LongBench v2 / 66fe8eb3bb02136c067ca35f / According to the paper, what is the fundamental difference in jurisprudence…

PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT:
 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
 By Hanspeter Neuhold*
 THE states forthcoming to be held at sixth Havana "Summit" this fall provides Conference an appropriate of the opportunity non-aligned
 states to be held at Havana this fall provides an appropriate opportunity
 for comparing the legal status of permanent neutrality and the political
 doctrine of non-alignment. Not only the general public but even experts
 on foreign affairs in permanently neutral states are rather ill-informed
 about the characteristics of the non-aligned movement. Similarly, the
 status of permanent neutrality is often not correctly perceived in the non-
 aligned camp.
 The first part of this article will consist of brief summaries of the main
 features of permanent neutrality and non-alignment; a comparison of
 their most striking similarities will then be made. This paper is based on
 relevant legal and diplomatic documents, "traditionalist" scholarly literature
 and a recent empirical study.1 One important finding of the following
 comparative analysis should be stated at the outset: both the aspects which
 the permanently neutral and the non-aligned states obviously appear to
 have in common and those which clearly separate them at first sight will
 have to be qualified against the background of the actual behaviour of the
 countries concerned, so that the final picture which will emerge as a result
 of this article is going to be more complex than might be expected.
 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY2
 A permanently neutral state is, by virtue of an international treaty or
 a binding unilateral declaration, under a legal obligation not to participate
 in any future war. Hence it has to observe the norms of the law of neutrality
 whenever a war as defined by international law breaks out. These obligations,
 which are partly codified in international treaties3 and partly based on
 customary law, can be divided into four categories:
 The obligations of abstention can best be summed up as the (absolute)4
 prohibition to directly or indirectly provide belligerents with military
 support. Consequently, a neutral state must not, for instance, furnish
 troops or war material to belligerent parties, nor may it grant loans
 for military purposes to them.
 Under the obligations of prevention, neutrals are not to permit
 states involved in a war to engage in military activities on their terri-
 tories, e.g., the establishment of military bases. Similarly, the transit
 *Dr. Neuhold is Associate Professor of International Law and International Relations
 at the University of Vienna and the Austrian Diplomatic Academy.
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 286 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 of belligerent troops or 
 impeded. Under the Dam
 these obligations lies in th
 it prove, at least over a c
 put an end to such encro
 negatively affected by the
 however, that armed hos
 to the neutral state's terr
 war - the very result wh
 by choosing a neutral pos
 The principle of impart
 gation of treating bellige
 military sectors where no o
 a neutral decides to pla
 it must apply the emba
 Finally, by virtue of the
 must put up with certain 
 be clearly illegal. In par
 the freedom of the high
 merchantmen carrying c
 These norms of the law 
 in mind if one wants to real
 neutral states must alread
 to refrain from any act w
 for them to abide by the a
 able to comply with them 
 According to the 1954 Offici
 and secondary obligation
 It goes without saying t
 launch a war of aggressio
 of abandoning neutrality
 on all states by virtue of
 In addition, states that
 neutrality must maintain
 and neutrality and provi
 if only to live up to thei
 The minimum which the
 by the international stand
 taken by comparable cou
 proportion of GNP, spen
 be used as a yardstick to 
 standard.8
 As to the secondary ob
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 287
 above has far-reaching implications especially for th
 and the international economic relations of perm
 states.
 When it comes to assuring its defence, a permanently neutral state must
 rely primarily on its own strength, because membership in a military alliance
 even for purely defensive purposes, is ruled out by its special status ; otherwise,
 it will be confronting an insoluble dilemma, whenever one of its allies
 is attacked by an aggressor and becomes involved in a war. On the one
 hand, if a permanently neutral state took up arms to come to the victim's
 rescue in accordance with the alliance treaty, it would violate the obligations
 of abstention and impartiality. If, on the other hand, it were to invoke
 these principles resulting from its neutrality, it would, of course, refuse
 to abide by its main obligation as an ally. In order to forestall the emergence
 of this dilemma, permanently neutral states are barred from entering into
 alliance agreements altogether, even with other countries endowed with
 this status.
 Similarly, they must not permit the establishment of foreign military
 bases on their territories. For, when their owner becomes involved in a
 war, their use constitutes a violation of the obligations of abstention and
 may draw the neutral state into the war.
 Although permanent neutrality thus casts a long shadow on the security
 policy of the states that have adopted this status, it neither prohibits
 "unilateral alliances", i.e., the guaranty of the neutral's independence
 and territorial integrity against aggression by other states, nor ad hoc requests
 for help if they are attacked and their neutrality terminated. Moreover,
 although permanent neutrality and participation in a system of collective
 security appear mutually exclusive in principle, the flexibility of the UN
 system allows permanently neutral states, too, to apply for admission to
 the Organization.9 The UN Charter does not call for automatic sanctions
 by its members against the guilty states whenever an act of aggression,
 a breach of the peace or a threat to the peace occur. The Security Council
 must decide in each concrete case whether such a situation requiring forcible
 measures exists, against whom they are to be taken, whether armed force
 is to be resorted to or non-military sanctions suffice, and finally whether
 all member states or only some of them are to participate in them. In point
 of fact, Art. 48 of the Charter expressly authorizes the Council to call upon
 some members only when it deems action necessary to maintain or restore
 international peace and security. Permanently neutral member states can
 thus be exempted from military sanctions which would jeopardize their
 status.10
 In a similar vein, permanently neutral states must refrain from economic
 ties which, because of the scope of the areas envisaged for co-operation
 and/or the institutional integration are so close as to compromise the
 future observance of the law of neutrality. For these reasons Austria, Sweden
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 288 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 and Switzerland were free
 not of the European Comm
 a special free trade arrange
 sions to safeguard the thr
 Last but not least, perman
 a policy of neutrality. Its o
 of the other states beyond 
 in the aforementioned fiel
 behaviour patterns have h
 steps to be taken in the purs
 by international law. They 
 ment concerned. Yet, the s
 of the rest of internationa
 becomes clear once the g
 The "positive" policy of ne
 countries special internatio
 too often, neutrals have bee
 conflicts, letting the belliger
 too. Hence they have to con
 functions which are usefu
 states are particularly qual
 in international conflicts
 operations or to invite int
 quarters and to host intern
 The "negative" componen
 the credibility of a perman
 to defend itself effectivel
 developed by neutrals as a 
 demonstrating to a would-
 occupy their territory in ter
 and political goodwill as we
 from occupation.14
 A final point which is wo
 concerns the ideological di
 have opted for this status 
 Yet, their governments and
 the credibility of their cou
 not at least moderate the tone of their criticism.
 At present, only the permanent neutrality of Austria and Switzerland
 does not give rise to any doubts. Switzerland had factually practised this
 status ever since its expansionist ambitions had been thwarted at the battles
 of Marignano and Pavia early in the sixteenth century. Its permanent
 neutrality was eventually recognized and guaranteed by the then Great
 Powers in the course of the comprehensive political settlement after the
 defeat of Napoleon in 1815. Austria benefited from a brief thaw in the
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 289
 Cold War as the Soviet Union agreed to join the three ot
 powers, France, the United Kingdom and the United Sta
 Austrian independence by affixing its signature to the Austr
 in exchange, Austria declared its permanent neutrality 
 Sweden has been observing permanent neutrality as a 
 foreign policy ever since the early nineteenth century witho
 into, however, any legal obligation to this effect. Fin
 at best be described as "asymmetrical neutrality" with a
 The peculiar legal foundation of this status is the 1948 Treaty
 Co-operation and Mutual Assistance which was renewed in 1955 and
 1970.16 Whether Laos can really be included among the permanently
 neutral states as a result of its Declaration of Neutrality and the corres-
 ponding multilateral Geneva Agreements of 1962 is open to question,
 especially in the light of more recent events.17 Finally, a good case can
 be made for the Vatican State's permanent neutrality under one of the
 three Lateran Treaties concluded between Italy and the Holy See in 1929;
 yet, because of its size and other peculiarities, it can be omitted for the
 purposes of the present analysis.18
 non-alignment19
 In the brief history of non-alignment, three phases can be distinguished
 which highlight the evolution of the main features of the movement.
 The first period, which lasted from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties,
 was characterized by the struggle for self-assertion and non-involvement
 in the Cold War on the one hand and efforts to strengthen the non-aligned
 camp by accelerating the de-colonization process, on the other.
 Thus, the key concept of non-alignment was construed rather strictly,
 as membership in military alliances and the lease of military bases to
 foreign Powers,20 at least in the context of Great Power conflicts, were
 denounced as contrary to the principles of the emerging movement. The
 non-aligned states also rejected the establishment of an alliance among
 themselves and did not regard themselves as a (third) bloc in world affairs.
 They envisioned loose co-operation within the non-aligned group and
 declared themselves in favour of strengthening the United Nations.
 On the legal plane, they stressed "Panchsheel", the five principles of
 "Peaceful Coexistence."21 In general, respect for territorial integrity and
 sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality
 and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence are well-established norms
 of international law, with the exception of the last, very vague and ill-
 defined principle.22 It is also hardly surprising that the non-aligned countries
 singled out principles which particularly protect the weaker states in the
 international arena.
 Especially during this first phase, non-aligned spokesmen underlined
 the moral superiority of their approach to world affairs. In doing so, they
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 290 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 tried to counter those crit
 stance as immoral.23 By 
 as a struggle between good
 positive, superior mission f
 each specific dispute betw
 emphasized the active role 
 were thus to contribute to i
 and mediation to the Cold 
 between them. Their searc
 national system was furthe
 (Afro-Asian) cultural simil
 Their low level of econo
 even though economic dem
 Thus, merely three and a h
 at the first Conference of H
 Countries held in Belgrade
 only one of the eleven Cha
 which took place in Cairo
 Throughout those years, e
 to independence by colonial 
 used the United Nations to
 to self-determination ensh
 superior "fundamental" no
 people entitled to self-d
 boundaries, arbitrarily dra
 overseas territories27, left
 with the seeds of future eth
 The second half of the s
 appointment for the non-a
 hopes and expectations of 
 between the more radica
 to be precarious. The rappr
 wake of the Cuban missile cr
 each other more difficult.
 Congo and the United Stat
 in Vietnam demonstrated th
 the military clout of Great
 the psychological fascination
 to traditional power polit
 founding fathers of the n
 Nkrumah and Sukarno were 
 It was therefore all the
 disappearing from the in
 states recovered and cam
 kept growing as the move
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 291
 Whereas the Belgrade and the Cairo Conference of 1961
 attended by 25 and 47 states respectively, the number o
 participants rose to 54 at the 1970 Lusaka, 75 at the 1973
 tually 86 at the 1976 Colombo "Summits."
 Still more importantly, the emphasis of the non-align
 has been shifted to demands for economic reforms. The Third World has
 come to realize that political and legal de-colonization have not solved
 its problems, because their genuine independence requires economic
 de-colonization as well. It dawned upon developing countries that the
 neo-liberal international economic system, established after the Second
 World War, served only the recovery and development of the (Western)
 industrialized states, whereas the promised "trickle-down effect" permitting
 the Third World to automatically obtain a fair share of the benefits did not
 materialize. On the contrary, the gap between rich and poor countries kept
 widening. It is no wonder that the latter are focusing their demands on the
 creation of a New International Economic Order based on the principles
 of equality and justice. This New Order is not restricted to a few cosmetic
 operations within the existing system. It is conceived as a comprehensive
 scheme of fundamental structural changes which are to eliminate the present
 asymmetries in international economic relations. In particular, the develop-
 ing countries insist on ending their subservient role as suppliers of raw
 materials, confronting terms of trade which are continuously deteriorating.
 The New International Economic Order also includes far-reaching reforms
 in such areas as international monetary matters, development aid, foreign
 investment, technology transfer and industrialization.31 The non-aligned
 camp espoused these demands in declarations adopted at their last three
 Summit conferences in Lusaka (1970), Algiers (1973) and Colombo (1976).
 It has become the political spearhead of the "Group of 77" (now comprising
 almost 115 member states) which can, to a certain extent, be compared
 with a trade union of global dimensions.
 The common economic plight has so far prevented the disintegration
 of the movement which could have resulted from increased membership
 and heterogeneity and the shift from bipolar East-West confrontation
 to multipolarity in the international system.32
 The non-aligned movement has, on the contrary, strengthened its hand
 in this world-wide, mainly socio-economic struggle by recently enhancing
 its institutional cohesion.33 Thus, conferences at the levels of Heads of
 State and Government as well as Foreign Ministers are convened not only
 more frequently and regularly but have also undergone a change in character.
 Previously, non-aligned "Summits" were held as rather informal meetings
 of like-minded political leaders who discussed mainly political issues. In
 the seventies, these high level conferences have become more structured
 and are more carefully prepared. Economic problems are debated at least
 on a footing of equality with political items on the agenda. Lengthy docu-
 ments are published at the conclusion of these meetings.
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 292 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 Moreover, it was decided 
 the "Summit" Chairperson,
 respective host country as t
 movement for the three-y
 highest level. In addition, a
 the non-aligned states estab
 ship was increased from 15
 on the levels of their Forei
 Nations and is to meet at le
 As its name indicates, the B
 activities during the interv
 of reference include also the
 and the discussion of urgen
 well as the submission of p
 Small groups of between tw
 the actual implementation
 the health sector, there is ju
 of these groups was incre
 The sectors they cover range 
 sports. In addition, groups 
 specific purposes if need be.
 zation was the creation, in 
 This attempt at "decolonizin
 of the "Northern" news ag
 field, which are criticized for
 Third World. What has not 
 strengthening the hand of t
 secretariat of the non-align
 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
 Non-membership in Military Alliances
 The most evident common denominator of permanent neutralit
 non-alignment consists of non-participation in military alliances
 among permanently neutral or non-aligned states themselves. With
 to permanent neutrality, there exists a clear-cut legal prohibition
 effect; the refusal of non-aligned countries to enter into military 
 ments is based solely on a political maxim.
 Moreover, this non-participation has been restricted, from the very
 beginning, to multilateral military alliances and other agreements, "concluded
 in the context of Great Power conflicts"35 which, however, were not specified.
 As already mentioned, the very raison ďetre of the emergence of the non-
 aligned group was its desire to steer clear of involvement in the Cold War,
 a conflict between industrialized Powers, of only secondary concern to
 them. Consequently, membership in NATO, the Warsaw Pact, CENTO
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 293
 or SEATO was regarded as out of the question for a non-
 Yet, OAS did not fall into the category of unacceptable allian
 was one of the founding members of the movement which in
 was joined by several other Latin American states, too. The 
 also to apply, for instance, both to Francess multilateral mili
 ment with the Defence Council of Equatorial Africa and bilat
 treaties concluded by the United Kingdom with ten states, 
 were admitted to non-aligned conferences.36 Obviously* all t
 ments were excluded from "the context of Great Powers conflicts" - a
 debatable decision* especially in the light of increasing East-West rivalry
 in Africa in recent years.
 Despite the aforementioned recent progress in this respect, the present
 degree of institutionalization within the non-aligned group would still
 appear compatible with its refusal to form a "third bloc" in world affairs.37
 This diagnosis is borne out by its only partial cohesion in its voting record
 in the UN General Assembly. For, whereas the non-aligned countries
 close their ranks whenever economic and de-colonization issues are put
 to the vote, they are divided on other political problems, especially those
 concerning East-West relations. It is a fine question as to when their inte-
 gration would reach an intensity contrary to the above principle. It may
 become relevant if and when the developing countries do embark on the
 strategy of collective self-reliance which they have been verbally stressing
 ever since the 1970 Lusaka Conference. If taken seriously, closer economic
 co-operation - for instance by the creation of a common market - may
 necessitate restrictions on the sovereignty of the states involved.
 As to the permanently neutral states, their co-operation remains rather
 loose,38 the friendly and cordial character of their mutual relations and
 their many common interests notwithstanding.
 Differences Between Permanently Neutral and Non-aligned States
 Differences between permanent neutrality and non-alignment seem
 to prevail - at least at first sight. First and foremost, there is little if anything
 which permanently neutral and non-aligned states have in common in
 terms of their respective objective conditions. The permanently neutral
 states are all industrialized countries in Europe which stick to a Western
 pluralist-democratic political system and to a (more or less) "capitalist"
 market-oriented economic order. Almost all non-aligned countries are
 situated in Africa, Asia and South America. They share a low level of
 economic development. Many of them opted for a one-party political system
 and a Socialist planned economy.39 If measured in terms of modern military
 hardware, GNP or similar criteria, their power potential still appears
 negligible. Because they are small, albeit developed, however, the European
 neutrals are facing a number of economic problems familiar to developing
 countries.40 Their exports are in fact concentrated on relatively few
 commodities and markets. To make matters worse, the structure of their
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 294 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 foreign trade is also unfavo
 a higher share of their exp
 those requiring advanced tec
 national commercial relations
 trade tends to be negative.
 economic field, their primary 
 facturing sector smaller and
 compete in international m
 technological level. To make m
 to other small developed cou
 from remedying these stru
 integration with other coun
 beyond certain rather low th
 That is, of course, not to s
 sitting in the same economic b
 ments have begun to realize, h
 be identical to those of the l
 Other recent development
 developed and developing s
 power factors have strength
 in the international arena.41 O
 in the destructive capabilities 
 states' military potential de
 terror" and the danger of c
 and their allies escalating a
 standards of technological
 not automatically provide the 
 by the case of Japan.
 On the other hand, the valu
 ing countries is not on the
 are within the reach of a gr
 of resorting to them by a dev
 the wall of misery and fam
 relevant in the wielding of 
 few Third World countries 
 impossible. They should dete
 example to ensure access to n
 drastically demonstrated th
 have-nots" can even resist a n
 to adjust to this type of wa
 The success of the "oil weap
 increasing strength to be dr
 to modern industry.42 This 
 need foreign assistance for 
 marketing of the natural re
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 295
 and are relatively invulnerable to counter-pressure. Public op
 the Third World has learned to use to its advantage through 
 Nations and otherwise is becoming also less of a "quantité nég
 world affairs. Finally, the "chaos power" of the South kee
 as the global problems of mankind - be it nuclear proliferation
 pollution - cannot be solved without its co-operation. All t
 mean that the tables are all of a sudden turned in the develop
 favour, but merely that they areno longer helpless underdogs in in
 Power politics.
 The two types of status, pursuing different kinds of neutrality 
 sense, are also distinguishable from a simple numerical po
 Permanent neutrality has up to now been a rather unusual
 to very few states. For the countries in question were, and ar
 on the main front of Great Power confrontation; at the sam
 benefit(ed) from a privileged geopolitical position of secondary
 The result was that the Great Powers jointly renounced direct
 the territory of the state whose permanent neutrality they 
 accepted.43 This applies to Switzerland's primary strategic tr
 the passes across the Alps, as well as to the transformation
 into a permanently neutral wedge in Central Europe in 1955 wh
 with Switzerland, extends over a length of some 800 kilo
 obviously favours the Warsaw Pact to NATO's detriment,44 s
 Soviet Union's decision to relinquish the Eastern part of Aust
 appears better understandable). Similarly, Sweden's factua
 neutrality today makes sense against the background of the 
 Nordic Balance, with Denmark and Norway having thrown
 with NATO45 and Finland trying to steer an independent course as
 country in terms of its political and economic structures, wi
 antagonizing her powerful Soviet neighbour.
 In contrast to the exceptional character of permanent neutra
 evolved in the era of the European balance of power system, t
 of the members of the contemporary society of states has o
 much more recent counterpart, which is the Third World's r
 the bipolar global system emerging after the Second World Wa
 was facilitated by the revolutionary advent of the nuclear ag
 even the Super Powers face annihilation in a conflict fought w
 weapons by both sides, and the resulting shift to "milieu goals
 politics through indirect control and penetration instead of 
 gains.46 The Great Powers therefore came to accept the refu
 countries in the "gray area" in the Southern half of the globe 
 in their confrontation, the Cold War and its successor, deten
 Legal status v. Political doctrine
 Permanent neutrality is a legal status consisting of well-defined 
 obligations, which the state bound to it is not free to alter un
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 296 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 terminate at will. By contrast, t
 binding on the states subscrib
 doctrine from which deviation
 patterns of non-aligned state
 they are consistently observed d
 with opinio iuris*1 Should the
 non-alignment would be transfo
 law. This evolution has not ye
 to prove the existence of opinio 
 impossible.
 "Passive" Permanent Neutrality v. " active " Non-alignment?
 One widespread misunderstanding concerns the political role and the
 ideological dimension both of permanent neutrality and non-alignment.
 On the one hand, representatives of non-aligned countries are among the
 most outspoken critics of the allegedly "passive", isolationalist stance
 of permanently neutral states in world affairs.48 On the other, both foreign
 policy experts and public opinion in the West, and in the permanently
 neutral states, accuse the non-aligned group of "immoral neutralism"
 because it refuses to support what these critics regard as the just cause
 in the central East-West confrontation.
 On closer analysis, both reproaches turn out to be rather ill-founded.
 As was mentioned earlier, permanently neutral states pursue a "positive"
 policy of neutrality whose "active" character cannot be denied. By trying to
 contribute to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts in various
 ways, such as offering their good offices and mediation, acting as protecting
 Powers, hosting international conferences and international organizations
 or participating in peace-keeping operations, they, too, engage in "bridge-
 manship" upon which some non-aligned leaders prided themselves.49 They
 are well aware that their survival as neutrals depends, to a large extent,
 on the success of their attempts to make themselves useful to other states.
 Realistically taking account of their small number and the limitations upon
 their power, they prefer, however, the channels of quiet diplomacy, so
 that their activities sometimes may not receive the publicity which they
 would deserve.
 At any rate, the criticism of the neutrals' passive stance in world affairs
 was at best justified in that past age where the right to go to war at will
 was considered an element of state sovereignty, but the negative effects
 of armed hostilities were limited by the (relatively) "primitive" weapons
 technology and the mechanisms of the European balance of power system.50
 Neutrals were regarded as seconds in a permissible duel between other
 states.51 By their mere non-involvement therein they rendered, in this
 view, a positive service. It helped isolate the belligerents and facilitated
 their return to peace. In the contemporary era of nuclear "overkill
 capabilities", in which the use of force is outlawed, and in an increasingly
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 297
 interdependent world, permanently neutral states are not b
 realities. They realize full well that they, too, are required to 
 contribution to the solution of global problems for which th
 cularly qualified. As regards the ideological dimension o
 neutrality, the states concerned (above all Switzerland) d
 passive on this front either. In order to enhance their inte
 and to add to the legitimacy of their status in the eyes of th
 world, the permanently neutral states rather sought to cre
 mission.52 This mission was sometimes even propagated i
 terms. Thus the Swiss, time and again, called for the "Helveti
 world; if the other states only adopted their democratic, fe
 humanitarian ideals, eternal peace would reign on earth...53
 Those who denounce the "immoral" character of non-alignm
 the East-West conflict as a confrontation between good a
 this point of view, "those who are not for us are - indeed -
 These critics fail to understand that to the non-aligned stat
 War appeared in a different light. It was a conflict between t
 opponents, namely blocs of industrialized countries. They the
 to take sides once and for all. This step would only have comp
 newly-won independence, imposed military burdens on the
 have drawn them into a fatal clash between the Super Powers.
 was thus dictated by their national interests - a principle wh
 nents of "neutralism" would never question in the case of the
 That the non-aligned countries underscore more strongly t
 superiority of their movement than the permanently neutral sta
 surprising. The moralistic undertones stem from their effo
 their critics and their search for identity on the internation
 are also due to self-confidence built on achievements and numerical
 strength.54
 Another alleged difference is worth mentioning in this context. Non-
 aligned activism in the United Nations is sometimes quoted as evidence of
 a dynamic role in world affairs,55 which, in this view, the permanently
 neutral states are unable to share. True enough, the non-aligned states have
 gained control of those UN organs in which their voting power tips the
 scales. Yet, the permanently neutral states do not sit by idly.
 Admittedly, Switzerland, because of its negative experiences as a member
 of the League of Nations, has not yet applied for admission to the United
 Nations. Austria, however, as a newcomer on the international scene in
 1955, staked its hopes on the Organization from the very beginning. Nor
 can it be denied that Sweden is among the most active members of the United
 Nations whose influence far exceeds its material power base.
 An Austrian citizen is serving his second term as Secretary-General
 of the Organization. One of his only three predecessors was a Swede. Vienna's
 most ambitious architectural venture after the Second World War, the
 "UN City", is designed to host IAEA and UNIDO and other UN organs
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 298 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 and serve as an international conference center. Sweden and Austria are
 second to none when it comes to participating in United Nations peace-
 keeping.
 The above considerations are not to deny the differences in the approaches
 to world affairs adopted by the two groups of states. The Europeans, whose
 time-honoured, narrowly defined status is in the main restricted to legal
 obligations in the military sector, emphasize stability and the maintenance
 of a balance of forces in international relations. Although the non-aligned
 states also oppose shifts in the existing power structure leading to hegemony
 by one side, they denounce the division of the world into military blocs,
 whose very existence creates dangerous tensions in their eyes.56 Moreover,
 non-alignment is a comprehensive doctrine aiming at structural changes
 in the international system
 Armed Permanent Neutrality v. Disarmament under the Auspices of
 Non-Alignment?
 As already mentioned, permanent neutrality includes the obligation
 to provide for defence in accordance with the international standard. As
 long as other states maintain armed forces, permanently neutral states
 must follow suit. A shift to civil, i.e., non-violent defence is consequently
 out of the question, even if the political conditions in a permanently neutral
 state seem to ideally lend themselves to this alternative to armed violence.
 Instead of leading the way, the permanently neutral countries are, on the
 contrary, the last to lay down their weapons.
 The non-aligned states are among the most outspoken critics of the arms
 race.57 At their very first "Summit" conference in Belgrade in 1961, they
 devoted six of the 27 points of the Declaration adopted to questions of
 disarmament and arms control.58 The desire to slow down and reverse
 the development and accumulation of military hardware has remained
 one of their main concerns over the years. Their call for a special session
 of the UN General Assembly on disarmament (or a World Disarmament
 Conference) at the 1961 Belgrade Conference, last reiterated by the partici-
 pants to the Colombo "Summit" in 1976, finally met with a positive response
 by the other states. In fact, a Special Session of the General Assembly on
 Disarmament was convened in 1978. Its concrete results, however, were
 rather meager, despite agreement on a fairly lengthy (but not binding) final
 document.59
 The interest of the non-aligned countries in ending the arms race is obvious.
 The gap in their power potential, especially vis-a-vis the countries ahead
 of them in military technology, would be gradually bridged. The huge sums
 spent on adding new, more sophisticated and more expensive weapons
 to the arsenals of industrialized countries could instead be channelled into
 the development of the Third World.
 Consequently, there seems to exist another fundamental difference between
 the permanently neutral states which, whether they like it or not, are involved
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 299
 in traditional (military) power politics, and the non-aligned m
 which actively campaigns for a better, more peaceful world. Y
 they emphasize the necessity to maintain the balance of forc
 the major blocs, the permanently neutral states, too, support 
 initiatives. They offer their conference facilities to arms control n
 S ALT J took place in Helsinki and Vienna, SALT-II in Ge
 MURFAAMCE negotiations are being held in Vienna, the SAL
 ments were also signed in the Austrian capital. To mention ju
 recent example, Sweden and Austria played a particularly activ
 the 1978 Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disar
 Moreover, the non-aligned countries, in their actual behavio
 refrain from acquiring weapons. At the Lusaka Conference, t
 that international peace and security were not only to be safeguard
 the development of the social, economic and political but also of th
 strength of each country.61 It is quite understandable that the
 too, try to provide for their security by conventional means
 force - but then, they cannot claim to be different from other st
 the limited economic and financial resources of the buyer coun
 trade with the Third World is continuously increasing.62 Mo
 aligned states are also actually using their military hardwa e, e
 each other, e.g., in the Horn of Africa and Indochina, wherea
 nently neutral state ever committed an act of aggression. Once 
 is thus more complex than declarations of principle might su
 Permanent Neutrality and Non-alignment in the East-West C
 In addition to the traditional difficulties of maintaining in
 and neutrality inherent in a precarious status, permanently ne
 are faced with new problems brought about by recent develo
 international relations.
 Permanent neutrality originated in an international system in which war
 was an acceptable and frequently-employed instrument of foreign policy.
 The law of neutrality therefore focuses on the military (and governmental)
 sector. Even Austria's permanent neutrality was established between the
 parties to the Cold War at a time when resort to armed force by them could
 not be ruled out.
 The first novel dilemma which confronts permanently neutral states
 is the growing obsolescence of war in a technical sense.63 The decisive legal
 criterion for the existence of the state of war is animus belligerendi, i.e.,
 the belligerents' intention to break off all peaceful relations with the
 enemy and apply the international law of war, instead of the law of peace -
 and not the outbreak of armed hostilities! If only to avoid the odium of
 openly violating the prohibition to resort to war, states nowadays refrain
 from issuing declarations of war which would prove their animus belligerendi
 beyond any doubt. They nevertheless pursue their foreign policy goals by
 force of arms "short of war" which they try to justify, more or less plausibly,
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 300 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 as (preventive) self-defence, 
 permanently neutral states ha
 only in future wars as defin
 do so in armed conflicts fough
 do abide at least by the main
 prudence.
 The situation was further complicated by the trend towards subtler
 forms of violence. Formerly, regular armed forces of states in uniform
 used to fight battles on the front with conventional weapons. Nowadays,
 civil strife, often "by proxy", i.e., supported by other states, in which the
 parties rely on the methods of guerrilla strategy, and "indirect aggression"
 are increasingly replacing "classical" inter-state warfare.
 The permanent neutrals are skating on even thinner legal and political
 ice since the East-West conflict crucial to their status gave way to dótente or
 "peaceful co-existence".64 Both camps involved now agree that an armed
 clash must be avoided, because it may lead to mutual annihilation in the
 thermo-nuclear age. The center of gravity of the nonetheless ongoing
 confrontation has therefore shifted to the economic sphere and the ideologi-
 cal plane. On the economic level, East and West not only co-operate,
 especially in areas where their interests happen to be complementary; they
 are simultaneously also engaged in more than "normal" competition
 in which each side attempts to demonstrate the superiority of its economic
 system. Both parties hope that their examples will prove "contagious"
 and eventually be followed by the opponent, too.
 On the ideological front, the "Socialist" bloc has always insisted that
 confrontation must not be renounced. The other side has taken up the
 gauntlet. Probably to its own surprise, the West finds itself on the offensive
 with its human rights campaign which encourages similar claims by dissidents
 in the "Socialist" camp.
 The permanently neutral states cannot (and do not wish to) sit on the
 fence in this variant of the East-West conflict. They never made a secret
 of the fact that they are to be counted among the pluralist democracies
 with (at least partly) market-oriented, liberal economies. They are therefore
 by no means neutral in these respects, but must be included in the Western
 camp.
 In contrast, the original common denominator of non-alignment was the
 desire not to be involved in the Cold War. It was in this conflict that the
 countries concerned opted for a neutral position in principle. They saw it
 contrary to their interests to side with any of the two blocs, whose very
 existence, in their opinion, posed a continuous threat to world peace and
 whose dissolution they therefore advocated. Furthermore, from the point
 of view of the developing non-aligned states, both East and West belong to
 the opposite camp of industrialized countries, due to their advanced economic
 development.
 When it comes to actual political behaviour, however, the line of cleavage
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 301
 between non-aligned and permanently neutral states again turns 
 be less clear-cut than the above statements of principle suggest.
 The non-aligned movement merely refuses to take sides once an
 all in the East-West conflict. Its members insist on judging ea
 separately on its merits and supporting the side whose cause 
 just in the dispute at hand. A quantitative analysis of their voting b
 in the UN General Assembly reveals that they often are deeply d
 over East-West questions.65 On the ideological level, many non
 countries, if only to speed up their economic and social developm
 for a one-party political system and economic planning; other
 pluralist democratic structures and market mechanisms. Hence, the
 help sympathizing with the side in the East-West conflict which 
 the same political values and economic principles. Yet, as mentioned
 non-aligned countries underline their "active bridgemanship" 
 to mitigate the East-West conflict by offering their good offices, med
 arbitration to the parties.
 Although the European neutrals reject any legal obligation to ob
 neutrality in the struggle between political and economic system
 nevertheless have a vested interest in the reduction of tension between the
 East and the West. An atmosphere of detente enlarges their freedom of
 action in various fields, as both blocs are then more inclined to tolerate
 neutral activities even if the other side benefits from them. In their "positive"
 policy of neutrality, the states in question therefore also try to build bridges
 between East and West. They offer their conference facilities to inter-
 svstemic negotiations, such as CSCE, SALT or the talks on MURFAAMCE,
 or their participation in the verification of arms control agreements. If
 called upon, they are also willing to assume those other functions for
 which non-aligned states feel particularly qualified. It remains to be seen
 whose services the Great Powers prefer. On the whole, the non-aligned
 countries may have over-estimated their potential in the light of the trend
 towards bilateralism in Super Power relations. The Big Two usually choose
 to settle their problems in face-to-face negotiations, without bringing in
 a third party.
 Despite different points of departure, in principle, non-aligned and perma-
 nently neutral states consequently even meet half-way every now and
 then. Thus the European neutrals joined forces with the non-aligned
 participants to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,
 namely Cyprus, Malta and Yugoslavia, to form the so-called "N+N"
 group. Together they worked for compromise solutions to issues over
 which the East and the West were divided, such as confidence-building
 measures or human rights. They were instrumental in bringing about agree-
 ment on these and other hotly debated issues in the Final Act of CSCE.
 The role played by these "honest brokers" in the "codification of détente "
 exceeded the'r actual power potential as compared with that of the two
 blocs led by the Super Powers.
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 302 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 Permanently Neutral and No
 Another conflict which will m
 during the next decades is th
 for a New International Ec
 justice. Its establishment wi
 national economic system an
 political matters.
 In this global confrontation
 not neutral but rather the 
 the latter's spokesman in the
 77" represents it as its econo
 Whether they like it or no
 are entrenched in the oppos
 countries, to whom the de
 sometimes accused of havin
 first phase of the North-South
 colonization of dependentte
 that the non-aligned movem
 of non-involvement in the
 enough, the European neutra
 issues in the UN General Ass
 to a basically colonialist po
 radical formulations to whi
 objecting to de-colonization 
 they unequivocally condemn
 Southern Africa and denoun
 Moreover, upon closer anal
 turns out to be impressive 
 such as votes in the Gener
 consistent if relatively little
 involved are considerable. A
 the agreed upon policy are
 example, neither the ruptur
 links with South Africa urg
 aligned group were carried out
 The European neutrals can 
 current second phase of the
 has shifted to the socio-econ
 as neutral bystanders by eith
 Because of their particular
 economies and the prohibitio
 integration with other states
 stake in the avoidance of an all-out North-South confrontation. Hence
 they ought to try, together with other like-minded countries if possible, to
 help settle this conflict. They should conceive methods of implementing
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 303
 the New International Economic Order which would be beneficial to both
 sides and thus move it beyond the present zero-sum game perspective. For
 instance, Western engineers looking for a job might be employed to develop
 adequate technologies for the Third World. "Bridgemanship" performed
 by the European neutrals in the North-South conflict could be facilitated by
 their own awareness that their interests do not wholly coincide with those
 of the great economic Powers. Furthermore, they may be acceptable to
 the South in this role because of their non-colonial credentials - in point
 of fact, the states in question never embarked on overseas colonialism.
 If they wish to be credible, however, in the eyes of the Third World, mere
 lip service to the noble cause will not suffice. Those of them that are lagging
 behind in this regard will have to increase their development assistance.
 CONCLUSIONS
 From the above analysis it cannot, of course, be inferred that there 
 no far-reaching differences between permanently neutral and non-alig
 states. In terms of numbers, geographical location, economic developm
 and systems, political structures, legal status and basic positions in the 
 global conflicts of our age, they are indeed fundamentally dissimilar. Equall
 important is the fact that the two categories of states perceive each ot
 as different.
 Yet, there are also quite a few interests which they have in common.
 They are relatively powerless and should therefore strive to reduce tension
 between the Great Powers in order to enhance their own freedom of action.
 They are confronted with a number of similar economic difficulties; small
 developed states that are excluded from integration with other countries
 beyond a low threshold of intensity are, in fact, facing the threat of occupying
 an increasingly peripheral position within the industrialized world. Hence,
 they should better understand the problems with which the developing
 countries are struggling on a global scale. Moreover, when it comes to
 actual behaviour in the international arena, permanently neutral and
 non-aligned states are not as far apart as they could be expected to be
 against the background of the above distinctions. It is therefore hardly
 surprising that the neutrals are by now regularly invited to attend non-
 aligned "Summits" as Guests. The conclusion to be drawn from this paper
 is that, in this field, too, mutually entertained cliches should be corrected.
 They ought to give way to more balanced views which take complex realities
 into account.
 June 1979.
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 304 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 FOOTNOTES
 1 P. Willetts, The Non- Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Allianc
 New York, 1978). Willetts' quantitative analysis does not go beyond 1970
 empirical research along the same lines in order to bring his findings upto date
 highly desirable, would exceed the scope of this article. For a recent step in thi
 see Klaus Burri; The Non-Aligned Developing Countries 1968-1972; Voting A
 in the UN General Assembly and Foreign Relations with the Soviet Union and 
 (Kleine Studien zur Politischen Wissenschaft, No. 176, Zurich, 1979). After com
 this manuscript, the author received a paper on the topic under discussion
 by D. Frei, Neutrality and Non- Alignment, Convergencies and Contrasts (Klein
 zur Politischen Wissenschaft, No. 175, Zurich, 1979). It was too late to inclu
 points and conclusions in the present article.
 2 Most of the literature on this topic is in German, the dominant language in S
 and Austria, the only two genuine permanently neutral states. Since this 
 addressed mainly to English-speaking readers, only some major scholarly 
 German will be quoted. For a recent summary, see A. Verdross, The Permanen
 lity of Austria (Vienna, 1978), and the literature quoted therein.
 3 The Vth and Xlllth Hague Conventions of 1907 deserve particular mention
 context. Changes in the non-legal context since 1907 have of course affected t
 cability of some of those "classical" norms.
 4 Hence they cannot be circumvented by observing the principle of impart
 of the "pillars" of neutrality; even if the neutral state (the traditional pr
 does not apply to individual citizens) were to grant all belligerents exactly 
 amount of military aid, such support would still constitute a breach of th
 neutrality.
 5 It stands to reason that the material consequences of such a formally equal treatment
 - which suffices under international law - may considerably differ. In the above illust-
 ration, this will be the case, for example, if only one side has previously imported
 the embargoed goods from the neutral state, whereas the other grew it on its own
 territory. Formal impartiality will, in such a constellation, favour the latter and hurt
 the former. The neutrals will be well advised, if the crucial credibility of their status
 is to be maintained, to see to it that the adverse net effects of at least several such
 restrictive measures also are as balanced as possible. For this reason, Switzerland
 introduced the yardstick of the " courant normal " during World War II; it tried to
 maintain commercial relations with the belligerents along the pre-war lines. The Swiss
 Government always insisted, however, on the optional character of this decision.
 6 14 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch fuer intrenationales Recht (1957), p. 195 ff.
 7 K. Zemanek, "Gutachten zu den von dem Volksbegehren zur Abschaffung des
 Bundescheeres (Bundesheervolksbegehren) aufgeworfenen neutralitaetsrechtlichen und
 neutralitaets-politischen Fragen," Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Aussenpolitik,
 (Vienna) 10 1970, p. 115 ff. (p. 128 ff.)
 8 The relevant statistics are contained in the Military Balance published each year by
 the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
 9 A Verdross, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization",
 50 American Journal of International Law (Washington D.C.) Vol. 50, 1956, p. 61 ff. ;
 K. Zemanek, "Neutral Austria in the United Nations," International Organization
 (Boston) Vol. 15, 1961, p. 408 ff.; H.F. Koeck, "A Permanently Neutral State in
 the Security Council," Cornell International Law Journal (Cornell, N.Y.) Vol. 6, 1973,
 p. 137 ff.
 10 Furthermore, these considerations are - alas ! - highly academic anyway, as disagreement
 among the permanent members of the Security Council has upto now led time and
 again to the use of their "veto power", with the result that the UN system of collective
 security has in practice remained a dead letter.
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 305
 11 K. Zemanek, "Zeitgemaesse" Neutralitaet? Oesterreichische Zeitschrift
 politik , 16 1976, p. 355 ff., (p. 358).
 12 Which is by no means restricted to the permanently neutral state's f
 but encompasses all sectors of its political activity.
 13 The reasons why they are in a better position to make such classical 
 to the mitigation of international conflicts and the improvement of inte
 operation are fairly obvious. With respect to good offices, mediation and 
 the states involved in the conflict must believe in the impartiality of the
 willing to engage in these functions ; as regards headquarters of internat
 tions and venues of international conferences, each member or partic
 feel that he is sending his delegates to a friendly state's territory.
 14 The permanently neutral states that by definition are small Powers a
 that they cannot really hope to resist a large-scale attack launched by 
 or a group of allied states against them. What they are confident to be ab
 is rather to influence the potential aggressors' cost-benefit calculations in
 They are therefore well advised to exceed the threshold of the internatio
 standard, which they are legally bound to reach, in their defensive efforts. E
 "Verteidigung ohne Selbstzerstoerung", in: E. Spannocchi G. Brossolet,
 ohne Schlacht (Munich-Vienna, 1976) p. 15 ff.
 15 In a historic perspective, Belgium and Luxemburg (from 1831/39 and 186
 until the First World War) have to be added to the list of permanently ne
 16 G. Maude, The Finnish Dilemma: Neutrality in the Shadow of Power (
 D. Woker, Die Skandinavischen Neutralen (Berne, 1978).
 17 H. Neuhold, "La neutralité du Laos," O seterreichische Zeitschrift fuer
 Recht 19 (1969), p. 187 ff.
 18 Whether Ireland is to be included among the permanently neutral sta
 doubt: true enough, it has not joined any military alliance, but did beco
 of the European Communities - a step contrary to permanently neutral
 Keatinge, The Formulation of Irish Foreign Policy Ě (Dublin, 1973), p. 2
 19 Surprisingly few comprehensive works have been written on non-align
 exceptions include: L.W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Non- Alignme
 States in World Affairs (New York, 1962); B. Sen, Against the Cold W
 1962); P. Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester 1963); P.F. Power, Neutralism and D
 (New York, 1964); C.V. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass : A Study of N
 (New York, 1965); Y. Etinger and O. Metikyan, The Policy of Non-Alignme
 1966); G.H. Jansen, Afro- Asia and Non-Alignment (London, 1966); J.W.
 Non-Alignment (London 1966); J.W. Burton, International Relations: A Gen
 (London 1967), p. 163 ff. ; L. Acimovic (ed.), Non-Alighment in the Wo
 (Belgrade 1969); M.S. Rajan, Non-Alignment , India and the Future (M
 L. Mates, Non-Alignment : Theory and Current Policy (1972); Willetts,
 A comprehensive collection of documents on non-alignment was com
 Jankowitsch and K.P. Sauvant, The Third World Without Superpowers ; 
 Documents of the Non- Aligned Countries (1978).
 20 Even Yugoslavia, one of the protagonists of the movement, developed a
 process of "trial and error". As late as 1954, it in fact agreed to transfo
 Balkan Treaty with Greece and Turkey into a formal military alliance. W
 p. 4.
 21 Laid down for the first time in the preamble of a trade and communication agreement
 concerning Tibet concluded between India and the People's Republic of China in 1954.
 United Nations Treaty Series (New York), Vol. 299, p. 90 ff.
 22 Q.L. Focsaneanu, "Les 'cinq principes' de coexistence et le droit international",
 Annuaire français de droit international (Paris) 2, (1965), p. 150 ff.
 23 Dulles condemned neutrality as an "immoral and short-sighted conception". Lyon,
 n. 19, p. 67.
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 306 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 24 Burton, n. 19, p. 194.
 25 The Afro-Asian Conference he
 not be included among the non-
 Western and Communist allies suc
 on the one hand and North Vietn
 B. Jevtic, "Die internationale Rolle der Blockfreiheit" (I), Internationale Politik
 (Belgrade) I, (27), (1976), No. 640, p. 5 if. (p. 7); Willetts, n. 1, p. 3.
 26 Jankowitsch Sauvant, n. 19, p. 3 if., p. 44 if. In addition, it was more than a coincidence
 that the non-aligned movement was carried by strong and colourful personalities,
 such as Presidents Nasser, Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Tito during its first phase;
 Tito by now is the only surviving figurehead of that "heroic" age of non-alignment.
 Cf. K.W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
 1968), p. 198 if.
 27 R. Emerson, "Self-Determination", American Journal of International Law 65, (1971),
 p. 459 ff.
 28 The Nigerian Civil War and the armed hostilities in the Horn of Africa may only have
 been the forerunners.
 29 Burton, n. 19, p. 163 f. p. 232 ff.
 30 OAS is therefore not included among the military alliances "concluded in the context
 of Great Power conflicts." Moreover, the non-aligned states perhaps hope that admis-
 sion to their ranks will facilitate the withdrawal of OAS members from this regional
 organization dominated by a Super Power or at least encourage a more independent
 policy. O. Jankowitsch and K.P. Sauvant, The Evolution of the Non- Aligned Movement
 into a Pressure Group for the Establishment of the New International Economic Order,
 Paper delivered at the 17th Annual Convention of the International Studies Associa-
 tion (Toronto, 1976), p. 13.
 31 Cf. the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New
 International Economic Order adopted by the UN General Assembly at its Sixth Special
 Session in 1974 in Resolutions 3201 (SVI) and 3202 (SVI).
 32 On the other hand, the common economic position did not spill over into the political
 sector. Political conflicts and even armed hostilities continue to break out between
 non-aligned states and do weaken the movement. At the time of writing, controversies
 over the exclusion of Egypt, one of the founding members, because of its peace treaty
 with Israel and the representation of Cambodia after the overthrow of the Pol Pot
 regime loom large on the political horizon. The Preparatory Conference of the Co-
 ordinating Bureau held at Colombo could only agree to leave the decision on these
 two issues to the forth-coming Havana "Summit". Cf. " Neue Zuericher-Zeitung "
 (Zurich) 12 June 1979.
 33 Jankowitsch and Sauvant, n. 30, p. 13 ff ; O. Jankowitsch, "Neue Modelle Zwischenstaat-
 licherZusammenarbeit: Organisation und Institutionen der Blockfreien, Oesterreichische
 Zeitschrift fuer Aussenpolitik, 17 (1977), p. 214 ff; Willetts, n. 1, p. 36 ff.
 34 The non-aligned states also established a few funds. Willetts, n. 1, p. 43.
 35 This was already specified at the Preparatory Meeting held in Cairo in 1961, which
 set the stage for the Belgrade "Summit". Jankowitsch and Sauvant n. 19, p. XXXI f.
 36 Willetts, n. 1, p. 127 f. Nine of the 25 "radical core group" states which attended the
 1961 Belgrade "Summit" had strong military ties with the United States or the United
 Kingdom; Ibid., p. 23.
 37 See R. Petkovic, "Die Entwicklung der Doktrin und Bewegung der Blockfreiheit",
 Internationale Politik (Belgrade) 27, (1976), No. 636, p. 11 ff. (p. 13).
 38 Their joint action within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
 in Europe should be singled out in this respect. Frei, n. 1, p. 6 f.
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 PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT 307
 39 Burton, n. 19, p. 195 if. One of the gravest errors committed by Western gover
 was to equate economic planning and the prohibition of opposition parties
 Third World (both of which were dictated by the desire to accelerate develop
 with Communism. They overlooked the strong nationalism of young states w
 prevented them from throwing in their lot with the "Northern" bloc.
 40 D. Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International R
 (Oxford, 1967), p. 39 if.
 41 I have developed this point at length elsewhere. Cf. H. Neuhold, "Der Wandel im 
 der Internationalen Beziehungen", Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Aussenpolitik
 (1975), p. 327 if. (p. 344 ff.)
 42. H. Maull, Oil and Influence : The Oil Weapon Examined (London) Adelphi Pap
 177 (1975); E.N. Krapels, Oil and Security : Problems and Prospects of Impo
 Countries (London) Adelphi Paper No. 136 (1977).
 43 A general theory of neutral policy in a broad, political science sense was developed by
 D. Frei, Dimensionen neutraler Politik (Etudes et Trauvaux de lTnstiut Universitaire
 de Hautes Etudes Internationales No. 8, Geneva, 1969).
 44 It separates NATO forces in the North and in Central Europe from the "Southern
 Tier".
 45 Denmark and Norway do not permit the presence of foreign armed forces or nuclear
 weapons on their territories in time of peace.
 46 Aģ Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore,
 1965), p. 73 ff.
 47 Defined by the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
 as follows: "The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what
 amounts to a legal obligation". I.C.J. Report 1969, (The Hague), p. 3 if (p. 44).
 48 Burton, n. 19, p. 221 ; Willetts, n. 1, p. 20.
 49 Lyon, n. 19, p. 64.
 50 Neuhold, n. 41, p. 327 if, and the literature quoted here.
 51 Verdross, n. 2, p. 13.
 52 D. Frei, "Kleinstaatliche Aussenpolitik als Umgang mit Abhaengigkeit," in : D. Frei
 (ed.), Die Schweiz in einer sich wandelnden welt (Zurich, 1977) p. 201 if. (p. 222).
 53 Frei, Neutralitaet - Ideal oder Kalkuell (Stuttgart, 1967).
 54. Lyon, n. 19, p. 67 if. ; Willetts, n. 1, p. 5 if.
 55 Willetts, n. 1, p. 21.
 56 Jevtic, n. 25, p. 7.
 57 Ibid., (II), 27 Internationale Politik (1976), No. 641, p. 13 ff. (p. 15 ff.); Willetts, n. 1,
 p. 23 if.
 58 Janko witsch and Sauvant, n. 19, p. 3 if.
 59 UN Document A/RES/S-10/2; text in 17 International Legal Materials (1978),
 p. 1016 ff.
 60 E. Sucharipa, "Die Sondergeneralversammulung der Vereinten Nationen ueber
 Abruestung (23. Mai - 30. Juni 1978)", Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Aussenpolitik
 18, (1978), p. 112 ff.
 61 Jankowitsch and Sauvant n. 19, p. 83.
 62 See the relevant figures in the Yearbooks of the Stockholm International Peace Research
 Institute.
 63 Only the Arab-Israeli conflict undoubtedly was fought as a war in the legal sense.
 D. Schindler, "Der Kriegszustand im Voelkerrecht der Gegenwart", in: H. Kipp
 F. Mayer/A. Steinkamm (eds.), Um Recht und Freiheit. Festschrift fuer August Freiherr
 von der Heydte (Berlin 1977), p. 555.
 64 H. Neuhold, "Military, Economic and Ideological Ambiguities of Detente: Theory
 and Reality" (in: Studia Diplomatica - in print).
 65 Willetts, n. 1, p. 137 ff.
 66 Willetts, n. 1, p. 19, p. 159 ff.
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 308 HANSPETER NEUHOLD
 67 Austria recently abstained for 
 upon in the UN General Assembly
 not only material and financial b
 People's Organization to enable it t
 To equate this with support for co
 votes cast in the General Assem
 correspond, however, to a much m
 68 Willetts, n. 1, p. 167 if.
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