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MMLU-Pro / 10457 / Consider the paper Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native…

Problem

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question

Consider the paper Native Client: A Sandbox for Portable, Untrusted x86 Native Code by Yee et al. Ben Bitdiddle notes that NaCl uses Intel x86 segmentation to ensure that the sandboxed module does not read or write memory outside its own data area, and does not execute instructions outside its own code. Ben thinks that with these restrictions alone, executing the sandboxed module must be safe; that is, he thinks validation is not needed. Ben is wrong. Circle the types of x86 machine instructions that the validator always forbids in sandboxed code. Please ignore trampoline and springboard code.

category

computer science

options

  1. all instructions that modify segment state
  2. all loads or stores to addresses that are not 0 mod 32
  3. all indirect loads or stores (via an address in a register or variable)
  4. all indirect jumps (via an address in a register or variable)

src

ori_mmlu-computer_security

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Source and history

upstream_id / Original problem ID
10457
task_id
d10afe2f-7fbc-5b35-b954-d5ed367ca5ce
task_key
default--test--10457
task_revision_id
1
config / split
default / test

Official source

initial import