The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace as a critical enabler 
and means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict. Beginning in the early 2000s, 
as part of the PRC’s overall influence operations, the PLA began developing the “Three Warfares” 
concept, which calls for the coordinated use of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and 
legal warfare. Public opinion warfare creates and disseminates information to guide an adversary’s 
public opinion and gain support from domestic and foreign audiences. Psychological warfare uses 
propaganda, deception, and coercion to induce pressure and affect the behavior of the target 
audience. Legal warfare uses domestic and international laws to shape narratives that advance 
Chinese interests and undermine those of an adversary. The PLA likely seeks to combine digital 
influence activities with the “Three Warfares” concept to demoralize adversaries and influence 
domestic and foreign audiences, creating an environment advantageous to the PRC.  
From the PRC’s perspective, all nations – especially the United States – that use digital narratives 
to undermine the CCP’s authoritarian system in China employ offensive influence operations. 
Hence, the PRC considers its influence operations that counter this perceived subversion as 
defensive in order to protect the party and the military.  
Another primary goal of the PRC’s influence operations is to maintain domestic stability and 
protect CCP rule. Domestically, the CCP uses influence activities to protect its image to the public 


 
 
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and garner popular support for the military. Internationally, Beijing aims to create an information 
environment favorable to the PRC and its strategic foreign policy objectives.  The PRC conducts 
influence operations that target media organizations, businesses, academic and cultural 
institutions, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international 
organizations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
PRC INFLUENCE ACTORS  
PRC influence operations are coordinated and executed by a range of affiliated actors, such as the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD), the MSS, and the SSF. The CCP likely seeks to 
condition multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept the PRC’s narrative 
surrounding its priorities such as the PRC’s “one China principle” on Taiwan unification, BRI, 
political control over Hong Kong, and territorial and maritime claims in the SCS and ECS. In mid-
2022, official messaging from diplomatic personnel, state media outlets, and diplomatic social 
media accounts surrounding the U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit to Taiwan highlighted how the 
PRC uses influence operations to shape the information environment surrounding Taiwan policy. 
In an August 2022 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Communique, Beijing advanced its official 
narrative that the PRC is a responsible, law-abiding member of the international community and 
that the U.S. Speaker’s visit unlawfully violated the PRC’s sovereignty and needlessly provoked 
potential U.S.-China confrontation. 
PRC INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
PRC influence operations can range from lobbying and cultivating foreign politicians, injecting 
Chinese cultural narratives or values into foreign education systems, bringing academic or thank 
tank researchers’ access to China, and flooding Chinese language media abroad, all of which can 
be accomplished via diplomacy or coercive means. For example, a hallmark of the PRC’s influence 
strategy includes appealing to overseas PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese of other countries as 
indirect proxies to assert the CCP’s objectives through soft power engagements.  The PRC often 
targets Uyghurs and overseas dissidents with harassment or threats to imprison their family 
members in China.   Furthermore, the UFWD collaborated with overseas Chinese communities in 
the Global South, including Latin America and Caribbean countries in order to shape positive 
views of China that would better facilitate economic ties.  Additionally, the PRC’s “Thousand 
Talents Program” targets overseas Chinese emigrants to support its foreign technology acquisition 
strategy, which is critical to China’s scientific and technical modernization.  
The PRC has demonstrated its intent to use multilateral forums and organizations to expand its 
defense influence and security cooperation, while establishing a leadership role in those 
organizations.   The PRC promotes strategic messaging by portraying China as a responsible global 
actor through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and through PRC created multilateral regional forums like 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Arab States Cooperation, the China-


 
 
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Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Framework, the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), and through organizations which exclude traditional western partners, 
such as  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). In August 2022, official PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarks to the 
FOCAC advanced a narrative that, unlike other potential foreign partners, Beijing respected the 
sovereignty of African nations and was committed to supporting sustainable development, food 
security, public health services, and foreign direct investment across the continent. In May 2022, 
the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the Forum for Senior Defense Officials from 
Caribbean and South Pacific Countries, last hosted by Beijing in 2019, as evidence of its strong 
security cooperation with the Solomon Islands.   
The PRC government-affiliated entities use overt and covert messaging vectors, such as the 
internet and social media platforms, and military cyber capabilities during both peacetime and 
wartime. The PLA’s goals for social media influence operations include promoting narratives to 
shape foreign governments’ policies and public opinion in favor of the PRC’s interests and 
undermining adversary resolve. The PLA views social media through the prism of information 
dominance, and during a crisis could use digital influence operations to undermine enemy morale 
and confuse or deceive adversary decision makers. Most Chinese media platforms, including 
traditional and digital newspaper and television programs, are either state-owned or heavily 
influenced by Beijing to augment the CCP’s response to geopolitics and often take on a more 
aggressive messaging tone. 
COGNITIVE DOMAIN OPERATIONS (CDO)  
The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected that the CCP understands cyber operations as the 
primary means for psychological manipulation. As the PLA seeks to expand the reach of its 
influence operations around the world and seize information dominance on the battlefield, it is 
researching and developing what it believes to be the next evolution of psychological warfare, 
which it calls CDO. CDO blends previous Chinese concepts such as public opinion and 
psychological warfare with modern internet technologies and communication platforms, and is 
designed to achieve strategic national security goals by affecting a target’s cognition and resulting 
in a change in the target’s decision making and behavior. The PLA has recognized the importance 
of incorporating emerging technologies such as AI, big data, brain science, and neuroscience into 
CDO as PLA perceives that these technologies will lead to profound changes in the ability to 
subvert human cognition. 
The goal of CDO is to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance, which the PLA defines 
as the use of information to influence public opinion to affect change in a nation’s social system, 
likely to create an environment favorable to China and reduce civilian and military resistance to 
PLA actions. The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or 
third-party entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize 
a society. Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring 
about psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles 


 
 
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on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy 
without fighting is the highest realm of warfare. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE  
The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that 
are most applicable to the PRC’s strategic interests of strengthening its whole-of-government 
approach to counter a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.  From the PRC’s perspective, the 
war provides unique opportunities for PRC leaders to evaluate how countries use diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic measures to advance their interests before, during and after 
a major conflict. As the conflict continues, the PRC’s ultimate takeaways probably will depend on 
the conflict’s resolution, the PRC’s predispositions and perceptions of Washington’s intent toward 
the PRC and competing bureaucratic priorities within the PRC system. 
Diplomatically, the war in Ukraine probably has reaffirmed to Beijing the importance of 
persuading Global South countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific 
to echo China’s narratives on the conflict. The PRC probably views support from the developing 
countries as crucial to blunting U.S.-led efforts imposing reputational and economic costs on the 
PRC as well as claiming broad international support for PRC goals. At the same time, Beijing 
almost certainly continues to be surprised by the scope, scale, duration, and cohesion of the 
international response to Russia war on Ukraine. The PRC’s dismissal of the independent agency 
of countries it views as aligned with the United States or the legitimacy of shared values almost 
certainly has contributed to the PRC’s continued diplomatic struggles, especially in Europe. 
The PLA likely is observing how Russia and Ukraine are employing CDO during the current 
Russia-Ukraine war, and likely will seek to incorporate lessons learned from this conflict into its 
own doctrine for future conflicts. The PLA’s lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression in 
Ukraine probably will reinforce a commitment to conducting influence operations to deter 
adversaries, shape public opinion early on during a conflict, polarize societies, erode the will to 
fight, and guard against charismatic leaders changing public perceptions. PLA researchers have 
stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may yield greater strategic benefits than firepower 
destruction, force control, and siege, and that effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has 
concluded.   
On the economic front, western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the 
PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience. The PRC’s 
reliance on Western technology and capital investment probably will slow economic decoupling 
from Washington. 
 
 
 


 
 
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PRC ENERGY STRATEGY  
Key Takeaway 
● The PRC’s interest in ensuring reliable, cost-effective, and diverse hydrocarbon sources to 
support its economic growth drives its overseas energy investments. 
In 2022, the PRC imported approximately 10.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, which met 
about 70 percent of its needs, and produced the other 30 percent domestically, according to 
industry reports.  The PRC continues to build its crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) 
capacity to safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ 
worth of oil imports in storage. The PRC’s EPR storage capacity is approximately 600 million 
barrels, equal to about 60 days’ worth of oil imports, according to industry data.  The PRC met 
about 41 percent of its natural gas demand with imports in 2022, and industry experts estimate that 
the PRC’s natural gas imports will increase to about 50 percent by 2035.  In 2022, most of China’s 
oil and natural gas imports came from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia.  China’s 
investments in transport networks for oil and gas could help diversify its supply and reduce 
dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. 
The PRC relies on maritime routes that transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca for most of its 
hydrocarbon deliveries. Approximately 62 percent of the PRC’s oil imports and 17 percent of its 
total natural gas imports transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca.  Despite the PRC’s efforts to 
diversify energy suppliers, Beijing will most likely continue to rely on oil and natural gas imports 
from Africa and the Middle East to meet energy demands for at least the next 10 years.  
Crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate the PRC’s interest in 
increasing overland fuel supply. In 2022, the PRC imported about 600,000 barrels per day of 
Russian crude oil via the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which has a total designed capacity 
of 1.6 million barrels per day.   The PRC also imports crude oil from Middle Eastern—primarily 
Saudi—and African suppliers via a crude oil pipeline across Burma. This 440,000-barrels-per-day 
pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyaukpyu, Burma, to 
Yunnan Province, China, and reduces shipping time by more than a third.  This pipeline, however, 
still relies on seaborne oil imports through the Indian Ocean, where the PRC has little power 
projection capability. 
In 2022, approximately 30 percent of the PRC’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan via 
a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  This pipeline can transport 55 billion 
cubic meters per year; Turkmenistan and China are planning to expand it to 85 billion cubic meters 
per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion cubic meters per 
year, but only 4 billion cubic meters of gas was shipped in 2022.  Russia’s Power of Siberia gas 
pipeline supplied approximately 15 billion cubic meters to China in 2022. The pipeline is projected 
to reach an annual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2027.   


 
 
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CRITICAL MINERAL EXPLOITATION 
China controls the majority of the global critical minerals refining, in addition to the 
majority of rare earth element (REE) production and refining. Critical minerals such as 
lithium are key to the green energy transition, while REEs have significant industrial and 
defense applications.  A 2022 Brookings report estimated that the PRC refines 68 
percent of nickel, 40 percent of copper, 59 percent of lithium, and 73 percent of cobalt. 
However, other countries make up the majority of lithium and cobalt mining. While China’s 
share of the global extraction of REEs has declined from a peak of 95 percent in 2010 to 
nearly 60 percent in 2019, the world is still significantly reliant on China for over 90 
percent of REE processing and refining.   The PRC’s control of these supply chains could 
grant it a competitive advantage in sustainable energy technologies such as lithium-ion 
battery production and secure critical supply lines for its defense industrial base and 
production of high-end weapons platforms.   
 
CHINA’S TOP CRUDE SUPPLIERS 2022 
Country 
Volume (1,000 barrels per day) 
Percentage of Imported Crude Oil 
Saudi Arabia 
1,752 
17 
Russia 
1,728 
17 
Iraq  
1,111 
11 
UAE 
858 
8 
Oman 
789 
8 
Malaysia 
715 
7 
Kuwait 
667 
7 
Angola 
603 
6 
Brazil  
497 
5 
Colombia 
173 
2 
Others 
1,289 
13 
Total 
10,182 
101* 
* Total does not equal 100 because figures have been rounded. 
 


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CHINA IN THE POLAR REGIONS 
CHINA IN THE ARCTIC  
The PRC has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status 
in the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy paper 
that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be a “near-Arctic State,” although it has 
since stopped using this language to describe itself in public fora. The strategy paper identifies the 
PRC’s interests as access to natural resources, sea lines of communication, and promoting an 
image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs.  The strategy highlights the PRC’s 
icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to implementation.  
The PRC maintains civilian research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates three icebreaking 
research vessels as of early 2023.  The first is the Xue Long, which in 2017 became the first official 
Chinese vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage. In 2018, Beijing launched its second 
icebreaking research vessel, the Xue Long 2.  The Xue Long 2 can break ice up to 1.5 meters thick, 
compared to the Xue Long’s maximum of 1.2 meters, and the first polar research vessel that can 
break ice while moving forwards or backwards.  In October 2022, the Xue Long 2 commenced the 
PRC’s 12th Arctic expedition, during which researchers did comprehensive observations of the 
atmosphere, ocean and ecology. During the 12th Arctic Expedition, the PRC deployed an 
autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) for the first time in the Arctic Ocean. In November 2020, 
the Xue Long 2 embarked on the PRC’s 37th Antarctic expedition, where researchers planned to 
carry out hydrological, meteorological and environmental studies and monitor new pollutants such 
as microplastics and drifting garbage in the Antarctic Ocean. In February 2023, the PRC’s third 
polar icebreaker—the Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—completed a 3,000-mile round-trip winter sea 
trial in the Bohai Sea. 
The PRC’s expanding Arctic engagement has created new opportunities for engagement between 
the PRC and Russia. The PRC is interested in increasing the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
to cut shipping times between Europe and China by a third. The use of the NSR also allows China 
to diversify shipping routes away from the strategic Strait of Malacca. In September 2022, China 
and Russia also conducted a combined naval patrol in the Bering Sea. China-Russia cooperation 
on Arctic issues throughout 2022 likely created momentum enabling spring 2023 agreements to 
coordinate Arctic maritime law enforcement and establish a joint working body for the 
development of the NSR.    
THE PRC IN THE ANTARCTIC  
China currently has four active Antarctic sites that are used for environmental research and support 
to the Chinese space program: the Great Wall Station, Zhongshan Station, Kunlun Station, and 
Taishan Station. China is quickly building a formidable presence in Antarctica that almost certainly 
has a nexus with its civilian space program and future PLA missions. It also endeavors to work 


 
 
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more closely with Russia and possibly seeks to revise the Antarctic Treaty in 2048 to afford it 
greater access to natural resources and support military operations there.      
China is constructing bases in Antarctica that includes possible dual-use technology. While the 
equipment is ostensibly used for legitimate scientific research and is allowable under the Antarctic 
Treaty, it could also be used for unspecified military purposes.  For instance, China is building a 
fifth station on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea to increase its Antarctic footprint that could 
provide the PLA with better surveillance capabilities. Inexpressible Island will provide telemetry, 
tracking and communications for scientific polar observation satellite, and its equipment is also 
well positioned to collect signals intelligence over Australia and New Zealand.  
While China is a relative newcomer to Antarctica, it has been de-legitimizing the Consensus-based 
Antarctic Treaty, preparing for 2048, when central aspects of the treaty will be open to 
renegotiation.  It is likely both China and Russia will work together to seek to renegotiate the 
Antarctic Treaty to loosen regulations on mining and fishing practices, which both countries need 
for future consumption.  
 
 
 
 


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CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES AND 
TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused
with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for
modern military capabilities.
The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including
through its MCF Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive,
dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-
industrial sector to improve weapon system research, development, acquisition, testing,
evaluation, and production.
In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 7.1 percent,
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position
as the second-largest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published military budget omits
several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is significantly
higher than what it states in its official budget.
In 2022, China’s defense budget marginally increased from $229 billion. According to a PRC 
“work report,” the new defense budget aligned with PRC military goals associated with its 2027 
and 2035 military modernization program. PRC state media reported that the part of the defense 
budget increase over the prior year focused on modernizing the PLA’s training with realistic 
simulation and use of virtual reality; accelerating improvements in logistics capabilities, defense 
science, and technology; and enhancing the military’s strategic capacities.  
China is continuing to reorganize its defense, science, and commercial industries to ensure PLA 
access to the resources, technologies, and expertise required to militarily surpass the United States 
and develop capabilities for complex future military contingencies. China’s efforts include 
developing and incorporating military-AI and other emerging disruptive technologies (EDT) to 
build an “intelligentized” force sufficiently equipped with high-tech weapons and advanced 
communications and information technologies to wage and win dynamic wars. While China’s 
MCF strategy supports acquisition of foreign materiel, technology, and expertise through overt 
and illicit means, China is also accelerating efforts to build domestic capacity in these areas and 
reduce its vulnerabilities to foreign supply chokepoints. 


 
 
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MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDS 
 In 2022, the PRC announced a nominal 7.1 percent annual military budget increase to $229 billion, 
which is approximately 1.3 percent of gross domestic product. This year’s budget continues more 
than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains the PRC’s position as the second-
largest military spender in the world after the United States.   The PRC’s defense budget has nearly 
doubled during the past 10 years—data from 2013 through 2022 indicates China’s official military 
budget grew 6 percent annually after adjusting for inflation. The PRC can support continued 
growth in defense spending for at least the next five to 10 years, based on economic data and 
growth projections.  
 
 
China: Official Defense Budget (2013–2022)  
China’s Estimated Military Expenditures. The PRC’s published military budget does not 
include details of expenditure breakouts, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. In 
2022, China’s actual military-related spending could be significantly higher than its officially 
announced defense budget. Actual PRC military expenses are difficult to calculate, largely due to 
the PRC’s lack of transparency.  United Kingdom and Europe-based think tanks estimate that the 
PRC’s actual 2022 defense budget is at least 30-40 percent higher than the PRC’s announced 
budget.  
China’s Estimated Defense Budget Growth. If China’s official defense budget continues to 
increase annually by an average of 6 percent, the PLA can dedicate more money for training, 
operations, and personnel costs. Economic forecasters project that China’s economic growth will 
slow during the next 10 years, from about 3 percent in 2022 to around 4 percent in 2025, which 
could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming accurate economic projections and a steady 
defense burden, China will remain the second-largest spender after the United States.  
0%
3%
6%
9%
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0
50
100
150
200
250
Official Defense Budget
GDP Growth
Billions USD


 
 
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REGIONAL COMPARISON OF THE PRC’S 2022 OFFICIAL DEFENSE BUDGET 
 
2022 BillionPRC(officialdefensebudget)229  
India
74.4Japan51.9  
Russia (national defense budget)
90.9SouthKorea42.5  
Taiwan
$16.8  
 
PLA PERSONNEL COSTS 
China is facing adverse demographics such as an aging population and low-birth rates. The PLA 
could respond to the demographics issues by raising pay standards to support recruitment and 
retainment efforts, which would place upward pressure on PLA personnel spending relative to 
other defense spending categories. The PLA is giving priority to recruiting college graduates with 
science and engineering backgrounds and those experienced in operating high-tech weapons, 
suggesting the PLA will have to compete with the private sector to attract top talent. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Key Takeaways 
● China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and 
many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. 
● China is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide 
range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and 
electronic systems, which makes it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. 
MISSILE AND SPACE INDUSTRY 
China produces a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, many 
comparable in quality to those of other international top-tier producers, for domestic military use 
and export.  China has the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal and has dramatically advanced its 
development of both conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the 
past 20 years. Beijing fielded its first missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2020 and tested a 


 
 
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new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous progress in hypersonic weapons 
development. China also advanced its scramjet engine development in 2022, which has 
applications in hypersonic cruise missiles. In April 2019, the PLAN revealed during its 70th 
anniversary celebration that its new guided-missile cruiser can employ long-range land attack 
cruise missiles and, in 2022, launched the YJ-21 hypersonic missile designed to defeat aircraft 
carriers. In 2022, Beijing made its first delivery of a surface-to-air missile system to a European 
nation, Serbia. China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring dual-
mode guidance capabilities, which uses both active radar and infrared homing seekers that improve 
target-selection capabilities and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures. 
China’s space industry, managed by the PLA, is rapidly expanding its intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellite constellations. The successful completion 
of the Tiangong Space Station in 2022 and its planned expansion demonstrates the industry’s 
continued progress. China’s domestic space market is dominated by state-run enterprises; 
however, increased investment has enabled private space companies to successfully launch orbital 
satellites in the past 4 years.   In 2020, China launched its first satellites for an ongoing new space-
based internet-of-things  project with container monitoring and maritime communications 
applications and, in 2021, designated satellite internet as a national infrastructure project.   
NAVAL AND SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
China, the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, is increasing its shipbuilding 
capacity for all naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. 
China also has developed unmanned underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system 
in 2019. China domestically produces naval gas turbine and diesel engines as well as almost all 
shipboard weapons and electronic systems for its shipbuilding sector, making the industry nearly 
self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed 
and manufactured aircraft carrier, featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting 
devices. The carrier will be able to deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-
submarine helicopters.  
ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY 
China’s production capacity is improving in nearly every PLA ground system category: main and 
light battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, assault vehicles, air defense artillery systems, and 
artillery systems. Notably, China began testing unmanned Type-59 tanks in 2018 as part of its 
military modernization program. In November 2022, China unveiled an unmanned model of its 
VT-5 light tank, which is an export variant of the Type-15 light tank. The Type-15 entered PLA 
service in 2018 and was meant to replace aging Type-62 light tanks that first entered service in 
1962. China is capable of producing ground weapon systems at or near world-class standards; 
although customers also cite persistent quality deficiencies with some exported equipment, 
inhibiting the PRC’s ability to expand its export markets.  


 
 
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AVIATION INDUSTRY 
China is advancing its domestic aviation industry through two major state-owned aircraft 
corporations, the China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) and the Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China (COMAC). AVIC designs and produces China’s military aircraft, including 
the J-20 fifth-generation fighter, the Y-20 heavy transport, and the future H-20 flying wing stealth 
bomber.   COMAC produces large passenger aircraft and has begun to export the ARJ21 regional 
jet to Indonesia, in line with its efforts to expand into the international commercial airliner market.   
COMAC has also delivered its first narrow-body C919 airliner to China Eastern Airlines, but 
cooperation with Russia on the wide-body CR929 may be stalled because of the effects of Western 
sanctions on Russia.     
China’s decades-long effort to improve domestic aircraft engine production is starting to produce 
results, with the J-10 and J-20 fighters beginning to switch to domestically produced WS-10 
engines, although some Russian AL-31F engines may remain in use.    China’s first domestically 
produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing on the Y-20 heavy 
transport aircraft and probably has begun to replace previously imported Russian engines.      UAV 
development has also proceeded rapidly with new flight tests of experimental craft such as the Y-
5U transport UAV. China’s military aviation industry has continued to export UAVs abroad, 
including its sale of nine armed drones to the Democratic Republic of Congo this year.   
DRIVE TO DOMINATE EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES  
China seeks to be an innovation superpower that is largely non-reliant on foreign technology and 
serves as a global center for high-tech industries. The goal of attaining self-sufficiency in key S&T 
sectors—a theme of PRC state plans going back decades—was recently reiterated in the 14th Five-
Year Plan. As part of this self-sufficiency drive, Beijing has mobilized its bureaucracies to rapidly 
develop the country’s capacity for domestic innovation. Published in 2006, the National Medium-
and-Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020) was a landmark 
policy that formalized China’s push for domestic innovation while also calling for the assimilation 
and “re-innovation” of advanced foreign technologies. In 2015, with the Made in China 2025 plan, 
Beijing sharpened its emphasis on technological independence by establishing import substitution 
quotas across a range of core technologies. The plan also called for the reform of state-owned 
enterprises, the establishment of regional innovation centers, and the leveraging of private sector 
capabilities in order to leapfrog foreign technological competitors and create a superior innovation 
ecosystem. 
China is particularly focused on dominating a range of emerging, dual-use technologies that 
promise to be both disruptive and foundational for future economies. In its 14th Five-Year Plan, 
China prioritized the advancement of next-generation artificial intelligence, quantum information, 
brain science and biotechnology, semiconductors, and deep space, deep sea, and polar-related 
technologies. Beijing has a clear understanding of its remaining S&T deficiencies and wields 


 
 
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industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to close these gaps. 
China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies to domestic 
companies working on frontier technologies. 
Artificial Intelligence. China is a global leader in AI technology and aims to overtake the West 
in AI R&D by 2025 to become the world leader in AI by 2030. China has designated AI as one of 
its priority, national-level S&T development areas and assesses that advances in AI and autonomy 
are central to intelligentized warfare, the PRC’s concept of future warfare. Beijing views the 
integration of military and civilian institutions as central for developing AI-enabled military 
capabilities and has established military-civilian R&D centers and procured commercially-
developed AI and robotic technologies to ensure PLA access to cutting-edge AI technologies.  
Although, Chinese researchers are world leaders in certain AI applications, such as facial 
recognition and natural language processing, and Chinese companies are marketing domestically-
designed AI chips. While China remains reliant on certain foreign capabilities to produce AI 
hardware, such as advanced semiconductor fabrication factories and electronic design automation 
software, Chinese researchers continue to explore new materials and design concepts for next-
generation semiconductors. 
Brain Science. In 2021, Beijing funded the China Brain Plan, a major research project aimed at 
using brain science to develop new biotechnology and AI applications. That year, China also 
designed and fabricated a quantum computer capable of outperforming a classical high-
performance computer for a specific problem. China was also domestically developing specialized 
refrigerators needed for quantum computing research in an effort to end reliance on international 
components. In 2017, China spent over a billion dollars on a national quantum lab which will 
become the world’s largest quantum research facility when completed.  
FOREIGN ARMS ACQUISITION  
China uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, 
particularly with helicopters and aircraft engines. Only a few states have been willing to supply 
military materiel to China, such as Russia and Ukraine. As its aerospace industry improves over 
the next decade, China very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to a point of only 
maintaining an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in 
the PRC’s inventory.     
● Helicopters. In 2019, China signed four contracts with Russia worth a total of $1.7 billion for 
100 Mi-171 helicopters. Russia began producing helicopters for these contracts in 2020 and 
Beijing expects at least one of the orders to be completed in 2022. As of 2021, China sought 
at least 36 Russian Ka-52K ship-borne heavy attack helicopters to operate from Type 075 
amphibious assault ships while it develops a domestic alternative. 
● Aircraft Engines. China has a longstanding reliance on Russian- and Ukrainian-built engines 
for fixed and rotary wing aircraft produced domestically. China is developing new engine 


 
 
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designs to lessen its reliance on foreign engines, such as the WS-15 to replace Ukrainian AI-
222 engines that power its L-15 trainer aircraft.
   Russia’s war on Ukraine probably will impede 
China’s ability to acquire military equipment and maintenance services from either country. 
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY 
MODERNIZATION 
There have been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC 
nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. 
citizens. These include procuring and exporting controlled items to China and economic 
espionage, according to a U.S. Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement. 
The PRC’s efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included aviation 
technologies, radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits, radiation-hardened 
integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval 
and marine technologies, signals decoders, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, 
military communication jamming equipment, and dynamic random access memory.  Cases from 
2022 include the following:  
● In November 2022, an MSS intelligence officer was sentenced to 20 years in prison for 
attempting to steal technology and proprietary information from companies based both in the 
United States and abroad. The MSS intelligence officer attempted to steal technology related 
to a U.S. aviation company’s exclusive composite aircraft engine fan module – which no other 
company in the world has been able to duplicate – in order to advance China’s commercial and 
military aviation efforts. The MSS intelligence officer also openly talked about efforts to obtain 
U.S. military information in addition to commercial aviation trade secrets. The espionage 
operation was executed with full coordination between the MSS and China’s aviation entities.   
● In September 2022, a federal district court jury convicted a Chinese national of acting illegally 
within the United States as an agent of the PRC. The Chinese national was tasked by the MSS 
with providing biographical information on certain individuals for possible recruitment. The 
individuals included Chinese nationals who were working as engineers and scientists in the 
United States, some of whom worked for U.S. defense contractors. This tasking was part of an 
effort by the MSS to obtain access to advanced aerospace and satellite technologies being 
developed by companies within the United States.  
 
PRC CYBER-ENABLED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES 
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military 
and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to 
information and advanced technologies.   


 
 
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Detected PRC cyberspace operations have targeted telecommunications firms, managed service 
providers (MSPs), and software developers.  Key U.S. targets include proprietary commercial and 
military technology companies and research institutions associated with defense, energy, and other 
sectors.   
The PRC seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to 
physical disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 
operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict.  China’s activities in cyberspace constitute 
a fundamentally different, more complex, and more urgent challenge to the United States national 
security today than they did a decade ago.  
CHINA’S ARMS EXPORTS 
China is the fifth-largest arms supplier in the world, and sells nearly every category of conventional 
military equipment including UAVs, MANPADS, submarines, naval surface vessels, surface to 
air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.        
Many developing countries buy Chinese weapons systems because they are less expensive than 
other comparable systems. Although some potential customers consider arms made by the PRC to 
be of lower quality and reliability, many of China’s systems are offered with enticements such as 
donations and flexible payment options, which make them appealing options for buyers.  
China’s arms sales operate primarily through state-run export organizations such as AVIC and 
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Arms transfers also are a component of the PRC’s 
foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of assistance to complement foreign policy 
initiatives undertaken as part of China’s BRI.  
● Fixed-Wing Aircraft. China offers three combat aircraft for export: the FC-31 fifth generation 
multirole combat aircraft, the JF-17 light combat aircraft, and the J-10 multirole combat 
aircraft. As of 2022, China had not sold any FC-31s and had sold J-10s only to Pakistan.  China 
co-produces the JF-17 with Pakistan, which has been sold to Burma, Iraq, and Nigeria. China 
has supplied strike-capable Caihong and Wing Loong UAVs to countries including Algeria, 
Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and the UAE.  
● Precision-Strike Weapons. As of 2021, China had exported ballistic missile systems, 
including the M20, BP-12, and Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System (JARM), as well as 
long-range satellite-guided rocket systems. Although China typically does not disclose the 
countries purchasing these types of arms, in 2021, Burma displayed an SY-400 transporter 
erector launcher (TEL) and in 2017 Qatar displayed a JARM.   
● Air Defense Systems. In April 2022, Beijing made its first delivery of a surface-to-air missile 
system to a European nation, Serbia. Serbia displayed the PRC-produced FK-3 medium- to 


 
 
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long-range semi-active radar homing/radio-command guidance air defense system. The FK-3, 
an export-variant of the HQ-22, fires missiles that can reach Mach 6 and range 100 km.  
● Naval Combatants. China is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by Pakistan’s 2015 
purchase of eight Yuan-class submarines for more than $3 billion. Thailand also purchased 
one Yuan-class submarine in 2017 and is interested in purchasing two more. As of April 2022, 
China had not delivered any Yuan submarines, although it had delivered two Ming-class 
submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 and 2018, China sold 
two frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan, respectively. In September 2019, China made 
its first-ever sale of a landing platform dock ship to Thailand. 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEFENSE CONTACTS  
AND EXCHANGES IN 2022  
 
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS  
 In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and 
DoD requests for communication.  
 The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely continued in 2023.  
 The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, 
combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk 
of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.  
 DoD is committed to reopening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition 
does not veer into conflict.  
 DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include ensuring crisis communications 
channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and clarifying misperceptions. 
DoD contacts and exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the statutory 
limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2020, as amended. 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR U.S.-PRC DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP  
Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States approached defense engagement with the PRC as 
a means of enhancing PLA transparency, advancing mutual reciprocity, and imparting best 
practices for air and maritime operational safety.  These activities sought to encourage the PRC to 
play a constructive and peaceful role in a free and open international system.   
Despite U.S. and international efforts to encourage the PRC’s rise to occur within the rules-based 
international order, PRC malign behavior has subsequently cast doubt on the PRC’s willingness 
to operate in accordance with international laws, rules, and norms. As the PLA modernizes toward 
its goal of producing a world-class force by 2049, the PRC has increasingly turned to the PLA as 
an instrument of statecraft to advance its foreign policy objectives— adopting more coercive and 
aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.   
As the PRC pushes the PLA to engage in increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior in 
an effort to achieve the PRC’s policy objectives in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has 


 
 
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retreated from military-to-military communications with the United States. The ability of the two 
sides to now effectively communicate to preempt or manage a potential incident caused by risky 
PLA behavior is weak and raises the risk of escalation. 
In August 2022, the PRC suspended military contacts and exchanges with the United States, 
claiming the cut-off was in response to the former House Speaker’s visit to Taiwan. Roughly a 
year on, the PRC continues to point to long-standing U.S. military activities in the Western Pacific, 
the United States’ Taiwan policy, and Washington’s refusal to remove sanctions on the PRC’s 
newly-appointed Minister of National Defense, General Li Shangfu, for creating a “negative 
atmosphere” for talks. The PRC’s long track record of cancelling military-to-military lines of 
communication in response to perceived offenses suggests the PRC views military channels of 
communication as a tool to punish or reward the United States for its perceived behavior, versus 
being inherently valuable to maintaining peace and stability.  
High-Level Contacts and Exchanges. High-level exchanges between the U.S. and PRC— such 
as between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the PRC Minister of National Defense—are an 
important way to exchange views on the bilateral defense relationship and the international 
security environment. In the past, the PRC was willing to responsibly engage in high-level 
dialogue to ensure mutual understanding on a range of policy and operational issues. While DoD 
continues to seek open lines of communication with the PLA at multiple levels in both operator 
and policy channels, the PRC now views executing military-to-military communications as a tool 
to either reward or punish U.S. behavior based on U.S. adherence and respect for PRC core 
interests. 
● Executed. In 2022, the Secretary of Defense engaged with then-PRC Minister of National 
Defense, General Wei Fenghe, three times to discuss regional security, bilateral defense 
relations, and issues of common concern. They met once in June on the sidelines of the Shangri 
La dialogue in Singapore, and once in November on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense 
Ministerial Meeting + (ADMM+) in Cambodia. The Secretary also held one Defense 
Telephone Link (DLT) call with General Wei in April 2022 to discuss Russia’s war on Ukraine.  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) held one DTL with then-PRC Chairman of 
the Joint Staff Department (JSD) in July to discuss operational issues. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. In 2022, the PLA declined, cancelled, or ignored the 
majority of senior-level contacts. In July, the PLA cancelled a planned DTL call about 
operational issues between INDOPACOM Commander and the PLA Southern Theater 
Command (STC) commander. In August, the PLA refused a CJCS DTL call request to the 
Chairman of the JSD. In August, the PLA refused a Secretary of Defense DTL call request to 
the PRC Minister of National Defense. In December, the PLA again refused a CJCS DTL call 
request to the Chairman of the JSD. 
Recurring Exchanges. Recurring exchanges serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to 
advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management and reduce of operational risk.   


 
 
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● Executed. None. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. In 2020, the PLA indefinitely postponed the Asia-Pacific 
Security Dialogue (APSD), an Assistant Secretary of Defense-level policy dialogue. The 
APSD did not take place in 2021 or 2022. In August, the PRC cancelled the Defense Policy 
Coordination Talks (DPCT), an annual Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) level 
policy dialogue. In August, the PRC also cancelled all Military Maritime Consultative 
Agreement (MMCA) talks, an operational safety dialogue between U.S. INDOPACOM and 
PLA naval and air forces, in violation of the U.S-PRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
establishing the MMCA. Until 2020, the U.S. and PRC have met regularly since 1998 for 
MMCA dialogue to strengthen military maritime safety, improve operational safety in the air 
and sea, and reduce risk between the two militaries. The PLA also declined to hold a Crisis 
Communications Working Group (CCWG) meeting, a working-level policy dialogue 
established in 2020 to advance crisis prevention and management mechanisms between DoD 
and the PLA.  
Confidence Building Measures and Academic Exchanges. Confidence Building Measure 
engagements focus on employing mechanisms for risk reduction, briefing significant policy 
documents, reducing misunderstanding or misperceptions, POW/MIA accounting, and 
communication to promote international rules and norms. Similarly, academic exchanges focus on 
building mutual understanding.  
● Executed. In September, the PRC Defense Attaché provided a briefing to the DASD for China, 
Taiwan, and Mongolia on the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan white paper “The Taiwan Question and 
China’s Reunification in the New Era.” DoD requested the briefing, consistent with the 2014 
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of Defense and the PRC 
Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence Building 
Measures Mechanism, to reduce misperceptions about PRC intentions for “reunification.” 
Similarly, DoD provided a briefing to the PRC Defense Attaché on the 2022 annual report on 
“Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC” and the 2022 National Defense 
Strategy to share DoD assessments of PRC security developments and discuss areas of 
perceived misperception. DoD offered these briefings to the PRC to clarify U.S. strategic intent 
and provide a platform to clarify misperceptions. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. Since 2019, the PRC has not offered or requested briefings 
to DoD on security related policy developments under the 2014 MOU between the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the PRC Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major 
Military Activities Confidence Building Measures Mechanism. There were no exchanges or 
contacts in 2022 between the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) and the PLA.  
 


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U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2023
The PRC’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communication only sharpened in 
2023.  
●Executed. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff each sent
congratulatory letters to the newly-appointed PRC Minister of National Defense, Li Shangfu,
and Chairman of the Joint Staff Department, General Liu Zhenli. The United States, as the
chair of the dialogue among the five Nuclear Weapons States, organized a working-level
experts meeting on June 13-14 in Cairo, which included officials from the U.S. Department of
Defense and PRC Ministry of National Defense.
●Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. As of June 2023, the PRC declined two SECDEF DTL call
requests to General Wei Fenghe. The PRC ignored INDOPACOM Commander DTL call
requests to the PLA STC, Northern Theater Command (NTC), and Eastern Theater Command
(ETC) commanders. The PRC similarly ignored DoD requests to hold recurring exchanges
including DPCTs, MMCA talks, and CCWG. The PRC defense attaché in the United States
refused multiple invitations to engage with the DASD for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia.
Of note, in April 2023, the PLA requested U.S. assistance in evacuation of PRC diplomats from 
Khartoum, Sudan amidst ongoing fighting. In response, DoD provided evacuation routes from 
Khartoum to the Port of Sudan to the PRC and multiple other countries that had requested U.S. 
assistance. 


 
 
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 SPECIAL TOPICS 
 
 
 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA SELF-ASSESSMENTS  
The PLA highlights some self-assessed shortcomings publicly, likely to guide and accelerate force-
wide modernization efforts. The PLA routinely use set slogans or phrases to describe these self-
assessments to exhort the force to carry out specific campaigns. These evaluations also likely 
represent genuine anxieties among PRC leaders about the PLA’s readiness and ability to conduct 
joint operations if tested under real combat conditions. The five PLA slogans are described on the 
next page.  
● Leadership and Command. The PLA has regularly identified concerns about the quality and 
ability of its commanders and officers. Numerous PLA slogans have addressed this issue most 
pointedly expressing concern that its forces will be unable to seize the operational initiative at 
the level necessary for modern warfare, with previous annual training mobilization orders 
explicitly referencing the “Five Incapables” and “Two Inabilities.”  
● Lack of Combat Experience. The PLA’s self-assessments often express insecurities about 
the fact that the military has not fought a war since 1979, with common references to the “peace 
disease” or “peacetime practices”. For the PLA, the “peace disease” presents itself as both a 
lack readiness within the force and a lackadaisical attitude towards training and preparing for 
potential conflict.   
● Exercise and Training Realism. For decades, the PLA has identified poor and unrealistic 
training as a key problem for military modernization. . The PLA has focused on both 
“formalism” and “bureaucratism” as the leading causes of substandard training. This means 
that training is stilted and formal rather than being appropriate for dynamic and unpredictable 
real-world conditions.  
● Professional Military Education. The PLA has identified a lack of officers with knowledge 
of joint combat operations and is working to implement a true joint culture throughout the 
force.   To rectify the gap in military education on joint warfighting, theater command 
headquarters have attempted to set up educational programs at headquarters to build joint 
proficiency. Additionally, the PRC’s NDU launched the PLA’s first training course for officers 
to receive joint post qualifications upon graduation.  
● Fighting and winning modern wars. The PLA has utilized the slogan the “Two Big Gaps” 
to underline enduring concerns about its true capability for warfighting despite the long 


 
 
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modernization effort. It also is an acknowledgement that the PLA feels itself to be behind the 
world’s most capable militaries and that they have not yet achieved that standard.  
SLOGAN 
ARTICULATION 
“Five Incapables” 
● Cannot judge the situation  
● Cannot understand the intention of higher authorities  
● Cannot make operational decisions  
● Cannot deploy forces  
● Cannot deal with unexpected situations  
“Two Incompatibles”  
● Does not meet the requirements of winning local war under 
informatized conditions  
● Does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic 
missions at the new stage of the new century 
“Two Big Gaps” 
● Does not meet the requirements for national security 
● Lack of capability compared to the level of the world’s most 
advanced militaries  
“Two Inabilities”  
● Inability to fight a modern war 
● Inability of officers at all levels to command in modern war 
“Three Whethers”  
● Whether the armed forces can constantly maintain the Party’s 
absolute leadership  
● Whether the armed forces can fight victoriously when needed by 
the Party and the people  
● Whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead forces 
and command in war  
 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN ITS WAR AGAINST 
UKRAINE  
The PRC probably was caught off guard by Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022, which 
occurred 20 days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing and the signing of a “no 
limits” partnership. Although Russia’s was on Ukraine has tested the strength of the elevated 
relationship, the PRC has sought to preserve its close ties with Russia while promoting its own 
image as a responsible great power and its “neutrality” in the war. Xi has also stood by Putin as 
the war entered its second year and resisted Western pressure to isolate and impose costs on Russia 
for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. The PRC’s perception that Washington and NATO are 
responsible for starting the conflict, along with its sympathy for Russia’s security concerns, has 
driven the PRC’s response to the conflict.  
To provide diplomatic cover for Russia, Beijing has parroted Russian narratives when they align 
with the PRC’s criticism of the United States and refrained from condemning its conduct or 


 
 
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referring to Russia’s invasion as a “war”. The PRC has also legitimized Russia’s role on the world 
stage by continuing to work with Russia in various multilateral fora such as the UN, BRICS, and 
ASEAN as well as by conducting routine bilateral meetings with Russian leaders. China has 
stepped up trade and become a willing buyer of Russian energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanction-
battered economy. As of mid-2022, the PRC’s approach probably has shifted towards 
opportunistically advancing China’s interests, specifically to strengthen its international efforts to 
counter the United States.  
On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the PRC Foreign Ministry 
released a 12-point proposal discussing the PRC’s approach to the political settlement of Russia’s 
war of aggression in Ukraine. Although Beijing touted the proposal as a major diplomatic 
statement, it largely recycled and consolidated previous PRC statements and proposals on the war, 
which probably indicates that Beijing primarily aims to exploit the peace plan as a messaging tool 
to advance China and Russia’s interests. Beijing probably views the proposal as an opportunity to 
advance China’s desired image as a responsible great power, deflect international criticism of 
Sino-Russian relations, and reemphasize the PRC narrative that blames the United States and 
NATO for causing and perpetuating the war; this messaging is probably intended to primarily 
target developing countries in the Global South.  
Similarly, the PRC’s ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons 
probably is intended to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power and signal its 
discomfort about the prospect of nuclear escalation to relevant parties in the war in Ukraine. In 
November 2022, during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear 
weapons must not be used, nuclear wars should not be fought, and the international community 
should come together to prevent a nuclear conflict in Eurasia. 
Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing materiel 
assistance to Russia. To date, PRC officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance 
to Russia. However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it 
probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or 
economic costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese 
companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, 
dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, spare 
parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. Additionally, the United States announced 
sanctions in 2023 against specific PRC companies for their role in sharing imagery to the private 
Russian military company, Wagner.  
China and Russia have continued to increase the frequency of combined military exercises and 
maneuvers despite Russia’s war on Ukraine. These maneuvers typically are scripted and parallel 
rather than integrated, suggesting that both countries are not capable of operational or tactical 
interoperability. During the past five years, China has increasingly participated in several Russian 
capstone exercises and both countries have undertaken a number of combined air and naval patrols. 
Beijing has probably benefitted from hands on training with Russian command and control systems 


 
 
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and from Russia’s more recent combat experience, given that China has not conducted active 
combat operations in several decades. In 2021, both countries signed a defense cooperation 
roadmap pledging to expand military exercises and carry out more patrols, probably to feed their 
narrative about a strengthening defense partnership. PRC-Russia military exercises since Russia’s 
war on Ukraine include the following:  
● In 2022, China and Russia conducted two combined bomber patrols– their fourth- and fifth-
ever – during the same year for the first time. In May 2022, the first coincided with the Quad 
Summit in Tokyo and the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The second was carried 
out on November 30th in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan, ECS, and Philippine Sea and included 
practicing the landing of bombers at each other’s airfields.  
● China and Russia conducted their second-ever combined naval patrol in September directly 
after VOSTOK-22, which preceded the annual bilateral naval JOINT SEA exercise in 
December. For the first time, the security patrol occurred in the Bering Sea along Alaska’s 
Aleutian Island chain.  
● China also participated in Russia’s capstone VOSTOK-22 exercise in September but decreased 
the number of personnel it sent. During the exercise, the PLA and Russian navies performed 
multiple combined maneuvers.  
Although Chinese and Russian leaders appear to assess that the benefits of cooperation outweigh 
the costs of working together, the relationship is still colored by latent tensions and strategic 
mistrust. The PRC’s strategic mistrust is probably fueled by the perception of the more powerful 
Russian Empire and Soviet Union historically taking advantage of a weaker China. Despite 
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 and the resolution of longstanding border disputes, 
China remains suspicious of Russia’s intentions. The CCP still draws on Russia’s past humiliation 
of China—such as the signing of unjust border treaties that ceded large swaths of Chinese territory 
to the Russians Far East—as a source of nationalism. For Russia, enduring structural inequities, 
such as geography and its declining population in the Far East, stoke fears that China may encroach 
on its interests, exploit Russian weaknesses, or relegate Russia as the inferior partner in their 
relationship.  
China’s rise, growing ambitions to establish a military presence in the Arctic, and lackluster 
economic and military support to Russia during the war in Ukraine probably all contribute to 
ongoing tensions in the relationship.  
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC BUILDING “A STRONG STRATEGIC 
DETERRENT SYSTEM” 
In President Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he set a goal for the PLA to “build a 
strong strategic deterrent system.”  This expands on PLA doctrinal writings from 2020 urging the 
construction of a “strategic deterrence system with Chinese characteristics” and the PRC’s 2021 


 
 
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guidance to create a high-level strategic deterrence system in its 14th Five-Year Plan.   The PRC 
views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military capabilities across 
various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic deterrent role. Building this 
system consists of two parts: the development of traditional nuclear deterrent force building and 
the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces in emerging fields and technologies. The 
PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat 
perceptions of the United States and by specific concerns over Taiwan. 
Strategic deterrence is a core component of the PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great 
power, achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class 
military by 2049. Beijing considers building a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as 
necessary to defend its national sovereignty, security, and development interests.  It also views it 
as necessary to increase the PRC’s ability to manage escalation in a conflict by deterring and 
preventing an adversary from escalating confrontation at will. 
As of 2022, the PRC perceives an erosion of strategic stability in the US-PRC relationship.  PLA 
academics and PRC government officials also perceive that the United States is interfering in the 
PRC’s periphery.  The PRC views building a “strong strategic deterrence force system” as a “trump 
card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan.  
The PRC views development of nuclear and conventional capabilities as necessary components of 
its “asymmetric countermeasures” approach to defeat strong enemies seeking to by developing 
capabilities that exploit PRC strengths and take advantage of its weaknesses. In addition to 
improving nuclear and conventional capabilities, Xi has urged the PLA to speed up development 
of other non-traditional capabilities—such as in the space and cyberspace domains—to support 
modern warfare, further “intelligentization” of the PLA, and “win local wars.” 
The PRC is committed to maintaining deterrence against its nuclear rivals, and PRC experts view 
a survivable second-strike capability as crucial to national security. The PRC’s understanding of 
nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient capability to inflict unacceptable 
destruction against its potential adversaries. Chinese think tanks are concerned about the credibility 
of its nuclear deterrent due to its smaller nuclear force, which may note be seen by adversaries as 
sufficiently survivable in a nuclear conflict.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and 
to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, 
as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”  The PLA expects space to play 
an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other 
militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems.  
The development of cyber warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA writings, which identify 
IO—comprising cyber, EW, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving 
information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe.  The 


 
 
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PRC has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its 
intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA RECRUITMENT AND PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT SITUATION  
PLA RECRUITMENT 
Traditional PRC military recruitment is dependent on two-year enlisted conscripts, requiring about 
400,000 young citizens must voluntarily join the PLA or be compulsorily inducted annually. The 
ratio of volunteer versus non-volunteer conscripts is unknown, and likely varies by year and place 
depending on local conditions and individual motivations. As of 2020, PLA officers and civilian 
personnel probably numbered approximately 450,000 personnel (23 percent), NCOs roughly 
850,000 (42 percent), and conscripted recruits about 700,000 (35 percent). 
Two-year conscripts are assessed to comprise about one-third of all active-duty personnel. 
Continuing practices implemented since at least 2016, the updated national conscription law 
focuses on encouraging college students, both recent graduates and current senior students, to 
voluntarily enlist. College students are offered incentives to serve, and those who have not yet 
graduated may return to school to finish their education after their time in service. Prior to this 
push for college-educated personnel, as recently as 2011, most of the new PLA recruits were high 
school graduates. In 2021, the PRC adopted a revised version of the Military Service Law to 
improve the system of military service registration and highlight the predominant role of 
volunteers in the military service system. 
The PLA also recruits civilian personnel to acquire specific skillsets. Civilian personnel are those 
who work in management or professional technical military posts but are not in active service 
unless deemed necessary. In 2018, the PLA launched its first written examination for recruiting 
civilian personnel; among the more than 140,000 participants, 86 percent held a bachelor’s degree 
or above, and 16 percent graduated with a master’s degree or above.  
In 2022, the PLA extended the recruitment age for university graduates. Compared to the usual 
age requirements – between 18 and 22 – for new recruits, male applicants who were in their final 
year of university or held a bachelor’s or associate degree, could enlist at age 24, and all applicants 
who were postgraduate students or held a master’s degree could list up to age 26. The Ministry of 
National Defense’s Recruitment Office instructed recruitment officers to focus on recent university 
and college graduates, with preference given to degree holders in the fields of science, technology, 
or engineering. Xi has continually urged the military to improve its human resources efforts to 
recruit and train more talented professionals to help achieve its key goals.  
 


 
 
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CONSCRIPTION CYCLE 
In 2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its single annual military conscription cycle to a 
two-phase system. Under the new system, conscription is held in both the spring and autumn 
instead of just once in the autumn, to account for the academic school year and allow for more 
efficient enlistment. The COVID-19 pandemic postponed the implementation of the biannual 
conscription cycle, which was delayed to early 2021. The change did not represent an increase in 
the total number of recruits, but rather a staggering of the overall intake process. The new system 
is intended to give military units greater flexibility by reducing the total number affected by 
turnover at a given time.  
2023 REFORMS 
Beijing has moved to update its national conscription law by enacting revisions in May 2023.  The 
new law reflects this updated system and recent developments in the PLA, particularly advances 
in information technology and population shifts. It calls for establishing an “inter-ministerial joint 
conference system for conscription work” intended to improve efficiency by formalizing the 
system already in operation through the CMC’s National Defense Mobilization Department and 
Ministry of National Defense Recruitment/Conscription Office.  After national-level inter-agency 
coordination, conscription quotas for every province are sent down the military chain of command 
and to the local governments for execution.  
 The law also provides further incentives for recently demobilized personnel to volunteer for a 
“second enlistment.”  Second enlistments refer to enlisted personnel who were not promoted to a 
higher rank, but later decided to return to service. The law specifies that personnel who enlist for 
a second time and meet the qualifications to be a NCO may be “directly recruited as sergeants” (a 
general term for NCOs at the rank of corporal or higher). Another option for demobilized personnel 
is to enter the expanding ranks of non-active-duty contract civilians, some of whom are assigned 
to the system of local headquarters responsible for conscription.   
 In pursuit of Xi’s vision of achieving a “world-class” military by 2049, the PLA is focusing on 
the personnel reform of its NCOs, which are expected to be the PLA’s “backbone” in future wars. 
Recognizing that small military units have played an increasingly important role in regional wars, 
the PLA is seeking to strengthen NCOs’ strategic and leadership capabilities, as well as improve 
their professional skills through academic and technical training. In March 2022, PLA 
implemented new regulations aimed at increasing “combat effectiveness,” such as allowing 
intermediate and senior sergeants to stay in service longer to have more professional NCOs in the 
military. The regulations aimed at enhancing professionalism and stability among NCOs, while 
allowing conscripts to play a more fundamental role in the development of the PRC’s military 
talent. They also intended to improve the management of PLA personnel by progressing the 
recruitment, training, rank promotion, benefits and demobilization system for NCOs and 
conscripts, and to play a key role in building a high-quality military.  


 
 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Beijing views its international security environment as becoming increasingly complex, with 
intensifying confrontation with the United States raising the danger of conflict during this decade. 
PRC leaders believe that the United States is engaging in a systematic effort to suppress China’s 
development, prevent Taiwan’s unification with mainland China, and maintain U.S. global 
hegemony. This perception is driving the PRC to accelerate efforts to increase its economic and 
technological self-reliance, strengthen its ability to secure interests internationally, and continue 
to modernize its military.  
In October 2022, the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report described the PRC’s external 
landscape as undergoing drastic changes unseen in a century and called on the Party to increase its 
sense of urgency to prepare for danger in an increasingly severe and complex international 
environment.  In a speech to PRC industry leaders in March 2023, Xi explicitly accused Western 
countries led by the United States as containing, encircling, and suppressing the PRC and seeking 
to bring severe challenges to its development, further emphasizing the PRC’s view that the 
international environment has become increasingly hostile.   
The PRC probably is increasingly concerned about Washington’s efforts to cultivate an 
international coalition willing to disrupt the PRC’s rise.  PRC leaders almost certainly view the 
announcement of AUKUS as well as the expansion of QUAD-related activities in the Indo-Pacific 
as the latest examples of the United States seeking to use its political and military power to threaten 
the PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  In response, Beijing has sought to strengthen PRC 
relations with Global South countries and promote PRC-backed incentives such as the GSI.   PRC 
leaders and officials aim to internationally isolate Washington and cultivate support for the PRC’s 
priorities such as diminishing international support for Taiwan and condemning U.S. activities in 
the Indo-Pacific.    
Russia’s war against Ukraine also represented a major, unexpected challenge for Beijing.   Despite 
multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions, Beijing was caught off guard by the full scope and scale 
of Russia’s war, resulting in PRC officials scrambling to protect PRC interests. As Russia’s war 
of aggression in Ukraine has continued, PRC leaders have increasingly viewed the war through 
the lens of U.S.-PRC strategic competition and sympathized with Russia’s rationale for waging a 
war against Ukraine.  This conclusion has translated into Beijing remaining steadfast in its defense 
of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, continuing to support Russia’s involvement in diplomatic 
forums, and opposing international economic sanctions.   The PRC has also echoed Russian 
messaging on the war, claiming that the United States and NATO are responsible for causing and 
prolonging the war.  Beijing also probably views assistance to Russia as an opportunity to maintain 
the positive trajectory in Sino-Russia ties and improve Russia’s willingness to support PRC efforts 
to counter the United States and reshape the international order. At the same time, PRC leaders 
have sought to emphasize the PRC’s “neutral narrative” on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, 
primarily to protect its reputation and deflect international criticism of Sino-Russian relations.     


 
 
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APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES 
DATA 
 
 
TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, GROUND FORCES 
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
  
Total 
Taiwan Strait Area* 
Total 
Total Ground Force Personnel 
1,050,000    
420,000 
 89,000 
Group Armies/Army Corps 
13  
5  
 3 
Combined Arms Brigades 
82  
31 (6 Amphibious)  
 7 
Artillery Brigades  
15  
5  
 3 
Army Aviation Brigades  
13  
4  
2 
Air Assault Brigades  
3  
1  
 0 
Airborne Brigades 
7  
7  
 0 
Marine Brigades  
8  
5  
 2 
Tanks 
4,200  
1,100  
 900 
Artillery Pieces** 
7,600  
2,300  
 1300 
*For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern 
Theaters.  
**For the purposes of this document, "Artillery Pieces" refers to systems 100mm and larger, are either 
towed or self-propelled, and includes Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) 
 
 
TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, AIR FORCES 
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
 
Total 
Eastern and Southern 
Theater 
Total 
Fighters  
1,900 (3,100*) 
750 (900*) 
300 (400*) 
Bombers/Attack  
500 
300 
0 
Transport  
500 
40 
50 
Special Mission Aircraft  
250 
150 
20 
Note: This chart displays estimated totals of military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN aviation. 
However, the PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario. 
  
*The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers. 


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TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, NAVAL FORCES   
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
Total 
Eastern and Southern Theater 
Command Navies 
Total 
Aircraft Carriers  
2
1
0
Amphibious Assault Ships 
3
3
0
Cruisers 
8  
4  
0 
Destroyers  
42
30
4
Frigates  
47  
30 
22 
Corvettes  
50
40
0
Medium Landing Ships/ 
Tank Landing Ships / Amphibious 
Transport Dock 
57
50
50
Attack Submarines  
47
31
4
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines  
6
2
0
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile 
Submarines  
6
6
0
Coastal Patrol (Missile)  
60
60
43
Coast Guard Ships 
142 
N / A 
168 
Note: The PLAN has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in 
Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Navies would 
participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be 
responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to 
support other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ CCG and CMM ships to support military operations. 
CHINA’S ROCKET FORCE 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM
500
350
>5,500km
IRBM
250
500
3,000-5,500km
MRBM
300
1000 
1,000-3,000km
SRBM
200
1000
300-1,000km
GLCM
150
300
>1,500km


 
 
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APPENDIX II: SELECTED BILATERAL AND 
MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2022 
           
  
 
Selected PLA Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises in 2022 
Exercise Name 
Type of Exercise 
Participants 
VOSTOK 2022 
Test Multi-domain Interoperability 
Russia 
Maritime Security Belt / 
Chiru 2022 
Counter-Piracy 
Iran and Russia 
International Army 
Games 2022 
Multinational Military Skills Competition 
Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Algeria, 
Uzbekistan, and 7 additional countries 
Falcon Strike 2022 
Joint Aerial and Ground Training 
Thailand 
Cobra Gold 2022 
Multinational humanitarian and disaster 
relief training 
Thailand, United States, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Australia, and India 
Joint Sea 2022 
Joint Naval Exercise 
Russia 
Unnamed Naval Patrol 
Joint Naval Patrol 
Vietnam 
Khaan Quest 
Peace Keeping 
Mongolia, Russia, United States, 
Germany, and 11 additional countries 
Peace Train 2022 
Humanitarian Medical Rescue Exercise 
Laos 
 
 
 


 
 
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APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
APSCO 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization  
AAM 
Air To Air Missiles  
AAV 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle  
ADIZ 
Air Defense Identification Zone 
ASF 
Aerospace Force 
AEW&C 
Airborne Early Warning & Control 
AGI 
Intelligence Collection Ships 
AGOS 
Ocean Surveillance Ships  
AI 
Artificial Intelligence 
ALBM 
Air-Launched Ballistic Missile 
AOE 
Fast Combat Support Ship 
AOR 
Fleet Replenishment Oilers  
APOSOS 
Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 
APSD 
Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue  
ASAT 
Anti-Satellite Weapon 
ASBM 
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
ASW 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
AUKUS 
Australia, The United Kingdom, And the U.S. 
AUV 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
AVIC 
Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
BACC 
Beijing Aerospace Control Center 
BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense  
BMEW 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning  
BRI 
Belt And Road Initiative 
BRICS 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, And South Africa 
BWC 
Biological Weapons Convention  
C2 
Command And Control 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
CALT 
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology 
CBM 
Confidence-Building Measures  
CBW 
Chemical And Biological Weapons  
CCDI 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 


 
 
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CCG 
Chinese Coast Guard 
CCMCFD 
Central Commission for Military Civilian Fusion Development 
CCP 
Chinese Communist Party 
CCWG 
Crisis Communications Working Group 
CDO 
Cognitive Domain Operations  
CELAC 
Community Of Latin American and Caribbean States 
CFO 
Chief Financial Officer 
CG 
Coast Guard 
CLTC 
China Launch and Tracking Control  
CMC 
Central Military Commission 
CMM 
Chinese Maritime Militia (See PAFMM) 
CMPR 
China Military Power Report 
CNSA 
China National Space Administration  
CNSC 
Central National Security Commission  
COMAC 
Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China  
CONUS 
Continental United States 
COSCO 
China Ocean Shipping Company 
COVID 
Coronavirus 
CPTPP 
Comprehensive And Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership  
CSF 
Cyberspace Force 
CWC 
Chemical Weapons Convention  
DASD 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
DDG 
Guided-Missile Destroyer 
DME 
Disaster Management Exchange 
DOB 
Date Of Birth 
DPAA 
Defense Pow/Mia Accounting Agency 
DPCT 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
DSR 
Digital Silk Road  
DTL 
Defense Telephone Link  
ECS 
East China Sea 
EDT 
Emerging Disruptive Technologies 
EEZ 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
EO 
Electro-Optical 
EPR 
Emergency Petroleum Reserve  
EW 
Electronic Warfare 
FFG 
Guided-Missile Frigate 
FFL 
Corvette 
FIC 
First Island Chain 
FOB 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment 
FOC 
Full Operational Capability 
FYP 
Five Year Plan 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product 
GEO 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 


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GLCM
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile 
GPS
Global Positioning System 
GSD 
General Staff Department 
GSR 
Green Silk Road  
HEU
Highly Enriched Uranium  
HGV
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle 
HQ
Headquarters
HSR 
Health Silk Road  
IADS
Integrated Air Defense System 
ICBM 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICT 
Information And Communications Technology 
INDOPACOM 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
IO
Information Operations
IOC 
Initial Operational Capability 
IRBM
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
JARM 
Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System 
JLSB
Joint Logistics Brigades  
JLSC
Joint Logistics Service Center 
JLSF
Joint Logistics Support Force 
JOCC 
Joint Operations Command Center  
LAC 
Line Of Actual Control  
LACM
Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LCAC
Landing Craft, Air Cushion  
LEO 
Low Earth Orbit 
LHA 
Amphibious Assault Ship  
LM
Long March 
LNG 
Liquid Natural Gas 
LOW
Launch-On-Warning 
LPD 
Amphibious Transport Docks  
LST
Tank Landing Ships  
MCF
Military-Civilian Fusion 
MANPADS 
Man-Portable Air Defense System 
MDPW
Multi-Domain Precision Warfare
MIRV
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles 
MMCA
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement  
MND
Ministry Of National Defense 
MOU 
Memorandum Of Understanding 
MOX
Mixed-Oxide  
MPS
Ministry Of Public Security  
MRBM
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MSP
Managed Service Providers 
MSS
Ministry Of State Security 


 
 
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MUM-T 
Manned Unmanned Teaming  
NDMD 
National Defense Mobilization Department  
NDU 
National Defense University  
NEO 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
NETF 
Naval Escort Task Force 
NFU 
No First Use 
NIH 
National Institutes of Health 
NORINCO 
North Industries Corporation 
NPC 
National People's Congress 
NSR 
Northern Sea Route  
NUDT 
National University of Defense Technology 
NWMA 
Non-War Military Activities 
OBOR 
One Belt One Road 
OIMC 
Office For International Military Cooperation 
OPFOR 
Opposing Force 
OTH 
Over-The-Horizon 
PAFMM 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
PAP 
People's Armed Police 
PBA 
Pharmaceutical-Based Agents  
PKO 
Peacekeeping Operations 
PLA 
People's Liberation Army  
PLAA 
People's Liberation Army Army 
PLAAF 
People's Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN 
People's Liberation Army Navy 
PLA NDU 
People's Liberation Army National Defense University  
PLANMC 
People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps 
PLARF 
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force 
PME 
Professional Military Education 
PNT 
Positioning, Navigation, And Timing 
POW 
Prisoner Of War 
PPE 
Personal Protective Equipment 
PRC 
People's Republic of China 
PRSS 
Pakistan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
RIMPAC 
Rim Of the Pacific Exercise 
RORO 
Roll-On/Roll-Off Cargo Ships 
SAM 
Surface-To-Air Missile 
SAR 
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SASTIND 
State Administration for Science, Technology, And Industry for National 
Defense 
SATCOM 
Satellite Communications 
SCO 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SCS 
South China Sea 
SIC 
Second Island Chain 


 
 
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SIGINT 
Signals Intelligence 
SLAM-ER 
Standoff Land 
SLBM 
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
SLOC 
Sea Lines of Communication 
SLV 
Space Launch Vehicle 
SMA 
Special Mission Aircraft 
SOE 
State-Owned Enterprise 
SOF 
Special Operations Forces 
SRBM 
Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
SRSS 
Sudan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
SS 
Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSBN 
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSD 
Space System Department 
SSF 
Strategic Support Force 
SSGN 
Guided-Missile Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSN 
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSP 
Air-Independent Powered Attack Submarines  
SSS 
Student Small Satellites  
STEM 
Science, Technology, Engineering, And Mathematics 
TEL 
Transporter, Erector, Launcher 
TRA 
Taiwan Relations Act 
TT&C 
Telemetry, Tracking, And Control  
TTP 
Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures 
UAE 
United Arab Emirates 
UAS 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems 
UAV 
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV 
Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UFWD 
United Front Work Department 
UN 
United Nations 
UNCLOS 
United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea 
USD 
U.S. Dollar 
USNS 
United States Naval Ship (Non-Commissioned) 
USTR 
United States Trade Representative 
VBSS 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure  
VIP 
Very Important Person 
VLS 
Vertical Launch System 
VRSS 
Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite  
VTC 
Video Teleconference 
VTOL 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
XPCC 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
XSCC 
Xi'an Satellite Control Center

Military and Security Developments Involving the  
People’s Republic of China 
 
 
A Report to Congress 
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000 
 
 
 
 
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 
106-65, as amended, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both 
classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s 
Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of 
military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and 
probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military 
organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. 
The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security 
matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China 
military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and 
cooperation in the future.” 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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C O N T E N T S  
 
PREFACE ................................................................................................................................ I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... III 
CHAPTER ONE:  UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY ............................................................ 1 
CHAPTER TWO:  CHINA’S FORCES, CAPABILITIES,  AND POWER PROJECTION ........................ 45 
CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY ........ 103 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE ................................................. 133 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES & TECHNOLOGY  FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION ....................... 147 
CHAPTER SIX: U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
.......................................... 155 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS ON STRATEGIC STABILITY ........................................................ 158 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS OF INFORMATION AND INFORMATION DOMINANCE ................. 160 
SPECIAL TOPIC: THE PLA’S EXPANDED MILITARY DIPLOMACY ............................................. 163 
APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA ..................................................................... 165 
APPENDIX II: DEFENSE CONTACTS  AND EXCHANGES ......................................................... 168 
APPENDIX III: SELECTED PLA BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2021 .............. 169 
APPENDIX IV: ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 170 
 
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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I 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
PREFACE 
 
 
 
The 2022 National Security Strategy identifies the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the 
only competitor with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international 
order. The Department of Defense (DoD) annual report on military and security developments 
involving the PRC charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military 
strategy and offers Congress insight on the tenets of Beijing’s ambitions and intentions. The 
PRC’s strategy entails a determined effort to amass and harness all elements of its national 
power to place the PRC in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
As expressed in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, the PRC presents the most consequential 
and systemic challenge to U.S. national security and the free and open international system.  
In this decisive decade, it is important to understand the contours of the People’s Liberation 
Army’s (PLA) way of war, survey its current activities and capabilities, and assess its future 
military modernization goals. In 2021, the PRC increasingly turned to the PLA as an 
instrument of statecraft as it adopted more coercive and aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Having purportedly achieved its 2020 modernization goal, the PLA now sets its sights 
to 2027 with a goal to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, 
informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this 2027 
objective could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification. 
In addition to the development of the PLA’s conventional capabilities, the PRC has continued 
to accelerate the modernization, diversification, and expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC 
has stated its ambition to strengthen its “strategic deterrent,” while being reluctant to discuss 
the PLA’s developing nuclear, space, and cyberspace capabilities, negatively impacting 
global strategic stability—an area of increasing global concern.   
As the PRC seeks to achieve “national rejuvenation” by its centenary in 2049, this report 
highlights Beijing’s ambition to reform the prevailing international rules-based system. This 
objective requires an external environment supportive of the PRC’s strategic goals defined 
under the concept of a “community of common destiny,” led by Xi Jinping’s initiatives such 
as the Global Security Initiative and the Global Development Initiative.  


 
II 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
This report illustrates how the CCP increasingly turns to the PLA in support of its global 
ambitions, and the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC’s 
increasingly capable military.   
Report Scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until 
the end of 2021.  
 
 


 
III 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY  
China’s National Strategy  
 The PRC’s national strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military 
modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the 
international order in support of Beijing’s system of governance and national interests.   
The PRC increasingly views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government 
effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC has characterized its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC 
leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and an increasingly 
confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition 
between the PRC and the United States.   
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and 
harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC 
in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
 The PRC’s 20th National Congress of the CCP holds important military and security 
implications for the PLA’s 2027 centenary objectives. The 20th Party Congress report 
focused on intensifying and accelerating the PLA’s modernization goals over the next 
five years, including strengthening its “system of strategic deterrence.” Xi Jinping 
retained his chairmanship of the seven-person Central Military Commission (CMC) 
and selected members that offer political continuity, technical expertise on military 
modernization and space issues, and Taiwan-focused operational experience. 
Foreign Policy 
 The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that 
supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Beijing’s 
revisionist ambition for the international order derives from the objectives of its 
national strategy and the CCP’s political and governing systems. 


 
IV 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
 In 2021, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and 
partner influence, such as highlighting the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
criticizing U.S.-backed security partnerships including the Quad (Australia, India, 
Japan, and the United States) and Australia-United Kingdom-United States 
partnership (AUKUS). 
 The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind the PRC’s 
foreign policy efforts in 2021, as Beijing sought to deflect blame for its initial response 
to the pandemic and continued its use of foreign medical assistance, including vaccine 
donations, to bolster its bilateral ties and advance its responsible great power narrative.   
Economic Policy 
 The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of 
China’s broader national development aspirations. The CCP’s economic, political, 
social, and security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support 
Beijing’s strategy of national rejuvenation. 
 Beijing’s “dual circulation (双循环)” policy aims to forge domestic resilience by 
reducing China’s reliance on foreign supply chains that have proven to be economic 
chokepoints. In addition, the policy aims to boost domestic production and 
consumption to fuel growth and decrease the economy’s reliance on exports moving 
forward. 
 China’s economic development supports its military modernization by providing the 
means for larger defense budgets.  Additionally, the PRC’s growing national industrial 
and technological base, as well as deliberate Party-led initiatives such as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025, offers systemic military benefits to the 
PRC. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
 The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand 
global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
 In 2021, the PRC significantly increased engagement with African, Latin American, 
and Middle Eastern countries and began prioritizing public health, digital 
infrastructure, and green energy opportunities. 
 Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards 
expanding its overseas security footprint to protect those interests.  


 
V 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy 
 The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF; 军民融合) development strategy to 
“fuse” its security and development strategies to build an integrated National Strategic 
System and Capabilities in support of the PRC’s national rejuvenation goals. 
 Beijing’s MCF development strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire 
advanced dual-use technology for military purposes and to deepen reform of the 
national defense science and technology industries, and serves a broader purpose to 
strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power.   
 The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing 
China’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base; (2) 
integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and 
civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and 
knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and 
leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service 
and logistics capabilities for military purposes; and (6) expanding and deepening 
China’s national defense mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its 
society and economy for use in competition and war.  
Defense Policy and Military Strategy 
 In 2021, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding 
its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater 
global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of 
“active defense (积极防御).” 
 PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” 
military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the 
PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”    
 In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of 
the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more 
credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification.      
 In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW; 多域精确战).”MDPW is intended to leverage a 
C4ISR network, which the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems that 
incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key 


 
VI 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across 
domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. 
China’s Forces, Capabilities, and Power Projection 
 The PLA seeks to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all 
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and 
maritime, as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and 
cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability 
to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a euphemism likely for the 
United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and project power globally.    
 In 2021, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, 
fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its 
competency to conduct joint operations. 
 People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA has approximately 975,000 
active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary ground fighting force in the 
PLA. In 2021, the PLAA emphasized realistic training scenarios and standardization 
of training methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and throughout extensive joint 
amphibious training that utilized both People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and 
civilian roll-on-roll-off (RORO) vessels. PLAA and Russian Army units participated 
in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, a large-scale joint exercise to expand cooperation 
between the two militaries, which was conducted on PRC soil for the first time. 
 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is numerically the largest navy 
in the world with an overall battle force of approximately 340 ships and submarines, 
including approximately 125 major surface combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is 
largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. In 2021, the 
PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight JIANGDAO 
class corvettes to the China Coast Guard (CCG). The PLAN commissioned its fourth 
RENHAI class cruiser in late 2021 and resumed series construction of the JIANGKAI 
II class frigate. The PLAN commissioned two YUSHEN class amphibious assault 
ships, one each in April 2021 and April 2022. The PLAN launched a third hull in the 
YUSHEN class in January 2021, which is currently undergoing sea trials prior to 
commissioning.  
 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation. The PLAAF 
and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the region and the 
third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total aircraft (not including trainer variants 


 
VII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
or uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)) of which approximately 2,250 are combat aircraft 
(including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and 
attack aircraft). The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces and continues 
to modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of 
UAVs. In October 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-
capable air-to-air refuelable bomber, signaling the airborne leg of its nuclear triad. 
 People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF organizes, mans, 
trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile 
forces, associated support forces, and missile bases. The PLARF is advancing its long-
term modernization plans to enhance its strategic deterrence capabilities. In 2021, the 
PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and training. This 
was more than the rest of the world combined, excluding ballistic missile employment 
in conflict zones. In 2021, the PRC continued building three solid-fueled 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silo fields, which will cumulatively contain 
at least 300 new ICBM silos. 
 Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization 
established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. 
The SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with 
an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.  
‒ The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled 
information sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information 
gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components in conducting 
modern “informatized warfare.”    
‒ The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, 
satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic 
space exploration.   
 Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF provides integrated joint logistics 
support for the PLA.  The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic 
and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and on integrating civilian 
products and services. The JLSF also had an active role in coordinating with civilian 
entities to provide logistic support in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
 


 
VIII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Joint Capabilities in Development 
 The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to 
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific 
region.  
 The PLA is also developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into 
the Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases, globally.  
 Although the PLA has undertaken important structural reforms to promote joint 
operations, its capability to carry out joint operations in support of counter-
intervention or joint campaigns outside the First Island Chain remains in its infancy.  
Capabilities for Counter-intervention and Power Projection 
 The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having 
a presence in China’s immediate periphery and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-
Pacific region. The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are, to date, 
the most robust within the First Island Chain, although the PLA is increasingly able to 
project power into the Philippine Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities 
to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.  
‒ Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA doctrinal writings state 
that precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war.  PLA writings 
state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of 
“war control” to prevent escalation.   
‒ Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant 
IADS architecture over land areas and within 300 nautical miles (mm) (556 
kilometers (km)) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning radar 
network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) systems. 
The PRC has also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the South 
China Sea, further extending the range of its IADS. It also employs point defenses, 
primarily to defend strategic targets against adversary long-range cruise missiles 
and airborne strike platforms.  
‒ Hypersonic Weapons. China’s deployment of the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle 
(HGV)-armed Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) will continue to 
transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly 
intended to replace some older Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) units, 
according to PRC media, and is designed to strike foreign military bases and fleets 
in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.   
 


 
IX 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Advancing Toward an Informatized Military  
 The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO 
in military exercises. 
 The PRC presents a significant, persistent threat of cyber-enabled espionage and 
attack on an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems.  
 The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future 
conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of 
artificial intelligence (AI) and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 
Space and Counterspace Capabilities 
 The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and 
related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting 
space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor 
objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.    
 The PLA views space operations as a means to deter and counter third-party 
intervention during a regional military conflict. Moreover, PRC defense academics 
suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites 
could be among the target of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”    
Nuclear Capabilities 
 Over the next decade, the PRC aims to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear 
forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts exceed previous modernization attempts in both scale and complexity. 
 The PRC is investing in and expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based 
nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this 
major expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC is also supporting this expansion by 
increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder 
reactors and reprocessing facilities.  
 In 2021, Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion. The Department of 
Defense estimates that the PRC’s operational nuclear warheads stockpile has 
surpassed 400.      
 The PLA plans to "basically complete modernization" of its national defense and 
armed forces by 2035. If China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will 
likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by its 2035 timeline.   


 
X 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Chemical and Biological Research 
 The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, 
develop, and produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale.   
 China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological 
warfare (CBW) agents, and its robust armaments industry and numerous conventional 
weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted 
to deliver CBW agents.   
 The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which 
raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.  
Such PRC biological activities include studies at PRC military medical institutions on 
potent toxins with dual-use applications. 
 The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the 
Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are 
organized based on the Beijing’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater 
Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the 
theater. 
Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 
 The PRC intensified diplomatic, economic, political, and military pressure against 
Taiwan in 2021. 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and 
around the Taiwan Strait, to include increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air 
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) and conducting island seizure exercises.    
 Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC 
has never renounced the use of military force. The circumstances under which the PRC 
has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have 
evolved over time. 
 The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, 
with varying degrees of feasibility and associated risks. These options may range from 


 
XI 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and 
occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan.  
THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an external environment conducive to China’s 
national rejuvenation.   
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside the 
PRC’s borders and immediate periphery to secure Beijing’s growing overseas interests 
and advance its foreign policy goals.  
The PLA’s Evolving Missions & Tasks 
 The PLAN’s evolving focus from “near seas defense” to “far seas protection” reflects 
the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach.  
 The PLAAF’s missions and tasks have similarly evolved towards conducting 
operations beyond China and its immediate periphery and supporting the PRC’s 
interests by becoming a “strategic” air force.  
 The PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as an 
effective way to support and safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s 
global interests, and gain valuable operational experience.   
PRC Influence Operations 
 The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace as a 
critical enabler and means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict.  
 The PRC conducts influence operations that target media organizations, business, 
academic, cultural institutions, and policy communities of the United States, other 
countries, and international organizations to shape public discourse and achieve 
outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
 PRC influence operations are coordinated at the high level and executed by a range of 
actors, such as the PLA Political Work Department, United Front Work Department 
(UFWD), International Liaison Department, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and 
the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF).    
 The CCP seeks to condition international institutions and public opinion to accept the 
PRC’s narrative surrounding its priorities such as Beijing’s “one China principle” on 
Taiwan unification, the Belt and Road Initiative, political control over Hong Kong, 
and territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.   


 
XII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
PLA Overseas Basing and Access 
 The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.  
 A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the 
PRC’s global military objectives evolve.  
 Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground 
forces projection.  
 The PRC has likely considered Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, 
Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan, among other places, as locations for PLA military 
logistics facilities.   
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
 The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial 
sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet 
the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.  
 The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, 
including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as 
espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The 
PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-industrial sector to improve weapon 
system research, development, acquisition, testing, evaluation, and production. 
 In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8 percent, 
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its 
position as the second-largest military spender in the world. As the PRC’s published 
military budget omits several major categories of expenditures, its actual military-
related spending is likely significantly higher than what it states in its official budget. 
Developments in the PRC Defense Industry 
 Most of China’s missile systems, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are 
comparable in quality to systems of other international top-tier producers. China 
conducted a test of a new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous 
progress in hypersonic weapon development.  


 
XIII 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
 China’s decades-long efforts to improve domestic aircraft engine production are 
starting to produce results with the J-10 and J-20 fighters switching to domestically 
produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s first domestically produced 
high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing on the Y-20 heavy 
transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end of 2022. 
 As the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, the PRC is increasing its 
shipbuilding capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and 
auxiliary and amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, 
publicly revealing a long-range system in 2019. 
Espionage Activities Supporting China’s Military Modernization 
 The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent threat of cyber-enabled espionage and 
attack to military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, 
acquire, or gain access to information and advanced technologies.    
 Sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment that the PRC have attempted to 
acquire include radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave 
integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval and marine technologies, 
syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military communication jamming 
equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. 
 The PRC seeks to create destructive effects to shape decision-making and disrupt 
military operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC believes 
these capabilities are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries that 
depend on information technologies.   
‒ The PLA and China’s Talent Recruitment Programs. The CCP operates more 
than 200 talent-recruitment programs that are overseen by central bodies, 
including the Central Coordination Group on Talent Work and the Overseas High-
level Talent Recruitment Work Group. Although the PRC government administers 
China’s talent recruitment programs, the PLA uses China’s network of recruitment 
programs, such as the Thousand Talents Plan, to recruit overseas talent for military 
purposes.  
U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
 DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 emphasized responsibly 
managing competition and establishing commonsense guardrails to ensure 
competition does not veer into conflict.  


 
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 2021 defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritized open channels of 
communication and the advancement of DoD priorities on managing crisis 
communications and strategic risk management. 
  
 


 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY 
 
 
Understanding the tenets of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) national strategy is 
essential to understanding the drivers of China’s security and military strategy. This in turn 
offers insights on the current and future course of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) 
reform and modernization in terms of its strength, technological advances, organization, and 
operational concepts—all of which could offer PRC leaders expanded military options to 
support its national goals.   
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s national strategy aims to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” by 2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military 
modernity to expand the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the 
international order in support of Beijing’s system of governance and national interests.   
The PRC increasingly views the United States as deploying a whole-of-government 
effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC has characterized its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC 
leaders believe that structural changes in the international system and an increasingly 
confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic competition 
between PRC and the United States.   
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and 
harness the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC 
in a “leading position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
The PRC’s strategy aims to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This 
objective, which General Secretary Xi Jinping (also referred to as Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission or President of the PRC, given the context of his responsibilities) calls 
“the Chinese Dream,” a national aspiration to elevate the PRC to a position of strength, 
prosperity, and leadership on the world stage.  
PRC leaders characterize their strategy to achieve political, social, and economic modernity—
as defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—as a grand national endeavor that is 


 
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sweeping in scope and far-reaching in how it will transform the PRC and, in turn, the world.   
The Party defines national rejuvenation as a state in which the PRC is “prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.” Beijing’s strategy entails 
deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external 
elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading position.” CCP leaders 
frequently refer to building the PRC’s “comprehensive” national power in this manner. The 
PRC’s strategy entails a long-term planning process to attain national rejuvenation that sets 
objectives, priorities, and milestones across virtually every aspect of governance and policy 
including economics, political affairs, the rule of law, public order, national security, 
diplomacy, and defense as well as social affairs, education, science and technology, culture, 
the environment, and other matters.  
The PRC pursues its efforts to generate greater national power from the basis of defending 
and advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Consequently, Beijing’s 
national ambitions and statecraft rest on the foundation of the CCP-dominated political 
ideology of enhancing the path, theory, system, and culture of “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics.” The objective of this Party-led strategy is perhaps best stated in what the 
Party calls its “basic line,” a single sentence in the CCP’s constitution that serves as the 
mission of the Party and as the cornerstone for its policymaking. Last amended at the 19th 
Party Congress in 2017, it states:   
“The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of 
socialism is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and 
pioneering effort, making economic development the central task, upholding 
the Four Cardinal Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening 
up, so as to see China becomes a great modern socialist country that is 
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and 
beautiful.”    
The 19th Party Congress also adopted “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era” into the CCP’s constitution. Unanimously agreed by Party 
delegates, “Xi Jinping Thought” was hailed as a “guide to action for the entire Party and all 
the Chinese people to strive for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” designating 
General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core of the Party with outsized influence driving party 
objectives to come. 
External Conditions. Among the external elements of the PRC’s national strategy are its 
deliberate efforts to create a “favorable” international environment that is conducive to the 
PRC’s rise and national rejuvenation, according to State Councilor Yang Jiechi, a member of 
the Politburo and a leading Party official on foreign policy. During the 6th Plenary session of 
the 19th Central Committee, the CCP reported its perceived success in managing its foreign 
affairs and national security challenges having “broken new ground” in diplomatic endeavors 
amidst “profound global changes and turned crises into opportunities amid complex situations 
on the international stage.” With regard to national security, the CCP reported to have 


 
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“enhanced” the PRC’s security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, 
and natural risks, challenges, and trials.” However, in 2021 and into 2022, PRC leadership 
contended with the on-going effects of the COVID-19 pandemic that brought challenges for 
the PRC’s diplomatic, cultural, and economic influence abroad. PRC leadership also took 
diplomatic measures to manage increased global concern regarding PRC rhetorical and 
diplomatic alignment with Russia before, following, and during the invasion of Ukraine, as 
well as concern for the PRC’s growing assertive and coercive economic and military actions.  
PRC leaders continue to believe that global trends, especially perceived U.S. decline, are 
generally conducive to their long-term interests.   
As PRC leadership view a divided China as a weak China, they argue that “full 
reunification”—including the resolution of the “Taiwan question” and completing Hong 
Kong’s and Macau’s integration by the end of 2049—is one of the fundamental conditions of 
national rejuvenation. Beijing views as an imperative that China field a “world-class” military 
that can “fight and win” and “resolutely safeguard” the country’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests.  In support of this goal, on December 26th, 2020 the National People's 
Congress (NPC) passed revisions to the PRC’s National Defense Law, which broadened the 
legal justification for PLA mobilization to include defense of China’s “development 
interests.” The codification of this language in PRC law is intended to add legitimacy to the 
use of military force to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests.   
China’s leaders claim national rejuvenation requires the PRC to “take an active part in leading 
the reform of the global governance system” as many rules and norms were established, in 
Beijing’s view, during a time of PRC weakness and without the PRC’s consultation and input. 
The Party views aspects of the prevailing international rules-based system as constraining the 
PRC’s strategic ambitions and incompatible with its sovereignty, security, political 
preferences, and development interests. To the PRC’s leaders, revisions are necessary to 
accommodate the PRC’s development and should reflect the CCP’s preferred transformation 
in the distribution of power to forge an external environment more favorable to the PRC’s 
political governance system and national interests.  
Key Objectives & Milestones. For decades, the PRC’s leaders have framed their pursuit of 
modernity and power as advancing China along a specific trajectory, with the PRC’s 
centenary in 2049 serving as the target for achieving national rejuvenation and becoming a 
“great modern socialist country.” From Beijing’s perspective, the PRC is a developing nation 
that must transition into a “fully developed and highly advanced” socialist society, and this 
trajectory involves the Party leadership shepherding the PRC through different stages of 
gradual but systematic modernization and development. The Party demarcates the stages of 
the PRC’s strategy with milestones accompanied by objectives and priorities determined by 
the Party’s long-term planning processes.  
Reflecting on the PRC’s progress at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Secretary Xi 
Jinping declared that China had assumed “…a leading position in terms of economic and 


 
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technological strength, defense capabilities, and comprehensive national strength” and 
therefore “crossed the threshold into a new era.” Xi’s declaration that the PRC had entered a 
“New Era” was not a change in strategic objectives, but an important signal of confidence that 
the PRC’s progress was sufficient to tackle the next set of challenges in its development. For 
the PRC’s strategy in the “New Era,” Xi laid out a broad plan to achieve national rejuvenation 
with a timeline linked to two symbolically important centenary milestones reached in 2021 
(the CCP’s centenary) and 2049 (the PRC’s centenary). To bridge the lengthy gap between 
the two anniversaries, Xi added interim national objectives for 2035 and laid out a broad two-
stage modernization plan to reach 2049. Further demonstrating the Party’s confidence in the 
PRC’s progress, Xi’s objectives for 2035 moved up certain mid-century targets set by the 
Party going back to 1987.   
At his centenary speech marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP on July 1st 2021, Xi 
declared that China had “realized the first centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects.” Beyond 2021, the PRC will use the “moderately prosperous society” 
as the basis for Xi’s “two-stage” plan to achieve national rejuvenation by the PRC’s centenary 
in 2049. In the first stage from 2021 to 2035, the Party aims for the PRC to "basically” meet 
its initial thresholds for becoming a “great modern socialist country.” In this stage, the PRC 
will likely continue to prioritize economic development as “the central task,” but rather than 
rapid economic growth, it will seek to address its uneven economic development and 
inequalities that Beijing recognized as the new “principal contradiction” in PRC society in the 
“New Era.” By 2035, the PRC will also seek to increase its economic and technological 
strength to become a “global leader in innovation” and aim to “basically” complete its military 
modernization. The PRC will also seek to significantly strengthen its cultural “soft power” 
and improve its domestic rule of law and governance systems.  
In the second stage from 2035 to 2049, the PRC aims to complete its development and attain 
national rejuvenation, realizing an international status that Xi describes as a “global leader in 
terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence." A renewed PRC will 
have attained—among the Party’s many goals—its objectives to field a “world-class” military 
and assume a leading position within an international order revised in line with Beijing’s 
overall foreign policy goal to establish what it refers to as a “community of common destiny 
(人类命运共同体),” or the PRC’s preferred official English translation, “community with a 
shared future for mankind.”  


 
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Military and Security Implications of the 
 20th National Congress of the CCP 
General Secretary Xi Jinping presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16 to 22, 2022. Party 
Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications for 
the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th Party 
Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s 
modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified 
ways.” In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set 
objectives to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic 
deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and 
space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, intelligence 
combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the network 
information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
for the third time, Xi Jinping selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical 
expertise on military modernization and space issues, and Taiwan-focused operational 
experience to lead the PLA toward achieving its centenary goals. 
The 20th Party Congress also offers new insight on the CCP’s changing perception of the 
PRC’s external security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reiterate 
previous reports’ statements that the PRC was operating within a “strategic window of 
opportunity for development,” and did not state unequivocally “peace and development 
remain the keynote of the times.” Rather, the PRC is facing “drastic changes in the 
international landscape” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and be 
prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”  
 
Historic Continuity. Understanding the origins of the PRC’s national rejuvenation is crucial 
to understanding how the PRC will likely shape and pursue this strategic objective. PRC 
leaders have consistently framed their efforts as seeking to “restore” China to a preeminent 
place in the world after enduring what the Party characterizes as China’s “century of 
humiliation” beginning in the 19th century as the Qing Dynasty began to disintegrate and 
lasting until the founding of the PRC in 1949. While the Party’s exact articulation of this goal 
as “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” first emerged in the late 1980s, the Party has 
championed the cause of rebuilding China since the 1920s. General Secretary Xi Jinping 
frequently points to the CCP’s steadfastness to the cause of national rejuvenation and 
describes it as the Party’s “original aspiration.”  
The Party’s narrative of national rejuvenation speaks to the deep impressions left on the PRC’s 
political landscape over an era defined by the disintegration of China’s polity, repeated 
violations of China’s sovereignty by foreign powers, and the prolonged absence of physical 
and economic security for many Chinese people. For a culture with a history stretching back 
thousands of years—much of it spent as one of the most powerful and advanced civilizations 
in the world—nationalist appeals to restore China’s greatness are deeply rooted. The threads 


 
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of national renewal can be traced to China’s reformers and nationalist revolutionary leaders 
in the late Qing Dynasty and emerged as a common nationalist theme in the fractured politics 
of China’s Republican Era. This resonance is crucial to why the CCP portrays the PRC’s 
rejuvenation as a nationalist project that the Party “shoulders” for the country. 
The PRC’s Strategy & the CCP. The Party’s leaders frame “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics” and the CCP as indispensable to the PRC overcoming its historical 
circumstances and attaining national rejuvenation. As General Secretary Xi Jinping stated in 
a speech to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, “Which ideological system a country 
implements depends on one crucial issue: can this ideology resolve the historical problems 
facing the country?” From the Party’s perspective, its leadership and systems are uniquely 
able to restore the PRC’s strength, prosperity, and prestige—underscored with the implicit 
warning that any deviation from socialism’s path would result in “chaos” and China falling 
behind on its “historic mission.” As Xi stated, “…only socialism can save China—and only 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can develop China.”    
CCP leaders flatly reject the notion that the Party has abandoned its socialist ideology in recent 
decades with the introduction of market features into the PRC’s economy or drifted towards 
a non-ideological form of governance. The Party asserts that the PRC remains on the path of 
“socialist modernization” but it seeks to advance the country gradually as a lesson painfully 
learned from the Mao-era catastrophes that aimed for rapid progress. Accordingly, the Party 
claims that to perform its decisive role in guiding the PRC’s development into a “great modern 
socialist country,” it must ensure that the country advances in line with “the Four Cardinal 
Principles (四项基本原则).” First stated by Deng Xiaoping and later written into the CCP 
Constitution, these principles mandate the Party “to keep to the path of socialism, to uphold 
the people’s democratic dictatorship, to uphold the leadership of the CCP, and to uphold 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.” The Four Cardinal Principles are the basis 
for political and governance reforms pursued by the Party and the outer boundaries of its 
efforts to “reform” and “open up” the country.   
As General Secretary Xi Jinping told Party cadres in 2014, “promoting the modernization of 
the national governance system and capacity is definitely not Westernization or capitalism.”  
In addition to cultivating ideological discipline and fighting corruption within the Party, Xi 
has sought to advance the PRC’s strategy by strengthening the Party’s primacy across China’s 
governance systems and making the Party more effective at managing China’s political, 
economic and social problems. Xi’s emphasis on building the CCP’s institutional capacity 
and promoting internal unity—which he views as the means for the Party to perform its 
strategic role—has become a prominent feature of his tenure.  
Competition Between Systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the 
international system and an increasingly confrontational United States are the root causes of 
intensifying strategic competition between China and the United States. The PRC’s leadership 
has long viewed China as embroiled in a major international strategic competition with other 


 
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states. Throughout the post-Mao reform era and particularly after the end of the Cold War, 
the Party’s leaders recognized their socialist system was—and would remain over the long-
term—an underlying source of tension with the West. Given the Party’s ambitions to “restore” 
the PRC’s place in the world and their assessment of the PRC’s relative weakness via-a-vis 
rival states, CCP leaders recognized the PRC’s growing strength could threaten to flare 
tensions with others without careful management. Deng Xiaoping’s reputed approach to this 
dilemma, as attributed by other Party leaders, was for China to “hide our capacities and bide 
our time, be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” While PRC’s 
leaders have consistently pursued national rejuvenation as their goal, they have demonstrated 
a degree of strategic adaptability to seize opportunities and manage threats to their overall 
strategic objectives.  
Over time, the PRC has characterized China’s view of strategic competition in terms of a 
rivalry among powerful nation states, most importantly the United States, as well as a clash 
of opposing ideological systems. The PRC’s leaders have indicated they view competition as 
entailing aspects of cooperation and conflict, and that the Party would need to be adaptable, 
flexible, and above all, patient. The PRC’s leaders have also offered a view of competition 
based on relative levels of economic, technological, and military power. Speaking to the CCP 
Central Committee in 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping remarked that the Party needed to 
“appreciate” that “developed Western nations” would continue to possess “real, long-term 
advantages” over China in the economic, technological, and military domains. Xi argued that 
China would need to “prepare for a long period of cooperation and of conflict between these 
two social systems in each of these domains.” Lastly, Xi alluded to the core elements of 
“national rejuvenation” as the PRC’s approach to this competition. Xi stated, “Most 
importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually 
broadening our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a 
socialism that is superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will 
win the initiative and have the dominant position.”  
In the past two years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has presented his thoughts on the PRC’s 
strategic environment on numerous occasions. In 2020, CCP leaders, including Xi himself, 
convened several meetings on “growing risks” and, in the communique following the 5th 
Plenum in October 2020, stressed that the PRC is on the brink of “changes unseen in a 
century,” but also that China would benefit from a “profound adjustment in the international 
balance of power.” In his CCP 100th anniversary speech, Xi asserted that as the world 
experienced “once-in-a-century changes,” China had to adopt “a holistic approach to national 
security that balances development and security imperatives” and implement “the national 
rejuvenation.” In his 2022 New Year’s speech, Xi stated that China needed to “remain mindful 
of potential risks” while maintaining “strategic focus and determination.” 
Since just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, PRC leaders have consistently 
characterized China’s security environment as undergoing intense changes and viewed the 
international order as shifting toward a multipolar system more commensurate with the PRC’s 


 
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development. The Party views a shift toward a multipolar system as consistent with its 
perception of global power trends. This shift is vital for the PRC to advance its strategy, 
perceiving U.S. power as a constraint that impedes many of the PRC’s goals. The PRC’s 
leaders have eagerly embraced narratives of the West’s relative decline and the inevitability 
of China’s rise as largely consistent with their strategy and evidence of China's progress. 
The Party views core aspects of the current international system as incompatible with its 
vision for a revised order premised on its “community of common destiny.” The PRC’s 
leaders view U.S. security alliances and partnerships, especially those in the Indo-Pacific, as 
destabilizing and irreconcilable with the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development 
interests. Regionally, the PRC’s  2019 defense white paper claims that “Asia-Pacific” 
countries are “increasingly aware that they are members” of the PRC’s “community with a 
shared future for mankind” and that managing disputes through dialogue is its “preferred 
policy option.”  
Beijing has also expressed concerns over growing global instability and a mounting sense of 
insecurity that it views as instigated by the United States. The PRC’s 2019 defense white 
paper criticized the United States as the “principal instigator” of global instability and driver 
of “international strategic competition.” China’s leadership views U.S. policy toward the PRC 
as a critical factor affecting the PRC’s national objectives and increasingly views the United 
States as more willing to confront Beijing where U.S. and PRC interests are inimical.  
Given the enduring suspicion among some in Beijing that the United States seeks to contain 
China, CCP leaders hold that the accrual of the PRC’s comprehensive national power will set 
the conditions for the PRC’s ability to confront or dissuade the United States and prevent 
containment. As China’s leaders seek to translate the PRC’s growing economic and military 
means into influence to advance their international aspirations, they must also carefully 
balance the PRC’s expanding interests across their priorities and resources. For example, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), originally called One Belt, One Road (OBOR), 
expands the PRC’s overseas development and security interests; Beijing has signaled this will 
drive the PRC toward expanding its overseas military footprint to protect those interests. 
China’s leaders also seem to have recognized that BRI and other initiatives have sparked 
concerns about the PRC’s intentions, leading it to use less inflammatory and more tailored 
rhetoric without altering the programs’ fundamental goals. Similar tensions can be found in 
the PRC’s efforts to advance General Secretary Xi Jinping’s foreign policy goals such as 
building a “community of common destiny;” pressing revisions to the international order; and 
establishing diplomatic relationships in accordance with what the PRC calls “strategic 
partnerships.” The PRC seeks to secure and advance its overseas interests without entirely 
compromising the relationships and stability crucial to its continued development. This 
tension underscores the increasingly complex decisions and risks China’s leaders must weigh 
in implementing their strategy. 
 


 
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The PRC’s National Security Concept & Management 
In recent years, the PRC has articulated its view of national security as a broad concept that 
spans the confluence of internal and external threats to the PRC’s interests. Party leaders 
have identified national security as encompassing traditional and non-traditional domestic 
and foreign threats; the intersection of external influences on internal stability; and economic, 
cultural, societal, and environmental threats. Additionally, Beijing has taken steps to define a 
concept for national security; improve the CCP’s ability to develop and coordinate national 
security policy across party, military, and state organs; and raise domestic awareness of 
national security concerns. These efforts seek to address longstanding concerns of China’s 
leadership that the country’s legacy system of stove-piped party-state organizations was ill 
equipped to meet the growing national security challenges that the PRC faces.  
National Security Concept: The CCP’s “Overall National Security Concept” (总体国家
安全观), first proposed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2014, provides the 
framework for the PRC’s national security system, the mission of the Central National 
Security Commission (CNSC), and the basis of the PRC’s national security strategy. 
According to the Party, the premise of the concept is that “The people's security is the 
purpose of national security, political security is the root of national security, and 
priority in national interests is the norm of national security.” China’s leaders consider 
people’s security, political security, and national interests as mutually reinforcing 
aspects of national security. Party outlets describe people’s security as the purpose 
because national security fundamentally must serve the PRC people and the PRC 
nation. Similarly, the Party’s view of political security as the foundation of national 
security is described in terms of the maintenance and “ruling status” of the Party and 
the system of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This reflects the Party’s 
certainty that its leadership and systems are indispensable to the PRC’s national 
rejuvenation. Party leaders assess the supremacy of national interests as the criterion 
or standard by which the Party expects its stewardship of the PRC’s national security 
will be judged: its ability to “resolutely safeguard” the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. The PRC’s concept also views development and security as 
mutually supporting aspects of national security in which “Security guarantees 
development, and development is the goal of security.” 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC): To improve coordination on national 
security matters, the CCP created the CNSC in 2013. The CNSC advises the Politburo, 
oversees the coordination of national security issues across the government, and 
manages crises. Embracing the Party’s expansive concept of national security, the 
CNSC’s purview covers internal and external national security matters. The CNSC’s 
mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and powerful 
leadership has led the CNSC to become an important party-state organ—promulgating 
regulations in 2021 on the “National Security Work of the CCP” and outlining who, 
what, and how the CCP will lead national security in the PRC.  


 
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Membership. The PRC’s top three leaders lead the CNSC: Xi who serves as the CNSC 
Chairman; Li Keqiang (Premier of the State Council); and probably Li Zhanshu 
(Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). CNSC 
membership may include Politburo members, senior government leaders, and senior 
PLA leaders (including the two Vice Chairman of the CMC). The CNSC General Office 
is responsible for the commission’s daily work and is run by senior CCP officials 
serving in dual-hatted roles in other positions. The current Director of the CNSC 
General Office is likely Ding Xuexiang, a longtime political aide to Xi. Ding also serves 
as the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and is a member of the 
Politburo. Since May 2018, Chen Wenqing has served as Deputy Director of the CNSC 
General Office. Chen is also the Minister of State Security.  
National Security Strategy. By 2015, the CCP adopted the PRC’s first national security 
strategy outline following the CNSC’s establishment. Official media noted the strategy 
intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s 
guidance. Over the years, the PRC’s leaders and media have indicated various 
national security sub-strategies that cover a variety of issues including political 
security, homeland security, military security, economic security, cultural security, 
societal security, technology security, network security, nuclear safety, ecological 
security, resource security, and biosecurity.  
National Security Law. With the establishment of the CNSC and the Party’s adoption 
of the national security strategy, in 2015 the NPC passed the National Security Law. 
This law encapsulated the Party’s overall national security concept and swept a broad 
range of issues beneath a new legal framework of “national security,” while 
strengthening the formal role of central authorities. In recent years, the NPC has also 
passed a series of laws intended to address more specific national security concerns 
including counterespionage (2014), counterterrorism (2015), cybersecurity (2016), 
foreign non-governmental organizations in China (2016), intelligence (2017), and 
cryptography (2019). While these laws address more specific national security 
concerns, they remain sweeping in scope and authorities.  
In an effort to raise public awareness of the Party’s national security concepts and 
emphasize national security as a civic responsibility, the 2015 National Security Law 
designated April 15 of each year as National Security Education Day. Indicating the 
reach and depth the Party desires its national security concepts to penetrate into the 
party-state, the 2015 National Security Law also made provincial, autonomous 
regions and municipalities responsible for national security work within their 
administrative areas. This has led to the creation of national security committees in 
the Party’s provincial-level organizations, each headed by the province’s party chief.  
 


 
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FOREIGN POLICY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that 
supports its strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Beijing’s 
revisionist ambition for the international order derives from the objectives of its 
national strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems. 
 In 2021, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and 
partner influence such as highlighting the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
criticizing U.S.-backed security partnerships including the Quad (Australia, India, 
Japan, and the United States) and Australia-UK-United States partnership (AUKUS).  
 The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind the PRC’s 
foreign policy efforts in 2021, as Beijing sought to deflect blame for its initial response 
to pandemic, and continued its use of foreign medical assistance, including vaccine 
donations, to bolster its bilateral ties and advance its responsible great power narrative.   
The PRC’s diplomatic activities continued to seek a more prominent role for Beijing in 
international affairs. China has embraced a new diplomatic framework that it terms “Major 
Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” which is guided by the foreign policy 
direction determined by the CCP Central Committee and was set forth in General Secretary 
Xi Jinping’s report at the 19th Party Congress. This framework seeks to advance the PRC’s 
strategy of national rejuvenation by achieving the CCP’s two centenary goals, improving the 
coordination of China’s major domestic and international policies, reforming aspects of the 
international order, adhering to the CCP Central Committee’s direction, and defending the 
PRC’s major interests. 
The CCP’s theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” underpins the conduct of the 
PRC’s foreign affairs. Since General Secretary Xi Jinping assumed power at the 18th Party 
Congress in 2012, the CCP Central Committee has placed greater emphasis on the PRC’s 
foreign policy advancing “the cause of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” Yang Jiechi, 
a top Party official for the PRC’s foreign policy, has claimed that adherence to Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics is “showing extremely bright prospects” and “reached a new 
historical starting point.” Importantly, the CCP’s theory shapes the particular contexts and 
caveats that the PRC applies to its diplomatic concepts and principles.  
According to Party officials, the overall goal of the PRC’s foreign policy is to build a 
“community of common destiny” that seeks to shift the international system towards an 
architecture based on the CCP’s principles for how nations should interact. This goal is 
essential to how the PRC’s foreign policy supports its broader strategy to achieve national 
rejuvenation.  From Beijing’s perspective, establishing this “community” is necessary to set 
the external security and economic conditions for the PRCs national rejuvenation by 


 
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“safeguarding world peace” and “promoting common development” according to the Party’s 
principles. The PRC recognizes it cannot achieve its goals in isolation and seeks “all 
countries” to adopt its diplomatic framework in order to “build a community with a shared 
future for mankind” and “actively control the new direction of China and the world.” Lastly, 
PRC officials acknowledge that aspects of the international order are inconsistent with its 
objectives. The PRC’s diplomatic framework seeks to remedy this by promoting changes in 
a more “just and reasonable direction.” 
The PRC’s ambition to shape the international order derives from the objectives of its national 
strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems. The PRC does not frame its efforts 
as simply opportunistic challenges to the status quo or a significant deviation from the past.    
Rather, Beijing is acting upon its longstanding desire to redesign the architecture of the 
international order to support the PRC’s national rejuvenation, efforts that are married with 
growing resources and opportunities to do so. The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise 
aspects of the international order on the Party’s terms and in accordance with ideas and 
principles it views as essential to forging an external environment supportive of the PRC’s 
national rejuvenation and strategic goals. 
As part of its effort to establish a “community of common destiny,” the PRC likely seeks to 
present itself as a provider of “global public goods.” According to PRC documents and 
speeches, this includes efforts to address a broad range of global challenges centered on 
international security, economics, global development, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Xi 
Jinping presents the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, BRI, and 
the PRC’s COVID-19 vaccine distribution to the international community as an impetus to 
improve collective global security challenges.   
The PRC’s foreign policy framework includes efforts to promote and accelerate the 
transformation in the distribution of power, revise the principles of interstate relations, and 
reform global governance structures. Within the context of “Major Power Diplomacy with 
Chinese Characteristics,” PRC officials have described how the PRC differentiates its goals 
and relations according to the power relationships among four categories of actors: major 
powers, peripheral nations, developing nations, and international organizations. Among the 
major powers, Beijing contends that a new framework for relations is necessary to construct 
a “stable and balanced development” between the powers—in essence a multipolar system.  
Yang Jiechi contends that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, major power relations are 
undergoing a “first round of interactive adjustment.” With geographically peripheral nations, 
the PRC seeks to strengthen its relationships to create a more favorable environment along its 
maritime and land borders in accordance with Beijing’s view of justice and interests. For 
developing countries, the PRC emphasizes solidarity and cooperation, as well as “actively” 
carrying out multilateral diplomatic work, to include continued “high-quality development” 
under its Belt and Road Initiative. PRC leaders consider developing countries the 
“unshakeable foundation of China’s foreign policy.” Its priorities in developing countries – 


 
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such as those in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East – include cooperating in existing 
multilateral organizations, creating export markets for PRC technology products, positioning 
the PRC as a provider of “global public goods,” and securing support for the PRC’s attempts 
to reshape the international system.  
Another tenet of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” is Beijing’s 
ambition to construct “new types” of “omnidirectional” relations and bilateral partnerships 
among states. The PRC desires for its concepts of mutual respect, cooperation and mutual 
benefit to provide the basis for these “new types” of relations. Yang Jiechi describes China’s 
“new type” relationships as strategic partnerships that follow a new path of “major power 
relations.” Although distinct from alliance relationships, the PRC’s notion of strategic 
partnerships is indicative of a relationship that meets Beijing’s criteria and is worthy of a 
higher level of bilateral cooperation. To improve its diplomatic support further, the PRC also 
seeks to create what it calls a “comprehensive global partnership network” of its strategic 
partners to form a global “circle of friends.” Despite its encompassing rhetoric, the PRC uses 
nomenclature to implicitly rank its level of “partnership.” For example, the PRC ranks 
Pakistan as its only “all-weather strategic partner,” Russia as its only “comprehensive 
strategic partner with coordination relations,” and other countries such as Brazil and various 
states in South and Southeast Asia holding “all-round strategic partnership relations.”  
The PRC also promotes reforms to the “global governance system” as part of its diplomatic 
framework in order to reflect the “profound evolution” of the international order. According 
to Yang Jiechi, “The global governance system is at an important stage of profound evolution, 
and global governance has increasingly become the frontier and key issue of China’s foreign 
work.” To “seize opportunities” for reform, the PRC actively participates in the construction 
of a new global governance system based upon the Party’s principles. This may be achieved 
through the creation of new multinational organizations and forums to uphold the authority 
of the CCP and the PRC’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. Yang 
also asserted that all nations are considering the state of international affairs following the 
pandemic, and that as a result, “changes in the international order are accelerating.” For 
example, the PRC promotes BRI as an “important practical platform for the concept of the 
community of common destiny.” BRI also serves to strengthen Beijing’s strategic 
partnerships, enlarge its network of strategic partners, and advance reforms to the international 
order to support the PRC’s strategy.   
PRC leaders also continued to push diplomatic efforts to strengthen the PRC’s economic 
connectivity across the Indo-Pacific region, particularly as the PRC’s economy recovered 
from the worst effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. In September 2021, the PRC sought to 
join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 
despite the huge gaps in the PRC’s ability to comply with the requirements of the trade pact. 
Beijing’s application to CPTPP occurred just a week prior to Taipei’s also applying to join 
the trade bloc, suggesting the PRC may have applied to isolate Taiwan’s economic connection 


 
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and limit CPTPP members’ autonomy to establish regional economic norms without Beijing’s 
input or participation. 
In addition, the PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2021 to erode 
U.S. influence globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad 
(Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States), which Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The PRC also 
seeks an alternative to the U.S. system of alliances centered on a broader, multilateral 
“common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” security. The CCP is frustrated by 
what it perceives to be an exaggerated threat picture of China caused by the United States. In 
addition, Beijing routinely asserts the United States is the sole party responsible for escalating 
U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the 
international environment to protect its interests. For example, PRC Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi claimed at the December 2021 symposium on China’s 2021 foreign policy that “…multiple 
challenges suffered by China-U.S. relations lies in the strategic misjudgment made by the 
U.S. side on China and bilateral relations.” PRC officials and state media outlets also 
repeatedly condemned the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and cited the withdrawal as 
evidence that the U.S. is an unreliable partner and declining power. In addition, PRC officials 
have inaccurately framed AUKUS as an act of nuclear proliferation and a threat to regional 
stability with an intent to stoke regional concerns about the trilateral security partnership and 
press countries to limit engagement with U.S.-backed alliances.   
COVID Diplomacy. The COVID-19 pandemic also continued to be a driving force behind 
the PRC’s foreign policy efforts throughout 2021. Beginning in 2020 and throughout 2021, 
Beijing seized the opportunity to use COVID-19 as a propaganda tool against the West, sought 
to deflect culpability for the global pandemic, and attempted to capitalize on its domestic 
success in containing the virus and providing foreign health assistance. PRC officials also 
continue to assert the superiority of the PRC’s political model in enabling its success against 
the virus, despite the notable performance of Asian democracies, particularly Taiwan. In 2021, 
PRC officials maintained its Zero-COVID strategy, which seeks to eliminate the virus through 
closed borders and stringent domestic controls. These controls include strict travel 
restrictions, mass mandatory testing regimes, and extensive quarantine requirements. PRC 
state media and PRC officials also engaged in an effort to push disinformation on the origins 
of COVID-19, denigrate democratic countries’ responses to COVID, and at times displayed 
a hardened political response to criticism. 
Beijing also sought to establish a reputation as a key supporter of nations around the world 
fighting the pandemic. Throughout 2021, the PRC conducted an extensive vaccine diplomacy 
effort, providing through donations or sales, PRC-origin vaccines for strategic political 
purposes. Beijing primarily targeted countries in Asia and the Global South, viewing the 
provision of COVID-19 vaccines as an opportunity to bolster China’s bilateral ties, advance 
its responsible great power narrative, and undercut support for Taiwan. The PRC also 


 
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continued to provide COVID-19 aid, such as personal protective equipment (PPE) and 
medical teams, to countries around the world, in some cases using military transport assets 
and personnel. However, the lack of sufficient data and transparency raised questions 
concerning the effectiveness of the PRC’s vaccines amidst reports of low protection rates, 
later confirmed by the Director of the PRC Center for Disease Control in April 2021. In 
addition, spread of new COVID-19 variants such as Omicron raised international concerns 
about the efficacy and durability of PRC-origin COVID-19 vaccines. 
In 2021, the PRC’s COVID-19 related aid and vaccines were criticized for including political 
conditions. Aid recipients and outside observers noted that Beijing often linked provision of 
assistance and promises of vaccine doses to specific PRC policy objectives, such as exclusion 
of Taiwan from the World Health Assembly and other international organizations, 
participation in BRI, opening markets to PRC technology companies, and severing diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan. For example, the PRC successfully used vaccine provision to convince 
the Brazilian government to reverse its ban on Huawei participation in its 5G networks.       
Though unsuccessful, in the case of Paraguay’s need for vaccines, the PRC sought to extract 
concessions regarding Paraguay’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for aid in 
early 2021.    
Assertive Diplomacy. In 2021, Xi Jinping continued to urge efforts for the PRC to develop a 
“voice in international discourse that matches China’s comprehensive national strength and 
international status.” In the PRC’s view, strengthening the country’s international 
communication was “imperative” to creating a “favorable external environment for China’s 
reform, development, and stability.” PRC diplomats, and non-official PRC actors, continued 
to use a more aggressive, confrontational approach to pursuing PRC aims and responding to 
criticism, often referred to as “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy—a term coined by Western 
observers. PRC diplomats frequently engaged in more assertive diplomacy with foreign 
audiences through traditional mediums and social media platforms—many of which are 
banned in the PRC. Although Xi Jinping said that China needs to improve its efforts to create 
a positive image of the PRC, PRC officials have maintained their hostile diplomatic 
messaging often in a performative style, which receives praise from domestic PRC audiences. 
For example, at the March 2021 U.S.-PRC Meeting in Anchorage, Yang Jiechi and PRC 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi exclusively blamed the United States for causing the downward 
trajectory in U.S.-Sino relations, with Yang Jiechi asserting that “the United States is not 
qualified to speak to China from a position of strength.” In June 2021, the PRC Ambassador 
to France defended the PRC’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy, claiming that international 
criticism of Beijing’s approach reflects the “arrogance of the west” and proclaimed that he 
was honored to be described as a “Wolf Warrior.” PRC diplomats and state media outlets 
have echoed this defense, suggesting that PRC officials view hostile and assertive diplomacy 
as an effective tool to advance and defend China’s interests. 


 
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Military Diplomacy. The PRC’s willingness to engage in military diplomacy with other 
countries can vary considerably based on its perception of a country’s adherence to Beijing’s 
diplomatic framework. For example, the PRC’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of 
coordination” with Russia entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. Sino-
Russian military cooperation occurs in practical forms through exchanges of training, 
equipment, technology, high-level visits, and other coordination mechanisms. For other 
strategic partnership countries, the PRC seeks to leverage those relationships to reinforce the 
PRC’s systemic preferences and maintain stability in Beijing’s favor. For countries with 
whom the PRC has not established strategic partnerships, such as the United States, the PRC 
shapes its military cooperation along more minimalist principles of conflict avoidance that 
emphasize “non-conflict” and “mutual respect.” From Beijing’s perspective, these curtailed 
relationships at least serve its foreign policy objective by ensuring stable relations with major 
powers.   
While the COVID-19 pandemic continued to constrain PRC’s military diplomacy in 2021, 
the PLA increased its external high-level military visits compared to 2020 and maintained 
close contact with the military leadership of neighboring countries. The PLA also relied on 
high-level virtual bilateral meetings and multilateral engagements to supplement cancelled 
engagements and maintain contacts with foreign militaries. The PRC has set up defense and 
security consultations as well as working meeting mechanisms with 17 neighboring countries 
to keep exchange channels open. 
China’s Territorial Disputes in Context 
The PRC’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely since 1949. Some disputes led 
to war, as in border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. China’s contested 
border with the Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In recent 
cases involving land border disputes, China has sometimes been willing to compromise with 
and even offer concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled 11 land-based 
territorial disputes with six of its neighbors. However, within the last decade China has 
employed a more coercive approach to deal with several disputes over maritime features, 
ownership of potentially rich offshore oil and gas deposits, and border areas. 
Tensions with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) sparked a standoff between 
Chinese and Indian forces in mid-May 2020, which persisted into the winter. The standoff 
escalated on June 15th 2020 after a skirmish ensued in the Galwan Valley between Indian 
Army and PLA forces that ended with 20 Indian soldiers and four PRC soldiers dead, 
according to press. In 2021, the PRC continued to amass forces and build military 
infrastructure along the LAC. 
The PRC and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea. The East China Sea contains natural gas and 
oil, though hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant 


 
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line from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended 
continental shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. The PRC continues to 
assert sovereignty over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands and reiterate the importance 
of abiding by the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states both sides will 
acknowledge divergent positions over the East China Sea dispute but will prevent escalation 
through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. Japan remains concerned 
with the persistent deployment of PRC coast guard ships and fishing vessels in disputed East 
China Sea waters and contests the PRC’s claim of sovereignty.  
 
 
The South China Sea (SCS) plays an important role in security considerations across East 
Asia because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS 
shipping lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and other land features 
within its ambiguous self-proclaimed “nine-dash line”—claims disputed in whole or part by 
Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in 
the Spratly Islands, makes the same territorial assertions as the PRC. To further assert its 
sovereignty, in April 2021, China created two new administrative districts to cover the 
Paracels and Spratlys, and named 80 geographical features it claims in the region. The PRC 
continued to employ the PLA Navy (PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to 
patrol the region throughout 2021. In response to China’s continued assertive actions, 


 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam publicly rejected Beijing’s nine-dash line 
claims and invoked international law in support of their maritime sovereign rights. 
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its claimed exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, 
the PLA has begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the 
First Island Chain in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity 
highlights China’s double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. 
Examples include sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military exercises such 
as the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii in 2014 and 2018, TALISMAN 
SABER off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021.     
PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the South China Sea and they frequently operate 
in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Malaysia.  
ECONOMIC POLICY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of 
China’s broader national development aspirations. The CCP’s economic, political, 
social, and security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support 
Beijing’s strategy of national rejuvenation. 
 Beijing’s “dual circulation (双循环)” policy aims to forge domestic resilience by 
reducing China’s reliance on foreign supply chains that have proven to be economic 
chokepoints. In addition, the policy aims to boost domestic production and 
consumption to fuel growth, and decrease the economy’s reliance on exports moving 
forward. 
 China’s economic development supports its military modernization not only by 
providing the means for larger defense budgets, but through deliberate Party-led 
initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025, as well 
from systemic benefits of the PRC’s growing national industrial and technological 
base. 
 China’s tools of economic statecraft include inducements such as infrastructure 
investments under BRI; industrial and technology policies that seek foreign 
technology transfers in exchange for market access; protectionist policies and legal 
barriers for foreign firms to compete in China’s domestic market; selective observance 
of trade commitments; and economic coercion against other states. 


 
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The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with, and part of, China’s 
broader national development aspirations and work in coordination with China’s economic 
policies and systems. PRC’s leaders directly link the pace and scale of the PLA’s 
modernization with the country’s overall development. PRC’s economic, political, social, and 
military development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support its strategy of national 
rejuvenation. The Party gives priority to China’s economic development as the “central task” 
and frames its economic system as the means of advancing the nation’s overall political and 
social modernity. In particular, China’s economic targets abroad focuses intensely on 
advancing what the Party calls the country’s “productive forces” (e.g., industry, technology, 
infrastructure, and human capital) which it views as the means to achieve the country’s 
political and social modernity—including building a “world-class” military. The party-state’s 
relentless efforts to grow China’s national industrial and technological base has significant 
implications for China’s military modernization, as well as for China’s global economic 
partners.  
CCP leaders have cast China’s partial adoption of market features—which were implemented 
as part of its “reform and opening up” that began in the late 1970s, and subsequently led to an 
economic transformation—as evidence that their strategy to modernize China has been 
succeeding rather than viewing the market feature adoption as a repudiation of the Party’s 
fundamental economic ideals. Party leaders since Deng Xiaoping have consistently 
rationalized China’s market-oriented economic reforms as a necessary regression from 
socialism needed to account properly for China’s historical circumstances, which left it 
significantly underdeveloped. According to the Party, contemporary China remains at the 
beginning stage or the “primary stage of socialism” with a long process of socialist 
modernization ahead.  
Basic Economic System. The Party conceives of China’s economy as constituting the “basic 
economic system” in which public ownership is dominant and state, collective, and private 
forms of ownership develop side-by-side. The basic economic system comprises China’s 
public ownership economy and the multi-ownership economy.  
Economic Development Goals. Despite slowing economic growth just prior to and during 
the COVID-19 outbreak, China will continue to pursue the economic policy objectives 
determined by the CCP Central Committee and set forth in the 14th Five-Year Plan. According 
to Xi’s report at the 19th Party Congress, China’s economic goals are: (1) furthering supply-
side structural reform; (2) making China a country of innovators; (3) pursuing a rural 
vitalization strategy; (4) implementing the coordinated regional development strategy; (4) 
accelerating efforts to improve the socialist market economy; and (5) making new ground in 
pursuing opening up on all fronts. The CCP sets more specific development goals in its Five-
Year Plans (FYPs). The PRC is currently executing the 14th FYP that will cover 2021-2025. 
The priorities and goals in the FYPs not only apply to the government and the public 


 
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ownership economy, but also serve as implicit guidance from the Party to the multi-ownership 
economy.  
Economic Conditions. Even before COVID-19, China’s economic growth had slowed 
because of demographic challenges, declining returns from state-led infrastructure 
investment, and slowing urbanization. Since 2016, and increasingly in the past year, the PRC 
leadership’s decision to increase oversight and tighten regulation on the financial and tech 
sector, as well as the PRC’s efforts to curb risky lending practices in housing and property 
markets have added additional strain on its economy. China’s efforts in early 2020 to contain 
the COVID-19 outbreak with government lockdowns and strict control measures exacerbated 
this slowdown in China’s economy. In March 2021, China announced an annual growth target 
of 6 percent, but China achieved 8.1 percent growth for 2021. In the first half of 2021 China’s 
exports surged, fueling growth, but as the economic landscape tightened exports were weaker 
in the second half of the year, portending substantially slower growth in to 2022.  
Economic Policies & Practices. The PRC’s introduction of market economy features within 
the “basic economic system” without a full transition to free and open markets has resulted in 
laws, regulations, and policies that generally disadvantage foreign firms vis-à-vis their 
Chinese counterparts in terms of tradable goods, services sectors, market access, and foreign 
direct investment. Examples of China’s economic policies and trade practices include its 
support to domestic industries at the expense of foreign counterparts, commercial joint 
venture requirements, technology transfer requirements, subsidies to lower the cost of inputs, 
sustaining excess capacity in multiple industries, sector-specific limits on foreign direct 
investment, discriminatory cybersecurity and data transfer rules, insufficient intellectual 
property rights enforcement, inadequate transparency, and lack of market access—
particularly in the information and communications technology (ICT), agriculture, and service 
sectors. Market access remains difficult for foreign firms because China restricts inbound 
investment, resulting in persistent underperformance in other countries’ services exports, 
particularly in the banking, insurance, Internet-related, professional, and retail services 
sectors. 
In March 2018, an investigation by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 determined that the acts, policies, and practices of the 
PRC government related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation were 
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce, resulting in harm to the 
U.S. economy of at least $50 billion per year. Additionally, the USTR’s annual Special 301 
Report, which identifies trading partners that do not adequately or effectively protect and 
enforce intellectual property rights and the findings of its Review of Notorious Markets for 
Counterfeiting and Piracy, has repeatedly identified China as a country that has serious 
intellectual property rights deficiencies. These reports, for example, have repeatedly identified 
China as the world’s leading source of counterfeit and pirated goods. Since 2006, USTR has 
placed China on its Priority Watch List, placement on which indicates particular problems 


 
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with respect to intellectual property protection, enforcement, or market access for U.S. 
persons relying on intellectual property. The USTR’s 2020 Special 301 Report states: 
“China’s placement on the Priority Watch List reflects U.S. concerns with China’s system of 
pressuring and coercing technology transfer, and the continued need for fundamental 
structural changes to strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement, including 
to trade secret theft, obstacles to protecting trademarks, online piracy and counterfeiting, the 
high-volume manufacturing and export of counterfeit goods, and impediments to 
pharmaceutical innovation.” 
A large portion of China’s economic output results from government and policy-directed 
investments rather than market-based forces. China pursues state-directed investment 
overseas and encourages mergers and acquisitions. Along with heavy investments in 
infrastructure and commodities to support its strategic firms, increase economic engagement, 
and improve economic security, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational 
for future innovations with both commercial and military applications. 
The PRC seeks and obtains foreign technology through the following means: foreign direct 
investment, overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign 
research and development (R&D) centers, joint ventures, research and academic partnerships, 
talent recruitment, industrial, and cyberspace-enabled espionage and theft.   
Recent legal proceedings highlight numerous cases of China’s efforts to obtain technology 
and knowledge through theft of trade secrets and economic espionage. In November 2021, a 
jury in U.S. Federal court convicted a PRC intelligence officer of attempting to steal industry-
leading aviation trade secrets. Court documents show that the PRC officer attempted to steal 
technology related to GE Aviation’s exclusive composite aircraft engine fan to benefit the 
PRC state. In November of 2020, a rheumatology professor pleaded guilty to using $4.1 
million in NIH grants to develop China’s expertise in rheumatology and immunology. In 
November 2019, a U.S. Federal grand jury indicted a PRC national who had worked as an 
imaging scientist for Monsanto and its subsidiary, The Climate Corporation, on charges 
related to economic espionage and stealing trade secrets for China. Federal officials stopped 
him from boarding a flight on a one-way trip to China in 2017 with a proprietary algorithm, 
according to the U.S. Department of Justice.  
The PRC’s recent economic policies have promoted innovation focused on strengthening 
domestic industry, while placing additional restrictions on foreign firms. Recognizing that 
some of its initiatives such as “Made in China 2025” and BRI have sparked concerns about 
China’s intentions, China’s leaders have adopted less inflammatory rhetoric when promoting 
these initiatives without altering their fundamental strategic goals. 
Made in China 2025: First announced by the PRC in May 2015, the “Made in China 
2025” plan seeks to increase China’s domestic innovation by setting higher targets 
for domestic manufacturing in strategic industries such as robotics, power 


 
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equipment, and next-generation information technology by 2020 and 2025. This 
plan seeks to strengthen China’s domestic enterprises through awarding subsidies 
and other incentives while increasing pressure on foreign firms to transfer 
technology to have market access in China. “Made in China 2025” came under 
criticism from advanced countries for unfairly favoring China’s domestic enterprises 
at the expense of foreign participants in China’s markets. Increasingly aware and 
sensitive to these concerns, by June 2018, China began avoiding references to “Made 
in China 2025” in major policy papers. The PRC government ordered its media 
outlets to downplay use of the term in June 2018. Key events that PRC leaders use 
to set strategic directives have also avoided references to “Made in China,” including 
the 2019 Central Economic Work Conference and the NPC. Despite the adjustments 
in its narrative, China has largely continued implementing the policies behind “Made 
in China 2025.” 
Dual Circulation: In 2020, Xi Jinping articulated the economic policy of dual 
circulation, which aims for a largely self-sufficient China that could innovate, 
manufacture, and consume within its own economy, while still drawing on the 
international economy through exports, critical supply chains, and limited imports 
of capital. Dual circulation seeks to enable the internal markets and external markets 
to reinforce each other, with a focus on establishing the domestic market as the 
primary driver of economic growth. 
Legal Framework. The PRC in recent years has implemented new laws that seek to place 
further restrictions on foreign firms while creating or strengthening the legal framework for 
the Party’s national security concepts and in some cases furthering its Military-Civil Fusion 
(MCF) Development Strategy (discussed in the next section): 
National Defense Law: Adopted in March 1997, the law provides legal justification 
to mobilize the military and civilian resources in defense of a broad range of national 
interests.  
National Security Law: Adopted in July 2015, the law limits foreign access to the 
information and communications technology (ICT) market in China on national 
security grounds. 
Counterterrorism Law: Adopted in December 2015, among its provisions, the law 
requires telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide 
information, decryption, and other technical support to public and state security 
organizations “conducting prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.” 
National Defense Transportation Law: Coming into effect in 2016, the National 
Defense Transportation Law advances the PRC military-civil fusion development 


 
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strategy by laying the groundwork for the PLA Navy to mobilize civilian maritime 
transportation resources and facilities to support power projection missions. 
Cyber Security Law: The law, which went into effect in June 2017, promotes 
development of indigenous technologies and restricts sales of foreign ICT in China. 
The law also requires that foreign companies submit ICT for government-
administered national security reviews, store data in China, and seek government 
approval before transferring data outside of China. 
Intelligence Law: Passed in June 2017, the law allows authorities to monitor and 
investigate foreign and domestic individuals and organizations to protect national 
security. Specifically, it allows authorities to use or seize vehicles, communication 
devices, and buildings to support intelligence collection efforts. 
Cryptography Law: Adopted in October 2019 and coming into effect in 2020, this 
law requires entities working on cryptography to have management systems in place 
to ensure sufficient security for their encryption. Although the law encourages 
development of commercial encryption technology, its use cannot harm national 
security or the public good. It provides for the State Cryptography Administration 
and its local agencies to have complete access to cryptography systems and the data 
protected by those systems. 
Foreign Investment Law: In March 2019, the PRC’s NPC passed a new Foreign 
Investment law with the stated objective of improving the business environment for 
foreign investors and leveling the playing field between foreign businesses and 
Chinese private firms and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The law passed in just 
three months, which reflects an unusually fast turnaround in China where the same 
level of legislation usually takes years. PRC officials have indicated that swift 
passage of the law was to facilitate U.S.-China trade talks, and the law appears to 
respond to a number of issues raised by the U.S. Trade Representative’s Section 301 
report related to unfair Chinese trade practices related to intellectual property, 
technology transfer, and innovation. Despite the law’s stated objective, its wording 
is vague and the most substantial provisions are not new. 
Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law: Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee 
of the 13th National People’s Congress on June 10th, 2021, the law was enacted to 
“safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests, and to protect 
the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.” According 
to PRC media sources, the law is intended to “counter, fight, and oppose” unilateral 
sanctions on the PRC imposed by foreign countries. The law was likely adopted in 
response to sanctions on PRC officials in connection with serious human rights 
abuse in Xinjiang.  


 
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Data Security Law: This law went into effect on September 1st, 2021 and subjects 
almost all data-related activities to government oversight, as PRC officials grew 
concerned about the transfer of potentially sensitive data overseas. Companies in the 
PRC have become more reluctant to share data, as authorities are ambiguous as to 
what is considered sensitive information, increasing difficulties for international 
firms trying to do business in the PRC. In early November, local providers of ship 
tracking data stopped sharing details of ship locations, citing the data security law. 
Personal Information Protection Law: Effective on November 1st, 2021 and enacted 
by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the law is purposed 
to protect the rights and interests on personal information, regulate personal 
information processing activities, and promote reasonable use of personal 
information. PRC media sources note that activities such as “collection, 
application, processing, and trading of personal information will be strictly 
monitored” with infringements punishable according to the law. The law 
exemplifies a more complete system of regulation that will work in tandem with 
the PRC’s existing Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.  
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 
Key Takeaways  
 The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand 
global transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
 In 2021, the PRC significantly increased engagement with African, Latin American, 
and Middle Eastern countries and began prioritizing public health, digital 
infrastructure, and green energy opportunities. 
 Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards 
expanding its overseas security footprint to protect those interests.  
First announced in 2013, the PRC’s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic 
policy advanced by President Xi Jinping, which rebranded and further expanded China’s 
global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking 
to expand global transportation and trade links to support its development and deepen its 
economic integration with nations along its periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI 
by financing, constructing, and developing transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, 
hydropower projects, digital connectivity, satellite navigation ground stations, and technology 
and industrial parks worldwide. For example, Huawei has implemented “Safe Cities” 
programs across many African countries prompting concerns of surveillance and digital 
authoritarianism from the PRC. As of 2021, at least 146 countries had signed BRI cooperation 
documents, up from 138 in 2020 and 125 in 2019. BRI related spending is difficult to estimate 


 
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because there is no comprehensive list of projects, and difficulties delineating between official 
lending and lending from PRC state-owned banks; however, publicly available data indicates 
that the PRC’s 2021 BRI financing and investment commitments were similar to those of 
2020 and around 50 percent lower than the pre-pandemic numbers of 2019.  
In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial 
integrity, energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability 
and diminish threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern 
periphery. Similarly, through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in 
Pakistan, it seeks to become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic 
choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it 
builds through BRI to pursue additional economic cooperation with participating countries. 
2021 saw two key shifts in how Beijing implements BRI: The PRC significantly increased 
engagement with African and Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iraq, and began 
prioritizing public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy opportunities through its 
“Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)” (HSR), “Digital Silk Road (数字丝绸之路)” (DSR), 
“Space Information Corridor ( 空间信息走廊) ” (SIC), and “Green Silk Road (绿色丝绸之
路)” (GSR). Improving each of these “roads” offers Beijing benefits beyond economic 
integration.  
• 
HSR is Beijing’s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing 
medical assistance through BRI transportation networks, which the PRC leveraged in 
2020 and 2021 to provide COVID-19 vaccines, personal protective equipment, and 
other pandemic support to partner countries. In the future, it may help the PRC expand 
the international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role 
as a global public health leader, and identify the need for – and justify – new BRI 
projects.  
• 
DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing delivers PRC technology to partner countries, 
which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it seeks to set 
global standards for next-generation technology. The PRC hopes the DSR will 
increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and 
establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free 
trade zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech 
leaders by providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production 
opportunities for PRC tech firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, 
including next-generation cellular networks—such as fifth-generation (5G) 
networks—fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and data centers. The initiative also 
includes developing advanced technologies including satellite navigation systems, 
artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and export.  


 
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• 
Noted in the 2021 PRC State Council report on China’s Space Program, the PRC 
continued to press ahead with the construction of the SIC—the space-based 
component of BRI. The SIC advances the PRC’s national interests with aims to (1) 
internationalize the Beidou navigation system; (2) advance the construction of satellite 
telemetry, tracking, and command ground stations with potential dual-use 
applications; (3) provide space launch, satellite, and data services to BRI  signatories; 
and (4) integrate PRC satellites with BRI infrastructure projects. The integration could 
make operation of these infrastructure projects dependent on PRC satellites and 
associated space services.  
• 
GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects – an 
initiative that aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 
2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  
Since BRI’s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international 
concerns over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with 
suspicion of Beijing’s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. 
China has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived 
threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most 
participating countries. However, 2021 brought additional challenges such as a weak appetite 
for investment precipitated by the COVID-19 pandemic and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Kenya, for example, was unable to secure PRC financing to finish a super-fast rail 
link from its port of Mombasa to Uganda, a flagship BRI project in Africa. Meanwhile, 
Australia canceled its 2018 and 2019 agreements to deepen cooperation on infrastructure, 
innovation, and trade development through BRI on the grounds that they were contrary to 
Australia’s national interests. 
As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expand under BRI, the CCP has 
signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect those interests, 
which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned 
or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and 
instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk. In 2021, 
for example, 10 PRC nationals were killed and 26 others injured when a suicide bomber 
targeted a workers’ bus on its way to a BRI infrastructure development project in Pakistan. 
China has therefore sought to extend its ability to project military power to safeguard its 
overseas interests, including BRI, by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism 
cooperation and supporting host-nation security forces through military aid, including military 
equipment donations. 
 


 
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MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF; 军民融合) Development Strategy 
to “fuse” its security and development strategies to build an integrated National 
Strategic System and Capabilities in support of the PRC’s national rejuvenation goals. 
 Beijing’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use 
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science 
and technology industries, and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s 
instruments of national power.   
 The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing 
China’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base; (2) 
integrating and leveraging science and technology innovations across military and 
civilian sectors; (3) cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and 
knowledge; (4) building military requirements into civilian infrastructure and 
leveraging civilian construction for military purposes; (5) leveraging civilian service 
and logistics capabilities for military purposes; and (6) expanding and deepening 
China’s national defense mobilization system to include all relevant aspects of its 
society and economy for use in competition and war.  
The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy as a nationwide 
endeavor that seeks to meld its economic and social development strategies with its security 
strategies to build an integrated national strategic system and capabilities in support of China’s 
national rejuvenation goals. The Party’s leaders view MCF as a critical element of their 
strategy for the PRC to become a “great modern socialist country” which includes becoming 
a world leader in science and technology (S&T) and developing a “world-class” military.  
Although the PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-
use technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense S&T 
industries, its broader purpose is to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power 
by melding aspects of its economic, military, and social governance. MCF strives to establish 
an infrastructure that connects the military and civilian sectors in a way that serves as a 
catalyst for innovation and economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in 
advancing dual-use technologies, especially those suited for “intelligentized” warfare, and 
facilitates effective industrial mobilization during wartime.  
Development & Significance. The Party has explored the concept of leveraging or 
integrating the combined contributions of the military and civilian sectors since the PRC’s 
founding. The current MCF concept initially took root in the early 2000s as the Party sought 
methods to enhance the PRC’s overall development. This led Party leaders to call for 


 
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improving “military-civilian integration” that echoed the collaboration between the defense 
and civilian sectors that China observed in the United States and other developed countries. 
Implementation of these efforts stalled due to a lack of centralized government control and 
the organizational barriers that exist across the party-state. Coinciding with the 11th Five Year 
Plan (FYP) (2006-2010), the PRC began replacing “military-civilian integration” with 
“military-civilian fusion.” In 2007, Party officials publicly noted the change from 
“integration” to “fusion” was not merely cosmetic, but broadened the scope to include all 
available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry.  
Since that time, MCF’s ambitions have grown in scope and scale as the Party has come to 
view it as a means to bridge the PRC’s economic and social development with its security 
development in support of the PRC’s national strategy to renew China. As such, the Party has 
continued to elevate MCF’s importance. In 2015, the CCP Central Committee elevated the 
MCF Development Strategy to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between the 
PRC’s national development strategy and its national security strategy that seeks to build an 
“integrated national strategic system and capabilities,” all of which support the PRC’s goal of 
national rejuvenation. In 2020 during the 5th Plenum of the 19th CCP Central Committee, PRC 
leaders reiterated the high-level priority of MCF by calling for accelerated military 
modernization through integration of new technologies and operational concepts, increased 
science and technology research, improved MCF, and personnel reforms. 
Management & Implementation. The overall management and implementation of the MCF 
Development Strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the 
State Council (notably the National Development and Reform Commission), and the CMC. 
In addition to signifying its importance, the CCP Central Committee’s elevation of the MCF 
Development Strategy to a national-level strategy also intended to overcome obstacles to 
implementation across the party-state. 
This elevation also led to the establishment of the Central Commission for Military Civilian 
Fusion Development (CCMCFD) in 2017, chaired by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Premier 
Li Keqiang, several other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, two State 
Councilors, both CMC Vice Chairmen, 12 Ministry-level leaders, and others. The stated 
objective of the CCMCFD is to build the PRC’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” 
This commission works to improve the “top-level design” of MCF and overcome 
impediments to implementation. The elevation of the MCF Development Strategy and the 
creation of the CCMCFD signals the importance that Party leaders place on MCF and the 
scope and scale of the strategy’s ambitions.   
The PRC pursues MCF through six interrelated efforts. Each effort overlaps with the others 
and has both domestic and international components. The Party seeks to implement the MCF 
Development Strategy across every level of the PRC from the highest national-level organs 
down to provinces and township, and creates top-down financing and regulatory mechanisms 
that incentivize civilian and military stakeholders—such as local governments, academia, 


 
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research institutions, private investors, and military organizations—to combine efforts on 
dual-use technologies. The PRC refers to these six aspects as “systems,” which may also be 
understood as mutually supporting lines of effort or components.  The six systems in the MCF 
Development Strategy are:  
The Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System. This system focuses 
on fusing the PRC’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base.   
This includes expanding the private sector’s participation in the PRC’s defense industrial base 
and supply chains as well as improving the efficiency, capacity, and flexibility of defense and 
civilian industrial and manufacturing processes. This broader participation seeks to transfer 
mature technologies both ways across military and civilian sectors, with the goal to produce 
outsized benefits for both sectors. This also aims to increase the competitiveness within the 
PRC’s defense industrial base in which one or two defense SOEs dominate an entire sector.   
This MCF system also seeks to advance the PRC’s self-reliance in manufacturing key 
industrial technologies, equipment, and materials to reduce its dependence on imports, 
including those with dual-uses. The PRC’s MCF-influenced industrial and technology 
endeavors include Made in China 2025 that sets targets for the PRC to achieve greater self-
sufficiency in key industrial areas such as aerospace, communications, and transportation.  
The Military-Civil Coordinated Technology Innovation System. This MCF system seeks 
to maximize the full benefits and potential of the country’s S&T development.  Consistent 
with the CCP leadership’s view that high technology and innovation are critical to 
strengthening China’s comprehensive national power, this system develops and integrates 
advanced technologies across civilian and military entities, projects, and initiatives—with 
benefits flowing in both directions. This includes using cutting-edge civilian technology for 
military applications or to more broadly advance military S&T, as well as using military 
advancements to push civilian economic development. Although related to the Advanced 
Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System, this system largely focuses on fusing 
innovations and advances in basic and applied research. Specific efforts in this MCF system 
include strengthening and promoting civilian and military R&D in advanced dual-use 
technologies and cross-pollinating military and civilian basic research. Additional efforts 
include promoting the sharing of scientific resources, expanding the institutions involved in 
defense research, and fostering greater collaboration across defense and civilian research 
communities. This system also seeks to foster “new-type” research institutions with mixed 
funding sources and lean management structures that are more dynamic, efficient, and 
effective than the PRC’s wholly state-owned research bodies. Examples of MCF-influenced 
dual-use S&T endeavors include the PRC’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy and 
Artificial Intelligence National Project.   
The Fundamental Domain Resource Sharing System. This system includes building 
military requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure from the ground up as 
well as leveraging China’s civilian construction and logistics capacities and capabilities for 


 
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military purposes. This includes factoring military requirements and dual-use purposes into 
building civilian private and public transportation infrastructure such as airports, port 
facilities, railways, roads, and communications networks. This also extends to infrastructure 
projects in dual-use domains such as space and undersea, as well as mobile communications 
networks and topographical and meteorological systems. Another element seeks to set 
common military and civilian standards to make infrastructure easier to use in emergencies 
and wartime. This aspect of MCF has arguably the greatest reach into the PRC’s local 
governance systems as military requirements inform infrastructure construction at the 
province, county, and township levels. The influence of this aspect of MCF is visible in the 
PRC’s major land reclamations and military construction activities in the South China Sea, 
which brought together numerous government entities, the PLA, law enforcement, 
construction companies, and commercial entities. It may also have important implications for 
the PRC’s overseas infrastructure projects and investments under BRI as the PRC seeks to 
establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to project 
and sustain military power. 
The Military Personnel (Talent) Cultivation System. This MCF system seeks to blend and 
cultivate military and civilian S&T expertise through education programs, personnel 
exchanges, and knowledge sharing. The purpose of this effort is to improve the utilization of 
experts able to participate in S&T projects irrespective of whether they are military or civilian 
(or even foreign) experts and allow expertise to flow more freely across sectors. This aspect 
of MCF also seeks to reform the PRC’s talent cultivation system, which encompasses 
hundreds of talent recruitment plans, in order to improve China’s human capital, build a highly 
skilled workforce, and recruit foreign experts to provide access to know-how, expertise, and 
foreign technology. It takes into account all levels of education from the Party’s nationwide 
“patriotic education” programs for children to the matriculation of post-doctorate researchers 
within China and at institutions abroad. Many of the PRC’s named talent programs are likely 
influenced by MCF planning, as are reforms in its military academies, national universities, 
and research institutes.    
The Socialized Support and Sustainment System for the PLA. This system entails two 
major efforts that seeks to shift the PLA away from its inefficient self-contained logistics and 
sustainment systems, and towards modern streamlined logistics and support services. First, it 
seeks to harness civilian public sector and private sector resources to improve the PLA’s basic 
services and support functions—ranging from food, housing, and healthcare services. The 
concept is to gain efficiencies in costs and personnel by outsourcing non-military services 
previously performed by the PLA while also improving the quality of life for military 
personnel.  Second, it seeks to further the construction of a modern military logistics system 
that is able to support and sustain the PLA in joint operations and for overseas operations. 
This system seeks to fuse the PLA Joint Logistic Support Force’s (JLSF’s) efforts to integrate 
the military’s joint logistics functions with the PRC’s advanced civilian logistics, 
infrastructure, and delivery service companies and networks. These arrangements seek to 


 
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provide the PLA with modern transportation and distribution, warehousing, information 
sharing, and other types of support in peacetime and wartime. This fusion also seeks to 
provide the PLA with a logistics system that is more efficient, higher capacity, higher quality, 
and global in reach.  
The National Defense Mobilization System. This MCF system binds the other systems as 
it seeks to mobilize the PRC’s military, economic, and social resources to defend or advance 
China’s sovereignty, security and development interests. The Party views China’s growing 
strength as only useful to the extent that the party-state can mobilize it. China views 
mobilization as the ability to use precisely the instrument, capability, or resource needed, 
when needed, for the duration needed. Within the PLA, the reforms in 2015-16 elevated 
defense mobilization to a department called the National Defense Mobilization Department 
(NDMD), which reports directly to the CMC. The NDMD plays an important role in this 
system by organizing and overseeing the PLA’s reserve forces, militia, and provincial military 
districts and below. This system also seeks to integrate the state emergency management 
system into the national defense mobilization system in order to achieve a coordinated 
military-civilian response during a crisis. Consistent with the Party’s view of international 
competition, many MCF mobilization initiatives not only seek to reform how the PRC 
mobilizes for war and responds to emergencies, but how the economy and society can be 
leveraged to support the PRC’s strategic needs for international competition. 
MCF Linkages. Each MCF system entails linkages between dozens of organizations and 
government entities, including: 
• 
Ministry-level organizations from the State Council: Examples include the National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of 
Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Education, and key state entities 
such as the State Administration of Science and Technology in National Defense and 
others. 
• 
Lead military organs subordinate to the Central Military Commission: CMC Strategic 
Planning Office, Joint Political, Logistics, and Equipment Development Departments, 
as well as operational units and the regional military structure at the Military District 
and Sub-District levels; military universities and academies such as National Defense 
University, Academy of Military Science, National University of Defense 
Technology, and service institutions. 
• 
State-sponsored educational institutions, research centers, and key laboratories: 
Prominent examples include the “Seven Sons of National Defense” (Harbin Institute 
of Technology, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Northwestern 
Polytechnical Institute, Beijing Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering 
University, Beihang University, and Nanjing University of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics), as well as certain PLA-affiliated laboratories of Tsinghua University, 


 
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Beijing University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University, North University of China, and 
others. 
• 
Defense industry: The ten major defense SOEs continue to fill their traditional roles 
providing weapons and equipment to the military services. Many defense SOEs 
consist of dozens of subsidiaries, sub-contractors, and subordinate research institutes.  
• 
Other SOEs and quasi-private companies: High profile examples include PRC high-
tech corporations and important SOEs like China Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO), China National Offshore Oil Company, and major construction companies 
that have roles in BRI projects as well as helping the PRC build out occupied terrain 
features in the South China Sea. 
• 
Private companies: MCF efforts also seek to increase the proportion of private 
companies that contribute to military projects and procurements. These enterprises 
include technology companies that specialize in unmanned systems, robotics, artificial 
intelligence, cybersecurity, and big data.  
• 
Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships: In practice, many MCF efforts involve partnerships 
between central, provincial, or city government entities with military district 
departments, PLA departments, academia, research entities, and companies. A 
majority of provincial and local governments have announced MCF industrial plans, 
and more than 35 national-level MCF industrial zones have been established across 
China. MCF-linked investments funds created by central and local governments and 
private investors total in the tens of billions of dollars.  
DEFENSE POLICY & MILITARY STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
 In 2021, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding 
its sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater 
global role for itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of 
“active defense (积极防御).” 
 PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” 
military by the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the 
PRC into a “great modern socialist country.”   
 In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027: to accelerate the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of 
the PRC’s armed forces, which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more 
credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification. 


 
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 In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW; 多域精确战).” MDPW is intended to leverage a 
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) network, which the PLA calls the “network information 
system-of-systems that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to 
rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine 
joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. 
The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. CCP leaders view these interests as foundational to their national 
strategy. The modernization of the armed forces is an indispensable element of the Party’s 
national strategy to modernize the country. At the Fifth Plenum in October 2020, the CCP 
declared that the PRC’s ambitions for becoming a rich country are closely integrated with its 
ambitions to develop a powerful military. The PRC’s defense policy and military strategy 
primarily orients the PLA toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” 
interests in the region counter to the United States. At the same time, CCP leaders increasingly 
cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend Beijing’s expanding global interests 
and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of “Great Power Diplomacy 
with Chinese characteristics.”   
As reported in the 19th Party Congress, one of the conditions for the PLA’s military 
modernization is to enable the PRC to “effectively shape the PLA’s military posture, manage 
crises, and deter and win wars.” The PRC’s military strategy is based on “active defense,” a 
concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at 
the operational and tactical levels. To adapt the PRC’s armed forces to long-term trends in 
global military affairs and meet the country’s evolving national security needs, PRC’s leaders 
stress the imperative of meeting key military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035. 
These milestones seek to align the PLA’s transformation with the PRC’s overall national 
modernization so that by the end of 2049, the PRC will field a “world-class” military.  
Strategic Assessment. A key driver of the PRC’s defense policy is how the CCP leaders 
perceive the relative threats and opportunities facing the country’s comprehensive national 
development. During Chairman Xi’s CCP centenary speech, he called for the full 
implementation of the Party’s idea of strengthening the army in the new era. The last defense 
white paper, China’s National Defense in the New Era, published in 2019 reaffirmed that 
China’s armed forces are aligned with and contribute to the strategies of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), stating that ongoing military reforms “ensure absolute leadership of 
the CCP over the military.” According to the paper, Beijing views the international 
environment as undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.”  The CCP concludes that 
“international strategic competition is on the rise” and expresses deep concerns at what it sees 
as growing sources of instability in the near-term. Offering no introspection on Beijing’s own 
role in stirring geopolitical tensions through its economic practices, military activities and 


 
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modernization, excessive maritime territorial claims, assertive diplomacy, or efforts to revise 
aspects of global governance, the PRC describes the international system as being 
“…undermined by growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional 
conflicts and wars.” Similarly, the PRC contends that global military competition is 
intensifying, and that “major countries” are adjusting their security and military strategies, 
reorganizing their militaries, and are developing new types of combat forces to “seize the 
strategic commanding heights in military competition.”  
Defense Policy. The PRC’s stated defense policy is to “resolutely safeguard” its sovereignty, 
security, and development interests, according to its 2019 defense white paper—offering 
continuity with past statements by PRC senior leaders and other official documents. In 
practice, the PRC’s military power is increasingly a central feature of the CCP’s regional and 
global ambitions. The 2019 defense white paper also identifies the PRC’s national defense 
aims that support these interests, likely offered in order of importance:  
• 
to deter and resist aggression; 
• 
to safeguard national political security, the people’s security, and social stability; 
• 
to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence”; 
• 
to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” 
and the creation of “East Turkistan”; 
• 
to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum, 
and cyberspace;  
• 
to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests; 
• 
and to support the sustainable development of the country.  
Key changes in defense policy for the “New Era” include efforts to improve coordination 
across the party-state to leverage all organs of national power in a unified approach to support 
the CCP’s ambitions of a global military capability. Unlike previous defense white papers, 
China’s National Defense in the New Era explicitly stressed the PRC’s armed forces’ 
alignment and support to the Party’s broader societal and foreign policy objectives. The paper 
specifically aligns the PRC’s armed forces with the national objectives set by General 
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. For example, the white paper states 
that the PRC’s armed forces must be ready to, “provide strong strategic support for the 
realization of the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and to make new and greater 


 
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contributions to the building of a shared future for mankind.” Also notable is the growing 
explicit alignment between the PRC’s defense and foreign policies, particularly in the armed 
forces’ role in protecting the PRC’s overseas interests and furthering the CCP’s concept of 
“strategic partnerships” with other countries.  
Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针). The Chairman of the CMC issues military 
strategic guidelines to the PLA that provide the foundation of the PRC’s military strategy. 
The military strategic guidelines set the general principles and concepts for the use of force 
in support of the CCP’s strategic objectives, provide guidance on the threats and conditions 
the armed forces should be prepared to face, and set priorities for planning, modernization, 
force structure, and readiness. The CCP leadership issues new military strategic guidelines, 
or adjusts existing guidelines, whenever they perceive it necessary to shift the PLA’s priorities 
based on the Party’s perceptions of China’s security environment or changes in the character 
of warfare.  
Since 2019, trends indicate the PRC has reviewed and adjusted its military strategic 
guidelines. In early 2019, PRC state media indicated that Beijing held senior-level meetings 
to “establish the military strategy of the ‘New Era.’” The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
states that the PLA is implementing guidelines for the “New Era” that, “…actively adapt to 
the new landscape of strategic competition, the new demands of national security, and new 
developments in modern warfare…” PRC official media in the latter half of 2019 echoed these 
themes and described the guidelines as constituting a notable change. The PRC’s defense 
white paper may reflect changes in the guidelines given its emphasis on the intensification of 
global military competition, the increase in the pace of technological change, and the military 
modernization themes introduced by General Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress. 
Documents released following the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee in October 
2020 hailed progress in the “comprehensive and in-depth” implementation of the “New Era 
military strategic guidelines.”   
These developments are notable because the CCP leadership has issued new military strategic 
guidelines or adjusted its guidelines only a few times since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, 
the CMC under Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare to win “local wars” under “high-
tech conditions” after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, the CMC 
under Hu Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local wars under informationized 
conditions.” In 2014, the CMC under Chairman Xi Jinping placed greater focus on conflicts 
in the maritime domain and fighting “informatized local wars.” 
Military Strategy—Active Defense. The PRC’s military strategy is based on what it 
describes as “active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in 
combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. Active defense is 
neither a purely defensive strategy nor limited to territorial defense. Active defense 
encompasses offensive and preemptive aspects. It can apply to the PRC acting externally to 


 
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defend its interests. Active defense is rooted on the principle of avoiding initiating armed 
conflict, but responding forcefully if challenged. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
reaffirmed active defense as the basis for its military strategy. Minister of National Defense 
General Wei Fenghe reiterated this principle of active defense in his speech at the Ninth 
Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, stating that the PRC “will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but will surely counterattack if attacked.” 
First adopted by the CCP in the 1930s, active defense has served as the basis for the PRC’s 
military strategy since its founding in 1949. Although the PRC has adjusted and tailored the 
specifics of active defense over time based on changes in strategic circumstances, its general 
principles have remained consistent. Contemporary PRC writings describe the tenets of active 
defense as: 
• 
Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. This describes the 
basic principle for the use of military force under active defense. The PRC’s 2019 
defense white paper describes this principle as, “We will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.” Active defense may entail 
defensive counterattacks in response to an attack or preemptively striking an adversary 
that the PRC judges is preparing to attack. 
• 
Combine strategic defense with operational and tactical offense. This aspect offers 
two approaches to warfare influenced by Mao Zedong’s notion of using defense and 
offense in turns. First, active defense may involve offensive campaigns, operations, 
and tactical actions in support of the strategic defense. These may occur rapidly and 
along “external lines.” Second, it uses strategic defense to weaken the enemy and set 
the conditions to transition into strategic offense in order to secure victory.  
• 
Taking the operational initiative. This aspect emphasizes the effective use of 
offensives at the operational and tactical levels, avoiding enemy strengths, and 
concentrating on building asymmetric advantages against enemy weaknesses to 
“change what is inferior into what is superior.” 
• 
Strive for the best possibilities. This calls for thorough peacetime military preparations 
and planning based on fighting the most challenging threat under the most complicated 
circumstances “in order to get the best results.” This aspect stresses the importance of 
setting conditions in advance and suggests it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, 
than to fight unprepared.   
• 
The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. This tenet seeks to resolve 
the dilemma that using too little force may protract a war instead of stopping it, while 
the unconstrained use of force may worsen a war and make it harder to stop. Calling 
for the “effective restraint of warfare,” this tenet seeks to avoid war first through 
sufficient military preparations and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act 


 
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in concert with political and diplomatic efforts to “subdue the enemy’s forces without 
fighting.” If war is unavoidable, however, this aspect calls for restraining war by 
taking the “opening move” and “using war to stop war.” 
• 
Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. This integrates the concept of active 
defense with the concept of “people’s war.” People’s war comprises subordinate 
military strategies, “guerrilla war” and “protracted war” that Mao saw as a means to 
harness the capacity of China’s populace as a source of political legitimacy and 
mobilization to generate military power. Contemporary PRC writings link “people’s 
war” to national mobilization and participation in wartime as a whole-of-nation 
concept of warfare. 
Military Missions & Tasks. The CMC directs the PLA to be ready and able to perform 
specific missions and tasks to support the Party’s strategy and defend the PRC’s sovereignty, 
security, and development interests. The PLA’s missions and tasks in the “New Era” include: 
safeguarding China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests; maintaining 
combat readiness; conducting military training under real combat conditions; safeguarding 
China’s nuclear weapons and its interests in the space and cyberspace domains; countering 
terrorism and maintaining stability; protecting the PRC’s overseas interests; and participating 
in emergency response and disaster relief. 
Modernization Objectives & Targets. The PLA successfully achieved its 2020 
modernization goal to generally achieve mechanization, while continuing to “significantly 
enhance informatization and greatly improve its strategic capabilities.” Throughout 2021, the 
PLA continued to pursue ambitious modernization objectives, implement major 
organizational reforms, update its procurement, training, and recruitment systems, and 
improve its combat readiness in line with the goals and timelines announced by General 
Secretary Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The PRC’s goals for modernizing its 
armed forces in the “New Era” are:  
• 
By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, 
and intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, 
organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment;  
• 
By 2035: “To comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, 
organizational structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with 
the modernization of the country and basically complete the modernization of national 
defense and the military …”; and, 
• 
In 2049: “To fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”  
The new milestone for PLA modernization in 2027 aligns with the 100th anniversary of the 
PLA’s founding. While the new 2027 goal did not clearly shift forward any of the PLA’s 


 
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declared modernization for 2035 and 2049 objectives, it did likely shift the PLA’s 
development of certain capabilities within the categories of the integrated development of 
mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. If realized, this achievement could 
give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues 
Taiwan unification. Following the PLA generally achieving mechanization, its 2020 goal, a 
new interim target was likely believed to be necessary by PRC leadership as a means for the 
CCP to keep the PLA on track towards its longer-term 2035 and 2049 goals—paralleling the 
CCP’s broader approach towards military development occurring in three steps. In March 
2021, Xi Jinping stated that 2021, the first year of China’s 14th Five Year plan, would be the 
year in which the new “three steps (三步走)” of PLA modernization would begin. PLA 
writings note the “three-step” strategic arrangement connects “near-, medium-, and long-term 
goals by 2027, 2035, and 2049.    
The 5th Plenum communique holds that the 2027 goal means that the Chinese military should 
comprehensively push forward the modernization of military theories, military organizational 
form, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. PRC media, citing a military source, 
connected the PLA’s 2027 goals to developing the capabilities to counter the U.S. military in 
the Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on Beijing’s 
terms. The communique stressed the need to “spur on synchronous improvements in national 
defense and economic power,” (presumably under Military-Civil Fusion), a PLA spokesman 
added that “China's national defense strength does not match its economic growth, and is not 
compatible with China's international standing and its strategic security needs.”   
Although China’s leaders view building military strength as a strategic imperative, they also 
place important caveats on these objectives. For example, Chairman Xi’s direction to the PLA 
to “basically complete” modernization by 2035 should also occur “in step with the 
modernization of the country.” These qualifications serve several purposes that highlight the 
interlocking nature of the Party’s strategic planning. First, as the PRC’s interests continue to 
expand as it develops, the Party expects the PLA to keep pace with the country’s evolving 
interests and be ready and able to defend its progress. Second, linking the PLA’s 
transformation to the country’s transformation allows Party leaders to signal the scope and 
scale of the internal changes they expect the PLA to implement, particularly given its historic 
resistance to reforms that challenge its risk-adverse organizational culture or threaten vested 
bureaucratic interests. Finally, these qualifications provide flexibility to the Party’s leaders to 
modulate military resources and defense objectives based on the conditions of the country’s 
overall development. This offers PRC leaders the ability to adapt to changing economic or 
international conditions and ensure military investments support—rather than compromise—
the strategy.  
Military Ambitions. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-
class” military by the end of 2049. Within the context of China’s national strategy, however, 
it is likely that the PRC will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in 
some cases superior to—the U.S. military,  and that of any other great power that Beijing 


 
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views as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Given the far-reaching 
ambitions the CCP has for a rejuvenated China, it is unlikely that the Party would aim for an 
end state in which the PRC would remain in a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis the 
United States or any other potential rival. For the PRC to aim lower or otherwise willingly 
accept a permanent condition of military inferiority would seem anathema to the fundamental 
purpose of becoming a “great modern socialist country.” However, this does not mean that 
the PRC will aim for the PLA to mirror the U.S. military in terms of capacity, capability, or 
readiness. The PRC will likely seek to develop its “world-class” military in a manner that it 
believes best suits the needs of its armed forces to defend and advance the country’s interests 
and how the PLA—guided by the Party—adapts to the changing character of warfare.    
Way of War. The PLA increasingly view warfare as a confrontation between opposing 
operational systems, rather than a war of annihilation between opposing mechanized military 
forces. Following this logic, PLA writings refer to systems destruction warfare (体系破击战
) as the next way of war, transforming from mechanized warfare to an informatized and 
intelligentized style warfare. Though not a new PLA approach, systems destruction warfare 
likely continues to be the principal theory guiding its way of war.  
In November 2020, the CMC announced that it had issued the “Chinese People's Liberation 
Army Joint Operations Outline (Trial).” The Outline establishes a system for the PLA’s joint 
operations and focuses on clarifying basic issues regarding the organization and 
implementation of joint operations, command rights and responsibilities, and the principles, 
requirements, and procedures for joint operations, combat support, national defense 
mobilization, and political work. According to PLA writings, the Outline describes how the 
future combat style of the PLA will be integrated joint operations under the unified command 
of a joint operations command system. PLA writers emphasized that winning future wars 
would require a high degree of joint integration of various combat forces and combat elements 
from across the PLA services and all domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and 
tactical levels. The PLA’s “operational regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA 
leaders and PLA-affiliated academics had pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is 
out of step with the 2015-era structural command and organizational reforms and an obstacle 
to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint PLA.   
After the Outline was issued, PLA writings noted that PLA joint operations remain limited to 
the strategic level and are insufficient for success in future wars because of the reliance on the 
command authority of senior leaders or the use of administrative means to ensure compliance.   
Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational 
concept,” called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW;多域精确战).” MDPW is 
intended to leverage a C4ISR network, which the PLA calls the “network information system-
of-systems that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, to rapidly identify 
key vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across 


 
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domains to launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities. MDPW is meant to sit atop 
an “operational conceptual system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional 
subordinate operational concepts and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, 
evaluate, and improve these future-oriented operational concepts. The timing of MDPW’s 
appearance with China’s updated doctrine and military strategic guidelines suggests that 
MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely amplifying themes and guidance in both 
while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be able to do to win future wars. 
Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC 
leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important 
element in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Chairman Xi Jinping and 
senior military leaders have continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat 
readiness so it can “fight and win wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA 
conducting more training, but making its training more rigorous and realistic as well as 
addressing issues in the PLA’s training and education systems relating to conducting complex 
joint operations and adapting to other aspects of modern warfare. It probably has also led to a 
standardization of a combat readiness system across the PLA to enable the PRC to quickly 
transition to a wartime footing.  
Along with the CCP leadership’s focus on improving the PLA’s combat readiness, in recent 
years PLA media outlets have noted shortcomings in the military’s training and education 
systems that reportedly left some commanders—particularly at the operational level—
inadequately prepared for modern warfare. In recent years, PLA media outlets have identified 
the need for the military to address the “Five Incapables” problem: that some commanders 
cannot (1) judge situations; (2) understand higher authorities’ intentions; (3) make operational 
decisions; (4) deploy forces; and (5) manage unexpected situations. Although PLA writings 
do not specify how widespread the “Five Incapables” are, PLA media outlets have 
consistently raised them. One outside expert has noted this may indicate the PLA lacks 
confidence in its proficiency to execute its own operational concepts. Additionally, senior 
Party and PLA leaders are keenly aware that the military has not experienced combat in 
decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organizational structures. PLA 
leaders and state media frequently call on the force to remedy the “peacetime disease” that 
manifests in the form of what it characterizes as lax training attitudes and practices that are 
viewed as hindering combat readiness.  
The COVID-19 pandemic degraded PLA readiness during early 2020, but mitigation 
measures probably allowed it to return to near-normal states of readiness levels by mid-
summer. The PLA continued to conduct exercises throughout 2021. Chapter 2 discusses the 
PLA’s 2021 training and exercises in detail. 
Anticorruption Campaign. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a 
Party-wide effort that General Secretary Xi Jinping strengthened and accelerated shortly after 
taking office. The stated goal of these campaigns is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, 


 
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root out corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority. Military 
discipline inspectors led by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission have targeted 
individual power networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such 
as officers connected to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, 
and former Chief of Joint Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 2021, General Secretary Xi Jinping 
continued to stress strict Party governance for the 14th Five-Year Plan period stating 
corruption still exists as the biggest risk to the Party’s governance. Throughout 2021, the 
anticorruption campaign also targeted executives within the PRC’s defense industrial sector 
as the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced investigations of the 
former Chairman and head of the Communist Party at China North Industries Group 
Corporation (Norinco Group) and the executive at China National Nuclear Corporation.    
Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a party-
army, does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the party. The 
CCP Central Military Commission (CMC), currently chaired by Xi Jinping, is the highest 
military decision-making body in the PRC.  As a party-army, the PLA is a political actor.  As 
a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political and governance systems.  
As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government system, the PLA’s 
missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to its national 
defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi Jinping has implemented multiple 
reforms reducing PLA autonomy and greatly strengthening Party control over the military. 
Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s 
absolute control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party.    
China’s Military Leadership 
The military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC, is technically a department of the 
CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as 
the General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at 
the Party Congresses every five years. In fall of 2022, five of the seven CMC members were 
expected to retire. During the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia remained as Vice 
Chairman, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice Chairman. Other CMC 
members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning members Admiral 
Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. The CMC in 2021 consisted of two vice chairs, the 
Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work Departments, 
and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission. 
Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, 
and President of the PRC. The first two positions are party positions, while the third is a state 
position. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 2012 and 
as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to his Party positions at the fall 2017 
19th Party Congress and was reappointed President in spring 2018 at the National People's 
Congress (NPC). For a third term, Xi was reappointed to his Party positions in 2022 at the 


 
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20th Party Congress and is expected to be reappointed President at the 2023 NPC. In 2016, Xi 
was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command Center 
(JOCC) and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming CMC 
Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father 
was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo 
member in the 1980s. Xi Jinping served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career 
and had regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. 
Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang was the first career air force officer to be appointed the 
PRC’s top uniformed official.  Xu is a public advocate for reform and guides the effort as a 
deputy secretary of the CMC’s reform leading group.  Xu previously served on the CMC as 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) commander, where he oversaw rapid force modernization and 
expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He may have crossed paths with Xi Jinping 
early in his career, when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the first PLAAF officer 
to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since the Cultural Revolution 
period, and – at 54 years of age at the time – the youngest in PLA history. Xu served as a third 
term CMC member and retired following the Party Congress in 2022.   
Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia was China’s second-most senior officer and former 
head of the Equipment Development Department. Zhang gained rare experience as a combat 
commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang formerly commanded the 
Shenyang Military Region, which shared a border with North Korea and Russia. Zhang is one 
of the PLA’s “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, served with Xi 
Jinping’s father at the close of China’s Civil War in 1949. Zhang was expected to retire due 
to previously followed age norms within the PLA, but remains on the CMC for a third term 
following the 20th Party Congress. 
Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe was appointed to the CMC at the 2017 
Party Congress, and as the Minister of National Defense at the NPC in March 2018. Wei is 
the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and 
foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of 
command and his primary policy influence is derived from membership on the CMC and State 
Council. Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top 
posts in the headquarters of the former PLA Second Artillery Corps, the PLA Rocket Force’s 
(PLARF’s) predecessor, before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff – the first officer from the Second Artillery to serve in that position. Wei most recently 
was the PLARF commander. Wei is serving a second term as a CMC member he will likely 
be replaced as the Minister of National Defense during the National People’s Congress in 
March 2023.  
Joint Staff Department Chief General Li Zuocheng oversaw PLA joint operations, a 
narrowing of the wider responsibilities held by the former GSD prior to reforms initiated in 
2015. Li is one of few remaining active duty PLA officers with combat experience and is 


 
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recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. He was also 
the first Army commander after the PLA Army (PLAA) became a separate service in 2015. 
Li previously commanded the Chengdu Military Region, which was responsible for the 
sensitive area of Tibet. Li Zuocheng retired from his CMC position following the 20th Party 
Congress.  
Political Work Department Director Admiral Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political 
work, including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who 
switched services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the 
PLA Navy (PLAN).  Miao may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army 
in Fujian Province, when his career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLAN 
political commissar during the Navy’s BRI cruise conducted in mid-2017. Miao Hua, at age 
65 in 2021, remained on the CMC in his current position. 
Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengmin oversees 
the highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party 
discipline. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third ranking member on the standing 
committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s appointments indicate 
the Party’s commitment to the anticorruption campaign in the military. Shortly after his 
appointment to the CMC, Zhang was promoted to the rank of general, the highest rank in the 
PLA. Zhang Shengmin, at age 64 in 2021, remained on the CMC following the 20th Party 
Congress.  
 
 
 
 


 
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CHAPTER TWO:  
CHINA’S FORCES, CAPABILITIES,  
AND POWER PROJECTION 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across 
all warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, 
and maritime, as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and 
cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability 
to fight and win wars against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a euphemism likely for the 
United States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and project power globally.    
 In 2021, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, 
fielding modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its 
competency to conduct joint operations. 
With approximately 2.2 million active duty military service members and 660,000 
paramilitary personnel, China maintains one of the largest military forces in the world.  In 
2021, China’s defense budget increased by 6.8% to $261 billion. According to a PRC work 
report, the new defense budget aligned with PRC military goals associated with its 2027 and 
2035 military modernization program. PRC state media reported that the defense budget 
increase over the prior year focused on modernizing the PLA’s training with realistic 
simulation and the use of virtual reality, accelerating improvements in logistics capabilities, 
investing in defense science and technology, and enhancing the military’s strategic capacities.  
In effort to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily reduced 
active duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with roughly 
one million soldiers in 2021. The PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have 
grown in size since 2015, indicating their increasing importance.  By 2021, the PLAN Marine 
Corps expanded from two to six brigades and supplemented with aviation and Special Forces, 
becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. The PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based nuclear and 
conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s strategic 
space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological 


 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) handles 
quartermaster, transportation, medical services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s 
joint capabilities during peace and war. 
PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA)  
Key Takeaways:  
 The PLAA emphasized realistic training scenarios and standardization of training 
methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and throughout extensive joint 
amphibious training that utilized both PLAN and civilian roll-on roll-off (RORO) 
vessels. 
 The PLAA and Russian Army units participated in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, a 
large-scale joint exercise to expand cooperation between the two militaries, which was 
conducted on PRC soil for the first time. 
 The PLAA applied twice a year conscription after delays from COVID-19 in 2020, 
emphasizing the recruitment of college graduates and students with science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) backgrounds. 
The PLA Army (PLAA) has approximately 975,000 active-duty personnel in combat units 
and is the primary ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 PRC National Defense 
University’s Science of Military Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition 
from a regional defense force to a global combat force. In 2021, the PLAA continued to 
emphasize the modernization and standardization of their equipment through the fielding of 
new and upgraded combat systems. 2021 also highlighted standardization of training, 
improvements to power projection capabilities, and extensive combined-arms and joint 
trainings. 
Force Structure and Organization. In 2021, the PLAA continued to field a large number of 
new platforms and updated equipment. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 
and 2017 PLA reforms is complete, but significant additional equipment fielding is necessary 
to complete the transformation of the PLAA into a fully modern force.  
The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang military command, 
and the Tibet military command. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of 
multiple combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force. The 
brigades vary in size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into 
three types: light (high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled 
armored vehicles), and heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from 
approximately 4,000 (light) to 5,000 (heavy) personnel each. Each group army controls six 
additional brigades responsible for operational element functions: an artillery brigade, an air 
defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) 


 
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brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a sustainment brigade. Some 
variations exist with at least one group army per theater separating their engineering and 
chemical defense brigades into separate units. Although the PLAA has standardized its group 
armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and brigades that exist outside of the 
group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP considers sensitive including 
Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Beijing. 
Capabilities and Modernization. Despite the PLAA's ambitions to become a highly 
modernized ground force they still widely employ a mix of modern and obsolete tanks and 
armored fighting vehicles. Throughout 2021, the PLAA continued to test and field new 
systems with a large emphasis on the development of situational awareness and manned 
unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with the proliferation of vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) 
and fixed-wing uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). Soldier enhancement capabilities have also 
taken the next step as units are beginning to use exoskeletons and hyperbaric oxygen therapy 
to mitigate stresses on the individual soldier. A ground force with these capabilities, supported 
by sufficient lift and sustainment capabilities, would likely be able to project at least limited 
ground power regionally. The PLAA also continued the fielding of light, highly mobile 
systems with emphasis on areas with difficult terrain. 
The PLAA is rapidly developing a limited capability to project ground power as an 
expeditionary force. In addition to protecting national sovereignty and security, the 2020 
National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy describes the PLAA as focused on 
improving precision, multi-functional, and sustained operations capabilities, command and 
control, and integrated systems to promote ambitions of building a global combat capable 
army. The PLAA’s primary power projection initiatives are mobile, modular combined arms 
formations, special operations forces, and PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units.  
After years of substantial reform, the combined-arms battalion of the combined arms brigade 
is the basic combat unit of the PLAA. PLAA officers tell PRC media that the formations 
comprise more than 10 different combat arms, are plug-and-play and adjustable based on the 
terrain and mission requirements. The PLAA enhanced power projection capabilities through 
increased mobility, ease of transport and logistics, and precision strike capabilities. This was 
accomplished through an effort to lighten PLAA with a focus on medium and light, high 
mobility platforms, and the fielding of new long-range multiple rocket launcher systems.  
The PLAA's 15 Special Operations Forces (SOF) brigades provide group army commanders 
with an organic unit capable of executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF brigade 
missions include raids, harassment operations, target seizure and control, special 
reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and rescue operations. Observed SOF training in 
2021 included aerial infiltration, small-unit tactics, and maritime operations. 
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units remained a focus of development in 2021. PLAA 
training events and reports in PRC media show that air-ground integration, multi-dimensional 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
assaults, and MUM-T are now a standard part of training. Training in 2021 also included 
numerous examples of helicopters executing nighttime flight operations and ultra-low altitude 
flying.  PLAA Aviation works directly with ground units to enhance its ability to support air 
assault operations and conduct air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint training in 
2021 included the army aviation helicopters conducting confrontational training against 
PLAAF surface-to-air missile brigades, and army aviation helicopters coordinating with PLA 
Navy landing ships. The two PLAA Air Assault brigades continued extensive training on 
helicopter insertion, air reconnaissance, and coordinating air strikes with other PLAA units 
and joint service partners. In 2021, PLAA Aviation Brigades began using the new Z-20 
medium-lift transport helicopters for various missions in western China. Ongoing 
development of PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units will lead to a highly-mobile, modular 
ground force unit capable of supporting expeditionary operations. Expeditionary operations 
where PLA seeks to improve proficiency include: the protecting of overseas PRC citizens and 
overseas PRC economic interests, UN Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO), Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR), Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), 
Counterterrorism Operations (CT), and the ability to secure strategic lines of communication 
(SLOCs) far from the PRC mainland. The PLAA envisions its Aviation and Air Assault units 
employing their three-dimensional maneuver, firepower, and assault capabilities to act as a 
main combat force, support a greater joint operation, or conduct non-war military operations 
outside China. Overseas military operations is comprised of surveillance implementation, 
seizure, electronic combat, and battlefield rescue, while overseas non-combat operations 
include disaster relief, emergency rescue, and anti-terrorism. 
Readiness. PLAA training in 2021 followed the trend from 2020, focusing on combined-arms 
and joint training. PLAA units conducted multiple iterations of STRIDE-2021 in various 
theaters with an emphasis on setting the standardization of training methods and conditions. 
PLAA units stressed realistic training, professionalization of opposing force (OPFOR) 
formations, and conducted numerous force-on-force “confrontation drills.”  
In addition to conventional ground force training, PLAA units conducted extensive specialty 
exercises in 2021. Units conducted coastal defense, multiple sea crossings and landings, and 
high-elevation 
plateau 
operations. 
Joint 
training 
included 
for 
the 
first 
time, 
ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, where PLAA units conducted a large-scale exercise with the 
Russian 
military 
in 
China. 
PLAA 
and 
Russian 
forces 
participating 
in 
ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021 underwent theoretical and systems training, weapon swaps, 
and a culminating exercise to further understanding and cooperation between the two 
militaries. The PLAA also continued extensive joint training using PLAN landing ships and 
civilian RORO vessels to expand amphibious capabilities.  
While continuing to focus on equipment modernization, the PLAA also turned to the 
development of their personnel. The PLAA changes in their recruitment strategy as the PLA 
implemented a twice a year conscription and increased its emphasis on the recruitment of 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
college students majoring in science and engineering. The PLAA also emphasized the use of 
simulations in exercises to carry out immersive training in lieu of actual combat training. Use 
of simulations gives users an emulation of a battlefield that provides a variety of training 
situations to allow for completion of instruction and mitigation of shortcomings in a low risk 
environment. 
 
 
 
 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN) 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of 
approximately 340 ships and submarines, including approximately 125 major surface 
combatants.  As of 2021, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission 
ships and submarines. 
 In 2021, the PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight 
JIANGDAO class corvettes to the China Coast Guard.  
 The PLAN commissioned its fourth RENHAI class cruiser (CG) in late 2021 and 
resumed series construction of the JIANGKAI II class frigate. 
 The PLAN commissioned two YUSHEN class amphibious assault ships, one each in 
April 2021 and April 2022. The PLAN launched a third hull in the class in January 
2021, which is currently undergoing sea trials prior to commissioning. 
 In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision 
strikes against land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-
attack cruise missiles, notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability. 
The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
as adjusting to changes in the strategic requirements of near seas protection and far seas 
protection, noting that it was “speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near 
seas to protection missions on the far seas.” The PLAN is an increasingly modern and flexible 
force that has focused on replacing its previous generations of platforms that had limited 
capabilities in favor of larger, modern multi-role combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is largely 
composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-
submarine weapons and sensors. The PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint operations 
and joint integration within the PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing 
emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater 
distances from mainland China. 
The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as 
well as the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. The PLAN 
continues to implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. Similar to 
the other services, the PLA-wide reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting 
operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint Theater Commands, and focused 
the PLAN on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.  
Missions. The PLAN continues to develop into a force increasingly capable of global 
operations, gradually extending its operational reach beyond East Asia.  The PLAN’s latest 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
surface and subsurface platforms enable combat operations beyond the reach of the PRC’s 
land-based defenses. In particular, China’s growing force of aircraft carriers extend air 
defense coverage of deployed task groups beyond the range of land based defenses and will 
enable operations at increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-
based land-attack systems will also enhance the PRC’s ability to project power. Furthermore, 
the PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable logistical replenishment ships to support 
long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two new FUYU class fast combat 
support ships (AOEs) built specifically to support aircraft carrier operations. The PLAN’s 
expanding fleet of large modern amphibious warships will enable it to conduct a wide range 
of expeditionary operations wherever PRC interests are threatened or in support of PRC 
participation in internationally sanctioned operations. The expansion of naval operations 
beyond China’s immediate region will also facilitate its non-war military activities and further 
legitimize the PRC’s growing global military posture, including at its base in Djibouti.  
China continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first 
domestically built aircraft carrier, Shandong, was launched in 2017 and commissioned in 
December 2019—the beginning of what the PLA states will be a multi-carrier force. China’s 
next generation of carriers, including one that began construction in 2018, will have greater 
endurance and an electromagnetic catapult launch system making it capable of launching 
various types of specialized fixed-wing aircraft for missions such as early warning, electronic 
warfare (EW), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This will increase the striking power of 
a potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate 
periphery. China’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is expected commission in 2024. 
The PLAN’s newest amphibious ships, the YUSHEN class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA) 
and YUZHAO class Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD) are modern platforms capable of 
regional and global expeditionary missions in support of both wartime and non-war 
contingency operations either singly or as part of capable and flexible task groups composed 
of multiple amphibious ships and surface combatants. 
The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the First Island Chain is modest but growing 
as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced 
platforms. China’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended 
task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Notable 
deployments in 2021 included the following:  
• 
In April 2021 and December 2021, the PRC aircraft carrier Liaoning conducted 
deployments to the Philippine Sea and South China Sea accompanied by escort ships 
including the RENHAI class cruiser Nanchang during both deployments. According 
to the Japanese Self-Defense Force, the December deployment included night flight 
operations almost 200 miles southeast of Okinawa with the task group accompanied 
by a FUYU class AOE. 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
• 
In May of 2021, a PLAN task group operated in the South China Sea, Java Sea, and 
Celebes Sea, and conducted an exercise with the Indonesian Navy.  
• 
In August and September 2021, a PLAN task group that included a RENHAI class 
cruiser and an AGI deployed to the North Pacific and operated inside the U.S. EEZ in 
Alaskan waters. 
• 
In October 2021, PLAN and Russian warships exercised in the Sea of Japan and then 
sailed into the Pacific Ocean through the Tsugaru Strait that separates the Japanese 
Islands of Honshu and Hokkaido. 
• 
The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2021, 
a 13-year effort that is the PRC’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Indo-
Pacific region.  
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of 
approximately 340 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going 
amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. In 2021, the 
PLAN’s overall battle force shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight JIANGDAO class 
corvettes to the China Coast Guard. This figure does not include approximately 85 patrol 
combatants and craft that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle 
force is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030. Much of this growth 
will be in major surface combatants.  The PLAN’s force structure consists of three fleets with 
subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval bases. The 
PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the Eastern 
Theater Navy is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the Southern Theater Navy 
is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but 
its force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new 
technologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 44 
diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS/SSP).  The PLAN will likely 
maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more 
capable units on a near one-to-one basis. 
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing 
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the 
PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which are capable of 
launching ASCMs. China’s shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 
17 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 
039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a total of 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines purchased from 
Russia in the 1990s. 
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed twelve nuclear submarines – two SHANG 
I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs 
(Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM) (7,200KM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first 
credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.  
By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile 
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN). This new SHANG class variant will enhance the 
PLAN’s anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if 
equipped with land-attack cruise missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and 
special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.  By 
prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable surface combatants, acoustic surveillance ships, 
and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its 
ASW capabilities. However, it will still require several years of training and systems 
integration for the PLAN to develop a robust offensive deep water ASW capability.   
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for 
surface combatants. At the close of 2021, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new 
batch of guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and a new batch of guided missile frigates (FFG). 
These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine 
capabilities, and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the 
PLA’s shore-based air defense systems. By the end of 2019, the PLAN had commissioned its 
30th JIANGKAI II class FFG, reportedly completing the production run. However, in 2021 
PRC media reported production had restarted with at least two hulls launched by the end of 
year and additional units are likely under construction. The PLAN augmented its littoral 
warfare capabilities, especially for operations in the East and South China Seas, with the high-
rate production of the JIANGDAO class FFLs (Type 056 and Type 056A). The PLAN 
commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The 
PLAN also transferred the early flight JIANGDAO variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China 
Coast Guard in 2021, probably due to the models’ lack of towed-array sonar.  The 056A FFLs 
are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are thus capable ASW ships.  
The PLAN has expanded its force of large surface combatants with two programs, the 
LUYANG III class DDG and the RENHAI class guided-missile cruise (CG). By late 2020, 
the PRC had launched 25 LUYANG III class DDGs—including 12 lengthened LUYANG III 
MOD DDGs with 19 of the new hulls commissioning by the end of 2021. Both the standard 
LUYANG III and the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell multipurpose vertical launch system 
(VLS) capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to air missiles, and anti-submarine 
missiles. In December 2021, China commissioned its fourth RENHAI class guided-missile 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
cruiser with the remaining four hulls likely commissioning during 2022. The RENHAI has 
112 VLS cells and can carry a large load out of weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and anti-submarine weapons along with likely LACMs and anti-
ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when those become operational.   
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare capabilities in its force development. 
The PLAN’s frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of 
the YJ-83/YJ-83J ASCM (97NM, 180KM), while newer surface combatants such as the 
LUYANG II class DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (215NM, 400KM). The LUYANG III 
class DDGs and the RENHAI class CGs will be fitted with a variant of China’s newest ASCM, 
the YJ-18A (290NM, 537KM).  A few modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the 
supersonic YJ-12A ASCM (250NM, 460KM). Eight of the PLAN’s 10 KILO class SSs are 
equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM, 220KM). The PRC’s SONG class 
SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-
launched YJ-18 and its variants, which constitute an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM. 
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) 
targeting capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is 
investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications 
systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting 
information to surface and subsurface launch platforms. 
As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of land-
attack capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next 
step. In the coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and 
destroyers and developmental SHANG class Type 093B SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit 
its older surface combatants and submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition 
of land-attack capabilities to the PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide 
the PLA with flexible long-range strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets 
at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific region. 
Amphibious Warfare Ships. China’s investment in Landing Helicopter Assault ships 
(LHAs) signals its intent to continue to develop its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April 
2021, China commissioned the first of YUSHEN class LHA (Type 075) followed by the 
commissioning of the second hull in December 2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was 
launched in January 2021, marking an approximately 16-month timeframe to launch the three 
vessels, and will likely join the fleet in the first half of 2022. The YUSHEN class are highly 
capable large-deck amphibious ships that will provide the PLAN with an all-aspect 
expeditionary capability. The YUSHEN class can carry a large number of landing craft, 
forces, armored vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the PLAN has eight large YUZHAO 
class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type 071) in service. The YUZHAO class LPDs 
and YUSHEN class LHAs provide the PLA with greater capacity, endurance, and more 
flexibility for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships, which it has 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
reduced in number over the last decade with obsolete units being decommissioned. The 
YUSHEN and YUZHAO can each carry several YUYI class air-cushion medium landing 
craft and a variety of helicopters, as well as tanks, armored vehicles and PLAN marines for 
long-distance expeditionary deployments. 
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first domestically built 
aircraft carrier, Shandong, which launched in 2017 and completed multiple sea trials during 
2018-2019. Shandong was photographed at a base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater 
Navy in late 2020 and should now be considered to be operational. Shandong is a modified 
version of the Liaoning (Soviet KUZNETSOV class) design and likewise uses a ski-jump 
takeoff method for its aircraft. The PRC continued work on its second domestically built 
aircraft carrier in 2021, which will be larger and fitted with an electromagnetic catapult launch 
system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter aircraft, fixed-wing early-
warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations and thus extend the reach and effectiveness 
of its carrier based strike aircraft.  The PRC’s second domestically built carrier, the Fujian, is 
projected to be operational by 2024, with additional carriers to follow.  
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates and is developing several aircraft to operate from 
its carriers and combatants. In addition to the standard J-15 fighter that currently operates 
from PLAN carriers, there is a catapult-capable J-15 variant in development. The aircraft is 
currently testing from land-based steam and electromagnetic catapults. A third J-15 variant, 
the J-15D, is a two-seat aircraft equipped with wingtip electronic support measures/electronic 
intelligence gathering pods as well as several conformal antennas. The aircraft is intended to 
fill a dedicated electronic attack role. China is also developing a carrier capable variant of the 
fifth-generation J-31 fighter. Beyond fighter aircraft, China is refining the design of a carrier-
borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft known as the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft, 
which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D Hawkeye, has existed for many years, and a 
prototype of the KJ-600 is currently in flight testing. The PRC is also developing the Z-20F 
helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the RENHAI cruisers and LUYANG III MOD 
destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The Z-20F is similar to the U.S. Navy’s SH-60 
and will provide significant improvements in ASW capabilities over the smaller Z-9 and Ka-
28 helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-20F will also complement the larger Z-
18Fs that operate from the PLAN’s aircraft carriers. 
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the process of replacing its older variant H-6 bombers 
in 2019 with the H-6J, a naval variant of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new and 
larger advanced maritime strike bomber has six weapons pylons instead of four, advanced 
avionics, and upgraded engines, and the H-6J can employ the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM 
(250NM, 460KM). In 2020 PLAAF H-6Ks were also photographed carrying YJ-12s, 
significantly increasing the number of bombers available to the PLA for long-range maritime 
strike missions. 


 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime 
patrol and airborne early warning aircraft including many of the same variants operated by 
the PLAAF. However, the PLAN has also fielded a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine 
warfare and maritime patrol. The new aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector 
boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-
search radar mounted under the nose as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, 
probably for electronic surveillance. A small electro-optical (EO)/ infrared turret is located 
just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is equipped with an internal weapons bay in front 
of the main landing gear. 
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and 
support ships, including intelligence collection ships (AGI), ocean surveillance ships 
(AGOS), fleet replenishment oilers (AOR), hospital ships, submarine salvage and rescue 
ships, and various other specialized units. Additionally, China’s first domestically built polar 
icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in 2019. The ship is operated by the Polar 
Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration. In May 2021, XUELONG 2 
completed the PRC’s 37th research mission to Antarctica and in the second half of 2021, the 
PRC’s 12th research mission to the Arctic. 
PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). The PLANMC is still in the process of completing 
expansion requirements set forth by the CMC under PLA reform in 2016. Serving as the 
PLAN land combat arm, the PLANMC continued to evolve throughout 2021 and is receiving 
equipment and training necessary to become the PLA’s preeminent expeditionary force, as 
directed by Xi Jinping. All six PLANMC maneuver brigades have achieved initial operating 
capability (IOC); three of the brigades are assessed to be fully mission capable.   Two other 
PLANMC brigades – the aviation brigade and the special operations brigade, are IOC and 
Full Operational Capability (FOC), respectively. The aviation brigade will likely not achieve 
FOC status until at least 2025 and likely beyond, based on the current pace the brigade is 
receiving new helicopters, fully trained flight crews, and support equipment. The FOC 
aviation brigade will most likely contain a mix of heavy-lift, medium-lift, attack, and multi-
purpose helicopters capable of operating on land and at sea to support all aspects of PLANMC 
operations. Such operations include, but are not limited to humanitarian aid/disaster relief, 
force protection, counterterrorism, amphibious assault, and combat operations ashore, either 
in support of large-scale PLA operations or as an expeditionary force overseas. 
On December 30th, 2021, Lieutenant General Kong Jun, previously the PLANMC 
commander, was identified as the Eastern Theater Command Army commander. The new 
PLANMC commander is Major General Zhu Chuansheng. Major General Zhu also came from 
the PLAA and has a background in amphibious operations as the deputy commander of the 
41st Group Army. It is likely that Major General Zhu will see the PLANMC through its reform 
and expansion, likely by 2027. The new commander will lead a PLANMC of over 30,000 
marines. This number could increase to closer to 40,000 by 2027, depending on whether 


 
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current estimates of the number of marines in each combat brigade and the overall size of the 
aviation brigade remain accurate. The top end of PLANMC personnel strength is not likely to 
go higher than 40,000 marines, of which less than one-third will be conscripts. The majority 
of PLANMC marines will likely be non-commissioned officers with at least the equivalent of 
a high school diploma; many marines will likely be college-educated.    
The PLANMC’s roles and missions principally include defending PLA bases in mainland 
China, the South China Sea and abroad, conducting amphibious operations to seize and defend 
small reef and island outposts, and conducting non-war military activities (NWMA). 
Although the PLANMC has traditionally focused on its task to assault and defend small 
islands in the South China Sea, more recently its focus has grown to include expeditionary 
operations beyond the First Island Chain. The PLANMC’s roles under NWMA support the 
PRC’s efforts to protect its overseas interests including resources, infrastructure, and citizens 
abroad. 
The PLANMC has increased the size of its force in Djibouti from approximately 250 marines 
in 2017 to 400 marines in 2022, including a new special forces contingent. The PLANMC 
also embarks a contingent of marines with the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-focused 
naval escort task force that supports China’s trade interests. Additionally, the PLANMC 
supports the PRC’s military diplomacy. For example, they have trained with Thai, Pakistani, 
Saudi, South African, and Djiboutian forces.     
The PLANMC has begun to train on the PLAN’s first amphibious helicopter assault ship 
(LHA), likely as part of the vessel’s initial qualifications for operational status. PLAN LHAs 
will be capable of delivering PLANMC ground and air forces, to include amphibious and non-
amphibious combat units – throughout East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific 
Ocean. Additionally, the PLANMC is almost certainly serving a force protection role on 
PLAN ships operating beyond the First Island Chain, capable of both repelling an assault from 
the sea and conducting visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations to protect both PRC 
and international shipping in the Indian Ocean, the Philippine Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.  
Despite the focus on expanding expeditionary missions, the PLANMC has not abandoned its 
amphibious mission. To the contrary, the PLANMC continues to conduct amphibious and 
expeditionary training in the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands, to include 
training events in the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The most 
significant aspect of PLANMC amphibious training is the continued–and almost certainly 
expanding–use of civilian roll-on/roll off (RORO) vessels to transport PLANMC combat 
forces during training events. This activity is significant because it demonstrates that the 
PLANMC now has a role as a second-echelon force in the PLA, providing theater 
commanders the flexibility to use the PLANMC in multiple roles as part of an amphibious 
campaign, specifically in a Taiwan scenario. This flexibility decreases the requirement to 
build additional PLAN amphibious ships to successfully assault Taiwan. This operational 
flexibility also provides operational and logistics units within the PLANMC the training and 


 
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proficiency to move between military and civilian vessels not just in a Taiwan scenario, but 
in any maritime environment where civilian transport vessels are available to the PLANMC 
and PLAN amphibious ships are not. 
 


 
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PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN 
AVIATION 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the 
Indo-Pacific region. 
 The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to 
modernize with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. 
 In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad 
after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air 
refuelable bomber. 
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute 
the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total 
aircraft (not including trainer variants or UASs) of which approximately 2,250 are combat 
aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and 
attack aircraft).  The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable 
of long-range airpower projection. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the 
PLAAF’s missions and tasks as transitioning from territorial air defense to “offensive and 
defensive operations.” In 2021, General Chang Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF 
commander and continued to enact PLAAF reforms to improve the force’s ability to 
accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. 
This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant U.S. military technical 
advantages vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain. 
The CMC’s intent is to transform the PLAAF into a more effective and capable force that is 
proficient at conducting joint operations. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air 
defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-
ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF has reorganized into five Theater Command 
Air Forces, established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate 
regiments into brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber 
divisions.  
Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to field greater numbers of fourth-
generation aircraft (now more than 800 of 1,800 total fighters, not including trainers) and 
probably will become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years. For 
fifth-generation fighters, the PLAAF has operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth-generation 
stealth fighter, and PRC social media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 in October 
2021. The PLAAF is preparing upgrades for the J-20, which may include increasing the 
number of air-to-air missiles (AAMs) the fighter can carry in its low-observable 


 
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configuration, installing thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, and adding super cruise capability 
by installing higher-thrust indigenous WS-15 engines. Development continues on the smaller 
FC-31/J-31 for export or as a future naval fighter for the PLAN’s next class of aircraft carriers.    
Bombers. The PRC’s bomber force is currently composed of H-6 Badger variants, which are 
domestically produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber. Despite the 
relative age of its bomber force, the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the 
operational effectiveness of these aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded greater 
numbers of the H-6K, a modernized H-6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and features 
more-efficient turbofan engines for extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs, giving 
the PLA a long-range standoff precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second 
Island Chain from home airfields in mainland China. PLAN Aviation has traditionally fielded 
the H-6G to support maritime missions. More recently, PLAN Aviation has begun operating 
the H-6J, a maritime strike version of the H-6K with six weapons pylons for ASCMs. This 
aircraft carries six supersonic long-range YJ-12 ASCMs and can attack warships out to the 
Second Island Chain.  
During the PRC’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N, a 
derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-range strikes. The H-6N features a modified 
fuselage that allows it to carry externally an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may 
be nuclear capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was observed carrying an air-launched ballistic 
missile. The H-6N’s air-to-air refueling capability also provides it greater reach over other H-
6 variants that are not refuelable in air. In 2020, the PLAAF operationally fielded the H-6N 
bomber, providing a platform for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The 
H-6N-equipped unit very likely is developing tactics and procedures to conduct the PLAAF 
nuclear mission.  In addition, the PLAAF is seeking to extend its power projection capability 
with the development of a new H-20 stealth strategic bomber, with official PRC state media 
stating that this new stealth bomber will have a nuclear mission in addition to filling 
conventional roles. The PLAAF is also developing new medium- and long-range stealth 
bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders publicly announced the program 
in 2016, however it may take more than a decade to develop this type of advanced bomber. 
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9 communications 
jamming/electronic countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-11). This aircraft is designed 
to disrupt an adversary’s battlespace awareness at long ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to-
air refueling operations to extend the ranges of its fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with 
refueling probes using the H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a 
small number of larger IL-78 Midas. In addition, the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its 
Y-20 heavy-lift transport, which will enable the PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve 
the PLAAF’s ability to operate beyond the First Island Chain from bases in mainland China.  
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500—the PRC’s most advanced airborne early warning 
and control (AEW&C) aircraft—continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-2000 Mainring 


 
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and KJ-200 Moth variants. These aircraft amplify PLAAF’s ability to detect, track, and target 
threats in varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances. It also extends the 
range of the PLA’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. Furthermore, China has 
produced at least one KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which will improve the aircraft’s 
ability to provide persistent AEW&C coverage. 
The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large 
transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports 
will supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which 
to date, consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports 
are intended to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic 
reconnaissance operations as well as HA/DR missions. 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs). China continues their comprehensive UAS 
modernization efforts, highlighted by the routine appearance of ever more sophisticated UASs 
across theater and echelon levels. The last three years have seen several key milestones. These 
include the airshow display and operational appearance of the Xianglong jet powered UAS, 
as well as the unveiling of both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a redesigned version of the 
GJ-11 stealth uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The PLA also continues the maritime 
use of ISR UASs, featuring both the venerable BZK-005 and the newer TW-328/TB001. 
China is also expanding the applications of large UASs, demonstrating uses including disaster 
communications, anti-submarine roles, firefighting, and weather modification. Advanced 
small UASs are increasingly appearing in both military and civilian applications, with the 
PRC industry remaining a key exporter of UAS and components of all sizes. 
In addition to maturing their current capabilities, China is also signaling its efforts in next 
generation capabilities. Air and trade shows are displaying growing numbers of autonomous 
and teaming systems, including for combat applications. In these concepts, PRC developers 
are demonstrating an interest in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into both air-to-air 
and air-to-ground combat, with a substantial amount of development displaying efforts to 
produce swarming capability for operational applications. 
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-
range SAM systems in the world, composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) battalions and 
domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions.  To improve its 
strategic long-range air defenses, the PRC has acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM system from 
Russia. The PRC is also developing its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will likely 
have a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. China is also developing kinetic-kill 
vehicle technology to field a mid-course interceptor, which will form the upper layer of a 
multi-tiered missile defense. The PLA conducted a test of a land-based mid-course interceptor 
on February 4, 2021. 


 
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PLAAF Airborne Corps. The PLAAF Airborne Corps commands six airborne combined-
arms brigades, a SOF brigade, an operational support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, 
a training base, and a new training brigade. The six combined arms brigades consist of three 
airborne infantry, one air assault, one wheeled airborne mechanized (wheeled air droppable 
armored vehicles), and one tracked airborne mechanized (tracked air droppable armored 
vehicles). 
Each airborne combined-arms brigade typically commands four combined-arms battalions, 
an artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support 
battalion, and a service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion. 
Airborne units conducted significant joint training events in 2021. The PLAAF Airborne 
Corps participated in the ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021 exercise held in western China, 
which included paradrops from Y-20 aircraft and joint training with Russian military forces. 
PLAAF Airborne Corps also trained in 2021 for core strategic missions such as long range 
insertion, and seizure and control of key locations. In October, the PLAAF Airborne Corps 
conducted joint training with the PLAN Marine Corps off southern Hainan Island, in an effort 
to further their ability to execute joint force projection. Additionally, the PLAAF Airborne 
Corps used simulation technology, including virtual reality parachute simulators to improve 
effectiveness of parachute training.    


 
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PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its strategic 
deterrence capabilities.      
 In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and 
training.  This was more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile 
employment in conflict zones. 
 The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles (IRBMs), which are capable of conducting both conventional and nuclear 
precision strikes against ground targets as well as conventional strikes against naval 
targets. 
 The PRC is developing new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will 
significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require increased 
nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. In 2021, the PRC 
continued building three solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will cumulatively 
contain at least 300 new ICBM silos. 
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-
based nuclear and conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. 
The PLARF is a critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy 
to deter and counter third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 
2019 defense white paper, the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable 
capabilities of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-
range precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build 
a strong and modernized rocket force. 
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s 
ground-based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of 
the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces includes the CSS-6 (DF-
15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 
km); the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km); the land-attack and anti-ship variants 
of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km); 
the hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM; the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 3,000 
km); the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km); 
and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally 
armed CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-
range precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific 


 
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from mainland China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a 
maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the 
field. The PLARF continues to grow its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 
2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and 
nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in 
the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea from mainland China.  In 
2020, China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target in the South China Sea.  
The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles and 
developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
systems. In 2021, the PLARF launched approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing and 
training, more than the rest of the world combined excluding ballistic missile employment in 
conflict zones. The DF-17 passed several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. 
While the DF-17 is primarily a conventional platform, it may be equipped with nuclear 
warheads. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert described the primary purpose of the DF-17 
as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific.  
The PLARF is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly 
improve its nuclear-capable missile forces with more survivable delivery systems, and will 
require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The PRC appears to be 
doubling the numbers of launchers in some ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists 
of approximately 300 ICBMs, including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching 
unitary and multiple reentry vehicles.  China’s fixed ICBMs consist of the shorter range CSS-
3 (DF-4), as well as the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF-
5B), which is capable of carrying up to five MIRVs. PRC media indicates a follow-on DF-5C 
may be in development. The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 class and CSS-20 (DF-41) 
ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess of 
11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. PRC media reports 
suggest a DF-31B might also be in development. The DF-41 ICBM has been operationally 
deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades existed for the 
system. The PRC appears to be considering additional DF-41 launch options, including rail-
mobile and silo basing. The PRC is building multiple ICBM silo’s intended to support the 
land-based component of the PRC’s nuclear triad. Additionally, sources indicate a “long-
range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in development. Official PRC military writings indicates this 
range-class spans 5,000-8,000km, which means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. 
Additionally, on 27 July 2021, China conducted the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM 
with an HGV. The HGV flew around the world and impacted inside China. This demonstrated 
the greatest distance flown (~40,000 km) and longest flight time (~100+ minutes) of any PRC 
land-attack weapons system to date. According to senior U.S. military officials, the HGV did 
not strike its target, but came close. 
 


 
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STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF)  
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a theater command-level organization 
established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
information, communications, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.  
 The SSF’s Network Systems Department is responsible for information warfare with 
an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. 


 
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 The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent 
anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy 
systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space 
domain during a crisis or conflict.  
 The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted 
significant resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space 
applications to civil applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific 
endeavors, and space exploration. SSF works with civilian organizations, such as 
universities and research organization, to integrate civilian support to military efforts.  
The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s 
strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. 
The SSF reports directly to the CMC and supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The 
PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper described the SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to 
achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of 
new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.” 
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the Space Systems 
Department responsible for military space operations, and the Network Systems Department 
responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, EW, 
cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a 
four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, 
and Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the 
CMC, but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The 
SSF provides information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to 
all PLA services and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – 
typically comprised of personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, 
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment 
SSF cyberspace operations during peacetime and are organized into specialized units during 
wartime to support network defense operations. 
In 2021, General Ju Qiansheng was promoted to SSF commander. He previously served as 
commander of the Network Systems Department. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong was the commander 
of the Space Systems in 2021. He previously served as the chief of staff for the former General 
Armaments Department, Chairman of the China Satellite Launch and Tracking General, and 
commander of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch center. The leader of the Network Systems 
Department is unknown.  
The SSF participates in joint exercises and training throughout China, including possible 
national strategic joint exercises. For example, since its creation, the SSF has participated in 
joint far seas training exercises with the PLA Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force concentrated 
on advancing joint operations and informatized warfare capabilities. These exercises allow 


 
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the SSF to assess and improve its capabilities to support joint operations and better enable the 
PLA to project power into the East and South China seas. 
Network Systems Department. The SSF Network Systems Department is responsible for 
information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical 
reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and psychological warfare. By placing these 
missions under the same organizational umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational 
coordination challenges that hindered information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform 
organizational structure. The integration of cyberspace and EW elements under one 
organization was a crucial step towards realizing the operational concept of integrated 
network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since the early 2000s. The 
Network Systems Department operates five theater–aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a 
number of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The Network Systems 
Department provides intelligence support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse 
suite of ground-based technical collection assets to provide a common operating picture to 
geographically dispersed operational units. 
The SSF and the “Three Warfares” Concept: The SSF Network Systems 
Department, performs missions and tasks associated with the PLA’s concept of “Three 
Warfares,” which comprises psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal 
warfare. This department is the only publicly known organization in the PLA that 
performs psychological warfare operations. See ‘Special Topic:  PRC Views of 
Information and Information Dominance’ for more on PLA views on information 
warfare, including psychological warfare.  
The SSF’s strategic space, cyberspace, and psychological warfare capabilities and missions 
are not bound by geographic constraints and can be used independently or to enable and 
support PLA global power projection operations. The SSF’s information support role involves 
centralizing technical intelligence collection and management, which provides strategic 
intelligence support to the theater commands, enables power projection, supports strategic 
defense in the space and nuclear domains, and enables joint operations. The PRC continues 
to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent an adversary's 
use of space-based assets during crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed-
energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite 
(ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably intends to 
pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth 
orbit.   
 


 
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SSF Space Systems Department  
Space and Counterspace Trends. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly 
and Beijing has devoted significant economic and technological resources to growing all 
aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as 
profit-generating launches, human spaceflight, scientific endeavors, as well as lunar and 
Martian exploration missions. Space has been considered a distinct domain of warfare since 
at least 2015, and the PLA expects space to play an important role in future conflicts by 
enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead 
command, 
control, 
communications, 
computers, 
intelligence, 
surveillance, 
and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The PRC probably will continue to develop the capabilities 
for use against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.   
Space and Counterspace Organizations. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible 
for nearly all PLA space operations, including space launch and support; space surveillance; 
space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare.  The 
Space System Department operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions 
are the launch, tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to China’s overhead C4ISR 
architecture. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in several locations 
worldwide. The SSD also operates Yuan Wang space support ships that track satellite and 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches.  
Cyberspace Activities Directed Against the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) 
PRC-based intrusions continued to target computer systems around the world, including 
those owned by the U.S. Government, throughout 2021. These and past intrusions focus 
on accessing networks and extracting information. The PRC uses its cyberspace 
capabilities to not only support intelligence collection against U.S. political, economic, 
academic, and military targets, but also to exfiltrate sensitive information from the defense 
industrial base to gain military advantage and possibly for cyberattack preparations. The 
targeted information can benefit the PRC’s defense high-technology industries, support the 
PRC’s military modernization, provide China’s leadership with insights into U.S. plans and 
intentions, and enable diplomatic negotiations. Additionally, targeted information could 
enable their cyberspace forces to build an operational picture of U.S. defense networks, 
military disposition, logistics, and related military capabilities that could be exploited prior 
to or during a crisis. The access and skills required for these intrusions are similar to those 
necessary to conduct cyberspace operations in an attempt to deter, delay, disrupt, and 
degrade DoD operations prior to or during a conflict. In aggregate, these cyber-enabled 
campaigns threaten to erode U.S. military advantages and imperil the infrastructure and 
prosperity on which those advantages rely.   


 
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China’s space program comprises organizations in the military, political, defense-industrial, 
and commercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed China’s space program and 
continues to support both civilian and military interests. This includes strengthening and 
investing in its science and technology sector, growing international partnerships, and 
improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR, SATCOM, satellite navigation, human 
spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although state-owned enterprises are China’s 
primary civilian and military space contractors, China is placing greater emphasis on 
decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.  
The SSD’s China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four launch sites, in 
addition to Yuan Wang space support ships, two major satellite control centers—Xian 
Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC—and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and 
control (TT&C) system for all Chinese satellites.    
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral 
organization with rotating leadership whose members include China, Bangladesh, Iran, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as 
associate members.  APSCO oversees a space surveillance project known as the Asia-Pacific 
Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System (APOSOS). As part of the project, 
China provided to Iran, Pakistan, and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to track objects in 
LEO and GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data collected is funneled 
through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical Observatory of China. 
APOSOS has near full coverage of LEO and GEO. The organization is planning to improve 
optical system capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.     
China utilizes locations worldwide to aid in TT&C of space missions both around the Earth 
as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are ground stations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ethiopia, France, Greenland, Kenya, Kiribati, Namibia, Norway (Svalbard), Pakistan, South 
Africa, and Spain. There are also four sites in Antarctica that can provide similar support as 
well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall, Kunlun, Taishan, and Zhongshan Stations.  
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages 
China’s space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also 
maintains a working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees China’s military 
acquisitions. SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting 
China’s space activities.  
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the 
public face of China’s civilian space efforts. China is increasingly using CNSA efforts to 
bolster relationships with countries around the world, providing opportunities to cooperate on 
space issues. China had more than a hundred cooperative space-related agreements with more 
than three dozen countries and four international organizations.    


 
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Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose, and China emphasizes 
“military-civil fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, 
policies, and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations 
like universities and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts 
since there is an already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human 
resources. China’s commercial space sector features partially state-owned enterprises such as 
Zhuhai Orbita, Expace, Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote sensing, launch, and 
communication services.      
International Cooperation. In 2021, China launched the China-France Oceanography 
Satellite, China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite 04A, Ethiopian Remote-Sensing Satellite, 
and Student Small Satellites (SSS) for the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 
(APSCO).  Beijing also completed the in-orbit delivery of the Pakistan Remote-Sensing 
Satellite (PRSS-1), Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite (VRSS-2), Sudan Remote-Sensing 
Satellite (SRSS-1), and the Algerian Communications Satellite (Alcomsat-1). China has 
provided satellite carrying or launching services for countries including Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Laos, and Luxembourg. China has built satellite data 
receiving stations with countries including Bolivia, Indonesia, Namibia, Thailand and South 
Africa.  
Space and Counterspace Operations. The PLA views space superiority, as well as the 
ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and to deny adversaries their own 
space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, as critical components of 
modern “informatized warfare.” China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled 
operations to the United States and its allies has shaped integral components of PLA military 
planning and campaigns. In addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight 
operations for deployed PLA forces. The PLA probably views counterspace operations as a 
means to deter and counter a U.S. intervention during a regional military conflict. Moreover, 
PRC defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early 
warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the 
enemy.” 
The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and 
capabilities of its space systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well 
as the BeiDou navigation satellite system. These capabilities allow the PLA to maintain 
situational awareness of potential flashpoints as well as monitor, track, and target adversary 
forces. Additionally, the PRC continues to develop direct ascent, co-orbital, electronic 
warfare, and directed energy capabilities that can contest or deny an adversary’s access to and 
operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict. PLA writings indicate the purpose 
of these capabilities is to deter and counter the intervention of a third party during a military 
conflict.     


 
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JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (JLSF) 
Key Takeaway 
 The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level 
logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services.   
 The JLSF also had an active role coordinating with civilian entities to provide logistic 
support in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. 


 
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The PLA Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF) provides integrated joint logistics support for 
the PLA. The JLSF is directly subordinate to the CMC and is central to China’s efforts to 
build a joint, efficient “combat-oriented modern logistics system,” which Beijing views as 
essential for modern warfare. The JLSF works to modernize PLA joint strategic- and 
campaign-level logistics by overseeing theater wide supply operations, establishing and 
coordinating support relationships among the PLA service logistics elements, conducting joint 
logistics exercises with the PLA services, and integrating civilian logistics resources into 
military operations. The JLSF conducts exercises of various size, scope, and complexity to 
improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint logistics operations.     
The JLSF is headquartered at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base. It operates five joint 
logistics support centers (JLSCs) aligned with each of the theater commands that are intended 
to streamline logistics support to the PLA. Under the JLSCs’ control are units that provide 
materiel support to the PLA and joint logistics brigades (JLSBs), who focus exclusively on 
providing mobile logistic support to combat operations.    
The JLSF provides the PLA with joint strategic- and campaign-level logistics, enabling the 
PLA to conduct large-scale operations. Force elements of the JLSF include weapons and 
ammunition, warehousing, medical services, transport, fuel, engineering and construction 
management, reserve equipment, and procurement support. During peacetime, the JLSF has 
authority over the JLSCs’ operations and activities; during wartime, theater commands 
possibly would assume control of their designated JLSC.  
The JLSF routinely integrates civilian logistics resources and equipment into military 
operations and exercises, a known PLA practice to leverage China’s civilian products, 
services and transportation, such as aircraft and buses, to improve resupply and move military 
personnel and equipment more rapidly. The JLSF continues to play a lead role working with 
the civilian sector to provide logistic support in response to the continuing COVID-19 
outbreak.  
PLA Training to Improve Readiness 
The CMC sought to improve PLA combat readiness, interoperability, and training through 
the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced these priorities through military training mobilization 
orders and senior leadership guidance. In 2021, PLA training focused on reconnaissance, 
rapid mobilization, disaster relief, medical response, and joint warfare in a realistic combat 
environment. PLA training increasingly integrated non-military government agencies and 
militias. There was growing emphasis on incorporating the militia and PLA Reserve Forces 
into PLA joint training and operations.    
Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained, and in some cases increased, the frequency, scale, and 
duration of joint exercises. The COVID-19 pandemic likely did not significantly impact the 
PLA’s ability to conduct joint exercises. The PLA successfully completed at least thirteen 


 
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bilateral and multinational exercises conducting naval drills, maritime patrols, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Although the PLA has improved some 
combat proficiencies, the force as a whole still struggles with jointness, command and control, 
and professional military education, especially among the mid-level officers.     
PLA RESERVES, PARAMILITARY & MILITIA 
Key Takeaway 
 Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the 
PRC’s paramilitary forces continues to grow in scale and sophistication, including the 
coordination between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the People’s 
Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM).   
 
The PRC’s Internal Security Forces 
The PRC’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and the militia. The CCP relies on these forces to address challenges 
ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic problems, to 
terrorism and natural disasters. In 2021, the PRC deployed more than 100,000 PLA, PAP, 
and militia personnel for disaster relief following devastating floods in Henan Province.  
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads the PRC’s civilian national police, which 
serves as the front force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law 
enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including anti-
rioting and anti-terrorism. 
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and 
counterintelligence service. MSS operations include but are not limited to: protect the 
PRC’s national security; conduct counterintelligence; combating foreign espionage; and 
investigate organizations or individuals inside the PRC who carry out or direct, support, or 
aid other people perceived to threaten national security.  On April26th 2021, the PRC 
enacted a new counter espionage law permitting the MSS authority to identify companies 
and organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require these 
institutes to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration.  
People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed 
forces.  Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and augmentation 
to the PLA during conflict. As part of a security structures reorganization in 2018, the CMC 
centralized control of the PAP. The same reform also subordinated the CCG to the PAP. 


 
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People's Liberation Army Reserve Force. The PLA Reserve Force was founded in 1983 
and professionalized throughout the 1990s and 2000s. On July 1, 2020, the PRC amended 
laws, regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve Force under the command of the Central 
Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous arrangement split control of the Reserve 
Force between the PLA and local Party committees. Motivations for the change include 
improving combat capability, facilitating cooperation with active-duty units, and upholding 
the CCP’s absolute leadership over the military. Chinese sources often stated specifically that 
the reform would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA 
appears to have begun making a partial restructure towards using a PLAA reserve base system 
to continue to improve facilitation and support for active-duty units. 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA has 
formal and informal roles in the PRC’s internal security. As the principal armed wing of the 
CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s survival, and supports other internal 
security forces as necessary. The 2015 white paper, China’s Military Strategy, outlined 
eight PLA strategic tasks: safeguard the sovereignty of China’s territory; safeguard national 
unification; safeguard China’s interests in new domains, such as space and cyberspace; 
safeguard China’s overseas interests; maintain strategic deterrence; participate in 
international security cooperation; maintain China’s political security and social stability; 
and conduct emergency rescue, disaster relief, and “rights and interest protection” 
missions. 
Militia. PRC’s militia is a force that can be mobilized for a variety of peace- and war-time 
missions and is distinct from the PLA’s Reserve Force. The militia is organized by townships, 
administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions, and the 
missions may vary widely. In wartime, militia units assist the PLA with its military operations, 
conduct independent security operations, and provide support and manpower replacement 
to the PLA. During peacetime, the militia assists in humanitarian aid and disaster relief, 
supports military training, and maintains internal security. PRC’s Military Service Law 
requires male citizens between 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for military service, 
excluding those already in active service, be enrolled into the militia. The militia is divided 
into two categories. The primary militia consists of former soldiers, personnel that have 
received military training, and personnel selected for military training that are under the 
age of 28, in good health, and politically reliable. The remainder of male citizens between 
18 and 35 years of age are considered ordinary militia. The primary militia may recruit 
female citizens when necessary and the age limits can be waived under special 
circumstance. Local maritime militia forces, referred to by many western analysts as the 
People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, perform tasks including safeguarding maritime 
claims, protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance 
and reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG. 


 
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The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate to the 
Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve.  According to 
official Chinese media and journal articles, a small number of active duty cadre serve as a 
permanent backbone for the Reserve Force to enable the influx of reserve officers and soldiers 
when required. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy published by the PLA’s National 
Defense University states the building of the reserve force is an important part of national 
defense construction and is the basic and strategic project to consolidate national defense. The 
primary mission of the reserves is to reinforce active-duty forces for national defense, with a 
secondary mission to aid in national disasters or maintaining social order. The Reserve Force 
should be prepared to effectively respond to a variety of emergencies and military threats, 
safeguard national sovereignty, security and development interests, and the core security of 
the country. 
Reserve officers are selected from veteran PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia 
officers, and other technical personnel. Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA 
veterans, trained grass-roots militias, and other local or military specialty personnel. Some 
reserve soldiers also failed to meet active duty entry requirements and conduct remedial 
training in the reserves until they are able to join the active duty force.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that significant issues remain in the mobilization of reserve 
forces, including which equipment should be used, what level of government pays for the 
mobilization, and resistance from enterprises at the sudden requisition of their employees. 
Chinese documents state that Reserve Force equipment is predominately antiquated; one 
report stated that more than 70% of air defense artillery and artillery equipment is at or beyond 
its maximum service life. Some of the equipment is no longer manufactured and repair 
requires cannibalization. 
The PLA Reserve Force also provides significant support to local areas after natural disasters.  
The PLA Reserve Force does not include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad other 
groups (e.g. the People’s Armed Police or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(XPCC)). 
People's Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a component of the PRC’s armed forces and an 
armed wing of the CCP with an estimated 660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National Defense 
University publication Science of Military Strategy, the primary responsibilities of the PAP 
include maintaining political, institutional and regime security, handling emergency rescue, 
counter-terrorism, air support, maritime rights protection, administrative law enforcement, 
and defense operations. The PAP is organized into three main parts: the Internal Security 
Corps, the Mobile Corps, and the China Coast Guard (CCG). The Internal Security Corps 
covers each of the PRC’s provinces, provincial-level cities, and autonomous regions. There 
is not yet a reported permanent presence of the PAP in the Special Administrative Regions 
(SARs) of Hong Kong or Macao, but since 2019, the PAP maintains a rotational deployment 
in Hong Kong. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad PAP units placed to reinforce the 


 
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Internal Security Corps and provide flexibility in responding to internal security issues.  
Mobile Corps units are concentrated in the west and south (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, 
and Qinghai) as well as the major cities of Beijing and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular focus 
of the PAP due to PRC perceived separatist activity, as well as its proximity to areas of unrest 
in Central Asia. The China Coast Guard is covered in depth in the next section of this report. 
Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership tasked the PAP with integrating themselves into the PLA’s 
joint operation system. The PAP’s main mission is internal security, but is increasingly 
focused on joint operations with the PLA and is developing capabilities for rapid response, 
mobility, and counterterrorism operations. The PAP also conducts training with foreign 
partners, including at least Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP 
forces have likely operated in Tajikistan, patrolling the tri-border region connecting 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC. 
In 2021, the PAP reportedly executed numerous emergency rescue and disaster response 
operations in response to heavy flooding and typhoons, as well as conducting counter-
terrorism and opposing force training and exercises. 
China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a 
wide range of maritime security missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; 
fisheries enforcement; combating smuggling, terrorism, and environmental crimes; as well as 
supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing Committee of China’s National 
People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect on 1 February 2021. The 
legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, and applies those duties 
to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with concern by other regional 
countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially as territorial 
disputes in the region continue.  
The CCG’s rapid expansion and modernization has made it the largest maritime law 
enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer vessels are larger and more capable than older 
vessels, allowing them to operate further off shore and remain on station longer. A 2019 
academic study published by the U.S. Naval War College estimates the CCG has over 140 
regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (of more than 1,000 tons displacement). Some of the 
vessels are former PLAN vessels, such as corvettes, transferred to the CCG and modified for 
CCG operations. The newer, larger vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-
capacity water cannons, interceptor boats, and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In 
addition, the same academic study indicates the CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol 
combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations, and an 
additional 450 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499 tons). 
 
 


 
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China’s Maritime Militia 
Background & Missions. The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a subset 
of China’s national militia, an armed reserve force of civilians available for mobilization that 
is ultimately subordinate to the Central Military Commission through the National Defense 
Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around towns, villages, 
urban sub-districts, and enterprises, and vary widely in composition and mission.  
PAFMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the 
China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. China employs 
the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or “low-intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” 
at a level designed to frustrate effective response by the other parties involved. China employs 
PAFMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty claims, often amassing them in disputed 
areas throughout the South and East China Seas.  In this manner, the PAFMM plays a major 
role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, and these 
operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations 
short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.  
Operations. PAFMM units have been active for decades in maritime incidents and combat 
operations throughout China’s near seas and in these incidents PAFMM vessels are often used 
to supplement CCG cutters at the forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to 
outweigh and outlast rival claimants. In March of 2021, hundreds of Chinese militia vessels 
moored in Whitsun Reef, raising concerns the Chinese planned to seize another disputed 
feature in the Spratly Islands.  Other notable incidents include standoffs with the Malaysian 
drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 oil rig in waters disputed with 
Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Shoal (2012), and harassment of USNS 
Impeccable  and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014).  Historically the maritime militia also 
participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 seizure of the Paracel 
Islands from South Vietnam, and the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 
1994.  
The PAFMM also protects and facilitates PRC fishing vessels operating in disputed waters.  
For example, from late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 PRC 
fishing vessels operated under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in 
Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the PRC ships 
in this fishing fleet were affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, including a 
maritime militia unit based out of Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most traditional 
maritime militia units operating in the South China Sea continue to originate from townships 
and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of increasingly prominent maritime 
militia units based out of provinces in the PRC. These mainland based maritime militia units 
routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern South China Sea, and their 


 
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operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the PRC government to 
improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.   
Capabilities. Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes 
various local and provincial commercial organizations to operate PAFMM vessels to perform 
“official” missions on an ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. 
PAFMM units employ marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the 
PLAN and the CCG. While retaining their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, 
often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can be activated on demand. Additionally, starting in 
2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has developed into a salaried 
full-time maritime militia force equipped with at least 84 purpose-built vessels armed with 
mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls for ramming along with 
their own command center in the Paracel Islands. Lacking their normal fishing 
responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia personnel, many of whom are former PLAN 
and CCG sailors, train for peacetime and wartime contingencies, often with light arms, and 
patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features even during fishing moratoriums. 
Additionally, since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 
235 large fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons.  
These vessels were built under central direction from the Chinese government to operate in 
disputed areas south of twelve degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly 
Waters,” including the Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built 
for prominent PAFMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces. For vessel 
owners not already affiliated with PAFMM units, joining the militia was a precondition for 
receiving government funding to build new Spratly backbone boats. As with the CCG and 
PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands enhance the PAFMM’s ability to 
sustain operations in the South China Sea. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to 
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
 The PLA is also developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into 
the Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases, globally.  
 Although the PLA has undertaken important structural reforms to promote joint 
operations, the capability of the PLA to carry out joint operations in support of 
counter-intervention or joint campaigns outside the First Island Chain remains in its 
infancy.  


 
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Joint Capabilities for Counter-intervention  
The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a 
presence in China’s immediate periphery and limit US access in the broader Asia-Pacific 
region. The PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are, to date, the most robust 
within the First Island Chain, although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the 
Philippine Sea, and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific 
Ocean.  
PLA ground, naval, air and rocket forces are increasingly capable of projecting power at 
greater distances from China. However, joint service training is still in its infancy and the 
PLA has demonstrated limited joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC. Instead, overseas 
activities are mostly conducted by single services and do not involve combat.  
Beijing recognizes the importance of increasing military capabilities to achieve global 
security objectives and has encouraged the PLA to increase its operations beyond the Indo-
Pacific. As detailed in China’s 2015 and 2019 Defense White Papers, Beijing is primarily 
interested in developing these capabilities to protect Chinese maritime rights and commercial 
interests.  However, the majority of PLA modernization and recent exercises remains focused 
on fighting and winning a regional conflict. As Beijing’s economic interests expand in areas 
like Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East, we expect to see increased 
focus on expanding power projection operations globally. 
Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA doctrinal writings state that 
precision attack in all warfare domains is critical in modern war.  The PLA further notes that 
small elite forces using advanced weapons or capabilities can attain military effects that 
previously required large armies and much higher levels of damage and cost.  Therefore, PLA 
writings state that precision weapons are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war 
control” to prevent escalation. PLA documents further state that the range of vital political, 
economic, and military targets has grown as the advanced globalized economy develops, 
implying that growing PLA strike capabilities will attack an increasing array of targets, and 
thereby attaining international strategic effects by striking critical nodes of the global 
economy during a future conflict. The PRC’s military modernization efforts have rapidly 
transformed the PLA’s missile force. PLA writings frame logistics and power projection 
assets as potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare, which aligns with the PLA’s expanding 
ability to conduct strikes against regional air bases, logistics and port facilities, 
communications, and other ground-based infrastructure.  
U.S. bases in Guam are in range of a growing number of the PLA’s ballistic and cruise 
missiles. In the future, LACMs will also likely be deployable on surface platforms like the 
RENHAI class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K bomber flights into the Philippine Sea 
demonstrate the PRC’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs. The DF-26 


 
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intermediate range ballistic missile is capable of reaching Guam, and is capable of conducting 
nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.   
China views its ability to acquire timely, high-fidelity information as critical to its ability to 
execute precision strikes. The PLA’s information support system for precision strikes depends 
heavily on Strategic Support Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target, and conduct 
battlefield damage assessments. China emphasizes the importance of space-based 
surveillance capabilities in supporting precision strikes. In 2021, the PRC continued to 
develop its constellation of military reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, 
tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces, while also investing in reconnaissance, 
surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity OTH targeting information for its strike platforms.   
 Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS 
architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive 
early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has 
also placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the South China Sea, further 
extending the range of its IADS. It also employs point defenses, primarily to defend strategic 
targets against adversary long-range cruise missiles and airborne strike platforms.  
The PLA has increasing numbers of advanced long-range SAMs, including its indigenous 
CSA-9 (HQ-9) and its follow-on HQ-9B, Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU), and SA-20 (S-
300PMU1 / PMU2), all of which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft 
and low-flying cruise missiles. To improve its strategic air defenses, the PLA possesses 
Russian-built SA-21 (S-400) Triumf SAM systems as a follow-on to the SA-20. Compared to 
these other systems, the SA-21 systems possess a longer maximum range, improved missile 
seekers, and more sophisticated radars.   
The PRC manufactures a variety of long-range air surveillance radars, including models 
claiming to support ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other models asserting the ability to 
detect stealth aircraft. Marketing materials also emphasize these systems’ ability to counter 
long-range airborne strike and combat support aircraft. PLAAF AEW&C aircraft such as the 
KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend the PRC’s s radar coverage well past the range of its 
ground-based radars. 
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a 
limited capability against ballistic missiles. The PRC’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range 
SAM system likely has a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic 
missiles. The PLA has SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs and SA-21 (S-400) SAMs that may have 
some capability to engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting 
infrastructure. The PRC is working to develop BMD systems consisting of exo-atmospheric 
and endo-atmospheric kinetic-energy interceptors. China is pursuing a mid-course interceptor 
that may have capabilities against IRBMs and possibly ICBMs. The RENHAI cruiser has been 


 
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identified as a platform for mid-course intercept capabilities suggesting the PRC will have 
forward deployed missile defense in the near future.  Additionally, the HQ-19 interceptor has 
undergone tests to verify its capability against 3,000 km-class ballistic missiles. The PLA’s 
cruise missile defense capability is more robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses, with 
short-to-medium range SAMs, such as the HQ-22, augmenting the PLA’s long-range SAMs 
in this role. 
Hypersonic Weapons. China’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue 
to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly intended to 
replace some older SRBM units, according to PRC media, and is intended to strike foreign 
military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.   
Aviation Forces (PLAAF, PLAA Aviation, PLAN Aviation). PLA aviation forces are 
fielding advanced platforms capable of supporting future long-distance operations, as their 
mission sets evolve from defending Chinese territorial space to launching offensive operations 
at distances beyond the First Island Chain. While interoperability is a stated priority, joint 
exercises between the aviation’s forces are limited. Individually, the PLAAF, PLAN Aviation, 
and PLAA Aviation continue to improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive 
operations offshore, including strike, air and missile defense, strategic mobility, early warning 
and reconnaissance missions, and insertion. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated 
calls from its leadership to become a truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long 
distances to advance and defend the PRC’s global interests.   
• 
In 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service, supporting the continued PLAAF 
expansion of air refuelable fighters, bombers, and SMA aircraft like the KJ-500 
AEW&C aircraft. These new air refuelable aircraft will significantly expand China’s 
ability to conduct long-range offensive air operations.     
• 
China was developing a new generation of long-range bombers, likely named the H-
20, according to multiple reports and a 2016 public statement by then PLAAF 
Commander General Ma Xiaotian. The H-20, which may debut sometime in the next 
decade, will have a range of more than 10,000km, enabling the PLAAF to cover the 
Second Island Chain and into the western region of the Pacific. The H-20 bomber’s 
range could be extended to cover the globe with aerial refueling. It is also expected to 
employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry and feature a stealthy design. 
• 
The PLA Army aviation and air assault units are enabling highly-mobile, modular 
ground task force capable of expeditionary operations. In 2021, the PLAA added at 
least six heavy lift Z-8 transport helicopters and 12 medium lift Z-20 helicopters. 
According to PRC media, three Z-8 transport aircraft battalions could airdrop a combat 
battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is also expected to fill a variety of missions including 
special force insertion and shipborne ASW.    
• 
PRC’s outposts in the South China Sea extends the operating reach of PLA aviation 
forces.   


 
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ADVANCING TOWARD AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict, and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO 
in military exercises. 
 The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat 
to an adversary’s military and critical infrastructure systems.  
 The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future 
conflict, which it calls “intelligentized warfare,” defined by the expanded use of AI 
and other advanced technologies at every level of warfare. 
Chairman Xi Jinping has called for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of 
dominating all networks and expanding the country’s security and development interests. PRC 
military writings describe informatized warfare as the use of information technology to create 
an operational system-of-systems, which would enable the PLA to acquire, transmit, process, 
and use information during a conflict to conduct joint military operations across the ground, 
maritime, air, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum domains. The PLA is 
accelerating the incorporation of command information systems, providing forces and 
commanders with enhanced situational awareness and decision support to more effectively 
carry out joint missions and tasks to win informatized local wars. The PLA continues to 
expand the scope and regularity of military training exercises that simulate informatized 
operations and likely views offensive and defensive cyberspace operations as a means to 
achieve information dominance early in a crisis or conflict.  
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Modernization 
(C4I). The PRC continues to prioritize C4I modernization as a response to trends in modern 
warfare that emphasize the importance of rapid information collection, processing, and 
sharing and accelerated decision making. The PLA is continuing modernization and reform 
efforts, both technologically and organizationally, to effectively command complex, joint 
operations across all warfare domains and potentially in multiple theaters.  
The PLA sees networked, technologically advanced C4I systems as essential to providing 
reliable, secure communications to fixed and mobile command posts, thereby enabling rapid, 
effective, multi-echelon decision making. These systems are designed to distribute real-time 
data—including intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather 
reports via redundant, resilient communications networks—to improve commanders’ 
situational awareness. PLA field commanders view near-real-time ISR and situational data as 
well as redundant and reliable communications as essential to streamlining decision making 
processes and shortening response timelines. China has expanded its communications and 


 
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intelligence gathering capabilities in key regions like the South China Sea, where it has rapidly 
constructed new facilities and antennas likely supporting satellite communications and 
technical collection between 2018 and 2021. The PRC is also fielding the Integrated 
Command Platform to units at multiple echelons across the force to enable lateral and cross-
service communications and intelligence sharing required for joint operations. Digital 
databases and command automation tools allow commanders to simultaneously issue orders 
to multiple units while on the move and enable units to quickly adapt to shifting conditions in 
the battlespace. 
As the PLA continues to focus on improving its ability to fight and win informatized wars, 
future information systems will likely implement emerging technologies such as automation, 
big data, the internet of things, artificial intelligence (AI), and cloud computing to improve 
process efficiencies. The PLA has already begun this process by embracing big data analytics 
that fuse a variety of data to improve automation and to create a comprehensive, real-time 
picture for warfighters. 
Electronic Warfare (EW). The PLA considers EW to be an integral component of modern 
warfare and seeks to achieve information dominance in a conflict through the coordinated use 
of cyberspace and electronic warfare to protect its own information networks and deny the 
enemy the use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The PRC’s EW strategy emphasizes 
suppressing, degrading, disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment throughout the 
continuum of a conflict. The PLA will likely use electronic warfare early in a conflict as a 
signaling mechanism to warn and deter adversary offensive action. Potential EW targets 
include adversary systems operating in radio, radar, microwave, infrared and optical 
frequency ranges, as well as adversary computer and information systems. PLA EW units 
routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming operations against multiple 
communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems 
during force-on-force exercises. These exercises test operational units’ understanding of EW 
weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to improve confidence in 
their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic environment. In addition, the 
PLA reportedly tests and validates advances in EW weapons’ R&D during these exercises. 
Cyberspace warfare. The development of cyberspace warfare capabilities is consistent with 
PLA writings, which identify information operations (IO)—comprising cyberspace, 
electronic, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving information superiority 
early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe. The PRC has publicly 
identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its intent to 
expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to 
military and critical infrastructure systems, and presents a growing influence threat. The PRC 
seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to physical 
disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 


 
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operations beginning in the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC can launch 
cyberspace attacks that, at a minimum, can cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical 
infrastructure within the United States, and the PRC believes these capabilities are even more 
effective against militarily superior adversaries that depend on information technologies. As 
a result, the PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch 
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the 
United States.  
Authoritative PLA sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and 
EW as strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and 
“sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict. PLA writings 
judge other countries have effectively used cyberspace warfare and other IO in recent conflicts 
and argue for attacks against C2 and logistics networks to affect an adversary’s ability to make 
decisions and take actions in the early stages of conflict. The PLA also considers cyberspace 
capabilities to be a critical component in its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture, 
alongside space and nuclear deterrence. PLA studies discuss using warning or demonstration 
strikes—strikes against select military, political, and economic targets with clear awing 
effects—as part of deterrence. Accordingly, the PLA probably seeks to use its cyber-
reconnaissance capabilities to collect data for intelligence and cyberspace attack purposes; to 
constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, 
commercial activities, and civilian and defense critical infrastructure; and, to serve as a force-
multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.  
The PLA’s recent structural reforms may further change how the PLA organizes and 
commands IO, particularly as the SSF continues to develop its capabilities and further 
integrate into joint planning, exercises, and operations with other PLA forces. The SSF likely 
is generating synergies by combining national-level cyberspace reconnaissance, attack, and 
defense capabilities in its organization, alongside other strategic IO capabilities. 
Intelligentized Warfare. In October 2020, the CCP announced that modern warfare was 
evolving to include intelligentization and incorporated the concept into its 14th Five-Year 
Plan. Beijing anticipates that AI and other advanced technologies, such as cloud computing 
and big data analytics, will be key to success in future warfare. As a result, it is adjusting the 
PRC’s defense modernization plans to focus on integrating the development of 
“mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization,” suggesting the PLA will field some 
intelligentized capabilities as it completes mechanization and informatization over the next 
decade. 
PLA strategists have stated new technologies will increase the speed and tempo of future 
warfare, and that operationalization of AI will be necessary to improve the speed and quality 
of information processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty and providing decision making 
advantage over potential adversaries. The PLA is researching various applications for AI 
including support for missile guidance, target detection and identification, and autonomous 


 
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systems. The PLA is exploring next-generation operational concepts for intelligentized 
warfare, such as attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, cross-domain mobile warfare, AI-
based space confrontation, and cognitive control operations. The PLA also considers 
unmanned systems to be critical intelligentized technologies, and is pursuing greater 
autonomy for unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles to enable manned and 
unmanned hybrid formations, swarm attacks, optimized logistic support, and disaggregated 
ISR, among other capabilities. 
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways 
 The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information 
sphere and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and 
communication capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized 
warfare.”    
 The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, 
and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.   
 The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and 
related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting 
space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor 
objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.    
Space Strategy and Doctrine. The PRC officially advocates for the peaceful use of space 
and is pursuing agreements in the United Nations on the “non-weaponization” of space.  China 
continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms 
to better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations. China’s space 
strategy is expected to evolve over time, keeping pace with the application of new space 
technology. These changes probably will be reflected in published national space strategy 
documents, through space policy actions, and in programs enacted by political and military 
leadership. In September 2021, President Xi Jinping stated that “space is an important 
strategic asset for the country that must be well managed and utilized and, more importantly, 
protected,” and called for strengthened space traffic management and international 
cooperation on security issues to improve effectiveness in managing crises in space.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere 
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication 
capabilities, as a critical component to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” China’s first 
public mention of space and counterspace capabilities came as early as 1971, largely from 
academics reviewing foreign publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chinese science 


 
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and technology efforts on space began to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of the 
U.S. space-focused Strategic Defense Initiative to defend against the former Soviet Union’s 
nuclear weapons.  Subsequently, after observing the U.S. military’s performance during the 
1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an 
effort to modernize weapon systems, across all domains including space, and update its 
doctrine to focus on using and countering adversary information-enabled warfare.  
China’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and 
its allies has shaped integral components of PLA military planning and campaigns. In 
addition, space is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed PRC 
forces, and the PLA sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a U.S. 
intervention during a regional military conflict. China has claimed that “destroying or 
capturing satellites and other sensors” would make it difficult for the U.S. and allied militaries 
to use precision-guided weapons. Moreover, PRC defense academics suggest that 
reconnaissance, communication, navigation, and early warning satellites could be among the 
targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”  
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature 
rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant economic and political resources to growing all 
aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as 
profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.  The PRC’s space 
enterprise includes the SSF and also encompasses other military, government, and civilian 
organizations, including state-owned enterprises, academic institutions, and commercial 
entities.  The PLA has historically managed the PRC’s space program and the SSF Space 
Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations. The PRC continues 
to strengthen its military space capabilities, despite its public stance against the weaponization 
of space. The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite 
navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration. In 
2022, the PRC plans to have a permanent operating space station that will host its own and 
foreign payloads and astronauts. The PRC has built an expansive ground support 
infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions including spacecraft 
and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.  Additionally, 
the PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct ascent, co-orbital, 
electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities—that can contest or deny an adversary’s 
access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.  
China has devoted considerable economic and technological resources to growing all aspects 
of its space program, improving military space applications, developing human spaceflight, 
and conducting lunar and Martian exploration missions. In the past 10 years, China has 
doubled its launches per year and the number of satellites in orbit. China has placed three 
space stations in orbit, two of which have since deorbited, and the third of which launched in 


 
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2021. Furthermore, China has launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side of the Moon; 
a lander and sample return mission to the Moon; and an orbiter, lander, and rover in one 
mission to Mars. The PRC has also launched multiple anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that are 
able to destroy satellites and developed mobile jammers to deny SATCOM and GPS.         
Beijing’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully capable space power. Its rapidly growing 
space program—second only to the United States in the number of operational satellites—is 
a source of national pride and part of Chairman Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” to establish a 
powerful and prosperous China. The space program, managed by the PLA, supports both 
civilian and military interests, including strengthening its science and technology sector, 
growing international relationships, and modernizing the military. China seeks to rapidly 
achieve these goals through advances in the research and development of space systems and 
space-related technology.       
China will continue to launch a range of satellites that substantially enhance its ISR 
capabilities; field advanced communications satellites able to transmit large amounts of data; 
increase Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities; and deploy new weather and 
oceanographic satellites. China has developed and will continue to develop weapons for use 
against satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.     
The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, 
as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space 
within their field of view and enable counterspace actions. In concert with its marked 
improvements in satellite navigation, launch capabilities, and space object surveillance and 
identification, the PRC is developing electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers; 
offensive cyberspace capabilities; and directed-energy weapons. Moreover, the PRC has 
demonstrated sophisticated, potentially damaging on-orbit behavior with space-based 
technologies. The PRC has an operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile 
intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional 
ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit. The PRC 
is employing more sophisticated satellite operations and is probably testing dual-use 
technologies in space that could be applied to counterspace missions.    
ISR Satellite Capabilities. China employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to 
enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing 
and mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR 
satellites are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery 
as well as electronic and signals intelligence data. China also exports its satellite technology 
globally, including its domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.  
As of the end of 2021, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 260 systems—a quantity 
second only to the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit systems since 2018.   


 
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The PLA owns and operates about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which could 
support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially 
throughout the Indo-Pacific region. These satellites also allow the PLA to monitor potential 
regional flashpoints, including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean, and the South 
China Sea.     
Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, 
procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well 
as space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.  These improvements increase 
China’s monitoring capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, 
expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air wings.  Space capabilities will enhance potential 
PLA military operations farther from the Chinese coast. These capabilities are being 
augmented with electronic reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio 
transmissions.  
Satellite Communications. China owns and operates more than 60 communications 
satellites, at least four of which are dedicated to military use.  China produces its military-
dedicated satellites domestically. Its civilian communications satellites incorporate off-the-
shelf commercially manufactured components.  China is fielding advanced communications 
satellites capable of transmitting large amounts of data.  Existing and future data relay 
satellites and other beyond-line-of-sight communications systems could convey critical 
targeting data to Chinese military operation centers.     
In addition, China is making progress on its ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront 
of the global SATCOM industry. China is continuing to test next-generation capabilities like 
its Quantum Experimentation at Space Scale (QUESS) space-based quantum-enabled 
communications satellite, which could supply the means to field highly secure 
communications systems.  In 2016, China launched the world's first quantum communications 
satellite (Micius) into low Earth orbit. Between 2017 and 2019, PRC scientists used Micius 
to send quantum keys to ground stations up to distances of 1,200 kilometers and as a trusted 
relay to transmit quantum keys between ground stations in China and Austria, facilitating 
intercontinental quantum-secured communications. In June 2020, a team of PRC scientists 
claimed to achieve quantum supremacy—the event that a quantum device performs a 
computational task that no existing or easily foreseeable classical device could perform—
using a photonic quantum computer (Jiuzhang), followed by a Chinese superconducting 
quantum computer (Zuchongzhi), which also achieved quantum supremacy in 2021. Testing 
satellite-based quantum entanglement represents a major milestone in building a practical, 
global, ultra-secure quantum network, but the widespread deployment and adoption of this 
technology still faces hurdles.    
China also intends to provide SATCOM support to users worldwide and plans to develop at 
least seven new SATCOM constellations in LEO. However, as these constellations are still in 
the early stages of development, their effectiveness remains uncertain.       


 
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Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capabilities. China’s satellite navigation system, 
known as BeiDou, is an independently constructed, developed, and exclusively China-
operated PNT service. China’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national security and 
economic and social development by adopting PRC PNT into precise agriculture, monitoring 
of vehicles and ships, and aiding with civilian-focused services across more than 100 countries 
in Africa, Asia, and Europe. BeiDou provides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT 
services to users domestically, in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as globally and consists of 
49 operational satellites. Initially deployed to facilitate regional PNT services, BeiDou 
achieved worldwide initial operating capability in 2018. In June 2020, China successfully 
launched the final satellite in the BeiDou satellite constellation, completing its global 
navigation system. China’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT services to enable 
force movements and precision guided munitions delivery.    
BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy standard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-
Pacific region is within 5 meters. In addition to providing PNT, the BeiDou constellation 
offers unique capabilities, including text messaging and user tracking through its Regional 
Short Message Communication service to enable mass communications among BeiDou users. 
The system also provides additional military C2 capabilities for the PLA.     
China intends to use its BeiDou constellation to offer additional services and incentives to 
countries taking part in its Belt and Road Initiative emphasizing building strong economic ties 
to other countries to align partner nations with China’s interests. As of May 2021, China is 
predicting BeiDou products and services will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and potentially 
export BeiDou products to more than 100 million users in 120 countries.  
Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration Efforts. Following uncrewed missions that 
began in 1999, China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight 
when it successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003. In 2011, China then 
launched its first space station, Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second space station, 
Tiangong-2. In 2020, China conducted its first orbital test of the New-Generation Manned 
Spaceship, which is expected to replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft. On 29 April 
2021, China launched the first element, Tianhe, of its new Tiangong space station.  Beijing 
launched the first supply vessel, Tianzhou, and has launched two PRC crews since then.    
China has also taken on a greater role in deep space exploration and space science and has 
made notable accomplishments during the past several years. China has demonstrated its 
interest in working with Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to conduct deep-space 
exploration. China is the third country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and was the first 
to land a rover on the lunar far side in 2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao 
relay satellite that China launched the year before to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon 
Lagrange point. In May 2021, China landed the Zhurong rover on Mars, the first PRC rover 
to operate on Mars. 


 
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Space Launch Capabilities. China is improving its space launch capabilities to ensure it has 
an independent, reliable means to access space and to compete in the international space 
launch market. China continues to improve manufacturing efficiencies and launch capabilities 
overall, supporting continued human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions—
including to the Moon and Mars. New modular space launch vehicles (SLVs) that allow China 
to tailor an SLV to the specific configuration required for each customer are beginning to go 
into operation, leading to increased launch vehicle reliability and overall cost savings for 
launch campaigns. China is also in the early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV 
similar to the U.S. Saturn V or the newer U.S. Space Launch System to support proposed 
crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.  
In addition to land-based launches, in 2020 China demonstrated the ability to launch a Long 
March-11 (LM-11) from a sea-based platform. This capability, if staged correctly, would 
allow China to launch nearer to the equator than its land-based launch sites, increase the 
rocket’s carrying capacity, and potentially lower launch costs.  
China has developed quick-response SLVs to increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 
satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could 
support Chinese military operations during a conflict or civilian response to disasters. 
Compared with medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite 
launch campaigns because they are transportable via road or rail and can be stored launch-
ready with solid fuel for longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. Because their size is limited, 
quick-response SLVs such as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 are only able to 
launch relatively small payloads of up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO. In June 2020, 
China announced its intention to upgrade the payload capacity of the LM-11 in the new LM-
11A, designed for land or sea launches, beginning in 2022.      
The expansion of non-state-owned PRC launch vehicle and satellite operation companies in 
China’s domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is successfully advancing military-
civil fusion efforts. Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these entities and obfuscates 
the end users of acquired foreign technology and expertise.  
Space Situational Awareness. China has a robust network of space surveillance sensors 
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network 
includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow China to support its 
missions including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early 
warning (BMEW), spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris 
monitoring.    
Electronic Warfare Counterspace Capabilities. The PLA considers EW capabilities to be 
critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or 
deceive enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates jamming and anti-jamming 
techniques in its exercises that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based 


 
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communications, radar systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and 
precision-guided munitions employment. China probably is developing jammers dedicated to 
targeting SAR, including aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR 
satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any 
potential conflict involving the United States or its allies. In addition, China probably is 
developing jammers to target SATCOM over a range of frequency bands, including military-
protected extremely high frequency communications.    
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). During the past two decades, PRC defense research has 
proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for 
reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite 
components. China has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to 
disrupt, degrade, or damage satellites that include a current limited capability to employ laser 
systems against satellite sensors. By the mid- to late-2020s, China may field higher power 
systems that extend the threat to the structures of non-optical satellites.       
ASAT Missile Threats. In 2007, China destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites more 
than 800 kilometers above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The effect of this destructive test 
generated more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which more than 2,700 remain 
in orbit and most will continue orbiting the Earth for decades. The PLA’s operational ground-
based ASAT missile system is intended to target LEO satellites. China’s military units have 
continued training with ASAT missiles.    
China plans to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO. 
In 2013, China launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius 
above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No new satellites were released from the object, 
and the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding 
rocket launches for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability could exist to use ASAT 
technology against satellites at great distances and not just LEO.    
Orbital Threats. China is developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as 
satellite inspection and repair. At least some of these capabilities could also function as a 
weapon. China has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space 
maintenance technologies and is conducting research on space debris cleanup; the most recent 
launch was the Shijian-21 launched into GEO in October 2021. In January 2022, Shijian-21 
moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a high graveyard orbit above GEO. The 
Shijian-17 is a Chinese satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm technology could 
be used in a future system for grappling other satellites.    
Since at least 2006, the government-affiliated academic community in China began 
investigating aerospace engineering aspects associated with space-based kinetic weapons—
generally a class of weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets from orbit. Space-based 
kinetic weapons research included methods of reentry, separation of payload, delivery 


 
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vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes. China conducted the first fractional orbital 
launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China on July 27th, 2021. This 
demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (~100+ 
minutes) of any PRC land attack weapons system to date.  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways  
 Over the next decade, the PRC aims to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear 
forces. Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts exceed beyond previous attempts in both scale and complexity. 
 The PRC is investing in, and expanding, the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based 
nuclear delivery platforms and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this 
major expansion of its nuclear forces. The PRC is also supporting this expansion by 
increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder 
reactors and reprocessing facilities.  
 In 2021, Beijing probably accelerated its nuclear expansion; DoD estimates China’s 
operational nuclear warheads stockpile has surpassed 400.      
 The PLA plans to "basically complete modernization" of its national defense and 
armed forces by 2035. If China continues the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will 
likely field a stockpile of about 1500 warheads by its 2035 timeline.   
 The PRC is fielding the DF-41, China’s first road-mobile and silo-based ICBM with 
MIRV capability. The system is likely intended to carry no more than three warheads 
per missile and has improved range and accuracy over DF-31 class ICBMs.  The PRC 
is conducting continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six JIN-class (Type 094) 
submarines (SSBNs), which are equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 SLBMs.  
 The PRC is rapidly establishing its silo-based solid-propellant missile fields likely 
consisting of over 300 silos in total, which are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-
41 class ICBMs. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force 
suggests that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force 
by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.    
Strategy. The PRC’s approach to using nuclear force is based on PLA “deterrence” of an 
enemy first strike and “counterstrike” when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an 
adversary’s military capability, population, and economy.  The PRC’s nuclear weapons policy 
prioritizes the maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with 
sufficient strength to conduct multiple rounds of counterstrike, deterring an adversary with 
the threat of unacceptable damage to its military capability, population, and economy. The 


 
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PLA probably selects its nuclear strike targets to achieve conflict de-escalation and return to 
a conventional conflict with a remaining force sufficient to deter its adversary. PLA planners 
would probably avoid a protracted series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary, 
and state that the scale and intensity of retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. It is 
unclear whether the buildup of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal may influence or change the PRC’s 
nuclear strategy in the future; the PLA insists its nuclear policy remains clear and consistent. 
• 
The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a public declaratory “no first 
use” (NFU) policy. That policy states the PRC will never use nuclear weapons first at 
any time nor under any circumstances. In addition, the PRC unconditionally 
undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-
weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China’s nuclear 
strategy probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear 
attack threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates 
the strategic effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear 
use to restore deterrence if a conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC 
survival.  
Readiness. Although the PRC almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a 
peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads—nuclear and 
conventional PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty.” These 
apparently include assigning a missile battalion to be ready to launch, and rotating to standby 
positions, on about a monthly basis for unspecified periods of time. The PRC will likely 
increase the number of units on “high alert duty” during times of increased tension. 
Authoritative PLA text books on strategy state “high alert duty” is valuable for the defender 
in a nuclear war and recommend the PLARF adopt a high alert posture conceptually 
comparable to the claimed high alert posture kept by portions of U.S. and Russian nuclear 
force. Such a posture is compatible with the PRC’s active defense concept, NFU policy, and 
post-strike response approach.   
Land-Based Platforms. The PRC’s land-based nuclear forces primarily consist of ICBMs 
with different basing modes complimented by several theater-range road-mobile MRBMs and 
IRBMs. The PRC has approximately 300 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-
5A) and Mod 3 (DF-5B) and possibly more recently a CSS-10 class missile (DF-31 class); 
the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10-class (DF-31 class) with new versions having improved 
survivability and lethality  and CSS-20 (DF-41); and the more limited range roll-out-to-launch 
CSS-3 (DF-4). The PRC is establishing additional nuclear units and increasing the number of 
launchers in mobile ICBM units from six to 12. This strategic arsenal is complemented by 
road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 Mod 2 and Mod 6 (DF-21) MRBMs and DF-26 IRBMs 
capable of ranging targets in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLA is probably upgrading its 
existing unitary and MIRVed DF-5 liquid propellant ICBMs.   


 
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Sea-based Platforms. The PRC likely began near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with 
its six operational JIN class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) 
or CSS-NX-20 (JL-3) SLBMs. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN is probably 
intended to field MIRVed SLBMs judging from past developmental trends.  The 096 SSBNs 
will likely begin construction in the early-2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the 
PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets 
concurrently. The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas 
north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States. The 
fielding of newer, more capable, and longer ranged SLBMs such as the JL-3 gives the PLAN 
the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters allowing the PLAN to 
consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent.  The South 
China Sea and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for employing this 
concept.  
Air Platforms. The PLAAF has operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform 
for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N, compared to other H-6 
bombers, adds an air-to-air refueling probe, as well as its recessed fuselage modifications that 
would allow for external carriage of an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) assessed to be 
nuclear capable. China is probably also developing a strategic stealth bomber, according to 
PRC state media.  
Future Developments. Over the next decade, the PRC will expand and diversify its nuclear 
forces. The PRC probably intends to develop new nuclear warheads and delivery platforms 
that at least equal the effectiveness, reliability, and/or survivability of some of the warheads 
and delivery platforms currently under development by the United States and/or Russia. The 
PLA seeks a diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from lower-yield precision 
strike missiles to ICBMs with multi-megaton yields. Developing robust nuclear strike options 
is likely intended to provide deterrence predominantly against a “strong enemy,” as well as 
ensure China can inflict unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming 
retaliatory capabilities, and thus denying an adversary victory if a war escalates to the nuclear 
domain.   
China is establishing new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities very likely 
to support its nuclear force expansion. Although these efforts are consistent with China’s goals 
to increase nuclear energy generation and to close its nuclear fuel cycle, Beijing likely also 
considers this dual-use infrastructure as crucial to supporting its military goals, judging from 
Chinese nuclear industry reporting and think tank publications. Despite China’s public 
support for a fissile material cutoff treaty, we judge that Beijing intends to use this 
infrastructure to produce nuclear warhead materials for its military in the near term.    
• 
Plutonium. China is constructing two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder nuclear 
reactors at Xiapu, each capable of producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear 
warheads annually from blankets (referring to uranium placed around the fuel core for 


 
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the purpose of breeding plutonium) surrounding the core, according to think tank 
estimates and informed by PRC state media and nuclear industry reporting. China 
originally planned to use Russian-sourced mixed-oxide (MOX is a blend of uranium 
and plutonium) fuel for these reactors but changed the order to highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) fuel through 2030, according to nuclear industry reporting.    By using 
HEU fuel, China has the potential to generate additional weapons-grade plutonium. In 
addition, China is constructing multiple new reprocessing plants that could extract this 
plutonium, according to a Western think tank. China has reduced transparency in its 
nuclear program as its capabilities are increasing. It ceased reporting its stockpile of 
separated plutonium to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2017 while still 
being capable of producing plutonium in reactors and separating it at its reprocessing 
plant at Jiuquan, judging from PRC state media and a Western think tank.   
• 
Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally 
associated with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and 
likely will continue to do so. China is also working to expand and diversify its 
capability to produce tritium by methods such as using tritium production targets in 
reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy water, according to Chinese nuclear 
industry reporting.     
Evolving Nuclear Posture. The PRC’s evolving posture is presently more consistent with 
what PLA writings describe as a “limited deterrent”—a posture that the PLA describes as the 
very wide space between a minimum and maximum deterrent.  The PRC claims to adhere to 
a minimum deterrent which it defines as “…keeping its nuclear capabilities at the minimum 
level required for maintaining its national security.” The PRC perceived national security 
requirements will grow as it transitions from a ‘large country’ to a ‘powerful country’ and its 
minimum number of military forces—to include nuclear—needed to defend those greater 
interests is also likely to grow.   
Stockpile Size. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile 
was in the low-200s and expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing probably 
accelerated its nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates this stockpile has now surpassed 400 
operational nuclear warheads. By 2030, DoD estimates that the PRC will have about 1,000 
operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging 
the continental United States (CONUS).    
Beijing has not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, and has 
declined to engage in substantive arms control discussions. We continue to assess the PRC is 
constructing the infrastructure necessary to support this force expansion, including increasing 
its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by constructing fast breeder reactors and 
reprocessing facilities. Though this is consistent with the PRC goal of closing the nuclear fuel 
cycle, the PRC likely intends to use some of this infrastructure to produce plutonium for its 
expanding nuclear weapons program. 


 
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The PRC’s long-term nuclear requirements—and the relationship between the PRC’s nuclear 
requirements and its national strategy and goal to field a “world-class” military by mid-
century—remain unclear from public sources. Hawkish PRC state media outlets have asserted 
that the PRC needs 1,000 warheads, while retired PLA officers have suggested that the PRC 
should possesses a ‘mutually assured destruction’ capability. The PLA plans to "basically 
complete modernization" of its national defense and armed forces by 2035. If China continues 
the pace of its nuclear expansion, it will likely field a stockpile of about 1,500 warheads by 
that time. While neither of those claims are official, anticipated changes to the capacity, 
capability, and readiness of the PRC’s nuclear forces in the coming years seem likely to 
outpace potential developments by the nuclear forces of any adversary that could plausibly 
threaten the PRC ability to retaliate against a first strike. A Western think tank publication 
indicated that the PRC could field more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by the end of the decade, 
judging from the amount of plutonium that could be produced from reactors under 
construction.  
In recent years, the PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-
round and lack of transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding 
its adherence to the U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.  
Regardless of the ultimate number of nuclear weapons it makes, the PRC will probably 
continue to claim it is, like other nuclear powers, adhering to the minimum of nuclear weapons 
needed to protect its security interests.   
Hypersonics and Fractional Orbital Bombardment. The PRC is probably developing 
advanced nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a fractional 
orbital bombardment (FOB) system in part due to long-term concerns about United States 
missile defense capabilities, as well as to attain qualitative parity with future worldwide 
missile capabilities. On July 27th, 2021, the PRC conducted a test of an ICBM-range 
hypersonic glide vehicle that travelled 40,000 kilometers. The test likely demonstrated the 
PRC’s technical ability to field a FOB system.   
Lower-yield Nuclear Weapons. The PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead 
capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot 
deliver. PRC strategists have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order 
to increase the deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined 
specific nuclear yield values. A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield 
weapon had been developed for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce 
collateral damage. By late 2018, PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States would 
use low-yield weapons against its Taiwan invasion fleet, with related commentary in official 
media calling for proportionate response capabilities. The DF-26 is the PRC’s first nuclear-
capable missile system that can conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most likely 
weapon system to field a lower-yield warhead in the near-term.   


 
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PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear 
weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in the warzone, for 
warning and deterrence. Additional PRC military writings as of 2017 noted that while 
strategic nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with 
high hit precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war. Such 
discussions provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, 
suggesting PRC nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear 
war is uncontrollable.  
Launch on Warning (LOW). The PLA is implementing a launch-on warning posture, called 
“early warning counterstrike” (预警反击), where warning of a missile strike leads to a 
counterstrike before an enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple 
manned C2 organs are involved in this process, warned by space and ground based sensors, 
and that this posture is broadly similar to the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC 
probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, especially its new silo-based units, on a 
LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted exercises involving early warning 
of a nuclear strike and launch on warning responses.  
China’s considerations to attain a LOW posture date back to even the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the PRC considered using existing land-based ballistic missile early warning radar to support 
a LOW posture for its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs, but apparently this early warning system was 
unreliable. In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed 
to support a LOW posture. China has several ground-based large phase array radars—similar 
in appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars—that could support a missile early warning role. 
There has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well. In 2013, foreign 
media sources claimed to be in possession of PLA documents indicating expedited plans to 
field three geostationary satellites capable of detecting ballistic missile launches.  Then, in 
2015, the PRC’s Defense White Paper identified “improved strategic early warning” as 
specific nuclear force modernization goals with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) 
reported including requirements to place early warning satellites in space. As of 2022, the 
PRC likely has at least three early warning satellites in orbit. In 2019, Russia offered to assist 
China in developing a missile early warning system.   
Despite these developments, the PRC has called upon other states to abandon similar launch-
on-warning postures to enhance strategic stability while declining to engage in substantive 
dialogue on risk reduction. The PRC probably believes a LOW posture is consistent with its 
no first use policy, given that it involves a retaliatory strike that takes place after warning of 
an inbound first attack from an adversary. PRC military writings note that command and 
control systems—which would include early warning systems—can be a source of accidental 
nuclear war. China has refused to join the Hague Code of Conduct or participate in other 
confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.  However, 
the PRC does have a bilateral missile and carrier rocket launch notification agreement with 
Russia called the Russian-Chinese Inter-governmental Agreement signed in 2009, which was 


 
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extended for 10 years in 2021—though little additional information regarding the 
implementation of the notification agreement is known.  
New ICBM Silos. The PRC is building hundreds of new ICBM silos. The PRC established a 
silo-based solid-propellant missile project likely consisting of at least 300 silos across three 
fields, judging from the size of the first field. These silos are capable of fielding both DF-31 
and DF-41 class ICBMs. This project and the expansion of China’s DF-5 class silo force 
suggests that the PRC intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by 
moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.  
• 
The PRC is also building more silos for DF-5 class ICBMs; increasing the number of 
brigades while simultaneously increasing the number of launchers per brigade – 
though there is currently no indication this project will approach the size or numbers 
of the solid propellant missile silos.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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Chemical and Biological Research 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, 
develop, and produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale.   
 China probably has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological 
warfare (CBW) agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and numerous 
conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably 
could be adapted to deliver CBW agents.   
 The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which 
raise concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC). This includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins 
with dual-use applications. 
 The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research 
on pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use 
applications. 


 
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The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have 
sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed historical biological 
warfare (BW) program, which the United States assesses that the PRC possessed from the 
1950s to at least the late 1980s. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
in 1984 and regularly submits to confidence-building measures (CBM) under the BWC; 
however, the PRC’s CBM reporting has never acknowledged its past offensive program. As 
part of its historical BW program, the PRC had reported weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, 
and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, plague, and tularemia.  
Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its 
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the 
PRC’s research of PBAs and toxins with potential dual-use applications. China has declared 
that it once operated a small chemical weapons program for offensive purposes; however, 
Beijing has consistently maintained that the program was dismantled and all agents and 
munitions were used before China ratified the CWC in 1997. Beijing also has declared two 
historical chemical warfare production facilities and was probably capable of producing 
mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite.   
Scientists at a PRC military institute have expressed interest in military applications of 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs), including synthesis, characterization, and testing of 
PBAs with potential dual-use applications. In addition, available information on studies 
conducted at PRC military medical institutions indicates that researchers identify, test and 
characterize diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use applications.  
China’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. The PRC probably 
has the technical expertise to weaponize chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents, and 
China’s robust armaments industry and numerous conventional weapon systems, including 
missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could be adapted to deliver CBW agents. China also 
has the technical expertise, military units, and equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and 
to defend against a CBW attack.   
Entities and individuals in the PRC continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, 
components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile 
programs. Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their 
own production capabilities.   
 


 
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CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S 
PERIPHERY 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the 
Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are 
organized based on the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the Central Military Commission (CMC), each Theater 
Command has operational authority over the PLA conventional forces within the 
theater. 
The PRC continues to make steady improvements to joint operations in the five theater 
commands, which were established in early 2016. Each theater command receives direction 
from the CMC, has operational authority over assigned PLA forces within its theater,  and is 
responsible for all conventional combat and non-combat operations within its area of 
responsibility. Theater commands are responsible for developing theater-specific strategies 
aimed at preparing to fight and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans 
and military capabilities, responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability 
of territories. The strategic directions of the theater commands are based on PRC perceptions 
of peripheral threats:   
• 
Eastern Theater Command – Taiwan, East China Sea;  
• 
Southern Theater Command – South China Sea, Southeast Asia border security, 
territorial and maritime disputes; 
• 
Western Theater Command – India, Central Asia, “counterterrorism” in Xinjiang and 
Tibet;  
• 
Northern Theater Command – Korean Peninsula, Russia border security;  
• 
Central Theater Command – Capital defense; surge support to other theaters. 
 
 


 
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EASTERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaways 
 The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the East China Sea.   
 The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of executing a Taiwan 
invasion.   
The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the East China Sea and likely executes 
operational control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies 
in and around the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.  PLA units located within the Eastern 
Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Armies; the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval 
aviation division and two marine brigades; two Air Force divisions, two operational PLAAF 
bases, and one PLARF base. The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all China 
Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related 
to the ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. During a contingency, the Eastern 
Theater Command likely also exercises command over some Strategic Support Force (SSF) 
units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield 
awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.     
In 2021, the Eastern Theater Command focused on training and exercises to improve joint 
operations and combat readiness with long-distance maneuvers and mobilization, aerial 
combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified civilian ferries to augment transportation.    
2021 Eastern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Weidong [何卫东] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Western Theater Command,Commander of 
the Western Theater Command Army 
DOB: 5/1957 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Dongtai, Jiangsu Province [东台市江苏省] 
Education: Army Command College, National University of Defense Technology 
Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command 
DOB: 11/1957 
Age: 64 


 
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Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市] 
Education: N/A 
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command – Lieutenant General Wang Xiubin 
[王秀斌] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command 
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army 
DOB: 3/1964 
Age: 57 
Birthplace: Rudong County, Nantong, Jiangsu Province [江苏省南通市如东县] 
Education: N/A 


 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN 
STRAIT 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC intensified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan in 
2021. 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and 
around the Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air 
Defense Identification Zone and conducting island-seizure exercises.    
Throughout 2021, island-seizure exercises became more frequent and realistic. The PLA 
conducted more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, greatly exceeding the 
13 observed in 2020. Many of these exercises focused on combat realism and featured night 
missions, training in adverse weather conditions, and simultaneous multi-domain operations. 
The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived 
as necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any 
intervention by a third-party, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on 
Taiwan’s behalf. As part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai 
administration, and signal its displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, China has 
persistently conducted military operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan 
contingency. Throughout 2021, the PLA increased provocative actions in and around the 
Taiwan Strait, to include repeated flights into Taiwan’s self-declared Air Defense 
Identification Zone and numerous island seizure exercises.   
PLA Unsafe and Unprofessional Behavior 
Throughout 2021 and into 2022, PLA naval vessels and aircraft have exhibited a sharp 
increase in unsafe and unprofessional behavior in the Indo-Pacific region. Unsafe and 
unprofessional PLA behavior appear to target U.S. and U.S. allies and partner military 
aircrafts and naval vessels, risking a major incident or accident in the region.  
Unsafe behaviors include lasing, aerobatics, discharging objects, and activity that impinge 
upon the ability of nearby aircraft to maneuver safely. For instance, in 2022, a PLA J-16 
fighter maneuvered across the nose of an Australian P-8 operating in international airspace 
in the South China Sea and released a round of chaff that was ingested by the P-8 engine. 
The number of unsafe PLA intercepts against military aircraft operating lawfully in 
international airspace have increased steadily over the past five years.  
 


 
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EAST CHINA SEA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near 
the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands.  
 In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their 
Coast Guard vessels, creating a legal justification for more aggressive patrols. 
The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East 
China Sea (ECS), which Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of 
the four-point consensus signed in 2014, which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge 
divergent positions over the ECS but will prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, 
and crisis management mechanisms. The United States does not take a position on sovereignty 
of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s administration of the islands and continues to 
reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security 
Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any unilateral actions that seek to undermine 
Japan’s administration of the islands.   
The PRC uses maritime law enforcement vessels and aircraft to patrol near the islands, not 
only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness 
to potential contingencies. In 2021, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the 
contiguous zone territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge 
Japan’s control over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. In 
one instance, China Coast Guard (CCG) ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 
100 consecutive days. Japan’s government protested in January 2021, calling on China to 
ensure that new PRC legislation allowing its coast guard to use weapons in its waters complies 
with international law. In August 2021, seven CCG vessels—including four equipped with 
deck guns—sailed into disputed waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku islands in the 
East China Sea. According to the Japanese coast guard, the PRC vessels attempted to approach 
Japanese fishing vessels, but were prevented from doing so by Japan Coast Guard Vessels. 
Increased PRC assertiveness caused Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi to express 
"extremely serious concerns" in December 2021 and led to the Japanese and PRC defense 
ministries to begin operating a new hotline between the two countries to manage the risk of 
escalation. 
 
 
 


 
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SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the South China Sea, Southeast 
Asia border security, and territorial and maritime disputes.   
The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the 
South China Sea (SCS).  This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is 
responsible for securing the SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation 
against Taiwan, and assuring the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to 
China’s global ambitions. PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 
74th and 75th Group Armies, the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air 
Force bases, and two PLA Rocket Force bases. The Southern Theater Command is responsible 
for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the SCS and can assume command 
as needed over all CCG and PAFMM vessels conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed 
“nine-dash line.”  
2021 Southern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Southern Theater Command – Yuan Yubai [袁誉柏]  
Rank: Admiral  
Current position: Commander of the Southern Theater Command  
Previous position: Commander of the PLA Navy Northern Theater Navy and Deputy 
Command of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 5/1956 
Age: 65 
Birthplace: Gongan County, Hubei Province [湖北省公安县] 
Education: Attended and received a master’s degree from the PLA Naval Submarine 
Academy from 1978-1981 
 
Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command – Wang Jianwu [王建武]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Political Commissar of the Souhern Theater Command  
Previous position: Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department 
DOB: 8/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Luoning, Henan Province [河南省洛宁] 
Education: N/A 
 
Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command – Liu Yayong [刘亚永] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command  


 
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Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 4/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Duchang, Jiangxi Province [江西省都昌]  
Education: N/A 
 
The Southern Theater Command is responsible for training, force disposition, and operations 
in the SCS.  In 2020 and 2021, Southern Theater Command units conducted multiple live-fire 
drills and amphibious training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS. The Southern 
Theater Command also plays a significant role in the PLA’s bilateral and multilateral 
exercises with countries in Southeast Asia, participating in a joint naval exercise with 
Pakistan, a counterterrorism exercise with Cambodia, and a U.S. co-led multilateral exercise 
in Thailand, in 2021.   
The PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons are subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
In August 2021, the PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons conducted an annual rotation of 
forces. Since 1997, the PLA has rotated forces by land, air, and sea from Shenzhen at night, 
nominally as part of the usual annual rotation. Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, China 
maintains a rotational deployment of PAP forces in Hong Kong. The PAP and PLA units 
continued to publicly highlight their anti-riot, counterterrorism, and disaster prevention 
training.     
All of the PLA’s 24 Su-35s purchased from Russia are assigned to the Southern Theater 
Command Air Force and have flown patrols in the SCS and the Western Pacific. The Southern 
Theater Command was also the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike 
bombers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first-domestically produced aircraft 
carrier, Shandong into service at Yulin Naval Base in the Southern Theater Command.  
Shortly after, the carrier returned to its shipyard in the Northern Theater to complete testing 
and flight certifications with J-15 fighter aircraft before returning to its homeport on Hainan 
Island sometime in 2020.  


 
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SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s Spratly outposts are capable of supporting military operations, include 
advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft; however, no 
large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed there.  
 In 2021, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels in response 
to Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-
dash-line” and Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island. 
Developments in the Security Situation in the South China Sea 
In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest ruled that the PRC’s 
claims to “historic rights” in the SCS, within the area depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were 
not compatible with UNCLOS. Since December 2019, four SCS claimants (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) have explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes 
verbales to the UN denying the validity of the PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line 
claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the tribunal decision, and the PRC continues 
to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA naval, coast guard, and paramilitary 
vessels, to enforce its claims and advance its interests. The PRC does so in ways calculated 
to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict.  
• 
The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to 
its sovereignty. Throughout 2021, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian vessels 
to maintain a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu 
Island, and in response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within 
the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.” Separately, the CCG blocked two Philippine 
supply boats on their way to an atoll in the South China Sea and employed water 
cannons against them, prompting the United States to warn that an armed attack on 
Philippine public vessels would invoke U.S. defense commitments. 
• 
In April 2020, Beijing announced the creation of two new administrative districts in 
the SCS covering the Paracels and the Spratly Islands. This action were likely intended 
to further solidify PRC claims in these areas—especially in terms of domestic law— 
and justify its actions in the region. 
• 
In July 2019, China and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members 
completed the first reading of the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct (CoC), with a 
second and third reading remaining before China and ASEAN members finalize the 
agreement. China and ASEAN member states had sought to complete CoC 
negotiations by 2021; however, the COVID-19 pandemic has delayed its progress.   


 
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When negotiations resumed in November of 2021, China was met with hostility from 
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte following the aforementioned CCG actions 
against Philippine vessels. Negotiations did not produce substantive outcomes, likely 
because China and some SCS claimants were sensitive to language in the CoC that 
limits their activities. Given the complexity of the disagreement and ASEAN’s 
consensus-based process, it is extremely unlikely that there will be a CoC signed in 
2022.     
    
 
 
South China Sea Outposts Capable of Supporting Military Operations 
Since early 2018, PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced 
anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, marking the most 
capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed South China 
Sea to date. From early 2018 through 2021, the PRC regularly utilized its Spratly Islands 


 
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outposts to support naval and coast guard operations in the South China Sea. In mid-2021, the 
PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the Spratly Islands 
during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region.  
The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it occupies in the 
Spratlys. The PRC has stated the main objectives of these projects are mainly to improve 
marine research, safety of navigation, and the living and working conditions of personnel 
stationed on the outposts. However, the outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and 
resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a more flexible and persistent military and 
paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the PRC’s ability to detect and challenge 
activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the range of response options available 
to Beijing 
WESTERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism 
missions along China’s Central Asia borders.  
The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the 
PRC and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and terrorist threats in western 
China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th and 77th Group 
Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; three 
PLAAF bases, one transportation division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base.   
PAP units responsible for internal security operations are also likely under the control of the 
Western Theater Command.    
Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous 
Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly 
among Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2021 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against 
humanity occurred during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other 
ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have 
arbitrarily detained more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other 
Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed to erase religious and ethnic identities. 
PRC government officials justified the camps under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, 
separatism, and extremism,” however, greater criticism from the international community, 
including the United Nations, refute such justifications. Moreover, ethnic oppression of 
Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by 
extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the 
region. 


 
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Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions of border demarcations along 
the Line of Actual Control (LAC) combined with recent infrastructure construction, led to 
multiple unarmed clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups on both sides of the 
India-China border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols 
in Galwan Valley—the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years—the 
Western Theater Command conducted a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA 
forces along the LAC.  Negotiations stalled throughout 2021, with the 13th round of military 
commander negotiations breaking down in October. Due to the sustained military 
development along the LAC, the Western Theater Command’s deployment will likely 
continue through 2022.   
2021 Western Theater Command Leadership 
 
Commander of the Western Theater Command – General Zhang Xudong [张旭东] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Western Theater Command  
Previous position: Commander of the Central Theater Command Army 
DOB: 11/1962 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Qian'an, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市迁安市] 
Education: N/A 
 
Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command – General Wu Shezhou [吴社洲] 
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command 
Previous position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
Army and Deputy Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
DOB: 1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Hanchuan County, Hubei Province [湖北省汉川县] 
Education: N/A 
 
Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command – Lieutenant General Rong Guiqing [戎
贵卿] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Western Theater Command 
Previous position: Chief of Staff of the Chengdu Military Region 
DOB: 5/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Weishi County, Henan Province [河南省尉氏县] 
Education: Graduated with a master’s degree from the Department of Joint 
Campaign Command of the PLA National Defense University 
 


 
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CHINA-INDIA BORDER 
Key Takeaways 
 Throughout 2021, the PLA sustained the deployment of forces and continued 
infrastructure build up along the LAC.  
 Negotiation made minimal progress as both sides resist losing perceived advantages 
on the border.   
Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and 
clubs wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff 
triggered the buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded 
the withdrawal of the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China 
nor India agreed on those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure 
construction, which it perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China 
of launching aggressive incursions into India’s territory. Since the 2020 clash, the PLA has 
maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the LAC.  
• 
The 2020 Galwan Valley incident was the deadliest clash between the two nations in 
the past 46 years. On June 15th, 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley 
resulting in approximately twenty Indian soldiers and the death of four PLA soldiers, 
according to PRC officials.  
• 
Throughout the standoff, PRC officials sought to downplay the severity of the crisis, 
emphasizing Beijing’s intent to preserve border stability and prevent the standoff from 
harming other areas of its bilateral relationship with India. The PRC seeks to prevent 
border tensions from causing India to partner more closely with the United States. 
PRC officials have warned U.S. officials to not interfere with the PRC’s relationship 
with India. 
NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND 
Key Takeaway 
 The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian 
border security. 
The Northern Theater Command includes the PRC’s provinces bordering Mongolia, Russia, 
North Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern 
periphery and border security associated with North Korean, Russia, and Mongolia.  PLA 
units located within the Northern Theater Command include the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group 
Armies; the Northern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; 


 
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two operational PLAAF bases, one special mission aircraft division, and one flying academy; 
and one PLARF base.  
During a contingency, the Northern Theater Command likely exercises command over some 
Strategic Support Force (SSF) units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from 
the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater.   
The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to 
northern China, but it could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets during 
contingencies located beyond the Northern Theater. In 2021, Northern Theater Command 
forces conducted various joint and single service training activities including carrier 
navigation and flight training, and, likely, UAS training.  
 
2021 Northern Theater Command Leadership 
 
Command of the Northern Theater Command – General Li Qiaoming [李桥铭]  
Rank: General 
Current position: Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 4/1961 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Yanshi, Henan Province [河南省偃师市] 
Education: N/A 
 
Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command – General Fan Xiaojun [范骁骏]  
Rank: General 
Current position: Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command 
Previous position: Director of the Political Work Department of the PLA Air 
Force 
DOB: 10/1956 
Age: 65 
Birthplace: Danyang, Jiangsu Province [江苏省丹阳市] 
Education: N/A 


 
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RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC's relations with North Korea remained officially friendly in 2021, but the 
land border remained closed and North Korea's continued isolation prevented high-
level diplomacy. 
 The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula. 
Throughout 2021, PRC sought to prevent bilateral relations with North Korea from stalling 
due to Pyongyang’s self-imposed COVID-19 isolation, which has prevented high-level 
diplomatic exchanges. The land border remained closed, but in late 2021, North Korea was 
reportedly making preparations to reopen it and resume trade with China and Russia. The 
PRC continues to import North Korean coal by sea, despite United Nations sanctions, and still 
fails to act against prohibited ship-to-ship transfers in their territorial waters. In October 2021, 
the PRC and Russia circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution that would lift some 
sanctions on North Korea, but the Council did not act on the draft. 
The PRC’s objectives for the Korean Peninsula include stability, denuclearization, and the 
absence of U.S. forces near China’s border. The PRC’s focus on maintaining stability on the 
Korean Peninsula involves preventing North Korea’s collapse or military conflict. Toward 
these ends, the PRC continues to advocate for an approach towards North Korea that 
prioritizes dialogue, to include the resumption of U.S.-North Korea talks. Beijing urges 
Washington to acknowledge Pyongyang’s “legitimate concerns” and argues that Pyongyang 
has taken denuclearization measures that merit a commensurate U.S. response, such as 
sanctions relief.  
The PLA conducts military exercises in preparation for a contingency on the Korean 
Peninsula including air, land, sea, and chemical defense training events. China’s leaders could 
order the Northern Theater Command to engage in a range of operations in the event of a 
crisis. These could include securing the China-North Korea border to control the flow of 
refugees, or a military intervention into North Korea to secure weapons of mass destruction 
or preserve a North Korean buffer state.  
CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaway 
 The Central Theater Command’s mission is the defense of Beijing while providing 
support to other theater commands.  


 
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The Central Theater Command’s primary responsibility is to defend the capital and CCP 
leadership while providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. It is centrally 
located, connecting the four remaining theater commands. Major military units under the 
Central Theater Command military include the PLAA’s 81st, 82nd, and 83rd Group Armies; 
the PLAAF’s 13th Transport Division, 34th VIP Transport Division, 36th Bomber Division, 
15th Airborne Corps, the Shijiazhuang Flying Academy, the Wuhan and Datong PLAAF 
bases; and one PLARF base.   
2021 Central Theater Command Leadership 
Commander of the Central Theater Command – Yi Xiaoguang [乙晓光]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Commander of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department 
DOB: 6/1958 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Shuyang County, Jiangsu Province [江苏省沭阳县] 
Education: Graduated from the Baoding Aviation School and received master’s degree 
from the PLA National Defense University 
 
Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command  – Zhu Shengling [朱生岭]  
Rank: General  
Current position: Political Commissar of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Political Commissar of the People’s Armed Police 
DOB: 11/1957 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Dongtai, Jiangsu Province [东台市江苏省] 
Education: Master’s Degree in Military Science 
 
Chief of Staff of the Central Theater Command – Wang Changjiang [王长江] 
Rank: Vice Admiral 
Current position: Chief of Staff of the Central Theater Command 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: 2/1959 
Age: 62 
Birthplace: Luanzhou, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市滦州是] 
Education: The PLA Air Force's Fourth Aviation Academy  
 
2021 Central Theater Command Activities 
On May 31 2021, 16 Ilyushin Il-76 and Y-20 aircraft originating from the Central Theater 
Command’s 13th Transport Division, and possibly the Western Theater Command’s 4th 
Transportation Division, were operating near the contested areas of Malaysian airspace.  


 
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On July 20 2021, the Central Theater Command deployed more than 6,000 soldiers and 
16,000 militiamen for disaster relief in the flood-stricken area of Henan province.  
On November 8 2021, members of the PLA Central Theater Command’s 82nd Group Army 
deployed to the disputed territory of Abyei, Sudan, to perform a yearlong international 
peacekeeping mission.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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THE PRC’S STRATEGY & CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
TAIWAN STRAIT  
Key Takeaways 
 Although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful unification with Taiwan, the PRC 
has never renounced the use of military force; the circumstances under which the PRC 
has historically indicated it would consider using force remain ambiguous and have 
evolved over time. 
 The PRC could conduct a range of options for military campaigns against Taiwan, 
from an air and/or maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and 
occupy some of its offshore islands or all of Taiwan, with varying degrees of 
feasibility and risks associated.   
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan heightened in 2021, as the PRC intensified political 
and military pressure aimed at Taiwan. The PRC continues its suspension of formal 
communication with Taiwan, which it did in 2016, and remains adamant that Taiwan must 
accept Beijing’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart formal engagement. China’s leaders 
have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to Beijing’s “One China principle” which was 
reaffirmed by General Secretary Xi Jinping in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” in 
Taiwan.  
 
PRC efforts to conflate foreign one China policies  
with its “One China principle” 
Beijing’s “One China principle,” established in 1949, according to PRC government white 
papers, predicates diplomatic relations with the PRC on “recognizing” the “government of 
the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China” and “that 
Taiwan is part of China.”  
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, countries around the world have enacted 
respective and unique “One China” policies that govern their relations with the PRC and 
Taiwan. Some countries have endorsed Beijing’s “One China principle” in their national 
“One China” policies, while other countries have determined to “acknowledge,” 
“understand,” or “note” the PRC’s position within their respective, national “One China” 
policies. These unique “One China” policies, and their attendant joint communiques with 
the PRC, provide countries around the world with the legal basis upon which each country 
engages with the PRC and Taiwan.  
The United States’ one China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Under the three Joint Communiques, the U.S. 
acknowledged the PRC’s position and reaffirmed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of 


 
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the “Taiwan question.” The United States’ implementation of the 1982 Communique 
related to arms sales to Taiwan is guided by President Ronald Reagan’s August 17, 1982 
internal presidential memo, where he stated the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales 
to Taiwan is conditioned “absolutely” upon the continued commitment of the PRC to the 
peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC cross-Strait differences. The Six Assurances, delivered 
to Taiwan in 1982, outlined key principles for continued U.S. support for Taiwan.  
The PRC has sought to conflate the United States’ one China policy, as well as other foreign 
nations’ respective “One China” policies, with its own “One China principle.” This effort 
erroneously portrays broad international support for its claim over Taiwan, attempts to 
legitimize PRC coercion against Taiwan, and make assertions of “broken legal 
commitments” by countries who engage with Taiwan in ways that Beijing perceives as 
threatening to its unification objectives.   
 
In October 2021, Taiwan President Tsai Ing-Wen called for a building of consensus around 
four commitments: 1) to a free and democratic constitutional system; 2) that Taiwan and 
China should not be subordinate to each other; 3) to resist annexation or encroachment upon 
the island's sovereignty, and 4) that Taiwan's future be decided in accordance with the will of 
its people. Xi replied in a 2021 New Year’s Eve speech, stating the complete unification of 
"the motherland" was an aspiration shared by people on both sides of the Strait − referring to 
Taiwan, which Xi described as "sacred" territory. This speech came a week after Beijing’s 
Taiwan Affairs Office warned that China would take "drastic measures" if Taiwan makes 
moves towards formal independence.  
The PRC appears willing to defer the use of military force as long as it considers that 
unification with Taiwan could be negotiated over the long-term and the costs of conflict 
outweigh the benefits. The PRC argues that the credible threat of force is essential to 
maintaining the conditions for political progress on its terms and preventing Taiwan from 
making moves toward independence.  In January 2019, General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly 
reiterated the PRC’s long-standing refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the Taiwan 
issue and its position on peaceful unification under the model of “one country, two systems.”  
In his July 2021 speech, Xi put more emphasis on opposing Taiwan independence than on 
pressing unification during his tenure. In addition, Xi omitted China’s offer of “one country, 
two systems” including the “protection” of Taiwan’s social system, way of life, private 
property, religious beliefs, and “lawful rights and interests,” provided the PRC’s “sovereignty, 
security, and development interests,” are ensured. However, the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan White 
Paper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office restated the PRC’s preference for peaceful 
reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework, while maintaining a refusal 
to renounce the use of force to compel unification, if needed. 


 
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Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan from polling data over recent years, PRC 
leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under Beijing’s 
“one country, two systems” framework. The PRC in 2021 continued an aggressive pressure 
campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and 
deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near 
Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA 
to improve its planning and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to 
achieve their objectives.   
• 
The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicated it would consider 
the use force have evolved over time. These circumstances have included:  
‒ Formal declaration of Taiwan independence;  
‒ Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence;  
‒ Internal unrest in Taiwan;  
‒ Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;  
‒ Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue on unification; 
‒ Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.  
• 
Article 8 of the PRC’s March 2005 Anti-Secession Law states that the PRC may use 
“non-peaceful means” if “secessionist forces … cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession 
from China,” if “major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession” occur, or if 
“possibilities for peaceful reunification” are exhausted. The PRC’s use of such non-
specific conditions increases their policy flexibility through deliberate strategic 
ambiguity. 
PLA Increasing Military Pressure on Taiwan Through 
2021, Rising in 2022   
Throughout 2021 and into 2022, the PRC has increasingly deployed military means to 
pressure Taiwan to yield to Beijing’s “reunification” objectives and punish Taiwan for 
perceived transgressions.  
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) markedly increased its air operations inside Taiwan’s self-
declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2021 compared to 2020, with PLAAF 
aircraft entering the Taiwan ADIZ on 240 days of 2021, according to data published by 
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Notably, the ratio of advanced PLAAF J-16 
fighters in these operations increased throughout 2021 and special mission aircraft 
operating inside the Taiwan ADIZ on a near daily basis.    


 
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Amphibious exercises—training events that would help prepare the PLA for an amphibious 
assault on Taiwan—also increased in 2021. Moreover, the PLA Navy (PLAN) conducted 
more than 20 naval exercises with an island-capture element, exceeding the 13 observed 
in 2020. In one three-month period, the PLAN conducted more than 120 maritime training 
exercises. The PLA also tested new platforms that could potentially play a key role in an 
amphibious assault, such as the Type 05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), which it used 
in large numbers for the first time in 2021.    
The PLA has continued to erode the status quo across the Taiwan Strait into 2022. In 
reaction to the U.S. Speaker of the House’s Congressional Delegation in early August, the 
PLAAF flew more than 250 fighter aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 
August 2022, according to Taiwan MND data. Additionally, in August 2022, the PLA Rocket 
Force (PLARF) fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones in waters around Taiwan, 
including at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, according the Japan Ministry of 
Defense – an unprecedented act. The PLA likely will continue to increase military pressure— 
in concert with diplomatic, information, and economic pressure—in an attempt to compel 
Taiwan towards unification.  
 
PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN 
The PRC continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA 
has a range of options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple 
domains. The PRC could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force 
or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more 
comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or attempt to 
compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table under Beijing’s terms. Notably, the PRC 
would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign—
capabilities relevant to deterring or countering potential U.S. intervention were among those 
that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th 
anniversary. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a limited 
war of short duration.  In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate 
cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to 
fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer the following 
military options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying 
degrees of feasibilities and risk associated.  
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which 
the PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s 
vital imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation. Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures 
of Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to 
compel Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct 
weeks or months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely will complement its air 
and maritime blockades with concurrent electronic warfare (EW), network attacks, and 


 
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information operations (IO) to further isolate Taiwan’s authorities and populace and to control 
the international narrative of the conflict.    
Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or 
lethal military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with 
overt and clandestine economic and political activities supported by a variety of information 
operations to shape perceptions or undercut the effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan 
authorities. Such a campaign could include computer network or limited kinetic attacks 
against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure to induce fear in Taiwan and 
degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. Similarly, PLA special 
operations forces (SOF) could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or 
leadership targets.  
Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key 
government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and 
communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or 
undermine the public’s resolve to resist.   
Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an amphibious 
invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, 
envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, 
logistics, air, and naval support. The objectives are to break through or circumvent shore 
defenses, establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, 
and seize key targets or the entire island.     
The PRC continues to build and exercise capabilities that would likely contribute to a full-
scale invasion. In 2021, the PLA conducted joint amphibious assault exercises near Taiwan 
and completed construction of its third LHA. In addition to this capability, the PLA likely will 
augment their capabilities with civilian “roll on/roll off” ships, under the legal basis of the 
2016 National Defense Transportation Law. The PLA experimented with launching 
amphibious assault vehicles from these civilian ships in July 2020 and summer 2021, allowing 
them to flow amphibious forces directly to the beach rather than disembarking at port 
facilities. 
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military 
operations, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment of 
supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.  An attempt to invade Taiwan would likely strain 
PRC’s armed forces and invite international intervention. Combined with inevitable force 
attrition, complexity of urban warfare, and potential insurgency, these factors make an 
amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi Jinping and the 
Chinese Communist Party, even assuming a successful landing and breakout.    


 
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The PLA is capable of various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.  
With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, the PRC could launch an 
invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the South China Sea such as Pratas or Itu Aba.    
A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island such as Matsu or Kinmen is within 
the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, political 
resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure of 
restraint. This kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political risk 
because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful 
international opposition.  
 
THE PLA'S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT 
PLA Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to enhance its readiness to prevent Taiwan 
independence and execute an invasion. Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault 
training in recent years likely indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the 
Army.  Major PLAA contributions to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive 
amphibious, army aviation, and air assault operations.   


 
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The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater 
Command (nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units 
continued amphibious assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts 
in 2021. Training events refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach 
assault under complicated sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also 
claimed extensive use of sea, air, and ground unscrewed systems in support of the amphibious 
assault operation. PLAA amphibious brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale 
amphibious operations that are almost certainly aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion 
scenario.  
Amphibious trainings were frequent in 2021—in one 3-month period the PLA held more than 
120 maritime trainings. They also tested new platforms that would play a key role in an 
amphibious seizure. In 2021, the PLA debuted the YUSHEN class amphibious assault ship 
(Type 075) Hainan LHA, designed to improve forces' operational capabilities and vessel 
maneuver. Additional YUSHEN class hulls are currently under construction. It appears that 
the PLA is also planning to build a new class of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076. The 
new Type 076 reportedly will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, which would 
enhance its ability to support fixed-wing aircraft and make it somewhat more like an aircraft 
carrier. 2021 also saw the PLA’s most advanced amphibious armored equipment, the Type 
05 amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), used in large numbers for the first time. These AAVs 
represent an upgrade in armor, survivability, and speed from the last-generation Type 63A, 
and provide the PLA with a more capable amphibious assault platform. 
PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine 
warfare capabilities, further developing an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new 
multi-mission platforms capable of conducting diverse missions during peace and war.  New 
attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and fourth-
generation naval aircraft are designed to achieve maritime superiority within the First Island 
Chain to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.  
The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of 
ocean-going amphibious transport docks (LPDs) and amphibious assault ships (LHAs) ships. 
There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its tank landing ships (LSTs) and 
medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has not invested in the large 
number of landing ships and medium landing craft that outsiders believe the PLA would need 
for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has sufficient amphibious 
capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational capabilities— 
such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets— to address this gap. The PLA may also 
have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the 
necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.   
PLA Air Force (PLAAF). The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of 
capabilities necessary in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced 


 
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aircraft capable of conducting operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, 
providing it with a significant capability to conduct air and ground-attack operations. A 
number of long-range air defense systems provide a strong layer of defense against attacks on 
key military installations or population centers on China’s mainland. The PRC’s development 
of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved ISR capability to support PLA 
operations.  Additionally, the PLAAF has improved refueling capabilities, expanding its 
ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party 
intervention. 
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against 
high-value targets, including Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, to degrade 
Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. 2021 
saw an acceleration of the positioning of conventional missiles. PLARF nuclear units will 
likely be postured to conduct deterrence operations.     
Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space 
and cyberspace domains in joint operations.  The PRC’s 2019 Defense White Paper stated that 
its armed forces are accelerating the build-up of its cyberspace capabilities, specifically its 
cyber defenses and its ability to detect and counter network intrusions. PLA writings suggest 
that the SSF would be responsible for EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan 
contingency, as one of the missions of the force is to seize and maintain information 
dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be responsible for political and psychological warfare, 
such as disseminating propaganda against Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote 
the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a strategic information and communications 
support role, centralizing technical intelligence collection and management and providing 
strategic intelligence support to theater commands involved in a Taiwan contingency.  
Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics 
support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, 
by conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support 
mechanisms. 
TAIWAN’S ABILITY TO DETER FORCE 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the 
capability gap compared to Taiwan’s military. 
 To counter the PRC’s improving capabilities, Taiwan is developing new concepts and 
capabilities for asymmetric warfare. 


 
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Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to garner international support and 
expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity 
with the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, 
improving joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and 
noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects 
adjustments to the military’s strategy for defending the island, placing emphasis on protecting 
its littorals and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified 
strategy stresses enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater 
reliance on Taiwan’s Air Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures. 
However, these improvements only partially address Taiwan’s defense challenges. 
Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 
active duty billets. As of 2021, the Ministry of National Defense accomplished the goal to fill 
90 percent of the active duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitioned to an 
all-volunteer force, the cost savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to 
improve individual pay and benefits, housing, and incentive pay; however, these savings have 
been insufficient to cover the full increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and 
retain personnel under the new system. Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and 
readiness challenges. Reservists and civil defense volunteers support the active duty forces. 
Taiwan’s reserves number approximately 2.3 million, roughly 750,000 of which participate 
in refresher training. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization within 
its national security structure to improve whole of society mobilization to support defense.   
Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget in order to support defense acquisitions and 
bolster its forces against PRC pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense 
spending to be the highest level since 1990. Taiwan announced a further 10 percent increase 
from the previous year, bringing the 2021 defense budget to NT$453 billion ($15.4 billion), 
and representing more than 2% of Taiwan’s GDP. Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget 
continues to grow and is about 17 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of it 
focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force. Recognizing the 
growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has stated that it is 
working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric warfare. 
Some specific areas of emphasis include offensive and defensive information and electronic 
warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid mining and 
minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan has 
also dedicated significant defense spending toward its domestic submarine program, 
upgrading its existing F-16 fighters, as well as producing four transport docks and four 
minelaying ships to supplement its navy.  
Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability. From fiscal year 2019 to 2021, the United States has notified 


 
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approximately $17 billion in potential arms sales to Taiwan, including 66 F-16 Block 70 
fighter jets, 108 M1A2T Abrams tanks, four MQ-9 Reaper surveillance drones, Patriot missile 
system components, 250 Stinger missiles, 18 Mk-48 Mod 6 heavyweight torpedoes, artillery 
rocket systems, Paladin howitzers, 100 Harpoon coastal defense cruise missile systems, and 
AGM-84 SLAM-ER missiles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING 
GLOBAL PRESENCE 
 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s 
national rejuvenation.  
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside 
China’s borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas 
interests and advance its foreign policy goals.  
The CCP continues its goal to create international conditions that are conducive to the PRC’s 
development and compatible with its aspirations for the PRC’s rejuvenation as a “great 
modern socialist country.” CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the 
PLA’s growing global presence, contribute to creating a “favorable” international 
environment for the PRC’s national rejuvenation. This evolving approach parallels the Party’s 
view that the initial decades of the 21st century represent a “period of strategic opportunity” 
to focus on building the PRC’s comprehensive national power.  
The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s 
borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance 
its foreign policy goals. The PRC is focusing efforts to develop security relationships with 
key countries along its periphery. In addition to promoting BRI, the PRC has begun to seek 
new cooperative security partnerships with foreign nations, including the expansion of the 
PLA’s global military attaché presence and access, expansion of strategic partnerships, and 
ensuring more reliable, cost-effective, and diverse sources of energy and other strategic 
resources.  
The PRC probably will continue to expand the PLA’s global military presence through 
humanitarian assistance, naval escorts and port calls, UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), 
arm sales, influence operations, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through 
these engagements, Beijing can strengthen and expand its diplomatic relationships to advance 
its foreign policy goals, to include shaping the international system to align with the PRC’s 
interests, gaining operational experience for the PLA, and attracting foreign interest in hosting 
PLA bases abroad.  


 
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CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active 
role in advancing its foreign policy goals.  
 As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s 
leaders have increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the 
capabilities to operate beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance 
and defend these interests. This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military 
coercion—and inducements—to advance its global security and development 
interests. 
 In 2021, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas, build closer ties to 
foreign militaries, and provide COVID-19 related aid. In late 2021, China and 
Cambodia attended a groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of a military 
police shooting range. Around the same time, PRC medical experts from the PLA 
General Hospital provided online training to PRC doctors assigned to PRC 
peacekeeping forces overseas.  
The PLA’s Evolving Missions & Tasks. In 2004, one of the “new historic missions” given 
to the PLA by then-President Hu Jintao was to support China’s overseas interests and 
diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus—from “offshore defense” to “open seas protection” 
—reflects the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach. The PLAAF’s missions and tasks 
have similarly evolved towards conducting operations beyond China and its immediate 
periphery, and supporting the PRC’s interests by becoming a “strategic” air force. 
Additionally, the PLA has embraced its concept of non-war military activities (NWMA) as 
an effective way to support and safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s global 
interests, and gain valuable operational experience.   
The PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA, and SSF have deployed abroad for counterpiracy, humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), peacekeeping, training exercises, and space support 
operations. Within the PLA, the PLAN has the most experience operating abroad due to its 
far seas deployments and counterpiracy missions, the PLAAF likely has the most experience 
conducting rapid response HA/DR operations abroad,  and the PLAA has the most experience 
conducting peacekeeping operations. The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command 
stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan 
Wang space support ships to track satellite and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
launches.  
• 
Increasingly, the PLAN is operating outside of its home waters in places that include 
the Middle East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Latin 
America. The PLAN has also conducted submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, 


 
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demonstrating its increasing familiarity in that region and underscoring the PRC’s 
interest in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) beyond the South China 
Sea.  In 2015, three PLAN ships from a Gulf of Aden naval escort task force evacuated 
629 PRC citizens from Yemen to Djibouti and Oman.  
• 
Since 2002, the PLAAF has delivered aid after natural disasters throughout Southeast 
Asia and South Asia, assisted with evacuation from Libya in 2015. The PLAAF has 
delivered COVID-19 related aid to multiple countries including Myanmar, Vietnam, 
Pakistan, and Tunisia. 
Military Cooperation. As China’s regional and international interests grow increasingly 
complex, the PLA’s international engagements likely will continue to expand. Beijing often 
relies on senior military visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, and 
peacekeeping and military assistance to promote China’s foreign policy objectives. For 
example, through 2021, Beijing continued to conduct global “vaccine diplomacy” with 
Cambodia, Pakistan, Mongolia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia, among other countries, 
which has allowed China to deepen bilateral relations and set itself up as a global leader. As 
part of this COVID assistance, China has also donated personal protective equipment to more 
than 50 countries throughout 2021 and has deployed its naval hospital ship nine times over 
the past ten years to provide medical services for more than 40 countries and regions.    
PRC has sought to gain security access through policing cooperation agreements and is likely 
to continue seeking these agreements. Following domestic unrest and riots in the Solomon 
Islands that threatened Chinese property and nationals in late 2021, Beijing offered to provide 
Honiara with policing assistance.   
While senior-level military visits and international exchanges remained limited throughout 
2021 due to the pandemic, China continued to promote selective military engagements, such 
as signing a revised memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Korea regarding the 
establishment and use of direct communication lines between their respective air forces and 
navies in March 2021. China may have used these engagements as an opportunity to observe 
foreign military command structures, unit formation, operational training, and shaping foreign 
approaches to shared security concerns. In 2021, China’s Minister of National Defense, 
General Wei Fenghe, led delegations to Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Singapore, and 
Tajikistan, where he also met with Russian Defense Minister General Sergey Shoygu. Wei 
undertook these visits to further promote bilateral relations and, in the case of the meeting 
with Shoygu, to demonstrate China’s solidarity and expanding relationship with Russia. 
The PRC continues to expand the PLA’s participation in bilateral and multilateral military 
exercises, normalizing the PLA’s presence overseas and establishing ties to foreign militaries. 
For example, in 2021, the PLA participated in seventeen bilateral or multilateral exercises, 
including hosting Russian forces for Interaction-2021, as well as Peace Mission 2021 along 
with forces from other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) militaries including 


 
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Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. China also hosted forces 
from Pakistan, Mongolia, and Thailand in Queshan County, Henan Province for Shared-
Destiny-2021, a multinational peacekeeping exercise. Additionally, China partnered with Iran 
and Russia for joint naval drills in February of 2022. For a list of selected PLA bilateral and 
multilateral exercises in 2021, see Appendix III.  
In recent years, the PRC has expanded its efforts on global peacekeeping and increased 
contributions to multilateral organizations, particularly in Africa. The PRC currently has more 
than 2,500 forces participating in peacekeeping missions worldwide, of which approximately 
1,800 are performing missions in several countries and regions. The PLA also deploys regular 
convoys in the Gulf of Aden, and has a number of forces stationed in Lebanon. China’s 
peacekeeping forces have provided a wide variety of services, including medical training and 
support, minesweeping efforts to include donating mine clearance equipment, and repair and 
construction of key infrastructure.     
Military Attaché Presence. China’s military attaché presence has grown around the world, 
which reflects its increasing global interests. Military attaches manage much of the PLA’s 
day-to-day military diplomacy efforts using PLA military attachés in over 110 offices 
worldwide. The attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, support Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives. They also perform a variety of duties tied 
to PLA military and security cooperation, including counterpart exchanges with host-nation 
and third-country personnel. Additionally, attachés may conduct clandestine and overt 
intelligence collection on their areas of assignment. Although the general function of an 
attaché office is the same worldwide, attaché offices probably prioritize different specific 
missions or diplomatic priorities based on China’s defense objectives across different 
countries.   
China’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to ten officers. Most 
offices consist of just a few accredited officers; however, offices in countries considered 
important to China’s strategic interests are often considerably larger, potentially including 
multiple assistant attachés, dedicated naval or air force attachés, and support staff. 
Counterterrorism. Beijing is implementing its global counterterrorism (CT) strategy through 
international outreach that spans across diplomatic and military domains to garner the 
assistance of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against PRC 
citizens abroad. China routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur 
extremists, pursues formal extradition treaties with countries with large Chinese diaspora 
populations and seeks public endorsement of its CT efforts in multilateral forums. Beijing 
further leverages involvement in regional security forums, joint border patrols, and 
international exercises to press its neighbors into adopting China’s approach to CT operations.   
Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2021, China continued to conduct counterpiracy operations within 
the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters by deploying its 37th, 38th, 39th and 40th naval escort task 


 
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forces to the area since 2008. The 39th Task Force escorted 48 Chinese ships and foreign ships 
while voyaging over 90,000 nautical miles in over 165 days. At the conclusion of 
deployments, these task groups usually conducted port calls and bilateral engagements with 
host-country militaries and local Chinese communities, providing additional opportunities for 
PLA military diplomacy. However, it is unclear if this activity has resumed, likely due to 
continued concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic.     
Peacekeeping Operations. In 2022, the PRC continued to contribute the largest number of 
forces among the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The 
PRCs participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports the PRC’s objectives of 
highlighting its role as a global actor and obtaining operational experience for the PLA. The 
PRC could use its role in nine UN PKOs to collect intelligence on other UN units, and 
supporting these missions demonstrates the PLA’s ability to operate outside of China’s 
borders. The PRC provides PLA forces and other personnel to several UN PKOs, primarily 
across Africa and in Lebanon. For the PRC, contributing PLA forces to UN peacekeeping 
operations is one of several measures it employs to support its country’s engagement across 
the African continent to expand its foreign policy goals. Beijing continues to provide PLA 
personnel to UN operations in Mali, Moroccan Sahara, Sudan and South Sudan, Cyprus, and 
Lebanon. PRC personnel deployed to peacekeeping operations consist of forces, police, staff 
officers, and experts that include engineers, medical professionals, and logisticians. As of the 
end of 2021, the PRC was the ninth largest contributor of personnel to the UN PKOs with 
approximately 2,235 personnel among nine UN PKO missions in Africa and the Middle East. 
The PRC’s force contributions decreased from 2,548 personnel in October 2020 to 2,235 at 
the end of 2021. The PRC is the second largest financial contributor to UN PKOs and has 
funded 15 percent of the total $6.38 billion 2021-2022 UN PKO budget.  
Military Education Collaboration. Beijing considers establishing international professional 
military education (PME) to create transnational networks of alumni, establish the doctrinal 
foundation for globally integrated operations, and strengthen China’s defense and security 
ties. Over the past decade, China has increased its military exchange programs with a bias 
toward junior officers. Nearly half of the 70 military academies operating in China admit 
foreign students but only a few offer senior-level education. The College of Defense Studies 
of the PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU) is the highest level of training for 
foreign officers offered by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to training 
foreign senior military officials, PLA NDU conducts international exchanges and academic 
discussions on defense and security issues. The PLA NDU has accepted students from more 
than 100 partner nations and has pursued relationships with Latin American and African 
militaries.  
Although third countries have historically perceived Chinese PME as less prestigious than 
Russian or U.S. PME, Beijing’s growing economic clout and expanded global security 
presence has bolstered the international reputation of Chinese programs. For example, PLA 


 
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NDU offers students higher stipends and greater exposure to Chinese technological and 
scientific innovations (such as military applications of AI) than Russian schools. 
China also cultivates transnational alumni and shared doctrinal understanding through short-
term course offerings. Since 2002, the PLA NDU sought to increase exchanges with the 
international military community by sponsoring security seminars annually, which aim to 
foster cooperation, strengthen military exchanges, and attempt to impart a common approach 
to issues of interest to the community. The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from 
over 90 countries; it also maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 
countries in addition to over 140 countries’ militaries. 
Despite the PLA’s progress to enhance its PME programs, cultural and linguistic barriers limit 
the effectiveness of PRC PME. For example, foreign student and host nation student contacts 
and opportunities for interaction are limited owing to the separation between Chinese and 
foreign language courses. Additionally, PRC military schools rarely consider root causes of 
the security problems they teach their students despite a detailed dive into the problems 
themselves. Lastly, military ethics and human rights are off-limits for discussion within the 
PLA NDU curriculum; students are prohibited from criticizing Beijing’s record in these areas, 
whether they are Chinese or foreign.  
PRC Influence Operations. The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the 
modern battlespace as a critical enabler and means of achieving information dominance early 
in a conflict. Since the early 2000s, as part of the PRC’s overall influence operations, the PLA 
has been developing the “Three Warfares” concept, which calls for the coordinated use of 
public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. Public opinion warfare 
creates and disseminates information to guide an adversary’s public opinion and gain support 
from domestic and foreign audiences. Psychological warfare uses propaganda, deception, and 
coercion to induce pressure and affect the behavior of the target audience. Legal warfare uses 
domestic and international laws to shape narratives that advance PRC interests and undermine 
those of an adversary. The PLA likely seeks to couple digital influence activities with the 
“Three Warfares” concept to demoralize adversaries and influence domestic and foreign 
audiences during conflict.  
From the CCP’s perspective, influence operations are undertaken by all nations, especially 
the United States, which Beijing believes uses digital narratives, to undermine the CCP’s 
governance system in the PRC. Thus in the CCP’s view, the PRC’s influence operations are 
a means to counter this perceived subversion and are considered a defensive measure to 
protect the party and the military. 
At the heart of the PRC’s influence operations is the CCP’s ability to maintain its stable and 
continued governance of China. Domestically, the CCP uses influence activities to protect the 
PLA’s image to the public and garner their support for the military. Internationally, Beijing 
aims to create an information environment favorable to its strategic objectives. The PRC 


 
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conducts influence operations that target media organizations, business, academic, cultural 
institutions, Chinese diaspora communities, and policy communities of the United States, 
other countries, and international organizations, to shape public discourse and achieve 
outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
PRC influence operations are coordinated at the high level and executed by a range of actors, 
such as the PLA Political Work Department, United Front Work Department (UFWD), 
International Liaison Department, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the PLA 
Strategic Support Force (SSF). The CCP likely seeks to condition international institutions 
and public opinion to accept the PRC’s narrative surrounding its priorities such as the 
“inevitable rise” of the PRC as a great power, Beijing’s “one China principle” on Taiwan 
unification, the Belt and Road Initiative, political control over Hong Kong, and territorial and 
maritime claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.   
The PRC almost certainly will increase its influence over foreign governments using a 
combination of diplomatic, economic, and defense engagements tools. Beijing engages in 
such activities to promote its interests abroad while undermining U.S. influence. PRC 
influence operations take advantage of corruption where present and can include lobbying, 
bribing, or cultivating foreign politicians. PRC influence operations also aim to inject Chinese 
cultural narratives or values into foreign education systems, bridging academic or think tank 
researchers’ access to China, and flooding Chinese language media abroad, all of which can 
be accomplished via diplomacy or coercive means. A foundation of the PRC’s influence 
strategy includes appealing to overseas PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese of other countries as 
indirect proxy to assert the CCP’s objectives through soft power engagements. The PRC also 
uses threats, blackmail, and other forms of coercion to force members of Chinese diaspora 
communities to assist in carrying out Beijing’s priorities. As part of this strategy, the PRC 
often targets Uyghurs overseas with threats to imprison their family members in China. 
Furthermore, the UFWD collaborated with overseas Chinese communities in Latin America 
and Caribbean countries in order to shape positive views of China that would better facilitate 
economic ties. Additionally, the PRC’s hundreds of known “talent recruitment programs,” 
such as the Thousand Talents, target ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese scientists and experts 
around the world to support a systematic strategy of identifying and acquiring technologies 
critical to the PRC’s scientific and technical modernization. 
The PRC has also demonstrated its intent to use multilateral forums and organizations to 
expand its defense influence and security cooperation while establishing a leadership role in 
those organizations. The PRC promotes strategic messaging by portraying China as a 
responsible global actor through organizations such as the World Trade Organization, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa (BRICS) mechanism. Additionally, the PRC augments this strategic communication 
with “forum diplomacy,” the creation of regional diplomatic bodies such as the Forum on 


 
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China-Africa Cooperation, the China-CELAC Forum, the China-Arab States Cooperation 
Forum, and the China-Central Central Eastern Cooperation Framework.      
The PRC uses overt and covert messaging vectors, such as the Internet, social media 
platforms, and military cyberspace capabilities during peacetime and wartime. The PLA’s 
goals for social media influence operations can fall into three broad categories: promote a 
narrative favorable to the PRC, undermine adversary resolve, and shape foreign governments’ 
policies in favor of Beijing’s interests. The PLA views social media through the prism of 
information dominance and during a crisis, the PRC could use digital influence operations to 
undermine enemy morale and confuse or deceive adversary decision makers.  Most Chinese 
media platforms, including traditional and digital newspaper, and television programs, are 
either state-owned or heavily influenced by Beijing to augment the CCP’s response to 
geopolitics and often take on a more aggressive messaging tone. 
The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected that the CCP understood cyberspace operations 
as the primary mean for psychological manipulation. As the PLA seeks to expand the reach 
of its influence operations around the world and seize information dominance on the 
battlefield, it is researching and developing the next evolution of psychological warfare called 
cognitive domain operation (CDO) (认知领域作战) that leverages subliminal messaging, 
deep fakes, overt propaganda, and public sentiment analysis. The PLA views CDO as a more 
aggressive form of psychological warfare that it could employ across a range of domains to 
influence an adversary’s cognitive functions.  
The CCP has consistently framed the United States and the broader Western community as a 
threat to its interests and security. This has enabled Beijing to continue expanding the target 
audience of its influence campaigns to discredit the United States, amplify the PRC’s great 
power narratives, and reorder the Indo-Pacific region to China’s advantage.    
China’s Energy Supplies. In 2021, China imported approximately 10.3 million barrels per 
day of crude oil, which met about 72 percent of its needs, according to an industry report. 
China continues to build its crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) capacity to 
safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ worth of 
imports—about 1.25 billion barrels—in storage. China’s EPR storage capacity is 
approximately 600 million barrels, according to industry data. China met about 45 percent of 
its natural gas demand with imports in 2021, and industry experts estimate that China’s natural 
gas imports will increase to about 50 percent by 2035.  In 2021, most of China’s oil and natural 
gas imports came from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia. China’s 
investments in transport networks for oil and gas could help diversify its supply and reduce 
dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. 
China relies on maritime routes that transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca for 
most of its hydrocarbon deliveries. Approximately 76 percent of China’s oil imports and 23 


 
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percent of its total natural gas imports transit the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca.  
Despite China’s efforts to diversify energy suppliers, the sheer volume of oil and natural gas 
imported from Africa and the Middle East will make securing strategic maritime routes a 
priority for Beijing for at least the next 15 years. 
Crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate China’s interest in 
increasing overland fuel supply. In 2021, China imported about 600,000 barrels per day of 
Russian crude oil via the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which has a total designed 
capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day. China also imports crude oil from Middle Eastern—
primarily Saudi—and African suppliers via a crude oil pipeline across Burma. This 440,000-
barrels-per-day pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from 
Kyaukpyu, Burma, to Yunnan Province, China, and reduces shipping time by more than a 
third.  
In 2021, approximately 20 percent of China’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan 
via a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This pipeline can transport 55 
billion cubic meters per year; Turkmenistan and China are planning to expand it to 80 billion 
cubic meters per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion 
cubic meters per year, but only 4.1 billion cubic meters of gas was shipped in 2021. In early 
December 2020, the middle section of the China-Russia East natural gas pipeline—which is 
connected to the Power of Siberia pipeline—began operations, which will increase gas supply 
to 27 million cubic meters per day. The pipeline is projected to reach an annual capacity of 
38 billion cubic meters per year by 2025.  
China in the Polar Regions. China has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic 
region since gaining observer status in the Arctic Council in 2013.  In May 2019, China hosted 
the Arctic Circle China Forum in Shanghai where PRC Officials highlighted Beijing’s interest 
in expanding its partnership with countries along the Polar Silk Road.  In January 2018, China 
published its first Arctic strategy that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be 
a “near-Arctic State.” The strategy identifies Beijing’s interests as access to natural resources, 
sea lines of communication, and promoting an image of a “responsible major country” in 
Arctic affairs. The strategy highlights China’s icebreaker vessels and research stations as 
integral to implementation. During the 2019 Arctic Circle China Conference, PRC officials 
underlined the importance of China’s role in protecting the Arctic environment.  
China maintains research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates two icebreaking 
research vessels. The first is the Xue Long, which in 2017 became the first Chinese official 
vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage, and in September 2019, completed the 10th 
Arctic expedition, which focused on research on the Arctic environment. In 2018, Beijing 
launched its second icebreaking research vessel, the Xue Long 2. The Xue Long 2 can break 
ice up to 1.5 meters thick, compared to the Xue Long’s maximum of 1.2 meters. Furthermore, 
the Xue Long 2 is the first polar research vessel in the world that can break ice while moving 
forwards or backwards. In July 2021, the Xue Long 2 commenced the PRC’s 12th Arctic 


 
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expedition, during which researchers studied the ecosystem and new pollutants in Arctic 
waters. The Xue Long 2 explored the Gakkel Ridge in order to learn about the formation of 
rocks and magma and the geomorphic features. During the 12th Arctic Expedition, the PRC 
deployed an autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) for the first time in the Arctic Ocean. In 
November 2020, the Xue Long 2 embarked on the PRC’s 37th Antarctic expedition, where 
researchers planned to carry out hydrological, meteorological and environmental studies, and 
monitor new pollutants such as microplastics and drifting garbage in the Antarctic Ocean. 
The PRC’s expanding Arctic engagement has created new opportunities for engagement 
between the PRC and Russia. Russian Foreign Minister referred to the PRC as Russia’s 
“priority partner” in the Arctic. In April 2019, China and Russia established the Sino-Russian 
Arctic Research Center. PRC and Russia plans to use this center to conduct a joint expedition 
to research optimal routes of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and climate change were probably 
limited due to a continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic.    
In mid-2021, during a virtual summit between PRC President Xi Jinping and Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, the PRC and Russia agreed to deepen cooperation in the Arctic and 
strengthen collaboration on the use of the NSR. The PRC and Russia support further 
cooperation on commercial issues, energy development, and infrastructure projects such as 
the Yamal LNG project in north-central Siberia and LNG 2, a notional second natural gas 
plant which Russia and the PRC signed agreements for in 2018. In 2019, Russia and China 
also agreed to found a joint Arctic research center, furthering their academic cooperation 
alongside economic measures. As of late 2021, PRC banks agreed to provide 2.5 billion 
rubles, although the PRC continued to raise the issues of Yamal LNG dividend taxation. 
However, some limitations and potential bilateral friction points remain. In 2019 and in 2022, 
Russia proposed regulations governing the passage along the Northern Sea Route, which 
would have required foreign warships to give Moscow 45 days' notice of their intention to 
transit and to have a Russian pilot on board, and would have reserved Moscow the right to 
refuse passage. Additionally, Russian experts have noted private Russian objections to 
China’s “Polar Silk Road” concept, saying it undermines a Russian-led Northern Sea Route.   
The PRC is also increasing its presence in the Antarctic through scientific projects, 
commercial ventures, and infrastructure and capability investments, likely intended to 
strengthen its position for future claims to natural resources and maritime access. The PRC’s 
strategy for Antarctica includes the use of dual-use technologies, facilities, and scientific 
research, which are likely intended, at least in part, to improve PLA capabilities. Beijing’s 
2015 National Security Law identifies polar regions, along with deep sea and outer space, as 
areas for development and exploitation.  
China-Russia Relations. Throughout 2021, Russia and the PRC continued to broaden their 
strategic diplomatic, informational, military and economic cooperation, primarily aimed 
countering the United States. PRC leaders, including PRC President Xi Jinping, have 
reiterated on multiple occasions the strength and commitment toward sustaining Sino-Russian 


 
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relations. In August 2021, more than 13,000 Russian and Chinese military personnel 
reportedly conducted joint land and air operations within Chinese territory as part of Western 
Joint 2021. China and Russia probably used their participation in WESTERN JOINT/ZAPAD 
INTERACTION 2021 to signal the strength of Sino-Russian cooperation rather than to 
improve interoperability. Separately, both navies conducted joint operations in the Sea of 
Japan in October 2021 as part of Joint Sea 2021. The PRC and Russia likely perceive further 
cooperation between the two militaries, including joint defense technology development, 
exercises, and other military modernization initiatives, as advantageous to their respective 
interests. Ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on February 4, 2022, PRC President Xi 
Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin released a joint statement underscoring China 
and Russia’s commitment to “deepening strategic coordination of mutual support.” The PRC 
has maintained rhetorical and diplomatic alignment with Russia before, following, and during 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Despite on-going military cooperation, the PRC and Russia 
continue to stop short of characterizing its partnership as a formal alliance with mutual 
security guarantees. 
China-Iran Relations. Since at least 2018, China has pursued closer economic and military 
ties with Iran, with the two countries signing a memorandum of understanding on intelligence 
and security cooperation in 2018. In 2020, PRC and Iranian diplomats signed the China-Iran 
25-year Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement, which paved the way for an 
expanded PRC presence in Iran’s banking, telecommunications, and infrastructure, and 
locked in discounted oil sales for China.  Additionally, China and Iran—along with Russia—
have conducted three joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean since 2019, most recently in 
February 2022, titled the Maritime Security Belt Combined Exercises. Despite these 
activities, however, the threat of sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear ambitions have probably 
limited China’s appetite for investing in Iran, particularly after secondary sanctions stemming 
from Huawei’s activities in Iran led to the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in 2018. 
PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
Key Takeaways 
 The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances.  
 A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the 
PRC’s global military objectives evolve.  
 Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering 
and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground 
forces projection.  


 
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 The PRC has likely considered Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, 
Angola, and Tajikistan among other places as locations for PLA military logistics 
facilities.   
The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to 
allow the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. Beijing may assess 
that a mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to commercial 
infrastructure abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities with prepositioned supplies co-
located with commercial infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, most closely aligns 
with the PRC’s overseas military logistics needs. Currently, the PRC uses commercial 
infrastructure to support all of its military operations abroad, including the PLA’s presence in 
other countries’ territories, such as at its base in Djibouti. Some of the PRC’s BRI projects 
could create potential military advantages, such as PLA access to selected foreign ports to 
pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant 
as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests.  
PRC official sources assert that military logistics facilities, to include its Djibouti base, will 
be used to provide international public goods like support to U.N. operations and HA/DR, and 
to secure China’s lines of communication, citizens, and assets abroad. Regardless, a global 
PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global 
military objectives evolve.  Host nations can perform an essential role in regulating the PRC’s 
military operations, as PRC officials very likely recognize that a stable long-term relationship 
with the host nation is critical to the success of their military logistics facilities. 
• 
PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of 
PLA forces and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military 
logistics network could enable intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.   
• 
In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLA Navy 
Marines are stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are 
currently largely dependent on nearby commercial ports due to the lack of experience 
utilizing its recently operational pier on its base. In late March 2022, a FUCHI II class 
(Type 903A) supply ship Luomahu docked at the 450-meter pier for resupply; the first 
such reported PLA Navy port call to the Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier 
is now operational. The pier likely is able to accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft 
carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA personnel at the facility have 
interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, and the PRC has sought 
to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base. 
 


 
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Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and planning for 
additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The 
PLA’s approach likely includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many 
countries, but only some will advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status 
of forces or visiting forces agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations 
involved in planning and negotiating for military logistics facilities are the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support Department, and service 
headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by the willingness of 
potential host nations to support a PLA presence. PRC interlocutors likely use all means 
available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host nations, 
while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.  
• 
The PRC has likely considered Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, 
Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan among other places as locations for PLA military 
logistics facilities. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Namibia, 
Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. The PLA is most interested in military access along 
the SLOCs from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the Pacific Islands.  
• 
The PRC’s military facility at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia will be the first PRC 
overseas base in the Indo-Pacific. In 2021, the “Joint Vietnamese Friendship” 
building, a facility built by the Vietnamese, was relocated off Ream Naval Base to 
avert conflicts with PRC military personnel.  As of early 2021, dredgers were spotted 
off Cambodia’s Ream naval base, where the PRC is funding construction work and 
deeper port facilities that would be necessary for the docking of larger military ships.   
In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help 
to modernize and expand Ream, but would not be the only country given access to the 
facility. If the PRC is able to leverage such assistance into a presence at Ream Naval 
Base, it suggests that the PRC’s overseas basing strategy has diversified to include 
military capacity-building efforts. Both the PRC and Cambodia have publicly denied 
having signed an agreement to provide the PLA exclusive access to Ream Naval Base.  
  
 


 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES & TECHNOLOGY  
FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
 
 
 
 Key Takeaways 
 The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial 
sector—fused with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet 
the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.  
 The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, 
including through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as 
espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The 
PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-industrial sector to improve weapon 
system research, development, acquisition, testing, evaluation, and production. 
 In 2021, the PRC announced its annual military budget would increase by 6.8 percent, 
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its 
position as the second-largest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published 
military budget omits several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-
related spending is higher than what it states in its official budget. 
China is continuing to reorganize its defense, science, and commercial industries to ensure 
PLA access to the resources, technologies, and expertise required to militarily surpass the 
United States and develop capabilities for complex future military contingencies. China’s 
efforts include developing and incorporating military-AI and other emerging disruptive 
technologies (EDT) to build an “intelligentized” force sufficiently equipped with high-tech 
weapons and advanced communications and information technologies to wage and win 
dynamic wars. While China’s Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy supports acquisition of 
foreign materiel, technology, and expertise through overt and illicit means, China is also 
accelerating efforts to build domestic capacity in these areas and reduce its vulnerabilities to 
foreign supply chokepoints.     
Military Expenditures Trends  
In 2021, the PRC announced a 6.8 percent annual military budget increase to $209 billion, 
which is approximately 1.3 percent of gross domestic product. This year’s budget continues 
more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains the PRC’s position as 
the second-largest military spender in the world after the United States. The PRC’s defense 


 
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budget has nearly doubled during the past 10 years—data from 2012 through 2021 indicates 
China’s official military budget grew 7 percent annually. Of note, on March 9, 2022 a 
spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of National Defense (MND) stated at the fifth session of 
the 13th NPC that the PRC had allocated a defense budget of 1.45 trillion yuan (228.3 billion 
USD) for 2022, up by 7.1 percent compared to the budget implementation in 2021. This 
increase would mark the defense budget's fastest growth rate since 2019. 
China: Official Defense Budget (2012–2021)  
 
 
 
China’s Estimated Military Expenditures. The PRC’s published military budget omits 
several major categories of expenditures, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. 
In 2021, China’s actual military-related spending could be significantly higher than its 
officially announced defense budget. Actual PRC military expenses are difficult to calculate, 
largely due to the PRC’s lack of transparency. 
China’s Estimated Defense Budget Growth. If China’s official defense budget increases 
annually by an average of 7 percent, growing as high as $270 billion by 2023, the PLA can 
dedicate more money for training, operations, and modernization, especially given the 
reduction of the PLA’s size by 300,000 people. Economic forecasters project that China’s 
economic growth will slow during the next 10 years, falling from about 6 percent in 2021 to 
around 4 percent in 2025, which could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming 
accurate economic projections and a steady defense burden, China will remain the second-
largest spender after the United States. 
 


 
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Regional Comparison of the PRC’s 2021   
Official Defense Budget 
 
2021 $ Billion 
PRC (official defense budget) 
$209 
India 
$64.8 
Japan 
$55 
Russia (national defense budget) 
$56.7 
South Korea 
$48 
Taiwan 
$15.4 
 
CHINA: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
Missile and Space Industry 
Most of China’s missile systems, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are 
comparable in quality to systems of other international top-tier producers. China’s Aviation 
Industry Corporation of China, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, and China 
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation produce a wide range of missiles—ballistic, 
cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air—for domestic military use and for export. China 
conducted a test of a new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous progress 
in hypersonic weapon development. In 2020, China fielded its first missile with a hypersonic 
glide vehicle and advanced its scramjet engine development, which has applications in 
hypersonic cruise missiles. In 2021 and 2022, China conducted flight tests of a reusable 
suborbital vehicle believed to be part of a plan to build a hypersonic transport system that 
could take people and cargo anywhere on Earth in less than an hour. According to the China 
Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), this system will “feature winged aircraft 
that take off and land like ordinary aircraft, but cruise at five times the speed of sound at high 
altitude.”  
China’s space industry, managed by the PLA, is rapidly expanding its intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellite constellations. The 
successful landing of a rover on Mars and launch of the first and second modules of China’s 
first long-term space station in 2021 and 2022 demonstrated the industry’s continued progress. 


 
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China’s domestic space market is dominated by state-run enterprises; however, increased 
investment has created private space companies, which have achieved successful orbital 
satellite launch attempts during the past 2 years. During 2020, China launched its first 
satellites for a new space-based Internet-of-things project with container monitoring and 
maritime communications applications, and announced the completion of its global 
navigation satellite services. The PRC is also developing the Shenlong and Tengyun space 
planes. Following the 2020 launch of its first prototype spaceplane, in 2022, China launched 
its second prototype space plane, which stayed on orbit for an extended period of time. Beijing 
stated these prototypes tested reusable and in-orbit service technologies as part of advancing 
the peaceful use of space. 
Naval and Shipbuilding Industry 
China, the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, is increasing its shipbuilding 
capacity and capability for all naval classes: submarines, warships, and auxiliary and 
amphibious ships. China also has developed underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-
range system in 2019. China domestically produces naval gas turbine and diesel engines as 
well as almost all shipboard weapons and electronic systems for its shipbuilding sector, 
making the sector nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. In 2020, China 
Shipbuilding Corporation signed agreements with the two major aerospace enterprises to 
collaborate on joint projects supporting the PLA Navy. 
Armaments Industry 
China’s North Industries Corporation and China South Industries Group Corporation are 
improving in nearly every PLA ground system category: armored personnel carriers, assault 
vehicles, air defense artillery systems, artillery systems and pieces, and main and light battle 
tanks. Notably, China began testing unmanned Type 59 tanks in 2018 and displayed 
lightweight Type 15 tanks in October 2019. China can produce ground weapon systems at or 
near world-class standards; however, quality deficiencies persist with some exported 
equipment, which is inhibiting Beijing’s ability to expand China’s export markets.  
Aviation Industry 
China is advancing its domestic aviation industry through two major state-owned aircraft 
corporations, AVIC and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC). AVIC 
designs and produces China’s military aircraft including the J-20 fifth-generation fighter, the 
Y-20 heavy transport, and the future H-20 flying wing stealth bomber. COMAC produces 
large passenger aircraft and aims to compete in the global commercial airliner market. 
COMAC is producing the ARJ21 regional jet, flight-testing the C919 airliner, and working 
with Russia to develop the CR929 wide-body airliner. China’s decades-long efforts to 
improve domestic aircraft engine production are starting to produce results with the J-10 and 
J-20 fighters switching to domestically produced WS-10 engines by the end of 2021. China’s 


 
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first domestically produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing 
on the Y-20 heavy transport and probably will replace imported Russian engines by the end 
of 2022. 
PRC’s Drive to Dominate Emerging Technologies 
China seeks to be an innovation superpower that is largely non-reliant on foreign technology 
and that serves as a global center for high-tech industries. The goal of attaining self-
sufficiency in key S&T sectors—a theme of Chinese state plans going back decades—was 
recently reiterated in the 14th Five-Year Plan. As part of this self-sufficiency drive, Beijing 
has mobilized its bureaucracies to rapidly develop the country’s capacity for domestic 
innovation. Published in 2006, the National Medium-and-Long-Term Plan for the 
Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020), was a landmark policy that formalized 
China’s push for domestic innovation while also calling for the assimilation and “re-
innovation” of advanced foreign technologies. In 2015, with the Made In China 2025 plan, 
Beijing sharpened its emphasis on technological independence by establishing import 
substitution quotas across a range of core technologies. The plan also called for the reform of 
state-owned enterprises, the establishment of regional innovation centers, and the leveraging 
of private sector capabilities in order to leapfrog foreign technological competitors and create 
a superior innovation ecosystem. 
China is particularly focused on dominating a range of emerging, dual-use technologies that 
promise to be both disruptive and foundational for future economies; these technologies 
include AI, autonomous systems, smart city platforms, quantum technologies, biotechnology, 
and advanced materials and manufacturing. Beijing has a clear understanding of its S&T 
deficiencies, particularly China’s vulnerability and reliance on western companies for 
enabling technologies such as semiconductors, new materials, and in some cases basic 
research. In addition, Beijing aims to address the challenges present in growing its science 
and technology talent pool. As a result of these vulnerabilities, the PRC has focused their 
industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to reduce 
these dependencies, ensure their resilience, and to become a market leader in emerging 
technologies. China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies 
to domestic companies working on frontier technologies, and has developed a focused effort 
to improve their domestic education, attract overseas Chinese talent, and attract foreign talent. 
China designates AI as one of its priority S&T development areas and assesses that advances 
in AI and autonomy are central to intelligentized warfare, Beijing’s concept of future warfare.  
Beijing views the integration of military and civilian institutions as central for developing AI-
enabled military capabilities and has established military-civilian R&D centers and procured 
commercially-developed AI and robotic technologies to ensure PLA access to cutting-edge 
AI technologies. PRC researchers are world leaders in certain AI applications, such as facial 
recognition and natural language processing, and PRC companies are marketing domestically-
designed AI chips. While China remains reliant on certain foreign capabilities to produce AI 


 
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hardware, such as advanced semiconductor fabrication factories and electronic design 
automation software, PRC researchers are exploring new materials and design concepts for 
next-generation semiconductors. 
Last year, China designed and fabricated a quantum computer capable of outperforming a 
classical high-performance computer for a specific problem. China was also domestically 
developing specialized refrigerators needed for quantum computing research in an effort to 
end reliance on international components. In 2020 and 2021, Chinese scientists and engineers 
performed additional testing demonstrating the feasibility of quantum communications from 
geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO) using their Shijian-20 satellite.  
China’s Arms Exports. China is the fifth-largest arms supplier in the world, and sells nearly 
every category of conventional military equipment including UASs, submarines, naval 
surface vessels, surface to air missile systems and fighter aircraft to customers like Saudi 
Arabia, Serbia, the UAE, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Iraq, and Pakistan.      
Armed UASs. China has supplied strike-capable Caihong and Wing Loong UASs to 
at least Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Algeria, Serbia, Indonesia, and 
Kazakhstan.  
Precision-Strike Weapons. As of 2017, China had sold export variant ballistic 
missile systems, including the M20, BP-12, and Joint Attack Rocket and Missile 
System (JARM), as well as long-range satellite-guided rocket systems. Although 
China typically does not disclose the countries purchasing these types of arms, in 
2021, Burma displayed an SY-400 TEL and in 2017 Qatar displayed a JARM.  
Naval Combatants. China is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by 
Pakistan’s 2015 purchase of eight Yuan class submarines for more than $3 billion. 
Thailand also purchased one Yuan class submarine in 2017 and originally planned to 
purchase two more. As of late 2021, Thailand’s procurement of the first Yuan 
submarine was not fulfilled by China due to contractual delays, though it delivered 
two Ming class submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 
and 2018, China sold two naval frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan. In 
September 2019, China made its first-ever sale of an LPD-class ship to Thailand. 
Combat Aircraft. The PRC is attempting to diversify its international arms exports 
to include more technologically advanced combat aircraft. For example, in 2022 the 
PRC has offered to sell its JF-17 aircraft to Argentina. 
China’s arms sales operate primarily through state-run export organizations such as AVIC 
and North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Arms transfers also are a component of the 
PRC’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of assistance to complement 
foreign policy initiatives undertaken as part of China’s BRI policy.  


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Many developing countries buy PRC weapons systems because they are less expensive than 
other comparable systems. Although some potential customers consider arms made by the 
PRC to be of lower quality and reliability, many of China’s systems are offered with 
enticements such as donations, and flexible payment options, which make them appealing 
options for buyers.  
Espionage Activities Supporting China’s Military Modernization. Multiple U.S. criminal 
indictments since 2015 involve PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens or permanent resident 
aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. citizens. They include procuring and exporting controlled 
items to China, economic espionage, and sanctions-related criminal cases, according to a U.S. 
Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement. The PRC’s efforts to 
acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included radiation hardened 
integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, 
naval and marine technologies, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, military 
communication jamming equipment, dynamic random access memory, aviation technologies, 
and ASW. Cases from 2021 include:  
•
In July 2021, a PRC national was sentenced to 42 months in Federal prison for
conspiring to fraudulently export maritime raiding craft and engines to China. The
U.S. Military utilizes these vessels and multi-fuel engines because they can be
operated after being launched from a submerged submarine, or after being dropped
into the ocean by an aircraft.  No comparable engine is manufactured in China.
•
In April 2021, a PRC national residing in the United States pled guilty to conspiring
to export devices with military applications to the PRC government and military.  The
PRC national fulfilled instructions from the PLA to obtain dual-use technology used
for anti-satellite weapons and other advanced military capabilities. This included
remotely operated side scan sonar systems, hydrophones, robotic boats, unmanned
underwater vehicles, and unmanned surface vehicles.
PRC Cyber-Enabled Espionage Activities  
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to 
military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain 
access to information and advanced technologies. 
Detected PRC cyberspace operations have targeted telecommunications firms, managed 
service providers (MSPs), and software developers. Key U.S. targets include proprietary 
commercial and military technology companies and research institutions associated with 
defense, energy, and other sectors. 
The PRC seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to 
physical disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 


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operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC believes these capabilities 
are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries that depend on information 
technologies.   
The PLA and China’s Talent Recruitment Programs 
The CCP operates more than 200 talent-recruitment programs that are overseen by central 
bodies that oversee talent development, including the Central Coordination Group on Talent 
Work and the Overseas High-level Talent Recruitment Work Group. Although the PRC 
government administers its talent recruitment programs, the PLA uses China’s network of 
recruitment programs, such as the Thousand Talents Plan, to recruit overseas talent. The PLA 
also has used its premier science and technology university, the National University of 
Defense Technology (NUDT), to offer foreign talent guest professorships at NUDT. 
Additionally, the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, which runs the PLA’s nuclear 
weapons program, plays an active role in recruitment of overseas experts. 


 
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CHAPTER SIX: U.S.-PRC DEFENSE 
CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES 
 
 
 
Key Takeaways 
 DoD’s defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 emphasized responsibly 
managing competition and establishing commonsense guardrails to ensure competition did 
not veer into conflict.  
 2021 defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC prioritized open channels of 
communication and the advancement of DoD priorities on managing crisis 
communications and strategic risk. 
President Biden made clear to PRC President Xi Jinping that it is their responsibility, as leaders, 
to ensure that competition between the United States and the PRC does not veer into conflict. 
Following the President’s guidance, U.S. defense contacts and exchanges conducted in 2021 
supported U.S. policy and strategy toward the PRC to responsibly manage competition.  
DoD contacts and exchanges with the PRC were conducted in accordance with the statutory 
limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as amended. 
In 2021, U.S. defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC focused on three interconnected 
priorities: (1) challenging PRC’s destabilizing behaviors inconsistent with peace and stability in 
region; (2) promoting dialogue on strategic risk in nuclear, cyberspace, and space to avoid 
misunderstanding or miscalculation that could escalate into crisis; and (3) building the structures 
and habits necessary to manage crises. 
A complete list of U.S. defense contacts and exchanges with the PRC in 2021 is provided in 
Appendix II. 
Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2021  
Despite consensus built between President Biden and PRC President Xi to maintain open channels 
of communication, the PLA exhibited an unwillingness to engage on substantive matters with 
appropriate interlocutors.    
High-Level Contacts and Exchanges. High-level contacts between the United States and PRC 
are an important means to exchange views on the international security environment, and 


 
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demonstrates the responsible management of competition between our nations. In 2021, the United 
States made several requests to the PLA for the use of the Defense Telephone Link (DTL) or Video 
Teleconference (VTC). The Secretary of Defense made clear his desire to engage with PLA 
leadership, as needed, to advance priorities across the defense relationship. The Secretary of 
Defense requested calls to discuss issues related to operational matters and foreign defense 
relations with PLA CMC Vice Chairman General Xu Qiliang and PLA CMC-member and Minister 
of National Defense General Wei Fenghe. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China 
also conducted one DTL call with the Deputy Director of the PLA’s Office International Military 
Cooperation (OIMC) on August 19, 2021.  
Recurring Exchanges. Recurring exchanges serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to 
advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management, and reduce of operational risk. The 
following is a list of recurring exchanges and their status in 2021: 
• 
In 2020, the PLA indefinitely postponed the Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue (APSD), an 
Assistant Secretary of Defense-level policy dialogue. The APSD did not take place in 2021.  
• 
The Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) is an annual Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Defense (DASD) level policy dialogue. On September 28-29, 2021, DASD for China 
Dr. Michael Chase conducted a secure video conference with PRC Major General Huang 
Xueping, Deputy Director of OIMC, to hold the 16th U.S.-PRC DPCT. The two sides held 
frank and in-depth discussion on a range of issues affecting the U.S.-PRC defense 
relationship.  
• 
In 2021, the PLA declined to hold the second Crisis Communications Working Group 
(CCWG), a working-level policy dialogue established to advance the crisis prevention and 
management mechanisms between DoD and the PLA. The U.S. first convened the CCWG 
in October 2020 by video teleconference to discuss with the PLA concepts of crisis 
communications, crisis prevention, and crisis management. The meeting provided an 
opportunity to build mutual understanding between the U.S. military and the PLA on 
principles to prevent and manage crisis and reduce risk to forces.   
• 
The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group is an operational 
safety dialogue between U.S. INDOPACOM and PLA naval and air forces. The MMCA 
Working Group and Flag Officer session was held virtually on December 14-16, 2021. 
During the 2021 MMCA meetings, both sides discussed sustaining maritime and aviation 
operational safety and professionalism; reviewed safety-related events; and discussed 
implementation and assessment of the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime 
Encounters Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The U.S. and PRC have met regularly 
since 1998 for MMCA dialogue to strengthen military maritime safety, improve 
operational safety in the air and sea, and reduce risk between the two militaries.  


 
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Functional and Academic Exchanges. Functional engagements focus on advancing channels for 
risk reduction, understanding, and communication to promote international rules and norms, and 
set assumptions and expectations for safe and professional behavior between our two militaries. 
Similarly, academic exchanges focus on building mutual understanding. COVID restrictions 
prevented the execution of U.S. and PRC military academic institution exchanges planned for 
2021.  
• 
The annual exchange between the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) and 
the PLA Archives held an event in February 2021, which had been rescheduled from 2020 
due to COVID restrictions. During the meeting, DPAA and the PLA Archives discussed 
16 cases. No additional DPAA-PLA Archives meetings were held in 2021.  
• 
The U.S. Army Pacific Command and the PLA did not hold the 2021 Disaster Management 
Exchange (DME).  
• 
On November 30, 2021 U.S. and PRC defense officials held a working level virtual 
meeting to discuss the Department of Defense’s 2021 annual report on “Military and 
Security Developments Involving the PRC,” consistent with the 2014 “MOU between the 
U.S. Department of Defense and the PRC Ministry of National Defense on Notification of 
Major Military Activities Confidence Building Measures Mechanism.”   
U.S-PRC Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2022 
In 2022, the U.S. has prioritized maintaining open channels of communication at senior-levels and 
holding following exchanges: Defense Policy Coordination Talks, Crisis Communications 
Working Group, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group and Plenary, and 
Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA)-PLA Archive exchange. In August 2022, the 
PRC canceled defense engagements with the United States. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS ON STRATEGIC 
STABILITY 
 
 
 
Understanding strategic stability. PRC strategists typically define strategic stability as including 
nuclear, conventional, and political-military aspects of state relations.  Beijing increasingly views, 
what it characterizes as, “ensuring mutual vulnerability” with its nuclear rivals as a linchpin to this 
concept.    
• 
China’s understanding and approach to strategic stability are influenced by the PRC’s 
history, Western research and scholarship, and modern developments in weapons 
technology, proliferation, and great power competition. PRC experts’ understanding of 
strategic stability originally draws from Mao Zedong−era strategies that downplayed the 
need for a vast nuclear arsenal. Current views have evolved, and frequently refer to 
strategic stability as a general state of balance between the PRC and its rivals in multiple 
domains, including military, economic, and political.   
• 
Modern PRC experts increasingly accept Western definitions and concepts around strategic 
stability, agreeing that strategic stability should be understood as involving crisis stability 
(the absence of incentives to use nuclear weapons first) and arms control stability (the 
absence of incentives to build up a nuclear force). PRC scholars also emphasize the 
importance of constraints against the use of nuclear weapons and strategic mutual 
confidence and communications, and tend to reject frameworks that seem to portray the 
United States and China as being in a “Cold War-style” arms race.    
• 
China is committed to maintaining nuclear deterrence with its nuclear rivals, and PRC 
nuclear experts view a secure second-strike capability as crucial to national security. 
Beijing’s understanding of nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient 
capability to inflict a degree of unbearable destruction against its rivals and thus deter 
attack. Maintaining this posture with a small number of weapons has often led to China’s 
leaders lacking confidence in their ability to assure retaliation, perceiving that they either 
lacked enough weapons or lacked a sufficiently survivable arsenal.  
PRC leadership reluctant to engage on strategic stability. It remains unclear how much PRC 
leadership and decision-makers accept the premise behind strategic stability, including the utility 
of crisis stability and communications. PRC officials have been reluctant to engage on nuclear, 
cyberspace, and space issues as it pertains to strategic risk reduction in official or unofficial 
dialogue, particularly in defense channels.  


 
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Challenges to China’s pursuit of strategic stability. China’s concerns about maintaining 
strategic stability with its major power rivals revolves around keeping pace with emerging 
technological developments while also managing neighbors viewed as having the potential ability 
to alter the regional nuclear balance and degrade the PRC’s deterrence capability.  
• 
PRC experts perceive risks to ensuring strategic stability with their neighbors and U.S. 
allies, which they describe as pursuing a strategy of ‘nuclear hedging.’ Experts both worry 
about the impacts of the U.S. nuclear umbrella on allied behavior, and raise concerns over 
those U.S. allies pursuing independent nuclear deterrents. 
• 
Beijing views significant risks to strategic stability from potential U.S. technological 
breakthroughs or new commitments to produce and deploy cutting-edge weapons systems 
at greater scale or near China’s periphery.   
‒ PRC leaders are concerned that the United States could achieve rapid advances in 
missile defense technology, despite the technical limitations and small stockpiles of 
present U.S. interceptor systems. PRC leaders are concerned that Washington could 
achieve a breakthrough development in system effectiveness or deployment scale that 
negates Beijing’s ballistic missile arsenal.  
‒ Beijing fears that advances in U.S. and allied hypersonic capabilities may credibly 
threaten China’s relatively small arsenal of land-based weapons. Additionally, some 
PRC experts are concerned that the proliferation of hypersonic technology may blur 
the line between nuclear and conventional escalation; for example, the use of nuclear-
armed air defense systems to counter hypersonic glide vehicles could lower the nuclear 
threshold and raise the possibility of escalation into a broader nuclear exchange. 
‒ Beijing’s perception of strategic stability is also challenged by other technological 
developments, including potential U.S. development of increasingly accurate long-
range missiles capable of conducting counterforce strikes with low-yield nuclear 
warheads. Advanced space surveillance assets, conventional prompt-strike weapons, 
and the possibility of cyberspace-attacks to undermine nuclear command and control 
also contribute to PRC’s concerns about maintaining mutual nuclear vulnerability.  
 
 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC VIEWS OF INFORMATION 
AND INFORMATION DOMINANCE 
 
 
 
The concept of information put forth by PLA writers, in authoritative texts, defines information as 
identifiable, carriable, indestructible, shareable, timely, and movable content that, through 
acquisition, allows individuals to transform the world. PRC leaders have identified that collecting, 
controlling, and accessing of information is crucially important in both warfighting and modern 
society. As a result, the PLA has conceptualized warfighting concepts to seize control of the 
information domain during a conflict. The concept of information warfare is an expansive concept 
that includes individuals, enterprises, societies, and national communication networks that form 
integrated entities, and encompasses the electromagnetic spectrum, psychology and perception, 
and intelligence operations. The PLA would probably use a variety of military capabilities such as 
cyberspace, electronic, and conventional to destroy adversary information systems and propagate 
PRC foreign policy messaging or disinformation. China’s goal for information warfare is to gain 
information superiority, which is achieved by destroying the adversary’s ability to acquire, 
transmit, and process information while simultaneously protecting the PLA’s ability to do the 
same.  
The PLA probably believes that it can successfully deter and manage a conflict by either 
controlling or destroying an adversary’s access to information. Authoritative PRC military 
documents illustrate that the PLA is aware of the risk of escalation during a conflict. Similar to 
their Western counterparts, PLA strategists broadly define escalation as an increase in the intensity 
or scope of military activities to achieve explicit goals. Beijing views of conflict escalation suggest 
confidence in their ability to control conventional conflict, and willingness to conduct offensive 
operations to demonstrate Beijing’s resolve, seize the initiative, and exploit adversary weaknesses.   
• 
PLA strategy is also informed by the view that contemporary “informatized” warfare, 
enabled by modern C4ISR capabilities, provides leaders with sufficient battlefield 
awareness to calibrate military effects and elicit a desired adversary response. PLA 
strategists view warfare as a science, discounting the possibility of inadvertent escalation 
or the effects of the “fog of war.”      
• 
PLA writings indicate that the Chinese military leaders probably views achieving 
information dominance during a conflict as a requirement to deny the adversary the ability 
to control the conflict, weaken their will to fight, and compel them to cease hostilities. The 
PLA has noticed that U.S. information dominance during the Iraq war provided the U.S. 


 
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military with the ability to control the conflict, while the Iraqi military was unable to 
receive orders or conduct operations because their command systems had been destroyed. 
The PLA probably will seek to control the information domain across the spectrum of conflict. 
Prior to the start of hostilities, the PLA would conduct psychological warfare to erode the will to 
fight of both adversary military forces and the civilian population, positioning the PLA to seize 
control of the information environment. Additionally, the PLA could conduct kinetic strikes or 
cyberspace-attacks on adversary command and control (C2) systems in order to cut off an 
adversary’s information flow. PLA writings states that a key concept of seizing information 
dominance is to preempt the enemy by conducting operations to paralyze adversary information 
systems. As the conflict progresses, the PLA will continue to use cyberspace and kinetic attacks 
to suppress and jam enemy information systems. The PLA would probably continue to use 
information operations against an adversary’s military and civilian populations in order to continue 
to erode adversary support for the conflict.  
• 
The PLA has recognized that information operations are highly offensive in nature and that 
individuals are often highly sensitive to the first narrative around an event. The PLA 
observed both Russia and Ukraine attempting to be the first side to control the information 
environment during the beginning of the current crisis in Ukraine. The PLA has also 
noticed that information operations have the ability to shape the information domain before 
the start of the conflict and the effects can be felt long after the conflict has concluded. 
In 2019, the PLA began mentioning a new concept called “intelligentized warfare,” which seeks 
to incorporate AI and other advanced technologies into every level of warfare. A major focus of 
intelligentized warfare is in the cognitive domain, as PRC theorists have perceived that the 
development of information technology has reached its limits and that future wars will occur in 
this cognitive domain. The PLA has already stated that modern conflict has transitioned towards 
intelligentized warfare have highlighted the utility of learning from the current Russia-Ukraine 
crisis, a conflict which the PLA thinks has cognitive confrontation at its core. To prepare for these 
future confrontations in the cognitive domain, the PLA has been honing its concept of “Cognitive 
Domain Operations (认知领域作战)” (CDO) that seek to adapt previous PRC concepts such as 
public opinion and psychological warfare to the modern information environment through the aid 
of emerging technologies such as AI.  
• 
According to a PLA researcher, CDO actions integrate military, political, economic, public 
opinion, psychology, legal theory, and other means to achieve strategic national security 
goals that affect a target’s cognition, decision making, and behavior. The goal of CDO is 
to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance”, defined as the use of propaganda 
as a weapon to influence public opinion to effect change in a nation’s social system—likely 
to create an environment favorable to China and reduce civilian and military resistance to 
PLA actions. PLA researchers have stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may 


 
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yield greater strategic benefits than firepower destruction, force control, and siege, and that 
effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has concluded. 
The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party 
entry into a future conflict or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a society. 
Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring about 
psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles on CDO 
state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy without 
fighting is the highest realm of warfare. The PLA recognizes the offensive utility of CDO, as 
researchers have noticed that individuals are highly sensitive to the first news of an event, even if 
that news is misinformation. By using CDO to conduct offensive actions, the PLA seeks to create 
an asymmetric advantage to not only suppress their opponents, but also to subtly shape the thinking 
habits of the opponent’s audience and guide their opponents to support PLA objectives. 
PLA researchers have stated that emerging technology such as artificial intelligence and big data 
are key to creating profound advancements in CDO. Since at least 2019, PLA researchers have 
called on the PLA to improve their big data, natural language processing, and deep learning 
capabilities in order to improve its ability to create deep fakes, disseminate propaganda, and 
analyze internet users’ sentiments. Another PLA researcher suggested that the PLA should use AI 
to run its bot network on social media, which would be able to create content, and coordinate the 
optimal time to post on social media. If the PLA is successful in incorporating these technologies 
into operations, it could increase obfuscation of activities, create more plausible content, and 
enable more accurate targeting of audiences. 


 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA’S EXPANDED MILITARY 
DIPLOMACY 
 
 
 
The expansion of China’s military diplomatic activities began in the early 1990s with a dramatic 
shift in Beijing’s view of the international security environment. In 2004, then-Chinese President 
Hu directed the PLA to undertake “new historic missions,” which included supporting China’s 
overseas interests and diplomacy. A major milestone occurred in 2008 when the PLA Navy began 
counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden—an important Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) 
for Chinese trade. Since 2015, President Xi has reemphasized expanding PLA global activities and 
developing a system to defend China’s growing overseas interests as part of broader PLA reform 
efforts. The PLA’s engagement strategy depends on China’s overall relationship with each country 
or international organization. 
In 2015, China developed a prioritization for military-to-military relations in line with how Beijing 
categorizes its diplomatic relations with other countries: major powers (Russia, the United States, 
and Western Europe) with whom Beijing seeks “stable and balanced development” in a multipolar 
system; peripheral nations in the Indo-Pacific region with whom China seeks stronger relationships 
to create a more favorable environment along its maritime and land borders; and developing 
nations (usually in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East), where China emphasizes 
solidarity and cooperation and participates in multilateral diplomatic efforts, including projects 
associated its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
Beijing uses foreign defense relations to shape global perceptions, strengthen its overseas 
influence, collect information on foreign militaries, and facilitate global access for the PLA to 
support Beijing’s strategic objectives. These engagements also advance Beijing’s broader goal of 
countering foreign opposition to China’s global activities and establishing a multipolar global 
governance system in which China has a greater role and no single country is dominant.  
The PLA’s interest in bilateral defense engagement activities is influenced by Beijing’s broader 
diplomatic priorities. China tends to undertake greater levels of military cooperation with countries 
where it has established a strategic partnership—such as Russia, with whom its “comprehensive 
strategic partnership of coordination” entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. 
China seeks to leverage its relationship with other strategic partnership countries to reinforce its 
systemic preferences and maintain stability in Beijing’s favor. 
As China’s overseas interests grew during the past two decades, CCP leaders directed the PLA to 
think about operating beyond China’s borders and its periphery to advance Beijing’s objectives. 


 
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This emphasis probably represents Beijing's increased reliance on and trust in the PLA to tout itself 
as a contributor to global security. 
While not the sole focus of China’s foreign defense relations, these activities provide opportunities 
to negotiate overseas military facilities and military access, which China needs to protect PRC 
nationals abroad, SLOCs, and substantial commercial investments associated with BRI, while also 
helping to support its forces participating in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Since 2018, the PLA has emphasized the responsibilities and roles of military attachés, training 
and professional military education (PME) opportunities in China, and engagement in multilateral 
forums, as the most effective means to boost its reputation and support Beijing’s strategic 
objectives. The PLA participates in combined exercises when doing so is likely to support political 
objectives or yield insights into foreign tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) concerning 
counterterrorism, mobility operations, and logistics. 
Beijing continues to focus its foreign defense relations and influence efforts in the Indo-Pacific 
region to expand trade and investment, secure China’s borders, and counter U.S. influence. Outside 
of the Indo-Pacific, China sees Africa as a region of particular opportunity because African 
governments are highly receptive to China’s engagement and assistance. In 2021, the PRC held 
the inaugural China-Africa Peace and Security Forum, which brought together virtually the PLA 
and military representatives from 19 African countries. The event focused on COVID-19’s impact 
on African regional security, military medicine exchanges, and the role of military cooperation in 
combating COVID. During 2021, the PRC provided forces to UN Peacekeeping missions in Mali, 
South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The PLA likely uses peacekeeping missions 
in Africa to gain operational experience and signal political commitment on the continent.  During 
the last five years, China has expanded ties with its historical partners like Russia and Pakistan 
while increasing engagements with U.S. partners and allies, such as the Philippines, Djibouti, and 
Thailand. These bilateral defense engagements provide the PLA opportunities to acquire advanced 
weapon systems and technologies and give the PLA access to foreign military practices, 
operational doctrine, and training methods.  
China’s defense outreach provides interlocutors with alternatives to U.S.-provided support.  
China’s diplomatic engagements provides alternative sources of support and legitimacy to isolated 
regimes, such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
which blunts the effectiveness of international sanctions, enables these regimes to circumvent U.S. 
efforts, and weakens commitments to U.S. objectives among U.S. partners like the United Arab 
Emirates and Tunisia.    
 
 


 
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APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 
 
 
 
 
Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces  
          
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Taiwan Strait Area 
Total 
Total Ground Force 
Personnel 
1,040,000  
416,000  
89,000 
Group Armies/Army Corps 
13  
5 
3 
Combined Arms Brigades 
81  
30 (6 Amphibious)  
NA 
Mechanized Infantry 
Brigades 
N/A 
3 
Motorized Infantry 
Brigades 
6 
Armor Brigades 
4 
Army Aviation/Air 
Assault Brigades  
17 
5  
4 
Artillery Brigades  
15 
5 
3 
Airborne Brigades 
7  
7 
0 
Marine Brigades  
8 
5 
2 
Tanks 
4,400 
. 
850 
Artillery Pieces 
9,800 
. 
1,200 
Note: For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern Theaters.  
 
 


 
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Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 
       
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Eastern and 
Southern Theater 
Navies 
Total 
Aircraft Carriers  
2 
1 
0 
Cruisers 
6 
2 
0 
Destroyers  
36 
24 
4 
Frigates  
45 
32 
22 
Corvettes  
50 
N/A 
0 
Tank /Medium Landing ships 
Amphibious Transport Dock 
57 
52 
31 
Attack Submarines  
56 
31 
2 
Nuclear Attack Submarines  
9 
2 
0 
Nuclear Powered Ballistic 
Missile Submarines  
6 
6 
0 
Coastal Patrol (Missile)  
84 
68 
44 
Coast Guard Ships 
224 
N / A 
23 
 
Note: The PLAN has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in Asia. 
In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Navies would participate in direct action 
against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be responsible primarily for protecting the 
sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to support other fleets. In conflict, China may also 
employ CCG and PAFMM ships to support military operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 
 
 
China 
Taiwan 
 
Total 
Eastern and 
Southern Theater 
Total 
Fighters  
1,900 (2,900*) 
700 (800*) 
300 (450*) 
Bombers/Attack  
450 
250 
0 
Transport  
450 
20 
30 
Special Mission Aircraft  
200 
150 
240 
 
Note: This chart displays estimated totals of military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN aviation. However, the 
PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario.  
 
*The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers. 
 
 
China’s Rocket Force  
 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM 
300 
300 
>5,500km 
IRBM 
250 
250+ 
3,000-5,500km 
MRBM 
250 
500+ 
1,000-3,000km 
SRBM 
200 
600+ 
300-1,000km 
GLCM 
100 
300+ 
>1,500km 
 
 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX II: DEFENSE CONTACTS  
AND EXCHANGES 
 
 
 
U.S.-China Defense Contacts and Exchanges in 2021 
 
RECURRENT EXCHANGES 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
September 
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement Working Group 
December 
ACADEMIC EXCHANGES 
FUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES 
DPAA-PLA Archives 
February 
CMPR Briefing-Per 2014 MOU 
November 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX III: SELECTED PLA BILATERAL 
AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2021 
 
 
Selected PLA Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises in 2021 
Exercise Name 
Type of Exercise 
Participants 
Peace 2021/ Aman 
2021 
Multinational joint naval exercise 
Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, United 
States and 41 additional nations  
Joint Naval Drill 
Joint Naval exercise 
Singapore 
Joint maritime 
Training Exercise 
Joint Naval exercise 
Indonesia 
Cobra Gold 2021 
Multinational humanitarian and 
disaster relief training  
Thailand, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
India, United States 
Zapad/ Interaction 
2021 
Joint military training  
Russia 
Shared Destiny 2021 
Multinational peacekeeping exercise 
Pakistan, Mongolia, Thailand 
Peace Mission 2021 
Multinational military training 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, India, Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Pabbi Antiterror 2021 
Joint anti-terrorism exercise 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, 
India 
Coast Guard Joint 
Patrols 
Joint Coast Guard patrol 
Vietnam 
Joint Sea 2021 
Joint Naval exercise 
Russia 
Joint Aerial Strategic 
Patrol 
Joint aerial strategic patrol 
Russia 
Joint Naval Patrols 
Joint Naval patrol 
Vietnam 
Peace Rescue 2021 
Joint medical exercise 
Vietnam 
               
 
 
 
 


 
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APPENDIX IV: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
APSCO 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization  
AAM 
Air To Air Missiles  
AAV 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle  
ADIZ 
Air Defense Identification Zone 
AEW&C 
Airborne Early Warning & Control 
AGI 
Intelligence Collection Ships 
AGOS 
Ocean Surveillance Ships  
AI 
Artificial Intelligence 
ALBM 
Air-Launched Ballistic Missile 
AOE 
Fast Combat Support Ship 
AOR 
Fleet Replenishment Oilers  
APOSOS 
Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 
APSD 
Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue  
ASAT 
Anti-Satellite Weapon 
ASBM 
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
ASW 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
AUKUS 
Australia, The United Kingdom, And The U.S. 
AUV 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
AVIC 
Aviation Industry Corporation Of China 
BACC 
Beijing Aerospace Control Center 
BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense  
BMEW 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning  
BRI 
Belt And Road Initiative 
BRICS 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, And South Africa 
BWC 
Biological Weapons Convention  
C2 
Command And Control 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
CALT 
China Academy Of Launch Vehicle Technology 
CBM 
Confidence-Building Measures  
CBW 
Chemical And Biological Weapons  
CCDI 
Central Commission For Discipline Inspection 


 
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CCG 
Chinese Coast Guard 
CCMCFD 
Central Commission For Military Civilian Fusion Development 
CCP 
Chinese Communist Party 
CCWG 
Crisis Communications Working Group 
CDO 
Cognitive Domain Operations  
CELAC 
Community Of Latin American And Caribbean States 
CFO 
Chief Financial Officer 
CG 
Coast Guard 
CLTC 
China Launch And Tracking Control  
CMC 
Central Military Commission 
CMM 
Chinese Maritime Militia (See PAFMM) 
CMPR 
China Military Power Report 
CNSA 
China National Space Administration  
CNSC 
Central National Security Commission  
COMAC 
Commercial Aircraft Corporation Of China  
CONUS 
Continental United States 
COSCO 
China Ocean Shipping Company 
COVID 
Coronavirus 
CPTPP 
Comprehensive And Progressive Agreement For Trans-Pacific Partnership  
CWC 
Chemical Weapons Convention  
DASD 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Of Defense 
DDG 
Guided-Missile Destroyer 
DME 
Disaster Management Exchange 
DOB 
Date Of Birth 
DPAA 
Defense Pow/Mia Accounting Agency 
DPCT 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
DSR 
Digital Silk Road  
DTL 
Defense Telephone Link  
ECS 
East China Sea 
EDT 
Emerging Disruptive Technologies 
EEZ 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
EO 
Electro-Optical 
EPR 
Emergency Petroleum Reserve  
EW 
Electronic Warfare 
FFG 
Guided-Missile Frigate 
FFL 
Corvette 
FIC 
First Island Chain 
FOB 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment 
FOC 
Full Operational Capability 
FYP 
Five Year Plan 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product 


 
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GEO 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
GLCM 
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile 
GPS 
Global Positioning System 
GSD 
General Staff Department 
GSR 
Green Silk Road  
HEU 
Highly Enriched Uranium  
HGV 
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle 
HQ 
Headquarters 
HSR 
Health Silk Road  
IADS 
Integrated Air Defense System 
ICBM 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICT 
Information And Communications Technology 
INDOPACOM 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command 
IO 
Information Operations 
IOC 
Initial Operational Capability 
IRBM 
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR 
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
JARM 
Joint Attack Rocket And Missile System 
JLSB 
Joint Logistics Brigades  
JLSC 
Joint Logistics Service Center 
JLSF 
Joint Logistics Support Force 
JOCC 
Joint Operations Command Center  
LAC 
Line Of Actual Control  
LACM 
Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LEO 
Low Earth Orbit 
LHA 
Amphibious Assault Ship  
LM 
Long March 
LNG 
Liquid Natural Gas 
LOW 
Launch-On-Warning 
LPD 
Amphibious Transport Docks  
LST 
Tank Landing Ships  
MCF 
Military-Civilian Fusion 
MDPW 
Multi-Domain Precision Warfare 
MIRV 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles 
MMCA 
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement  
MND 
Ministry Of National Defense 
MOU 
Memorandum Of Understanding 
MOX 
Mixed-Oxide  
MPS 
Ministry Of Public Security  
MRBM 
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MSP 
Managed Service Providers 


 
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MSS 
Ministry Of State Security 
MUM-T 
Manned Unmanned Teaming  
NDMD 
National Defense Mobilization Department  
NDU 
National Defense University  
NEO 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
NFU 
No First Use 
NIH 
National Institutes Of Health 
NORINCO 
North Industries Corporation 
NPC 
National People's Congress 
NSR 
Northern Sea Route  
NUDT 
National University Of Defense Technology 
NWMA 
Non-War Military Activities 
OBOR 
One Belt One Road 
OIMC 
Office For International Military Cooperation 
OPFOR 
Opposing Force 
OTH 
Over-The-Horizon 
PAFMM 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
PAP 
People's Armed Police 
PBA 
Pharmaceutical-Based Agents  
PKO 
Peacekeeping Operations 
PLA 
People's Liberation Army  
PLAA 
People's Liberation Army Army 
PLAAF 
People's Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN 
People's Liberation Army Navy 
PLA NDU 
People's Liberation Army National Defense University  
PLANMC 
People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps 
PLARF 
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force 
PME 
Professional Military Education 
PNT 
Positioning, Navigation, And Timing 
POW 
Prisoner Of War 
PPE 
Personal Protective Equipment 
PRC 
People's Republic Of China 
PRSS 
Pakistan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
RIMPAC 
Rim Of The Pacific Exercise 
RORO 
Roll-On/Roll-Off Cargo Ships 
SAM 
Surface-To-Air Missile 
SAR 
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SASTIND 
State Administration For Science, Technology, And Industry For National 
Defense 
SATCOM 
Satellite Communications 
SCO 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 


 
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SCS 
South China Sea 
SIC 
Second Island Chain 
SLAM-ER 
Standoff Land 
SLBM 
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
SLOC 
Sea Lines Of Communication 
SLV 
Space Launch Vehicle 
SMA 
Special Mission Aircraft 
SOE 
State-Owned Enterprise 
SOF 
Special Operations Forces 
SRBM 
Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
SRSS 
Sudan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
SS 
Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSBN 
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSD 
Space System Department 
SSF 
Strategic Support Force 
SSGN 
Guided-Missile Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSN 
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSP 
Air-Independent Powered Attack Submarines  
SSS 
Student Small Satellites  
STEM 
Science, Technology, Engineering, And Mathematics 
TRA 
Taiwan Relations Act 
TT&C 
Telemetry, Tracking, And Control  
TTP 
Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures 
UAE 
United Arab Emirates 
UAS 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems 
UAV 
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV 
Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UFWD 
United Front Work Department 
UN 
United Nations 
UNCLOS 
United Nations Convention On The Law Of The Sea 
USD 
U.S. Dollar 
USNS 
United States Naval Ship (Non-Commissioned) 
USTR 
United States Trade Representative 
VBSS 
Visit, Board, Search And Seizure  
VIP 
Very Important Person 
VLS 
Vertical Launch System 
VRSS 
Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite  
VTC 
Video Teleconference 
VTOL 
Vertical Take-Off And Landing 
XPCC 
Xinjiang Production And Construction Corps 
XSCC 
Xi'an Satellite Control Center  


 
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Military and Security Developments Involving the  
People’s Republic of China 
 
A Report to Congress 
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2000, as amended 
 
 
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, as 
amended, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and U form, on 
military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the 
current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army 
and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the 
military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The 
report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the 
period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the 
United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.” 
 
 


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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE .................................................................................................................................................. I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. II 
CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING  THE PRC’S STRATEGY ........................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER TWO: PLA FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION ................................................... 
47 
CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY ......................... 117 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE ................................................................... 149 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION...................................... 164 
CHAPTER SIX: DEFENSE CONTACTS  AND EXCHANGES IN 2022 ............................................................ 173 
 SPECIAL TOPICS 
................................................................................................................................. 177 
APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES DATA 
....................................................................................... 185 
APPENDIX II: SELECTED BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2022 ....................................... 187 
APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ 188 


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I 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
 
PREFACE 
The 2022 National Security Strategy states that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only 
competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the 
international order.  As a result, the 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the 
“pacing challenge” for the Department of Defense. As the PRC seeks to achieve “national 
rejuvenation” by its centenary in 2049, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders view a modern, 
capable, and “world class” military as essential to overcoming what Beijing sees as an increasingly 
turbulent international environment.  
The DoD annual report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 
of China charts the current course of the PRC’s national, economic, and military strategy, and 
offers insight on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategy, current capabilities and activities, 
as well as its future modernization goals. 
In 2022, the PRC turned to the PLA as an increasingly capable instrument of statecraft. Throughout 
the year, the PLA adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region, while accelerating its 
development of capabilities and concepts to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” 
against a “strong enemy,” counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s 
periphery, and to project power globally. At the same time, the PRC largely denied, cancelled, and 
ignored recurring bilateral defense engagements, as well as DoD requests for military-to-military 
communication at multiple levels.  
This report illustrates the importance of meeting the pacing challenge presented by the PRC’s 
increasingly capable military.   
Report Scope: This report covers security and military developments involving the PRC until the 
end of 2022.  


II 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGY  
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
●The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by
2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand
the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support
of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as
deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents
obstacles to its national strategy.
●The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful
nation states, as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that
structural changes in the international system and a confrontational United States are the root
causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.
‒ 
In March 2023, Xi Jinping told delegates to the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference that “Western countries led by the United States have 
implemented comprehensive containment, encirclement and suppression against 
us, bringing unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development.”  
●The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness
the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading
position” in an enduring competition between systems.
●In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded on its calls to prepare for
an increasingly turbulent international climate, while reporting it had “enhanced” the PRC’s
security on all fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks,
challenges, and trials.”
FOREIGN POLICY  
●The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to


III 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the 
Party’s political and governing systems. 
●Beginning late 2022 Beijing launched a diplomatic ‘charm offensive’ targeting European
countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of ‘wolf
warrior’ diplomacy and COVID isolation.
●In April 2022, Xi Jinping announced the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Echoing the previous
year’s rollout of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI
extensively and attempted to insert GSI language into multilateral forums and documents.
●Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
II. As Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments to Russia’s war on
Ukraine, it probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding
reputational or economic costs that could result from its assistance.
ECONOMIC POLICY  
●At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID policy. The decision to implement
China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-wide protests
against the PRC’s zero-COVID policies, economic pressures, and fiscal difficulties for local
governments.
●The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of
growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted “common prosperity,” more equitable access to
basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green
developments as a few of the PRC’s economic initiatives.
●The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of
China’s broader national development aspirations.
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) 
●The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global
transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic
integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.
●In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline.
However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and
Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy
opportunities.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding
its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.
MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
●
The PRC pursues its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) (军民融合) Development Strategy to
“fuse” its security and development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and
Capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals.
●The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and
technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments
of national power.
●Since early 2022, the CCP appears to have been deemphasizing the term “Military Civil
Fusion” in public, in favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 
●In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy remained oriented toward safeguarding its
sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for
itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense” (积极防
御).
●PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by
the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great
modern socialist country.”
●In October 2022, Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of CCP at the Party
Congress and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC probably will enable Xi
to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during his next 5-year term.
●During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi
reaffirmed his commitment to the PLA’s 2027 milestone for modernization to accelerate the
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s
armed forces. If realized, this capability milestone could give the PLA the capacity to be a
more credible military tool for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts.
●In 2022, the PLA continued discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-
Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR
network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence to rapidly identify key
vulnerabilities in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to
launch precision strikes against those vulnerabilities.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not
significantly impact PLA combat readiness.
FORCES, CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION  
●The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime
as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.
●The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to “fight
and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United States),
counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and project
power globally.
●People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA). The PLAA continues to modernize equipment
and focus on combined arms and joint training in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world
class military. The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military
response to the August 2022 U.S. Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to Taiwan. The
PLAA continues to incorporate a twice a year conscript intake. The long-term effects of the
policy are not clear.
●People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the
world with an overall battle force of over 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140
major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-mission ships and
submarines. In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
‒ 
It also commissioned its third YUSHEN class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA) 
and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.  In the near-term, 
the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against land 
targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles, 
notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability. 
‒ 
The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international 
law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the 
same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the EEZs of other countries, including 
the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
●People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation.  The PLAAF and
PLAN aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region. The
PLAAF is rapidly catching up to western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize with
the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs. In October 2019, the
PLAAF signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the PLAAF publicly
revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). The PLARF is advancing its long-term
modernization plans to enhance its “strategic deterrence” capabilities.  The PRC is developing
new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces and will require
increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction of multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
‒ 
The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental 
range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the 
PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United 
States, Hawaii, and Alaska. 
●Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF is a theater command-level organization established
to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications,
and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF’s Network Systems Department
(NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF; 网络空间部队), is responsible
for information warfare with an integrated mission set that includes cyberspace warfare,
technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s
Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天
部队), is responsible for military space operations.  The PRC continues to develop
counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital satellites,
electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can contest or deny an adversary’s
access to and operations in the space domain.
●
Joint Logistic Support Force. The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint
strategic and campaign-level logistic efficiencies through training and integrating civilian
products and services. The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the
movement of PLA forces and equipment for training.
●Special Operations Forces (SOF). Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s
SOF units lack real-world combat experience. China’s SOF does not have a national-level
special operations command to oversee all of China’s SOF activities. Despite an emphasis to
conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it
difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
●The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade,
deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region, and to conduct
military operations deeper into the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
●The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to
strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the First Island Chain
(FIC).


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION  
●The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a
presence in the East and South China Sea regions—within the FIC—and increasingly to hold
at risk U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
●Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in
all warfare domains is critical in modern war. PLA writings state that precision weapons are
not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation.
●Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS
architecture over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive
early warning radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also
placed radars and air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of
its IADS.
●Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will
continue to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system is possibly intended to replace some
older SRBM units and is intended to strike foreign military bases and fleets in the Western
Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert.
ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
●The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military
exercises.
●The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict,
which it calls "intelligentized warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced
technologies at every level of warfare.
●The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
United States.
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
●The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication
capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”


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●The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), satellite communication, satellite navigation, and
meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.
●The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within
their field of view and enable counterspace actions.
 NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
●Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its
nuclear forces.  Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current
efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity.
●The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms
while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion
of its nuclear forces.
●In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates that the PRC
possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023—on track to exceed
previous projections.
●DoD estimates that the PRC will probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by
2030, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its
force to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that
year, which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military
by 2049.
●The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce
plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies
are intended for peaceful purposes.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into
these silos. This project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to
increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW)
posture.
●The PRC is fielding the DF-5C, a silo-based liquid-fueled ICBM armed with a nuclear warhead
with a multi-megaton yield. The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its current
JIN class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from PRC
littoral waters.


 
 
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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
● The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
oncerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This 
includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
● The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a 
threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations.  
● The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 
OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
● The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, 
Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on 
the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
● Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the 
PLA conventional forces within the theater. 
● In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring 
Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a 
dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed ADIZ.  
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS 
● The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its 
sovereignty.  
● Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain a presence 
in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in response to oil 
and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”   
● During 2022, the PRC conducted multiple coercive actions against the Philippines in the SCS, 
including cutting the tow line of a Philippine Navy vessel, executing dangerous maneuvers in 
close proximity to Philippine vessels; and reportedly reclaiming several unoccupied land 
features in the SCS, which the Philippines noted contravenes the Declaration of Conduct on 
the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award.  
 


 
 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT  
● In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. The 
PLA’s increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the Taiwan Strait 
included ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into Taiwan’s self-
declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan. 
● At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position 
that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force 
as an option. 
● The PLA practiced elements of each of its military courses of action against Taiwan during its 
August 2022 large-scale military exercise aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 
in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s transit of the United States. 
PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
● Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances 
of PLA coercive and risky air intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past 
two years than in the previous decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 
100 instances of coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in 
an effort to deter both the United States and others from conducting lawful operations in the 
region.  
● Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft 
have included lasing; reckless maneuvers; close approaches in the air or at sea; high rates of 
closure; discharging chaff or flares in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other 
actions.  
● The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of 
the road, and increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential 
for loss of life. 
THE PLA’S GROWING GLOBAL PRESENCE  
● CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national 
rejuvenation.   
● The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders 
and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its 
foreign policy goals.  This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion—
and inducements—to advance its global security and development interests. 


 
 
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● In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas through participation UN 
peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia. 
The also PLA restarted in-person military diplomacy in 2022 that was suspended due to 
COVID-19.  
 PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
● The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA 
to project and sustain military power at greater distances. If realized, a global PLA military 
logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives 
evolve. 
● Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces 
projection. 
● In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s 
Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA 
military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United 
Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.  
● The SSF operates tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, 
and Kenya. The SSF also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and 
ICBM launches. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE 
● The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine 
that are most applicable to the PRC’s goal of strengthening its whole-of-government approach 
to countering a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.  
● Western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the PRC’s push for defense 
and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience.   
RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
● The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused 
with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for 
modern military capabilities. 
● The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including 
through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities 
to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment. 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
●In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 7.1 percent,
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position
as the second-largest military spender in the world.
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
●China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and
many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers.
●China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring missile capabilities
that improve target-selection and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures.
●In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed and manufactured aircraft carrier,
featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. The carrier will be able to
deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-submarine helicopters.
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
●The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to
military and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain
access to information and advanced technologies.
●There have also been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by
PRC nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as
U.S. citizens, for their efforts to illegally acquire information and technology to advance PLA
modernization.
DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2022 
●In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and
DoD requests for communication. The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely
continued in 2023.
●The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States,
combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk
of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.
●DoD is committed to re-opening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition
does not veer into conflict. DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include
ensuring crisis communications channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and avoiding
misperceptions.


 
 
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CHAPTER ONE: UNDERSTANDING  
THE PRC’S STRATEGY 
 
 
Understanding the tenets of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) national strategy is essential 
to understanding the drivers of China’s security and military strategy. This, in turn, offers insights 
on the current and future course of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) reform and 
modernization in terms of its strength, technological advances, organization, and operational 
concepts —all of which could offer PRC leaders expanded military options to support its national 
goals.  
CHINA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PRC’s national strategy is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 
2049. The strategy is a determined pursuit of political, social, and military modernity to expand 
the PRC’s national power, perfect its governance, and revise the international order in support 
of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests. The PRC views the United States as 
deploying a whole-of-government effort meant to contain the PRC’s rise, which presents 
obstacles to its national strategy.  
 The PRC characterizes its view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry among powerful 
nation states as well as a clash of opposing ideological systems. PRC leaders believe that 
structural changes in the international system and confrontational United States are the root 
causes of intensifying strategic competition between the PRC and the United States.  
 The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness 
the internal and external elements of national power that will place the PRC in a “leading 
position” in an enduring competition between systems. 
The PRC’s strategy aims to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This objective, 
which General Secretary Xi Jinping (also referred to as Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission or President of the PRC, depending on the context of his responsibilities) calls “the 
Chinese Dream,” is a national aspiration to elevate the PRC to a position of strength, prosperity, 
and leadership on the world stage.  
PRC leaders characterize their strategy to achieve political, social, and economic modernity—as 
defined by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party)—as a grand national endeavor that is 
sweeping in scope and far-reaching in how it will transform the PRC and, in turn, the world.  The 


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Party defines national rejuvenation as a state in which the PRC is “prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.” The PRC’s strategy entails deliberate and 
determined efforts to amass, improve, and harness the internal and external elements of national 
power that will place the PRC in a “leading position.” CCP leaders frequently refer to building the 
PRC’s “comprehensive” national power in this manner.  The PRC’s strategy entails a long-term 
planning process to attain national rejuvenation that sets objectives, priorities, and milestones 
across virtually every aspect of governance and policy area including economics, political affairs, 
the rule of law, public order, national security, diplomacy, and defense as well as social affairs, 
education, science and technology, culture, the environment, and other matters. CCP officials have 
discussed achieving the unification of PRC and Taiwan as an element of national rejuvenation.  
The PRC pursues its efforts to generate greater national power from the basis of defending and 
advancing its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Consequently, the PRC’s national 
ambitions and statecraft rest on the foundation of the CCP-dominated political ideology of 
enhancing the path, theory, system, and culture of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” The 
objective of this Party-led strategy is perhaps best stated in what the Party calls its “basic line,” a 
single sentence in the CCP’s constitution that serves as the mission of the Party and as the 
cornerstone for its policymaking. Last amended at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, it states:   
“The basic line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism 
is to lead all the people of China together in a self-reliant and pioneering effort, 
making economic development the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal 
Principles, and remaining committed to reform and opening up, so as to see China 
becomes a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, 
culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.”   
The 20th Party Congress also incorporated new developments since 2017 in “Xi Jinping Thought 
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” after the term was adopted into the 
CCP’s constitution. Unanimously agreed upon by Party delegates to the 19th Party Congress, the 
inclusion of Xi Jinping’s namesake ideology into the CCP constitution was hailed as a “guide to 
action for the entire Party and all the Chinese people to strive for the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation.” 
External Conditions. Among the external elements of the PRC’s national strategy are its 
deliberate efforts to create a “favorable” international environment that is conducive to the PRC’s 
rise and national rejuvenation. In the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report, the CCP expanded 
on its calls to prepare for an increasingly turbulent international climate and prioritized securing 
and safeguarding its overseas interests.  The Party stressed the need for strengthening the PRC’s 
capacity to secure its overseas interests, including improving its control over grain, energy and 
other resources, and key industrial and supply chains. The report also stressed the CCP’s need to 
prevent digital penetration, sabotage, subversion, and separatism activities from external actors. 
With regard to national security, the CCP reported it had “enhanced” the PRC’s security on all 
fronts and “withstood political, economic, ideological, and natural risks, challenges, and trials.” 
However, in 2021 and into 2022, PRC leadership contended with the ongoing effects of the 


 
 
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COVID-19 pandemic that brought challenges for the PRC’s diplomatic, cultural, and economic 
influence abroad. PRC leadership also took diplomatic measures to manage increased global 
concern about PRC rhetorical and diplomatic alignment with Russia before, immediately 
following, and during the war on Ukraine, as well as concern for the PRC’s growing assertive and 
coercive economic and military actions.  PRC leaders continue to believe that global trends, 
especially perceived U.S. decline, are generally conducive to their long-term interests.  
As PRC leadership views a divided China as a weak China, they argue that “full reunification”— 
including the resolution of the ‘Taiwan question’ by 2049 and solidifying the PRC’s “overall 
jurisdiction” over Hong Kong — is one of the fundamental conditions of national rejuvenation. 
Beijing views as an imperative that China field a “world-class” military by 2049 that can “fight 
and win” and “resolutely safeguard” the country’s sovereignty, security, and development 
interests. In support of this goal, on 26 December 2020 the National People's Congress passed 
revisions to the PRC’s National Defense Law, which broadened the legal justification for PLA 
mobilization to include defense of China’s “development interests.” The codification of this 
language in PRC law is intended to add legitimacy to the use of military force to safeguard the 
PRC’s overseas interests.  
China’s leaders claim national rejuvenation requires the PRC to “take an active part in leading the 
reform of the global governance system” as many rules and norms were established, in the PRC’s 
view, during a time of PRC weakness and without the PRC’s consultation and input. The Party 
views aspects of the prevailing international rules-based system as constraining the PRC’s strategic 
ambitions and incompatible with its sovereignty, security, political preferences, and development 
interests. To the PRC’s leaders, revisions are necessary to accommodate the PRC’s development 
and should reflect the CCP’s preferred transformation in the distribution of power to forge an 
external environment more favorable to the PRC’s political governance system and national 
interests.  
Key Objectives and Milestones. For decades, the PRC’s leaders have framed their pursuit of 
modernity and power as advancing China along a specific trajectory, with the PRC’s centenary in 
2049 serving as the target for achieving national rejuvenation and becoming a “great modern 
socialist country.” From the PRC’s perspective, the PRC is a developing nation that must transition 
into a “fully developed and highly advanced” socialist society, and this trajectory involves the 
Party leadership shepherding the PRC through different stages of gradual but systematic 
modernization and development. The Party demarcates the stages of the PRC’s strategy with 
milestones accompanied by objectives and priorities determined by the Party’s long-term planning 
processes.  
Reflecting on the PRC’s progress at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi declared that China had 
assumed “…a leading position in terms of economic and technological strength, defense 
capabilities, and comprehensive national strength” and, therefore, “crossed the threshold into a 
new era.” Xi’s declaration that the PRC had entered a “New Era” was not a change in strategic 
objectives, but an important signal of confidence that the PRC’s progress was sufficient to tackle 


 
 
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the next set of challenges in its development. For the PRC’s strategy in the “New Era,” Xi laid out 
a broad plan to achieve national rejuvenation with a timeline linked to two symbolically important 
centenary milestones reached in 2021 (the CCP’s centenary) and 2049 (the PRC’s centenary). To 
bridge the lengthy gap between the two anniversaries, Xi added interim national objectives for 
2035 and laid out a broad two-stage modernization plan to reach 2049. Further demonstrating the 
Party’s confidence in the PRC’s progress, Xi’s objectives for 2035 moved up certain mid-century 
targets set by the Party going back to 1987.  
At his centenary speech marking the 100th anniversary of the CCP on July 1st, 2021, Xi declared 
that China had “realized the first centenary goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all 
respects.” Beyond 2021, the PRC will use the “moderately prosperous society” as the basis for 
Xi’s “two-stage” plan to achieve national rejuvenation by the PRC’s centenary in 2049. In the first 
stage, from 2021 to 2035, the Party aims for the PRC to “basically” meet its initial thresholds for 
becoming a “great modern socialist country.” In this stage, the PRC will likely continue to 
prioritize economic development as “the central task,” but rather than rapid economic growth, it 
will seek to address its uneven economic development and inequalities that Beijing recognized as 
the new “principal contradiction” in PRC society in the “New Era.” By 2035, the PRC will also 
seek to increase its economic and technological strength to become a “global leader in innovation” 
and aim to “basically” complete its military modernization. The PRC will also seek to significantly 
strengthen its cultural “soft power” and improve its domestic rule of law and governance systems.  
In the second stage from 2035 to 2049, the PRC aims to complete its development and attain 
national rejuvenation, realizing an international status that Xi describes as a “global leader in terms 
of comprehensive national strength and international influence.” A renewed PRC will have 
attained—among the Party’s many goals—its objectives to field a “world-class” military and 
assume a leading position within an international order revised in line with the PRC’s overall 
foreign policy goal to establish what it refers to as a “community of common destiny (人类命运
共同体),” or the PRC’s preferred official English translation “community with a shared future for 
mankind.”  
Historic Continuity. Understanding the origins of the PRC’s national rejuvenation is crucial to 
understanding how the PRC will likely shape and pursue this strategic objective. PRC leaders have 
consistently framed their efforts as seeking to “restore” China to a preeminent place in the world 
after enduring what the Party characterizes as China’s “century of humiliation” beginning in the 
19th century as the Qing Dynasty began to disintegrate and lasting until the founding of the PRC 
in 1949. Although the Party’s exact articulation of this goal as “the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” first emerged in the late 1980s, the Party has championed the cause of rebuilding 
China since the 1920s. Xi frequently points to the CCP’s steadfastness to the cause of national 
rejuvenation and describes it as the Party’s “original aspiration.”   
The Party’s narrative of national rejuvenation speaks to the deep impressions left on the PRC’s 
political landscape over an era defined by the disintegration of China’s polity, repeated violations 
of China’s sovereignty by foreign powers, and the prolonged absence of physical and economic 


 
 
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security for many Chinese people.  For a culture with a history stretching back thousands of 
years—much of it spent as one of the most powerful and advanced civilizations in the world—
nationalist appeals to restore China’s greatness are deeply rooted.  The threads of national renewal 
can be traced to China’s reformers and nationalist revolutionary leaders in the late Qing Dynasty 
and emerged as a common nationalist theme in the fractured politics of China’s Republican Era.  
This resonance is crucial to understanding why the CCP portrays the PRC’s rejuvenation as a 
nationalist project that the Party “shoulders” for the country.   
The PRC’s Strategy and the CCP. The Party’s leaders frame “Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics” and the CCP as indispensable to the PRC overcoming its historical circumstances 
and attaining national rejuvenation. Xi stated in a speech to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, 
“Which ideological system a country implements depends on one crucial issue: can this ideology 
resolve the historical problems facing the country?” From the Party’s perspective, its leadership 
and systems are uniquely able to restore the PRC’s strength, prosperity, and prestige—underscored 
with the implicit warning that any deviation from socialism’s path would result in “chaos” and 
China falling behind on its “historic mission.” As Xi stated, “…only socialism can save China—
and only Socialism with Chinese Characteristics can develop China.”   
CCP leaders flatly reject the notion that the Party has abandoned its socialist ideology in recent 
decades with the introduction of market features into the PRC’s economy or drifted towards a non-
ideological form of governance. The Party asserts that the PRC remains on the path of “socialist 
modernization” but it seeks to advance the country gradually as a lesson painfully learned from 
the Mao-era catastrophes that aimed for rapid progress. Accordingly, the Party claims that to 
perform its decisive role in guiding the PRC’s development into a “great modern socialist country,” 
it must ensure that the country advances in line with “the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原
则).” First stated by Deng Xiaoping and later written into the CCP Constitution, these principles 
mandate the Party “to keep to the path of socialism, to uphold the people’s democratic dictatorship, 
to uphold the leadership of the CCP, and to uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”  
The Four Cardinal Principles are the basis for political and governance reforms pursued by the 
Party and the outer boundaries of its efforts to “reform” and “open up” the country.  
Xi told Party cadres in 2014, “promoting the modernization of the national governance system and 
capacity is definitely not Westernization or capitalism.”  In addition to cultivating ideological 
discipline and fighting corruption within the Party, Xi has sought to advance the PRC’s strategy 
by strengthening the Party’s primacy across China’s governance systems and making the Party 
more effective at managing China’s political, economic and social problems. Xi’s emphasis on 
building the CCP’s institutional capacity and promoting internal unity—which he views as the 
means for the Party to perform its strategic role—has become a prominent feature of his tenure.  
Competition Between Systems. PRC leaders believe that structural changes in the international 
system and an increasingly confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying 
strategic competition between China and the United States. The PRC’s leadership has long viewed 
China as embroiled in a major international strategic competition with other states. Throughout 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
the post-Mao reform era and particularly after the end of the Cold War, the Party’s leaders 
recognized their socialist system was—and would remain over the long-term—an underlying 
source of tension with the West. Given the Party’s ambitions to “restore” the PRC’s place in the 
world and their assessment of the PRC’s relative weakness via-a-vis rival states, CCP leaders 
recognized the PRC’s growing strength could threaten to aggravate tensions with others without 
careful management. Deng Xiaoping’s reputed approach to this dilemma, as attributed by other 
Party leaders, was for China to, “hide our capacities and bide our time, be good at maintaining a 
low profile; and never claim leadership.”  Although the PRC’s leaders have consistently pursued 
national rejuvenation as their goal, they have demonstrated a degree of strategic adaptability to 
seize opportunities and manage threats to their overall strategic objectives.  
Over time, the PRC has characterized China’s view of strategic competition in terms of a rivalry 
among powerful nation states, most importantly the United States, as well as a clash of opposing 
ideological systems. The PRC’s leaders have indicated they view competition as entailing aspects 
of cooperation and conflict and that the Party would need to be adaptable, flexible, and above all 
patient. The PRC’s leaders have also offered a view of competition based on relative levels of 
economic, technological, and military power. Speaking to the CCP Central Committee in 2013, Xi 
remarked that the Party needed to “appreciate” that “developed Western nations” would continue 
to possess “real, long-term advantages” over China in the economic, technological, and military 
domains. Xi argued that China would need to “prepare for a long period of cooperation and of 
conflict between these two social systems in each of these domains.” Xi also alluded to the core 
elements of “national rejuvenation” as the PRC’s approach to this competition. Xi stated, “Most 
importantly, we must concentrate our efforts on bettering our own affairs, continually broadening 
our comprehensive national power, improving the lives of our people, building a socialism that is 
superior to capitalism, and laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and 
have the dominant position.”  
CCP Views of Geostrategic Shifts. In the past two years, General Secretary Xi has presented his 
thoughts on the PRC’s strategic environment on numerous occasions. In 2020, CCP leaders, 
including Xi himself, convened several meetings on “growing risks” and, in the communique 
following the 5th Plenum in October 2020, stressed that the PRC is on the brink of “changes unseen 
in a century,” but also that China would benefit from a “profound adjustment in the international 
balance of power.” In his CCP 100th anniversary speech, Xi asserted that, as the world experienced 
“once-in-a-century changes,” China had to adopt “a holistic approach to national security that 
balances development and security imperatives” and implement “the national rejuvenation.” In his 
2022 New Year’s speech, Xi stated that China needed to “remain mindful of potential risks” while 
maintaining “strategic focus and determination.” 
Since just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, PRC leaders have consistently characterized 
China’s security environment as undergoing intense changes and viewed the international order as 
shifting toward a multipolar system more commensurate with the PRC’s development. The Party 
views a shift toward a multipolar system as consistent with its perception of global power trends. 
This shift is vital for the PRC to advance its strategy, perceiving U.S. power as a constraint that 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
impedes many of the PRC’s goals. The PRC’s leaders have eagerly embraced narratives of the 
West’s relative decline and the inevitability of China’s rise as largely consistent with their strategy 
and evidence of China’s progress. 
The Party views core aspects of the current international system as incompatible with its vision for 
a revised order premised on its “community of common destiny.” The PRC’s leaders view U.S. 
security alliances and partnerships, especially those in the Indo-Pacific, as destabilizing and 
irreconcilable with the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. Regionally, the 
PRC’s 2019 defense white paper claims that “Asia-Pacific” countries are “increasingly aware that 
they are members” of the PRC’s “community with a shared future for mankind” and that managing 
disputes through dialogue is its “preferred policy option.”   
Beijing has also expressed concerns over growing global instability and a mounting sense of 
insecurity that it views as instigated by the United States. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper 
criticized the United States as the “principal instigator” of global instability and driver of 
“international strategic competition.” China’s leadership views U.S. policy toward the PRC as a 
critical factor affecting the PRC’s national objectives and increasingly views the United States as 
more willing to confront Beijing where U.S. and PRC interests are inimical.  
Given the enduring suspicion among some in Beijing that the United States seeks to contain China, 
CCP leaders hold that the accrual of the PRC’s comprehensive national power will set the 
conditions for the PRC’s ability to confront or dissuade the United States and prevent containment. 
As China’s leaders seek to translate the PRC’s growing economic and military means into 
influence to advance their international aspirations, they must also carefully balance the PRC’s 
expanding interests across their priorities and resources.  
 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
THE PRC’S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT & MANAGEMENT 
In recent years, the PRC has articulated its view of national security as a broad concept 
that spans the confluence of internal and external threats to the PRC’s interests.  Party 
leaders have identified national security as encompassing traditional and non-traditional 
domestic and foreign threats; the intersection of external influences on internal stability; 
and economic, cultural, societal and environmental threats. Additionally, Beijing has 
taken steps to define a concept for national security; improve the CCP’s ability to develop 
and coordinate national security policy across party, military, and state organs; and raise 
domestic awareness of national security concerns. These efforts seek to address 
longstanding concerns of China’s leadership that the country’s legacy system of stove-
piped party-state organizations was ill equipped to meet the growing national security 
challenges that the PRC faces. 
National Security Concept. The CCP’s “Overall National Security Concept” (总体国家安全
观), first proposed by Xi in 2014, provides the framework for the PRC’s national security 
system, the mission of the Central National Security Commission (CNSC), and the basis 
of the PRC’s national security strategy. According to the Party, the premise of the concept 
is that “The people’s security is the purpose of national security, political security is the 
root of national security, and priority in national interests is the norm of national security.” 
China’s leaders consider people’s security, political security, and national interests as 
mutually reinforcing aspects of national security. Party outlets describe people’s security 
as the purpose because national security fundamentally must serve the PRC people and 
nation. Similarly, the Party’s view of political security as the foundation of national security 
is described in terms of the maintenance and “ruling status” of the Party and the system 
of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” This reflects the Party’s certainty that its 
leadership and systems are indispensable to the PRC’s national rejuvenation. Party 
leaders assess the supremacy of national interests as the criterion or standard by which 
the Party expects its stewardship of the PRC’s national security will be judged: its ability 
to “resolutely safeguard” the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. The 
PRC’s concept also views development and security as mutually supporting aspects of 
national security in which “security guarantees development, and development is the goal 
of security.” 
Central National Security Commission (CNSC). To improve coordination on national 
security matters, the CCP created the CNSC (中央国家安全委员会) in 2013. The CNSC 
advises the Politburo; oversees the coordination of national security issues across the 
government; manages crises; fights terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism; and 
interacts with foreign counterparts. Embracing the Party’s expansive concept of national 
security, the CNSC’s purview covers both internal and external national security matters. 
The CNSC’s mission, codification in law, sprawling definition of national security, and 
powerful leadership has led the CNSC to become an important party-state organ, and 
exemplified by its promulgating regulations in 2021 on the “National Security Work of the 
CCP” and outlining who, what, and how the CCP will lead national security in the PRC. 
CNSC Membership. The PRC’s top three leaders lead the CNSC: Xi who serves as the 
CNSC Chairman; Li Qiang (Premier of the State Council); and probably Zhao Leji 
(Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress). CNSC 
membership may include Politburo members, senior government leaders, and senior PLA 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
leaders (including the two Vice Chairmen of the CMC). The CNSC General Office is 
responsible for the commission’s daily work and is run by senior CCP officials serving in 
dual-hatted roles in other positions. As of March 2023, the Director of the CNSC General 
Office likely continued to be Ding Xuexiang, a longtime political aide to Xi. Ding also serves 
as the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee and is a member of the 
Politburo Standing Committee. Last October, Chen Wenqing was elevated to Secretary of 
the Central Politics and Law Commission at the 20th Party Congress and is unlikely to stay 
on at the CNSC where he has served as Deputy Director of the CNSC General Office since 
2018. 
National Security Strategy. By 2015, the CCP had adopted the PRC’s first national security 
strategy outline following the CNSC’s establishment. Official media noted the strategy 
intends to unify efforts by various departments under the central leadership’s guidance. 
Since 2015, the PRC’s leaders and media have indicated national security sub-strategies 
that cover a variety of issues including political security, homeland security, military 
security, economic security, cultural security, societal security, technology security, 
network security, nuclear safety, ecological security, resource security, and biosecurity.  
In November 2021, the Politburo deliberated and, soon thereafter, passed the PRC’s 
National Security Strategy (2021-2025) (国家安全战略). 
National Security Law. With the establishment of the CNSC and the Party’s adoption of 
the national security strategy, in 2015 the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the 
National Security Law (国家安全法). This law encapsulated the Party’s overall national 
security concept and swept a broad range of issues beneath a new legal framework of 
“national security,” while strengthening the formal role of central authorities. In recent 
years, the NPC has also passed a series of laws intended to address more specific 
national security concerns including counterespionage (2014, updated in 2022), 
counterterrorism (2015), cybersecurity (2016), foreign non-governmental organizations 
in China (2016), intelligence (2017), cryptography (2019), and the coast guard (2021). 
While these laws address more specific national security concerns, they remain sweeping 
in scope and authorities.  
In an effort to raise public awareness of the Party’s national security concepts and 
emphasize national security as a civic responsibility, the 2015 National Security Law 
designated April 15th of each year as National Security Education Day. Indicating the 
reach and depth the Party desires its national security concepts to penetrate into the 
party-state, the 2015 National Security Law also made provincial, autonomous regions 
and municipalities responsible for national security work within their administrative 
areas. This has led to the creation of national security committees in the Party’s 
provincial-level organizations, each headed by the province’s party chief.  
 
 
 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
FOREIGN POLICY  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to build a “community of common destiny” that supports its
strategy to realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The PRC’s ambition to
reshape the international order derives from the objectives of its national strategy and the
Party’s political and governing systems.
●In 2022, the PRC employed multiple diplomatic tools in an attempt to erode U.S. and partner
influence and sought to cultivate international support against intensifying U.S.-backed
security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS.
●Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022 represented a major, unexpected challenge for the
PRC as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of World War
II. Beijing has increasingly sought to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while
avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would result from providing non-deniable
material offensive or “lethal” assistance to Russia.
●Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material
support to Russia to enable the PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material
transfers, create off-ramps to renege on agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid
Russia.
The PRC has increasingly sought to use its growing diplomatic clout to promote a more prominent, 
global leadership role for Beijing in international affairs. China continued to advance a new 
diplomatic framework that it terms “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” based 
on the foreign policy direction determined by the CCP Central Committee and reaffirmed at the 
20th Party Congress. This framework seeks to advance the PRC’s strategy of national rejuvenation 
by achieving the CCP’s two centenary goals, improving the coordination of China’s major 
domestic and international policies, reforming aspects of the international order, adhering to the 
CCP Central Committee’s direction, and defending the PRC’s major interests. At the same time, 
PRC leaders are increasingly aware that the PRC foreign security environment is becoming more 
unstable and dangerous, especially in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, which 
could disrupt the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  
The CCP’s theory of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” underpins the conduct of the PRC’s 
foreign affairs. Since Xi assumed power at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the CCP Central 
Committee has placed greater emphasis on the PRC’s foreign policy advancing “the cause of 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”  Yang Jiechi, a former top Party official for the PRC’s 
foreign policy, has claimed that adherence to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is “showing 
extremely bright prospects” and “reached a new historical starting point.”  


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
According to Party officials, the overall goal of the PRC’s foreign policy is to build a “community 
of common destiny” that seeks to shift the international system towards an architecture based on 
the CCP’s principles for how nations should interact. This goal is essential to how the PRC’s 
foreign policy supports its broader strategy to achieve national rejuvenation.   From the PRC’s 
perspective, establishing this “community” is necessary to set the external security and economic 
conditions for the PRC’s national rejuvenation by “safeguarding world peace” and “promoting 
common development” according to the Party’s principles.  The PRC recognizes it cannot achieve 
its goals in isolation and seeks “all countries” to adopt its diplomatic framework in order to “build 
a community with a shared future for mankind” and “actively control the new direction of China 
and the world.” Lastly, PRC officials acknowledge that aspects of the international order are 
inconsistent with its objectives. The PRC’s diplomatic framework seeks to remedy this by 
promoting changes in a more “just and reasonable direction.” 
The PRC’s ambition to shape the international order derives from the objectives of its national 
strategy and the Party’s political and governing systems.  The PRC does not frame its efforts as 
simply opportunistic challenges to the status quo or a significant deviation from the past.  Rather, 
Beijing is acting upon its longstanding desire to redesign the architecture of the international order 
to support the PRC’s national rejuvenation, efforts that are married with growing resources and 
opportunities to do so.  The PRC’s foreign policy seeks to revise aspects of the international order 
on the Party’s terms and in accordance with ideas and principles it views as essential to forging an 
external environment supportive of the PRC’s national rejuvenation and strategic goals. 
The PRC’s foreign policy framework includes efforts to promote and accelerate the transformation 
in the distribution of power, revise the principles of interstate relations, and reform global 
governance structures.  Within the context of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese 
Characteristics,” PRC officials have described how the PRC differentiates its goals and relations 
according to the power relationships among four categories of actors: major powers, peripheral 
nations, developing nations, and international organizations. Among the major powers, Beijing 
contends that a new framework for relations is necessary to construct a “stable and balanced 
development” between the powers—in essence a multipolar system.  With peripheral nations, the 
PRC seeks to strengthen its relationships to create a more favorable environment along its maritime 
and land borders in accordance with the PRC’s view of justice and interests. For developing 
countries, the PRC emphasizes solidarity and cooperation as well as “actively” carrying out 
multilateral diplomatic work, to include continued “high-quality development” under its Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). This likely refers to the importance that the PRC places on attaining support 
from developing countries within international organizations. 
Another tenet of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics” is the PRC’s ambition 
to construct “new types” of “omnidirectional” relations and bilateral partnerships among states.  
The PRC desires for its concepts of mutual respect, cooperation, and mutual benefit to provide the 
basis for these “new types” of relations. Politburo member Yang Jiechi describes China’s “new 
type” relationships as strategic partnerships that follow a new path of “major power relations.” 
Although distinct from alliance relationships, the PRC’s notion of strategic partnerships is 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
indicative of a relationship that meets the PRC’s criteria and is worthy of a higher level of bilateral 
cooperation.  To improve its diplomatic support further, the PRC also seeks to create what it calls 
a “comprehensive global partnership network” of its strategic partners to form a global “circle of 
friends.” Despite its encompassing rhetoric, the PRC uses nomenclature to implicitly rank its level 
of “partnership.”  For example, the PRC ranks Pakistan as its only “all-weather strategic partner,” 
Russia as its only “comprehensive strategic partner with coordination relations,” and other 
countries such as Brazil and various states in South and Southeast Asia holding “all-round strategic 
partnership relations.”  
The PRC also promotes reforms to the “global governance system” as part of its diplomatic 
framework in order to reflect the “profound evolution” of the international order. According to 
Yang Jiechi, “The global governance system is at an important stage of profound evolution, and 
global governance has increasingly become the frontier and key issue of China’s foreign work.” 
To “seize opportunities” for reform, the PRC actively participates in the construction of a new 
global governance system based upon the Party’s principles.  This may be achieved through the 
creation of new multinational organizations and forums to uphold the authority of the CCP and the 
PRC’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests. For example, the PRC promotes 
BRI as an “important practical platform for the concept of the community of common destiny.” 
BRI also serves to strengthen the PRC’s strategic partnerships, enlarge its network of strategic 
partners, and advance reforms to the international order to support the PRC’s strategy.  
At the same time, PRC leaders probably increasingly seek to protect the PRC’s interests amid an 
external security environment that is becoming more unstable and dangerous.  At the 20th Party 
Congress in October 2022, Xi proclaimed that “the CCP Central Committee coordinated the 
overall strategic situation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and major changes in the 
world unseen in a century.” He added that the “CCP led the entire party, the entire military, and 
the people of all ethnic groups across the country to effectively deal with the severe and complex 
international situation and the huge risks and challenges that came one after another.” Although 
Xi did not mention specific challenges, Russia’s ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, the PRC’s 
heightened threat perception of United States, and lingering economic and political consequences 
of the COVID-19 pandemic almost certainly inform the PRC’s current foreign policy aimed at 
maximizing the PRC’s ability to shape the international system and better protect PRC’s interests.  


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
MILITARY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
 20TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE CCP 
General Secretary Xi presided over the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party, known as the 20th Party Congress, from October 16th–22nd, 2022. Party 
Congresses, convened every five years, hold important military and security implications 
for the PRC’s national and defense strategy. The military dimensions of the Report to 20th 
Party Congress focused on intensifying and accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s 
modernization goals, to include deploying PLA forces on a “regular basis and in diversified 
ways.”  
In order to achieve the PLA’s 2027 centenary goal, the 20th Party Congress set objectives 
to “provide new military strategic guidance, establish a strong system of strategic 
deterrence, increase the proportion of new-domain forces (most likely cyberspace and 
space) with new combat capabilities, speed up the development of unmanned, 
intelligence combat capabilities, and promote the development and application of the 
network information system.” Reappointed as Chairman of the CMC for the third time, Xi 
selected a six-man CMC that offers political continuity, technical expertise on nuclear and 
space issues, and Taiwan-centric operational experience to lead the PLA toward achieving 
its centenary goals. 
The 20th Party Congress offered new insight on the CCP’s perception of the PRC’s external 
security environment. Notably, the Party Congress report did not reference a “strategic 
window of opportunity for development,” but rather that the PRC is facing “drastic changes 
in the international landscape,” and thus must be more mindful of “potential dangers and 
be prepared to deal with worse-case scenarios.”  
 
The PRC employed a wide range of diplomatic tools throughout 2022 to erode U.S. influence 
globally and subvert U.S.-backed security partnerships such as the Quad and AUKUS, which 
Beijing perceives as avenues to constrain its rise. The CCP is increasingly frustrated by 
Washington’s perceived use of an exaggerated threat picture of China to cultivate an international 
coalition willing subvert the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  In response, PRC leaders and 
officials have increasingly sought to bolster the PRC’s relations with developing countries in 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East; co-opt regional multilateral organizations such as 
ASEAN; and assert its status as the self-appointed de facto leader of the “Global South.”  Similarly, 
beginning late 2022, Beijing launched a diplomatic “charm offensive” targeting European 
countries in an apparent effort to improve perceptions of Beijing following years of “wolf warrior” 
diplomacy and COVID-19 isolation. Through these engagements, Beijing aims to internationally 
isolate Washington and persuade countries that the United States is the sole party responsible for 
escalating U.S.-China tensions, primarily to deflect criticism of the PRC’s efforts to reshape the 
international environment to protect its interests.   PRC officials have also framed AUKUS as an 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
act of nuclear proliferation and threat to regional stability to stoke international concerns about the 
trilateral security partnership and press countries to limit engagement with U.S.-backed alliance.  
In recent years, global public opinion of the PRC has fallen, particularly after the PRC’s response 
to COVID and continued coercive foreign and domestic policies. Out of 24 countries across 
Europe, Asia, and the Americas surveyed by the Pew Research Center in spring 2023, 15 countries 
registered their most negative feelings towards the PRC in 2022 or 2023. Similarly, five of the 
eight middle-income countries polled saw the PRC in more negative light after the pandemic. In 
the 2022 Pew survey, only 18 percent of global respondents trusted Xi Jinping do the right thing 
regarding world affairs. These reports are only the most recent in a series of surveys showing an 
increasingly negative perception of the PRC across the U.S., Europe, and Asia.  
Russia’s War on Ukraine. The Russian war on Ukraine represented a major, unexpected 
challenge for Beijing as it sought to react to the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of 
World War II. Despite multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions towards Kyiv, Beijing was caught 
completely off guard by the full scope and scale of Russia’s war on Ukraine. For example, on the 
first day of the invasion and as Russian and Ukraine air forces battled over Kyiv, the PRC 
Ambassador to Ukraine publicly announced that PRC was organizing an aerial evacuation of 
Chinese citizens. Although the PRC eventually shifted to an overland evacuation of its citizens 
once the reality of the conflict became apparent to PRC officials, the PRC’s initial reaction is 
indicative of the PRC’s continued struggles to anticipate geopolitical risks and protect its overseas 
interests. 
As Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has continued, Beijing has increasingly sought to balance 
its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding the reputational or economic costs that would 
result from providing undeniable offensive material or “lethal” assistance to Russia. PRC leaders 
and officials have parroted Russian narratives blaming the U.S. and NATO for causing the conflict. 
Beijing has also refrained from directly criticizing or condemning Russia for using military force 
to infringe on Ukraine’s sovereignty despite Russia’s actions in Ukraine violating the PRC’s Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  Of note, Beijing has also become a willing buyer of Russian 
energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanctioned-battered economy and has ensured Russia’s continued 
diplomatic participation in multilateral organizations. At the same time, Beijing probably has taken 
a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing material support to Russia to enable the 
PRC to maintain plausible deniability, control material transfers, create off-ramps to renege on 
agreements, and maximize the PRC’s options to aid Russia.  It remains to be seen whether/when 
Russia becomes more of a liability than an asset in the Chinese calculus. 
● To date, Chinese officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance to Russia. 
However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it probably will 
seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or economic 
costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese 
companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, 


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, 
spare parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. 
● China’s expansive and unregulated commercial drone market has allowed Russian defense 
forces to routinely acquire small drones and dual-use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to 
support their war in Ukraine. Between March 2022 and 2023, Chinese firms exported more 
than $12 million worth of drones and drone components to Russia. Chinese-origin drones have 
been employed by Russian forces for targeting, surveillance, and strike missions in Ukraine. 
In August 2023, Beijing announced it would implement its first controls on the civilian and 
dual-use drone market, as well as the sale of civilian-use counter-UAV systems, in response to 
international speculation over Chinese drones’ use in Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine.  
PRC leaders and officials have sought to deflect international criticism over Sino-Russian relations 
and protect its international reputation by using high-level diplomatic engagements and messaging 
emphasizing the PRC’s “neutral” role in the conflict. These efforts include Chinese officials 
meeting with Ukrainian officials, announcing token humanitarian assistance, and calling for peace 
talks without developing a specific, detailed plan to resolve the conflict. Similarly, the PRC’s 
ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons probably is also intended 
to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power. In November 2022, during German 
Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear weapons must not be used, nuclear 
wars should not be fought, and the international community should come together to prevent a 
nuclear conflict in Eurasia. Xi’s repetition of the PRC’s stated stance on nuclear weapons as well 
as his unwillingness to specifically condemn Russian nuclear threats, suggest that Xi probably was 
focused on protecting China’s reputation rather than applying strong pressure to prevent Russia 
from using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.   
Global Initiatives. Adding to this standard framework for talking points on Russia’s war of 
aggression in Ukraine and other foreign policy issues, in April 2022, Xi announced the Global 
Security Initiative (GSI) at the Bo’ao Forum. Echoing the previous year’s rollout of the Global 
Development Initiative (GDI), Beijing has promoted GSI extensively and attempted to insert GSI 
language into multilateral forums and documents.  At the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in October, 
Xi further promoted GSI and GDI, emphasizing that realizing the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” required equal prioritization of both security and development. As of the end of 
2022, however, Chinese officials had yet to clearly define how GSI would actually advance the 
vague security goals it espouses, such as safeguarding “comprehensive” security and protecting 
territorial integrity. International receptivity to GDI and GSI has been mixed so far; GDI’s links 
to BRI has made the initiative more attractive to developing countries, while GSI’s vagueness and 
implicit criticisms of the United States have made more countries hesitant to sign on to it. 
 


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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PRC EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GSI ABROAD 
PRC state-run media outlets publish multiple articles daily aimed at promoting the GSI 
abroad, including in English, Spanish, French, Russian, and other languages. These 
reports frequently quote local voices as well as current and former PRC and non-PRC 
government officials expressing support for GSI. Additionally, PRC diplomats publish 
“signed articles,” promoting GSI in local newspapers all around the world. While some 
foreign-language PRC media reports and “signed articles” are tailored to local audiences, 
most reports emphasize four key themes: (1) GSI promotes world peace and shared 
prosperity; (2) the West’s security framework is based on a hegemonic, Cold-War mindset 
that leads to crises; (3) The “International Community” supports GSI, especially in Africa, 
the Middle East, Latin America, parts of Asia; and (4) GSI represents “true 
multilateralism.” Although these reports state that GSI “seeks concrete actions and 
tangible results” they do not articulate a framework, mechanisms, list of “signatories,” or 
other specifics about how and what GSI would do.   
Military Diplomacy. The PRC’s willingness to engage in military diplomacy with other countries 
varies considerably based on its perception of a country’s adherence to the PRC’s diplomatic 
framework.  For example, the PRC’s “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination” with 
Russia entails a relatively high degree of military cooperation. Sino-Russian military cooperation 
occurs in practical forms through exchanges of training, equipment, technology, high-level visits, 
and other coordination mechanisms.  For other strategic partnership countries, the PRC seeks to 
leverage those relationships to reinforce the PRC’s systemic preferences and maintain stability in 
Beijing’s favor.  For countries with whom the PRC has not established strategic partnerships, such 
as the United States, the PRC shapes its military cooperation along more minimalist principles of 
conflict avoidance that emphasize “non-conflict” and “mutual respect.” From the PRC’s 
perspective, these curtailed relationships at least serve its foreign policy objective by ensuring 
stable relations with major powers.   
Although the COVID-19 pandemic continued to constrain PRC’s military diplomacy in 2022, the 
PLA increased its external, in-person high-level military visits compared to 2021 and maintained 
close contact with the military leadership of neighboring countries. The PLA also relied on high-
level virtual bilateral meetings and multilateral engagements to supplement cancelled engagements 
and maintain contacts with foreign militaries.  
PRC Policy Towards the Pacific Islands. Since 2015, the PRC probably has viewed economic, 
political, and policing engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) as an opportunity to 
expand the PRC’s regional influence, press countries to switch diplomatic recognition to Beijing, 
deepen security cooperation, and advance the PRC’s responsible great power narrative. Of note, 
in late May and early June 2022, then PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to seven PICs, 
including Fiji and the Solomon Islands, and sought to promote the expansion of Sino-PICs 
relations. During his visits, Wang emphasized that the PRC would continue to pursue a “four-


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pronged adherence’ towards relations with the PICs that linked the PRC’s efforts to improve 
relations with PICS with foreign policy principals. 
Wang’s visit came on the heels of the April 2022 announcement that the PRC and the Solomon 
Islands had signed a security cooperation agreement. According to a draft copy of the China-
Solomon Islands Security Agreement, China would be permitted to send armed policy and military 
personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though Honiara denied this would lead 
to a PRC military base. Beijing probably seeks to use security agreements with the PICs to justify 
the expansion of PLA security activities in the region. 
PRC Relationship with Iranian Proxies. The PRC almost certainly does not have extensive 
relations with Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, or Iranian-
backed militia groups in Iraq. PRC officials, including the PRC’s Special Envoy to Syria, have 
publicly met with Hezbollah officials to discuss the Syrian civil war, but such engagements almost 
certainly are perfunctory and focused on advancing the PRC’s responsible great power narrative 
rather than the PRC seeking to expand ties with these groups.    PRC officials probably calculate 
that expanding relations with Iranian proxies, especially Iranian-backed militia groups in Iraq, 
would alienate regional governments and disrupt the PRC’s regional objectives such as promoting 
the expansion of BRI projects in the Middle East.   
The PRC has also maintained diplomatic, economic, and some security ties with the Assad Regime 
Syria.Since 2016, the PRC’s special envoy to Syria has focused the PRC’s efforts on political 
support to the Assad regime, facilitating a political resolution to the civil war, humanitarian 
assistance, reconstruction, and counterterrorism.  In 2022, the PRC reached an agreement with 
Syria to join the BRI, demonstrating the PRC’s efforts to promoted economic relations with Syria.   
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN CONTEXT
The PRC’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied widely since 1949. Some disputes led to 
war, as in border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. China’s contested border with 
the Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In recent cases involving 
land border disputes, China has sometimes been willing to compromise with and even offer 
concessions to its neighbors. Since 1998, China has settled 11 land-based territorial disputes with 
six of its neighbors. However, within the last decade China has employed a more coercive 
approach to deal with several disputes over maritime features, ownership of potentially rich 
offshore oil and gas deposits, and border areas. 
Tensions with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) sparked a standoff between Chinese 
and Indian forces in mid-May 2020, which persisted into the winter.  The standoff escalated on 15 
June 2020 after a skirmish ensued in the Galwan Valley between Indian Army and PLA forces that 
ended with 20 Indian soldiers and four PRC soldiers dead. In late 2022, Chinese and Indian forces 
engaged in an unarmed clash near Tawang along the Eastern Sector of the LAC separating Tibet 
and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. This was the first such clash since the 2020 Galwan 


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skirmish, although local commanders quickly diffused the clash and the overall standoff did not 
substantively escalate. 
Select Chinese Territorial Claims 
The PRC and Japan have overlapping claims to both the continental shelf and the exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) in the East China Sea (ECS). The ECS contains natural gas and oil, 
although hydrocarbon reserves are difficult to estimate. Japan maintains that an equidistant line 
from each country involved should separate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental 
shelf beyond the equidistant line to the Okinawa Trench. The PRC continues to assert sovereignty 
over the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands and reiterate the importance of abiding by the four-
point consensus signed in 2014, which states both sides will acknowledge divergent positions over 
the ECS dispute but also prevent escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management 
mechanisms. Japan remains concerned with the persistent deployment of PRC coast guard ships 
and fishing vessels in disputed ECS waters and contests the PRC’s claim of sovereignty. 
The South China Sea (SCS) plays an important role in security considerations across East Asia 
because Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SCS shipping 
lanes, including more than 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China 
claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands and other land features within its 
ambiguous self-proclaimed “nine-dash line” claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba Island in the Spratly Islands, 
makes the same territorial assertions as the PRC. The PRC continued to employ the PLA Navy 
(PLAN), China Coast Guard, and maritime militia to patrol the region throughout 2022.  In 
response to China’s continued assertive actions, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam 


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have publicly rejected the PRC’s nine-dash line claims and invoked international law in support 
of their maritime sovereign rights. 
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its claimed exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) in a manner that is inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has 
begun conducting the same types of military activities inside and outside the First Island Chain 
(FIC) in the EEZs of other countries, including the United States. This activity highlights China’s 
double standard in the application of its interpretation of international law. Examples include 
sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific 
(RIMPAC) exercise off Hawaii in 2014 and 2018, TALISMAN SABER off Australia in 2017, 
2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021.  PRC survey ships are also extremely 
active in the SCS and frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such 
as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.  
ECONOMIC POLICY  
Key Takeaways 
●At the end of 2022, China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID-19 policy. The decision to
implement China’s reopening took most by surprise and was probably triggered by country-
wide protests against the PRC’s zero-COVID-19 policies, economic pressures, and fiscal
difficulties for local governments.
●The 20th Party Congress emphasized the importance of quality growth rather than the speed of
growth. General Secretary Xi also highlighted common prosperity, more equitable access to
basic public services, a better multi-tiered social security system, and cultural and green
developments as a few of China’s economic initiatives.
●The PRC’s ongoing military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of
China’s broader national development aspirations. China’s economic, political, social, and
security development efforts are mutually reinforcing and support China’s strategy of national
rejuvenation.
●China’s tools of economic statecraft include inducements such as infrastructure investments
under BRI; industrial and technology policies such as Made in China 2025 that seek foreign
technology transfers in exchange for market access; protectionist policies and legal barriers for
foreign firms to compete in China’s domestic market; selective observance of trade
commitments; and economic coercion against other states.
The PRC’s military modernization objectives are commensurate with and part of China’s broader 
national development aspirations and work in coordination with China’s economic policies and 
systems.  PRC’s leaders directly link the pace and scale of the PLA’s modernization with the 
country’s overall development. The PRC’s economic, political, social, and military development 


 
 
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efforts are mutually reinforcing and support its strategy of national rejuvenation. The Party gives 
priority to China’s economic development as the “central task” and frames its economic system as 
the means of advancing the nation’s overall political and social modernity. In particular, China’s 
economic targets abroad focus intensely on advancing what the Party calls the country’s 
“productive forces” (e.g., industry, technology, infrastructure, and human capital) which it views 
as the means to achieve the country’s political and social modernity—including building a “world-
class” military. The party-state’s relentless efforts to grow China’s national industrial and 
technological base has significant implications for China’s military modernization, as well as for 
China’s global economic partners.  
CCP leaders have cast China’s partial adoption of market features–which were implemented as 
part of its “reform and opening up” that began in the late 1970s, and subsequently led to an 
economic transformation–as evidence that their strategy to modernize China has been succeeding 
rather than viewing the market feature adoption as a repudiation of the Party’s fundamental 
economic ideals. Party leaders since Deng Xiaoping have consistently rationalized China’s 
market-oriented economic reforms as a necessary regression from socialism needed to account 
properly for China’s historical circumstances, which left it significantly underdeveloped. 
According to the Party, contemporary China remains at the beginning stage or the “primary stage 
of socialism” with a long process of socialist modernization ahead.  
Basic Economic System. The Party conceives of China’s economy as constituting the “basic 
economic system” in which public ownership is dominant and state, collective, and private forms 
of ownership develop side by side. The basic economic system comprises China’s public 
ownership economy and the multi-ownership economy.  
Economic Development Goals. Despite slowing economic growth just prior to and during the 
COVID-19 outbreak, China will continue to pursue the economic policy objectives determined by 
the CCP Central Committee and set forth in the 14th Five-Year Plan (FYP). China’s economic 
goals are (1) furthering supply-side structural reform, (2) making China a country of innovators, 
(3) pursuing a rural vitalization strategy, (4) implementing the coordinated regional development 
strategy, (5) accelerating efforts to improve the socialist market economy, and (6) making new 
ground in pursuing “opening up on all fronts.” The PRC is currently executing the 14th FYP that 
will cover 2021-2025. The priorities and goals in the FYPs not only apply to the government and 
the public ownership economy, but also serve as implicit guidance from the Party to the multi-
ownership economy.  
 Economic Conditions. Prior to COVID-19, China’s economic growth had slowed because of 
demographic challenges, declining returns from state-led infrastructure investment, and slowing 
urbanization. China’s efforts in early 2020 to contain the COVID-19 outbreak with government 
lockdowns and strict control measures exacerbated this slowdown in China’s economy. In March 
2022, China announced an annual growth target of around 5.5 percent, but fell well short and only 
achieved 3 percent growth for 2022, the second lowest growth on record since 1976.  


 
 
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Multiple challenges affected China’s economy in 2022, including a COVID-19 resurgence in the 
fall, a weak property sector due to a correction in the housing market, high youth unemployment, 
and sluggish consumption recovery. China abruptly reversed its zero-COVID-19 policy at the end 
of 2022, a decision probably based on CCP leader’s recognition that the lock downs were failing 
to prevent infections and concerns about the fluffing economy and country-wide protests against 
the policy in early December. China is also facing adverse demographics, slowing external demand 
amid global inflationary pressures, and a debt problem. Although global supply chain relocation 
has been discussed for years, multinational corporations may be thinking more seriously about 
supply chain diversification after facing serious disruptions during China’s zero-COVID-19 
policy. 
China’s government is also concerned about economic risks associated with prolonged housing 
market corrections and may be more inclined to deliver funding support for developers and further 
easing measures on the demand side (e.g., lower down payments required and the removal of home 
purchase restrictions). China’s property market may have reached a trough in 2022 and could 
improve in 2023.  
Economic Policies and Practices. The 20th Party Congress unveiled a new economic leadership 
team to advance Xi’s goal of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts. Economic growth is 
a necessary condition for China to realize this goal, with more emphasis on quality and inclusive 
growth, as well as security requirements. The Party Congress vowed to grow China’s per capita 
GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country, which it defined as income of 
$20,000 per capita. This would imply average growth of approximately 3.5 percent during 2022 
to 2035. Xi’s new economic team has broad technocratic qualifications. Of note, Xi elevated Vice 
Premier Zhang Guoqing to be in charge of science, technology, and industry. Zhang has a doctorate 
in economics, which suggests a national security-oriented economic focus in Xi’s third term to 
supports his stated goal of national strength through increasing economic strength and scientific 
technological capabilities. 
The PRC’s introduction of market economy features within the “basic economic system” without 
a full transition to free and open markets has resulted in laws, regulations, and policies that 
generally disadvantage foreign firms vis- à-vis their Chinese counterparts in terms of tradable 
goods, services sectors, market access, and foreign direct investment. Examples of China’s 
economic policies and trade practices include its support to domestic industries at the expense of 
foreign counterparts, commercial joint venture requirements, technology transfer requirements, 
subsidies to lower the cost of inputs, sustaining excess capacity in multiple industries, sector-
specific limits on foreign direct investment, including partnership requirements and other barriers 
to investment, discriminatory cybersecurity and data transfer rules, insufficient intellectual 
property rights enforcement, inadequate transparency, and lack of market access—particularly in 
the information and communications technology (ICT), agriculture, and service sectors. Market 
access remains difficult for some foreign firms because China restricts certain inbound investment, 
resulting in persistent underperformance in other countries’ services exports, particularly in the 
banking, insurance, Internet-related, professional, and retail services sectors. 


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A large portion of China’s economic output results from government and policy-directed 
investments rather than market-based forces. China pursues state-directed investment overseas and 
encourages mergers and acquisitions. Along with heavy investments in infrastructure and 
commodities to support its strategic firms, increase economic engagement, and improve economic 
security, China is investing in technologies that will be foundational for future innovations with 
both commercial and military applications. 
The PRC seeks and obtains foreign technology through the following means: foreign direct 
investment, overseas acquisitions, legal technology imports, the establishment of foreign research 
and development (R&D) centers, joint ventures, research and academic partnerships, talent 
recruitment, industrial, and cyberspace espionage and theft. Investors may be concerned about 
intensified pressure of technology restrictions on China, which has forced the Chinese government 
to double down on its efforts to promote innovation and self-sufficiency in key technologies.   
Recent legal proceedings highlight numerous cases of China’s efforts to obtain technology and 
knowledge through theft of trade secrets and economic espionage. In April 2022, a jury in United 
States federal court sentenced a PRC national to 29 months in prison for conspiring to commit 
economic espionage. The PRC national had worked as an imaging scientist for a Monsanto 
subsidiary and was found to have stolen proprietary algorithms, which he brought to the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences Institute of Soil Science. In November 2021, a federal jury convicted a PRC 
intelligence officer of attempting to steal industry-leading aviation trade secrets. Court documents 
show that the PRC officer attempted to steal technology related to GE Aviation’s exclusive 
composite aircraft engine fan to benefit the PRC state.  
The PRC’s recent economic policies have promoted innovation focused on strengthening domestic 
industry, while placing additional restrictions on foreign firms. Recognizing that some of its 
initiatives such as Military Civil Fusion (MCF), “Made in China 2025,” and BRI have sparked 
concerns about China’s intentions, PRC leaders have adopted lower profile rhetoric when 
promoting these initiatives without altering their fundamental strategic goals. 
●Made in China 2025: First announced by the PRC in May 2015, the “Made in China 2025”
plan seeks to increase China’s domestic innovation by setting higher targets for domestic
manufacturing in strategic industries such as robotics, power equipment, and next-generation
information technology by 2020 and 2025. This plan seeks to strengthen China’s domestic
enterprises through awarding subsidies and other incentives while increasing pressure on
foreign firms to transfer technology to have market access in China. “Made in China 2025”
came under criticism from advanced countries for unfairly favoring China’s domestic
enterprises at the expense of foreign participants in China’s markets. Increasingly aware and
sensitive to these concerns, by June 2018, China began avoiding references to “Made in China
2025” in major policy papers. The PRC government ordered its media outlets to downplay use
of the term in June 2018. Key events that PRC leaders use to set strategic directives have also
avoided references to “Made in China,” including the 2019 Central Economic Work


 
 
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Conference and the NPC. Despite the adjustments in its narrative, China has largely continued 
implementing the policies behind “Made in China 2025.” 
● Dual Circulation: In 2020, Xi articulated the economic policy of dual circulation, which aims 
for a largely self-sufficient China that could innovate, manufacture, and consume within its 
own economy, while still drawing on the international economy through exports, critical 
supply chains, and limited imports of capital. Dual circulation seeks to enable the internal 
markets and external markets to reinforce each other, with a focus on establishing the domestic 
market as the primary driver of economic growth. 
Legal Framework. In recent years, the PRC has implemented new laws placing further 
restrictions on foreign firms while creating or strengthening the legal framework for the Party’s 
national security concepts and, in some cases, furthering its MCF Development Strategy 
(discussed in the next section):  
● National Defense Law: Adopted in March 1997, the law provides legal justification to mobilize 
the military and civilian resources in defense of a broad range of national interests.  
● National Security Law: Adopted in July 2015, the law limits foreign access to provide a broad 
framework for safeguarding the PRC’s security interests. It calls for review and monitoring of 
foreign participation in the ICT market in China on national security grounds.  
● Counterterrorism Law: Adopted in December 2015, among its provisions, the law requires 
telecommunications operators and Internet service providers to provide information, 
decryption, and other technical support to public and state security organizations “conducting 
prevention and investigation of terrorist activities.”  
● National Defense Transportation Law: Coming into effect in 2016, the National Defense 
Transportation Law advances the PRC MCF development strategy by laying the groundwork 
for the PLA Navy to mobilize civilian maritime transportation resources and facilities to 
support power projection missions. 
● Cyber Security Law: The law, which went into effect in June 2017, promotes development of 
indigenous technologies and restricts sales of foreign ICT in China. The law also requires 
foreign companies to submit ICT for government-administered national security reviews, store 
data in China, and seek government approval before transferring data outside of China.  
● Intelligence Law: Adopted in June 2017, the law allows authorities to monitor and investigate 
foreign and domestic individuals and organizations to protect national security. Specifically, it 
allows authorities to use or seize vehicles, communication devices, and buildings to support 
intelligence collection efforts. 
● Cryptography Law: Adopted in October 2019 and coming into effect in 2020, this law requires 
entities working on cryptography to have management systems in place to ensure sufficient 


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security for their encryption. Although the law encourages development of commercial 
encryption technology, its use cannot harm national security or the public good. It provides for 
the State Cryptography Administration and its local agencies to have complete access to 
cryptography systems and the data protected by those systems. 
●
Foreign Investment Law: In March 2019, the PRC’s NPC adopted a new Foreign Investment
law with the stated objective of improving the business environment for foreign investors and
leveling the playing field between foreign businesses and Chinese private firms and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). The law passed in just three months, which reflects an unusually
fast turnaround in China where the same level of legislation usually takes years. PRC officials
have indicated that swift passage of the law was to facilitate U.S.-China trade talks, and the
law appears to respond to a number of issues raised by the U.S. Trade Representative’s Section
301 report that highlighted unfair Chinese trade practices related to intellectual property,
technology transfer, and innovation. Despite the law’s stated objective, its wording is vague
and the most substantial provisions are not new.
●Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law: Adopted at the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the
13th National People’s Congress on June 10th, 2021, the law was enacted to “safeguard national
sovereignty, security, and development interests, and to protect the legitimate rights and
interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.” According to PRC media sources, the law is
intended to “counter, fight, and oppose” unilateral sanctions on the PRC imposed by foreign
countries. The law was likely adopted in response to sanctions on PRC officials in connection
with serious human rights abuse in Xinjiang.
●Data Security Law: This law went into effect on September 1st  2021, and subjects almost all
data-related activities to government oversight, as PRC officials grew concerned about the
transfer of potentially sensitive data overseas. Companies in the PRC have become more
reluctant to share data, as authorities are ambiguous as to what is considered sensitive
information, increasing difficulties for international firms trying to do business in the PRC. In
early November 2021, local providers of ship tracking data stopped sharing details of ship
locations, citing the data security law.
●Personal Information Protection Law: Effective November 1st, 2021 and adopted by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the law is purposed to protect the
rights and interests on personal information, regulate personal information processing
activities, and promote reasonable use of personal information. PRC media sources note that
activities such as “collection, application, processing, and trading of personal information will
be strictly monitored” with infringements punishable according to the law.  The law
exemplifies a more complete system of regulation in tandem with the PRC’s existing
Cybersecurity Law and Data Security Law.
●Counter-espionage law: On April 26th, 2021, the PRC adopted a counter-espionage law
permitting the Ministry of State Security (MSS) authority to identify companies and
organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require these institutes


 
 
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to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration. In July 2023, the PRC adopted an 
amended counter-espionage with a broader scope. The amended law expanded the definition 
of espionage from covering state secrets and intelligence to any documents, data, materials, or 
items related to national security, without defining these terms.   
CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) 
Key Takeaways  
● The PRC uses BRI to support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global 
transportation and trade linkages to support its development and deepen its economic 
integration with nations along its periphery and beyond.  
● In 2022, BRI projects saw mixed economic outcomes, experiencing both growth and decline. 
However, overall spending on BRI projects remained consistent with the previous year and 
Beijing continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy 
opportunities. 
● Overseas development and security interests under BRI will drive the PRC towards expanding 
its overseas security relationships and presence to protect those interests.  
First announced in 2013, the PRC’s BRI initiative is the signature foreign and economic policy 
advanced by Xi that rebranded and further expanded China’s global outreach. Beijing uses BRI to 
support its strategy of national rejuvenation by seeking to expand global transportation and trade 
links to support its development and deepen its economic integration with nations along its 
periphery and beyond. The PRC implements BRI by financing, constructing, and developing 
transportation infrastructure, natural gas pipelines, hydropower projects, digital connectivity, and 
technology and industrial parks worldwide. As of 2022, at least 147 countries had signed BRI 
cooperation documents, up from 146 in 2021, 138 in 2020, and 125 in 2019.  
In support of its national strategy, Beijing leverages BRI to strengthen its territorial integrity, 
energy security, and international influence. The PRC aims to improve stability and diminish 
threats, for example, by investing in projects along its western and southern periphery. Similarly, 
through BRI projects associated with pipelines and port construction in Pakistan, it seeks to 
become less reliant on transporting energy resources through strategic choke points, such as the 
Strait of Malacca. It also attempts to exploit the relationships it builds through BRI to pursue 
additional economic cooperation with participating countries. 
Since 2022, two distinct trends have developed relative to BRI. First, the share of PRC financial 
investment relative to construction increased to its highest levels, with investments almost 
doubling. Beijing experienced strong growth in their East Asian and the Middle Eastern 
investments but a decline in their Sub-Saharan Africa efforts. Conversely, spiraling construction 
costs over the past three years have resulted in $78 billion in bad loans which needed to be written 
off or renegotiated in 2022. Second, Beijing began to replace previous BRI rhetoric with language 


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highlighting cooperation and partnership, which likely is designed to make BRI more appealing to 
foreign partners. The official name of “Belt and Road Initiative” was removed from the English 
version of many of Xi’s speeches in 2022 and replaced with phrases such as “Belt and Road 
cooperation.” After launching the GDI in September 2021, Xi mentioned Belt and Road 
Cooperation eight times while referring to GDI more than 16 times.   
China has continued to prioritize public health, digital infrastructure, and green energy 
opportunities through its “Health Silk Road (健康丝绸之路)” (HSR), “Digital Silk Road (数字丝
绸之路)” (DSR), and “Green Silk Road (绿色丝绸之路)” (GSR), respectively. Improving each of 
these “roads” offers Beijing benefits beyond economic integration.  
●HSR is the PRC’s World Health Organization-supported initiative for providing medical
assistance through BRI transportation networks. In the future, it may help the PRC expand the
international market share of PRC medical products, strengthen its bid for a role as a global
public health leader, and identify the need for – and justify – new BRI projects.
●GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance projects; this initiative
aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 2060 and presents
Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.
●DSR is one of the primary ways Beijing seeks to facilitate transfer of PRC technology to
partner countries, which the PRC leverages to propagate its own technology standards as it
seeks to set global standards for next-generation technology. Announced in 2015 as a digital
subset of BRI, the PRC’s Digital Silk Road initiative, seeks to build a PRC-centric digital
infrastructure, export industrial overcapacity, facilitate expansion of the PRC’s technology
corporations, and access large repositories of data. As of 2016, 16 countries had signed
memorandums of understanding with Beijing to participate in the DSR. The PRC hopes the
DSR will increase international e-commerce by reducing cross-border trade barriers and
establishing regional logistics centers by promoting e-commerce through digital free trade
zones. Another goal of the DSR is to reduce PRC dependence on foreign tech leaders by
providing markets for Chinese goods, thereby creating production opportunities for PRC tech
firms. The PRC is investing in digital infrastructure abroad, including next-generation cellular
networks—such as fifth-generation (5G) networks—fiber optic cables, undersea cables, and
data centers. The initiative also includes developing advanced technologies including satellite
navigation systems, artificial intelligence (AI), and quantum computing for domestic use and
export. International opponents of China’s DSR fear that Beijing will encourage recipient
countries to use this technology as a tool of repression modeled on China’s authoritarian-style
government. Likewise, host country political elites would probably risk their sovereignty by
becoming vulnerable to espionage and political blackmail.


 
 
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Since BRI’s inception, its long-term viability has faced challenges from international concerns 
over corruption, debt sustainability, and environmental effects, coupled with suspicion of the 
PRC’s motives and the risk inherent in operating in politically unstable areas. China has applied 
military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived threats, but the party-
state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most participating countries.  
As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expanded under BRI, the CCP has 
signaled that its overseas security footprint will increase accordingly to protect those interests, 
which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s planned or 
active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, and 
instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk.  In 2022, for 
example, five PRC citizens were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul where 
Chinese nationals were known to stay. 
China has therefore sought to extend its ability to safeguard its overseas interests, including BRI, 
by developing closer regional and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and supporting host-
nation security forces through military aid, including military equipment donations. In an October 
2022 speech to the National Party Congress, Xi spoke of the need to become more adept at 
deploying the PLA to protect China’s national security interests. Xi also said, “We will better 
coordinate strategies and plans, align policies and systems, and share resources and production 
factors between the military and civilian sectors.”  
The PRC has adopted new security legislation establishing a legal basis to violate people’s data 
privacy and includes the aforementioned National Intelligence and Cybersecurity Laws of the 
People’s Republic of China.  Under the auspices of national security, the PRC and its security 
services have the authority to compel any private Chinese company to turn over all data collected 
by their systems, if desired.  GSR aims to support low-carbon infrastructure, energy, and finance 
projects – an initiative that aligns with the PRC’s own goal of achieving carbon neutrality before 
2060 and presents Beijing as a responsible party in working toward the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development Goals established by the United Nations General Assembly.  
The PRC has applied military, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic tools to counter perceived 
threats, but the party-state leaders lack the expertise to assess comprehensive risks in most 
participating countries. As the PRC’s overseas development and security interests expand under 
BRI, the CCP has signaled that its overseas security footprint will expand accordingly to protect 
those interests, which Beijing recognizes may provoke pushback from other states. Some of BRI’s 
planned or active economic corridors transit regions prone to violence, separatism, armed conflict, 
and instability, putting BRI-related projects and PRC citizens working overseas at risk.  In 2022, 
for example, five PRC nationals were injured when ISIS-K terrorists attacked a hotel in Kabul 
where Chinese nationals were known to stay. 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION (MCF) DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC pursues its MCF (军民融合) Development Strategy to “fuse” its security and
development strategies into its Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities in support
of China’s national rejuvenation goals.
●The PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense science and
technology industries and serves a broader purpose to strengthen all the PRC’s instruments of
national power.
●The PRC’s MCF development strategy encompasses six interrelated efforts: (1) fusing China’s
defense industrial base to its civilian technology and industrial base, (2) integrating and
leveraging science and technology innovations across military and civilian sectors, (3)
cultivating talent and blending military and civilian expertise and knowledge, (4) building
military requirements into civilian infrastructure and leveraging civilian construction for
military purposes, (5) leveraging civilian service and logistics capabilities for military
purposes, and (6) expanding and deepening China’s national defense mobilization system to
include all relevant aspects of its society and economy for use in competition and war.
●Since early 2022, the Party appears to have been deemphasizing the term MCF in public, in
favor of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”  Xi’s work report to the 20th
Party Congress in October 2022 omitted any mention of MCF, only calling for “consolidating
and enhancing integrated national security strategies and capabilities,” and then addressing
many of the components traditionally associated with MCF.
The PRC pursues its MCF strategy as a nationwide endeavor that seeks to meld its economic and 
social development strategies with its security strategies to build an integrated national strategic 
system and capabilities in support of China’s national rejuvenation goals. The Party’s leaders view 
MCF as a critical element of their strategy for the PRC to become a “great modern socialist 
country” which includes becoming a world leader in science and technology (S&T) and developing 
a “world-class” military.  
Although the PRC’s MCF strategy includes objectives to develop and acquire advanced dual-use 
technology for military purposes and deepen reform of the national defense S&T industries, its 
broader purpose is to strengthen all of the PRC’s instruments of national power by melding aspects 
of its economic, military, and social governance. MCF strives to establish an infrastructure that 
connects the military and civilian sectors in a way that serves as a catalyst for innovation and 
economic development, yields an effective unity of effort in advancing dual-use technologies, 
especially those suited for “intelligentized” warfare, and facilitates effective industrial 
mobilization during wartime.  


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
Development and Significance. The Party has explored the concept of leveraging or integrating 
the combined contributions of the military and civilian sectors since the PRC’s founding. The 
current MCF concept initially took root in the early 2000s as the Party sought methods to enhance 
the PRC’s overall development. This led Party leaders to call for improving “military-civilian 
integration” that echoed the collaboration between the defense and civilian sectors that China 
observed in the United States and other developed countries. Implementation of these efforts 
stalled due to a lack of centralized government control and the organizational barriers that exist 
across the party-state. Coinciding with the 11th FYP (2006-2010), the PRC began replacing 
“military-civilian integration” with “military-civilian fusion.” In 2007, Party officials publicly 
noted the change from “integration” to “fusion” was not merely cosmetic but broadened the scope 
to include all available economic resources in the promotion of the defense industry. 
Since that time, MCF’s ambitions have grown in scope and scale as the Party has come to view it 
as a means to bridge the PRC’s economic and social development with its security development 
in support of the PRC’s national strategy to renew China. As such, the Party has continued to 
elevate MCF’s importance.  In 2015, the CCP Central Committee elevated the MCF Development 
Strategy to a national-level strategy to serve as a bridge between the PRC’s national development 
strategy and its national security strategy, later also adding building “integrated national strategic 
systems and capabilities” (一体化的国家战略体系和能力), both of which support the PRC’s 
goal of national rejuvenation.  
Since early 2022, the Party appears to have been deemphasizing the term MCF in public, in favor 
of “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.”  This term appears to have originated in 
June 2017 when Xi addressed the first meeting of the Central Committee’s Central Commission 
for Military-Civil Fusion Development and charged them with gradually building up “China’s 
integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.” Xi used “integrated national strategic 
systems and capabilities” in conjunction with “military-civilian fusion” in his 2017 speech to the 
19th Party Congress, suggesting that completion of major projects, achievements in defense 
research, and improved MCF would contribute to building the PRC’s overarching integrated 
national strategic systems and capabilities. In December 2017, three PLA National Defense 
University (NDU) scholars published a study expanding on that concept, asserting that MCF was 
part of a near-term goal to establish basic “deep development patterns.”  The NDU academics 
maintained that once that was accomplished, the PRC could move on to its ultimate goal of 
building “integrated national strategic systems and capabilities.” Notably, the language in the study 
closely mirrored that of national policies, making it possible that the authors played a significant 
role in helping draft the strategy. Their interpretation of Xi’s speech was supported by numerous 
other writings that came out following the 19th Party Congress in 2017.  
Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 omitted any mention of MCF, only 
calling for “consolidating and enhancing integrated national security strategies and capabilities,” 
and then addressing many of the components traditionally associated with MCF. This same 
formulation was used in March 2023 by Xi and CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia in their 
separate addresses to PLA and People’s Armed Police delegates to the 14th National People’s 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Congress. Provincial party officials responsible for MCF were already publicly using the phrase 
“integrated national strategic systems and capabilities” and avoiding the term MCF in the months 
leading up to the 20th Party Congress. It is not clear whether Party leadership believes that China 
has met all the conditions to move beyond MCF. However, an article published in the PLA Daily 
in December 2022 stated that the process of enhancing integrated national strategic systems and 
capabilities will “quicken the pace of national defense and armed forces building” and “greatly 
enhance the strategic confrontation capability of the national system.” 
Management and Implementation. The overall management and implementation of the MCF 
Development Strategy involves the most powerful organs in the party-state: the Politburo, the State 
Council (notably the National Development and Reform Commission), and the CMC. In addition 
to signifying its importance, the CCP Central Committee’s elevation of the MCF Development 
Strategy to a national-level strategy also was intended to overcome obstacles to implementation 
across the party-state. 
This elevation led to the establishment of the Central Commission for Military Civilian Fusion 
Development (中央军民融合发展委员会) (CCMCFD) in 2017, chaired by General Secretary Xi 
Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, several other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, two State 
Councilors, both CMC Vice Chairmen, 12 Ministry-level leaders, and others. The stated objective 
of the CCMCFD is to build the PRC’s “national strategic system and capabilities.” This 
commission works to improve the “top-level design” of MCF and overcome impediments to 
implementation. The elevation of the MCF Development Strategy and the creation of the 
CCMCFD signals the importance that Party leaders place on MCF and the scope and scale of the 
strategy’s ambitions.  
The PRC pursues MCF through six interrelated efforts. Each effort overlaps with the others and 
has both domestic and international components. The Party seeks to implement the MCF 
Development Strategy across every level of the PRC from the highest national-level organs down 
to provinces and townships and creates top-down financing and regulatory mechanisms that 
incentivize civilian and military stakeholders – such as local governments, academia, research 
institutions, private investors, and military organizations – to combine efforts on dual-use 
technologies. The PRC refers to these six aspects as “systems,” which may also be understood as 
mutually supporting lines of effort or components. The six systems in the MCF Development 
Strategy are as follows: 
The Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial System. This system focuses on 
fusing the PRC’s defense industrial base and its civilian technology and industrial base. This 
includes expanding the private sector’s participation in the PRC’s defense industrial base and 
supply chains as well as improving the efficiency, capacity, and flexibility of defense and civilian 
industrial and manufacturing processes. This broader participation seeks to transfer mature 
technologies both ways across military and civilian sectors, with the goal to produce outsized 
benefits for both. This also aims to increase the competitiveness within the PRC’s defense 
industrial base in which one or two defense SOEs dominate an entire sector. This MCF system 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
also seeks to advance the PRC’s self-reliance in manufacturing key industrial technologies, 
equipment, and materials to reduce its dependence on imports, including those with dual-uses. The 
PRC’s MCF-influenced industrial and technology endeavors include Made in China 2025, which 
sets targets for the PRC to achieve greater self-sufficiency in key industrial areas such as aerospace, 
communications, and transportation.  
The Military-Civil Coordinated Technology Innovation System. This MCF system seeks to 
maximize the full benefits and potential of the country’s S&T development. Consistent with the 
CCP leadership’s view that high technology and innovation are critical to strengthening China’s 
comprehensive national power, this system develops and integrates advanced technologies across 
civilian and military entities, projects, and initiatives—with benefits flowing in both directions. 
This includes using cutting-edge civilian technology for military applications or to more broadly 
advance military S&T as well as using military advancements to push civilian economic 
development. Although related to the Advanced Defense Science, Technology, and Industrial 
System, this system largely focuses on fusing innovations and advances in basic and applied 
research. Specific efforts in this MCF system include strengthening and promoting civilian and 
military R&D in advanced dual-use technologies and cross-pollinating military and civilian basic 
research. Additional efforts include promoting the sharing of scientific resources, expanding the 
institutions involved in defense research, and fostering greater collaboration across defense and 
civilian research communities. This system also seeks to foster “new-type” research institutions 
with mixed funding sources and lean management structures that are more dynamic, efficient, and 
effective than the PRC’s wholly state-owned research bodies. Examples of MCF-influenced dual-
use S&T endeavors include the PRC’s Innovation Driven Development Strategy and Artificial 
Intelligence National Project.   
The Fundamental Domain Resource Sharing System. This system includes building military 
requirements into the construction of civilian infrastructure from the ground up as well as 
leveraging China’s civilian construction and logistics capacities and capabilities for military 
purposes. This includes factoring military requirements and dual-use purposes into building 
civilian private and public transportation infrastructure such as airports, port facilities, railways, 
roads, and communications networks. This also extends to infrastructure projects in dual-use 
domains such as space and undersea as well as mobile communications networks and 
topographical and meteorological systems. Another element seeks to set common military and 
civilian standards to make infrastructure easier to use in emergencies and wartime. This aspect of 
MCF has arguably the greatest reach into the PRC’s local governance systems as military 
requirements inform infrastructure construction at the province, county, and township levels. The 
influence of this aspect of MCF is visible in the PRC’s major land reclamations and military 
construction activities in the SCS, which brought together numerous government entities, the PLA, 
law enforcement, construction companies, and commercial entities. It may also have important 
implications for the PRC’s overseas infrastructure projects and investments under BRI as the PRC 
seeks to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA to 
project and sustain military power. 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
The Military Personnel (Talent) Cultivation System. This MCF system seeks to blend and 
cultivate military and civilian S&T expertise through education programs, personnel exchanges, 
and knowledge sharing. The purpose of this effort is to improve the utilization of experts able to 
participate in S&T projects irrespective of whether they are military or civilian (or even foreign) 
experts and allow expertise to flow more freely across sectors. This aspect of MCF also seeks to 
reform the PRC’s talent cultivation system, which encompasses hundreds of talent recruitment 
plans, in order to improve China’s human capital, build a highly skilled workforce, and recruit 
foreign experts to provide access to know-how, expertise, and foreign technology. It takes into 
account all levels of education from the Party’s nationwide “patriotic education” programs for 
children to the matriculation of post-doctorate researchers within China and at institutions abroad. 
Many of the PRC’s named talents programs are likely influenced by MCF planning, as are reforms 
in its military academies, national universities, and research institutes.  
The Socialized Support and Sustainment System for the PLA. This system entails two major 
efforts that seeks to shift the PLA away from its inefficient self-contained logistics and sustainment 
systems and towards modern streamlined logistics and support services. First, it seeks to harness 
civilian public sector and private sector resources to improve the PLA’s basic services and support 
functions—ranging from food, housing, and healthcare services. The concept is to gain efficiencies 
in costs and personnel by outsourcing non-military services previously performed by the PLA 
while also improving the quality of life for military personnel.  Second, it seeks to further the 
construction of a modern military logistics system that is able to support and sustain the PLA in 
joint operations and for overseas operations. This system seeks to fuse the PLA Joint Logistic 
Support Force’s (JLSF’s) efforts to integrate the military’s joint logistics functions with the PRC’s 
advanced civilian logistics, infrastructure, and delivery service companies and networks. These 
arrangements seek to provide the PLA with modern transportation and distribution, warehousing, 
information sharing, and other types of support in peacetime and wartime. This fusion also seeks 
to provide the PLA with a logistics system that is more efficient, higher capacity, higher quality, 
and global in reach.  
The National Defense Mobilization System. This MCF system binds the other systems as it 
seeks to mobilize the PRC’s military, economic, and social resources to defend or advance China’s 
sovereignty, security and development interests. The Party views China’s growing strength as only 
useful to the extent that the party-state can mobilize it. China characterizes mobilization as the 
ability to precisely use the instrument, capability, or resource needed, when needed, for the 
duration needed. Within the PLA, 2015-16 reforms elevated defense mobilization to a department 
called the National Defense Mobilization Department (NDMD), which reports directly to the 
CMC. The NDMD plays an important role in this system by organizing and overseeing the PLA’s
reserve forces, militia, and provincial military districts and below. This system also seeks to
integrate the state emergency management system into the national defense mobilization system
in order to achieve a coordinated military-civilian response during a crisis. Consistent with the
Party’s view of international competition, many MCF mobilization initiatives not only seek to
reform how the PRC mobilizes for war and responds to emergencies, but how the economy and
society can be leveraged to support the PRC’s strategic needs for international competition.


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
MCF Linkages. Each MCF system entails linkages between dozens of organizations and 
government entities, including: 
● Ministry-level organizations from the State Council: Examples include the National 
Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology, Ministry of Education, and key state entities such as the State 
Administration of Science and Technology in National Defense and others. 
● Lead military organs subordinate to the Central Military Commission: CMC Strategic 
Planning Office, Joint Political, Logistics, and Equipment Development Departments, as well 
as operational units and the regional military structure at the Military District and Sub-District 
levels; military universities and academies such as National Defense University, Academy of 
Military Science, National University of Defense Technology, and service institutions. 
● State-sponsored educational institutions, research centers, and key laboratories: Prominent 
examples include the “Seven Sons of National Defense” (Harbin Institute of Technology, 
Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Northwestern Polytechnical Institute, Beijing 
Institute of Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Beihang University, Nanjing 
University of Aeronautics and Astronautics), as well as certain PLA-affiliated laboratories of 
Tsinghua University, Beijing University, and Shanghai Jiaotong University, North University 
of China, and others. 
● Defense industry: The ten major defense SOEs continue to fill their traditional roles providing 
weapons and equipment to the military services. Many defense SOEs consist of dozens of 
subsidiaries, sub-contractors, and subordinate research institutes.  
● Other SOEs and quasi-private companies: High profile examples include PRC high-tech 
corporations and important SOEs like COSCO, China National Offshore Oil Company, and 
major construction companies that have roles in BRI projects as well as helping the PRC build 
out occupied terrain features in the SCS. 
● Private companies: MCF efforts also seek to increase the proportion of private companies that 
contribute to military projects and procurements. These enterprises include technology 
companies that specialize in unmanned systems, robotics, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, 
and big data.  
● Multi-stakeholder partnerships: In practice, many MCF efforts involve partnerships between 
central, provincial, or city government entities with military district departments, PLA 
departments, academia, research entities, and companies. A majority of provincial and local 
governments have announced MCF industrial plans, and more than 35 national-level MCF 
industrial zones have been established across China. MCF-linked investments funds created 
by central and local governments and private investors total in the tens of billions of dollars.  


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY 
Key Takeaways 
●In 2022, the PRC’s stated defense policy aims remained oriented toward safeguarding its
sovereignty, security, and development interests, while emphasizing a greater global role for
itself. The PRC’s military strategy remains based on the concept of “active defense
(积极防御).”
●PRC leaders stress the imperative of strengthening the PLA into a “world-class” military by
the end of 2049 as an essential element of its strategy to rejuvenate the PRC into a “great
modern socialist country.”  In response to perceived personnel deficiencies within the PLA, Xi
approved and issued a new series of regulations in July 2022 on the management of PLA
soldiers seeking to improve recruiting, training, promotions, benefits, and demobilization
efforts for non-commissioned officers (NCOs).
●CCP leaders increasingly cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend the PRC’s
expanding global interests and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of
“Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”
●Xi secured his third term as the general secretary of China’s Communist Party at the Party
Congress in October 2022 and his appointment of loyalists to top positions in the CMC
probably will enable Xi to expand upon military modernization and operational goals during
his next 5-year term. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Xi detailed PLA goals of
enhancing party loyalty in the military, while simultaneously strengthening the military
through reform, science and technology, personnel training, mechanization, informatization,
and modernized military strategies.
●In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed
forces, which, if realized, could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool
for the CCP’s Taiwan unification efforts. During his October 2022 speech at the opening
ceremony of the 20th Party Congress, Xi stated that China intends to complete the plan to
modernize the PLA by 2027.
●In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” called “Multi-Domain
Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to leverage a C4ISR network
that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what the PLA calls the
“network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities in the U.S.
operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision strikes
against those vulnerabilities. The PLA’s official newspaper continued to emphasize the
importance developing MDPW in 2022, citing “several informatized local wars” as evidence
for the need for MDPW capabilities.


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
● COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not 
significantly impact PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 
skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC and other deployments. While some 
non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the 
PLA’s mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within 
China’s military. 
The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. CCP leaders view these interests as foundational to their national strategy. 
The modernization of the armed forces is an indispensable element of the Party’s national strategy 
to modernize the country. At the Fifth Plenum in October 2020, the CCP declared the PRC’s 
ambitions for becoming a rich country are closely integrated with its ambitions to develop a 
powerful military. The PRC’s defense policy and military strategy primarily orients the PLA 
toward “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” interests in the region while 
countering to the United States. At the same time, CCP leaders increasingly cast the armed forces 
as a practical instrument to defend the PRC’s expanding global interests and to advance its foreign 
policy goals within the framework of “Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”  
Xi’s work report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 said that the People’s Liberation Army 
must move quicker with troop training and new strategies to reach its target of becoming a world-
class military. The PRC’s military strategy is based on “active defense,” a concept that adopts the 
principles of strategic defense in combination with offensive action at the operational and tactical 
levels. To adapt the PRC’s armed forces to long-term trends in global military affairs and meet the 
country’s evolving national security needs, PRC leaders stress the imperative of meeting key 
military transformation targets set for 2027 and 2035. These milestones seek to align the PLA’s 
transformation with the PRC’s overall national modernization so that by the end of 2049, the PRC 
will field a “world-class” military.  
Strategic Assessment. A key driver of the PRC’s defense policy is how the CCP leaders perceive 
the relative threats and opportunities facing the country’s comprehensive national development. 
During Chairman Xi’s CCP centenary speech, he called for the full implementation of the Party’s 
idea of strengthening the army in the new era. The last defense white paper, China’s National 
Defense in the New Era, published in 2019, reaffirmed that China’s armed forces are aligned with 
and contribute to the strategies of the CCP, stating that ongoing military reforms “ensure absolute 
leadership of the CCP over the military.”  According to the paper, Beijing views the international 
environment as undergoing “profound changes unseen in a century.” The CCP concludes that 
“international strategic competition is on the rise” and expresses deep concerns at what it sees as 
growing sources of instability in the near-term. Beijing offers no introspection on its role in stirring 
geopolitical tensions through its economic practices, military activities and modernization, 
excessive maritime territorial claims, assertive diplomacy, or efforts to revise aspects of global 
governance. Rather, the PRC describes the international system as being “…undermined by 
growing hegemonism, power politics, unilateralism and constant regional conflicts and wars.” 
Similarly, the PRC contends that global military competition is intensifying and that “major 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
countries” are adjusting their security and military strategies, reorganizing their militaries, and are 
developing new types of combat forces to “seize the strategic commanding heights in military 
competition.”  
Defense Policy. The PRC’s stated defense policy is to “resolutely safeguard” its sovereignty, 
security, and development interests, according to its 2019 defense white paper, which provides 
continuity with past statements by PRC senior leaders and other official documents. Xi’s work 
report to the 20th Party Congress reiterated this policy, saying that fast modernization of the PLA’s 
organization, personnel, and military technology standards, under the absolute leadership of the 
party, would be key not only to defending China’s sovereignty but also its security and 
developmental interests. In practice, the PRC’s military power is increasingly a central feature of 
the CCP’s regional and global ambitions. The 2019 defense white paper also identifies the PRC’s 
national defense aims that support these interests, in likely order of importance:  
●to deter and resist aggression;
●to safeguard national political security, the people’s security, and social stability;
●to oppose and contain “Taiwan independence;”
●to crack down on proponents of separatist movements such as “Tibet independence” and the
creation of “East Turkistan;”
●to safeguard national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security;
●to safeguard the PRC’s maritime rights and interests;
●to safeguard the PRC’s security interests in outer space, the electromagnetic spectrum, and
cyberspace;
●to safeguard the PRC’s overseas interests; and
●to support the sustainable development of the country.
Key changes in defense policy for the “New Era” include efforts to improve coordination across 
the party-state to leverage all organs of national power in a unified approach to support the CCP’s 
ambitions of a global military capability. Unlike previous defense white papers, China’s National 
Defense in the New Era explicitly stressed the PRC’s armed forces’ alignment and support to the 
Party’s broader societal and foreign policy objectives. For example, the white paper states that the 
PRC’s armed forces must be ready to “provide strong strategic support for the realization of the 
Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation, and to make new and greater contributions to the building 
of a shared future for mankind.” Also notable is the explicit alignment between the PRC’s defense 
and foreign policies, particularly in the armed forces’ role in protecting the PRC’s overseas 
interests and furthering the CCP’s concept of “strategic partnerships” with other countries.  


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
Military Strategic Guidelines (军事战略方针). The Chairman of the CMC issues military 
strategic guidelines to the PLA that provide the foundation of the PRC’s military strategy. The 
military strategic guidelines set the general principles and concepts for the use of force in support 
of the CCP’s strategic objectives, provide guidance on the threats and conditions the armed forces 
should be prepared to face, and set priorities for planning, modernization, force structure, and 
readiness. The CCP leadership issues new military strategic guidelines, or adjusts existing 
guidelines, whenever they perceive it necessary to shift the PLA’s priorities based on the Party’s 
perceptions of China’s security environment or changes in the character of warfare. 
Since 2019, trends indicate the PRC has reviewed and adjusted its military strategic guidelines. In 
early 2019, PRC state media indicated that Beijing held senior-level meetings to “establish the 
military strategy of the ‘New Era.’” The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper states that the PLA is 
implementing guidelines for the “New Era” that, “…actively adapt to the new landscape of 
strategic competition, the new demands of national security, and new developments in modern 
warfare…” PRC official media in the latter half of 2019 echoed these themes and described the 
guidelines as constituting a notable change. The PRC’s defense white paper may reflect changes 
in the guidelines given its emphasis on the intensification of global military competition, the 
increase in the pace of technological change, and the military modernization themes introduced by 
General Secretary Xi at the 19th Party Congress. Documents released following the Fifth Plenum 
of the 19th Central Committee in October 2020 hailed progress in the “comprehensive and in-
depth” implementation of the “New Era military strategic guidelines.”  
These developments are notable because the CCP leadership has issued new military strategic 
guidelines or adjusted its guidelines only a few times since the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the 
CMC under Jiang Zemin directed the PLA to prepare to win “local wars” under “high-tech 
conditions” after observing U.S. military operations in the Gulf War. In 2004, the CMC under Hu 
Jintao ordered the military to focus on winning “local wars under informationized conditions.” In 
2014, the CMC placed greater focus on conflicts in the maritime domain and fighting 
“informatized local wars.” 
Military Strategy—Active Defense. The PRC’s military strategy is based on what it describes as 
“active defense,” a concept that adopts the principles of strategic defense in combination with 
offensive action at the operational and tactical levels. Active defense is neither a purely defensive 
strategy nor limited to territorial defense. Active defense encompasses offensive and preemptive 
aspects. It can apply to the PRC acting externally to defend its interests. Active defense is rooted 
on the principle of avoiding initiating armed conflict but responding forcefully if challenged. The 
PRC’s 2019 defense white paper reaffirmed active defense as the basis for its military strategy. 
Minister of National Defense General Wei Fenghe reiterated this principle of active defense in his 
speech at the Ninth Beijing Xiangshan Forum in 2019, stating that the PRC “will not attack unless 
we are attacked, but will surely counterattack if attacked.” 
First adopted by the CCP in the 1930s, active defense has served as the basis for the PRC’s military 
strategy since its founding in 1949. Although the PRC has adjusted and tailored the specifics of 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
active defense over time based on changes in strategic circumstances, its general principles have 
remained consistent. Contemporary PRC writings describe the tenets of active defense as: 
● Adhere to a position of self-defense and stay with striking back. This describes the basic 
principle for the use of military force under active defense. The PRC’s 2019 defense white 
paper describes this principle as, “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely 
counterattack if attacked.” Active defense may entail defensive counterattacks in response to 
an attack or preemptively striking an adversary that the PRC judges is preparing to attack. 
● Combine strategic defense with operational and tactical offense. This aspect offers two 
approaches to warfare influenced by Mao Zedong’s notion of using defense and offense in 
turns. First, active defense may involve offensive campaigns, operations, and tactical actions 
in support of the strategic defense. These may occur rapidly and along “external lines.” Second, 
it uses strategic defense to weaken the enemy and set the conditions to transition into strategic 
offense in order to secure victory. Strategic defense is not equivalent to deterrence but includes 
deterrence. Strategic defense also includes actions taken after deterrence has failed, such as 
conducting conventional strikes against an adversary. 
● Taking the operational initiative. This aspect emphasizes the effective use of offensives at the 
operational and tactical levels, avoiding enemy strengths, and concentrating on building 
asymmetric advantages against enemy weaknesses to “change what is inferior into what is 
superior.” 
● Strive for the best possibilities. This calls for thorough peacetime military preparations and 
planning based on fighting the most challenging threat under the most complicated 
circumstances “in order to get the best results.” This aspect stresses the importance of setting 
conditions in advance and suggests it is preferable to be prepared and not fight, than to fight 
unprepared.  
● The dialectical unity of restraining war and winning war. This tenet seeks to resolve the 
dilemma that using too little force may protract a war instead of stopping it while the 
unconstrained use of force may worsen a war and make it harder to stop. Calling for the 
“effective restraint of warfare,” this tenet seeks to avoid war first through sufficient military 
preparations and powerful conventional and strategic forces that act in concert with political 
and diplomatic efforts to “subdue the enemy’s troops without fighting.” If war is unavoidable, 
however, this aspect calls for restraining war by taking the “opening move” and “using war to 
stop war.” 
● Soldiers and the people are the source of victory. This integrates the concept of active defense 
with the concept of “people’s war.” People’s war comprises subordinate military strategies, 
“guerrilla war” and “protracted war” that Mao saw as a means to harness the capacity of 
China’s populace as a source of political legitimacy and mobilization to generate military 
power. Contemporary PRC writings link “people’s war” to national mobilization and 
participation in wartime as a whole-of-nation concept of warfare. 


 
 
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Military Missions and Tasks. The CMC directs the PLA to be ready and able to perform specific 
missions and tasks to support the Party’s strategy and defend the PRC’s sovereignty, security, and 
development interests. The PLA’s missions and tasks in the “New Era” include safeguarding 
China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, maintaining combat readiness, 
conducting military training under real combat conditions, safeguarding China’s nuclear weapons 
and its interests in the space and cyberspace domains, countering terrorism and maintaining 
stability, protecting the PRC’s overseas interests, and participating in emergency response and 
disaster relief. 
Modernization Objectives and Targets. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress, Xi detailed 
PLA goals of enhancing party loyalty in the military, while simultaneously strengthening the 
military through reform, science and technology, personnel training, mechanization, 
informatization, and modernized military strategies. 
In 2020, the PLA added a new milestone for modernization in 2027, to accelerate the integrated 
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces, 
which if realized could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP’s 
Taiwan unification efforts.  The PLA’s 2027 modernization goal aligns with the 100th anniversary 
of the PLA’s founding. During his October 2022 speech at the opening ceremony of the 20th Party 
Congress, Xi said that China intends to complete the plan to modernize the PLA by 2027. In a 
March 2021 speech, Xi detailed that the 2027 modernization goal is the first step in a broader 
modernization effort. PLA writings note the “three-step” modernization plan connects “near-, 
medium-, and long-term goals in 2027, 2035, and 2049” respectively.   
The PRC’s goals for modernizing its armed forces in the “New Era” are as follows:  
● By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and 
intelligentization,” while boosting the speed of modernization in military theories, 
organizations, personnel, and weapons and equipment.  
● By 2035: “To comprehensively advance the modernization of military theory, organizational 
structure, military personnel, and weaponry and equipment in step with the modernization of 
the country and basically complete the modernization of national defense and the military…”  
● By 2049: “To fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces.”  
The 5th Plenum communique holds that the 2027 goal means that the Chinese military should 
comprehensively push forward the modernization of military theories, military organizational 
form, military personnel, and weapons and equipment. PRC media, citing a military source, 
connected the PLA’s 2027 goals to developing the capabilities to counter the U.S. military in the 
Indo-Pacific region, and compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the PRC’s terms. 
Although China’s leaders view building military strength as a strategic imperative, they also place 
important caveats on these objectives. For example, Chairman Xi’s direction to the PLA to 


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“basically complete” modernization by 2035 should also occur “in step with the modernization of 
the country.” These qualifications serve several purposes that highlight the interlocking nature of 
the Party’s strategic planning. First, as the PRC’s interests continue to expand, the Party expects 
the PLA to keep pace with the country’s evolving interests and be ready and able to defend its 
progress. Second, linking the PLA’s transformation to the country’s transformation allows Party 
leaders to signal the scope and scale of the internal changes they expect the PLA to implement, 
particularly given its historic resistance to reforms that challenge its risk-adverse organizational 
culture or threaten vested bureaucratic interests. Finally, these qualifications provide flexibility to 
the Party’s leaders to calibrate military resources and defense objectives based on the conditions 
of the country’s overall development. This offers PRC leaders the ability to adapt to changing 
economic or international conditions and ensure military investments support—rather than 
compromise—the strategy.
Military Ambitions. The CCP has not defined what it means by its ambition to have a “world-
class” military by the end of 2049. Within the context of China’s national strategy, however, it is 
likely that the PRC will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or, in some 
cases, superior to—the U.S. military, and that of any other great power that Beijing views as a 
threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests. Given the far-reaching ambitions the 
CCP has for a rejuvenated China, it is unlikely that the Party would aim for an end state in which 
the PRC would remain in a position of military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States or any other 
potential rival. For the PRC to aim lower or otherwise willingly accept a permanent condition of 
military inferiority would seem anathema to the fundamental purpose of becoming a “great modern 
socialist country.” However, this does not mean that the PRC will aim for the PLA to mirror the 
U.S. military in terms of capacity, capability, or readiness. The PRC will likely seek to develop its 
“world-class” military in a manner that it believes best suits the needs of its armed forces to defend 
and advance the country’s interests and how the PLA—guided by the Party—adapts to the 
changing character of warfare.  
Way of War. The PLA increasingly views warfare as a confrontation between opposing 
operational systems, rather than a war of annihilation between opposing mechanized military 
forces. Following this logic, PLA writings refer to systems destruction warfare (体系破击战) as 
the next way of war, transforming from mechanized warfare to an informatized and intelligentized 
style warfare. Although not a new PLA approach, systems destruction warfare likely continues to 
be the principal theory guiding its way of war.  
In November 2020, the CMC announced that it had issued the “Chinese People's Liberation Army 
Joint Operations Outline (Trial).” The Outline establishes a system for the PLA’s joint operations 
and focuses on clarifying basic issues regarding the organization and implementation of joint 
operations, command rights and responsibilities, and the principles, requirements, and procedures 
for joint operations, combat support, national defense mobilization, and political work. According 
to PLA writings, the Outline describes how the future combat style of the PLA will be integrated 
joint operations under the unified command of a joint operations command system.  PLA writers 
emphasized that winning future wars would require a high degree of joint integration of various 


 
 
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combat forces and combat elements from across the PLA services and other arms and across all 
domains, with jointness deepened at the operational and tactical levels. PLA writings highlight the 
multi-domain component of integrated joint operations and the need to coordinate the development 
of “mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization integration.”  The PLA’s “operational 
regulations” were last updated in 1999 and PLA leaders and PLA-affiliated academics have 
pointed to the lack of updated doctrine, which is out of step with the 2015-era structural command 
and organizational reforms, and an obstacle to advancing the next steps in building a unified joint 
PLA.   
Since the CMC issued the Outline, the PLA has launched a force-wide effort to study and 
implement it, including through joint operations undertaken during exercises. The PLA is working 
to turn the Outline’s vision of joint operations into reality by breaking down institutional barriers 
and standardizing command systems in practice.  Along the way, the PLA seeks to identify 
shortcoming develop solutions and facilitate the adoption of modern operational concepts.   
Core Operational Concept. In 2021, the PLA began discussing a new “core operational concept,” 
called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (多域精确战)” (MDPW). MDPW is intended to 
leverage a C4ISR network that incorporates advances in big data and artificial intelligence, what 
the PLA calls the “network information system-of-systems,” to rapidly identify key vulnerabilities 
in the U.S. operational system and then combine joint forces across domains to launch precision 
strikes against those vulnerabilities.  MDPW is meant to sit atop an “operational conceptual 
system-of-systems,” suggesting the PLA will develop additional subordinate operational concepts 
and use simulations, war games, and exercises to test, evaluate, and improve these future-oriented 
operational concepts.  The timing of MDPW’s appearance vis-à-vis China’s updated doctrine and 
military strategic guidelines suggests that MDPW serves as a connection between them, likely 
amplifying themes and guidance in both while focusing on the contours of what the PLA must be 
able to do to win future wars. 
Joint Firepower Strike. PLA writings have long emphasized the importance of joint firepower 
strikes as a component of large-scale operations. Joint firepower strikes include multiple services 
combining to utilize their firepower capabilities to create substantial effect and have been explicitly 
tied to a Taiwan invasion in PLA writings. During the August 2022 Congressional Delegation 
(CODEL) visit to Taiwan, the PLA Rocket Force fired multiple ballistic missiles into impact zones 
in waters around Taiwan; this included at least four missiles that overflew Taiwan, which was 
unprecedented. The military drills afforded the PLA an opportunity to train simulated joint 
firepower strike operations.  
Readiness. Alongside modernizing the PLA’s capabilities and organizational reform, PRC’s 
leaders have identified enhancing the combat readiness of the armed forces as an important element 
in developing the PRC’s military strength. In recent years, Xi and senior military leaders have 
continued to emphasize the need to build the PLA’s combat readiness so it can “fight and win 
wars.” This emphasis has not only entailed the PLA conducting more training but making its 
training more rigorous and realistic as well as addressing issues in the PLA’s training and 


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education systems relating to conducting complex joint operations and adapting to other aspects 
of modern warfare. It probably has also led to a standardization of a combat readiness system 
across the PLA to enable the PRC to quickly transition to a wartime footing.
Along with the CCP leadership’s focus on improving the PLA’s combat readiness, in recent years 
PLA media outlets have noted shortcomings in the military’s training and education systems that 
reportedly left some commanders—particularly at the operational level—inadequately prepared 
for modern warfare. In response to perceived personnel deficiencies within the PLA, Xi approved 
and issued a new series of regulations in July 2022 regarding the management of PLA soldiers 
seeking to improve recruiting, training, promotions, benefits, and demobilization efforts for NCOs. 
In recent years, PLA media outlets have identified the need for the military to address the “Five 
Incapables” problem: that some commanders cannot (1) judge situations, (2) understand higher 
authorities’ intentions, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy forces, and (5) manage 
unexpected situations. Although PLA writings do not specify how widespread the “Five 
Incapables” are, PLA media outlets have consistently raised them. One outside expert has noted 
this may indicate the PLA lacks confidence in its proficiency to execute its own operational 
concepts. Additionally, senior Party and PLA leaders are keenly aware that the military has not 
experienced combat in decades nor fought with its current suite of capabilities and organizational 
structures. PLA leaders and state media frequently call on the force to remedy the “peacetime 
disease” that manifests in the form of what it characterizes as lax training attitudes and practices 
that are viewed as hindering combat readiness.  
COVID-19 mitigation measures and multiple outbreaks throughout 2022 probably did not 
significantly undermine PLA combat readiness, judging from the PLA’s December 2022 
skirmishes with Indian forces near Tawang along the LAC, and other deployments. Although some 
non-combat programs like the PLA’s annual spring recruitment program were delayed, the PLA’s 
mitigation efforts probably were successful in limiting COVID-19 outbreaks within China’s 
military. 
Anti-Corruption Campaign. Anticorruption investigations in the PLA are a component of a 
Party-wide effort that General Secretary Xi strengthened and accelerated shortly after taking 
office. The stated goal of these campaigns is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, root out 
corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority. Military discipline 
inspectors led by the CMC Discipline Inspection Commission have targeted individual power 
networks and occupational specialties historically prone to corruption, such as officers connected 
to disgraced former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong and, former Chief of Joint 
Staff General Fang Fenghui. In 2022, General Secretary Xi delivered a speech to the CCP Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection in which he stated that although serious potential dangers 
of corruption within the Party and the military have been rooted out, the fight against corruption 
is still raging in the PRC.  In mid-2023, PRC media announced that PLA Rocket Force leadership 
was being replaced and the PLA launched an inquiry into corruption linked to the procurement of 
military equipment, indicating that the PLA’s anti-corruption campaign remains incomplete. 
Emblematic of Xi’s sustained focus on anti-corruption efforts in 2022, PRC authorities continued 


 
 
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frequent arrests of high-ranking officials and business elites for allegations of taking bribes and 
abusing power, especially in the financial sector. In November 2022 alone, PRC authorities 
arrested the Vice Governor of the People’s Bank of China and former CEO of a major PRC 
telecommunications firm as a result of investigations by CCP anti-corruption bodies.  
Effects of COVID-19 on PLA Modernization and Reform Goals. In 2022, the COVID-19 
pandemic likely had little effect on the PLA’s modernization and reform goals. At the 20th Party 
Congress in October, Xi continued to emphasize promoting the modernization of China’s national 
defense and armed forces. A few months later, in his annual new year's address, Xi highlighted 
military and strategic achievements from 2022 including the PLA’s 95th anniversary, the launching 
of the PLAN’s third aircraft carrier, and the completion of China's space station. In 2022, the PLA 
continued to play a role in COVID-19 response activity, such as mobilizing approximately 2,000 
medical personnel to Shanghai during an outbreak in April. The PRC’s recent Government Work 
Report referenced PLA activities through the last year, including COVID-19 response that boosted 
China’s national defense mobilization capability. 
Party-Army Relations. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the CCP and, as a Party-army, 
does not directly serve the state but rather is under the direct control of the Party. The CCP CMC, 
currently chaired by Xi, is the highest military decision-making body in the PRC. As a Party-army, 
the PLA is a political actor. As a constituency within the Party, it participates in the PRC’s political 
and governance systems. As the ultimate guarantor of the Party’s rule and the PRC’s government 
system, the PLA’s missions include formal and informal domestic security missions in addition to 
its national defense missions. Since becoming CMC Chairman, Xi has implemented multiple 
reforms which reduced PLA autonomy and greatly strengthened Party control over the military. 
Party leaders and official statements continue to emphasize the principles of the Party’s absolute 
control over the PLA and the PLA’s loyalty to the Party. 
CHINA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 
As the military’s highest decision-making body, the CMC is technically also a department of the 
CCP Central Committee. The CMC Chairman is a civilian, usually serving concurrently as the 
General Secretary of the CCP and President of the PRC. CMC members are appointed at Party 
Congresses every five years. In the fall of 2022 at the 20th Party Congress, General Zhang Youxia 
ascended to the first Vice Chairman position, joined by General He Weidong as the second Vice 
Chairman. Other CMC members include General Li Shangfu, General Liu Zhenli, and returning 
members Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. In 2022, the CMC consisted of two 
vice chairs, the Minister of National Defense, the chiefs of the Joint Staff and Political Work 
Departments, and the head of the Discipline Inspection Commission. 
Chairman Xi Jinping concurrently serves as the CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman, and 
President of the PRC. Xi was first appointed as Party General Secretary and CMC Chairman in 
2012 and as President in the spring of 2013. Xi was reappointed to all of his positions for an 
unprecedented third term at 2022’s 20th Party Congress and the 2023 National People’s Congress. 


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In 2016, Xi was announced as the commander-in-chief of the CMC’s Joint Operations Command 
Center (JOCC) and was named “core” leader of the CCP Central Committee. Prior to becoming 
CMC Chairman, Xi served as the CMC’s only civilian Vice Chairman under Hu Jintao. Xi’s father 
was an important military figure during China’s communist revolution and was a Politburo 
member in the 1980s. Xi also served as an aide to a defense minister early in his career and had 
regular interactions with the PLA as a provincial Party official. 
Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia is China’s top uniformed official and former junior vice 
chairman. Zhang was first appointed to the CMC in 2012 as the head of the General Armaments 
Department – now the Equipment Development Department (EDD) – where he oversaw the PLA’s 
manned space program, as well as MCF and military modernization efforts. Zhang gained rare 
experience as a combat commander during China’s brief war with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang 
formerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea and 
Russia. Zhang is one of the PLA’s “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure in China, 
served with Xi’s father at the close of Chinese Civil War in 1949. Zhang, at age 72 in 2022, was 
expected to retire due to previously followed age norms within the PLA. However, Zhang’s 
retention on the CMC for a third term probably reflects Xi’s desire to keep a close and experienced 
ally as his top military advisor. 
Vice Chairman General He Weidong is China’s second-most senior officer and a former 
commander of the PLA’s Eastern Theater. His ascent to a vice chairman position absent prior 
CMC membership is unusual and probably a testament to his extensive operational experience 
focused on Taiwan. Before his selection as vice chairman, He served a brief stint in the CMC 
JOCC where he played a key role in planning live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait as part of the PLA 
response to the then-U.S. House Speaker Pelosi’s August 2022 visit to Taipei. He may have close 
ties to Xi due to their overlapping service in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s.  
Minister of National Defense General Li Shangfu was appointed to the CMC at the 20th Party 
Congress in October 2022, and as the Minister of National Defense at the NPC in March 2023. Li 
is the PLA’s third-most senior officer and manages its relationship with state bureaucracies and 
foreign militaries. Unlike the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he is not part of the chain of command 
and his primary policy influence is derived from membership on the CMC and State Council, 
where he serves as a direct liaison for civil-military integration, defense mobilization, and 
budgeting. Li previously headed the EDD where he managed the PLA’s weapons development 
and acquisition efforts and China’s manned space program. In 2018, Li was sanctioned by the 
United States for his role as EDD director overseeing the purchase of Russian fighter jets and 
surface-to-air missile systems.  
Joint Staff Department Chief General Liu Zhenli oversees PLA joint operations, a narrowing 
of the wider responsibilities held by the former General Staff Department prior to reforms initiated 
in 2015. Liu is one of few remaining active-duty PLA officers with combat experience and is 
recognized as a combat hero for his service in China’s border war with Vietnam. Like his 


 
 
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predecessor Li Zuocheng, Liu rose through the ranks of the PLA Army HQ, assuming command 
of the service in 2021. Beginning in 2015 as Army chief of staff, Liu guided the service through a 
major period of reform which saw the ground force downgraded to an equal standing with the 
other branches. Liu, at age 58 in 2022, is the youngest CMC member and is eligible to remain on 
the CMC for at least an additional term.  
Political Work Department Director Admiral Miao Hua oversees the PLA’s political work, 
including propaganda, organization, and education. Miao is a former Army officer who switched 
services to the Navy in December 2014 when he became political commissar of the PLAN. Miao 
may have ties to Xi from his time serving in the 31st Group Army in Fujian Province, when his 
career overlapped with Xi’s. Miao participated as the PLAN political commissar during the Navy’s 
BRIcruise conducted in mid-2017. Miao Hua, at age 66 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his 
current position following the 20th Party Congress. 
Secretary of the Discipline Inspection Commission General Zhang Shengmin oversees the 
highest-level organization responsible for investigating military violations of Party discipline, 
including corrupt practices. Zhang is also a deputy secretary and third-ranking member on the 
standing committee of the Party’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Zhang’s reappointment 
reflects the Party’s continued commitment to the anticorruption campaign within the military. 
Zhang, at age 65 in 2022, remained on the CMC in his current position following the 20th Party 
Congress. 
 
 
 


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China’s Military Leadership Organizational Chart 


 
 
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CHAPTER TWO: PLA FORCES, 
CAPABILITIES, AND POWER PROJECTION  
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all 
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can conduct the full range of land, air, and maritime 
as well as nuclear, space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyberspace operations.  
 The PLA’s evolving capabilities and concepts continue to strengthen the PRC’s ability to 
“fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (a likely euphemism for the United 
States), counter an intervention by a third party in a conflict along the PRC’s periphery, and 
project power globally.  
 In 2022, the PLA continued to make progress implementing major structural reforms, fielding 
modern indigenous systems, building readiness, and strengthening its competency to conduct 
joint operations. 
The PLA is the world’s largest active-duty military force and comprised of approximately 2.185 
million active, 1.17 million reserve, and 660,000 paramilitary personnel for a total force of 4 
million. In efforts to create a leaner, more mobile force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily 
reduced active-duty personnel in the last three decades but still outnumbers other services with 
roughly 1 million soldiers in 2022. The PLAN and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have grown in size 
since 2015, indicating their increasing importance. By 2022, the PLAN Marine Corps expanded 
from two to six combined arms brigades and was supplemented with aviation and special forces 
units, with the intent of becoming increasingly capable of protecting China’s overseas interests. 
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery, manages the PRC’s land-based 
nuclear and conventional missile units. The Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the PLA’s 
strategic space, cyberspace, electronic warfare, information, communications, and psychological 
warfare missions and capabilities. Lastly, the JLSF handles quartermaster, transportation, medical 
services, and other logistic functions to enhance PLA’s joint capabilities during peace and war. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PLA’S MODERNIZATION AND REFORM 
The PRC maintains its goal to achieve a fully modernized national defense and military force by 
2035 and for the PLA to become a world-class military by 2049. The force also progresses toward 
its 2027 benchmark of military modernization that aligns with the 100th anniversary of the PLA’s 
founding on August 1, 1927. The 2027 benchmark, introduced during the 14th Five Year Plan 


 
 
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(2021-2025), represents the start of the new three-step development strategy that continues Xi’s 
approach of military reform to transform the PLA. The original three-step modernization strategy 
sought to achieve mechanization by 2020; modernization of military theory, organization, 
personnel, and equipment by 2035; and to become a world-class force by mid-century. With basic 
mechanization considered achieved in 2020, the 2027 goal is a short-term marker and represents a 
modification, not a compression in timeline, for China’s ambition to achieve complete military 
modernization of the PLA by 2035. The PLA centenary goal set by the CCP accelerates the 
integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization and to field a 
combat-ready force with improved strategic capabilities to defend national sovereignty, security, 
and development interests by 2027. 
PLA modernization in training includes realistic simulation and use of virtual reality and 
enhancing the military’s strategic capacity. The PLA has a minimal reliance on imports and has 
the ability to independently manufacture and develop equipment comparable to the most advanced 
U.S. and Russian equipment, accelerating their ability to modernize. The CCP continues to 
prioritize modernizing PLA activities in near and distant battlefields by integrating system-vs-
system operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes, and joint operations.  
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ARMY (PLAA) 
Key Takeaways  
● The PLAA continues to modernize equipment and focus on combined arms and joint training 
in effort to meet the goal of becoming a world-class military. 
● The PLAA demonstrated a new long-range fire capability in the PLA military response to the 
August 2022 U.S. CODEL visit to Taiwan.  
● The PLAA continues to incorporate a twice-a-year conscript intake. The long-term effects of 
the policy are not clear. 
The PLAA has approximately 970,000 active-duty personnel in combat units and is the primary 
ground fighting force in the PLA. The 2020 National Defense University’s Science of Military 
Strategy described the PLAA’s development as a transition from a regional defense to a global 
combat force.  
Force Structure and Organization. The PLAA continues to replace legacy equipment with 
newer systems. The major force restructuring required by the 2016 and 2017 PLA reforms is 
complete, but many units are still in the process of upgrading equipment.  
The PLAA is organized into five Theater Army Commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the 
Tibet Military District. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are comprised of multiple 
combined-arms brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary maneuver force. The brigades vary in 
size and composition. The PLAA delineates its combined-arms brigades into three types: light 


 
 
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(high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and motorized), medium (wheeled armored vehicles), and 
heavy (tracked armored vehicles), with sizes ranging from approximately 4,500 to 5,000 
personnel. Each group army controls six additional brigades responsible for operational element 
functions: an artillery brigade, an air defense brigade, an army aviation (or air assault) brigade, a 
special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defense brigade, and a 
sustainment brigade; however, some variations exist with at least one group army per theater 
separating their engineering and chemical defense brigades into separate units. Although the 
PLAA has standardized its group armies, it does retain a number of nonstandard divisions and 
brigades that exist outside of the group armies. These units are typically located in areas the CCP 
considers sensitive including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing. The PLAA also commands 
several border and coastal defense brigades under the Theater Army Commands and regiments 
under the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts. 
Capabilities and Modernization. To meet the stated ambitions to become a world-class military, 
the PLAA continues systems modernization and combined arms and joint training. However, they 
still employ a mix of modern and legacy military equipment. The PLAA continues focusing 
training on fighting as combined arms formations while adapting to the twice-a-year conscript 
induction change.  
The PLAA's 15 SOF brigades provide group army commanders with an organic unit capable of 
executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF brigade missions include raids, harassment 
operations, target seizure and control, special reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and rescue 
operations. The PLA continues to prioritize SOF for modernization with the fielding of the new 
QBZ-191 military service rifle and the CSK-series of vehicles. Observed SOF training in 2022 
included airborne parachuting, small unit tactics and maritime operations.  
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units remained a focus of development in 2022. PLAA training 
events and reports in PRC media show that support to amphibious operations, multi-dimensional 
assaults, developing close air support tactics, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) are now 
a standard part of training. Training in 2022 also included numerous examples of helicopters 
executing nighttime flight operations, over water maneuver, and ultra-low altitude flying. PLAA 
Aviation works directly with ground units to enhance its ability to support air assault operations 
and conduct air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint training in 2022 included army 
aviation helicopters continuing to train for operations with PLAN landing ships. 2022 saw the first 
observed evidence of PLAA helicopters being able to rearm and refuel onboard PLAN vessels 
along with continued progress towards maritime operations.  The two PLAA Air Assault brigades 
continued extensive training on helicopter insertion, area security, and aerial reconnaissance. The 
PLAA envisions its Aviation and Air Assault units employing their three-dimensional maneuver, 
firepower, and assault capabilities to act as a main combat force, support a greater joint operation, 
or conduct non-war military operations outside China.  
PLAA air defense units in 2022 concentrated on improving their tactical air defense against low 
and slow threats like Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) and loitering munitions to meet evolving 


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air defense requirements. Hybrid self-propelled air defense artillery systems (SPADA), gun air 
defense artillery, small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man-Portable Air Defense 
Systems (MANPADS) form the core of the PRC’s evolving solution to countering tactical UAS. 
One of the systems with high counter UAS potential being fielded to light combined arms brigades 
is armed with a six barreled 25mm rotary cannon, which possibly uses Programmable Timed Fuse 
Pre-Fragmented (PTFP) rounds, and also mounts four FN-16 MANPADS on its turret. 
During 2022, the PLAA continued to emphasize the fielding and application of modern EW 
capabilities that are designed to maximize a unit’s combat effectiveness by detecting and 
degrading/disrupting adversary command and control communications as well as complicating an 
adversary’s use of tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. Similar to 
the combined arms brigade’s fielding of EW capabilities, the PLAA’s air defense forces have 
rapidly fielded new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that will complement traditional air 
defense and support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) mission. 
Readiness. In 2022, the PLAA continued to improve its methods and standards of training 
combined arms units. Training encompassed individual to collective soldier events integrating 
reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, armor, engineers, and signal units. In addition to continued 
PLAA deployments to the LAC on the Indian border, the PLAA conducted multiple “around the 
clock” large-scale exercises in training areas throughout the country to include joint operations in 
response to the U.S. and Taiwan actions in 2022.The PLAA used its new PCH191 long-range 
rocket artillery system during live fire events along China’s east coast as a response to the U.S. 
CODEL in August 2022. The new long-range MRL is capable of striking Taiwan from mainland 
China. 
In an effort to help develop a more professional military, adjustments were made to the recruitment 
and promotion of PLAA enlisted personnel. The changes aimed to accelerate the integrated 
development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization. To expand the pool of 
educated and technically proficient personnel for conscription, the recruitment age for university 
graduates increased from 24 to 26. The "4+X" service policy was also implemented for the NCO 
Corps, creating flexibility for intermediate- and senior-level NCOs by helping avoid unwanted 
demobilization if an NCO fails to meet promotion criteria after their 4-year contract.  


 
 
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Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Major Ground Units   
 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY NAVY (PLAN) 
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370
ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The PLAN is largely
composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines.
●The PLAN commissioned its eighth RENHAI class cruiser in late 2022 and is continuing
construction of the RENHAI Guided Missile Cruiser (CG), the LUYANG III MOD Guided
Missile Destroyer (DDG), and the JIANGKAI II Guided Missile Frigate (FFG), as well as
beginning production on a new class of frigate, the JIANGKAI III.
●In 2022, the PLAN commissioned its third YUSHEN-class Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA)
and has likely begun construction on a fourth as of early 2023.
●In 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian.
●In the near-term, the PLAN will have the ability to conduct long-range precision strikes against
land targets from its submarine and surface combatants using land-attack cruise missiles,
notably enhancing the PRC’s power projection capability.
●The PRC continues to challenge foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is
inconsistent with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the same time, the PLAN conducts activities in the
EEZs of other countries, including the United States, Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, and
Malaysia.
The PRC has numerically the largest navy in the world with an overall battle force of over 370 
ships and submarines, including over 140 major surface combatants.  The PLAN is largely 
composed of modern multi-mission ships and submarines. The PLAN commissioned its eighth 
RENHAI-class cruiser in late 2022 and continued construction of the RENHAI cruiser, LUYANG 
III MOD destroyer and the JIANGKAI II-class frigate as well as beginning production of the 
JIANGKAI III-class frigate.  The PLAN commissioned its second YUSHEN-class amphibious 
assault ship (TYPE 075 LHA) in December 2021 and the third in October 2022 with the first ship 
in the class achieving initial operating capability (IOC) in March 2022. Construction on a fourth 
YUSHEN-class LHA likely began in early 2023. In June 2022, the PLAN launched its third aircraft 
carrier, CV-18 Fujian.  
The PRC has long challenged foreign military activities in its EEZ in a manner that is inconsistent 
with the rules of customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. However, in recent years, the PLA has begun conducting the same types of 
military activities inside and outside the FIC in the EEZs of other countries, including the United 
States. This activity highlights the PRC’s double standard in the application of its interpretation 
of international law. Examples include sending intelligence collection ships to collect on military 


 
 
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exercises such as the RIMPAC exercise off Hawaii in 2014, 2018, and 2022, TALISMAN SABER 
off Australia in 2017, 2019, and 2021, and operating near Alaska in 2017 and 2021. Chinese 
intelligence collection ships also operated near sensitivity defense facilities off Australia’s west 
coast in May 2022 and near Japan in July 2022. PRC survey ships are also extremely active in the 
SCS and they frequently operate in the claimed EEZs of other nations in the region such as the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia.  
The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAN as adjusting to changes in the strategic 
requirements of near seas defense and far seas protection, noting that it was “speeding up the 
transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas to protection missions on the far seas...” 
Towards the PRC’s goal of building a “strong and modernized navy force,” the PLAN has replaced 
or updated its previous generations of platforms that had limited capabilities in favor of larger, 
modern multi-mission combatants. Today, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role 
platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors. The 
PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint operations and joint integration with the other branches 
of the PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain 
and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater distances from mainland China. 
The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as well 
as the PLA Marine Corps (PLAMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. The PLAN continues to 
implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. The PLA-wide reforms 
removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the 
PLA’s joint theater commands, and focused it on organizing, manning, training, and equipping 
naval forces.  
Missions. The PLAN continues to develop into a global force, gradually extending its operational 
reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges, including 
a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden.  The PLAN’s latest surface and subsurface platforms 
enable combat operations beyond the reach of the PRC’s land-based defenses. In particular, the 
PRC’s growing force of aircraft carriers extend air defense coverage of deployed task groups 
beyond the range of land-based defenses, enabling operations farther from China’s shore. The 
PLAN’s emerging requirement for sea-based land-attack systems will also enhance the PRC’s 
ability to project power. Furthermore, the PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable 
logistical replenishment ships to support long-distance, long-duration deployments, including two 
new FUYU-class fast combat support ships (AOEs) built specifically to support aircraft carrier 
and large-deck amphibious ship operations. The PLAN’s expanding fleet of large modern 
amphibious warships will enable it to conduct in a wide range of expeditionary operations 
wherever PRC interests are threatened or in support of PRC participation in internationally 
sanctioned operations. The expansion of naval operations beyond China’s immediate region will 
also facilitate its non-war military activities and further legitimize the PRC’s growing global 
military posture, including at its base in Djibouti. 


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The PRC is in the beginning stages of operating what the PLA calls its “multi-carrier force.”  The 
PRC continues to learn lessons from operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its first 
domestically-built aircraft carrier, CV-17 Shandong, was launched in 2017 and commissioned in 
December 2019. The PRC’s next generation of carriers, the new FUJIAN-class – the first of which 
it is currently outfitting – will have greater endurance and an electromagnetic catapult launch 
system making it capable of launching various types of specialized fixed-wing aircraft for 
missions such as airborne early warning and EW. This will increase the striking power of a 
potential PLAN carrier battle group when deployed to areas beyond China’s immediate 
periphery. CV-18 Fujian launched in June 2022 and is expected to commission in 2024. 
The PLAN’s newest amphibious ships, the YUSHEN LHA and YUZHAO amphibious transport 
docks (LPD), are modern platforms capable of regional and global expeditionary missions in 
support of both wartime and non-war contingency operations either singly or as part of capable and 
flexible task groups composed of multiple amphibious ships and surface combatants. 
The PLAN continues to build multiple new, large auxiliary ships that can support force projection 
operations, including large logistic ships such as the FUYU fast combat support ship (AOE) and 
specialized platforms for intelligence collection ships (AGI) and ocean surveillance ships (AGOS). 
The PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC is modest but growing as it gains more 
experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The 
PRC’s experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended task group 
deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Other recent extended 
range PLAN operations include the following: 
●In September 2022, a PLAN task group that included a RENHAI class cruiser operated with
four Russian combatants near the Aleutian Islands and was shadowed by U.S. Coast Guard
ships and aircraft.
●In December 2022 and January 2023, a PLAN task force including a LUYANG III DDG
operated in the South Pacific near French Polynesia.
●In December 2022, CV-16 Liaoning with escorts including two RENHAI-class cruisers
operated in the Philippine Sea near Japan’s Daito Islands in an area similar to where Liaoning
deployed to in December 2021.
●In February 2023, a PLAN task group, that included YUSHEN-class LHA-31, conducted
training in the SCS and Western Pacific. This was the first extended range deployment for the
newly commissioned LHA.
●The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2022, a 14-
year effort that is the PRC’s first enduring naval operation beyond the Indo-Pacific region.  In
January 2022, the 39th Naval Escort Task Force conducted a three-day escort of Chinese fishing
vessels in the Gulf of Aden. Overall, according to Chinese state media, the PLAN has expanded


 
 
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its original mission of escorting Chinese-flagged vessels and vessels from the World Food 
Program to escorting merchant ships from other countries as well.  
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 
platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine 
warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries.  Notably, this figure does not include 
approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). 
The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. 
Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants. The PLAN’s force structure consists of 
three fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval 
bases. The PLAN’s Northern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the 
Eastern Theater Navy is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the Southern Theater 
Navy is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. 
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high priority on modernizing its submarine force, but its 
force structure continues to grow modestly as it works to mature its force, integrate new 
technologies, and expand its shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-
powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). The PLAN’s submarine force is 
expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 despite the ongoing retirement of older 
hulls due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity. 
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 
12 Russian-built KILO-class SS units, eight of which are capable of launching ASCMs. China’s 
shipyards have delivered 13 SONG-class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN-class diesel-electric 
air-independent propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to 
produce a total of 25 or more YUAN-class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired 
the first two KILO-class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 
1990s. 
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear submarines – two SHANG I-class 
SSNs (TYPE 093), four SHANG II-class SSNs (TYPE 093A), and six JIN-class SSBNs (TYPE 
094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
(3,900NM) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400NM), the PLAN’s six operational JIN-class 
SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN-class SSBN can 
carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC’s 70th founding 
anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation TYPE 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with 
follow-on longer range SLBM. The TYPE 096 will likely begin construction in the near future. 
Based on the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms, the PRC will operate its JIN and 
TYPE 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for 
the SSBN force to achieve “stronger growth.” 


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The PRC launched two SHANG III (TYPE 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines 
(SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational 
hulls by 2025.  This new SHANG-class variant will enhance the PLAN’s anti-surface warfare 
capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-submarine warfare capabilities through 
the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack a 
robust deep-water anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability.  
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface 
combatants. As of late 2022, the PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new batch of guided-
missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and a new batch of guided missile frigates, including 
a new 054 variant designated JIANGKAI III. These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN’s 
air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN expands its 
operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems. By the end of 2019, 
the PLAN had commissioned its 30th JIANGKAI II-class FFG, reportedly completing the 
production run. However, in 2021 PRC media reported production had restarted with at least three 
additional hulls commissioned by the end of 2022 with a total possible end production run of more 
than 40 hulls. The PLAN augmented its littoral warfare capabilities, especially for operations in 
the ECS and SCS, with the high-rate production of the JIANGDAO-class Corvettes (FFLs) (TYPE 
056 and TYPE 056A). The PLAN commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, 
completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently transferred the early flight TYPE 056 
variants, likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in 2021, probably due to the early models’ 
lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array 
sonar and are, thus, capable of contributing to ASW operations.  
The PLAN has expanded its force of large surface combatants with two programs, the LUYANG 
III DDG and the RENHAI CG. By the end of 2022, the PRC had commissioned 25 LUYANG III 
DDGs—including 12 lengthened LUYANG III MOD DDGs – with additional hulls under 
construction. Both the standard LUYANG III and the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell 
multipurpose vertical launch system (VLS) capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to air 
missiles, and anti-submarine missiles, and the MOD variants will be capable of carrying the new 
Z-20 anti-submarine helicopter by late 2022, eight RENHAI-class CG’s were in commission in
the PLAN with additional hulls under construction. The RENHAI has 112 VLS cells and can carry
a large load out of weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and
anti-submarine weapons along with likely LACMs and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when
those become operational. In early 2022, the PLAN released a video of RENHAI CG test launching
an anti-ship ballistic missile with a reported/estimated range of 540NM.  The new ship launched
anti-ship ballistic missile can possibly be launched by the LUYANG III and LUYANG III MOD
DDGs.
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-surface warfare capabilities in its force development. The 
PLAN’s frigates and corvettes, as well as modernized older combatants, carry variants of the YJ-
83/YJ-83J ASCM (135NM), while newer surface combatants such as the LUYANG II-class 


 
 
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DDGs are fitted with the YJ-62 (270NM). The LUYANG III-class DDGs and the RENHAI-class 
CGs are fitted with a variant of the PRC’s newest ASCM, the YJ-18A (290NM). A few 
modernized destroyers have been retrofitted with the supersonic YJ-12A ASCM (270NM), and 
the next-generation frigates may also receive this missile.  Eight of the PLAN’s 12 KILO-class 
SSs are equipped with the Russian built SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM). The PRC’s SONG-class SS, 
YUAN-class SSP, and SHANG-class SSN field the PLAN’s newest domestic submarine-launched 
ASCM, the YJ-18 which constitutes an improvement over the SS-N-27b ASCM. It is possible the 
PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial shipping container for 
covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant ships.  
The PLAN recognizes that long-range ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting 
capability to realize their full potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is investing in joint 
reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and communications systems at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting information to surface and 
subsurface launch platforms. 
As the PLAN continues to transition into a global multi-mission force, the addition of land-attack 
capabilities to its modern array of anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical next step. In the 
coming years, the PLAN will probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and destroyers and the 
developmental SHANG III SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit its older surface combatants and 
submarines with land-attack capabilities as well. The addition of land-attack capabilities to the 
PLAN’s surface combatants and submarines would provide the PLA with flexible long-range 
strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific 
region. 
Amphibious Warfare Ships. The PRC’s investment in LHA ships signals its intent to continue 
to develop its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April 2021, the PRC commissioned the first 
YUSHEN-class LHA (TYPE 075) followed by the commissioning of the second hull in December 
2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was commissioned in October 2022 while the first hull 
achieved IOC in March 2022, and there are indications of a probable fourth hull under construction 
in early 2023.The YUSHEN class are highly capable large-deck amphibious ships that will provide 
the PLAN with an all-aspect expeditionary capability including the ability to carry a large number 
of landing craft, troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the PLAN has eight large 
YUZHAO-class amphibious transport docks (LPD) (TYPE 071) in service. The YUZHAO-class 
LPDs and YUSHEN-class LHAs provide the PLA with greater capacity, endurance, and more 
flexibility for long-range operations than the PLAN’s older landing ships, which it has reduced in 
number over the last decade with obsolete units being decommissioned. The YUSHEN and 
YUZHAO can each carry several of the new YUYI class air-cushion medium landing craft and/or 
the conventional YUBU-class utility landing craft, and a variety of helicopters, tanks, armored 
vehicles and PLAN marines for long-distance expeditionary deployments. 
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first domestically built aircraft 
carrier, Shandong, which launched in 2017 and completed multiple sea trials during 2018-2019. 


 
 
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Shandong was photographed at a base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater Navy in late 2020 
and should now be considered to be operational. It is a modified version of the Liaoning (Soviet 
KUZNETSOV-class) design and likewise uses a ski-jump takeoff method for its aircraft. China 
launched its third domestically built aircraft carrier, CV-18 Fujian in June 2022 and continued 
outfitting work early 2023. CV-18 is larger than CV-16 and CV-17 and fitted with an 
electromagnetic catapult launch system. This design will enable it to support additional fighter 
aircraft, fixed-wing early-warning aircraft, and more rapid flight operations and thus extend the 
reach and effectiveness of its carrier-based strike aircraft. CV-18 is expected to be operational by 
2024, with additional carriers to follow.  
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates and is developing several aircraft to operate from its 
carriers and combatants. In addition to the standard J-15 fighter that currently operates from PLAN 
carriers, there is a catapult-capable J-15 variant in development. The aircraft is currently testing 
from land-based steam and electromagnetic catapults. Two other J-15 variants are in development 
– the J-15S tandem-seat variant and the J-15D electronic warfare variant, which is equipped with 
wingtip electronic support measures/electronic intelligence gathering pods as well as several 
conformal antennas. The PRC is also developing a carrier capable variant of the fifth-generation 
J-31 fighter, known as the J-35, which conducted its first flight in 2021. Beyond fighter aircraft, 
the PRC is refining the design of a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, known as 
the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft, which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D Hawkeye, 
has existed for many years, and prototypes of the KJ-600 have been in flight testing since 2020. 
Beijing is also developing the Z-20F helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the RENHAI cruisers 
and LUYANG III MOD destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The Z-20F is similar to the 
U.S. Navy’s SH-60 and will provide significant improvements in ASW capabilities over the 
smaller Z-9 and Ka-28 helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-20F will also complement 
the larger Z-18Fs that operate from the PLAN’s aircraft carriers.  
Accompanying the manned fixed-wing and rotary aircraft will be UAVs. The PLAN have 
conducted sea trials on multiple surface combatants with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) 
UAVs ranging in wingspan between 3.5 and 4 meters. These UAVs can include the SD-40, CSC-
005, S-100 CAMCOPTER, and AV-500 UAV systems. These UAVs are used for ISR purposes. 
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the process of replacing its older variant H-6 bombers with 
the H-6J, a naval variant of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new and larger advanced 
maritime strike bomber has six weapons pylons instead of four, advanced avionics, upgraded 
engines, and can employ the supersonic YJ-12 ASCM (270NM). In 2020, PLAAF H-6Ks were 
also photographed carrying YJ-12s, significantly increasing the number of bombers available to 
the PLA for long-range maritime strike missions. 
The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime patrol, 
airborne early warning aircraft including many of the same variants operated by the PLAAF. 
However, the PLAN also operates a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine warfare and maritime 
patrol. This aircraft is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector boom, similar to that of the U.S. 


 
 
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Navy’s P-3. This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-search radar mounted under the nose 
as well as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage, probably for electronic surveillance. A small 
electro-optical (EO)/infrared turret is located just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is 
equipped with an internal weapons bay in front of the main landing gear. 
The PRC also operates a fixed-wing medium to large size UAVs from land bases. These UAVs 
specialize in ISR and include EO/infrared imaging, signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities, and 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR). Many of these UAVs can be operated in satellite communications 
(SATCOM) mode, extending the datalink and operational ranges well past traditional line-of-sight 
(LOS) communications. Fixed-wing UAVs include the XIANGLONG high altitude, long 
endurance UAV; the BZK-005 medium altitude, long endurance UAV; and the ASN-209 medium 
altitude, medium endurance UAV. 
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and support 
ships, including AGIs, AGOs, fleet replenishment oilers, hospital ships, submarine salvage and 
rescue ships, and various other large auxiliaries for specialized missions. Additionally, the PRC’s 
first domestically built polar icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in 2019. The ship is 
operated by the Polar Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration. In October 2022, 
XUELONG 2 departed for the PRC’s 39th research mission to Antarctica and was followed one 
week later by XUELONG 1, marking the third occasion both research vessels have conducted a 
joint mission in Antarctica. 
Current Nuclear Sea-Based Capabilities. For the PLAN and CCP, the possession of SSBNs has 
long been seen as an important symbol in achieving great power status. The PRC has six 
operational TYPE 094 JIN-class SSBNs, and these submarines are conducting at sea deterrent 
patrols. The PLAN’s JIN SSBNs are equipped to carry up to 12 sea launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs); JL-2 (CSS-N-14) and JL-3 (CSS-N-20) representing the PRC’s first viable sea-based 
nuclear deterrent. With six operational SSBNs, the PLAN has the capacity to maintain a constant 
at sea deterrent presence. With a range of approximately 3,900NM, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 
would have to operate in the mid-Pacific Ocean in order to threaten targets in the western half of 
the Continental United States (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii in order to threaten 
targets on the East Coast of the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 
5,400NM which would allow a JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from 
Chinese littoral waters. The PLAN’s next generation SSBN, the TYPE 096 is expected to enter 
service the late 2020s or early 2030s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the PRC’s first-
generation SSNs, the PRC will operate the TYPE 094 and TYPE 096 SSBNs concurrently. 
PLAN MARINE CORPS (PLANMC)  
The PLANMC maintains a presence at the PRC’s first overseas military base in Djibouti that 
extends The PRC’s military reach and strategic influence in Africa and the Middle East. In 2020, 
China highlighted a PLANMC SOF unit that had joined the previously assigned PLANMC unit in 
Djibouti. The PLANMC’s presence in Djibouti provides the PRC with the ability to support a 


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military response to contingencies affecting China’s investments and infrastructure in the region 
and the approximately 1 million PRC citizens in Africa and 500,000 in the Middle East, although 
we have not observed the PLANMC in Djibouti assist in evacuation efforts to date. The PLANMC 
also embarks a contingent of marines with the PLAN’s Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-focused naval 
escort task force that supports the PRC’s trade interests. Additionally, the PLANMC supports the 
PRC’s military diplomacy. For example, the PLANMC at Djibouti have trained with Thai, 
Pakistani, Saudi, South African, and Djiboutian forces.  
The PLANMC’s roles and missions principally include defending PLA bases in mainland China, 
the SCS and abroad, conducting amphibious operations to seize and defend small reef and island 
outposts, and conducting non-war military activities (NWMA). Although the PLANMC has 
traditionally focused on its task to assault and defense of small islands in the SCS, more recently 
its focus has grown to include expeditionary operations beyond FIC. The PLANMC’s roles under 
NWMA support the PRC’s efforts to protect its overseas interests including resources, 
infrastructure, and citizens abroad. 
The PLANMC emphasized artillery training throughout 2022 which included training with the 
PCL-181 vehicle-mounted artillery pieces at various training ranges. The training also 
incorporated a reconnaissance variant of the Type-05, and it concluded with a multi-brigade 
culminating event in southern Guangdong. The inclusion of this artillery piece greatly increases 
the range of their artillery compared to what the PLANMC was previously fielding. Additionally, 
the PLANMC increased its overall aviation capability in 2022. The PLANMC’s Z-8C helicopter 
inventory increased to at least 28, bolstering their air assault capability. The PLANMC aviation 
brigade participated in three-dimensional amphibious assault training during the year which 
included air assault components, amphibious assault vehicles, and a combination of Landing Craft 
Air Cushion (LCAC) and assault boats. This training was conducted in conjunction with a 
commercial roll-on/roll-off vessel as the PLANMC continues to increase their integration with 
civilian vessels and expanding their sealift means.   


 
 
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Major Naval Units 
  
 
 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY AIR FORCE (PLAAF) AND PLAN 
AVIATION 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation force in the Indo-
Pacific region.
●The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to modernize
with the delivery of domestically built aircraft and a wide range of UASs.
●In October 2019, the PRC signaled the return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad after the
PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber.
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the 
largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 3,150 total aircraft 
(not including trainer variants or UASs) of which approximately 2,400 are combat aircraft 
(including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft).  
The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower 
projection. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the PLAAF’s missions and tasks as 
transitioning from territorial air defense to “offensive and defensive operations.” In 2021, General 
Chang Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF commander and continued to enact PLAAF reforms 
to improve the force’s ability to accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF is rapidly catching 
up to Western air forces. This trend is gradually eroding longstanding and significant U.S. military 
technical advantages vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain. 
The CMC’s intent is to transform the PLAAF into a more effective and capable force that is 
proficient at conducting joint operations. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air 
defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-ranging 
reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF has reorganized into five Theater Command Air Forces, 
established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate regiments into 
brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.  
Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation continue to field greater numbers of fourth-generation 
aircraft (now more than 1,300 of 1,900 total fighters, not including trainers) and probably will 
become a majority fourth-generation force within the next several years.   For fifth-generation 
fighters, the PLAAF has operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter, and 
PRC social media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 in October 2021. The PLAAF is 
preparing upgrades for the J-20, which may include increasing the number of air-to-air missiles 
(AAM) the fighter can carry in its low-observable configuration, installing thrust-vectoring engine 
nozzles, and adding super cruise capability by installing higher-thrust indigenous WS-15 engines. 
Development continues on the smaller FC-31/J-31 for export or as a future naval fighter for the 
PLAN’s next class of aircraft carriers. 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
Bombers. The PRC’s bomber force is currently composed of H-6 Badger variants, which are 
domestically produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber. Despite the relative 
age of its bomber force, the PLAAF has worked to maintain and enhance the operational 
effectiveness of these aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded greater numbers of the H-6K, 
a modernized H-6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and features more-efficient turbofan 
engines for extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs, giving the PLA a long-range standoff 
precision strike capability that can range targets in the Second Island Chain from home airfields in 
mainland China. PLAN Aviation has traditionally fielded the H-6G to support maritime missions. 
More recently, PLAN Aviation has begun operating the H-6J, a maritime strike version of the H-
6K with six weapons pylons for ASCMs. This aircraft carries six supersonic long-range YJ-12 
ASCMs and can attack warships out to the Second Island Chain.  
During the PRC’s 70th anniversary parade in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N, a 
derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-range strikes. The H-6N features a modified fuselage 
that allows it to carry externally an air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may be nuclear 
capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was observed carrying an air-launched ballistic missile. The 
H-6N’s air-to-air refueling capability also provides it greater reach over other H-6 variants that are 
not refuelable in air. In 2020, the PLAAF operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a 
platform for the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N-equipped unit very 
likely is developing tactics and procedures to conduct the PLAAF nuclear mission.  In addition, 
the PLAAF is seeking to extend its power projection capability with the development of a new H-
20 stealth strategic bomber, with official PRC state media stating that this new stealth bomber will 
have a nuclear mission in addition to filling conventional roles.   The PLAAF is also developing 
new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets. PLAAF leaders 
publicly announced the program in 2016; however, it may take more than a decade to develop this 
type of advanced bomber. 
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9 communications 
jamming/electronic countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-11). This aircraft is designed to 
disrupt an adversary’s battlespace awareness at long ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to-air 
refueling operations to extend the ranges of its fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with refueling 
probes using the H-6U, a modified tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a small number of 
larger IL-78 Midas. In addition, the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its Y-20 heavy-lift 
transport, which will enable the PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve the PLAAF’s ability 
to operate beyond the FIC from bases in mainland China.  
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500—the PRC’s most advanced airborne early warning and 
control (AEW&C) aircraft—continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-2000 Mainring and KJ-
200 Moth variants. These aircraft amplify PLAAF’s ability to detect, track, and target threats in 
varying conditions, in larger volumes, and at greater distances, It also extends the range of the 
PLA’s integrated air defense system (IADS) network. Furthermore, the PRC has produced at least 
one KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which will improve the aircraft’s ability to provide 
persistent AEW&C coverage. 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
The PRC’s aviation industry continues to advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20 large 
transport aircraft and completion of the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600. These transports will 
supplement and eventually replace the PRC’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which to date, 
consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These large transports are intended 
to support airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial refueling, and strategic reconnaissance 
operations as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). The PRC continues its comprehensive UAS modernization 
efforts, highlighted by the routine appearance of increasingly sophisticated systems across theater 
and echelon levels. The last three years have seen several key milestones. These include the 
airshow display and operational appearance of the Xianglong jet-powered UAS, as well as the 
unveiling of both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a redesigned version of the GJ-11 stealth 
Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). The PLA also continues the maritime use of ISR UASs, 
featuring both the venerable BZK-005 and the newer TW-328/TB001. The PRC is also expanding 
the applications of large UASs by demonstrating uses including disaster communications, anti-
submarine roles, firefighting, and weather modification. Advanced small UASs are increasingly 
appearing in both military and civilian applications, with Chinese industry remaining a key 
exporter of UASs and components of all sizes. 
In addition to maturing their current capabilities, the PRC is also signaling its efforts in next 
generation capabilities. Air and trade shows are displaying growing numbers of autonomous and 
teaming systems, including for combat applications. In these concepts, Chinese developers are 
demonstrating an interest in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into both air-to-air and air-to-
ground combat, with a substantial amount of development displaying efforts to produce swarming 
capability for operational applications. 
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF possesses one of the largest forces of advanced long-range 
SAM systems in the world, composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300) battalions and 
domestically produced CSA-9 (HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions. To improve its strategic 
long-range air defenses, in 2019 the PRC acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM system from Russia. 
The PRC is also developing its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will likely have a 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability. The PRC is also developing kinetic-kill vehicle 
technology to field a mid-course interceptor, which will form the upper layer of a multi-tiered 
missile defense. The PLA conducted a test of a land-based mid-course interceptor on February 4th, 
2021. 
PLAAF AIRBORNE CORPS 
The PLAAF Airborne Corps commands six airborne combined arms brigades, a SOF brigade, an 
operational support brigade, an aviation transport brigade, a training base, and a new training 
brigade. The six combined arms brigades consist of three airborne infantry, one air assault, one 
wheeled airborne mechanized (wheeled air droppable armored vehicles), and one tracked airborne 
mechanized (tracked air droppable armored vehicles). 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
Each airborne combined arms brigade typically commands four combined arms battalions, an 
artillery battalion, a reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an operations support battalion, and 
a service support battalion, and possibly a transportation battalion. 
  
 
Major Aviation Units  
 
 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ROCKET FORCE (PLARF) 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLARF is advancing its long-term modernization plans to enhance its “strategic
deterrence” capabilities.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which will cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM silos and has loaded at least
some intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) into these silos.
●The PRC is developing new ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile
forces and will require increased nuclear warhead production, partially due to the introduction
of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
●The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed intercontinental range
missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the PRC to threaten
conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability.
The PLARF organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and 
conventional missile forces and associated support forces and missile bases. The PLARF is a 
critical component of the PRC’s nuclear deterrence strategy and its strategy to deter and counter 
third-party intervention in regional conflicts. According to the PRC’s 2019 defense white paper, 
the PLARF is working towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities of nuclear 
deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, 
and enhancing strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket 
force.” 
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF’s ground-
based missile forces complement the air and sea-based precision strike capabilities of the PLAAF 
and PLAN. The PLARF’s conventional missile forces include the CSS-6 (DF-15) short-range 
ballistic missile (SRBM) (range 725-850 km), the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM (600 km), the CSS-11 
(DF-16) SRBM (more than 700 km), land-attack and anti-ship variants of the CSS-5 (DF-21) 
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km), the hypersonic glide vehicle 
capable DF-17 MRBM, the DF-26 Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (3,000 km-
4,000km), the CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km), 
and the CJ-100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km). The PLARF’s conventionally-armed 
CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the capability to conduct long-range 
precision strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers, out to the Western Pacific from mainland 
China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry vehicle 
(MaRV) and is reportedly capable of rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF continues to grow 
its inventory of DF-26 IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and fielded in 2016. The multi-role 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting 
precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS 
from mainland China. In 2020, the PRC fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a moving target 
in the SCS. The PLARF is developing and testing several new variants of theater-range missiles 
and developing capabilities and methods to counter adversary BMD systems. The DF-17 passed 
several tests successfully and is deployed operationally. In 2020, a PRC-based military expert 
described the primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking foreign military bases and fleets in the 
Western Pacific. The PRC may be exploring development of conventionally-armed 
intercontinental range missile systems. If developed and fielded, such capabilities would allow the 
PRC to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States, Hawaii, and 
Alaska. Conventionally-armed ICBMs would present significant risks to strategic stability. 
The PLARF is developing ICBMs that will significantly improve its nuclear-capable missile forces 
with more survivable delivery systems. The PRC has doubled and continues to grow the number 
of launchers at most ICBM units. The PRC’s ICBM arsenal consists of approximately 350 ICBMs, 
including fixed and mobile launchers capable of launching unitary and multiple reentry vehicles. 
The PRC’s fixed ICBMs consist of the multiple CSS-4 (DF-5)-class missiles, one of which is 
capable of carrying up to five (Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) MIRV’s and a 
silo-based CSS-10-class missile.  The solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 (DF-31)-class and CSS-
20 (DF-41) ICBMs complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A), with a range in excess 
of 11,000 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. The DF-41 ICBM 
has been operationally deployed with commentary during the 2019 parade noting that two brigades 
existed for the system. Additionally, sources indicate a “long-range” DF-27 ballistic missile is in 
development. Official PRC military writings indicate this range-class spans 5,000-8,000 km, which 
means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or ICBM. The PRC probably is developing advanced 
nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a fractional orbital 
bombardment (FOB) system.  
 
CHINA’S ROCKET FORCE 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM 
500 
350 
>5,500 km 
IRBM 
250 
500 
3,000-5,500 km 
MRBM 
300 
1,000 
1,000-3,000 km 
SRBM 
200 
1,000 
300-1,000 km 
GLCM 
150 
300 
>1,500 km 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Fielded Nuclear Ballistic Missiles 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
 
Fielded Conventional Strike 
 
 
 
 
 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
STRATEGIC SUPPORT FORCE (SSF) 
Key Takeaways 
●The SSF is a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic
space, cyberspace, electronic, information, communications, and psychological warfare
missions and capabilities.
●The SSF’s Network Systems Department (NSD), sometimes referred to as the Cyberspace
Force (CSF; 网络空间部队) is responsible for information warfare with an integrated mission
set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and
psychological warfare. The PLA SSF’s Space Systems Department (SSD), sometimes referred
to as the Aerospace Force (ASF; 航天部队), is responsible for military space operations.
●The PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct-ascent anti-satellite
missiles, co-orbital satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-energy systems—that can
contest or deny an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or
conflict.
●The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted significant
resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil
applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.
SSF works with civilian organizations, such as universities and research organization, to
integrate civilian support to military efforts.
The SSF was established in 2015 to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, 
and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF reports directly to the CMC and 
supports the entire PLA with its capabilities. The PRC’s 2019 defense white paper described the 
SSF’s modernization goals as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and 
accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and 
modernized strategic support force.” 
The SSF oversees two deputy theater command-level departments: the SSD, sometimes referred 
to as the ASF, is responsible for military space operations, and the NSD, sometimes referred to as 
the CSF, responsible for information operations (IO), which includes technical reconnaissance, 
EW, cyberspace warfare, and psychological operations. At the headquarters level, the SSF has a 
four-department administrative structure that includes the Staff, Equipment, Political Work, and 
Logistics Departments. As a strategic organization, the SSF is directly subordinate to the CMC, 
but some of its subordinate units may report to the theater commands in wartime. The SSF provides 
information support derived from space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to all PLA services 
and the five joint theater commands. Civilian reserve and militia units – typically comprised of 
personnel from the Ministry of Information and Industry Technology, Ministry of Public Security, 
Ministry of State Security, and academic institutions – augment SSF cyberspace operations during 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
peacetime and are organized into specialized units during wartime to support network defense 
operations. 
General Ju Qiansheng has served as SSF commander since 2021. He previously served as 
commander of the NSD. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong recently served as commander of the SSD, until 
leaving that position sometime in 2023, but a replacement has not been identified. The leader of 
the NSD is unknown.  
Network Systems Department. The SSF NSD, also referred to as the CSF, is responsible for 
information warfare with a mission set that includes cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance, 
EW, and psychological warfare.  By placing the SSF NSD missions under the same organizational 
umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the operational coordination challenges that hindered 
information sharing under the PLA’s pre-reform organizational structure. The incorporation of 
cyberspace and EW elements under one organization was a crucial step towards realizing the 
operational concept of integrated network and electronic warfare that the PLA has envisioned since 
the early 2000s. The NSD operates five theater–aligned technical reconnaissance bases, a number 
of signals intelligence bureaus, and several research institutes. The NSD provides intelligence 
support to the theater commands by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based technical collection 
assets to provide a common operating picture to geographically dispersed operational units. 
The SSF and the “Three Warfares” Concept: The SSF NSD, or CSF, performs 
missions and tasks associated with the PLA’s concept of “Three Warfares,” which 
comprises psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare.  This 
department is the only publicly known organization in the PLA that performs 
psychological warfare operations. See 2022 CMPR “Special Topic: PRC Views of 
Information and Information Dominance” for more on PLA views on information 
warfare, including psychological warfare. 
SSF SPACE SYSTEMS DEPARTMENT 
The SSD, sometimes referred to as the ASF, is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, 
including space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space 
telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare.   The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA’s 
command and control C2 for joint operations and establish a real-time surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and warning system, and it is increasing the number and capabilities of its space 
systems, including communications and intelligence satellites, as well as the BeiDou navigation 
satellite system.  
The SSD operates at least eight bases, including those whose core missions are the launch, 
tracking, R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to the PRC’s overhead C4ISR architecture.  The 
SSD operates tracking, telemetry, and command (TT&C) stations in multiple locations worldwide 
to guide space missions around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space.   The SSD also 
operates Yuanwang space support ships that track satellite and ICBM launches.  


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
China has five launch sites, including four land-based and one sea-based. The SSD’s China Launch 
and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all four fixed launch sites in China, in addition to 
Yuanwang space support ships (SESS), two major satellite control centers—Xian Satellite Control 
Center (XSCC) and the Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC)—and the PLA TT&C system 
for all Chinese satellites. 
Other Space and Counterspace Organizations. The PRC’s space program comprises 
organizations in the military, civil, defense-industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA 
historically has managed the PRC’s space program and continues to support both civilian and 
military interests. This includes strengthening and investing in its science and technology sector, 
growing international partnerships, and improving the PRC’s capabilities in space-based ISR, 
SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and robotic space exploration. Although state-
owned enterprises are China’s primary space contractors, the PRC is placing greater emphasis on 
decentralizing and diversifying its space industry to increase competition.  
The State Council’s State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National 
Defense (SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization that coordinates and manages the PRC’s 
space activities, including allocating space research and development funds. It also maintains a 
working relationship with the PLA organization that oversees the PRC’s military acquisitions. 
SASTIND guides and establishes policies for state-owned entities conducting the PRC’s space 
activities.  
The China National Space Administration (CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, conducts China’s 
civilian space efforts, including human spaceflight at the Chinese space station, lunar missions, 
and interplanetary missions. The PRC is increasingly using CNSA efforts to bolster relationships 
with countries around the world, particularly with the BRI Partners, providing opportunities to 
cooperate on space issues.  
Many space technologies can serve a civilian and military purpose and the PRC emphasizes 
“military-civil fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use technologies, policies, 
and organizations for military benefit. The SSF works with civilian organizations like universities 
and research organizations to incorporate civilian support to military efforts since there is an 
already high demand for aerospace talent and competition for finite human resources. China also 
has a growing commercial space sector that supports government objectives, including remote 
sensing, launch, and communication services. 
International Cooperation. The PRC has extensive civil space cooperation agreements around 
the world and is an exporter of satellites and space technology. It has more than a hundred 
cooperative space-related agreements with more than three dozen countries and four international 
organizations. The PRC is inviting countries to participate on the Chinese space station or 
International Lunar Research Station, which is jointly led by China and Russia, and has sold 
satellite launching services and ground stations to countries around the world.   


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a multilateral 
organization with rotating leadership whose members include Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey with Egypt, Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members. 
APSCO oversees a network of space surveillance telescopes and tasking information, and the 
observation data it collects is funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National 
Astronomical Observatory of China. The organization is planning to improve optical system 
capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well as data sharing networks.  
 
Major SSF Installations 
JOINT LOGISTIC SUPPORT FORCE (JLSF) 


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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
Key Takeaways 
●The JLSF is concentrating its efforts on improving joint strategic and campaign-level logistic
efficiencies through training and integrating civilian products and services.
●The JLSF supports multimodal transportation methods to facilitate the movement of PLA
forces and equipment for training.
The PLA JLSF, established in 2016, provides integrated joint logistics support for the PLA. The 
JLSF commander is Lt. Gen. Wang Liyan. The JLSF is directly subordinate to the CMC and is 
central to China’s efforts to build a joint, efficient “combat-oriented modern logistics system,” 
which Beijing views as essential for modern warfare. The JLSF modernizes PLA strategic- and 
campaign-level logistics by overseeing theater wide supply operations, establishing and 
coordinating support relationships among PLA service logistics elements conducting joint logistics 
exercises with the PLA services, and integrating civilian logistics resources into military 
operations. The JLSF conducts exercises to improve the PLA’s ability to conduct joint logistics 
operations.  
The JLSF is headquartered at Wuhan Joint Logistics Support Base.  It operates five joint logistics 
support centers (JLSCs) aligned with each of the theater commands that are intended to streamline 
logistics support to the PLA. Under the JLSCs’ control are units that provide materiel support to 
the PLA and joint logistics support brigades (JLSBs), who focus exclusively on providing mobile 
logistics support during combat operations.  
The JLSF provides the PLA with joint strategic- and campaign-level logistics, enabling the PLA 
to conduct large-scale operations. Elements of the JLSF who provide direct wartime support to the 
PLA fighting force are categorized as weapons and ammunition storage, warehousing, medical 
services, transport, fuel, engineering and construction management, reserve equipment, and 
procurement support. During peacetime, the JLSF has authority over the JLSCs’ operations and 
activities; during wartime, theater commands possibly would assume control of their designated 
JLSC. 
The JLSF integrates civilian resources and equipment into military operations and exercises, 
leveraging China’s civilian products, services and transportation, to improve resupply and move 
military personnel and equipment more rapidly. It does so primarily through the use of military 
representative offices (MROs) comprised of JLSF personnel who embed with civilian 
transportation companies (air, rail, road, and sea) to plan and manage military transportation. MRO 
personnel are vital to the JLSF’s military-civilian integration efforts because they understand the 
technical loading procedures for various modes of transportation, can draft load plans, and provide 
expertise to reduce load times at points of embarkation. JLSF theater dispatch centers are the 
headquarters of regional MROs, coordinate PLA mobilization, and are tasked with improving the 
efficiency of transferring materials and forces between transportation modes.  


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
PLA Training to Improve Readiness. The CMC sought to improve PLA combat readiness, 
interoperability, and training through the 14th Five-Year Plan and reinforced these priorities 
through military training mobilization orders and senior leadership guidance. In 2022, Xi 
emphasized the need for the PLA to adopt the latest technologies in its training and to focus on 
integrating training with combat operations The PLA conducted multiple large-scale joint 
exercises and incorporated advanced weapons and equipment, such as during the exercises around 
Taiwan in August.  
Throughout 2022, the PLA sustained the frequency, scale, and duration of joint exercises.  The 
COVID-19 pandemic likely did not significantly impact the PLA’s ability to conduct joint 
exercises. The PLA successfully completed at least eight bilateral and multinational exercises, 
conducting naval drills, maritime and aerial patrols, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
efforts. Although the PLA has improved some combat deficiencies, the force, as a whole, probably 
continues to work through challenges with joint operations, command and control, and tactical and 
small-unit leadership. 
The largest unplanned event of the year occurred in August 2022, when the PLA conducted live-
fire drills—including firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan—in response to the CODEL visit to 
Taipei in August 2022. During the visit, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that 27 PLA aircraft 
entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, including 22 that crossed the median of the 
Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s centerline crossings have continued since August as the PLA maintains 
a heightened readiness level. Such activity reflects ongoing PLA attempts to normalize median 
line crossings. 
INCREASING OPERABILITY WITH PLA RESERVES, PARAMILITARY 
& MILITIA  
Key Takeaways 
● Interoperability and integration between the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC’s 
paramilitary forces continue to grow in scale and sophistication, including the coordination 
between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard (CCG), and the China Maritime Militia (CMM).    
● The PRC primarily uses paramilitary maritime organizations in maritime disputes, selectively 
using the PLAN to provide overwatch in case of escalation. 
 


 
 
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 
THE PRC’S INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES 
The PRC’s internal security forces consist primarily of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), 
the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), and the militia.  The CCP relies on these forces to address 
challenges ranging from protests over political, social, environmental, or economic 
problems, to terrorism and natural disasters.  In 2022, the PRC deployed thousands of 
PLA, PAP, and militia personnel for disaster relief in response to multiple events such as 
an airplane crash, earthquakes, fires, and floods.   
Ministry of Public Security (MPS). The MPS leads the PRC’s civilian national police, which 
serves as the front force for public order. The key mission of the MPS is domestic law 
enforcement and the “maintenance of social security and order” with duties including anti-
rioting and anti-terrorism. 
Ministry of State Security (MSS). The MSS is the PRC’s main civilian intelligence and 
counterintelligence service. MSS operations include but are not limited to: protect the 
PRC’s national security; conduct counterintelligence; combating foreign espionage; and 
investigate organizations or individuals inside the PRC who carry out or direct, support, or 
aid other people perceived to threaten national security. On April 26th, 2021, the PRC 
enacted a new counter-espionage law permitting the MSS authority to identify companies 
and organizations deemed susceptible to foreign infiltration or influence and require 
these institutes to implement measures to prevent foreign infiltration.  
People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary component of the PRC’s armed 
forces.  Its primary missions include internal security, maritime security, and 
augmentation to the PLA during conflict. As part of a security structures reorganization in 
2018, the CMC centralized control of the PAP. The same reform also subordinated the 
CCG to the PAP. 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA has 
formal and informal roles in the PRC’s internal security. As the principal armed wing of the 
CCP, the PLA is the ultimate guarantor of the CCP’s survival and supports other internal 
security forces as necessary. The 2020 National Defense Law recognizes this role in 
assigning the PLA the mission to “consolidate the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China and the socialist system” in addition to external defense tasks. 
Militia. The PRC’s militia is a force that can be mobilized for a variety of peace- and war-
time missions and is distinct from the PLA’s Reserve Force. The militia is organized by 
townships, administrative villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and institutions, 
and the missions may vary widely. In wartime, militia units assist the PLA with its military 
operations, conduct independent security operations, and provide support and manpower 
replacement to the PLA. During peacetime, the militia assists in humanitarian aid and 
disaster relief, supports military training, and maintains internal security. The PRC’s 
Military Service Law requires male citizens between 18 to 35 years of age who are fit for 
military service, excluding those already in active service, be enrolled into the militia. The 


 
 
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militia is divided into two categories. The primary militia consists of former soldiers, 
personnel that have received military training, and personnel selected for military training 
that are under the age of 28, in good health, and politically reliable. The remainder of male 
citizens between 18 and 35 years of age are considered ordinary militia. The primary 
militia may recruit female citizens when necessary and the age limits can be waived under 
special circumstance. Local maritime militia forces, referred to by many western analysts 
as the Chinese Maritime Militia, perform tasks including safeguarding maritime claims, 
protecting fisheries, providing logistic support, search and rescue, and surveillance and 
reconnaissance, often in conjunction or coordination with the PLAN and the CCG. 
 
People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force. The People’s Liberation Army Reserve Force was 
founded in 1983 and professionalized throughout the 1990s and 2000s. On July 1st, 2020, the PRC 
amended laws, regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve Force under the command of the 
Central Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous arrangement split control of the 
Reserve Force between the PLA and local Party committees. Motivations for the change include 
improving combat capability, facilitating cooperation with active-duty units, and upholding the 
CCP’s absolute leadership over the military. Chinese sources often stated specifically that the 
reform would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA appears 
to have begun making a partial restructure towards using a PLAA reserve base system to continue 
to improve facilitation and support for active-duty units. 
The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate to the Army 
Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve. According to PLA 
documents, active-duty personnel are the backbone of the Reserve Force, but reserve-duty officers 
and soldiers are its foundation. 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military Strategy 
states the building of the reserve force is an important part of national defense construction and is 
the basic and strategic project to consolidate national defense. The primary mission of the reserves 
is to reinforce active-duty forces for national defense, with a secondary mission to aid in national 
disasters or maintaining social order. The Reserve Force should be prepared to effectively respond 
to a variety of emergencies and military threats, safeguard national sovereignty, security and 
development interests, and the core security of the country. 
Although originally founded to support the ground forces, reforms in recent years seek to reduce 
PLAA reserves and increase those for the PLAN, PLAAF, and the PLARF. However, PRC 
writings suggest that, as of 2018, the Reserve Force was still predominately ground force-centric, 
with less than 10 percent of reservists serving specialized technical functions in the PLAN, 
PLAAF, PLARF, or PLA SSF. 
Reserve officers are selected from veteran PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia officers, 
and other technical personnel. Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA veterans, trained 
grass-roots militias, and other local or military specialty personnel. Some reserve soldiers also 


 
 
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failed to meet active-duty entry requirements and conduct remedial training in the reserves until 
they are able to join the active-duty force.  
The PLA is working to improve reserve mobilization, which anecdotal evidence suggests is 
hindered by unclear processes. In March 2023, during the PRC’s annual “Two Sessions,” PLA 
deputies suggested that the PRC should study and prioritize wartime legislation, including the 
introduction of laws such as the mobilization of reserve forces. Chinese documents also suggest 
that Reserve Force equipment is old; one report in 2018 stated that more than 70 percent of air 
defense artillery and artillery equipment is at or beyond its maximum service life. Some of the 
equipment is no longer manufactured and repair requires cannibalization. 
The PLA Reserve Force does not include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad other groups 
(e.g., the People’s Armed Police or the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC)). 
PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE (PAP)  
The PAP is a component of the PRC’s armed forces and an armed wing of the CCP with an 
estimated 660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National Defense University's Science of Military 
Strategy, the primary responsibilities of the PAP include maintaining political, institutional and 
regime security, handling emergency rescue, counter-terrorism, air support, maritime rights 
protection, administrative law enforcement, and defense operations. The PAP is organized into 
three main parts: the Internal Security Corps, the Mobile Corps, and the CCG. The Internal 
Security Corps covers each of the PRC’s provinces, provincial-level cities, and “autonomous” 
regions. There is not yet a reported permanent presence of the PAP in the Special Administrative 
Regions (SARs) of Hong Kong or Macao. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad PAP units 
placed to reinforce the Internal Security Corps and provide flexibility in responding to internal 
security issues. Mobile Corps units are concentrated around non-Han ethnic regions in the West 
and South (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Qinghai) as well as the major cities of Beijing 
and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular focus of the PAP due to alleged separatist activity, as well 
as its proximity to areas of unrest in Central Asia.  
On July 1st, 2020, the standing committee of the PRC’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, 
approved a revision to the Law on the People’s Armed Police Force which officially recognized 
the CMC singular command of the PAP, identified the PAP as an important part of the armed 
forces that fall under the leadership of the CCP, as well as affirming its primary mission set of 
handling security emergencies, maintaining stability, conducting counter-terrorism operations, and 
executing maritime law enforcement and rescue. This legal amendment codified and deepened the 
substantial reforms of 2018, when command of the PAP was centralized under the Central Party 
Committee and the CMC after decades of dual-leadership under the CMC and State Council (a 
PRC government body); the China Coast Guard was subordinated to the PAP; and myriad auxiliary 
duties (e.g., protecting gold mines, firefighting, etc.) were removed from the PAP’s purview to 
focus its mission on PRC domestic and international security. Chinese media noted that the 2020 


 
 
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PAP reforms included an article that permitted the PAP to conduct certain operations, including 
counter-terrorism training, outside of the PRC. 
Xi and the CCP leadership tasked the PAP with integrating themselves into the PLA’s joint 
operation system. The PAP is increasingly focused on internal security and joint operations with 
the PLA and is developing capabilities for rapid response, mobility, and counterterrorism 
operations. The PAP also conducts training with foreign partners, including at least Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP forces have likely operated in Tajikistan, 
patrolling the tri-border region connecting Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC. 
In 2022, PAP forces performed rescue operations in Xining following major flooding in August 
and in Sichuan after a September 5th earthquake and acquired new helicopters to support in 
counter-terrorism and disaster relief tasks. An emphasis was also placed on PAP SOF training 
throughout the year, including a maritime tactical joint exercise in June with PLANMC. 
Additionally, a PAP officer was named as the commander of the PLA Garrison in the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, showing a PRC focus of maintaining social stability based on the 
new commander’s counter-terrorism experience in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.  
CHINA COAST GUARD (CCG)  
The CCG is subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a wide range of maritime security 
missions, including defending the PRC’s sovereignty claims; combating smuggling, terrorism, and 
environmental crimes; as well as supporting international cooperation. In 2021, the Standing 
Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the Coast Guard Law which took effect 
on 1 February 2021. The legislation regulates the duties of the CCG, to include the use of force, 
and applies those duties to seas under the jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with concern 
by other regional countries that may perceive the law as an implicit threat to use force, especially 
as territorial disputes in the region continue.  
Since the law, CCG activity has continued to prompt regional concern. In March 2022, the 
Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest against the PRC after a CCG vessel reportedly engaged in 
“close distance maneuvering” near a Filipino vessel in the disputed Scarborough Shoal. In 
December 2022, Japan reported that CCG vessels stayed in its territorial waters for over 72 hours, 
the longest continuous intrusion since 2012. 
The CCG’s continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest maritime law enforcement 
fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable than older vessels, allowing 
them to operate further offshore and remain on station longer. While exact numbers are 
unavailable, open-source reporting and commercial imagery counts indicate the CCG has over 150 
regional and oceangoing patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels include over 
20 corvettes transferred from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. , The newer, 
larger CCG vessels are equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, multiple 
interceptor boats and guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters., Revised estimates indicate the CCG 


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operates more than 50 regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for 
limited offshore operations, and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499 tons). 
CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA 
China’s Maritime Militia (CMM) is a subset of the PRC’s national militia, an armed reserve force 
of civilians available for mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to the CMC through the 
National Defense Mobilization Department. Throughout China, militia units organize around 
towns, villages, urban sub-districts, and enterprises and vary widely in composition and mission.  
CMM vessels train with and assist the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the China 
Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and 
reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics support, and search and rescue. These operations 
traditionally take place within the FIC along China’s coast and near disputed features in the SCS 
such as the Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reed, and Luconia Shoal. However, the presence 
of possible CMM vessels mixed in with Chinese fishing vessels near Indonesia’s Natuna Island 
outside of the “nine-dashed line” on Chinese maps indicated a possible ambition to expand CMM 
operations within the region. The PRC employs the CMM in gray zone operations, or “low-
intensity maritime rights protection struggles,” at a level designed to frustrate effective response 
by the other parties involved. The PRC employs CMM vessels to advance its disputed sovereignty 
claims, often amassing them in disputed areas throughout the SCS and ECS. In this manner, the 
CMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve the PRC’s political goals without fighting 
and these operations are part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational 
operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing strategic objectives.  
CMM units have been active for decades in incidents and combat operations throughout China’s 
near seas and in these incidents CMM vessels are often used to supplement CCG cutters at the 
forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the capacity to outweigh and outlast rival claimants. 
From September 2021 to September 2022, maritime militia vessels were a constant presence near 
Iroquois Reef in the Spratly Islands within the Philippines EEZ. Other notable examples include 
standoffs with the Malaysia drill ship West Capella (2020), defense of China’s HYSY-981 drill 
rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014), occupation of Scarborough Reef (2012), and 
harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014).   Historically, the 
maritime militia also participated in China’s offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the 1974 
seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, the occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly 
Islands in 1994. 
The CMM also protects and facilitates Chinese fishing vessels operating in disputed waters. From 
late December 2019 to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50 Chinese fishing vessels operated 
under the escort of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in Indonesian claimed waters northeast 
of the Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the Chinese ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated 
with known traditional maritime militia units, including a maritime militia unit based out of Beihai 
City in Guangxi province.  While most traditional maritime militia units operating in the SCS 


 
 
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continue to originate from townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is one of a number of 
increasingly prominent maritime militia units based out of provinces in mainland China. These 
mainland based maritime militia units routinely operate in the Spratly Islands and in the southern 
SCS, and their operations in these areas are enabled by increased funding from the Chinese 
government to improve their maritime capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.  
CMM AND LAND RECLAMATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
Since at least 2014, CMM vessels have engaged in covert small scale reclamation activity 
and likely caused physical changes observed at multiple unoccupied features in the 
Spratly Islands, including Lankiam Cay, Eldad Reef, Sandy Cay, and Whitsun Reef. Beijing 
likely is attempting to covertly alter these features so that it can portray them as naturally 
formed high tide elevations capable of supporting PRC maritime claims out to the farthest 
extent of the nine-nash line. In contrast to the PRC large-scale reclamation program, 
which was overt and where the original status of occupied features is well documented, 
the less well-known historical record about many of the unoccupied features makes them 
more susceptible to PRC efforts to shape international opinion regarding the status of the 
features. 
 
Through the National Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing subsidizes various local and 
provincial commercial organizations to operate CMM vessels to perform “official” missions on an 
ad hoc basis outside of their regular civilian commercial activities. CMM units employ marine 
industry workers, usually fishermen, as a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While retaining 
their day jobs, these mariners are organized and trained, often by the PLAN and the CCG, and can 
be activated on demand.  
Since 2014, China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet comprising at least 235 large steel-hulled 
fishing vessels, many longer than 50 meters and displacing more than 500 tons.  These vessels 
were built under central direction from the PRC government to operate in disputed areas south of 
12 degrees latitude that China typically refers to as the “Spratly Waters,” including the Spratly 
Islands and southern SCS. Spratly backbone vessels were built for prominent CMM units in 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan Provinces.  For vessel owners not already affiliated with CMM 
units, joining the militia was a precondition for receiving government funding to build new Spratly 
backbone boats.  As with the CCG and PLAN, new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
enhance the CMM’s ability to sustain operations in the SCS. 
Starting in 2015, the Sansha City Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has been developed into 
a salaried full-time maritime militia force with its own command center and equipped with at least 
84 purpose-built vessels armed with mast-mounted water cannons for spraying and reinforced steel 
hulls for ramming. Freed from their normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City Maritime Militia 
personnel – many of whom are former PLAN and CCG sailors – train for peacetime and wartime 


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contingencies, often with light arms, and patrol regularly around disputed South China Sea features 
even during fishing moratoriums. 
The Tanmen Maritime Militia is another prominent CMM unit. Homeported in Tanmen township 
on Hainan Island, the formation was described by Xi as a “model maritime militia unit” during a 
visit to Tanmen harbor in 2013. During the visit, Xi encouraged Tanmen to support “island and 
reef development” in the SCS. Between 1989 and 1995, the Tanmen Maritime Militia, under the 
authority of the PLAN Southern Theater Navy (then the South Sea Fleet), was involved in the 
occupation and reclamation of PRC outposts in the Spratly Islands, including Subi Reef, Fiery 
Cross Reef, and Mischief Reef.  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
Key Takeaways 
●Despite unilateral and multilateral training, all of China’s SOF units lack real-world combat
experience.
●China’s SOF does not have a national-level special operations command to oversee all of
China’s SOF activities.
●Despite an emphasis to conduct joint training, theater commanders have no authority over PAP
units, making it difficult to incorporate PAP SOF into PLA training exercises.
●The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and
international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and
the Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious).
In late 2015, the PRC’s SOF were impacted by a series of reforms that aimed to “reorganize troops 
and rebuild new-type combat forces. New types of combat forces have been enhanced to conduct 
special operations, all-dimensional offense and defense, amphibious operations, far seas 
protection, and strategic projection, aiming to make the force composition complete, combined, 
multi-functional, and flexible.” In 2016, additional changes to Chinese law were made authorizing 
the PRC’s SOF to conduct operations outside of China’s borders. 
Mission. The PRC’s SOF are tasked to conduct three primary missions; direct action, special 
reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. The goal of the PRC’s SOF operations are to prepare the 
battlefield for their conventional force counterparts by attacking critical areas, degrading enemy 
operational systems and capabilities, and delaying or disrupting enemy operational activities. In 
conventional warfare, the PRC’s SOF missions include, but are not limited to, disrupting rear 
echelon formations and activities, destroying or securing key targets, decapitation, and targeting 
for fire support.  The PRC’s SOF can also conduct humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) 
missions, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), and personal security assignments. While 
PLA SOF can conduct counterterrorism missions, PAP SOF are specifically tasked with this 


 
 
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mission.  The PRC categorizes its non-traditional security threats as terrorism (domestic and 
international), separatism (entities looking to break away from China such Taiwan, Tibet, and the 
Uyghur minority population in western China), and extremism (primarily religious). 
● PLA Army SOF. PLAA SOF train to clear obstacles, operate behind enemy lines, land 
navigation, reconnaissance, targeting, blocking maneuvers, and first aid. PLAA SOF units 
from the Eastern Theater Command train for maritime missions by swimming, maneuvering 
small rubber boats, marksmanship from moving boats, and scuba diving. In a 2016 exercise, 
forces from a Southern Theater Command Army SOF Brigade (BDE) conducted an air assault 
mission off the coast then traveled 5 km to the shoreline. 
● In September 2020, attack and transport helicopters from the 73rd Army Group (GA) conducted 
air assault training with elements from a 73rd GA SOF BDE. 
● That same month, elements from a Southern Theater Command SOF BDE deployed to a new 
training area and conducted a command post exercise and force-on-force exercise. 
● PLA Navy Marine Corps SOF. PLANMC SOF are trained to conduct ground-based special 
operations, as well as coastal and maritime missions, including maritime counterterrorism, 
HADR, NEO and visit, board, search and seizure operations. They train for more than a year 
learning airborne, rappelling, reconnaissance, secure communication, navigation, driving, 
search and seizure, demolition, and hand-to-hand combat skills. They also practice deploying 
rubber boats and fast-roping from helicopters into the water. In December 2020, PLANMC 
SOF participated in a combined arms island seizure exercise with mechanized infantry units 
where the SOF used mine-clearing line charges to destroy obstacles with sniper teams in 
overwatch. 
● PLA Air Force Airborne Corps SOF. The PLAAF Airborne Corps, created in 2011, train to 
conduct high-altitude, high-opening and high-altitude, low-opening airborne missions for 
critical target seizure, combat search and rescue, and fire support coordination during 
extraction. 
● PLA Rocket Force Reconnaissance Regiment. The PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment 
which is based in Qinghai, can conduct air, land, and sea missions including counter-ISR, 
strategic asset protection, special reconnaissance, and target acquisition. 
● People’s Armed Police SOF. The PAP has three main SOF units assigned to the two mobile 
contingents and the Xinjiang Military District. The Mountain Eagle Commando Unit created 
in 2019 and based in Xinjiang is trained to conduct counterterrorism missions within the 
province. The other two PAP SOF units, the Snow Leopards Commando Unit and the Falcon 
Commando Unit, are large rapid reaction forces with mixed capabilities that can be deployed 
in major contingencies on a national level. These units are also trained to conduct 
counterterrorism missions along with hostage rescue, and include assault, reconnaissance, 
explosive ordnance disposal, and sniper teams. The Snow Leopards have strict selection 


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standards with a 40-50 percent of recruits failing the initial screening. The Snow Leopards’ 
annual “Devil Week” training simulates counterterrorism missions in multiple combat 
environments including desert, jungle, urban terrain, air, and sea. 
Personnel. The PRC’s SOF currently has between 20,000 and 30,000 personnel. The PRC’s SOF 
units are comprised of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers but are also assigned 
new conscripts and officers that recently graduated from basic training or military academy, 
including the Special Operations Academy in Guangzhou. SOF conscripts are selected from 
volunteers suggesting they are among the most qualified that commit to a two-year term of service. 
After their two-year commitment, the conscripts are offered to continue service as 
noncommissioned officers. 
Structure and Organization. Beginning in January 2016, the PLA underwent several reforms 
that impacted the PLA SOF. The seven military regions were reorganized into five theater 
commands (TC) and five of the 18 GA were deactivated. The PLA SOF were also reorganized 
assigning a SOF BDE to each GA along with a SOF BDE for the Xinjiang and Tibet Military 
Districts. These and later reforms also impacted the PLARF Reconnaissance Regiment, the 
PLAAF Airborne Corps SOF BDE, and the PAP SOF units. Some of these SOF units are relatively 
new and were created using conventional forces to expand the PLA’s SOF capability. All PLA 
SOF units are supported by the PLA Air Force’s 15th Airborne Corps for tactical insertion, 
extraction, and resupply. 
Each PLA SOF BDE has between 2,000 and 3,000 personnel while a regiment has between 1,000 
and 2,000 personnel. While PLA SOF units have discrete missions based on branch and location, 
their internal structure resembles the PLA Army brigade-battalion-company-team construct with 
a main, reserve, and rear command structure. 
There are three SOF units within the PAP which have a total of six detachments. Three 
detachments are assigned to the 1st Mobile Contingent based in Beijing, two detachments are 
assigned to the 2nd Mobile Contingent based in Guangzhou, and one detachment falls under the 
Xinjiang Internal Contingent. 
There is no national-level special operations command responsible for all SOF activities.  PLA 
SOF also does not have organic or dedicated infrastructure or support and therefore must rely on 
conventional forces to support their missions whereas the PAP does have an internal logistic 
support system to support its SOF missions. 


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MAJOR PAP AND PLA SOF UNITS  
HIGHER 
HEADQUARTERS 
UNIT 
UNIT NAME 
Central Military 
Commission 
People’s Armed Police 
Snow Leopards Commando 
Unit 
Falcon Commando Unit 
Mountain Eagle Commando 
Unit 
Northern Theater 
Command 
78th Group Army SOF BDE 
Tigers of the Northeast 
79th Group Army SOF BDE 
Lions 
80th Group Army SOF BDE 
Falcons 
Eastern Theater 
Command 
71st Group Army SOF BDE 
Sharks 
72nd Group Army SOF BDE 
Thunderbolts 
73rd Group Army SOF BDE 
Dragons of the East Sea 
Southern Theater 
Command 
74th Group Army SOF BDE 
Unknown 
75th Group Army SOF BDE 
Sword of the South 
PLA Navy Marine Corps SOF BDE 
Sea Dragons 
Western Theater 
Command 
76th Group Army SOF BDE 
Sirius 
77th Group Army SOF BDE 
Cheetahs 
Xinjiang Military District SOF BDE 
Snowy Owls 
Sharp Blade of the Kunlun 
Tibet Military District SOF BDE 
Snow Leopards of the Plateau 
Central Theater 
Command 
PLA Rocket Force Reconnaissance 
Regiment 
Sharp Blade 
PLA Air Force Airborne Corps SOF 
BDE 
Thunder Gods 
81st Group Army SOF BDE 
Sacred Sword of the East 
82nd Group Army SOF BDE 
Whistling Arrows 
83rd Group Army SOF BDE 
Ferocious Tigers of the Central 
Plain 
Internal Training and Exercises. The PRC’s SOF focus on individual and squad-level training; 
however, they have participated in larger combined arms and joint exercises. SOF training entails 
physical fitness training, close quarters combat, individual and team survival, camouflage, 
weapons proficiency, land navigation, and communication. All PRC SOF units are airborne and 
air assault capable. 
The recent reforms under Xi gave theater commanders authority over a wider range of forces 
including PLA SOF and also emphasized joint training. However, these reforms did not create 
joint task forces which might encourage increased coordination between the services. The 
restructuring to theater commands has not resulted in increased integration of PLA SOF into joint 
training. There is scant evidence of PRC’s SOF units from different services training together or 


 
 
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with conventional forces, the exception being PLAAF aircraft for PLAA SOF airborne training. 
There is also no evidence that PAP SOF units have participated in joint exercises with any PLA 
forces. Theater commanders have no authority over PAP units, making it difficult to incorporate 
PAP SOF into PLA training exercises. 
External Training and Exercises. In 2002, the PLA began participating in multinational training 
exercises and since then, PRC’s SOF personnel and units, to include PAP SOF, have taken part in 
several foreign events, primarily focused on counterterrorism.  Some of these events were held 
with units from Belarus, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Russia, Thailand, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Jordan.  Individual PLA SOF personnel and small units have participated in training 
in Israel, Turkey, Estonia, Colombia, and Venezuela In August 2021, PLA SOF participated in 
joint training exercise “Zapad” with their Russian counterparts to help maintain security and 
stability in the Transbaikal region. Supported by Y-20 transport aircraft, PLA SOF focused their 
training on large-scale airborne exercises including heavy equipment insertion. Of note, the PAP’s 
Snow Leopards have won the International Warrior Competition held at Jordan’s King Abdullah 
II Special Operations Training Centre in Amman several times. 
Equipment and Sustainment. The PRC’s SOF units are equipped with the most modern 
domestically-produced weapons and equipment.    These include advanced communication and 
electronics, unmanned aerial systems ranging from micro-UAVs to the medium-altitude long 
endurance platforms, night vision devices, targeting devices, parachutes, and light vehicles, boats, 
and aircraft.  PLA SOF units tasked with conducting clandestine maritime missions are also 
equipped with diver navigation aids, radios, undersea sensors, diver propulsion systems, 
underwater personnel delivery systems, and handheld direction-finding sonars for low-visibility 
underwater environments.  
PLA SOF do not have an internal support system to conduct missions and relies on the theater 
command to meet their logistical needs whereas the PAP has an internal logistic system separate 
from the PLA to meet their sustainment needs during operations.   
Operational Capabilities. Most PLA ground SOF units appear to be elite light infantry units that 
can be inserted behind enemy lines but are limited by their conventional force counterpart’s ability 
to support their mission. PLA SOF brigades emphasize a “centralized command style”—common 
in conventional units—as opposed to a more flexible “task-oriented command style” via radio and 
satellite communications. PLA Army SOF brigades also include liaison officers from pertinent 
PLA Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, and aviation units in their command post to facilitate SOF 
missions in support of theater command operations. PLA SOF brigades also face the same C2 
issues that conventional PLA brigades encounter. One example from 2019 showed that voice 
communications were difficult to maintain using single-function and limited bandwidth radios and 
satellite communications terminals. This limited communication between the brigade and below 
conventional forces as well as the supporting SOF battalion and below forces. 
Many U.S. SOF activities do not fall within the purview of China’s SOF missions. PLA SOF do 
not conduct military information support operations (also known as psychological operations). 


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These operations are conducted by elements within the PLA Political Department System. 
However, PLA SOF units may assist in larger information support operations, but would not be in 
command. PLA SOF also do not have units equivalent to U.S. Army Civil Affairs units. 
Humanitarian aid and disaster relief (HADR) is a mission conducted by all PLA, PAP, and militia 
units in conjunction with local civilian authorities. The PRC’s SOF may provide support in the 
form of communications and reconnaissance in remote areas, but would not be the lead agency for 
HADR missions. 
Both the PLAA and PLAAF lack aviation assets to conduct long-range insertions of PLA SOF to 
conduct strategic-level direct action or reconnaissance, but they can conduct air insertions of SOF 
in support of theater operations. Helicopters are used to transport SOF for airborne and air assault 
missions. All PLA airborne-qualified SOF train in fixed-wing aircraft, such as the Yun-5 biplane, 
which can also be used for SOF missions. However, the PLA’s shortage of long-range, heavy 
transport aircraft means PLA Air Force units receive priority to use these aircraft for airborne 
training. 
Employment. Since 2008, approximately 70 PLANMC SOF personnel have deployed to the Gulf 
of Aden aboard PLAN vessels as part of the PRC’s counterpiracy operations.   In 2015, PLA SOF 
conducted search and rescue, medical evacuation, and force protection operations in Nepal 
following an earthquake. Also in 2015, PLANMC SOF helped evacuate foreign nationals due to 
the war in Yemen and in 2017, PLANMC SOF recaptured a hijacked freighter from Somali pirates 
in the Gulf of Aden. In 2020, PLA SOF from the Tibet Military Region deployed to the border 
with India following clashes between Chinese and Indian forces along the LAC. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Key Takeaways 
●The PLA is aggressively developing capabilities to provide options for the PRC to dissuade,
deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-party intervention in the Indo-Pacific region.
●The PLA continues developing the capabilities to conduct military operations deeper into the
Indo-Pacific region and globally.
●The PLA has undertaken important structural reforms and introduced new military doctrine to
strengthen joint operations and is testing joint capabilities in and beyond the FIC.


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UNDERGROUND FACILITIES  
The PLA maintains a robust and technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) 
program to conceal and protect all aspects of its military forces, including C2, weapons 
of mass destruction, logistics, and modernized missile, ground, air, and naval forces. The 
PRC has thousands of UGFs and constructs more each year. These UGFs are central to 
The PRC’s counter-intervention and power projection efforts, enabling the PLA to protect 
valuable assets from the effects of missile strikes and to conceal military operations from 
adversaries. The PRC’s emphasis on strategic deterrence has also contributed to the 
construction of UGFs for the country’s nuclear forces, which aims to survive an initial 
nuclear first-strike by an adversary. 
The PRC began to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid- to late-1980s. 
This modernization effort took on renewed urgency following the PRC’s observation of 
U.S. and Coalition air operations during the 1991 Gulf War and their use in OPERATION 
ALLIED FORCE. These military campaigns convinced China it needs to build more 
survivable, deeply buried facilities to protect military assets from the effects of 
penetrating conventional munition and nuclear strikes. Since the 2015-2016 military 
reforms, the PRC has expanded their UGF program to support survivable and redundant 
nodes for its wartime contingency planning. These nodes aim to enable continuous C2, 
communications, sustainment, and counterstrike capabilities across all PLA services and 
domains, as well as its joint forces. The PRC will likely continue to develop and expand its 
UGF program to support its expanding forces and military modernization. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR COUNTERINTERVENTION  
The PRC’s counter-intervention strategy aims to restrict the United States from having a presence 
in the PRC’s immediate periphery and limit U.S. access in the broader Indo-Pacific region. The 
PLA’s A2/AD—otherwise known as “counterintervention”—capabilities are, to date, the most 
robust within the FIC, although the PLA is increasingly able to project power into the Philippine 
Sea and the PRC seeks to strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into the Pacific Ocean.  
Long-Range Precision Strike and Supporting ISR. PLA texts state that precision attack in all 
warfare domains is critical in modern war. The PLA further notes that small elite forces using 
advanced weapons or capabilities can attain military effects that previously required large armies 
and much higher levels of damage and cost.  Therefore, PLA writings state that precision weapons 
are not only force multipliers, but also a means of “war control” to prevent escalation. PLA 
documents further state that the range of vital political, economic, and military targets has grown 
as the advanced globalized economy develops, implying that growing PLA strike capabilities will 
attack an increasing array of targets, and, thereby, attain international strategic effects by striking 
critical nodes of the global economy during a future conflict. 


 
 
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The PRC’s military modernization efforts have rapidly transformed the PLA’s missile force. The 
force is increasingly capable of conducting strikes against regional air bases, logistics and port 
facilities, communications, and other ground-based infrastructure—targets that PLA writings 
discuss as adversary vulnerabilities. The PLA is capable of reaching U.S. bases in Guam with 
ballistic and cruise missiles. In the future, PLA LACMs will also likely be deployable on surface 
platforms like the RENHAI-class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K bomber flights into the Philippine 
Sea demonstrate the PRC’s ability to range Guam with air-launched LACMs. The DF-26 
intermediate range ballistic missile is a capable of ranging Guam and is capable of conducting 
nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.  
The PRC views its ability to acquire timely, high-fidelity information as critical to its ability to 
execute precision strikes. The PLA’s information support system for precision strikes depends 
heavily on Strategic Support Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target, and conduct battlefield 
damage assessments. The PRC emphasizes the importance of space-based surveillance capabilities 
in supporting precision strikes and, in 2022, continued to develop its constellation of military 
reconnaissance satellites that could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied 
forces. The PRC is also investing in reconnaissance, surveillance, command, control, and 
communications systems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide high-fidelity 
OTH targeting information for its strike platforms.   
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The PRC has a robust and redundant IADS architecture 
over land areas and within 300 nm (556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive early warning 
radar network, fighter aircraft, and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also placed radars and 
air defense weapons on outposts in the SCS, further extending the range of its IADS. It also 
employs point defenses, primarily to defend strategic targets against adversary long-range cruise 
missiles and airborne strike platforms. 
The PLA has increasing numbers of advanced long-range SAMs, including its indigenous CSA-9 
(HQ-9) and its follow-on HQ-9B, Russian SA-10 (S-300PMU), and SA-20 (S-300PMU1/PMU2), 
all of which have the advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-flying cruise 
missiles. To improve its strategic air defenses, the PLA possesses Russian-built SA-21 (S-400) 
Triumf SAM systems as a follow-on to the SA-20. Compared to these other systems, the SA-21 
systems possess a longer maximum range, improved missile seekers, and more sophisticated 
radars.  
The PRC manufactures a variety of long-range air surveillance radars, including models claiming 
to support BMD and other models asserting the ability to detect stealth aircraft.  Marketing 
materials also emphasize these systems’ ability to counter long-range airborne strike and combat 
support aircraft. PLAAF AEW&C aircraft such as the KJ-2000 and KJ-500 can further extend the 
PRC’s radar coverage well past the range of its ground-based radars. 
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. The PLA’s long-range SAM inventory also offers a limited 
capability against ballistic missiles.  The PRC’s domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM system 
likely has a limited capability to provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles.  The PLA 


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has SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs and SA-21 (S-400) SAMs that may have some capability to 
engage ballistic missiles, depending on the interceptors and supporting infrastructure. The PRC is 
working to develop BMD systems consisting of exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric kinetic-
energy interceptors. The PRC is pursuing a mid-course interceptor that may have capabilities 
against IRBMs and possibly ICBMs.The Type-055 Destroyer has been identified as a platform for 
mid-course intercept capabilities, suggesting the PRC will have forward deployed missile defense 
in the near future. Additionally, the HQ-19 interceptor has undergone tests to verify its capability 
against 3,000 km-class ballistic missiles.  The PLA’s cruise missile defense capability is more 
robust than that of its ballistic missile defenses, with short-to-medium range SAMs, such as the 
HQ-22, augmenting the PLA’s long-range SAMs in this role. 
Hypersonic Weapons. The PRC’s deployment of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue 
to transform the PLA’s missile force. The system, fielded in 2020, is possibly intended to replace 
some older SRBM units, according to PRC media, and is intended to strike foreign military bases 
and fleets in the Western Pacific, according to a PRC-based military expert. 
JOINT CAPABILITIES FOR POWER PROJECTION  
 Key Takeaways 
●The PLA continues to increase its military capabilities to achieve China’s regional and global
security objectives beyond its immediate periphery.
●The PLA has emphasized primarily power projection capabilities in the maritime domain,
while its joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC remains limited.
●Improvements of PLA air and naval systems are enabling PLA forces to operate further from
China for longer periods.
PLA ground, naval, air and rocket forces are increasingly capable of projecting power at greater 
distances from China. However, joint service training is still in its infancy and the PLA has 
demonstrated limited joint operational capabilities beyond the FIC.  Instead, overseas activities are 
mostly conducted by single services and do not involve combat. In early 2022, the Southern 
Theater Command Navy conducted a joint distant sea training, where personnel from the Navy, 
Air Force, and Rocket Force served in the joint operations command system.  
Beijing recognizes the importance of increasing military capabilities to achieve global security 
objectives and has encouraged the PLA to increase its operations beyond the Indo-Pacific. China’s 
2015 and 2019 defense white papers claim that Beijing is primarily interested in developing these 
capabilities to protect PRC maritime rights and commercial interests. However, the majority of 
PLA modernization and recent exercises remains focused on winning a regional conflict. As the 
PRC’s economic interests expand in areas like Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, we expect 
to see increased focus on expanding power projection operations globally.  


 
 
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PLAN Operational Experience. The PLAN’s experience in extended range operations is 
primarily derived from naval task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the 
Gulf of Aden, humanitarian and disaster relief operations, or intelligence collection missions. 
However, the PLA does also deploy surface task groups into areas of the western and southern 
Pacific to gain incremental far seas experience.  
● The PLAN has operated in the Gulf of Aden since 2008, deploying 3-4 vessels on average and 
700 personnel for 4-month deployments. As of January 2023, the PLA has deployed 131 
vessels and more than 32,000 personnel across 42 escort missions. 
● In early 2022, the PLAN conducted distant sea joint training in the eastern Indian and western 
Pacific oceans. The task group included two destroyers, an amphibious landing dock, and a 
replenishment ship.  
● In January and February 2022, the PLAN and PLAAF delivered disaster relief supplies to the 
Pacific Island nation Tonga.  
● In March 2022, a PLA naval supply ship conducted resupply at the PLA’s Support Base in 
Djibouti, marking the first time a PLA vessel naval ships berthed at the location. 
● In August 2022, a PLA AGI conducted an intelligence collection mission during the U.S. 
Navy’s international exercise RIMPAC.  
● In September 2022, the PLA conducted a four-day maritime training exercise with guided 
missile destroyers in the South Pacific, near French Polynesia.  
● In November 2022, the Peace Ark hospital ship conducted its first visit since 2018 to Indonesia.  
PLAN PLATFORMS  
New ships enable the PLAN to gradually extend its operational reach beyond East Asia. In 2022, 
the PLAN launched its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults, 
capable of launching various fixed-wing aircraft. When commissioned, the carrier will be capable 
of launching various specialized fixed-wing aircraft for early warning, electronic warfare, or anti-
submarine warfare missions, increasing the strike power potential of the PLAN.   
The RENHAI and LUYANG III are the PRC’s premier carrier escort for blue-water operations.  
The RENHAI CG, with 13,000 tons displacement and long-range ASCMs and SAMs, will likely 
be equipped with a planned naval variant of the Z-20 helicopter.  The PLAN is engaged in series 
production of the RENHAI CG with at least eight units in service. The PLAN currently operates 
eight YUCHAO-class amphibious assault ships (LPD) and commissioned its first of three 
YUSHEN-class helicopter assault ships (LHD) in April 2021.  The PLAN’s expanding fleet of 
large modern amphibious warships will enable it to conduct a wide range of expeditionary 
operations to protect the PRC’s interests or in support of international assistance operations.   


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The PLAN is also expanding its logistical capabilities to support long-distance operations. The 
PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable logistical replenishment ships to support long-
duration deployments.  
The PLANMC continues to make strides towards becoming a multidimensional expeditionary 
force capable of conducting operations beyond the FIC to protect the PRC’s growing overseas 
interests. The PLANMC maintains a presence at the PRC’s first overseas military support facility 
in Djibouti, which the PRC refers to as its “PLA support base in Djibouti” (吉布提保障基地), that 
extends The PRC’s military reach and strategic influence in Africa and the Middle East. The 
PLANMC’s presence in Djibouti seeks to enable a military response to contingencies affecting the 
PRC’s investments and infrastructure in the region. 
Aviation Forces (PLAAF, PLAA Aviation, PLAN Aviation). PLA aviation forces are fielding 
advanced platforms capable of supporting future long-distance operations, as their mission sets 
evolve from defending Chinese territorial space to launching offensive operations at distances 
beyond the FIC. While interoperability is a stated priority, joint exercises between the aviation’s 
forces are limited. Individually, the PLAAF, PLAN Aviation, and PLAA Aviation continue to 
improve their capabilities to conduct offensive and defensive operations offshore, including strike, 
air and missile defense, strategic mobility, early warning and reconnaissance missions, and 
insertion. The PLAAF, in particular, has received repeated calls from its leadership to become a 
truly “strategic” air force, able to project power at long distances to advance and defend the PRC’s 
global interests.   
●The PLA’s indigenously developed Y-20A heavy-lift transport has performed numerous
overseas missions, including an April 2022 arms delivery to Serbia. Y-20A aircraft have
delivered humanitarian aid throughout Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and the South
Pacific. In 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service, supporting the continued PLAAF
expansion of air refuelable fighters, bombers, and SMA aircraft. These new air refuelable
aircraft will significantly expand the PRC’s ability to conduct long-range offensive air
operations. In addition to aerial refueling, it is expected that there will likely be further Y-20
variants, such as a possible AWAC variant.
●The PRC is developing a new generation of long-range bombers, likely named the H-20,
according to publicly released computer-generated design plans and promotional videos and a
2016 public statement by then PLAAF Commander General Ma Xiaotian. The H-20, which
may debut sometime in the next decade, will have a range of more than 10,000 km, enabling
the PLAAF to cover the Second Island Chain and into the western region of the Pacific. The
H-20 bomber’s range could be extended to cover the globe with aerial refueling. It is also
expected to employ both conventional and nuclear weaponry and feature a stealthy design.
●The PLA Army aviation and air assault units are enabling highly-mobile, modular ground task
force capable of expeditionary operations. According to PRC media, three Z-8 transport


 
 
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aircraft battalions could airdrop a combat battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is also expected to fill 
a variety of missions including special force insertion and shipborne ASW.  
● PRC’s outposts in the SCS extend the operating reach of PLA aviation forces.   
PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF’s strategic cyberspace, technical reconnaissance, 
and psychological warfare capabilities and missions are not bound by geographic constraints and 
can be used independently or to enable and support PLA global power projection operations. The 
SSF’s information support role involves centralizing technical intelligence collection and 
management, which provides strategic intelligence support to the theater commands, enables 
power projection, and aids joint operations.  
The Network Systems Department’s (NSD), also referred to as the Cyberspace Force (CSF), 
missions across the cyber and information domains and the electromagnetic spectrum probably 
provide key capabilities to support PLA power projection globally, including improving China’s 
access to the cyber domain in peacetime and contesting it in wartime.   
● The PLA integrates offensive and defensive cyber operations into its joint military exercises, 
allowing its cyber personnel to gain operational experience while testing new capabilities.  
● In August 2022, the PLA SESS Yuanwang-5 docked at Hambantota Port, in Sri Lanka. These 
ships are equipped with advanced electronic equipment, sensors, and antenna that can assists 
in tracking satellite, rocket, and ICBM launches.  
The PRC continues to develop a variety of counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent 
an adversary's use of space during a crisis or conflict. In addition to the development of directed-
energy weapons and satellite jammers, the PLA has an operational ground-based anti-satellite 
(ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit satellites. The PRC probably intends to pursue 
additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.  
ADVANCING TOWARDS AN INFORMATIZED MILITARY  
Key Takeaways 
● The PLA considers information operations (IO) as a means of achieving information 
dominance early in a conflict and continues to expand the scope and frequency of IO in military 
exercises.  
● The PRC presents a significant, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to an 
adversary's military and critical infrastructure systems.   
● The PLA is pursuing next-generation combat capabilities based on its vision of future conflict, 
which it calls "intelligentized warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI and other advanced 
technologies at every level of warfare.    


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●The PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities and has the ability to launch
cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the
United States.
Xi has called for the PLA to create a highly informatized force capable of dominating all networks 
and expanding the country's security and development interests.   PRC military writings describe 
informatized warfare as the use of information technology to create an operational system-of-
systems, which would enable the PLA to acquire, transmit, process, and use information during a 
conflict to conduct integrated joint military operations across the ground, maritime, air, space, 
cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum domains.   The PLA is accelerating the incorporation 
of command information systems, providing forces and commanders with enhanced situational 
awareness and decision support to more effectively carry out joint missions and tasks to win 
informatized local wars.   The PLA continues to expand the scope and regularity of military 
training exercises that simulate informatized operations and likely views offensive and defensive 
cyberspace operations as a means to achieve information dominance early in a crisis or conflict.    
C4I MODERNIZATION  
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence Modernization (C4I). 
The PRC continues to prioritize C4I modernization as a response to trends in modern warfare that 
emphasize the importance of rapid information collection, processing, and sharing and accelerated 
decision making. The PLA is continuing modernization and reform efforts, both technologically 
and organizationally, to effectively command complex, joint operations across all warfare domains 
and potentially in multiple theaters.  
The PLA sees networked, technologically advanced C4I systems as essential to providing reliable, 
secure communications to fixed and mobile command posts, thereby enabling rapid, effective, 
multi-echelon decision making. These systems are designed to distribute real-time data – including 
intelligence, battlefield information, logistical information, and weather reports via redundant, 
resilient communications networks – to improve commanders’ situational awareness.   PLA field 
commanders view near-real-time ISR and situational data as well as redundant and reliable 
communications as essential to streamlining decision making processes and shortening response 
timelines. Beijing recognizes advantages of near-space ISR capabilities and will probably seek to 
leverage near-space platforms to augment space-based satellite capabilities or provide redundancy 
during times of crisis. The PRC is also fielding the Integrated Command Platform to units at 
multiple echelons across the force to enable lateral and cross-service communications and 
intelligence sharing required for joint operations.  
As the PLA continues to focus on improving its ability to fight and win informatized wars, future 
information systems will likely implement emerging technologies such as automatization, big data, 
the internet of things, AI, and cloud computing to improve process efficiencies. The PLA has 
already begun this process by embracing big data analytics that fuse a variety of data to improve 
automation and to create a comprehensive, real-time picture for warfighters. The PRC’s 


 
 
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increasingly limited access to advanced technologies from the West may impede the PLA’s 
progress toward fully achieving an “intelligentized” military. However, the PRC is pursuing 
domestic production of critical technologies to reduce reliance on foreign sources.   
Electronic Warfare. The PLA considers EW to be an integral component of modern warfare and 
seeks to achieve information dominance in a conflict through the coordinated use of cyberspace 
and electronic warfare to protect its own information networks and deny the enemy the use of the 
electromagnetic spectrum. The PRC’s EW strategy emphasizes suppressing, degrading, 
disrupting, or deceiving enemy electronic equipment throughout the continuum of a conflict. The 
PLA will likely use electronic warfare prior to a conflict as a signaling mechanism to warn and 
deter adversary offensive action. Potential EW targets include adversary systems operating in 
radio, radar, microwave, infrared and optical frequency ranges, as well as adversary computer and 
information systems. PLA EW units routinely train to conduct jamming and anti-jamming 
operations against multiple communication and radar systems and Global Positioning System 
(GPS) satellite systems during force-on-force exercises.  These exercises test operational units’ 
understanding of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures and they also enable operators to 
improve confidence in their ability to operate effectively in a complex electromagnetic 
environment. In addition, the PLA reportedly tests and validates advances in EW weapons’ R&D 
during these exercises. 
Cyberspace Warfare. The development of cyberspace warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA 
writings, which identify IO – comprising cyberspace, electronic, space, and psychological warfare 
– as integral to achieving information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter 
a stronger foe. The PRC has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security 
and declared its intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
The PRC poses a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military 
and critical infrastructure systems and presents a growing influence threat. The PRC seeks to create 
disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to physical disruptions of 
critical infrastructure—to shape decision making and disrupt military operations beginning in the 
initial stages and throughout a conflict. The PRC can launch cyberspace attacks that, at a minimum, 
can cause localized, temporary disruptions to critical infrastructure within the United States, and 
the PRC believes these capabilities are even more effective against militarily superior adversaries 
that depend on information technologies. As a result, the PRC is advancing its cyberspace attack 
capabilities and has the ability to launch cyberspace attacks—such as disruption of a natural gas 
pipeline for days to weeks—in the United States.  
Authoritative PLA sources call for the coordinated employment of space, cyberspace, and EW as 
strategic weapons to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” and “sabotage the 
enemy’s war command system of systems” early in a conflict. PLA writings judge other countries 
have effectively used cyberspace warfare and other IO in recent conflicts and argue for attacks 
against C2 and logistics networks to affect an adversary’s ability to make decisions and take 
actions in the early stages of conflict. The PLA also considers cyberspace capabilities to be a 


 
 
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critical component in its overall integrated strategic deterrence posture, alongside space and 
nuclear deterrence. PLA studies discuss using warning or demonstration strikes—strikes against 
select military, political, and economic targets with clear awing effects—as part of deterrence. 
Accordingly, the PLA probably seeks to use its cyber-reconnaissance capabilities to collect data 
for intelligence and cyberspace attack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting 
network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense 
critical infrastructure; and, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during 
armed conflict.  
In addition, PLA publications emphasize the importance of cyber defense to defend the PRC’s 
critical infrastructure and military system-of-systems against adversary reconnaissance and 
attacks. The PLA likely views cyber defense as including preventative measures as well as 
offensive actions to deter or disrupt adversary cyberspace activity.  
The PLA may further change how it organizes and commands IO, particularly as the SSF continues 
to develop its capabilities and further integrate into joint planning, exercises, and operations with 
other PLA forces. The SSF likely is generating synergies by combining national-level cyberspace 
reconnaissance, attack, and defense capabilities in its organization, alongside other strategic IO 
capabilities, and integrating into theater command planning and operations. 
 
CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
China-based intrusions continued to target computer systems around the world, including 
those owned by the U.S. Government, throughout 2022. These and past intrusions exploit 
known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. government networks to steal intellectual 
property and develop access into sensitive networks. The PRC uses its cyberspace 
capabilities, not only to support intelligence collection against U.S. academic, economic, 
military, and political targets, but also to exfiltrate sensitive information from the critical 
defense infrastructure and research institutes to gain economic and military advantage 
and possibly for cyberattack preparations. The targeted information can benefit the PRC’s 
defense high-technology industries, support the PRC’s military modernization, provide the 
PRC’s leadership with insights into U.S. plans and intentions, and enable diplomatic 
negotiations. Moreover, targeted information could enable their cyberspace forces to 
build an operational picture of U.S. defense networks, military disposition, logistics, and 
related military capabilities that could be exploited prior to or during a crisis. The access 
and skillset required for these intrusions are similar to those necessary to conduct 
cyberspace operations in an attempt to deter, delay, disrupt, and degrade DoD operations 
prior to or during a conflict. Taken together, these cyber-enabled campaigns either directly 
or indirectly impact the United States’ ability to project, or defend against, military action. 


 
 
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Intelligentized Warfare. In recent years, the PLA has increasingly emphasized intelligentization 
as a leading element of its modernization plans. The PRC is in the middle of its 14th Five-Year 
Plan, covering years 2021-2025, in which it outlined the development of intelligentized weapons 
as important to keep pace with modern warfare. Beijing is applying its research into AI 
technologies, such as machine learning and human-machine teaming, to military processes, such 
as decision-making to ultimately gain a cognitive advantage in future warfare.  
PLA strategists have stated new technologies would enhance the PLA’s capability to process and 
utilize information at scale and machine speed, allowing decision-makers to plan, operate, and 
support cross-domain unconventional and asymmetrical fighting in the battlefield.  The PLA is 
researching various applications for AI including support for missile guidance, target detection 
and identification, and autonomous systems. The PLA is exploring next-generation operational 
concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, cross-domain 
mobile warfare, AI-based space confrontation, and cognitive control operations.  The PLA also 
considers unmanned systems to be critical intelligentized technology, and is pursuing greater 
autonomy for unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles to enable manned and unmanned 
teaming, swarm attacks, optimized logistic support, and distributed ISR, among other capabilities. 
SPACE AND COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways 
● The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere 
and to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication 
capabilities, as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.” 
● The PLA continues to invest in improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite 
communication, satellite navigation, and meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and 
robotic space exploration.  
● The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as 
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within 
their field of view and enable counterspace actions.  
Space Strategy and Doctrine. The PRC officially advocates for the peaceful use of space and is 
pursuing agreements in the United Nations on the “non-weaponization” of space. The PRC 
continues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities and has enacted military reforms to 
better integrate cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military operations. The PRC’s space strategy 
is expected to evolve over time, keeping pace with the application of new space technology. These 
changes probably will be reflected in published national space strategy documents, through space 
policy actions, and in programs enacted by political and military leadership. In September 2021, 
Xi stated that “space is an important strategic asset for the country that must be well managed and 


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utilized and, more importantly, protected,” and called for strengthened space traffic management 
and international cooperation on security issues to improve effectiveness in managing crises in 
space.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and 
to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, 
as a critical component to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”    The PRC’s first public 
mention of space and counterspace capabilities came as early as 1971, largely from academics 
reviewing foreign publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chinese science and technology 
efforts on space began to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of the U.S. space-focused 
Strategic Defense Initiative to defend against the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons. 
Subsequently, after observing the U.S. military’s performance during the 1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and the second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an effort to modernize weapon 
systems, across all domains including space, and update its doctrine to focus on using and 
countering adversary information-enabled warfare.  
The PRC’s perceptions of the importance of space-enabled operations to the United States and its 
allies has shaped integral components of PLA military planning and campaigns. In addition, space 
is a critical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for deployed Chinese forces, and the PLA 
sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter a U.S. intervention during a regional 
military conflict.  The PRC has claimed that “destroying or capturing satellites and other sensors” 
would make it difficult for the U.S. and allied militaries to use precision-guided weapons. 
Moreover, Chinese defense academics suggest that reconnaissance, communication, navigation, 
and early warning satellites could be among the targets of attacks designed to “blind and deafen 
the enemy.”  
Space and Counterspace Capabilities. The PRC’s space enterprise continues to mature rapidly 
and Beijing has devoted significant economic and political resources to growing all aspects of its 
space program, from military space applications to civil applications such as profit-generating 
launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration. The PRC’s space enterprise includes the 
SSF and also encompasses other military, government, and civilian organizations, including state-
owned enterprises, academic institutions, and commercial entities. The PLA has historically 
managed the PRC’s space program and the SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for 
nearly all PLA space operations. The PRC continues to strengthen its military space capabilities 
despite its public stance against the weaponization of space. The PLA continues to invest in 
improving its capabilities in space-based ISR, satellite communication, satellite navigation, and 
meteorology, as well as human spaceflight and robotic space exploration.  The PRC has built an 
expansive ground support infrastructure to support its growing on-orbit fleet and related functions 
including spacecraft and space launch vehicle (SLV) manufacture, launch, C2, and data downlink.
Additionally, the PRC continues to develop counterspace capabilities—including direct ascent, co-
orbital, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities—that can contest or deny an 
adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.  


 
 
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The PRC has devoted considerable economic and technological resources to growing all aspects 
of its space program, improving military space applications, developing human spaceflight, and 
conducting lunar and Martian exploration missions. In 2022, the PRC conducted over 60 
successful space launches, which is a three-fold increase compared to five years ago. One of these 
launches was a technology testing mission of a reusable spaceplane, which was in orbit from 
August 2022 until May 2023. These 2022 launches carried over 180 satellites into orbit, which is 
a five-fold increase in satellites deployed compared to five years ago.  Last year, the PRC 
completed construction of the three-module Chinese space station.  Furthermore, the PRC has 
launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side of the Moon; a lander and sample return mission 
to the Moon; and an orbiter, lander, and rover in one mission to Mars. The PRC has launched 
multiple ASAT missiles that are able to destroy satellites and developed mobile jammers to deny 
SATCOM and GPS.        
The PRC’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully capable space power. Its rapidly growing space 
program—second only to the United States in the number of operational satellites—is a source of 
national pride and part of Xi’s “China Dream” to establish a powerful and prosperous China. The 
space program, managed by the PLA, supports both civilian and military interests, including 
strengthening its science and technology sector, growing international relationships, and 
modernizing the military. The PRC seeks to rapidly achieve these goals through advances in the 
research and development of space systems and space-related technology.         
The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related 
technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as 
well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their 
field of view and enable counterspace actions.  In concert with its marked improvements in satellite 
navigation, launch capabilities, and space object surveillance and identification, the PRC is 
developing electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers; offensive cyberspace 
capabilities; and directed-energy weapons. Moreover, the PRC has demonstrated sophisticated, 
potentially damaging on-orbit behavior with space-based technologies. The PRC has an 
operational ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-Earth orbit 
satellites, and China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons capable of destroying 
satellites up to geosynchronous Earth orbit.    The PRC is employing more sophisticated satellite 
operations and is probably testing dual-use technologies in space that could be applied to 
counterspace missions.   
ISR Satellite Capabilities. The PRC employs a robust space-based ISR capability designed to 
enhance its worldwide situational awareness. Used for military and civilian remote sensing and 
mapping, terrestrial and maritime surveillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR satellites 
are capable of providing electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as 
electronic and signals intelligence data. The PRC also exports its satellite technology globally, 
including its domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.  


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As of March 2022, China’s ISR satellite fleet contained more than 290 systems—a quantity second 
only to the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit systems since 2018.   The PLA 
owns and operates about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which could support monitoring, 
tracking, and targeting of U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region. These satellites also allow the PLA to monitor potential regional flashpoints, including the 
Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean, and the SCS.   In early 2023, the United States 
announced sanctions against Chinese companies Spacety and China HEAD Aerospace for 
providing imagery of Ukraine to Russian private military company Wagner during the conflict.  
Recent improvements to the PRC’s space-based ISR capabilities emphasize the development, 
procurement, and use of increasingly capable satellites with digital camera technology as well as 
space-based radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage.     These improvements increase China’s 
monitoring capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft carriers, expeditionary strike 
groups, and deployed air wings.     Space capabilities will enhance potential PLA military operations 
farther from the Chinese coast. These capabilities are being augmented with electronic 
reconnaissance satellites that monitor radar and radio transmissions.  
Satellite Communications. The PRC owns and operates more than 60 communications satellites, 
at least four of which are dedicated to military use. The PRC produces its military-dedicated 
satellites domestically. Its civilian communications satellites incorporate off -the-shelf 
commercially manufactured components. The PRC is fielding advanced communications satellites 
capable of transmitting large amounts of data. Existing and future data relay satellites and other 
beyond-line-of-sight communications systems could convey critical targeting data to Chinese 
military operation centers.   
In addition, China is making progress on its ambitious plans to propel itself to the forefront of the 
global SATCOM industry.   China is continuing to test next-generation capabilities like its 
Quantum 
Experimentation 
at 
Space 
Scale 
(QUESS) 
space-based 
quantum-enabled 
communications satellite, which could supply the means to field highly secure communications 
systems.  In 2016, the PRC launched the world's first quantum communications satellite (Micius) 
into low Earth orbit, and in July 2022, the PRC launched an additional experimental quantum 
satellite Testing satellite-based quantum entanglement represents a major milestone in building a 
practical, global, ultrasecure quantum network, but the widespread deployment and adoption of 
this technology still faces hurdles.  
The PRC also intends to provide SATCOM support to users worldwide and plans to develop at 
least seven new SATCOM constellations in low earth orbit (LEO), most notably one from state-
owned enterprise China SatNet. These constellations are still in the early stages of development 
and may begin to launch in the next year.      
Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capabilities. The PRC’s satellite navigation system, 
known as BeiDou, is an independently constructed, developed, and exclusively China-operated 
PNT service. It reached initial operating capability in 2018 and was finalized with its last launch 
in 2020.    The PRC’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national security and economic and 


 
 
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social development by adopting Chinese PNT into precise agriculture, monitoring of vehicles and 
ships, and aiding with civilian-focused services across more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, 
and Europe. BeiDou provides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT services to users 
domestically, in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as globally and consists of 49 operational 
satellites. The PRC’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT services to enable force 
movements and precision guided munitions delivery.   
BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy standard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-Pacific 
region is within 5 meters. In addition to providing PNT, the BeiDou constellation offers unique 
capabilities, including text messaging and user tracking through its Regional Short Message 
Communication service to enable mass communications among BeiDou users. The system also 
provides additional military C2 capabilities for the PLA.    
The PRC intends to use its BeiDou constellation to offer additional services and incentives to 
countries taking part in its BRI emphasizing building strong economic ties to other countries to 
align partner nations with the PRC’s interests.  In 2021, China predicted Beidou products and 
services will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and potentially export BeiDou products to more than 
100 million users in 120 countries.  
Human Spaceflight and Space Exploration Efforts. Following uncrewed missions that began 
in 1999, China became the third country to achieve independent human spaceflight when it 
successfully orbited the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003.  In 2011, China then launched its 
first space station, Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second space station, Tiangong-2.   In 
2020, China conducted its first orbital test of the New-Generation Manned Spaceship, which is 
expected to replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft.  In 2022, China successfully 
launched the Mengtian Chinese Space Station laboratory module into orbit, completing the three-
module Chinese space station. 
China has also taken on a greater role in deep space exploration and space science and has made 
notable accomplishments during the past several years. The PRC has demonstrated its interest in 
working with Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to conduct deep-space exploration.  
China was the third country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and was the first to land a rover 
on the lunar far side in 2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao relay satellite that 
China launched the year before to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon Lagrange point.  In May 
2021, the PRC landed the Zhurong rover on Mars, the first Chinese rover to operate on Mars. This 
rover has provided China with valuable scientific data of the Martian surface and underground. 
Space Launch Capabilities. The PRC is improving its space launch capabilities to ensure it has 
an independent, reliable means to access space and to compete in the international space launch 
market. The PRC continues to improve manufacturing efficiencies and launch capabilities overall, 
supporting continued human spaceflight and deep-space exploration missions—including to the 
Moon and Mars. New modular SLVs that allow the PRC to tailor an SLV to the specific 
configuration required for each customer are beginning to go into operation, leading to increased 
launch vehicle reliability and overall cost savings for launch campaigns. The PRC is also in the 


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early stages of developing a super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn V or the newer U.S. 
Space Launch System to support proposed crewed lunar and Mars exploration missions.  
In addition to land-based launches, in 2019, the PRC demonstrated the ability to launch a Long 
March-11 (LM-11) SLV from a sea-based platform. Since 2021, the PRC has been expanding its 
sea launch infrastructure near Haiyang to expand the frequency of sea launch missions. This 
capability, if staged correctly, would allow the PRC to launch nearer to the equator than its land-
based launch sites, increase the rocket’s carrying capacity, and potentially lower launch costs.  
The PRC has developed quick-response SLVs to increase its attractiveness as a commercial small 
satellite launch provider and to rapidly reconstitute LEO space capabilities, which could support 
PRC military operations during a conflict or civilian response to disasters. Compared with 
medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-response SLVs are able to expedite launch campaigns 
because they are transportable via road or rail and can be stored launch-ready with solid fuel for 
longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs. Because their size is limited, quick-response SLVs such 
as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11 are only able to launch relatively small payloads of 
up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO.  
The expansion of non-state-owned PRC launch vehicle and satellite operation companies in 
China’s domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is successfully advancing military-civil 
fusion efforts. Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these entities and obfuscates the end 
users of acquired foreign technology and expertise.  
Space Situational Awareness. The PRC has a robust network of space surveillance sensors 
capable of searching, tracking, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This network 
includes a variety of telescopes, radars, and other sensors that allow the PRC to support its missions 
including intelligence collection, counterspace targeting, ballistic missile early warning (BMEW), 
spaceflight safety, satellite anomaly resolution, and space debris monitoring.  
Electronic Warfare Counterspace Capabilities. The PLA considers EW capabilities to be 
critical assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive 
enemy equipment. The PLA routinely incorporates in its exercises jamming and anti-jamming 
techniques that probably are intended to deny multiple types of space-based communications, radar 
systems, and GPS navigation support to military movement and precision-guided munitions 
employment. The PRC probably is developing jammers dedicated to targeting SAR, including 
aboard military reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR satellites very likely protects 
terrestrial assets by denying imagery and targeting in any potential conflict involving the United 
States or its allies.   In addition, China probably is developing jammers to target SATCOM over a 
range of frequency bands, including military-protected extremely high frequency communications. 
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW). During the past two decades, PRC defense research has 
proposed the development of several reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs for 
reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and even potentially destroying satellite components. 
The PRC has multiple ground-based laser weapons of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or 


 
 
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damage satellites that include a current limited capability to employ laser systems against satellite 
sensors. By the mid- to late-2020s, the PRC may field higher power systems that extend the threat 
to the structures of non-optical satellites.      
ASAT Missile Threats. In 2007, the PRC destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites more 
than 800 kilometers above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The effect of this destructive test 
generated more than 3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which more than 2,700 remain in 
orbit and most will continue orbiting the Earth for decades.   The PLA’s operational ground-based 
ASAT missile system is intended to target LEO satellites. The PRC’s military units have continued 
training with ASAT missiles.   
The PRC plans to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO. 
In 2013, the PRC launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius 
above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No new satellites were released from the object, and 
the launch profile was inconsistent with traditional SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket 
launches for scientific research, suggesting a basic capability could exist to use ASAT technology 
against satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO).   
Orbital Threats. The PRC is developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as 
satellite inspection and repair. At least some of these capabilities could also function as a weapon. 
The PRC has launched multiple satellites to conduct scientific experiments on space maintenance 
technologies and is conducting research on space debris cleanup. The Shijian-17 was the PRC’s 
first satellite with a robotic arm, technology that could be used in a future system for grappling 
adversary satellites. In October 2021, the PRC launched another satellite with a robotic arm, the 
Shijian-21, into GEO, and, in January 2022, it moved a derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a 
high graveyard orbit above GEO.       
Since at least 2006, the PRC has investigated aerospace engineering aspects associated with space-
based kinetic weapons—generally a class of weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets from 
orbit. Space-based kinetic weapons research included methods of reentry, separation of payload, 
delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits for targeting purposes.      In July 2021, the PRC conducted 
the first fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with a hypersonic glide vehicle from China. This 
demonstrated the greatest distance flown (~40,000 kilometers) and longest flight time (~100+ 
minutes) of any Chinese land attack weapons system to date.  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES 
Key Takeaways  
● Over the next decade, the PRC will continue to rapidly modernize, diversify, and expand its 
nuclear forces.  Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernization efforts a decade ago, current 
efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity. 


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●The PRC is expanding the number of its land-, sea-, and air-based nuclear delivery platforms
while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion
of its nuclear forces.
●In 2022, Beijing continued its rapid nuclear expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile
had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023.
●DoD estimates that the PRC will have have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030,
much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels and will continue growing its force
to 2035 in line with its goal of ensuring PLA modernization is “basically complete” that year,
which serves as an important milestone on the road to Xi’s goal of a “world class” military by
2049.
●The PRC probably will use its new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities to produce
plutonium for its nuclear weapons program, despite publicly maintaining these technologies
are intended for peaceful purposes.
●The PRC probably completed the construction of its three new solid-propellant silo fields in
2022, which consists of at least 300 new ICBM silos, and has loaded at least some ICBMs into
these silos. These silo fields are capable of fielding both DF-31 and DF-41 class ICBMs. This
project and the expansion of China’s liquid-propellant silo force is meant to increase the
peacetime readiness of its nuclear force by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.
●The PRC is updating its capability to deliver multi-megaton warheads by fielding the new DF-
5C silo based, liquid-fueled ICBM.The PRC is fielding the longer-range JL-3 SLBMs on its
current JIN-class SSBN, rendering them capable of ranging the continental United States from
PRC littoral waters, and continues to produce additional JIN-class SSBNs.


 
 
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China: ICBM Silo Externally Completed - Hami Silo Fields 
 
Strategy. The PRC’s approach to using nuclear force is based on PLA “deterrence” of an enemy 
first strike and “counterstrike” when deterrence fails, threatening retaliation against an adversary’s 
military capability, population, and economy.  The PRC’s nuclear weapons policy prioritizes the 
maintenance of a nuclear force able to survive a first strike and respond with sufficient strength to 
conduct multiple rounds of counterstrike, deterring an adversary with the threat of unacceptable 
damage to its military capability, population, and economy. The PLA probably selects its nuclear 
strike targets to achieve conflict de-escalation and return to a conventional conflict with a 
remaining force sufficient to deter its adversary. PLA planners would probably avoid a protracted 
series of nuclear exchanges against a superior adversary, and state that the scale and intensity of 
retaliatory force needs to be carefully controlled. The buildup of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal may 
change the PRC’s nuclear strategy in the future, while the PLA insists its nuclear policy remains 
clear and consistent.  
● The PRC’s current approach to nuclear force includes a declaratory “no first use” (NFU) 
policy, stating it will never use nuclear weapons first at any time under any circumstances. This 
includes unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-
weapon state or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Despite this policy, China’s nuclear strategy 


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probably includes consideration of a nuclear strike in response to a nonnuclear attack 
threatening the viability of China’s nuclear forces or C2, or that approximates the strategic 
effects of a nuclear strike. Beijing probably would also consider nuclear use to restore 
deterrence if a conventional military defeat in Taiwan gravely threatened CCP regime survival.  
The PRC’s commingling of some of its conventional and nuclear missile forces during peacetime 
and ambiguities in its NFU conditions could complicate deterrence and escalation management 
during a conflict. If a comingled PRC missile launch is not readily identifiable as a conventional 
missile or nuclear missile, it may not be clear what the PRC launched until it detonates. 
Furthermore, potential adversary attacks against China’s conventional missile force-associated C2 
centers could inadvertently degrade China’s nuclear C2 and generate nuclear use-or-lose the 
pressure to use weapons before they are targeted.  Once a conflict has begun, China’s dispersal of 
mobile missile systems to hide sites could further complicate the task of distinguishing between 
nuclear and conventional forces and, thus, increase the potential for inadvertent attacks on the 
nuclear forces. PRC leadership calculus for responding to conventional attacks on nuclear forces 
remains a key unknown. 
Readiness. The PLA Rocket Force uses a set of operational procedures to keep part of its force at 
heightened readiness during peacetime, according to PLA documents and media reporting.
PLARF brigades conduct “combat readiness duty” and “high alert duty” which includes assigning 
a missile battalion to be ready to rapidly launch. Further, a new generation of silo-based ICBMs 
are beginning to enter the force and they will probably be operating under China’s developing 
“Early Warning Counterstrike” (预警反击) posture (the PLA term for launch on warning), 
enabling a rapid responsive nuclear strike. This readiness posture allows the Rocket Force to 
maintain a portion of its units on a heightened state of readiness while leaving the other portion in 
peacetime status with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads.  
The PLA also probably has an orderly, pre-planned series of “combat readiness level” steps that 
govern the increases in the readiness of its forces from peacetime to wartime combat operations. 
This process probably allows the PLA to transition most, perhaps all, of its nuclear missile force 
from its current peacetime status to full combat readiness in order to respond to possible 
contingencies.   
Land-Based Platforms. The PRC’s land-based nuclear force primarily consists of ICBMs with 
different basing modes complimented by theater-range road-mobile systems. The PRC has 
approximately 350 ICBMs in its arsenal, all of which can reach CONUS.  


 
 
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Silo-Based Systems. The PRC’s silo-based ICBMs consist of multiple CSS-4 (DF-5 class) liquid-
fueled ICBMs and more recently a CSS-10 (DF-31class) solid-propelled ICBM, which China 
probably began to load at its new silo fields. The PRC is updating its capability to deliver multi-
megaton warheads by fielding the new DF-5C silobased, liquid-fueled ICBM.  The PRC is 
building more silos for DF-5 class ICBMs; increasing the number of brigades while simultaneously 
increasing the number of launchers per brigade – though there is no indication this project will 
approach the size or numbers of the solid propellant missile silos. The PLA probably is also 
developing an upgrade to its existing MIRVed DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBMs. 
China: Military garrisons constructed at newly build ICBM Silo Fields – Guazhou ICBM Silo 
Field Missile Garrison 
 
Road-Mobile Systems. China’s road-mobile ICBMs consist of the solid-fueled CSS-10 (DF-31 
class) and CSS-20 (DF-41) ICBMs. The CSS-20 has improved range and accuracy over legacy 
solid-fueled ICBMS and is armed with no more than three warheads per missile. The PRC is 
establishing additional nuclear units and increasing the number of launchers in mobile ICBM units.  
This strategic arsenal is complemented by road-mobile and DF-26 IRBMs capable of ranging 
targets in the Indo-Pacific region.  


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Sea-Based Platforms. The PRC probably fielded the extended-range CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM on 
China’s JIN-class SSBN, giving the PRC the ability to target the continental United States from 
littoral waters and allowing the PLAN to consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability 
of its sea-based deterrent.  The SCS and Bohai Gulf are probably the PRC’s preferred options for 
employing this concept.  The PRC also continued to construct additional JIN class SSBNs. It is 
unclear whether continued JIN-class SSBN production is the result of delays in the development 
of the PRC’s next-generation Type 096 SSBN or is an effort to accelerate its sea-based nuclear 
capability as Xi has directed. The Type 096 SSBN is probably intended to field MIRVed SLBMs 
and will likely begin construction in the early 2020s. Based on the 30-plus-year service life of the 
PRC’s first generation SSNs, the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently. 
The PRC probably continued to conduct near-continuous at-sea deterrence patrols with its six 
operational JIN-class SSBNs, which are equipped to carry up to 12 CSS-N-14 (JL-2) or CSS-N-
20 (JL-3) SLBMs.
China: PLA Navy Constructs Additional Submarine Piers – Yalong Naval Base 
Air Platforms. The PLAAF has operationally fielded the H-6N bomber, providing a platform for 
the air component of the PRC’s nascent nuclear triad. The H-6N, compared to other H-6 bombers, 
adds an air-to-air refueling probe, as well as its recessed fuselage modifications that would allow 
for external carriage of a nuclear-capable ALBM. The ALBM carried by the H-6N appears to be 
armed with a maneuvering reentry vehicle, indicating the ALBM, along with the DF-26 IRBM, is 


 
 
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likely capable of conducting nuclear precision strikes against targets in the Indo-Pacific theater. 
The PRC is probably also developing a strategic stealth bomber, according to PRC state media.  
Future Developments. Over the next decade, the PRC probably will continue to pursue selective 
qualitative parity with an increasing scope of U.S. and Russian capabilities. The PLA seeks a 
diverse nuclear force, comprised of systems ranging from low-yield precision strike missiles to 
ICBMs with multi-megaton yields. Developing robust nuclear strike options is likely intended to 
provide deterrence predominantly against a “strong enemy,” as well as ensure China can inflict 
unacceptable damage with both proportionate and overwhelming retaliatory capabilities, and thus 
denying an adversary victory if a war escalates to the nuclear domain.  
The PRC is establishing new nuclear materials production and reprocessing facilities very likely 
to support its nuclear force expansion. Although these efforts are consistent with the PRC’s goals 
to increase nuclear energy generation and to close its nuclear fuel cycle, Beijing likely also 
considers this dual-use infrastructure as crucial to supporting its military goals, judging from 
Chinese nuclear industry reporting and think tank publications. Despite the PRC’s public support 
for a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), it is likely that Beijing intends to use this 
infrastructure to produce nuclear warhead materials for its military in the near term. For example, 
the PRC’s efforts to impede progress at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) run contrary to its 
stated commitments of a FMCT.  
● Plutonium Production. The PRC is constructing, with Russian assistance including in the 
form of highly enriched uranium (HEU) supply, two CFR-600 sodium-cooled fast breeder 
nuclear reactors at Xiapu, each capable of producing enough plutonium for dozens of nuclear 
warheads annually from blankets (referring to uranium placed around the fuel core for the 
purpose of breeding plutonium) surrounding the core, according to think tank estimates and 
informed by Chinese state media and nuclear industry reporting. The PRC originally planned 
to use Russian-sourced mixed-oxide (MOX is a blend of uranium and plutonium) fuel for these 
reactors but changed the order to highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel through 2030, according 
to nuclear industry reporting. By using HEU fuel, China has the potential to generate additional 
weapons-grade plutonium. Chinese officials claim the CFR-600 reactors are intended to help 
the PRC achieve its civilian nuclear power and carbon neutrality objectives, but the PRC has 
described the CFR-600s as a “national defense investment project” subject to military nuclear 
facility regulations. By December 2022, Russia delivered the first three batches of HEU 
nuclear fuel assemblies, to China for the first core loading and the first refueling of the CFR-
600. In early 2023, think-tank reporting indicates the quantity of HEU transferred from Russia 
to China for its CFR-600 reactors is more than the entire amount of HEU removed worldwide 
under U.S. and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) auspices in the last three decades. 
In March 2023, the PRC and Russia signed an agreement that includes commitments for 
continued cooperation on fast reactor and reprocessing technology development, extending 
this relationship for “the decades ahead.”  


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●Plutonium Extraction. China could extract the WGPu at its 50 ton/year reprocessing plant at
Jiuquan (Plant 404) or at one of the two 200 ton/year reprocessing plants under construction at
the CNNC Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jinta, Gansu Province, the first of
which is expected to be operational by 2025. China has reduced transparency in its nuclear
program as its capabilities are increasing and has not reported its stockpile of separated
plutonium to the IAEA since 2017, according to a Western think tank. China has, thus far,
refused international calls to apply IAEA safeguards, under a Voluntary Offer Agreement on
its civilian reactors.
●Uranium and Tritium. In the past several years, China’s organization traditionally associated
with military uranium enrichment has expanded production capacity and likely will continue
to do so. China is also working to expand and diversify its capability to produce tritium by
methods such as using tritium production targets in reactors and extraction from tritiated heavy
water, according to Chinese nuclear industry reporting.
Nuclear Testing. In recent years, the PRC expanded its nuclear warhead research, development, 
testing, and production capacity to support the size and pace of its nuclear stockpile expansion. 
The PRC’s possible preparation to operate its Lop Nur nuclear test site year-round and lack of 
transparency on its nuclear testing activities have raised concerns regarding its adherence to the 
U.S. “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in 
their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria.  
EVOLVING NUCLEAR POSTURE  
Though it is often thought that the PRC maintains a “minimum deterrent,” the PRC’s evolving 
nuclear posture is more consistent with its own definition of “limited deterrent.”  Rocket Force 
documents describe these terms as follows: 
●“Minimum Deterrence” is achieving nuclear deterrence with only a small quantity of nuclear
weapons to strike enemy urban targets.
●“Maximum Deterrence” is seeking overwhelming disarming strikes to minimize one’s own
losses and maintain strategic freedom of action; employing overwhelming qualitative and
quantitative superiority, a multi-function offensive system capable of hitting hard targets and
a comprehensive defense system.
●“Limited Deterrence” is the wide space between minimum and maximum deterrence.
The PRC perceived national security requirements will grow as it transitions from a “large 
country” to a “powerful country” and its minimum number of military forces – to include nuclear 
–needed to defend those greater interests is also likely to grow.  In 2022, the PRC rejected requests
by the United States to discuss strategic stability or strategic risk reduction, and other impacts of
the PRC’s rapid nuclear build up.


 
 
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Stockpile Size. In 2020, the DoD estimated China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile was in 
the low-200s and expected to at least double by 2030. However, Beijing has accelerated its nuclear 
expansion, and DoD estimates China’s stockpile had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads 
as of May 2023. By 2030, DoD estimates that the PRC will have over 1,000 operational nuclear 
warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the CONUS.  Beijing has 
not declared an end goal nor acknowledged the scale of its expansion, has resisted calls in 
multilateral fora for increased transparency, and has declined to engage in substantive arms control 
discussions. We continue to assess the PRC is constructing the infrastructure necessary to support 
this force expansion, including increasing its capacity to produce and separate plutonium by 
constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities. Though this is consistent with the 
PRC goal of closing the nuclear fuel cycle, the PRC likely intends to use some of this infrastructure 
to produce plutonium for its expanding nuclear weapons program. 
The PRC’s long-term nuclear requirements—and the relationship between the PRC’s nuclear 
requirements and its national strategy and goal to field a “world-class” military by mid-century—
remain unclear from public sources. Hawkish PRC state media outlets have asserted that the PRC 
needs 1,000 warheads, while retired PLA officers have suggested that the PRC should possesses a 
“mutually assured destruction” capability. While neither of those claims are official, China’s 
arming of hundreds of silos over the next decade, continued rapid growth in its road-mobile force 
and air and sea legs indicates that beyond 2030, China will probably have over 1,000 operational 
nuclear warheads, much of which will be deployed at higher readiness levels, and will continue 
growing its force to 2035 in line with previous estimates. These changes to the numbers, capability, 
and readiness of the PRC’s nuclear forces in the coming years are likely to outpace potential 
developments by the nuclear forces of any competitor.  
Regardless of the ultimate number of nuclear weapons it makes, the PRC will probably continue 
to claim it is, like other nuclear powers, adhering to the minimum of nuclear weapons needed to 
protect its security interests.  
Hypersonics and Fractional Orbital Bombardment. The PRC probably is developing advanced 
nuclear delivery systems such as a strategic hypersonic glide vehicle and a FOB system in part due 
to long-term concerns about United States missile defense capabilities as well as to attain 
qualitative parity with future worldwide missile capabilities.  On July 27th, 2021, the PRC 
conducted a test of an ICBM-range hypersonic glide vehicle that travelled 40,000 kilometers. The 
test likely demonstrated the PRC’s technical ability to field a FOB system. The PRC does not 
appear to have tested a FOB system in 2022. 
Lower-Yield Nuclear Weapons. The PRC probably seeks lower yield nuclear warhead 
capabilities to provide proportional response options that its high-yield warheads cannot deliver. 
PRC strategists have highlighted the need for lower-yield nuclear weapons in order to increase the 
deterrence value of the PRC’s nuclear force, though they have not defined specific nuclear yield 
values. A 2017 defense industry publication indicated a lower-yield weapon had been developed 
for use against campaign and tactical targets that would reduce collateral damage. By late 2018, 


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PRC concerns began to emerge that the United States would use low-yield weapons against its 
Taiwan invasion fleet, with related commentary in official media calling for proportionate 
response capabilities. The DF-26 is the PRC’s first nuclear-capable missile system that can 
conduct precision strikes, and therefore, is the most likely weapon system to field a lower-yield 
warhead in the near-term.  
PRC military writings in 2021 noted that the introduction of new precise small-yield nuclear 
weapons could possibly allow for the controlled use of nuclear weapons, in the warzone, for 
warning and deterrence. Additional PRC military writings as of 2017 noted that while strategic 
nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with high hit 
precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war. Such discussions 
provide the doctrinal basis for limited nuclear employment on the battlefield, suggesting PRC 
nuclear thinkers could be reconsidering their long-standing view that nuclear war is uncontrollable.  
Launch on Warning (LOW). The PLA is implementing a LOW posture, called “early warning 
counterstrike” (预警反击), where warning of a missile strike leads to a counterstrike before an 
enemy first strike can detonate. PLA writings suggest multiple manned C2 organs are involved in 
this process, warned by space and ground based sensors, and that this posture is broadly similar to 
the U.S. and Russian LOW posture. The PRC probably seeks to keep at least a portion of its force, 
especially its new silo-based units, on a LOW posture, and since 2017, the PLARF has conducted 
exercises involving early warning of a nuclear strike and LOW responses. 
The PRC’s considerations to attain a LOW posture date back to even the 1970s and 1980s, when 
the PRC considered using existing land-based ballistic missile early warning radar to support a 
LOW posture for its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs, but apparently this early warning system was 
unreliable. In recent years, the PRC has been able to make advances in early warning needed to 
support a LOW posture. The PRC has several ground-based large phase array radars – similar in 
appearance to U.S. PAVE PAWS radars – that could support a missile early warning role. There 
has likely been progress made in space-based early warning as well. In 2013, foreign media sources 
claimed to be in possession of PLA documents indicating expedited plans to field three 
geostationary satellites capable of detecting ballistic missile launches. Then, in 2015, the PRC’s 
defense white paper identified “improved strategic early warning” as specific nuclear force 
modernization goals with the PRC’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) reported including 
requirements to place early warning satellites in space. As of 2022, the PRC likely has at least 
three early warning satellites in orbit.  In 2019, President Putin of Russia stated that Russia is aiding 
the PRC in developing a ballistic missile early warning system.  
Despite these developments, the PRC has called upon other states to abandon similar launch-on-
warning postures to enhance strategic stability while declining to engage in substantive dialogue 
on risk reduction. The PRC seems to believe a LOW posture is consistent with its no first use 
policy, given that it involves a retaliatory strike that takes place after warning of an inbound first 
attack from an adversary. At the same time, PRC military writings note that command and control 
systems – which would include early warning systems – can be a source of accidental nuclear war. 


 
 
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The PRC has refused to join the Hague Code of Conduct or participate in other confidence-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war. However, the PRC does have a 
bilateral missile and carrier rocket launch notification agreement with Russia called the Russian-
Chinese inter-governmental agreement signed in 2009, which was extended for 10 years in 2021— 
though little additional information regarding the implementation of the notification agreement is 
known.  
 
 
China: Solid Propellant ICBM Silo Fields and Associated Training Site Locations 
 
 


 
 
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China: Yumen Silo Field Launch Sites 
 
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. 
● The PRC likely possesses capabilities relevant to chemical and biological warfare that pose a 
threat to U.S., Allied, and partner forces, military operations, and civilian populations. 
● The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This 
includes studies at PRC military medical institutions on potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
● The United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its obligations under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research on 
pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) and toxins with potential dual-use applications. 


 
 
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The PRC continues to engage in biological activities with dual-use applications, which raise 
concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC. In addition, the United States does not have 
sufficient information to determine whether China eliminated its assessed historical biological 
warfare (BW) program, which the United States assesses that the PRC possessed from the 1950s 
to at least the late 1980s. The PRC acceded to the BWC in 1984 and regularly submits to 
confidence-building measures (CBM) under the BWC; however, the PRC’s CBM reporting has 
never acknowledged its past offensive program. As part of its historical BW program, the PRC 
had reported weaponized ricin, botulinum toxins, and the causative agents of anthrax, cholera, 
plague, and tularemia. 
Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that the PRC has met its 
obligations under the CWC due to concerns regarding the PRC’s research of PBAs and toxins with 
potential dual-use applications. The PRC has declared that it once operated a small chemical 
weapons program for offensive purposes; however, Beijing has consistently maintained that the 
program was dismantled and all agents and munitions were used before China ratified the CWC 
in 1997. Beijing also has declared two historical chemical warfare production facilities that were 
probably capable of producing mustard gas, phosgene, and lewisite. 
Scientists at a PRC military institute have expressed interest in military applications of PBAs, 
including synthesis, characterization, and testing of PBAs with potential dual-use applications. In 
addition, available information on studies conducted at PRC military medical institutions indicates 
that researchers identify, test, and characterize diverse families of potent toxins with dual-use 
applications. 
The PRC’s chemical and biotechnology infrastructures are sufficient to research, develop, and 
produce some chemical and biological agents or toxins on a large scale. The PRC probably has the 
technical expertise to weaponize CBW agents, and China’s robust armaments industry and 
numerous conventional weapon systems, including missiles, rockets, and artillery, probably could 
be adapted to deliver CBW agents. China also has the technical expertise, military units, and 
equipment necessary to detect CBW agents and to defend against a CBW attack. 
Entities and individuals in the PRC continue to supply countries of concern with technologies, 
components, and raw materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs. 
Such material and technology transfers could assist countries in developing their own production 
capabilities. 


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CHINA: HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOON DEVELOPMENT 
Military and commercial entities in the PRC have been researching and developing high-
altitude systems—including high altitude balloons—since at least the mid-2000s. PRC-
based research institutions and companies have developed and tested high-altitude 
balloons as early as 2015, including payloads to support imaging, data relay, and 
communications capabilities. While some of this research may support civilian 
applications such as weather monitoring, many of these high-altitude systems are very 
likely intended to support PLA requirements. Chinese military publications have 
demonstrated interest in integrating “near-space” platforms as another layer in the PLA’s 
broader reconnaissance “system-of-systems,” and have highlighted the use of high-
altitude systems to support various tracking and targeting missions.  The high-altitude 
balloon shot down on February 4th, 2023, was developed as part of this broader military-
linked aerial surveillance program. 
CHINA: JANUARY 28TH TO FEBRUARY 4TH, 2023 
 HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOON INTRUSION 
On January 28th, 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense detected a high-altitude balloon 
(HAB) approaching U.S. airspace off the west coast of Alaska. According to a timeline 
reconstruction published in the New York Times that made use of commercial imagery, 
the balloon launched from Hainan Island in China on approximately January 15th. It 
traveled across the Pacific over the course of 13 days, before passing over Alaska’s 
Aleutian Islands and then over the Alaskan mainland. The United States and Canada 
tracked the balloon as it crossed into Canadian airspace, where prevailing high-altitude 
winds blew it south, and it re-entered U.S. airspace over Idaho on January 31st. The 
Department of Defense tracked and monitored the balloon as it made its way across the 
United States and confirmed via handheld imagery from the pilot of a U-2 high-altitude 
surveillance aircraft that the balloon was indeed equipped with intelligence collection 
capabilities. 
As stated by CDR NORAD & USNORTHCOM, the United States took precautions to 
minimize the amount and sensitivity of any intelligence the balloon could collect as it 
transited the United States. President Biden later confirmed and on June 29, DoD 
spokesmen reiterated that the balloon did not collect. On February 4th, U.S. fighters shot 
down the balloon off the coast of Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, where U.S. Coast Guard, 
Navy, and agents of the FBI conducted salvage and recovery operations. 
For its part, China initially expressed “regret” that its airship entered North American 
airspace, but claimed that it was a purely civilian airship used for meteorological research, 
and that prevailing winds had blown off course. In slightly over a week, China’s tone 
changed, accusing the U.S. of flying surveillance balloons over China 10 times during 
2022 (which the National Security Council denied), and claiming that the U.S. and NATO 
were attempting to “smear and accuse China,” likely reflecting a decision by China’s top 
leadership to respond by manufacturing a counter-narrative. 


 
 
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CHAPTER THREE: OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE 
AND ACTIVITIES ON CHINA’S PERIPHERY 
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 The PRC continues to refine military reforms associated with the establishment of the Eastern, 
Southern, Western, Northern, and Central Theater Commands, which are organized based on 
the PRC’s perception of peripheral threats. 
 Under the direction of the CMC, each Theater Command has operational authority over the 
PLA conventional forces within the theater. 
 In August 2022, the PLA carried out large-scale joint military exercises aimed at pressuring 
Taiwan. The exercises included firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan’s main island, over a 
dozen naval patrols, and hundreds of flights into Taiwan’s claimed air defense identification 
zone (ADIZ).  
The PRC continues to make steady improvements to joint operations in the five theater commands, 
which were established in early 2016. Each theater command receives direction from the CMC, 
has operational authority over assigned PLA forces within its theater,  and is responsible for all 
conventional combat and non-combat operations within its area of responsibility.  Theater 
commands are responsible for developing theater-specific strategies aimed at preparing to fight 
and win against an adversary, developing joint operational plans and military capabilities, 
responding to crises, and safeguarding the sovereignty and stability of its claimed territories.  The 
strategic directions of the theater commands are based on Chinese perceptions of peripheral threats:   
● Eastern Theater Command – Taiwan, ECS;  
● Southern Theater Command – SCS; Southeast Asia border security; territorial and maritime 
disputes; 
● Western Theater Command – India, Central Asia, “counterterrorism” in Xinjiang and Tibet;  
● Northern Theater Command – Korean Peninsula, Russia border security;  
● Central Theater Command – Capital defense; surge support to other theaters. 
 


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EASTERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The Eastern Theater Command is oriented toward Taiwan and the ECS.
●The Eastern Theater Command likely would be in charge of a Taiwan Invasion.
●The Eastern Theater Command was responsible for executing the PLA’s large-scale joint
exercises aimed at pressuring Taiwan in August 2022.
The Eastern Theater Command has responsibility for the ECS and likely executes operational 
control over military matters related to Taiwan and Japan, including contingencies in and around 
the Taiwan Strait and the Senkaku Islands.   
During 2022, the Eastern Theater Command maintained focus on a series of training and exercises 
to improve joint operations and combat readiness, organizing exercises and drills consisting of 
long-distance training and mobilization, aerial combat, live-fire training, and the use of modified 
civilian ferries to help augment transportation.  
For Taiwan-related issues, see section on DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION 
IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT (Pg. 136).  
2022 EASTERN THEATER COMMAND LEADERSHIP 
Commander of the Eastern Theater Command – General Lin Xiangyang [林向阳]  
Previous Position: Commander of the Central Theater Command 
DOB: October 1964 
Age: 58 
Birthplace: Dengjun Village, Haikou Town, Fuqing, Fuzhou, Fujian Province [福建省福州市
福清市海口镇登俊村] 
Education: Nanchang Army Academy; Studied abroad in Russia; Attended a class at PRC NDU 
for Young- and Middle-aged Cadres [中青班] 
Political Commissar of the Eastern Theater Command – General He Ping [何平]  
Previous Position; Director of the Political Department of the Western Theater Command; 
Deputy Political Commissar of the Western Theater Command  
DOB: November 1957 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Nanchong, Sichuan Province [四川省南充市] 
Education: Unknown 
Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Theater 
Command – Lieutenant General Hong Jiangqiang [洪江强]  
Previous position: Commander of the 80th Group Army, Northern Theater Command Army 


 
 
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DOB: 1965 
Age: 57 
Birthplace: Meishi Village, Gangwei Town, Longhai, Zhangzhou, Fujian Province [福建省漳
州市龙海市港尾镇梅市村] 
Education: Unknown 
 
PLA units located within the Eastern Theater Command include 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies; 
the Eastern Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two Air 
Force divisions, two operational PLAAF bases, and one PLARF base.  During a contingency, the 
Eastern Theater Command likely also exercises command over some SSF units in theater and 
receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield awareness and facilitate 
joint operations within the theater.   The Eastern Theater Command also likely commands all CCG 
and maritime militia ships while they are conducting operations related to the ongoing dispute with 
Japan over the Senkaku Islands.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


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PLA Force Laydown in Eastern Theater Command 


 
 
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EAST CHINA SEA (ECS) 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC continues to use maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Japan-
administered Senkaku Islands. 
● The PRC attempts to legitimize its claims in the ECS through the continuous presence of PRC 
fishing and Maritime Militia vessels, escorted by CCG cutters and with PLA Navy warships 
nearby as overwatch. 
● In 2021, the PRC passed new legislation regarding the rules of engagement for their Coast 
Guard vessels, which created a legal justification for more aggressive patrols. Throughout 2021 
and 2022, the PRC expanded its annual unilateral summer fishing ban in Beijing-claimed 
waters north of the 12th parallel to include the ECS by an additional month to incrementally 
enforce its de facto maritime sovereignty claims. 
The PRC claims sovereignty over the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the ECS, which 
Taiwan also claims. Beijing continues to uphold the importance of the 2014 four-point consensus, 
which states Japan and the PRC will acknowledge divergent positions over the ECS but prevent 
escalation through dialogue, consultation, and crisis management mechanisms. The United States 
does not take a position on sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands but recognizes Japan’s 
administration of the islands and continues to reaffirm that the islands fall within the scope of 
Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In addition, the United States opposes any 
unilateral actions that seek to undermine Japan’s administration of the islands.  
The PRC uses maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft to patrol near the Senkaku Islands, not 
only to demonstrate its sovereignty claims, but also to improve readiness and responsiveness to 
potential contingencies. In 2022, the PRC continued to conduct regular patrols into the contiguous 
zone territorial seas around the Senkaku Islands and stepped up efforts to challenge Japan’s control 
over the islands by increasing the duration and assertiveness of its patrols. For the third year in a 
row, CCG ships entered Japanese-claimed waters for more than 100 consecutive days, including 
over 300 days in the contiguous zones around the Islands in 2022.  In December 2022, the CCG 
conducted the longest entrance to date into the Senkaku Islands territorial waters, with four ships 
remaining in the waters for nearly 73 hours. The previous record for territorial waters entrance 
duration was 64 hours, set in July 2022. The increased PRC assertiveness around the Senkaku 
Islands caused Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to express “grave concern” in November 
to President Xi during the first meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders since December 
2019. The two leaders agreed to reestablish a maritime and aerial hotline between the two 
countries’ militaries to resume security dialogue, which the two defense ministers later used for 
the first time in May 2023.  
 


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SOUTHERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The Southern Theater Command is oriented toward the SCS, Southeast Asia border security,
and territorial and maritime disputes.
●The Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation
operations in the SCS and can assume command as needed over all CCG and CMM ships
conducting operations within the PRC’s claimed “nine-dash line.”
●In 2022, Southern Theater Command units conducted multiple live-fire drills and amphibious
training events near PRC-occupied features in the SCS.
The Southern Theater Command covers mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, including the SCS.  
This geographic area implies that the Southern Theater Command is responsible for securing the 
SCS, supporting the Eastern Theater Command in any operation against Taiwan, and assuring the 
security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) vital to China’s global ambitions in the SCS.  The 
Southern Theater Command is responsible for responding to U.S. freedom of navigation 
operations in the SCS by regularly tracking and reacting to U.S. ships operating within the China-
claimed “nine-dash line.” 
The Southern Theater Command is responsible for training, force disposition, and operations in 
the SCS.  The Southern Theater Command also plays a significant role in the PLA’s bilateral and 
multilateral exercises with countries in Southeast Asia, such as participating in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief exercise with Thailand in 2022. 
The PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons are subordinate to the Southern Theater Command. In 
August 2022, the PLA Hong Kong and Macao garrisons conducted an annual rotation of forces. 
Since 1997, the PLA has rotated forces by land, air, and sea from Shenzhen at night, nominally as 
part of the usual annual rotation.  Since the 2019 pro-democracy protests, China maintains a 
rotational deployment of PAP forces in Hong Kong. The PAP and PLA units continued to publicly 
highlight their anti-riot, counterterrorism, and disaster prevention training. 
All of the PLA’s 24 Su-35s purchased from Russia are assigned to the Southern Theater Command 
Air Force and have flown patrols in the SCS and into the Western Pacific. The Southern Theater 
Command was also the first command to receive the PLAN’s H-6J maritime strike bombers. In 
December 2019, the PRC commissioned its first-domestically produced aircraft carrier, Shandong 
into service at Yulin Naval Base in the Southern Theater Command.  In April, the Shandong 
conducted its first training exercise in the Philippine Sea with J-15 aircraft entering Taiwan’s air 
defense identification zone for the first time, demonstrating the PLA’s increased capabilities 
further from China’s borders. 


 
 
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2022 Southern Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– Wang Xiubin [王秀斌] 
Previous position: Chief of Staff, Eastern Theater Command; Deputy Commander, Eastern 
Theater Command 
DOB: March 1964 
Age: 58 
Birthplace: Rudong County, Nantong, Jiangsu Province [江苏省南通市如东县掘港镇港南村] 
Education: National Defense University’s Joint Command and Staff College 
[联合指挥与参谋学院]; Postgraduate class at Zhejiang University; Taught at Nanjing Artillery 
Academy 
 
Political Commissar of the Southern Theater Command – Wang Jianwu [王建武]  
Rank: General 
Previous position: Deputy Director of the CMC Political Work Department 
DOB: August 1958 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Luoning, Henan Province [河南省洛宁] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Chief of Staff of the Southern Theater Command – Liu Yayong [刘亚永] 
Rank: Lieutenant General 
Previous position: Deputy Chief of Staff of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: April 1958 
Age: 64 
Birthplace: Duchang, Jiangxi Province [江西省都昌]  
Education: Unknown 
 
PLA units located within the Southern Theater Command include 74th and 75th Group Armies, 
the Southern Theater Navy, three marine brigades, two PLA Air Force bases, and two PLA 
Rocket Force bases.   
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Southern Theater Command 
 
SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS) 
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC’s outposts on the Spratly Islands are capable of supporting military operations, 
including advanced weapon systems, and have supported non-combat aircraft.  However, no 
large-scale presence of combat aircraft has been yet observed at airfields on the outposts.  


 
 
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● In 2022, the PRC continued to deploy PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships in response to 
Vietnamese and Malaysian drilling operations within the PRC’s claimed “Nine-DashLine,” the 
Philippines’ construction at Thitu Island, and the Philippines’ resupply missions to Second 
Thomas Shoal. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE SCS 
In July 2016, pursuant to provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), an arbitral tribunal convened at the Philippines’ behest, ruled that the PRC’s claims 
to “historic rights” in the SCS, depicted by the “nine-dash line,” were not compatible with 
UNCLOS. Since December 2019, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have 
explicitly referenced the arbitral ruling in notes verbales to the UN denying the validity of the 
PRC’s “historic rights” and nine-dash line claims. Beijing, however, categorically rejects the 
tribunal decision, and the PRC continues to use coercive tactics, including the employment of PLA 
naval, coast guard, and paramilitary vessels, to enforce its claims. The PRC does so in ways 
calculated to remain below the threshold of provoking conflict. In 2022, the PRC continued to 
impose a yearly, unilateral three-month fishing ban that includes the waters inside the EEZ of the 
Philippines and Vietnam to incrementally enforce its de facto maritime claims. 
● The PRC states that international military presence within the SCS is a challenge to its 
sovereignty. Throughout 2022, the PRC deployed PLAN, CCG, and civilian ships to maintain 
a presence in disputed areas, such as near Scarborough Reef and Thitu Island, as well as in 
response to oil and gas exploration operations by rival claimants within the PRC’s claimed 
“nine-dash line.”  Separately, the CCG and People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) 
used nets and ropes to block Philippine supply boats on their way to an atoll in the SCS and 
issued radio challenges and threats to Philippine ships during routine resupply missions. 
● In November 2022, a CCG vessel forcibly seized apparent PRC rocket debris that had fallen 
near Philippine-occupied Thitu Island from the Philippines by cutting the tow line of a 
Philippine Navy vessel as it was towing debris back to shore. PRC insisted the debris was 
returned to them after a “friendly negotiation,” despite the Philippines producing video 
evidence of the incident and issues diplomatic notes of protest.  
● In March 2022, the Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest after a CCG ship maneuvered 
within 21 meters of a Filipino vessel near Scarborough Shoal. This was the fourth time in under 
a year that the CCG had maneuvered dangerously close to Philippine vessels.   
● In December 2022, the Philippines expressed serious concern over reports that the PRC had 
reclaimed several unoccupied land features in the SCS, notably at four features in the Spratly 
Islands. The Philippines noted that new construction contravenes the Declaration of Conduct 
on the South China Sea’s undertaking on self-restraint and the 2016 Arbitral Award, while 
Beijing denied any actions and emphasized dialogue between the two nations.  


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Outposts in the Spratly Islands  
SCS OUTPOSTS CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 
Since early 2018, the PRC-occupied Spratly Islands outposts have been equipped with advanced 
anti-ship and anti-aircraft missile systems and military jamming equipment, representing the most 
capable land-based weapons systems deployed by any claimant in the disputed SCS areas to date. 
In mid-2021, the PLA deployed an intelligence-gathering ship and a surveillance aircraft to the 
Spratly Islands during U.S.-Australia bilateral operations in the region. From early 2018 through 
2022, the PRC regularly used its Spratly Islands outposts to support naval and coast guard 
operations in the SCS.  The PRC has added more than 3,200 acres of land to the seven features it 
occupies in the Spratlys. China has also added military infrastructure, including 72 aircraft 
hangars, docks, satellite communication equipment, antenna array, radars, and hardened shelters 
for missile platforms. 


 
 
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The PRC has stated these projects are mainly to improve marine research, safety of navigation, 
and the living and working conditions of personnel stationed on the outposts. However, the 
outposts provide airfields, berthing areas, and resupply facilities that allow the PRC to maintain a 
more flexible and persistent military and paramilitary presence in the area. This improves the 
PRC’s ability to detect and challenge activities by rival claimants or third parties and widens the 
range of response options available to Beijing.  
WESTERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
● The Western Theater Command is oriented toward India and counterterrorism missions along 
China’s Central Asia borders.  
● The Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions, where 
the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among Uyghur 
populations in Xinjiang. 
● Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention, including at least one border clash in December 2022 
along the PRC border with India’s Arunachal Pradesh state that injured multiple soldiers. 
The Western Theater Command is geographically the largest theater command within the PRC 
and is responsible for responding to conflict with India and what the PRC refers to as “terrorist 
threats” in western China. PLA units located within the Western Theater Command include 76th 
and 77th Group Armies and ground forces subordinate to Xinjiang and Xizang Military Districts; 
three PLAAF bases, one transportation division, one flying academy, and one PLARF base.   
Within China, the Western Theater Command focuses on Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous 
Regions, where the CCP perceives a high threat of separatism and terrorism, particularly among 
Uyghur populations in Xinjiang. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices, in the PRC, “genocide and crimes against humanity occurred 
during the year against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority 
groups in Xinjiang.” Authorities were reported to have arbitrarily detained more than one million 
ethnic Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in extrajudicial internment camps designed 
to erase religious and ethnic identities. Although PRC government officials justified the camps 
under the pretense of “combatting terrorism, separatism, and extremism,” information from the 
international community, including the UN, refute such justifications. Moreover, oppression of 
Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang is likely used by 
extremist organizations as a propaganda and recruiting tool, generating new threats to the region. 
Since early May 2020, sustained tensions along the India-China border have dominated the 
Western Theater Command’s attention. Differing perceptions between India and the PRC 


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regarding border demarcations along the LAC, combined with recent infrastructure construction 
on both sides, led to multiple clashes, an ongoing standoff, and military buildups along the shared 
border. In response to a skirmish in June 2020 between PRC and Indian patrols in Galwan Valley, 
the most violent clash between the two countries in 45 years, the Western Theater Command 
implemented a large-scale mobilization and deployment of PLA forces along the LAC. 
Commander-level negotiations meant to reduce tensions continued in December 2022 with the 17th 
round of talks. The Western Theater Command’s deployments along the LAC will likely continue 
through 2023.   
2022 Western Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– General Wang Haijiang [汪海江] 
Previous position: Commander, Xinjiang Military District 
DOB: July 1963 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Anyue County, Ziyang, Sichuan Province  
Education: Unknown 
Political Commissar– General Li Fengbiao [李凤彪] 
Previous position: Commander, Strategic Support Force  
DOB: October 1959 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Anxin County, Baoding, Hebei Province  
Education: Xinyang Army Infantry School; received a Master’s degree in strategic studies from 
National Defense University  
Chief of Staff– Major General Li Zhonglin [李中林] 
Previous position: Commander, 71st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command Army 
DOB: Unknown 
Age: Unknown 
Birthplace: Unknown 
Education: Unknown  


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Western Theater Command 
 
CHINA-INDIA BORDER  
Key Takeaways 
● In 2022, the PLA increased the deployment of forces and continued infrastructure build up 
along the LAC. 
● Negotiations between India and the PRC made minimal progress as both sides resisted losing 
perceived advantages on the border. 


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Beginning in May 2020, PRC and Indian forces faced off in clashes with rocks, batons, and clubs 
wrapped in barbed wire at multiple locations along the LAC. The resulting standoff triggered the 
buildup of forces on both sides of the disputed border. Each country demanded the withdrawal of 
the other’s forces and a return to pre-standoff conditions, but neither China nor India agreed on 
those conditions. The PRC blamed the standoff on Indian infrastructure construction, which it 
perceived as encroaching on PRC territory, while India accused China of launching aggressive 
incursions into India’s territory.  On 15 June 2020, patrols violently clashed in Galwan Valley and 
resulted in the death of approximately 20 Indian soldiers and four PLA soldiers. This incident was 
the deadliest clash between the two since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Following the 2020 clash, the 
PLA has maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure build up along the 
LAC. 
●In 2022, China continued to develop military infrastructure along the LAC. These
improvements include underground storage facilities near Doklam, new roads in all three
sectors of the LAC, new villages in disputed areas in neighboring Bhutan, a second bridge over
Pangong Lake, a dual-purpose airport near the center sector, and multiple helipads.
●In 2022, China deployed one border regiment, supported by two divisions of Xinjiang and
Tibet Military Districts with four combined arms brigades (CAB) in reserve in the western
sector of the LAC. China also deployed as many as three light-to-medium CABs in the eastern
sector from other theater commands and an additional three CABs in the central sector of the
LAC. Although some elements of a light CAB eventually withdrew, a majority of the deployed
forces remain in place along the LAC.
●On July 17th, China and India held the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks focusing on
the resolution of border disagreements in the western sector of the LAC. Both sides agreed to
withdraw forces from the Gogra-Hotsprings area of the LAC and to maintain dialogue through
military and diplomatic channels to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the remaining
border issues.   Two previous rounds of Corps Commander-level talks in March and January
made no progress to resolve the China-India border dispute.
●On September 8th, Chinese and Indian forces began to withdraw from the Gogra-Hotsprings
area along the western sector of the LAC. This withdrawal was the direct result of the 16th
round of Corps Commander-level talks held in July.
●On October 14th, representatives from China and India attended a virtual 25th Meeting of
Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC). Both sides lauded the
recent withdrawal of forces from the border and agreed to take measures to reduce border
tension and shift from emergency response to regular management of the border areas. The
24th WMCC was held on 31 May with no significant progress being made to disengage from
the western sector of the LAC.
●On 9 December, hundreds of Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern sector of the
LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India.  Both sides previously agreed to not use firearms


 
 
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along the border—instead they use sticks and clubs as weapons—however both Chinese and 
Indian forces sustained injuries.  Media reports described the skirmish as the worst since the 
2020 Galwan Valley incident. 
● On 20 December, China and India held the 17th round of Corps Commander-level talks at the 
Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in China. This round of talks was not announced—unlike 
previous talks—and came 10 days after Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the eastern 
sector of the LAC near the Yangtse area of Tawang, India.  No agreements were made during 
this meeting and both sides pledged to continue dialogue through military and diplomatic 
channels. 
NORTHERN THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaways 
● The Northern Theater Command is oriented toward the Korean Peninsula and Russian border 
security. 
● In September 2022, the Northern Theater Command sent a 2,000 member contingent of army, 
navy, and air force units to participate in the Russia-hosted multi-national military exercise 
Vostok-2022. 
The Northern Theater Command includes the PRC’s provinces bordering Mongolia, Russia, North 
Korea, and the Yellow Sea. It is responsible for operations along China’s northern periphery and 
border security associated with North Korean, Russia, and Mongolia.  PLA units located within 
the Northern Theater Command include the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies; the Northern 
Theater Navy and its naval aviation division and two marine brigades; and two operational PLAAF 
bases, one special mission aircraft division, and one flying academy; and one PLARF base.  
During a contingency, the Northern Theater Command likely exercises command over some SSF 
units in theater and receives strategic intelligence support from the SSF to improve battlefield 
awareness and facilitate joint operations within the theater. The North Sea Fleet is responsible 
primarily for protecting the sea approaches to northern China but could provide mission-critical 
assets to support other fleets during contingencies located beyond the Northern Theater. In 2022, 
Northern Theater Command forces conducted various joint and single service training activities 
including carrier navigation and flight training, and likely conducted UAS training.  
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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2022 Northern Theater Command Leadership 
 
Commander– General Wang Qiang [王强]  
Previous position: Commander of the Western Theater Command Air Force; Deputy 
Commander of the Western Theater Command 
DOB: ~1963 
Age: ~59 
Birthplace: Probable Rong County, Zigong, SichuanProvince [ 四川省自贡市荣] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Political Commissar– Admiral Liu Qingsong [刘青松]  
Previous position: Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command Navy; Deputy 
Political Commissar of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: ~November 1963 
Age: ~58 
Birthplace: Zhangqiu District, Jinan, Shandong Province [山东省济南市章丘区] 
Education: Unknown 
Chief of Staff– Vice Admiral Jiang Guoping 
Rank: Admiral 
Previous position: Assistant to the Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC 
DOB: ~October 1962 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Rushan, Weihai, Shandong Province  
Education: Dalian Naval Ship Academy  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Northern Theater Command  
 
 
 


 
 
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CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND  
Key Takeaway 
● The Central Theater Command’s mission is the defense of Beijing while providing support to 
other theater commands.  
The Central Theater Command’s primary responsibility is to defend the capital and CCP leadership 
while providing a strategic reserve to the other theater commands. It is centrally located, 
connecting the four remaining theater commands. Major military units under the Central Theater 
Command military include the PLAA’s 81st, 82nd, and 83rd Group Armies; and the PLAAF’s 13th 
Transport Division, 34th VIP Transport Division, 36th Bomber Division, 15th Airborne Corps, and 
the Shijiazhuang Flying Academy.  Other assets in the Central Theater Command include PLA 
Rocket Force and the Wuhan and Datong Bases.   
2022 Central Theater Command Leadership 
Commander– General Wu Ya'nan [吴亚男] 
Previous position: Deputy Chief, Joint Staff Department, CMC  
DOB: August 1962 
Age: 60 
Birthplace: Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province [河北省石家庄市] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Political Commissar– General Xu Deqing [徐德清] 
Previous position: Political Commissar, Western Theater Command Army; Deputy Political 
Commissar, Western Theater Command  
DOB: July 1963 
Age: 59 
Birthplace: Chongzhou, Chengdu, Sichuan Province [四川省成都市崇州市] 
Education: Unknown 
 
Chief of Staff– Vice Admiral Wang Changjiang [王长江] 
Previous position: Deputy Commander of the Northern Theater Command 
DOB: February 1959 
Age: 63 
Birthplace: Luanzhou, Tangshan, Hebei Province [河北省唐山市滦州市] 
Education: The PLA Air Force's Fourth Aviation Academy  
 


 
 
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PLA Force Laydown in Central Theater Command 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN 
STRAIT  
Key Takeaways 
● In 2022, the PRC amplified diplomatic, political, and military pressure against Taiwan. 
● Throughout 2022, the PLA increased provocative and destabilizing actions in and around the 
Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile overflights of Taiwan, sharply increased flights into 
Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and a series of major military exercises near Taiwan. 
Throughout 2022, the PRC conducted large-scale joint military exercises focused on training to 
deter further U.S. and allied operations along China’s periphery. Many of these exercises focused 
on combat realism and have featured night missions, training in extreme weather, and simultaneous 
multi-domain operations.  
The PLA is preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force if perceived as 
necessary by Beijing, while simultaneously deterring, delaying, or denying any third-party 
intervention, such as the United States and/or other like-minded partners, on Taiwan’s behalf.   As 
part of a comprehensive campaign to pressure Taiwan and the Tsai administration and signal its 
displeasure at deepening Washington-Taipei ties, the PRC has persistently conducted military 
operations near Taiwan and military training for a Taiwan contingency.    Throughout 2022, the 
PLA increased provocative actions in and around the Taiwan Strait, to include ballistic missile 
overflights of Taiwan, significantly increased flights into Taiwan’s self-declared air defense 
identification zone, and conducted a series of large-scale military exercises around Taiwan.  
● According to Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) data, the PLA sent a total of 1,737 
aircraft in Taiwan’s ADIZ in 2022. This is a 79 percent increase from 972 incursions in 2021.  
● Throughout 2022, the PLA also diversified the type of aircraft it sent into Taiwan’s ADIZ. 
Since September 2022, when the Taiwan MND began releasing information on UAV 
operations in the ADIZ, UAVs have made up around 10 percent of aircraft tracked. 
At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, Xi Jinping repeated the CCP’s longstanding public position 
that China seeks peaceful unification with Taiwan but would never renounce the use of force as 
an option.  Additionally, the CCP amended its constitution to reaffirm that it will resolutely oppose 
and deter Taiwan independence. The circumstances under which the PRC has historically indicted 
it would consider the use of force has evolved over time. These circumstances have included the 
following:  
● Formal declaration of Taiwan’s independence 
● Undefined moves toward Taiwan independence 


 
 
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● Internal unrest in Taiwan 
● Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons 
● Indefinite delays in the resumption of cross-strait dialogue on unification 
● Foreign military intervention in Taiwan’s internal affairs.   
 
 
PlA Aircraft Entering Taiwan ADIZ 
Tensions between the PRC and Taiwan increased in 2022, as the PRC intensified political and 
military pressure aimed at Taiwan. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan 
in August 2022, Beijing released a new Taiwan white paper, which was the third paper issued by 
Beijing since 1993. The content of the white paper appears consistent with familiar talking points 
from Beijing, albeit with a more pointed tone. It highlights that unification is foundational to the 
PRC’s “national rejuvenation,” Beijing’s preference for peaceful reunification under the “one 
country, two systems” framework, and a refusal to renounce the use of force to compel 
reunification, if needed.  Unlike the previous Taiwan white paper (released in 2000), this iteration 
explicitly calls out Taiwan’s ruling  Democratic People’s Party for “having adopted a separatist 
stance,” and features heavier criticism on “external interference” by singling out the United States.  
The paper further asserts that all U.S. “interference” in Taiwan is guided by a strategy to use 
Taiwan as a “pawn” in an effort to contain China.   
The PRC continues to suspend formal communications with Taiwan, which began in 2016, and 
remains steadfast that Taiwan must accept the PRC’s view of the “1992 Consensus” to restart such 
engagement. China’s leaders have directly equated the “1992 Consensus” to the PRC’s “One 
China principle,” which was reaffirmed by President Xi in a January 2019 address to “compatriots” 
in Taiwan.  


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CONSISTENT U.S. DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN 
In response to U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan, Beijing routinely accuses the United 
States of not abiding by its One China principle. U.S. defense engagements with Taiwan, as 
one element of the unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, remain consistent with our one China 
policy – as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, 
and the Six Assurances. U.S. defense engagement with Taiwan has evolved over time in 
response to the PRC’s capacity and willingness to use military coercion against Taiwan. This 
evolution does not contradict publicly-stated U.S. policy, and it is in fact required by U.S. 
policy.  
The 1979 TRA states that the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense 
articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” In 1982, President Reagan clarified in an 
internal memo—which the United States made public in 2019—that the quantity and quality 
of U.S. defense assistance provided to Taiwan be “conditioned entirely on the threat posed 
by the PRC.” President Reagan further emphasized that this linkage is intended as a 
“permanent imperative” of foreign policy.  
The United States opposes unilateral changes to the cross-Strait status quo by either side; 
does not support Taiwan independence; and expects cross-Strait differences to be resolved 
by peaceful means. United States defense engagement with Taiwan’s will continue to 
bolster these positions and be conditioned entirely on the evolving threat posed by the PRC 
and the interests of the people of Taiwan, as enumerated in U.S. policy. 
PLA COERCIVE AND RISKY OPERATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
The PLA’s coercive and risky air and maritime activity, particularly in the East and South China 
Seas, continued throughout 2022 and into 2023.  The PLA’s coercive and risky activities includes 
unsafe, unprofessional, and other behaviors that seek to impinge upon the ability of the United 
States and other nations to safely conduct operations where international law allows. The goal of 
the PLA’s behavior is to pressure the United States and other nations to reduce or cease lawful 
operations near areas Beijing claims territorial sovereignty.  
Examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky operational behavior against U.S. and Allied aircraft 
have included lasing (i.e., the use of military-grade lasers against a target), reckless maneuvers 
(i.e., maritime bow crossings and barrel rolls and acrobatics in close proximity to aircraft), close 
approaches in the air or at sea, high rates of closure (i.e., rapid approaches), discharging objects 
(i.e., chaff or flares) in front of, or in close proximity to, aircraft; and other actions.  
The PLA’s behavior contravenes flight safety protocols and the international maritime rules of the 
road; increases the risk of a major accident, incident, or crisis, including the potential for loss of 
life. 


 
 
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Over the last 18 months, the PLA appears to have been engaged in a centralized, concerted 
campaign to perform these risky behaviors in order to coerce a change in lawful U.S. operational 
activity, and that of U.S. Allies and partners. Prior to the fall of 2021, the PLA routinely intercepted 
foreign air and maritime assets operating in the Indo-Pacific, but these earlier interactions rarely 
involved PLA employment of coercive and risky behavior. Between the fall of 2021 and fall of 
2023, the United States has documented over 180 instances of PLA coercive and risky air 
intercepts against U.S. aircraft in the region – more in the past two years than in the previous 
decade. Over the same period, the PLA has conducted around 100 instances of coercive and 
risky operational behavior against U.S. Allies and partners, in an effort to deter both the United 
States and others from conducting lawful operations in the region.  The PRC’s messaging 
regarding its forces’ operational behavior, such as claiming it is “justified to take forceful 
countermeasures” against activities that Beijing labels “provocative,” suggests centralized 
coordination, not the behavior of a few isolated PLA officers. 
Some examples of the PRC’s coercive and risky behavior include the following:  
● In February 2022, a Chinese naval ship directed a laser at an Australian P-8A Poseidon aircraft 
operating in Australia’s exclusive economic zone, endangering the health of Australian airmen. 
● While flying a mission between April and May 2022, the Canadian CP-140 patrol aircraft were 
the subject of harassment by PLAAF fighter jets, which on several occasions, attempted to 
divert Canadian CP-140s. The PLAAF aircraft did this by conducting close approaches which 
forced the Canadian patrol craft to alter its flight path to avoid collision. 
● During a routine May 2022 maritime surveillance flight by an Australian P-8A in the South 
China Sea, a Chinese J-16 conducted a dangerous intercept maneuver which posed a safety 
threat to the P-8A and its aircrew. The Australian government issued a press release on this 
event. 
● In June 2022, a Chinese J-16 cut across the nose of another Australian P-8A Poseidon that was 
operating in international airspace over the South China Sea.  The Chinese jet released a round 
of chaff, which was ingested into the Australian aircraft’s engine.  
● In December 2022, a PLA J-11 fighter came within 20 feet of the nose of a U.S. military aircraft 
operating lawfully in international airspace over the South China Sea.    
● In February 2023, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs issued a statement concerning 
an incident with a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, operating under PLA overwatch, engaged in 
dangerous maneuvers against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel operating within Manila’s own 
EEZ, including by deploying a military-grade laser that temporarily blinded Filipino crew 
members.  
● In May 2023, the DoD released cockpit video of a PLA J-16 “thumping” a U.S. RC-135 aircraft 
by forcing the U.S. RC-135 to fly directly behind it in its wake turbulence.  
● Less than one week later, in June, the DoD released video of the PLA’s unprofessional reaction 
to the USS CHUNG HOON during a U.S.-Canada bilateral Taiwan Strait Transit. 
 


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PLA RESPONSE TO HIGH-PROFILE VISIT TO TAIWAN BY FOREIGN 
FIGURES 
Throughout 2022, the PRC continued to respond to high-level foreign visits to Taiwan with 
low-level military drills near Taiwan, typically including Taiwan Strait centerline crossings, 
increased PLA Navy activity around Taiwan, and public statements condemning the visits. 
In stark contrast, the PLA responded in early August 2022 to the CODEL vist to Taiwan 
with significantly larger-scale military activities that included several unprecedented 
actions. The Eastern Theater Command conducted snap military drills that included PLA 
aviation flying more than 250 fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s self-declared ADIZ and 13 PLA 
Navy vessels operating around Taiwan. The PLARF fired multiple ballistic missiles into 
impacts zones in waters around Taiwan, including the first-seen instance of at least four 
missiles overflying Taiwan. These military drills also afforded the PLA an opportunity to 
train simulated joint blockade and simulated joint firepower strike operations. 
PRC MILITARY COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST TAIWAN  
Although Beijing reaffirms that “peaceful reunification” is its preferred course of action, the PRC 
continues to signal its willingness to use military force against Taiwan. The PLA has a range of 
options to coerce Taipei based on its increasing capabilities in multiple domains. The PRC could 
increasingly signal its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA 
could also conduct a range of cyberspace, blockade, and kinetic campaigns designed to force 
Taiwan to capitulate to unification or compel Taiwan’s leadership to the negotiation table on the 
PRC’s terms. In any case, the PRC would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan 
contingency campaign. Failing that, the PRC would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in a 
limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, the PLA might choose to escalate 
cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight 
to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could offer Xi the following military 
options against Taiwan, listed below individually or in combination, with varying degrees of 
feasibilities associated risk. The PRC’s perception of domestic and international receptivity to 
military action, the expected impact on its economy of resulting sanctions, political trends in 
Taiwan, and its level of confidence in the PLA’s capability to conduct a successful invasion of 
Taiwan will determine which military option the PRC chooses during crises. The PLA practiced 
elements of each of these military options during its August 2022 large-scale military exercise 
aimed at pressuring Taiwan, and again in April 2023 in response to Taiwan president Tsai Ing-
wen’s transit of the United States. 
Air and Maritime Blockade. PLA writings describe a Joint Blockade Campaign in which the 
PRC would employ blockades of maritime and air traffic, including a cut-off of Taiwan’s vital 
imports, to force Taiwan’s capitulation.  Large-scale missile strikes and possible seizures of 


 
 
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Taiwan’s offshore islands would accompany a Joint Blockade Campaign in an attempt to compel 
Taiwan’s surrender, while at the same time, posturing air and naval forces to conduct weeks or 
months of blockade operations if necessary. The PRC likely would complement its air and 
maritime blockades with concurrent EW, network attacks, and IO to further isolate Taiwan’s 
authorities and populace and to control the international narrative of the conflict.  
Limited Force or Coercive Options. The PRC could use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or lethal 
military actions in a limited campaign against Taiwan, probably in conjunction with overt and 
clandestine economic and political activities supported by IO to shape perceptions or undercut the 
effectiveness or legitimacy of the Taiwan authorities. Such a campaign could include computer 
network or limited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’s political, military, and economic infrastructure 
to induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the Taiwan population’s confidence in their leaders. 
Similarly, PLA SOF could infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks against infrastructure or 
leadership targets.  
Air and Missile Campaign. The PRC could use precision missile and air strikes against key 
government and military targets, including air bases, radar sites, missiles, space assets, and 
communications facilities to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, neutralize its leadership, or undermine 
the public’s resolve to resist.   
Amphibious Invasion of Taiwan. PRC writings describe different operational concepts for an 
amphibious invasion of Taiwan. The most prominent of these, the Joint Island Landing Campaign, 
envisions a complex operation relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for EW, logistics, 
air, and naval support.  The objectives are to break through or circumvent Taiwan’s shore defenses, 
establish a beachhead, build up combat power along Taiwan’s western coastline, and seize key 
targets or the entire island.  
The PLA continues to test new options to force unification. In October 2022, seven Chinese 
civilian car ferries, under CMM, participated in amphibious landing drills on Chinese beaches in 
the Taiwan Strait. In August 2022, in response to the U.S. Speaker of the House CODEL to Taiwan, 
the PLA conducted joint exercises focusing on establishing air, maritime, and information 
superiority. The exercise consisted of joint air and maritime activities to the north, southwest, and 
southeast of Taiwan, focused on establishing air dominance, according to Eastern media reporting.  
A large-scale amphibious invasion would be one of the most complicated and difficult military 
operations for the PLA, requiring air and maritime superiority, the rapid buildup and sustainment 
of supplies onshore, and uninterrupted support.  It would likely strain the PRC’s armed forces and 
invite a strong international response. These factors, combined with inevitable force attrition, the 
complexity of urban warfare, and potential for an insurgency, make an amphibious invasion of 
Taiwan a significant political and military risk for Xi and the CCP, even assuming a successful 
landing and breakout past Taiwan beachhead defenses.    
Small Island Seizure. The PLA also is capable of attempting various amphibious operations short 
of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond routine training, 


 
 
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the PRC could launch an invasion of small Taiwan-occupied islands in the SCS, such as Pratas or 
Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better-defended island, such as Matsu or Kinmen, is 
also within the PLA’s capabilities. Such an invasion would demonstrate military capability, 
political resolve, and achieve tangible territorial gain while simultaneously showing some measure 
of restraint. However, this kind of operation involves significant, and possibly prohibitive, political 
risk because it could galvanize pro-independence sentiment on Taiwan and generate powerful 
international opposition.  
CIVILIAN ROLL-ON/ROLL-OFF (RORO) SHIPS AND THEIR 
POTENTIAL USE IN A TAIWAN INVASION 
The lack of significant PLA amphibious ship buildup does not independently reflect a PLA 
deficiency toward building a military option to take Taiwan by force, but rather, is consistent with 
the PRC’s exploratory approach to testing multi-dimensional Taiwan seizure concepts.  
In 2015, China’s official media reported that all future builds of five categories of civilian vessels 
had to be built to “national defense requirements” including container ships, RORO ferries, 
multipurpose vessels, bulk carriers, and break bulk ships.  
In 2019, images emerged on Chinese state television that at least one of its RORO ferries had been 
modified with a ramp to allow amphibious vehicles to disembark at sea suggesting these ferries 
could be used to deliver first echelon forces without requiring prior seizure of a pier. By 
demonstrating intent to use commercial ROROs during an amphibious invasion, the PLA is 
eroding the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict and obscuring crucial lines 
between warships and non-warships, civilians and combatants, and civilian objects and military 
objectives. 
In a similar state media disclosure, images emerged in 2021 showing that China had modified a 
flat deck container vessel to function as a landing platform helicopter (LPH) or as an expeditionary 
transfer dock (ESD); such modification could serve as a mid-way refueling point for helicopters 
returning from delivering air assault forces to Taiwan or enable PLA helicopters to transport 
forward stocks of logistics ashore.  
Although China has not officially revealed the size of its civilian fleet or how it plans to use it 
during an invasion, 2019 information indicated the PLA have at least 63 civilian ROROs suitable 
for military operations.   
Subsequent information from one Chinese province indicates as many as 64 civilian ROROs would 
be made available to the PLA in wartime and that these platforms would be equipped with weapons 
as part of the mobilization process.  
Some public estimates suggest that China’s use of its dual-capable civilian fleet could provide it 
greater displacement tonnage than the sum of all of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships. 


 
 
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In 2022, the PLA significantly stepped up RORO training to supportChina’s military activities by 
more than doubling the number of ROROs used to support similar activity in the prior year. 
Although most of these events consisted of troop movements within or between theaters, several 
marked a continued maturation towards using ROROs and other civilian shipping to support PLA 
amphibious force employment against Taiwan. However, these events have not demonstrated the 
realism or requisitite tactical proficiency to engage in wartime operations. This includes the 
absence of opposed landing operations in unfavorable weather conditions and sea states. It also 
includes a lack of RORO training to operate in convoys, conduct rapid disembarkation, and the 
offload of PLA forces at sea while underway. 
● Floating Causeway Improvement. During three events between May and July 2022, two 
Chinese civilian ROROs participated in docking evolutions with a new floating causeway 
system intended to allow ROROs to disembark forces onto a beach without seizing a port or 
being modified to discharge amphibious vehicles at sea.  The causeway observed in 2022 
featured several improvements over the one used in 2021 to include having six uniform self-
propelled sections extendable to an additional 200 meters.  The causeway system seems to rely 
on a semi-submersible barge to stabilize the causeway, which may limit its utility for a cross 
strait invasion. However, PLA naval writings stress the importance of floating causeways, 
especially those with wave attenuation capabilities, as one solution to dealing with Taiwan 
ports that might be inaccessible for off-loading operations in wartime. 
● Large-Volume Lift Exercise. From mid-July to mid-August, the PLA conducted large 
amphibious lift exercises along China’s Northern and Southern coast, using 12 civilian ships 
including eight large RORO ferries.  The lift capacity, number of vessels stops, and the number 
of participating ground vehicles suggest this training could have simulated the movement of 
up to a full group army for the first time. The PLA also conducted a five-day loading/unloading 
exercise in September 2022 using six ROROs and three cargo ships to simulate the movement 
of a heavy combined arms brigade in a Taiwan invasion. 
● Denial and Deception Training. In August 2022, a PLAA air defense brigade exercise 
attempted to obscure observation of its loading onto a RORO in the Bohai Gulf. A PLA video 
showed the brigade entering a dock-side building where it hid for an undetermined period of 
time before loading onto a RORO using a tarp that extended from the building to the ship, 
likely intended to limit observation of their loading activity.   
● Austere Port Operations. In mid-August 2022, a single RORO supported the transport of 
roughly 40 vehicles from a portion of Dongshan Port that had little cargo handling 
infrastructure, no pier-side RORO ramp, and no tugboat support. This training suggests the 
PLA seeks the capability to operate from any intact pier, even ones without offloading 
infrastructure. 


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●RORO Participation in PLAN Amphibious Forces. From August 31st to September 2nd,
2022, the PLA conducted its most complex use of civilian shipping for amphibious assault
operation at Dacheng Bay and Honghai Bay in southern China. The exercise featured 10
civilian ships – including RORO ferries and RORO vehicle carriers – operating alongside
PLAN amphibious ships, including at least one Type-071 LPD. The operations at Dacheng
Bay made use of the new six-segment floating causeway, supported by a San Hong Gong
submersible floating barge, which docked with at least one RORO ferry. ROROs in both
exercise area off-loaded forces at sea, suggesting stern ramp modifications allowing for at-sea
disembarkation are becoming more commonplace within the RORO fleet. One combined-arms
amphibious brigade and one combined-armed amphibious battalion were believed to have been
delivered as part of this exercise.
PRC Missile Coverage over the Taiwan Strait 
THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTURE FOR A TAIWAN CONFLICT  
PLAA. The PLAA has increased its posture in the Eastern Theater Command and along the 
Taiwan Strait, providing the PLAA with enhanced firepower, mobility, and rapid strike 
capabilities.  Significant reorganizations and amphibious assault training in recent years likely 
indicate that the Taiwan contingency is a high priority for the Army.  Major PLAA contributions 
to a Taiwan invasion scenario likely include extensive amphibious, army aviation, and air assault 
operations.   


 
 
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The PLAA fields six amphibious combined arms brigades—four in the Eastern Theater Command 
(nearest Taiwan) and two in the Southern Theater Command. PLAA units continued amphibious 
assault training as a single service and with joint service counterparts in 2022. Training events 
refined the tactics of rapid loading, long-distance transport and beach assault under complicated 
sea situations, and logistic support capabilities. Press reports also claimed that the PLA extensively 
used sea, air, and ground UAS in support of the amphibious assault operation. PLAA amphibious 
brigades reportedly conduct realistic, large-scale amphibious operations that are almost certainly 
aimed at supporting a Taiwan invasion scenario. 
PLAN. The PLAN is improving its anti-air, anti-surface, and ASW capabilities, further developing 
an at-sea nuclear deterrence, and introducing new multi-mission platforms capable of conducting 
diverse missions during peace and war and has increased its posture surrounding Taiwan since 
August 2022. New attack submarines and modern surface combatants with anti-air capabilities and 
fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force are designed to achieve maritime superiority 
within the FIC as well as to deter and counter any potential third-party intervention in a Taiwan 
conflict. 
The PRC’s amphibious fleet has in recent years focused on acquiring a modest number of ocean-
going LPD and LHA ships. There is no indication the PRC is significantly expanding its number 
of tank landing ships (LSTs) and medium sized landing craft at this time. Although the PLAN has 
not invested in the large number of landing ships and medium landing craft that analysts believe 
the PLA would need for a large-scale assault on Taiwan, it is possible the PLA assesses it has 
sufficient amphibious capacity and has mitigated shortfalls through investment in other operational 
capabilities, such as civilian lift vessels and rotary-wing assets to address this gap. The PLA may 
also have confidence in the PRC’s shipbuilding industry’s massive capacity to produce the 
necessary ship-to-shore connectors relatively quickly.  
PLAAF. The PLAAF has maintained a ready force posture for a variety of capabilities necessary 
in a Taiwan contingency. It has acquired a large number of advanced aircraft capable of conducting 
operations against Taiwan without requiring refueling, providing it with a significant capability to 
conduct air and ground-attack operations. A number of long-range air defense systems provide a 
strong layer of defense against attacks on key military installations or population centers on 
China’s mainland. The PRC’s development of support aircraft provides the PLAAF with improved 
ISR capability to support PLA operations. The PLAAF also has improved refueling capabilities, 
expanding its ability to operate further from China and increasing its ability to threaten third party 
intervention. Throughout 2022, Eastern Theater Command-based PLAAF units operated at higher 
levels than in previous years. Taiwan ADIZ incursions involved greater numbers of aircraft and 
were more frequent than in 2021, demonstrating the PLAAF’s improved ability to sustain pressure 
on Taiwan. 
PLARF. The PLARF is prepared to conduct missile attacks against high-value targets, including 
Taiwan’s C2 facilities, air bases, and radar sites, in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses, 
neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break the public’s will to fight. As of 2023, the PLARF is 


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increasing its presence along the Taiwan Strait with new missile brigades, possibly indicating an 
increasing number of deployed missiles.  
Strategic Support Force (SSF). PLA doctrinal writings emphasize the importance of space and 
cyberspace domains in joint operations. PLA writings suggest that the SSF would be responsible 
for the use of EW and cyberspace operations during a Taiwan contingency, as one of the missions 
of the force is to seize and maintain information dominance. The SSF 311 Base would be 
responsible for political and psychological warfare, such as disseminating propaganda against 
Taiwan to influence public opinion and promote the PRC’s interests. The SSF would also play a 
strategic information and communications support role, centralizing technical intelligence 
collection and management and providing strategic intelligence support to theater commands 
involved in a Taiwan contingency. Following the U.S. Speaker of the House’s CODEL in August 
2022, Taiwan’s MND claimed that China launched widespread cyber-attacks against Taiwan. 
Joint Logistic Support Force (JLSF). The JLSF’s primary goal is to provide joint logistics 
support to the PLA’s strategic and campaign-level operations, such as a Taiwan contingency, by 
conducting C2 of joint logistics, delivering materiel, and overseeing various support mechanisms. 
The JLSF participates in joint, theater-level exercises, becoming most relevant when units operate 
far from their home garrisons and beyond their organic logistics capabilities. 
TAIWAN’S ABILITY TO DETER THE MAINLAND  
Key Takeaways 
●The PRC’s multi-decade military modernization effort continues to widen the capability gap
compared to Taiwan’s military.
●Geopolitical events in 2022 accelerated Taiwan’s development of new concepts and
capabilities for asymmetric warfare to counter the PRC’s improving capabilities.
Taiwan has positioned itself as “a beacon of democracy” to generate international support and 
expand regional security ties. Taiwan is taking steps to compensate for the growing disparity with 
the PLA, including building its war reserve stocks, growing its defense-industrial base, improving 
joint operations and crisis response capabilities, and strengthening its officer and 
noncommissioned officer corps. Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review 2021 reflects adjustments 
to the military’s strategy for defending the island by placing emphasis on protecting its littorals 
and near-shore coastal areas in a multi-layered defense-in-depth. The modified strategy stresses 
enhanced asymmetric and joint capabilities, as well as suggesting greater reliance on Taiwan’s Air 
Force and Navy through multi-domain deterrence measures.  
In 2022, Russia’s war on Ukraine and the PRC’s forceful response to then-U.S. Speaker of the 
House’s CODEL to Taiwan in August increased the urgency with which Taiwan is pursuing 
defense reforms. The PRC’s response to the then-U.S. House Speaker’s visit accelerated the PRC’s 


 
 
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ongoing military and gray zone activity toward Taiwan. The PRC’s actions likely intended to 
establish a new status quo and to place greater operational demands on Taiwan’s military. 
Taiwan’s planned improvements only partially address its defense challenges, and a majority of 
Taiwan citizens believe that the then-Speaker’s visit and the PLA response were detrimental to 
Taiwan’s security. 
Taiwan’s armed forces are authorized to fill approximately 215,000 billets, including 188,000 
active-duty billets. As of 2021, the MND had accomplished its goal to fill 90 percent of the active 
duty billets (169,000) with volunteers. As Taiwan transitions to an all-volunteer force, the cost 
savings from manpower reductions provided some margin to improve individual pay and benefits, 
housing, and incentive pay. However, these savings have been insufficient to cover the full 
increase in manpower-related costs needed to attract and retain personnel under the new system. 
Taiwan also faces considerable equipment and readiness obstacles.  
Reservists, conscripts, and civil defense volunteers support the volunteer active duty forces. 
Taiwan’s number of reserve personnel ranges from one to two million, while there are fewer than 
half a million conscripts. In 2021, Taiwan passed legislation to establish an organization to 
improve the mobilization of reserves and civilians to support military operations.  In 2022, Taiwan 
implemented this legislation by establishing the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which 
coordinates a whole-of-society approach to support military operations and disaster prevention and 
response. In December 2022, Taiwan announced that it would extend the duration of mandatory 
military conscription service from four months to one year and double conscripts’ monthly salary 
starting in 2024. 
Taiwan continues to increase its defense budget to support defense acquisitions and strengthen its 
forces against Chinese pressure. In 2020, the Tsai administration announced defense spending to 
be the highest level since 1990. In October 2022, Taiwan proposed total defense spending of about 
$19 billion for 2023, a 13.9 percent increase from 2022, which will represent about 2.4 percent of 
Taiwan’s GDP. In January 2022, Taiwan approved an $8 billion multi-year supplemental defense 
budget to strengthen Taiwan’s air and sea combat capabilities. Over half of Taiwan’s supplemental 
defense spending will fund missile corvettes and anti-ship weapons, such as the Hsiung Feng 
missile system.  Meanwhile, China’s official defense budget continues to grow to around $230 
billion in 2022, about 12 times larger than Taiwan’s defense budget, with much of China’s defense 
budget focused on developing the capability to unify Taiwan with the PRC by force.  
Recognizing the growing disparity between their respective defense expenditures, Taiwan has 
stated that it is working to develop new cost effective concepts and capabilities for asymmetric 
warfare. Specific areas of emphasis in Taiwan’s strategy include offensive and defensive 
information and electronic warfare, high-speed stealth vessels, shore-based mobile missiles, rapid 
mining and minesweeping, unmanned aerial systems, and critical infrastructure protection. Taiwan 
has also dedicated significant defense spending toward its Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems, 
domestic submarine program, upgrading its existing F-16 fighters and producing the remaining 
three of a previously planned four transport docks.  


 
 
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The United States maintains a one-China policy that is based on the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC Joint 
Communiqués, and the Six Assurances; opposes unilateral actions aimed at altering the status quo; 
and continues to support the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues in a manner, scope, and pace 
acceptable to both sides. Consistent with the TRA, the United States contributes to peace, security, 
and stability in the Taiwan Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Since 2009 Taiwan has received about $30 billion in 
arms sales from the United States. Taiwan currently has arms sales agreements to acquire Stinger 
missiles, Javelins, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, Harpoon missiles, and F-16 fighter 
jets.   
PRC EFFORTS TO CONFLATE FOREIGN ONE CHINA POLICIES WITH 
ITS “ONE CHINA PRINCIPLE” 
The PRC’s “One China principle,” established in 1949, according to PRC government 
white papers, predicates diplomatic relations with the PRC on “recognizing” the 
“government of the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the whole of 
China” and “that Taiwan is part of China.”  
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, countries around the world have enacted 
respective and unique “One China” policies that govern their relations with the PRC and 
Taiwan. Some countries have endorsed the PRC’s “One China principle” in their national 
“One China” policies, while other countries have determined to “acknowledge,” 
“understand,” or “note” the PRC’s position within their respective, national “One China” 
policies. These unique “One China” policies, and their attendant joint communiques with 
the PRC, provide countries around the world with the legal basis upon which each country 
engages with the PRC and Taiwan.  
The U.S. one China policy is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. Under the three Joint Communiques, the U.S. 
acknowledged the PRC’s position and reaffirmed U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of 
the “Taiwan question.” U.S. implementation interpretation of the 1982 Communique 
related to arms sales to Taiwan is guided by President Ronald Reagan’s August 17th, 
1982 internal presidential memo (known as the Six Assurances), where he stated the 
U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned “absolutely” upon the 
continued commitment of the PRC to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC cross-Strait 
differences. The Six Assurances, delivered to Taiwan in 1982, outlined key principles for 
continued U.S. support for Taiwan.  
The PRC has sought to conflate the United States, as well as other foreign nations’ 
respective “One China” policies, with its own “One China principle.” This effort erroneously 
portrays broad international support for its claim over Taiwan, attempts to legitimize PRC 
coercion against Taiwan, and make assertions of “broken legal commitments” by 
countries who engage with Taiwan in ways that Beijing perceives as threatening to its 
unification objectives.   


 
 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE PLA’S GROWING 
GLOBAL PRESENCE  
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
 CCP leaders view the PLA’s growing global presence as an essential part of the PRC’s 
international activities to create an international environment conducive to China’s national 
rejuvenation.   
 The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s 
borders and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance 
its foreign policy goals.  
The CCP continues its goal to create international conditions that are conducive to the PRC’s 
development and compatible with its aspirations for the PRC’s rejuvenation as a “great modern 
socialist country.” CCP leaders believe that the PRC’s global activities, including the PLA’s 
growing global presence, contribute to creating a “favorable” international environment for the 
PRC’s national rejuvenation. Of note, the PRC’s perception of its international security 
environment is evolving in ways that Beijing views as “increasingly complex.” The PRC’s view 
of its increasingly complex security environment likely also factors into the PLA’s growing global 
ambitions.  
The CCP has tasked the PLA to develop the capability to project power outside China’s borders 
and immediate periphery to secure the PRC’s growing overseas interests and advance its foreign 
policy goals. The PRC is focusing on efforts to develop security relationships with key countries 
along its periphery. In addition to promoting BRI, the PRC is seeking new cooperative security 
partnerships with foreign nations, including the expansion of the PLA’s global military attaché 
presence and access, expansion of strategic partnerships, and ensuring more reliable, cost-
effective, and diverse sources of energy and other strategic resources.  
The PRC probably will continue to expand the PLA’s global military presence through 
humanitarian assistance, naval escorts and port calls, peacekeeping operations (PKO), arm sales, 
influence operations, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through these engagements, 
Beijing can strengthen and expand its diplomatic relationships to advance its foreign policy goals, 
to include shaping the international system to align with the PRC’s interests, gaining operational 
experience for the PLA, and attracting foreign interest in hosting PLA bases and dual-use 
installations abroad.  


 
 
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CHINA’S GLOBAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES  
Key Takeaways 
● The PRC has increasingly determined that its armed forces should take a more active role in 
advancing its foreign policy goals.  
● As the PRC’s overseas interests have grown over the past two decades, the Party’s leaders have 
increasingly pushed the PLA to think about how it will develop the capabilities to operate 
beyond China’s borders and its immediate periphery to advance and defend these interests. 
This has led to the PRC’s greater willingness to use military coercion — and inducements — 
to advance its global security and development interests. 
● In 2022, the PLA continued to normalize its presence overseas and build closer ties to foreign 
militaries. In 2022, Beijing maintained an active peacekeeping force of more than 2,000 
personnel stationed abroad, conducted regular anti-piracy escorts in the Gulf of Aden and 
waters off Somalia, continued construction of a PLA facility at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, 
participated in bi- and multilateral military exercises, and restarted in-person military 
diplomacy suspended by COVID-19.  
THE PLA’S EVOLVING MISSIONS AND TASKS 
In 2004, one of the “new historic missions” given to the PLA by then-President Hu Jintao was to 
support China’s overseas interests and diplomacy. The PLAN’s evolving focus—from “offshore 
defense” to “open seas protection”—reflects the PLAN’s interest in a wider operational reach. The 
PLAAF’s missions and tasks have similarly evolved towards conducting operations beyond China 
and its immediate periphery and supporting the PRC’s interests by becoming a “strategic” air force. 
Additionally, the PLA has embraced its concept of NWMA as an effective way to support and 
safeguard the PRC’s development, expand the PRC’s global interests, and gain valuable 
operational experience.  
The PLAN, PLAAF, PLAA, and SSF have deployed abroad for counterpiracy, HA/DR, 
peacekeeping, training exercises, and space support operations. Within the PLA, the PLAN has 
the most experience operating abroad due to its far seas deployments and counterpiracy missions,  
the PLAAF likely has the most experience conducting rapid response HA/DR operations abroad,  
and the PLAA has the most experience conducting peacekeeping operations. The SSF operates 
tracking, telemetry, and command stations in Namibia, Pakistan, Argentina, and Kenya. The SSF 
also has a handful of Yuan-wang space support ships to track satellite and ICBM launches. 
● Increasingly, the PLAN is operating outside of its home waters to places including the Middle 
East, Europe, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. The PLAN has 
also conducted submarine deployments to the Indian Ocean, demonstrating its increasing 
familiarity in that region and underscoring the PRC’s interest in protecting SLOCs beyond the 


 
 
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SCS.  In 2015, three PLAN ships from a Gulf of Aden naval escort task force (NETF) 
evacuated 629 PRC citizens from Yemen to Djibouti and Oman.  
● Since 2002, the PLAAF has delivered aid after natural disasters throughout Southeast Asia and 
South Asia and assisted with evacuations from Libya and Yemen. In January 2022, the PLAAF 
flew relief supplies to Tonga ten days after a volcanic eruption devastated the island nation, 
offering the PLA to normalize its presence in the region.  
PLA OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE  
Counterterrorism. Beijing is implementing its global counterterrorism strategy through 
international outreach that spans across diplomatic and military domains to garner the assistance 
of partner governments to prevent terrorist attacks in China and against Chinese citizens and 
economic projects abroad. The PRC routinely lobbies foreign partners to extradite alleged Uyghur 
extremists, coordinates with host nations to pursue terrorist threats, and seeks public endorsement 
of its counterterrorism efforts in multilateral forums. Beijing further leverages involvement in 
regional security forums, joint border patrols, and international exercises to press its neighbors into 
adopting the PRC’s approach to counterterrorism operations. 
Counterpiracy Efforts. In 2008, the PLAN joined anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, its first 
missions outside the Western Pacific. Since then, China has dispatched more than 40 NETFs to 
the region to escort Chinese and foreign ships. This naval activity demonstrates the PLAN’s 
increasing familiarity with the area, hones its ability to operate in far seas, and allows the PLAN 
to advance military diplomacy efforts by conducting port calls in Africa. In 2022, in addition to 
deploying its 42nd NETF to the Gulf of Aden, the PLAN convened a China-Africa symposium to 
discuss cooperating on anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.   
Peacekeeping Operations. China is the largest contributor of peacekeepers among the five UN 
Security Council permanent members, having deployed about 50,000 personnel over 31 years and 
pledged an 8,000-strong PKO standby force to the UN’s Peacekeeping Capability Readiness 
System. Beijing frames these efforts as advancing cooperative global governance, peaceful 
development, and the principles of the UN Charter, which are key components of its responsible 
global power narrative. However, the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa have also become a 
testing ground for China's "far seas operations" as Beijing seeks to extend its reach in tandem with 
the growth and expansion of its interests. The PRC could use its role in the UN PKOs to collect 
intelligence on other UN units, and supporting these missions demonstrates the PLA’s ability to 
operate outside of China’s borders.    
● In 2022, the PRC provided about 2,200 personnel to eight UN PKO missions in Africa and the 
Middle East: Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel, Lebanon, Mali, South Sudan, 
Sudan, and Western Sahara. These personnel consist of groups-infantry, engineering, medical 
service, and maintenance specialists. The PRC troop contributions have slightly decreased 
from 2,548 personnel in 2021 to 2,200 in 2022.  


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MILITARY ATTACHÉ PRESENCE 
The PRC’s military attaché presence continues to grow globally, reflecting the PRC’s 
increasing interests in military modernization and partnerships. Military Attaché offices 
manage the day-to-day overseas military diplomacy efforts in over 110 offices worldwide. 
The attachés serve as military advisors to the ambassador, and support Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and PLA foreign policy objectives. They also perform a variety of PLA 
military and security cooperation duties, including counterpart exchanges with host-
nation and third-country personnel.  Additionally, the attachés conduct clandestine and 
overt intelligence collection on respective areas of responsibility. Although the general 
function of an attaché office is the same worldwide, individual attaché offices probably 
prioritize specific missions or diplomatic priorities based on location, close bilateral 
relations, or other factors.  
The PRC’s military attaché offices vary in size, generally ranging from two to 1-officers. 
Most offices are made of two to three officers, although officers in countries considered 
important to China’s strategic interests often employ more attachés. These offices 
potentially include multiple assistant attaches, service attaches such as naval or air force, 
and additional support staff. 
MILITARY COOPERATION 
As the PRC’s regional and international interests grow increasingly complex, the PLA’s 
international engagements likely will continue to expand. Beijing often relies on senior military 
visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises and training, peacekeeping, and military assistance to 
promote the PRC’s foreign policy objectives.  
Senior-level military visits and international exchanges remained limited in 2022 due to continuing 
COVID-19 restrictions in China. Many engagements were still conducted via remote video, such 
as the 2nd China-Africa Peace and Security Forum Ministerial and a minister-level meeting with 
Latin American and Caribbean nations.  In 2022, former PRC Defense Minister Wei Fenghe 
resumed attending some multilateral security meetings in person, including the revived Shangri-
La Dialogue in Singapore and the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus in Cambodia. Wei 
also traveled to traditional partner nations such as Russia and Iran, and met with his Australian 
counterpart for the first time in two years.   Wei likely undertook these visits to influence foreign 
approaches to shared security concerns, demonstrate solidarity with long-standing partners, and 
improve bilateral and multilateral defense relations. 
The PLA continued to participate in bilateral and multilateral military exercises in 2022, though 
fewer than in past years, likely in part due to lingering concerns over COVID-19. The PLA carried 
out what appears to be a standard annual list of military exercises with the Russian military: the 


 
 
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Joint Sea naval exercise and a joint naval patrol; two strategic aerial patrols; and PLA participation 
in Russia’s capstone military exercise, VOSTOK 2022. The PRC and Russia also conducted a 
trilateral naval exercise with Iran, the third such exercise since 2019. Other bilateral exercises the 
PLA conducted last year included the fifth FALCON STRIKE air exercise with Thailand, the 
PEACE TRAIN humanitarian rescue exercise with Laos, and the SEA GUARDIANS naval 
exercise with Pakistan. The PRC’s lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in late 2022 will likely 
facilitate the reinvigoration of PLA defense activities abroad as well as the hosting of senior level 
bilateral and multilateral engagements in China. 
Military Education Collaboration. Beijing considers establishing international professional 
military education (PME) as a way to create transnational networks of alumni, foster a common 
understanding of military operational doctrine, and strengthen the PRC’s defense and security ties. 
Over the past decade, the PRC has increased its military exchange programs with a bias toward 
junior officers. Nearly half of the 70 military academies operated in China admit foreign students 
but only a few offers senior-level education. The College of Defense Studies of the PLA National 
Defense University (PLA NDU) provides the highest level of training for foreign officers offered 
by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. In addition to training foreign senior military officials, 
PLA NDU conducts international exchanges and academic discussions on defense and security 
issues.   The PLA NDU has accepted students from more than 100 partner nations and has pursued 
relationships with Latin American and African militaries.  
Although third countries have historically perceived Chinese PME as less prestigious than Russian 
or U.S. PME, the PRC’s growing economic clout and expanded global security presence has 
bolstered the international reputation of Chinese programs. For example, PLA NDU offers 
students higher stipends and greater exposure to Chinese technological and scientific innovations 
(such as military applications of AI) than Russian schools. 
The PRC also cultivates transnational alumni and shared doctrinal understanding through short-
term course offerings. Since 2002, the PLA NDU sought to increase exchanges with the 
international military community by sponsoring annual security seminars which aim to foster 
cooperation, strengthen military exchanges, and attempt to impart a common approach to issues 
of interest to the community. The PLA NDU has received thousands of students from over 90 
countries and maintains regular contacts with military academies in more than 10 countries in 
addition to over 140 countries’ militaries. 
Despite the PRC’s progress to enhance its PME programs, cultural and linguistic barriers limit the 
effectiveness of Chinese PME. For example, foreign student and host nation student contacts and 
opportunities for interaction are limited due to the separation between Chinese and foreign 
language courses. Additionally, despite detailed dives on specific issues, PRC military schools 
rarely teach students about the root causes of security problems. Military ethics and human rights 
are off-limits for discussion within the PLA NDU curriculum and students are prohibited from 
criticizing the PRC’s record in these areas.  


 
 
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In November 2022, the PLA hosted the third International Army Forum on Military Education via 
video link from Nanjing. Participants from 21 military academies in 10 countries including 
Pakistan, Greece, Egypt, and Argentina discussed training and career paths for junior army 
officers. According to an official PLA news site, the annual forum seeks to foster dialogue and 
cooperation between Chinese military academies and other nations.  
PLA OVERSEAS BASING AND ACCESS 
 Key Takeaways 
● The PRC is seeking to expand its overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA 
to project and sustain military power at greater distances. 
● A global PLA military logistics network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s 
global military objectives evolve. 
● Beyond the PLA support base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely already considering and 
planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces 
projection. 
● In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia’s 
Ream Naval Base. The PRC probably also has considered other countries as locations for PLA 
military logistics facilities, including Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United 
Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.  
The PRC is seeking to establish a more robust overseas logistics and basing infrastructure to allow 
the PLA to project and sustain military power at greater distances. Beijing may assess that a 
mixture of military logistics models, including preferred access to commercial infrastructure 
abroad, exclusive PLA logistics facilities with prepositioned supplies co-located with commercial 
infrastructure, and bases with stationed forces, most closely aligns with the PRC’s overseas 
military logistics needs. Some of the PRC’s BRI projects could create potential military 
advantages, such as PLA access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics 
support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, 
and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests. 
● Official PRC sources assert that military logistics facilities, to include its Djibouti base, will 
be used to provide international public goods like HA/DR, and secure China’s lines of 
communication, citizens, and assets abroad. Regardless, a global PLA military logistics 
network could disrupt U.S. military operations as the PRC’s global military objectives evolve. 
Host nations can perform an essential role in regulating the PRC’s military operations, as PRC 
officials very likely recognize that a stable long-term relationship with the host nation is critical 
to the success of their military logistics facilities. 


 
 
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● PRC military academics assert that bases abroad can enable forward deployment of PLA forces 
and support military conflict, diplomatic signaling, political change, bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation, and training. They also suggest that a military logistics network could enable 
intelligence monitoring of the U.S. military.  
● In August 2017, the PRC officially opened its first PLA base in Djibouti. PLANMC are 
stationed at the base with wheeled armored vehicles and artillery but are currently limited in 
their ability to conduct expeditionary operations due to a lack of helicopters at the facility. 
Notably, we have no evidence that the PRC has used its base to assist in evacuation of Chinese 
citizens.  
● In late March 2022, a Type 903A “Fuchi” class supply ship, Luomahu (AOE-964), docked at 
the 450-meter pier for resupply; this was the first such reported PLA Navy port call to the 
Djibouti support base, indicating that the pier is now operational. The pier likely is able to 
accommodate the PLA Navy’s aircraft carriers, other large combatants, and submarines. PLA 
personnel at the facility have interfered with U.S. flights by lasing pilots and flying drones, 
and the PRC has sought to restrict Djiboutian sovereign airspace over the base. 
Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional military 
logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection. The PLA’s approach likely 
includes consideration of many different sites and outreach to many countries, but only some will 
advance to negotiations for an infrastructure agreement, status of forces or visiting forces 
agreement, and/or basing agreement. Critical organizations involved in planning and negotiating 
for military logistics facilities are CMC Joint Staff Department, CMC Logistic Support 
Department, and service headquarters. The PRC’s overseas military basing will be constrained by 
the willingness of potential host nations to support a PLA presence. Host nations are likely 
concerned about risks to sovereignty, regional and international perceptions, and relations with the 
United States when considering hosting a Chinese military facility. PRC interlocutors likely use 
all means available to conduct influence operations to gain political favor among elites in host 
nations, while obfuscating the scale and scope of PRC political and military interests.  
In June 2021, Cambodian Defense Minister Tea Bahn stated that the PRC would help to modernize 
and expand Ream but would not be the only country given access to the facility. The following 
June, China and Cambodia hosted a ground opening ceremony for the Chinese-built upgrades of 
the Ream base.  
The PRC has likely also considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab 
Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The PRC has 
probably already made overtures to Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. According to a 
draft copy of the China-Solomon Islands Security Agreement, the PRC will be permitted to send 
armed police and military personnel to the Solomon Islands to help maintain order, though the 
Solomon Island government denied this would lead to a PRC military base. The PLA is most 


 
 
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interested in military access along the SLOCs from China to the Strait of Hormuz, Africa, and the 
Pacific Islands.  
China seeks to strengthen its security ties through small-scale, in-country efforts to support 
domestic security. As of 2022, the PRC provides occasional personnel support at public events for 
the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force.  In Africa, the PRC maintains an embedded PLA training 
cadre for local military forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a military training 
school in Tanzania. The PRC probably pursues such efforts in regions it assesses can help foster 
favorable environments for its security goals, but these efforts do not signal definite interest in 
overseas basing. 
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
Key Takeaways  
● The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected the CCP’s understandings of cyber operations 
as the primary means for psychological manipulation. 
● The PLA concept of Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO) combines psychological warfare 
with cyber operations to shape adversary behavior and decision making.  
● The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or third-party 
entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize a 
society.   
The PLA views controlling the information spectrum in the modern battlespace as a critical enabler 
and means of achieving information dominance early in a conflict. Beginning in the early 2000s, 
as part of the PRC’s overall influence operations, the PLA began developing the “Three Warfares” 
concept, which calls for the coordinated use of public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and 
legal warfare. Public opinion warfare creates and disseminates information to guide an adversary’s 
public opinion and gain support from domestic and foreign audiences. Psychological warfare uses 
propaganda, deception, and coercion to induce pressure and affect the behavior of the target 
audience. Legal warfare uses domestic and international laws to shape narratives that advance 
Chinese interests and undermine those of an adversary. The PLA likely seeks to combine digital 
influence activities with the “Three Warfares” concept to demoralize adversaries and influence 
domestic and foreign audiences, creating an environment advantageous to the PRC.  
From the PRC’s perspective, all nations – especially the United States – that use digital narratives 
to undermine the CCP’s authoritarian system in China employ offensive influence operations. 
Hence, the PRC considers its influence operations that counter this perceived subversion as 
defensive in order to protect the party and the military.  
Another primary goal of the PRC’s influence operations is to maintain domestic stability and 
protect CCP rule. Domestically, the CCP uses influence activities to protect its image to the public 


 
 
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and garner popular support for the military. Internationally, Beijing aims to create an information 
environment favorable to the PRC and its strategic foreign policy objectives.  The PRC conducts 
influence operations that target media organizations, businesses, academic and cultural 
institutions, and policy communities of the United States, other countries, and international 
organizations to achieve outcomes favorable to its strategic and military objectives.  
PRC INFLUENCE ACTORS  
PRC influence operations are coordinated and executed by a range of affiliated actors, such as the 
United Front Work Department (UFWD), the MSS, and the SSF. The CCP likely seeks to 
condition multilateral political establishments and public opinion to accept the PRC’s narrative 
surrounding its priorities such as the PRC’s “one China principle” on Taiwan unification, BRI, 
political control over Hong Kong, and territorial and maritime claims in the SCS and ECS. In mid-
2022, official messaging from diplomatic personnel, state media outlets, and diplomatic social 
media accounts surrounding the U.S. Speaker of the House’s visit to Taiwan highlighted how the 
PRC uses influence operations to shape the information environment surrounding Taiwan policy. 
In an August 2022 PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Communique, Beijing advanced its official 
narrative that the PRC is a responsible, law-abiding member of the international community and 
that the U.S. Speaker’s visit unlawfully violated the PRC’s sovereignty and needlessly provoked 
potential U.S.-China confrontation. 
PRC INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
PRC influence operations can range from lobbying and cultivating foreign politicians, injecting 
Chinese cultural narratives or values into foreign education systems, bringing academic or thank 
tank researchers’ access to China, and flooding Chinese language media abroad, all of which can 
be accomplished via diplomacy or coercive means. For example, a hallmark of the PRC’s influence 
strategy includes appealing to overseas PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese of other countries as 
indirect proxies to assert the CCP’s objectives through soft power engagements.  The PRC often 
targets Uyghurs and overseas dissidents with harassment or threats to imprison their family 
members in China.   Furthermore, the UFWD collaborated with overseas Chinese communities in 
the Global South, including Latin America and Caribbean countries in order to shape positive 
views of China that would better facilitate economic ties.  Additionally, the PRC’s “Thousand 
Talents Program” targets overseas Chinese emigrants to support its foreign technology acquisition 
strategy, which is critical to China’s scientific and technical modernization.  
The PRC has demonstrated its intent to use multilateral forums and organizations to expand its 
defense influence and security cooperation, while establishing a leadership role in those 
organizations.   The PRC promotes strategic messaging by portraying China as a responsible global 
actor through international organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and through PRC created multilateral regional forums like 
the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Arab States Cooperation, the China-


 
 
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Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Framework, the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), and through organizations which exclude traditional western partners, 
such as  Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). In August 2022, official PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarks to the 
FOCAC advanced a narrative that, unlike other potential foreign partners, Beijing respected the 
sovereignty of African nations and was committed to supporting sustainable development, food 
security, public health services, and foreign direct investment across the continent. In May 2022, 
the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs highlighted the Forum for Senior Defense Officials from 
Caribbean and South Pacific Countries, last hosted by Beijing in 2019, as evidence of its strong 
security cooperation with the Solomon Islands.   
The PRC government-affiliated entities use overt and covert messaging vectors, such as the 
internet and social media platforms, and military cyber capabilities during both peacetime and 
wartime. The PLA’s goals for social media influence operations include promoting narratives to 
shape foreign governments’ policies and public opinion in favor of the PRC’s interests and 
undermining adversary resolve. The PLA views social media through the prism of information 
dominance, and during a crisis could use digital influence operations to undermine enemy morale 
and confuse or deceive adversary decision makers. Most Chinese media platforms, including 
traditional and digital newspaper and television programs, are either state-owned or heavily 
influenced by Beijing to augment the CCP’s response to geopolitics and often take on a more 
aggressive messaging tone. 
COGNITIVE DOMAIN OPERATIONS (CDO)  
The creation of the PLA SSF in 2015 reflected that the CCP understands cyber operations as the 
primary means for psychological manipulation. As the PLA seeks to expand the reach of its 
influence operations around the world and seize information dominance on the battlefield, it is 
researching and developing what it believes to be the next evolution of psychological warfare, 
which it calls CDO. CDO blends previous Chinese concepts such as public opinion and 
psychological warfare with modern internet technologies and communication platforms, and is 
designed to achieve strategic national security goals by affecting a target’s cognition and resulting 
in a change in the target’s decision making and behavior. The PLA has recognized the importance 
of incorporating emerging technologies such as AI, big data, brain science, and neuroscience into 
CDO as PLA perceives that these technologies will lead to profound changes in the ability to 
subvert human cognition. 
The goal of CDO is to achieve what the PLA refers to as “mind dominance, which the PLA defines 
as the use of information to influence public opinion to affect change in a nation’s social system, 
likely to create an environment favorable to China and reduce civilian and military resistance to 
PLA actions. The PLA probably intends to use CDO as an asymmetric capability to deter U.S. or 
third-party entry into a future conflict, or as an offensive capability to shape perceptions or polarize 
a society. Authoritative PLA documents describe one aspect of deterrence as the ability to bring 
about psychological pressure and fear on an opponent and force them to surrender. PLA articles 


 
 
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on CDO state that seizing mind dominance in the cognitive domain and subduing the enemy 
without fighting is the highest realm of warfare. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE  
The PRC almost certainly is learning lessons from the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine that 
are most applicable to the PRC’s strategic interests of strengthening its whole-of-government 
approach to counter a perceived U.S.-led containment strategy.  From the PRC’s perspective, the 
war provides unique opportunities for PRC leaders to evaluate how countries use diplomatic, 
informational, military, and economic measures to advance their interests before, during and after 
a major conflict. As the conflict continues, the PRC’s ultimate takeaways probably will depend on 
the conflict’s resolution, the PRC’s predispositions and perceptions of Washington’s intent toward 
the PRC and competing bureaucratic priorities within the PRC system. 
Diplomatically, the war in Ukraine probably has reaffirmed to Beijing the importance of 
persuading Global South countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific 
to echo China’s narratives on the conflict. The PRC probably views support from the developing 
countries as crucial to blunting U.S.-led efforts imposing reputational and economic costs on the 
PRC as well as claiming broad international support for PRC goals. At the same time, Beijing 
almost certainly continues to be surprised by the scope, scale, duration, and cohesion of the 
international response to Russia war on Ukraine. The PRC’s dismissal of the independent agency 
of countries it views as aligned with the United States or the legitimacy of shared values almost 
certainly has contributed to the PRC’s continued diplomatic struggles, especially in Europe. 
The PLA likely is observing how Russia and Ukraine are employing CDO during the current 
Russia-Ukraine war, and likely will seek to incorporate lessons learned from this conflict into its 
own doctrine for future conflicts. The PLA’s lessons learned from Russia’s war of aggression in 
Ukraine probably will reinforce a commitment to conducting influence operations to deter 
adversaries, shape public opinion early on during a conflict, polarize societies, erode the will to 
fight, and guard against charismatic leaders changing public perceptions. PLA researchers have 
stated that the victory of the cognitive narrative may yield greater strategic benefits than firepower 
destruction, force control, and siege, and that effects of CDO can last long after the conflict has 
concluded.   
On the economic front, western sanctions against Russia almost certainly have amplified the 
PRC’s push for defense and technological self-sufficiency and financial resilience. The PRC’s 
reliance on Western technology and capital investment probably will slow economic decoupling 
from Washington. 
 
 
 


 
 
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PRC ENERGY STRATEGY  
Key Takeaway 
● The PRC’s interest in ensuring reliable, cost-effective, and diverse hydrocarbon sources to 
support its economic growth drives its overseas energy investments. 
In 2022, the PRC imported approximately 10.2 million barrels per day of crude oil, which met 
about 70 percent of its needs, and produced the other 30 percent domestically, according to 
industry reports.  The PRC continues to build its crude oil emergency petroleum reserve (EPR) 
capacity to safeguard against supply disruptions with a goal to have the equivalent of 90 days’ 
worth of oil imports in storage. The PRC’s EPR storage capacity is approximately 600 million 
barrels, equal to about 60 days’ worth of oil imports, according to industry data.  The PRC met 
about 41 percent of its natural gas demand with imports in 2022, and industry experts estimate that 
the PRC’s natural gas imports will increase to about 50 percent by 2035.  In 2022, most of China’s 
oil and natural gas imports came from Africa, Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Russia.  China’s 
investments in transport networks for oil and gas could help diversify its supply and reduce 
dependency on strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. 
The PRC relies on maritime routes that transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca for most of its 
hydrocarbon deliveries. Approximately 62 percent of the PRC’s oil imports and 17 percent of its 
total natural gas imports transit the SCS and Strait of Malacca.  Despite the PRC’s efforts to 
diversify energy suppliers, Beijing will most likely continue to rely on oil and natural gas imports 
from Africa and the Middle East to meet energy demands for at least the next 10 years.  
Crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China demonstrate the PRC’s interest in 
increasing overland fuel supply. In 2022, the PRC imported about 600,000 barrels per day of 
Russian crude oil via the East Siberia–Pacific Ocean pipeline, which has a total designed capacity 
of 1.6 million barrels per day.   The PRC also imports crude oil from Middle Eastern—primarily 
Saudi—and African suppliers via a crude oil pipeline across Burma. This 440,000-barrels-per-day 
pipeline bypasses the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oil from Kyaukpyu, Burma, to 
Yunnan Province, China, and reduces shipping time by more than a third.  This pipeline, however, 
still relies on seaborne oil imports through the Indian Ocean, where the PRC has little power 
projection capability. 
In 2022, approximately 30 percent of the PRC’s natural gas imports came from Turkmenistan via 
a pipeline that runs through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.  This pipeline can transport 55 billion 
cubic meters per year; Turkmenistan and China are planning to expand it to 85 billion cubic meters 
per year. A natural gas pipeline connecting China to Burma can deliver 12 billion cubic meters per 
year, but only 4 billion cubic meters of gas was shipped in 2022.  Russia’s Power of Siberia gas 
pipeline supplied approximately 15 billion cubic meters to China in 2022. The pipeline is projected 
to reach an annual capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per year by 2027.   


 
 
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CRITICAL MINERAL EXPLOITATION 
China controls the majority of the global critical minerals refining, in addition to the 
majority of rare earth element (REE) production and refining. Critical minerals such as 
lithium are key to the green energy transition, while REEs have significant industrial and 
defense applications.  A 2022 Brookings report estimated that the PRC refines 68 
percent of nickel, 40 percent of copper, 59 percent of lithium, and 73 percent of cobalt. 
However, other countries make up the majority of lithium and cobalt mining. While China’s 
share of the global extraction of REEs has declined from a peak of 95 percent in 2010 to 
nearly 60 percent in 2019, the world is still significantly reliant on China for over 90 
percent of REE processing and refining.   The PRC’s control of these supply chains could 
grant it a competitive advantage in sustainable energy technologies such as lithium-ion 
battery production and secure critical supply lines for its defense industrial base and 
production of high-end weapons platforms.   
 
CHINA’S TOP CRUDE SUPPLIERS 2022 
Country 
Volume (1,000 barrels per day) 
Percentage of Imported Crude Oil 
Saudi Arabia 
1,752 
17 
Russia 
1,728 
17 
Iraq  
1,111 
11 
UAE 
858 
8 
Oman 
789 
8 
Malaysia 
715 
7 
Kuwait 
667 
7 
Angola 
603 
6 
Brazil  
497 
5 
Colombia 
173 
2 
Others 
1,289 
13 
Total 
10,182 
101* 
* Total does not equal 100 because figures have been rounded. 
 


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CHINA IN THE POLAR REGIONS 
CHINA IN THE ARCTIC  
The PRC has increased activities and engagement in the Arctic region since gaining observer status 
in the Arctic Council in 2013. In January 2018, the PRC published its first Arctic strategy paper 
that promoted a “Polar Silk Road” and declared China to be a “near-Arctic State,” although it has 
since stopped using this language to describe itself in public fora. The strategy paper identifies the 
PRC’s interests as access to natural resources, sea lines of communication, and promoting an 
image of a “responsible major country” in Arctic affairs.  The strategy highlights the PRC’s 
icebreaker vessels and research stations as integral to implementation.  
The PRC maintains civilian research stations in Iceland and Norway and operates three icebreaking 
research vessels as of early 2023.  The first is the Xue Long, which in 2017 became the first official 
Chinese vessel to traverse Canada’s Northwest Passage. In 2018, Beijing launched its second 
icebreaking research vessel, the Xue Long 2.  The Xue Long 2 can break ice up to 1.5 meters thick, 
compared to the Xue Long’s maximum of 1.2 meters, and the first polar research vessel that can 
break ice while moving forwards or backwards.  In October 2022, the Xue Long 2 commenced the 
PRC’s 12th Arctic expedition, during which researchers did comprehensive observations of the 
atmosphere, ocean and ecology. During the 12th Arctic Expedition, the PRC deployed an 
autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) for the first time in the Arctic Ocean. In November 2020, 
the Xue Long 2 embarked on the PRC’s 37th Antarctic expedition, where researchers planned to 
carry out hydrological, meteorological and environmental studies and monitor new pollutants such 
as microplastics and drifting garbage in the Antarctic Ocean. In February 2023, the PRC’s third 
polar icebreaker—the Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—completed a 3,000-mile round-trip winter sea 
trial in the Bohai Sea. 
The PRC’s expanding Arctic engagement has created new opportunities for engagement between 
the PRC and Russia. The PRC is interested in increasing the use of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
to cut shipping times between Europe and China by a third. The use of the NSR also allows China 
to diversify shipping routes away from the strategic Strait of Malacca. In September 2022, China 
and Russia also conducted a combined naval patrol in the Bering Sea. China-Russia cooperation 
on Arctic issues throughout 2022 likely created momentum enabling spring 2023 agreements to 
coordinate Arctic maritime law enforcement and establish a joint working body for the 
development of the NSR.    
THE PRC IN THE ANTARCTIC  
China currently has four active Antarctic sites that are used for environmental research and support 
to the Chinese space program: the Great Wall Station, Zhongshan Station, Kunlun Station, and 
Taishan Station. China is quickly building a formidable presence in Antarctica that almost certainly 
has a nexus with its civilian space program and future PLA missions. It also endeavors to work 


 
 
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more closely with Russia and possibly seeks to revise the Antarctic Treaty in 2048 to afford it 
greater access to natural resources and support military operations there.      
China is constructing bases in Antarctica that includes possible dual-use technology. While the 
equipment is ostensibly used for legitimate scientific research and is allowable under the Antarctic 
Treaty, it could also be used for unspecified military purposes.  For instance, China is building a 
fifth station on Inexpressible Island in the Ross Sea to increase its Antarctic footprint that could 
provide the PLA with better surveillance capabilities. Inexpressible Island will provide telemetry, 
tracking and communications for scientific polar observation satellite, and its equipment is also 
well positioned to collect signals intelligence over Australia and New Zealand.  
While China is a relative newcomer to Antarctica, it has been de-legitimizing the Consensus-based 
Antarctic Treaty, preparing for 2048, when central aspects of the treaty will be open to 
renegotiation.  It is likely both China and Russia will work together to seek to renegotiate the 
Antarctic Treaty to loosen regulations on mining and fishing practices, which both countries need 
for future consumption.  
 
 
 
 


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CHAPTER FIVE: RESOURCES AND 
TECHNOLOGY FOR FORCE MODERNIZATION 
KEY TAKEAWAYS 
The PRC’s long-term goal is to create an entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector—fused
with a strong civilian industrial and technology sector—that can meet the PLA’s needs for
modern military capabilities.
The PRC has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including
through its MCF Development Strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive,
dual-use, and military-grade equipment. The PRC has substantially reorganized its defense-
industrial sector to improve weapon system research, development, acquisition, testing,
evaluation, and production.
In 2022, the PRC announced its official annual military budget would increase by 7.1 percent,
continuing more than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustaining its position
as the second-largest military spender in the world. The PRC’s published military budget omits
several major categories of expenditures and its actual military-related spending is significantly
higher than what it states in its official budget.
In 2022, China’s defense budget marginally increased from $229 billion. According to a PRC 
“work report,” the new defense budget aligned with PRC military goals associated with its 2027 
and 2035 military modernization program. PRC state media reported that the part of the defense 
budget increase over the prior year focused on modernizing the PLA’s training with realistic 
simulation and use of virtual reality; accelerating improvements in logistics capabilities, defense 
science, and technology; and enhancing the military’s strategic capacities.  
China is continuing to reorganize its defense, science, and commercial industries to ensure PLA 
access to the resources, technologies, and expertise required to militarily surpass the United States 
and develop capabilities for complex future military contingencies. China’s efforts include 
developing and incorporating military-AI and other emerging disruptive technologies (EDT) to 
build an “intelligentized” force sufficiently equipped with high-tech weapons and advanced 
communications and information technologies to wage and win dynamic wars. While China’s 
MCF strategy supports acquisition of foreign materiel, technology, and expertise through overt 
and illicit means, China is also accelerating efforts to build domestic capacity in these areas and 
reduce its vulnerabilities to foreign supply chokepoints. 


 
 
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MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDS 
 In 2022, the PRC announced a nominal 7.1 percent annual military budget increase to $229 billion, 
which is approximately 1.3 percent of gross domestic product. This year’s budget continues more 
than 20 years of annual defense spending increases and sustains the PRC’s position as the second-
largest military spender in the world after the United States.   The PRC’s defense budget has nearly 
doubled during the past 10 years—data from 2013 through 2022 indicates China’s official military 
budget grew 6 percent annually after adjusting for inflation. The PRC can support continued 
growth in defense spending for at least the next five to 10 years, based on economic data and 
growth projections.  
 
 
China: Official Defense Budget (2013–2022)  
China’s Estimated Military Expenditures. The PRC’s published military budget does not 
include details of expenditure breakouts, including R&D and foreign weapons procurement. In 
2022, China’s actual military-related spending could be significantly higher than its officially 
announced defense budget. Actual PRC military expenses are difficult to calculate, largely due to 
the PRC’s lack of transparency.  United Kingdom and Europe-based think tanks estimate that the 
PRC’s actual 2022 defense budget is at least 30-40 percent higher than the PRC’s announced 
budget.  
China’s Estimated Defense Budget Growth. If China’s official defense budget continues to 
increase annually by an average of 6 percent, the PLA can dedicate more money for training, 
operations, and personnel costs. Economic forecasters project that China’s economic growth will 
slow during the next 10 years, from about 3 percent in 2022 to around 4 percent in 2025, which 
could slow future defense spending growth. Assuming accurate economic projections and a steady 
defense burden, China will remain the second-largest spender after the United States.  
0%
3%
6%
9%
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
0
50
100
150
200
250
Official Defense Budget
GDP Growth
Billions USD


 
 
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REGIONAL COMPARISON OF THE PRC’S 2022 OFFICIAL DEFENSE BUDGET 
 
2022 $ Billion 
PRC (official defense budget)
$229  
India
$74.4  
Japan
$51.9  
Russia (national defense budget)
$90.9  
South Korea
$42.5  
Taiwan
$16.8  
 
PLA PERSONNEL COSTS 
China is facing adverse demographics such as an aging population and low-birth rates. The PLA 
could respond to the demographics issues by raising pay standards to support recruitment and 
retainment efforts, which would place upward pressure on PLA personnel spending relative to 
other defense spending categories. The PLA is giving priority to recruiting college graduates with 
science and engineering backgrounds and those experienced in operating high-tech weapons, 
suggesting the PLA will have to compete with the private sector to attract top talent. 
DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN ITS DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
Key Takeaways 
● China’s hypersonic missile technologies have greatly advanced during the past 20 years and 
many of the PRC’s missile programs are comparable to other international top-tier producers. 
● China is the world’s top ship-producing nation by tonnage and is capable of producing a wide 
range of naval combatants, gas turbine and diesel engines, and shipboard weapons and 
electronic systems, which makes it nearly self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. 
MISSILE AND SPACE INDUSTRY 
China produces a wide range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, many 
comparable in quality to those of other international top-tier producers, for domestic military use 
and export.  China has the world’s leading hypersonic arsenal and has dramatically advanced its 
development of both conventional and nuclear-armed hypersonic missile technologies during the 
past 20 years. Beijing fielded its first missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2020 and tested a 


 
 
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new hypersonic weapon system in 2021, building on previous progress in hypersonic weapons 
development. China also advanced its scramjet engine development in 2022, which has 
applications in hypersonic cruise missiles. In April 2019, the PLAN revealed during its 70th 
anniversary celebration that its new guided-missile cruiser can employ long-range land attack 
cruise missiles and, in 2022, launched the YJ-21 hypersonic missile designed to defeat aircraft 
carriers. In 2022, Beijing made its first delivery of a surface-to-air missile system to a European 
nation, Serbia. China is developing beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles and exploring dual-
mode guidance capabilities, which uses both active radar and infrared homing seekers that improve 
target-selection capabilities and make the missiles more resistant to countermeasures. 
China’s space industry, managed by the PLA, is rapidly expanding its intelligence, surveillance, 
reconnaissance, navigation, and communication satellite constellations. The successful completion 
of the Tiangong Space Station in 2022 and its planned expansion demonstrates the industry’s 
continued progress. China’s domestic space market is dominated by state-run enterprises; 
however, increased investment has enabled private space companies to successfully launch orbital 
satellites in the past 4 years.   In 2020, China launched its first satellites for an ongoing new space-
based internet-of-things  project with container monitoring and maritime communications 
applications and, in 2021, designated satellite internet as a national infrastructure project.   
NAVAL AND SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY 
China, the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage, is increasing its shipbuilding 
capacity for all naval classes: submarines, surface combatants, and auxiliary and amphibious ships. 
China also has developed unmanned underwater systems, publicly revealing a long-range system 
in 2019. China domestically produces naval gas turbine and diesel engines as well as almost all 
shipboard weapons and electronic systems for its shipbuilding sector, making the industry nearly 
self-sufficient for all shipbuilding needs. In 2022, China launched its first domestically designed 
and manufactured aircraft carrier, featuring an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting 
devices. The carrier will be able to deploy up to 70 aircraft, including J-15 fighters and Z-9C anti-
submarine helicopters.  
ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY 
China’s production capacity is improving in nearly every PLA ground system category: main and 
light battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, assault vehicles, air defense artillery systems, and 
artillery systems. Notably, China began testing unmanned Type-59 tanks in 2018 as part of its 
military modernization program. In November 2022, China unveiled an unmanned model of its 
VT-5 light tank, which is an export variant of the Type-15 light tank. The Type-15 entered PLA 
service in 2018 and was meant to replace aging Type-62 light tanks that first entered service in 
1962. China is capable of producing ground weapon systems at or near world-class standards; 
although customers also cite persistent quality deficiencies with some exported equipment, 
inhibiting the PRC’s ability to expand its export markets.  


 
 
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AVIATION INDUSTRY 
China is advancing its domestic aviation industry through two major state-owned aircraft 
corporations, the China Aviation Industry Corporation (AVIC) and the Commercial Aircraft 
Corporation of China (COMAC). AVIC designs and produces China’s military aircraft, including 
the J-20 fifth-generation fighter, the Y-20 heavy transport, and the future H-20 flying wing stealth 
bomber.   COMAC produces large passenger aircraft and has begun to export the ARJ21 regional 
jet to Indonesia, in line with its efforts to expand into the international commercial airliner market.   
COMAC has also delivered its first narrow-body C919 airliner to China Eastern Airlines, but 
cooperation with Russia on the wide-body CR929 may be stalled because of the effects of Western 
sanctions on Russia.     
China’s decades-long effort to improve domestic aircraft engine production is starting to produce 
results, with the J-10 and J-20 fighters beginning to switch to domestically produced WS-10 
engines, although some Russian AL-31F engines may remain in use.    China’s first domestically 
produced high-bypass turbofan, the WS-20, has also entered flight-testing on the Y-20 heavy 
transport aircraft and probably has begun to replace previously imported Russian engines.      UAV 
development has also proceeded rapidly with new flight tests of experimental craft such as the Y-
5U transport UAV. China’s military aviation industry has continued to export UAVs abroad, 
including its sale of nine armed drones to the Democratic Republic of Congo this year.   
DRIVE TO DOMINATE EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES  
China seeks to be an innovation superpower that is largely non-reliant on foreign technology and 
serves as a global center for high-tech industries. The goal of attaining self-sufficiency in key S&T 
sectors—a theme of PRC state plans going back decades—was recently reiterated in the 14th Five-
Year Plan. As part of this self-sufficiency drive, Beijing has mobilized its bureaucracies to rapidly 
develop the country’s capacity for domestic innovation. Published in 2006, the National Medium-
and-Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020) was a landmark 
policy that formalized China’s push for domestic innovation while also calling for the assimilation 
and “re-innovation” of advanced foreign technologies. In 2015, with the Made in China 2025 plan, 
Beijing sharpened its emphasis on technological independence by establishing import substitution 
quotas across a range of core technologies. The plan also called for the reform of state-owned 
enterprises, the establishment of regional innovation centers, and the leveraging of private sector 
capabilities in order to leapfrog foreign technological competitors and create a superior innovation 
ecosystem. 
China is particularly focused on dominating a range of emerging, dual-use technologies that 
promise to be both disruptive and foundational for future economies. In its 14th Five-Year Plan, 
China prioritized the advancement of next-generation artificial intelligence, quantum information, 
brain science and biotechnology, semiconductors, and deep space, deep sea, and polar-related 
technologies. Beijing has a clear understanding of its remaining S&T deficiencies and wields 


 
 
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industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to close these gaps. 
China also sustains high levels of R&D funding and offers significant subsidies to domestic 
companies working on frontier technologies. 
Artificial Intelligence. China is a global leader in AI technology and aims to overtake the West 
in AI R&D by 2025 to become the world leader in AI by 2030. China has designated AI as one of 
its priority, national-level S&T development areas and assesses that advances in AI and autonomy 
are central to intelligentized warfare, the PRC’s concept of future warfare. Beijing views the 
integration of military and civilian institutions as central for developing AI-enabled military 
capabilities and has established military-civilian R&D centers and procured commercially-
developed AI and robotic technologies to ensure PLA access to cutting-edge AI technologies.  
Although, Chinese researchers are world leaders in certain AI applications, such as facial 
recognition and natural language processing, and Chinese companies are marketing domestically-
designed AI chips. While China remains reliant on certain foreign capabilities to produce AI 
hardware, such as advanced semiconductor fabrication factories and electronic design automation 
software, Chinese researchers continue to explore new materials and design concepts for next-
generation semiconductors. 
Brain Science. In 2021, Beijing funded the China Brain Plan, a major research project aimed at 
using brain science to develop new biotechnology and AI applications. That year, China also 
designed and fabricated a quantum computer capable of outperforming a classical high-
performance computer for a specific problem. China was also domestically developing specialized 
refrigerators needed for quantum computing research in an effort to end reliance on international 
components. In 2017, China spent over a billion dollars on a national quantum lab which will 
become the world’s largest quantum research facility when completed.  
FOREIGN ARMS ACQUISITION  
China uses foreign suppliers to overcome limitations in its domestic production capabilities, 
particularly with helicopters and aircraft engines. Only a few states have been willing to supply 
military materiel to China, such as Russia and Ukraine. As its aerospace industry improves over 
the next decade, China very likely will decrease its foreign acquisitions to a point of only 
maintaining an import relationship with foreign suppliers positioned to quickly fill niche gaps in 
the PRC’s inventory.     
● Helicopters. In 2019, China signed four contracts with Russia worth a total of $1.7 billion for 
100 Mi-171 helicopters. Russia began producing helicopters for these contracts in 2020 and 
Beijing expects at least one of the orders to be completed in 2022. As of 2021, China sought 
at least 36 Russian Ka-52K ship-borne heavy attack helicopters to operate from Type 075 
amphibious assault ships while it develops a domestic alternative. 
● Aircraft Engines. China has a longstanding reliance on Russian- and Ukrainian-built engines 
for fixed and rotary wing aircraft produced domestically. China is developing new engine 


 
 
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designs to lessen its reliance on foreign engines, such as the WS-15 to replace Ukrainian AI-
222 engines that power its L-15 trainer aircraft.
   Russia’s war on Ukraine probably will impede 
China’s ability to acquire military equipment and maintenance services from either country. 
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING CHINA’S MILITARY 
MODERNIZATION 
There have been multiple U.S. criminal indictments since 2015 involving espionage by PRC 
nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, or permanent resident aliens from the PRC, as well as U.S. 
citizens. These include procuring and exporting controlled items to China and economic 
espionage, according to a U.S. Department of Justice summary of major U.S. export enforcement. 
The PRC’s efforts to acquire sensitive, dual-use, or military-grade equipment included aviation 
technologies, radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits, radiation-hardened 
integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, naval 
and marine technologies, signals decoders, syntactic foam trade secrets, space communications, 
military communication jamming equipment, and dynamic random access memory.  Cases from 
2022 include the following:  
● In November 2022, an MSS intelligence officer was sentenced to 20 years in prison for 
attempting to steal technology and proprietary information from companies based both in the 
United States and abroad. The MSS intelligence officer attempted to steal technology related 
to a U.S. aviation company’s exclusive composite aircraft engine fan module – which no other 
company in the world has been able to duplicate – in order to advance China’s commercial and 
military aviation efforts. The MSS intelligence officer also openly talked about efforts to obtain 
U.S. military information in addition to commercial aviation trade secrets. The espionage 
operation was executed with full coordination between the MSS and China’s aviation entities.   
● In September 2022, a federal district court jury convicted a Chinese national of acting illegally 
within the United States as an agent of the PRC. The Chinese national was tasked by the MSS 
with providing biographical information on certain individuals for possible recruitment. The 
individuals included Chinese nationals who were working as engineers and scientists in the 
United States, some of whom worked for U.S. defense contractors. This tasking was part of an 
effort by the MSS to obtain access to advanced aerospace and satellite technologies being 
developed by companies within the United States.  
 
PRC CYBER-ENABLED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES 
The PRC presents a sophisticated, persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to military 
and critical infrastructure systems through its efforts to develop, acquire, or gain access to 
information and advanced technologies.   


 
 
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Detected PRC cyberspace operations have targeted telecommunications firms, managed service 
providers (MSPs), and software developers.  Key U.S. targets include proprietary commercial and 
military technology companies and research institutions associated with defense, energy, and other 
sectors.   
The PRC seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects—from denial-of-service attacks to 
physical disruptions of critical infrastructure—to shape decision-making and disrupt military 
operations at the initial stages and throughout a conflict.  China’s activities in cyberspace constitute 
a fundamentally different, more complex, and more urgent challenge to the United States national 
security today than they did a decade ago.  
CHINA’S ARMS EXPORTS 
China is the fifth-largest arms supplier in the world, and sells nearly every category of conventional 
military equipment including UAVs, MANPADS, submarines, naval surface vessels, surface to 
air missile systems, and fighter aircraft to customers worldwide.        
Many developing countries buy Chinese weapons systems because they are less expensive than 
other comparable systems. Although some potential customers consider arms made by the PRC to 
be of lower quality and reliability, many of China’s systems are offered with enticements such as 
donations and flexible payment options, which make them appealing options for buyers.  
China’s arms sales operate primarily through state-run export organizations such as AVIC and 
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). Arms transfers also are a component of the PRC’s 
foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of assistance to complement foreign policy 
initiatives undertaken as part of China’s BRI.  
● Fixed-Wing Aircraft. China offers three combat aircraft for export: the FC-31 fifth generation 
multirole combat aircraft, the JF-17 light combat aircraft, and the J-10 multirole combat 
aircraft. As of 2022, China had not sold any FC-31s and had sold J-10s only to Pakistan.  China 
co-produces the JF-17 with Pakistan, which has been sold to Burma, Iraq, and Nigeria. China 
has supplied strike-capable Caihong and Wing Loong UAVs to countries including Algeria, 
Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, and the UAE.  
● Precision-Strike Weapons. As of 2021, China had exported ballistic missile systems, 
including the M20, BP-12, and Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System (JARM), as well as 
long-range satellite-guided rocket systems. Although China typically does not disclose the 
countries purchasing these types of arms, in 2021, Burma displayed an SY-400 transporter 
erector launcher (TEL) and in 2017 Qatar displayed a JARM.   
● Air Defense Systems. In April 2022, Beijing made its first delivery of a surface-to-air missile 
system to a European nation, Serbia. Serbia displayed the PRC-produced FK-3 medium- to 


 
 
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long-range semi-active radar homing/radio-command guidance air defense system. The FK-3, 
an export-variant of the HQ-22, fires missiles that can reach Mach 6 and range 100 km.  
● Naval Combatants. China is a supplier of major naval vessels, highlighted by Pakistan’s 2015 
purchase of eight Yuan-class submarines for more than $3 billion. Thailand also purchased 
one Yuan-class submarine in 2017 and is interested in purchasing two more. As of April 2022, 
China had not delivered any Yuan submarines, although it had delivered two Ming-class 
submarines to Bangladesh in 2016 and one to Burma in 2021. In 2017 and 2018, China sold 
two frigates to Bangladesh and four to Pakistan, respectively. In September 2019, China made 
its first-ever sale of a landing platform dock ship to Thailand. 
 
 
 
 


 
 
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CHAPTER SIX: DEFENSE CONTACTS  
AND EXCHANGES IN 2022  
 
 
 
KEY TAKEAWAYS  
 In 2022, the PLA largely denied, cancelled, and ignored recurring bilateral engagements and 
DoD requests for communication.  
 The PLA’s refusal to engage with DoD has largely continued in 2023.  
 The PLA’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communications with the United States, 
combined with the PLA’s increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior, raises the risk 
of an operational incident or miscalculation spiraling into crisis or conflict.  
 DoD is committed to reopening lines of communication with the PRC to ensure competition 
does not veer into conflict.  
 DoD’s objectives in opening lines of communication include ensuring crisis communications 
channels, reducing strategic and operational risk, and clarifying misperceptions. 
DoD contacts and exchanges with the PRC are conducted in accordance with the statutory 
limitations of the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2020, as amended. 
STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR U.S.-PRC DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP  
Beginning in the early 2000s, the United States approached defense engagement with the PRC as 
a means of enhancing PLA transparency, advancing mutual reciprocity, and imparting best 
practices for air and maritime operational safety.  These activities sought to encourage the PRC to 
play a constructive and peaceful role in a free and open international system.   
Despite U.S. and international efforts to encourage the PRC’s rise to occur within the rules-based 
international order, PRC malign behavior has subsequently cast doubt on the PRC’s willingness 
to operate in accordance with international laws, rules, and norms. As the PLA modernizes toward 
its goal of producing a world-class force by 2049, the PRC has increasingly turned to the PLA as 
an instrument of statecraft to advance its foreign policy objectives— adopting more coercive and 
aggressive actions in the Indo-Pacific region.   
As the PRC pushes the PLA to engage in increasingly coercive and risky operational behavior in 
an effort to achieve the PRC’s policy objectives in the East and South China Seas, Beijing has 


 
 
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retreated from military-to-military communications with the United States. The ability of the two 
sides to now effectively communicate to preempt or manage a potential incident caused by risky 
PLA behavior is weak and raises the risk of escalation. 
In August 2022, the PRC suspended military contacts and exchanges with the United States, 
claiming the cut-off was in response to the former House Speaker’s visit to Taiwan. Roughly a 
year on, the PRC continues to point to long-standing U.S. military activities in the Western Pacific, 
the United States’ Taiwan policy, and Washington’s refusal to remove sanctions on the PRC’s 
newly-appointed Minister of National Defense, General Li Shangfu, for creating a “negative 
atmosphere” for talks. The PRC’s long track record of cancelling military-to-military lines of 
communication in response to perceived offenses suggests the PRC views military channels of 
communication as a tool to punish or reward the United States for its perceived behavior, versus 
being inherently valuable to maintaining peace and stability.  
High-Level Contacts and Exchanges. High-level exchanges between the U.S. and PRC— such 
as between the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the PRC Minister of National Defense—are an 
important way to exchange views on the bilateral defense relationship and the international 
security environment. In the past, the PRC was willing to responsibly engage in high-level 
dialogue to ensure mutual understanding on a range of policy and operational issues. While DoD 
continues to seek open lines of communication with the PLA at multiple levels in both operator 
and policy channels, the PRC now views executing military-to-military communications as a tool 
to either reward or punish U.S. behavior based on U.S. adherence and respect for PRC core 
interests. 
● Executed. In 2022, the Secretary of Defense engaged with then-PRC Minister of National 
Defense, General Wei Fenghe, three times to discuss regional security, bilateral defense 
relations, and issues of common concern. They met once in June on the sidelines of the Shangri 
La dialogue in Singapore, and once in November on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defense 
Ministerial Meeting + (ADMM+) in Cambodia. The Secretary also held one Defense 
Telephone Link (DLT) call with General Wei in April 2022 to discuss Russia’s war on Ukraine.  
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) held one DTL with then-PRC Chairman of 
the Joint Staff Department (JSD) in July to discuss operational issues. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. In 2022, the PLA declined, cancelled, or ignored the 
majority of senior-level contacts. In July, the PLA cancelled a planned DTL call about 
operational issues between INDOPACOM Commander and the PLA Southern Theater 
Command (STC) commander. In August, the PLA refused a CJCS DTL call request to the 
Chairman of the JSD. In August, the PLA refused a Secretary of Defense DTL call request to 
the PRC Minister of National Defense. In December, the PLA again refused a CJCS DTL call 
request to the Chairman of the JSD. 
Recurring Exchanges. Recurring exchanges serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to 
advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management and reduce of operational risk.   


 
 
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● Executed. None. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. In 2020, the PLA indefinitely postponed the Asia-Pacific 
Security Dialogue (APSD), an Assistant Secretary of Defense-level policy dialogue. The 
APSD did not take place in 2021 or 2022. In August, the PRC cancelled the Defense Policy 
Coordination Talks (DPCT), an annual Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) level 
policy dialogue. In August, the PRC also cancelled all Military Maritime Consultative 
Agreement (MMCA) talks, an operational safety dialogue between U.S. INDOPACOM and 
PLA naval and air forces, in violation of the U.S-PRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
establishing the MMCA. Until 2020, the U.S. and PRC have met regularly since 1998 for 
MMCA dialogue to strengthen military maritime safety, improve operational safety in the air 
and sea, and reduce risk between the two militaries. The PLA also declined to hold a Crisis 
Communications Working Group (CCWG) meeting, a working-level policy dialogue 
established in 2020 to advance crisis prevention and management mechanisms between DoD 
and the PLA.  
Confidence Building Measures and Academic Exchanges. Confidence Building Measure 
engagements focus on employing mechanisms for risk reduction, briefing significant policy 
documents, reducing misunderstanding or misperceptions, POW/MIA accounting, and 
communication to promote international rules and norms. Similarly, academic exchanges focus on 
building mutual understanding.  
● Executed. In September, the PRC Defense Attaché provided a briefing to the DASD for China, 
Taiwan, and Mongolia on the PRC’s 2022 Taiwan white paper “The Taiwan Question and 
China’s Reunification in the New Era.” DoD requested the briefing, consistent with the 2014 
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Department of Defense and the PRC 
Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major Military Activities Confidence Building 
Measures Mechanism, to reduce misperceptions about PRC intentions for “reunification.” 
Similarly, DoD provided a briefing to the PRC Defense Attaché on the 2022 annual report on 
“Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC” and the 2022 National Defense 
Strategy to share DoD assessments of PRC security developments and discuss areas of 
perceived misperception. DoD offered these briefings to the PRC to clarify U.S. strategic intent 
and provide a platform to clarify misperceptions. 
● Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. Since 2019, the PRC has not offered or requested briefings 
to DoD on security related policy developments under the 2014 MOU between the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the PRC Ministry of National Defense on Notification of Major 
Military Activities Confidence Building Measures Mechanism. There were no exchanges or 
contacts in 2022 between the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) and the PLA.  
 


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U.S.-PRC DEFENSE CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES IN 2023
The PRC’s refusal to engage in military-to-military communication only sharpened in 
2023.  
●Executed. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff each sent
congratulatory letters to the newly-appointed PRC Minister of National Defense, Li Shangfu,
and Chairman of the Joint Staff Department, General Liu Zhenli. The United States, as the
chair of the dialogue among the five Nuclear Weapons States, organized a working-level
experts meeting on June 13-14 in Cairo, which included officials from the U.S. Department of
Defense and PRC Ministry of National Defense.
●Refused, Cancelled, or Ignored. As of June 2023, the PRC declined two SECDEF DTL call
requests to General Wei Fenghe. The PRC ignored INDOPACOM Commander DTL call
requests to the PLA STC, Northern Theater Command (NTC), and Eastern Theater Command
(ETC) commanders. The PRC similarly ignored DoD requests to hold recurring exchanges
including DPCTs, MMCA talks, and CCWG. The PRC defense attaché in the United States
refused multiple invitations to engage with the DASD for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia.
Of note, in April 2023, the PLA requested U.S. assistance in evacuation of PRC diplomats from 
Khartoum, Sudan amidst ongoing fighting. In response, DoD provided evacuation routes from 
Khartoum to the Port of Sudan to the PRC and multiple other countries that had requested U.S. 
assistance. 


 
 
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 SPECIAL TOPICS 
 
 
 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA SELF-ASSESSMENTS  
The PLA highlights some self-assessed shortcomings publicly, likely to guide and accelerate force-
wide modernization efforts. The PLA routinely use set slogans or phrases to describe these self-
assessments to exhort the force to carry out specific campaigns. These evaluations also likely 
represent genuine anxieties among PRC leaders about the PLA’s readiness and ability to conduct 
joint operations if tested under real combat conditions. The five PLA slogans are described on the 
next page.  
● Leadership and Command. The PLA has regularly identified concerns about the quality and 
ability of its commanders and officers. Numerous PLA slogans have addressed this issue most 
pointedly expressing concern that its forces will be unable to seize the operational initiative at 
the level necessary for modern warfare, with previous annual training mobilization orders 
explicitly referencing the “Five Incapables” and “Two Inabilities.”  
● Lack of Combat Experience. The PLA’s self-assessments often express insecurities about 
the fact that the military has not fought a war since 1979, with common references to the “peace 
disease” or “peacetime practices”. For the PLA, the “peace disease” presents itself as both a 
lack readiness within the force and a lackadaisical attitude towards training and preparing for 
potential conflict.   
● Exercise and Training Realism. For decades, the PLA has identified poor and unrealistic 
training as a key problem for military modernization. . The PLA has focused on both 
“formalism” and “bureaucratism” as the leading causes of substandard training. This means 
that training is stilted and formal rather than being appropriate for dynamic and unpredictable 
real-world conditions.  
● Professional Military Education. The PLA has identified a lack of officers with knowledge 
of joint combat operations and is working to implement a true joint culture throughout the 
force.   To rectify the gap in military education on joint warfighting, theater command 
headquarters have attempted to set up educational programs at headquarters to build joint 
proficiency. Additionally, the PRC’s NDU launched the PLA’s first training course for officers 
to receive joint post qualifications upon graduation.  
● Fighting and winning modern wars. The PLA has utilized the slogan the “Two Big Gaps” 
to underline enduring concerns about its true capability for warfighting despite the long 


 
 
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modernization effort. It also is an acknowledgement that the PLA feels itself to be behind the 
world’s most capable militaries and that they have not yet achieved that standard.  
SLOGAN 
ARTICULATION 
“Five Incapables” 
● Cannot judge the situation  
● Cannot understand the intention of higher authorities  
● Cannot make operational decisions  
● Cannot deploy forces  
● Cannot deal with unexpected situations  
“Two Incompatibles”  
● Does not meet the requirements of winning local war under 
informatized conditions  
● Does not meet the requirements of carrying out its historic 
missions at the new stage of the new century 
“Two Big Gaps” 
● Does not meet the requirements for national security 
● Lack of capability compared to the level of the world’s most 
advanced militaries  
“Two Inabilities”  
● Inability to fight a modern war 
● Inability of officers at all levels to command in modern war 
“Three Whethers”  
● Whether the armed forces can constantly maintain the Party’s 
absolute leadership  
● Whether the armed forces can fight victoriously when needed by 
the Party and the people  
● Whether commanders at all levels are competent to lead forces 
and command in war  
 
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC SUPPORT TO RUSSIA IN ITS WAR AGAINST 
UKRAINE  
The PRC probably was caught off guard by Russia’s war on Ukraine in February 2022, which 
occurred 20 days after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Beijing and the signing of a “no 
limits” partnership. Although Russia’s was on Ukraine has tested the strength of the elevated 
relationship, the PRC has sought to preserve its close ties with Russia while promoting its own 
image as a responsible great power and its “neutrality” in the war. Xi has also stood by Putin as 
the war entered its second year and resisted Western pressure to isolate and impose costs on Russia 
for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. The PRC’s perception that Washington and NATO are 
responsible for starting the conflict, along with its sympathy for Russia’s security concerns, has 
driven the PRC’s response to the conflict.  
To provide diplomatic cover for Russia, Beijing has parroted Russian narratives when they align 
with the PRC’s criticism of the United States and refrained from condemning its conduct or 


 
 
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referring to Russia’s invasion as a “war”. The PRC has also legitimized Russia’s role on the world 
stage by continuing to work with Russia in various multilateral fora such as the UN, BRICS, and 
ASEAN as well as by conducting routine bilateral meetings with Russian leaders. China has 
stepped up trade and become a willing buyer of Russian energy exports to buoy Russia’s sanction-
battered economy. As of mid-2022, the PRC’s approach probably has shifted towards 
opportunistically advancing China’s interests, specifically to strengthen its international efforts to 
counter the United States.  
On the one-year anniversary of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine, the PRC Foreign Ministry 
released a 12-point proposal discussing the PRC’s approach to the political settlement of Russia’s 
war of aggression in Ukraine. Although Beijing touted the proposal as a major diplomatic 
statement, it largely recycled and consolidated previous PRC statements and proposals on the war, 
which probably indicates that Beijing primarily aims to exploit the peace plan as a messaging tool 
to advance China and Russia’s interests. Beijing probably views the proposal as an opportunity to 
advance China’s desired image as a responsible great power, deflect international criticism of 
Sino-Russian relations, and reemphasize the PRC narrative that blames the United States and 
NATO for causing and perpetuating the war; this messaging is probably intended to primarily 
target developing countries in the Global South.  
Similarly, the PRC’s ambiguous public messaging about the potential use of nuclear weapons 
probably is intended to portray China as a responsible and peaceful great power and signal its 
discomfort about the prospect of nuclear escalation to relevant parties in the war in Ukraine. In 
November 2022, during German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing, Xi said that nuclear 
weapons must not be used, nuclear wars should not be fought, and the international community 
should come together to prevent a nuclear conflict in Eurasia. 
Beijing probably has taken a discreet, flexible, and cautious approach to providing materiel 
assistance to Russia. To date, PRC officials have publicly denied providing any lethal assistance 
to Russia. However, as Beijing deliberates the scale and scope of materiel commitments, it 
probably will seek to balance its strategic partnership with Russia while avoiding reputational or 
economic costs that could result from its assistance. Russian customs data revealed that Chinese 
companies, including state-owned enterprises under the purview of Beijing, have sold civilian, 
dual-use, and some minor military items to Russian military end users, such as small arms, spare 
parts, navigation equipment, and protective gear. Additionally, the United States announced 
sanctions in 2023 against specific PRC companies for their role in sharing imagery to the private 
Russian military company, Wagner.  
China and Russia have continued to increase the frequency of combined military exercises and 
maneuvers despite Russia’s war on Ukraine. These maneuvers typically are scripted and parallel 
rather than integrated, suggesting that both countries are not capable of operational or tactical 
interoperability. During the past five years, China has increasingly participated in several Russian 
capstone exercises and both countries have undertaken a number of combined air and naval patrols. 
Beijing has probably benefitted from hands on training with Russian command and control systems 


 
 
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and from Russia’s more recent combat experience, given that China has not conducted active 
combat operations in several decades. In 2021, both countries signed a defense cooperation 
roadmap pledging to expand military exercises and carry out more patrols, probably to feed their 
narrative about a strengthening defense partnership. PRC-Russia military exercises since Russia’s 
war on Ukraine include the following:  
● In 2022, China and Russia conducted two combined bomber patrols– their fourth- and fifth-
ever – during the same year for the first time. In May 2022, the first coincided with the Quad 
Summit in Tokyo and the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The second was carried 
out on November 30th in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan, ECS, and Philippine Sea and included 
practicing the landing of bombers at each other’s airfields.  
● China and Russia conducted their second-ever combined naval patrol in September directly 
after VOSTOK-22, which preceded the annual bilateral naval JOINT SEA exercise in 
December. For the first time, the security patrol occurred in the Bering Sea along Alaska’s 
Aleutian Island chain.  
● China also participated in Russia’s capstone VOSTOK-22 exercise in September but decreased 
the number of personnel it sent. During the exercise, the PLA and Russian navies performed 
multiple combined maneuvers.  
Although Chinese and Russian leaders appear to assess that the benefits of cooperation outweigh 
the costs of working together, the relationship is still colored by latent tensions and strategic 
mistrust. The PRC’s strategic mistrust is probably fueled by the perception of the more powerful 
Russian Empire and Soviet Union historically taking advantage of a weaker China. Despite 
normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 and the resolution of longstanding border disputes, 
China remains suspicious of Russia’s intentions. The CCP still draws on Russia’s past humiliation 
of China—such as the signing of unjust border treaties that ceded large swaths of Chinese territory 
to the Russians Far East—as a source of nationalism. For Russia, enduring structural inequities, 
such as geography and its declining population in the Far East, stoke fears that China may encroach 
on its interests, exploit Russian weaknesses, or relegate Russia as the inferior partner in their 
relationship.  
China’s rise, growing ambitions to establish a military presence in the Arctic, and lackluster 
economic and military support to Russia during the war in Ukraine probably all contribute to 
ongoing tensions in the relationship.  
SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC BUILDING “A STRONG STRATEGIC 
DETERRENT SYSTEM” 
In President Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he set a goal for the PLA to “build a 
strong strategic deterrent system.”  This expands on PLA doctrinal writings from 2020 urging the 
construction of a “strategic deterrence system with Chinese characteristics” and the PRC’s 2021 


 
 
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guidance to create a high-level strategic deterrence system in its 14th Five-Year Plan.   The PRC 
views a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as a set of advanced military capabilities across 
various domains to maintain national security and play a strategic deterrent role. Building this 
system consists of two parts: the development of traditional nuclear deterrent force building and 
the construction of conventional strategic deterrent forces in emerging fields and technologies. The 
PRC’s pursuit of a “strong strategic deterrent force system” is probably driven by threat 
perceptions of the United States and by specific concerns over Taiwan. 
Strategic deterrence is a core component of the PRC’s objectives of securing its status as a great 
power, achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and developing a world class 
military by 2049. Beijing considers building a “strong strategic deterrent force system” as 
necessary to defend its national sovereignty, security, and development interests.  It also views it 
as necessary to increase the PRC’s ability to manage escalation in a conflict by deterring and 
preventing an adversary from escalating confrontation at will. 
As of 2022, the PRC perceives an erosion of strategic stability in the US-PRC relationship.  PLA 
academics and PRC government officials also perceive that the United States is interfering in the 
PRC’s periphery.  The PRC views building a “strong strategic deterrence force system” as a “trump 
card” for safeguarding the PRC’s core interest of achieving unification with Taiwan.  
The PRC views development of nuclear and conventional capabilities as necessary components of 
its “asymmetric countermeasures” approach to defeat strong enemies seeking to by developing 
capabilities that exploit PRC strengths and take advantage of its weaknesses. In addition to 
improving nuclear and conventional capabilities, Xi has urged the PLA to speed up development 
of other non-traditional capabilities—such as in the space and cyberspace domains—to support 
modern warfare, further “intelligentization” of the PLA, and “win local wars.” 
The PRC is committed to maintaining deterrence against its nuclear rivals, and PRC experts view 
a survivable second-strike capability as crucial to national security. The PRC’s understanding of 
nuclear deterrence has focused on maintaining a sufficient capability to inflict unacceptable 
destruction against its potential adversaries. Chinese think tanks are concerned about the credibility 
of its nuclear deterrent due to its smaller nuclear force, which may note be seen by adversaries as 
sufficiently survivable in a nuclear conflict.  
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to control the space-enabled information sphere and 
to deny adversaries their own space-based information gathering and communication capabilities, 
as critical components to conduct modern “informatized warfare.”  The PLA expects space to play 
an important role in future conflicts by enabling long-range precision strikes and in denying other 
militaries the use of overhead C4ISR systems.  
The development of cyber warfare capabilities is consistent with PLA writings, which identify 
IO—comprising cyber, EW, space, and psychological warfare—as integral to achieving 
information superiority early in a conflict as an effective means to counter a stronger foe.  The 


 
 
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PRC has publicly identified cyberspace as a critical domain for national security and declared its 
intent to expedite the development of its cyber forces.  
SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA RECRUITMENT AND PERSONNEL 
MANAGEMENT SITUATION  
PLA RECRUITMENT 
Traditional PRC military recruitment is dependent on two-year enlisted conscripts, requiring about 
400,000 young citizens must voluntarily join the PLA or be compulsorily inducted annually. The 
ratio of volunteer versus non-volunteer conscripts is unknown, and likely varies by year and place 
depending on local conditions and individual motivations. As of 2020, PLA officers and civilian 
personnel probably numbered approximately 450,000 personnel (23 percent), NCOs roughly 
850,000 (42 percent), and conscripted recruits about 700,000 (35 percent). 
Two-year conscripts are assessed to comprise about one-third of all active-duty personnel. 
Continuing practices implemented since at least 2016, the updated national conscription law 
focuses on encouraging college students, both recent graduates and current senior students, to 
voluntarily enlist. College students are offered incentives to serve, and those who have not yet 
graduated may return to school to finish their education after their time in service. Prior to this 
push for college-educated personnel, as recently as 2011, most of the new PLA recruits were high 
school graduates. In 2021, the PRC adopted a revised version of the Military Service Law to 
improve the system of military service registration and highlight the predominant role of 
volunteers in the military service system. 
The PLA also recruits civilian personnel to acquire specific skillsets. Civilian personnel are those 
who work in management or professional technical military posts but are not in active service 
unless deemed necessary. In 2018, the PLA launched its first written examination for recruiting 
civilian personnel; among the more than 140,000 participants, 86 percent held a bachelor’s degree 
or above, and 16 percent graduated with a master’s degree or above.  
In 2022, the PLA extended the recruitment age for university graduates. Compared to the usual 
age requirements – between 18 and 22 – for new recruits, male applicants who were in their final 
year of university or held a bachelor’s or associate degree, could enlist at age 24, and all applicants 
who were postgraduate students or held a master’s degree could list up to age 26. The Ministry of 
National Defense’s Recruitment Office instructed recruitment officers to focus on recent university 
and college graduates, with preference given to degree holders in the fields of science, technology, 
or engineering. Xi has continually urged the military to improve its human resources efforts to 
recruit and train more talented professionals to help achieve its key goals.  
 


 
 
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CONSCRIPTION CYCLE 
In 2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its single annual military conscription cycle to a 
two-phase system. Under the new system, conscription is held in both the spring and autumn 
instead of just once in the autumn, to account for the academic school year and allow for more 
efficient enlistment. The COVID-19 pandemic postponed the implementation of the biannual 
conscription cycle, which was delayed to early 2021. The change did not represent an increase in 
the total number of recruits, but rather a staggering of the overall intake process. The new system 
is intended to give military units greater flexibility by reducing the total number affected by 
turnover at a given time.  
2023 REFORMS 
Beijing has moved to update its national conscription law by enacting revisions in May 2023.  The 
new law reflects this updated system and recent developments in the PLA, particularly advances 
in information technology and population shifts. It calls for establishing an “inter-ministerial joint 
conference system for conscription work” intended to improve efficiency by formalizing the 
system already in operation through the CMC’s National Defense Mobilization Department and 
Ministry of National Defense Recruitment/Conscription Office.  After national-level inter-agency 
coordination, conscription quotas for every province are sent down the military chain of command 
and to the local governments for execution.  
 The law also provides further incentives for recently demobilized personnel to volunteer for a 
“second enlistment.”  Second enlistments refer to enlisted personnel who were not promoted to a 
higher rank, but later decided to return to service. The law specifies that personnel who enlist for 
a second time and meet the qualifications to be a NCO may be “directly recruited as sergeants” (a 
general term for NCOs at the rank of corporal or higher). Another option for demobilized personnel 
is to enter the expanding ranks of non-active-duty contract civilians, some of whom are assigned 
to the system of local headquarters responsible for conscription.   
 In pursuit of Xi’s vision of achieving a “world-class” military by 2049, the PLA is focusing on 
the personnel reform of its NCOs, which are expected to be the PLA’s “backbone” in future wars. 
Recognizing that small military units have played an increasingly important role in regional wars, 
the PLA is seeking to strengthen NCOs’ strategic and leadership capabilities, as well as improve 
their professional skills through academic and technical training. In March 2022, PLA 
implemented new regulations aimed at increasing “combat effectiveness,” such as allowing 
intermediate and senior sergeants to stay in service longer to have more professional NCOs in the 
military. The regulations aimed at enhancing professionalism and stability among NCOs, while 
allowing conscripts to play a more fundamental role in the development of the PRC’s military 
talent. They also intended to improve the management of PLA personnel by progressing the 
recruitment, training, rank promotion, benefits and demobilization system for NCOs and 
conscripts, and to play a key role in building a high-quality military.  


 
 
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SPECIAL TOPIC: PRC PERCEPTIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Beijing views its international security environment as becoming increasingly complex, with 
intensifying confrontation with the United States raising the danger of conflict during this decade. 
PRC leaders believe that the United States is engaging in a systematic effort to suppress China’s 
development, prevent Taiwan’s unification with mainland China, and maintain U.S. global 
hegemony. This perception is driving the PRC to accelerate efforts to increase its economic and 
technological self-reliance, strengthen its ability to secure interests internationally, and continue 
to modernize its military.  
In October 2022, the 20th Party Congress Political Work Report described the PRC’s external 
landscape as undergoing drastic changes unseen in a century and called on the Party to increase its 
sense of urgency to prepare for danger in an increasingly severe and complex international 
environment.  In a speech to PRC industry leaders in March 2023, Xi explicitly accused Western 
countries led by the United States as containing, encircling, and suppressing the PRC and seeking 
to bring severe challenges to its development, further emphasizing the PRC’s view that the 
international environment has become increasingly hostile.   
The PRC probably is increasingly concerned about Washington’s efforts to cultivate an 
international coalition willing to disrupt the PRC’s rise.  PRC leaders almost certainly view the 
announcement of AUKUS as well as the expansion of QUAD-related activities in the Indo-Pacific 
as the latest examples of the United States seeking to use its political and military power to threaten 
the PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  In response, Beijing has sought to strengthen PRC 
relations with Global South countries and promote PRC-backed incentives such as the GSI.   PRC 
leaders and officials aim to internationally isolate Washington and cultivate support for the PRC’s 
priorities such as diminishing international support for Taiwan and condemning U.S. activities in 
the Indo-Pacific.    
Russia’s war against Ukraine also represented a major, unexpected challenge for Beijing.   Despite 
multiple warnings of Russia’s intentions, Beijing was caught off guard by the full scope and scale 
of Russia’s war, resulting in PRC officials scrambling to protect PRC interests. As Russia’s war 
of aggression in Ukraine has continued, PRC leaders have increasingly viewed the war through 
the lens of U.S.-PRC strategic competition and sympathized with Russia’s rationale for waging a 
war against Ukraine.  This conclusion has translated into Beijing remaining steadfast in its defense 
of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation, continuing to support Russia’s involvement in diplomatic 
forums, and opposing international economic sanctions.   The PRC has also echoed Russian 
messaging on the war, claiming that the United States and NATO are responsible for causing and 
prolonging the war.  Beijing also probably views assistance to Russia as an opportunity to maintain 
the positive trajectory in Sino-Russia ties and improve Russia’s willingness to support PRC efforts 
to counter the United States and reshape the international order. At the same time, PRC leaders 
have sought to emphasize the PRC’s “neutral narrative” on Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, 
primarily to protect its reputation and deflect international criticism of Sino-Russian relations.     


 
 
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APPENDIX I: PRC AND TAIWAN FORCES 
DATA 
 
 
TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, GROUND FORCES 
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
  
Total 
Taiwan Strait Area* 
Total 
Total Ground Force Personnel 
1,050,000    
420,000 
 89,000 
Group Armies/Army Corps 
13  
5  
 3 
Combined Arms Brigades 
82  
31 (6 Amphibious)  
 7 
Artillery Brigades  
15  
5  
 3 
Army Aviation Brigades  
13  
4  
2 
Air Assault Brigades  
3  
1  
 0 
Airborne Brigades 
7  
7  
 0 
Marine Brigades  
8  
5  
 2 
Tanks 
4,200  
1,100  
 900 
Artillery Pieces** 
7,600  
2,300  
 1300 
*For the purposes of this document, the “Taiwan Strait Area” includes the PLA’s Eastern and Southern 
Theaters.  
**For the purposes of this document, "Artillery Pieces" refers to systems 100mm and larger, are either 
towed or self-propelled, and includes Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) 
 
 
TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, AIR FORCES 
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
 
Total 
Eastern and Southern 
Theater 
Total 
Fighters  
1,900 (3,100*) 
750 (900*) 
300 (400*) 
Bombers/Attack  
500 
300 
0 
Transport  
500 
40 
50 
Special Mission Aircraft  
250 
150 
20 
Note: This chart displays estimated totals of military aircraft from both PLAAF and PLAN aviation. 
However, the PLAAF may supplement its military transports with civilian aircraft in a combat scenario. 
  
*The totals in parentheses include fighter trainers. 


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TAIWAN STRAIT MILITARY BALANCE, NAVAL FORCES   
CHINA 
TAIWAN 
Total 
Eastern and Southern Theater 
Command Navies 
Total 
Aircraft Carriers  
2
1
0
Amphibious Assault Ships 
3
3
0
Cruisers 
8  
4  
0 
Destroyers  
42
30
4
Frigates  
47  
30 
22 
Corvettes  
50
40
0
Medium Landing Ships/ 
Tank Landing Ships / Amphibious 
Transport Dock 
57
50
50
Attack Submarines  
47
31
4
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarines  
6
2
0
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile 
Submarines  
6
6
0
Coastal Patrol (Missile)  
60
60
43
Coast Guard Ships 
142 
N / A 
168 
Note: The PLAN has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships in 
Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Navies would 
participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The Northern Theater Navy (not shown) would be 
responsible primarily for protecting the sea approaches to China, but could provide mission-critical assets to 
support other fleets. In conflict, China may also employ CCG and CMM ships to support military operations. 
CHINA’S ROCKET FORCE 
System 
Launchers 
Missiles 
Estimated Range 
ICBM
500
350
>5,500km
IRBM
250
500
3,000-5,500km
MRBM
300
1000 
1,000-3,000km
SRBM
200
1000
300-1,000km
GLCM
150
300
>1,500km


 
 
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APPENDIX II: SELECTED BILATERAL AND 
MULTILATERAL EXERCISES IN 2022 
           
  
 
Selected PLA Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises in 2022 
Exercise Name 
Type of Exercise 
Participants 
VOSTOK 2022 
Test Multi-domain Interoperability 
Russia 
Maritime Security Belt / 
Chiru 2022 
Counter-Piracy 
Iran and Russia 
International Army 
Games 2022 
Multinational Military Skills Competition 
Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Algeria, 
Uzbekistan, and 7 additional countries 
Falcon Strike 2022 
Joint Aerial and Ground Training 
Thailand 
Cobra Gold 2022 
Multinational humanitarian and disaster 
relief training 
Thailand, United States, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Australia, and India 
Joint Sea 2022 
Joint Naval Exercise 
Russia 
Unnamed Naval Patrol 
Joint Naval Patrol 
Vietnam 
Khaan Quest 
Peace Keeping 
Mongolia, Russia, United States, 
Germany, and 11 additional countries 
Peace Train 2022 
Humanitarian Medical Rescue Exercise 
Laos 
 
 
 


 
 
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APPENDIX III: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
 
APSCO 
Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization  
AAM 
Air To Air Missiles  
AAV 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle  
ADIZ 
Air Defense Identification Zone 
ASF 
Aerospace Force 
AEW&C 
Airborne Early Warning & Control 
AGI 
Intelligence Collection Ships 
AGOS 
Ocean Surveillance Ships  
AI 
Artificial Intelligence 
ALBM 
Air-Launched Ballistic Missile 
AOE 
Fast Combat Support Ship 
AOR 
Fleet Replenishment Oilers  
APOSOS 
Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space Object Observation System 
APSD 
Asia-Pacific Security Dialogue  
ASAT 
Anti-Satellite Weapon 
ASBM 
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
ASCM 
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASEAN 
Association Of Southeast Asian Nations  
ASW 
Anti-Submarine Warfare 
AUKUS 
Australia, The United Kingdom, And the U.S. 
AUV 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
AVIC 
Aviation Industry Corporation of China 
BACC 
Beijing Aerospace Control Center 
BMD 
Ballistic Missile Defense  
BMEW 
Ballistic Missile Early Warning  
BRI 
Belt And Road Initiative 
BRICS 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, And South Africa 
BWC 
Biological Weapons Convention  
C2 
Command And Control 
C4ISR 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
CALT 
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology 
CBM 
Confidence-Building Measures  
CBW 
Chemical And Biological Weapons  
CCDI 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 


 
 
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CCG 
Chinese Coast Guard 
CCMCFD 
Central Commission for Military Civilian Fusion Development 
CCP 
Chinese Communist Party 
CCWG 
Crisis Communications Working Group 
CDO 
Cognitive Domain Operations  
CELAC 
Community Of Latin American and Caribbean States 
CFO 
Chief Financial Officer 
CG 
Coast Guard 
CLTC 
China Launch and Tracking Control  
CMC 
Central Military Commission 
CMM 
Chinese Maritime Militia (See PAFMM) 
CMPR 
China Military Power Report 
CNSA 
China National Space Administration  
CNSC 
Central National Security Commission  
COMAC 
Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China  
CONUS 
Continental United States 
COSCO 
China Ocean Shipping Company 
COVID 
Coronavirus 
CPTPP 
Comprehensive And Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership  
CSF 
Cyberspace Force 
CWC 
Chemical Weapons Convention  
DASD 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
DDG 
Guided-Missile Destroyer 
DME 
Disaster Management Exchange 
DOB 
Date Of Birth 
DPAA 
Defense Pow/Mia Accounting Agency 
DPCT 
Defense Policy Coordination Talks 
DSR 
Digital Silk Road  
DTL 
Defense Telephone Link  
ECS 
East China Sea 
EDT 
Emerging Disruptive Technologies 
EEZ 
Exclusive Economic Zone 
EO 
Electro-Optical 
EPR 
Emergency Petroleum Reserve  
EW 
Electronic Warfare 
FFG 
Guided-Missile Frigate 
FFL 
Corvette 
FIC 
First Island Chain 
FOB 
Fractional Orbital Bombardment 
FOC 
Full Operational Capability 
FYP 
Five Year Plan 
GDP 
Gross Domestic Product 
GEO 
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 


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GLCM
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile 
GPS
Global Positioning System 
GSD 
General Staff Department 
GSR 
Green Silk Road  
HEU
Highly Enriched Uranium  
HGV
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle 
HQ
Headquarters
HSR 
Health Silk Road  
IADS
Integrated Air Defense System 
ICBM 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ICT 
Information And Communications Technology 
INDOPACOM 
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
IO
Information Operations
IOC 
Initial Operational Capability 
IRBM
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile 
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, And Reconnaissance 
JARM 
Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System 
JLSB
Joint Logistics Brigades  
JLSC
Joint Logistics Service Center 
JLSF
Joint Logistics Support Force 
JOCC 
Joint Operations Command Center  
LAC 
Line Of Actual Control  
LACM
Land-Attack Cruise Missile 
LCAC
Landing Craft, Air Cushion  
LEO 
Low Earth Orbit 
LHA 
Amphibious Assault Ship  
LM
Long March 
LNG 
Liquid Natural Gas 
LOW
Launch-On-Warning 
LPD 
Amphibious Transport Docks  
LST
Tank Landing Ships  
MCF
Military-Civilian Fusion 
MANPADS 
Man-Portable Air Defense System 
MDPW
Multi-Domain Precision Warfare
MIRV
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles 
MMCA
Military Maritime Consultative Agreement  
MND
Ministry Of National Defense 
MOU 
Memorandum Of Understanding 
MOX
Mixed-Oxide  
MPS
Ministry Of Public Security  
MRBM
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile 
MSP
Managed Service Providers 
MSS
Ministry Of State Security 


 
 
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MUM-T 
Manned Unmanned Teaming  
NDMD 
National Defense Mobilization Department  
NDU 
National Defense University  
NEO 
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations  
NETF 
Naval Escort Task Force 
NFU 
No First Use 
NIH 
National Institutes of Health 
NORINCO 
North Industries Corporation 
NPC 
National People's Congress 
NSR 
Northern Sea Route  
NUDT 
National University of Defense Technology 
NWMA 
Non-War Military Activities 
OBOR 
One Belt One Road 
OIMC 
Office For International Military Cooperation 
OPFOR 
Opposing Force 
OTH 
Over-The-Horizon 
PAFMM 
People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
PAP 
People's Armed Police 
PBA 
Pharmaceutical-Based Agents  
PKO 
Peacekeeping Operations 
PLA 
People's Liberation Army  
PLAA 
People's Liberation Army Army 
PLAAF 
People's Liberation Army Air Force 
PLAN 
People's Liberation Army Navy 
PLA NDU 
People's Liberation Army National Defense University  
PLANMC 
People's Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps 
PLARF 
People's Liberation Army Rocket Force 
PME 
Professional Military Education 
PNT 
Positioning, Navigation, And Timing 
POW 
Prisoner Of War 
PPE 
Personal Protective Equipment 
PRC 
People's Republic of China 
PRSS 
Pakistan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
RIMPAC 
Rim Of the Pacific Exercise 
RORO 
Roll-On/Roll-Off Cargo Ships 
SAM 
Surface-To-Air Missile 
SAR 
Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SASTIND 
State Administration for Science, Technology, And Industry for National 
Defense 
SATCOM 
Satellite Communications 
SCO 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SCS 
South China Sea 
SIC 
Second Island Chain 


 
 
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SIGINT 
Signals Intelligence 
SLAM-ER 
Standoff Land 
SLBM 
Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles 
SLOC 
Sea Lines of Communication 
SLV 
Space Launch Vehicle 
SMA 
Special Mission Aircraft 
SOE 
State-Owned Enterprise 
SOF 
Special Operations Forces 
SRBM 
Short-Range Ballistic Missile 
SRSS 
Sudan Remote-Sensing Satellite 
SS 
Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSBN 
Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine 
SSD 
Space System Department 
SSF 
Strategic Support Force 
SSGN 
Guided-Missile Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSN 
Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine 
SSP 
Air-Independent Powered Attack Submarines  
SSS 
Student Small Satellites  
STEM 
Science, Technology, Engineering, And Mathematics 
TEL 
Transporter, Erector, Launcher 
TRA 
Taiwan Relations Act 
TT&C 
Telemetry, Tracking, And Control  
TTP 
Tactics, Techniques, And Procedures 
UAE 
United Arab Emirates 
UAS 
Uncrewed Aerial Systems 
UAV 
Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles 
UCAV 
Uncrewed Combat Aerial Vehicle 
UFWD 
United Front Work Department 
UN 
United Nations 
UNCLOS 
United Nations Convention on The Law of The Sea 
USD 
U.S. Dollar 
USNS 
United States Naval Ship (Non-Commissioned) 
USTR 
United States Trade Representative 
VBSS 
Visit, Board, Search and Seizure  
VIP 
Very Important Person 
VLS 
Vertical Launch System 
VRSS 
Venezuelan Remote-Sensing Satellite  
VTC 
Video Teleconference 
VTOL 
Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
XPCC 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
XSCC 
Xi'an Satellite Control Center